[HN Gopher] Dragon's teeth - Stopping tanks in their tracks
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Dragon's teeth - Stopping tanks in their tracks
Author : Kaibeezy
Score : 134 points
Date : 2022-11-08 14:06 UTC (8 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (tankhistoria.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (tankhistoria.com)
| tenebrisalietum wrote:
| Also Czech hedgehogs:
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czech_hedgehog
| smcl wrote:
| I saw these in a forest in jizni cechy near the Austrian
| border, they preserved some of the old border defenses. I
| thought "oh it's like the anti-tank things from Normandy" - had
| no idea it was originally Czech
| thehills wrote:
| All that time and energy and a lump of concrete is enough to hold
| up 60 tons of mental.
| Tuna-Fish wrote:
| Dragon teeth alone won't hold against a tank for more than a
| few minutes, if the tank just has a bulldozer attachment. Not
| for bulldozing the teeth, but for pushing enough soil over them
| so it can effortlessly go over.
|
| The purpose is to force enemy to spend time and effort dealing
| with the obstacle, while you direct fire on them.
| dsfyu404ed wrote:
| A tank battalion is going to have N engineering and M recon
| units attached (values of M and N and specific makeup of said
| units varies by country and service). The point of
| "inconveniences" like barriers is to a) make the enemy throw
| an engineering unit at them thereby tipping you off to a
| probable attack buying you time to mass force there b) just
| choose to attack somewhere else that is more conveniently
| defensible for you or where you already have more manpower.
| hadlock wrote:
| The neat thing about earth moving devices is that they
| converge at a time and place in a manner in which artillery
| and nearly any other conceivable weapon can hit them very
| reliably
| nomel wrote:
| > Dragon teeth alone won't hold against a tank for more than
| a few minutes
|
| This doesn't seem accurate.
|
| While searching for a video that shows a tank trying to go
| over (unsuccessful), I found a video showing three ways to
| get over them, and only the explosives would take a few
| minutes: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cRld768HDyc
|
| Anchored concrete blocks can be made more difficult to move
| than the dirt under the tracks.
| Someone wrote:
| Hundreds of lumps of concrete. A tank will go around a single
| one in seconds.
| peterclary wrote:
| There are Dragon's Teeth on the banks of the River Wey behind
| Waverley Abbey in Surrey, England.
| https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dragon%27s_Teeth,_Wa...
| xnorswap wrote:
| And down the road in Guildford:
| https://www.exploringsurreyspast.org.uk/through-the-dragons-...
| arethuza wrote:
| Remnants of the defensive lines from WW2?
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GHQ_Line
| onion2k wrote:
| That must be why you never see tanks around there.
| lapetitejort wrote:
| I've noticed there aren't a ton of tanks in my area and I'm
| wondering if there's some dragon's teeth buried in my lawn
| somewhere. Might do some random digging to find out.
| bombcar wrote:
| Lisa, I'd like to buy your Tiger[1] stopping rock.
|
| [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger_I
| _nalply wrote:
| The top image is in Wimmis in Switzerland at the bottom of the
| Niesen mountain. The mountain resembles a giant pyramid. That's
| nice: many small pyramids and a giant one. You see the mountain
| starting to rise in the background of the photo. There is a
| narrow side valley (Spissi) leading to Western Bernese Oberland
| and from there you can reach Valais and the Leman basin. Above
| Wimmis there is a small steep limestone hill (Burgflue) and
| inside it there is a military bunker with holes to shoot out of.
|
| https://s.geo.admin.ch/9b8456f6ad (a topographic map)
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niesen
|
| I live not far away therefore I immediately knew it. I verified
| it with a reverse image search.
|
| https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Panzersperre_in_Wimm...
| superkuh wrote:
| It's funny how they seem to understand how to display one photo
| at the top as html but then all the other photos don't display
| unless you execute their javascript. I call this a browser trap.
| This URL should probably be changed to something that actually
| has content like
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dragon%27s_teeth_%28fortificat...
| lucideer wrote:
| > _I call this a browser trap_
|
| Fwiw the idea here is bandwidth-minimisation. I.e.: you only
| incur the image download cost if you choose to scroll. It's
| common practice on a lot of article/blog/content websites.
|
| That said it's possible to implement this in a "graceful" way
| (where the mechanism only kicks in if JS is enabled & JS-less
| users just download all images at once), but this best practice
| is sadly rarely followed as it is admittedly somewhat more
| complex to implement.
| dspillett wrote:
| _> (where the mechanism only kicks in if JS is enabled & JS-
| less users just download all images at once)_
|
| This can fail and increase the bandwidth used if you only
| have a couple of images or have users on very fast
| connections.
|
| I've seen it done by sending the image tag, and at the end of
| the document scanning the DOM for marked image tags and
| changing the URL specified to a low-quality copy (much
| smaller data size but looks a little like the image) or a
| small place-holder (perhaps even a data:url image) with the
| original getting put back when the image is visible (or about
| to be). The issue being that with a small number of images or
| a fast connected user the main large files start loading
| before the HREF attribute is updated and the transfer is not
| aborted when it is changed so the user always loads both the
| main and place-holder image. You can improve this plan a
| little by emitting the JS to alter each relevant image tag
| immediately after it, but that can cause multiple-
| reflow/-repaint issues.
|
| _> admittedly somewhat more complex to implement_
|
| Aye, and sometimes it is simply worth losing a few viewers to
| save a bit of faf. Though care should be taken with regard to
| collateral damage: as with all methods that exclude people
| who have chosen to have JS turned off this can easily exclude
| those with accessibility issues which is far less acceptable.
|
| _> where the mechanism only kicks in if JS is enabled_
|
| Of course there is now a commonly available method of doing
| lazy loading built-in so that is the best way to go, for
| those few with an ancient or otherwise alternative browser
| that doesn't support the feature yet the images just load
| immediately: https://caniuse.com/loading-lazy-attr. You can
| augment this is JS for those that have it turned on if you
| wish, perhaps on long documents implementing early-lazy
| loading (start the load when the user scrolls to within on
| display-window of content rather than when first visible) by
| removing the lazy attribute at an appropriate time detected
| using the same methods as you do for entirely manual lazy
| loading support, or using the replace-with-low-res-copy
| method in place of attribute based lazy-loading when JS is
| available.
| superkuh wrote:
| That's not why these types of sites do it. They do it because
| they only make money if you run the arbitrary javascript from
| their advertisers. If you won't run their code they won't
| show you what you're there to see. It's a computational
| paywall.
| __alexs wrote:
| Also Chrome does it out of the box now:
| https://chromestatus.com/feature/4969496953487360
| rkangel wrote:
| "This feature is enabled for Chrome Lite Mode users only"
| __alexs wrote:
| Also Chrome Lite Mode no longer exists :'(
| TonyTrapp wrote:
| In fact, it's super-easy to implement these days: Add
| loading="lazy" to the img tag and let the browser do the
| magic.
| breckenedge wrote:
| Does the lazy attribute on img not address this exact issue
| with zero JS?
| lucideer wrote:
| It does but it's a relatively new feature - not every
| website is recently coded (& many do their best to support
| some older browsers).
| hn_throwaway_99 wrote:
| Curious from someone with more knowledge. Given some of the
| results from the war in Ukraine, what's the latest viewpoint on
| tanks in modern warfare?
|
| All I can say is I would rather be an infantryman than a tank
| operator. Seems way too easy to be a sitting duck given the
| effectiveness of anti-tank missiles. Honestly I don't really
| understand the need for manned tanks in any case. Why couldn't
| they just be operated remotely, and then put your actual soldiers
| in more nimble forms of transport?
| jjk166 wrote:
| It should be noted that we're not seeing large russian infantry
| formations walking around safely while the tanks and other
| armored vehicles are sitting ducks. Yes, tanks aren't
| invulnerable, but anti tank missiles are expensive, bulky, and
| require some advanced training. With advances in technology and
| western support, Ukraine is fielding more anti-tank weapons
| than the russians anticipated, but it still is nothing compared
| to the number of more traditional weapons like machine guns or
| mortars it could have pulled out of cold war stockpiles. The
| russians decided to send in mechanized units with minimal to no
| infantry support because 1) they needed to advance quickly
| since their logistics could not support a prolonged war, and 2)
| any russian walking through Ukraine's flat and open terrain
| without a few inches of armor around them is a dead man. It's
| Zap Brannigan logic - a Ukrainian squad can only carry a
| limited number of anti-tank munitions so you just need to keep
| sending tanks until they reach their kill count and shut down.
| This turned out to be a bad strategy which mostly has just
| resulted in lots of destroyed tanks with few strategic gains,
| but had they done things differently odds are there would just
| be a lot of dead infantrymen around those destroyed tanks.
|
| As for unmanned tanks, these have been explored time and again
| but they don't really work well. Truly autonomous tanks are
| extremely difficult to implement compared to say UAVs because
| it's very difficult to navigate. Remote control relies on
| reliable communication which is pretty difficult to achieve,
| especially if your adversary is being supported by a more
| technologically advanced superpower. You basically need a tank
| crew in another armored vehicle very nearby. This armored
| vehicle is still vulnerable so you're risking soldiers lives
| and those soldiers are basically doing twice the work operating
| and maintaining two vehicles instead of one, plus consuming
| twice the fuel, without doubling the firepower.
| shadowpho wrote:
| >All I can say is I would rather be an infantryman than a tank
| operator.
|
| You still should be tank operator rather than infantryman.
|
| If you are in a tank people who have AT missiles can shoot at
| you. If you are outside the tank ANYONE can shoot and kill you.
|
| Yes there's a lot of videos of tanks blown up. But that's
| because of their high propaganda value and relative ease of
| capturing videos (new AT have command center further away =
| safer)
| scottLobster wrote:
| Against an enemy with signal jamming capability remote
| operation is not a given. Plus tanks communicate in real time
| with infantry/other elements. The lag introduced by remote
| operation/communication would be a serious hindrance even if
| everything was working, which it often isn't. Tanks have to
| respond in real time, they don't have the luxury of seconds of
| delay like say an orbiting drone. There's also the case of not
| wanting disabled tanks to fall into the hands of the enemy.
| Short of rigging the tanks with a self-destruct system (which
| would likely just make them explode more easily when hit), you
| need soldiers to do that.
|
| Keep in mind that anything operating in battlefield conditions
| must be resilient. The entire situation is a constant stream of
| edge cases.
|
| Also, don't look to Russia in Ukraine for an example of how
| tanks are used. Tanks are generally not meant to act alone.
| Either they're operating with a lot of other tanks, substantial
| supporting infantry, or both.
|
| There are tons of other reasons as well, The Chieften, a former
| Tanker, has a good video on the subject:
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lI7T650RTT8
| [deleted]
| Fomite wrote:
| From a former tanker I know: This has proved that poorly driven
| and commanded tanks are vulnerable.
|
| The Russians are _really_ bad at doing the things necessary to
| protect themselves. They 're all buttoned up. There are a ton
| of pictures where they're essentially ambushed while in parade
| formation, rather than how you'd be on a road in a hostile
| area.
| lawn wrote:
| As an aside, it's been interesting to see the impact drones has
| had in the war. Reconnaissance, blowing up non-tank vehicles,
| bombing trenches and suicide bombers.
|
| Maybe tanks will still have a place in warfare, but I doubt
| they'll be as ubiquitous as before?
| themadturk wrote:
| Also tank design is a factor. Is your spare ammo arranged in a
| ring around the turret (as in Russian tanks) or an armored
| container behind the turret (US M1)?
| chrisseaton wrote:
| Difficult to see where tanks go forward from today. Still
| defeated by these basic WW2 obstacles, and currently completely
| overmatched by anti-tank weapons. The best chance of active
| protection systems from here rely on always-on active radar which
| means you're lighting yourself up.
| jcranmer wrote:
| Difficult to see where infantry can still be useful. Still
| defeated by basic Napoleonic-era weapons, and completely
| overmatched by... almost everything. Yet no one seriously
| proposes to eliminate infantry battalions, whereas people
| constantly do the same for things like tanks and aircraft
| carriers.
|
| Weapon systems are not obsolete just because they can be
| defeated--warfare is not a case where one weapon system just
| totally creams everything else, but closer to a rock-paper-
| scissors scenario where nothing is truly dominant. Tanks are
| not useless because they are easily defeated in some scenarios,
| but rather, tanks are useful as "part of the complete package".
| For example, tanks proved to be a critical component to the
| successful Ukrainian operation that led to the Russian rout in
| Kherson Oblast a few months ago.
| spywaregorilla wrote:
| > Weapon systems are not obsolete just because they can be
| defeated--warfare is not a case where one weapon system just
| totally creams everything else, but closer to a rock-paper-
| scissors scenario where nothing is truly dominant.
|
| Not really. War is unbalanced and the metagame is strict.
| Weapon systems do get obsoleted if they can be defeated
| cheaply and easily. But, when you have weapons, you tend to
| use them. The Russian meta is to hide behind a wall of meat
| shields and blow shit up with artillery from further back.
| The Ukranian meta is to... blow shit up with longer range
| artillery and then when the enemy is so weakened,
| demoralized, underequipped, and dead; rush them with vehicles
| and artillery.
|
| In this war long range artillery is the thing that matters.
| In a war against the US, you would see a lot of elements
| downplayed simply due to a capable airforce.
|
| Also I think you meant Kharkiv
| rmah wrote:
| "Blow shit up with longer range artillery and then when the
| enemy is so weakened, demoralized, underequipped, and dead;
| rush them with vehicles and artillery"
|
| That was the primary tactical doctrine in 1919. In fairness
| it started with "rush them with infantry", but that was
| countered with static defenses. Which was then countered
| with tanks (your statement). Which was countered with anti-
| tank weaponry. Which was countered with infantry. Which was
| countered with mechanized infantry. Which was countered
| with mobile artillery. Which was countered by aircraft.
| Which was countered with.. Seeing a pattern here?
| spywaregorilla wrote:
| > That was the primary tactical doctrine in 1919.
|
| As I understand it, this is not quite accurate. Trenches
| are pretty resilient to artillery fire. Especially shitty
| WWI artillery. Trench rushes tended to be pretty
| effective, but it was very difficult to solidify any
| gains because the enemy would always have a second line
| of trenches to quickly counterattack while you were
| inevitably overextended. The modern precise artillery and
| intel of the west at least is effective on an entirely
| different level where supply lines far behind the front
| are in danger.
|
| > Seeing a pattern here?
|
| That military tech evolves? I mean, yeah, obviously. The
| claim being addressed here is that things don't become
| obsolete. Many things do.
| jcranmer wrote:
| > Also I think you meant Kharkiv
|
| Ah yes, I did mix up Kherson and Kharkiv.
| chrisseaton wrote:
| > Difficult to see where infantry can still be useful.
|
| Infantry can disperse to defeat the weapon systems you're
| thinking about. That's where tanks currently really struggle.
|
| Tanks have been overmatched for some time both in the open,
| and in the close, in both conventional and unconventional
| conflicts, and we don't really seem to have major ideas to
| solve that (with the exception of active protection, which
| only works against an unsophisticated enemy as you're
| broadcasting your position.)
|
| Also - I said 'where they go forward from today' - I didn't
| say they were useless.
| bluGill wrote:
| >(with the exception of active protection, which only works
| against an unsophisticated enemy as you're broadcasting
| your position.)
|
| Modern war (what NATO does, not what Russia does) has radar
| sharing, so one radar behind the lines, or in an airplane
| well behind the lines - shares the information to everyone.
| Just a few well hardened/defended radars it all you need,
| nobody else is using active radar.
| chrisseaton wrote:
| > Just a few well hardened/defended radars it all you
| need
|
| No, these systems have vehicle mounted radars. You can't
| network that - they are responding in sub-millisecond
| times.
|
| > nobody else is using active radar.
|
| You're bonkers. Trophy. Arena. Quick Kill. All active
| radar.
| nradov wrote:
| Where we go forward today is that tanks will evolve along
| the same lines as naval surface combatants (frigates /
| destroyers / cruisers) have, just a few decades later.
| Warships used to primarily rely on cannons for offense
| (with large gun crews) and armor for defense, but the
| advent of strike aircraft and then guided missiles made
| those designs obsolete. Now surface ships have minimal gun
| armaments and little or no armor. Instead they rely on
| their own guided missiles and aircraft (helicopters and
| drones) for offense, and speed plus active measures
| (interceptor missiles, EW, decoys) for defense.
|
| I predict that the "tank" of the future will have a smaller
| main gun and thinner armor. Instead of slugging it out toe-
| to-toe with enemy armored vehicles and fortifications it
| will hang back and locate targets using it's own drones
| plus data links from other platforms. Then attack those
| targets using indirect fire missiles and suicide drones.
| Crews will be smaller, probably just two, with the option
| to operate temporarily uncrewed under remote control or
| with some limited autonomy. Survivability will be provided
| through high mobility, some low-observability (stealth)
| technology, EW, and updated active protection systems.
| Think of a mini "frigate" driving around on land.
| Ancapistani wrote:
| Truly modern, "Western-style" warfare is more about the pace
| of battle and maintaining consistency in the "information
| space" than anything else.
|
| You do everything you can to make your troops as mobile and
| fast to respond as possible, then you keep moving around and
| probing until you find a place where the enemy isn't ready
| for you. Exploit that, then move the battle somewhere else
| while the enemy scrambles to adapt.
|
| Ukraine has been doing exactly that in this war. Russia has
| enough trouble keeping their units supplied when they're in
| neat deployments - expecting them to be able to respond to
| multiple probing attacks along an extended front while
| maintaining force in all the areas not currently under attach
| is impossible for them.
| [deleted]
| mellavora wrote:
| > currently completely overmatched by anti-tank weapons
|
| The Chieftan disagrees with you.
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lI7T650RTT8
|
| I suspect he has more practical and theoretical knowledge on
| the topic than the sum total of all posters on this thread.
| arethuza wrote:
| I believe _chrisseaton_ is actually in the British Army?
| chrisseaton wrote:
| Well obviously it's a matter for reasoned opinion, rather
| than a mathematical fact, and you'll find opinions both ways.
| I'm saying I'm currently struggling to see it the positive
| for the situations we think we're likely to face next.
|
| Other weapon systems do go completely obsolete over time -
| it's not a truism that all claims of obsolesce are wrong.
|
| Also - I said 'where they go forward from today' - I didn't
| say they were obsolete.
| jcranmer wrote:
| I'll submit Rob Lee's opinion, if you'd rather read than
| watch a video: https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/the-tank-is-
| not-obsolete-a...
| spywaregorilla wrote:
| Depends who you're fighting, where you're fighting, and how
| fast you need to win.
| DeWilde wrote:
| That is a take I see often on Twitter and HN but actual
| military experts tend to disagree [0].
|
| The truth is the tank was never meant to be invulnerable piece
| of military hardware but one that can withstand small and
| medium calibre arms and shrapnel/fragmentation while also
| delivering direct fire to a front line location. In that regard
| there is nothing that can replace it yet and will continue to
| be used.
|
| [0] https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/the-tank-is-not-
| obsolete-a...
| chrisseaton wrote:
| > can withstand small and medium calibre arms and
| shrapnel/fragmentation while also delivering direct fire to a
| front line location. In that regard there is nothing that can
| replace it yet
|
| But an AFV can do this.
| DeWilde wrote:
| Its not comparable, a tanks armor and main gun are several
| classes above.
| gigaflop wrote:
| A modern tank can measure its weapon range in kilometers,
| and explosive shells can be used to destroy buildings or
| other cover.
|
| In my opinion, AFVs are better suited for situations where
| speed is more important than the absolute firepower of a
| tank.
| balderdash wrote:
| To the extent you meant IFV, while they are largely
| impervious to small arms fire, they are susceptible to
| heavy machine gun fire (especially if directed at anything
| others than the front arc of the vehicle)...
| breischl wrote:
| But... a tank _is an_ AFV.
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armoured_fighting_vehicle
|
| You may have meant an IFV, and in some cases those work.
| But that's like saying that a rifle and a machine gun both
| shoot bullets, so why would you want a machine gun?
| chrisseaton wrote:
| Any AFV can do it - it doesn't need to be a tank for what
| the person I was replying to said they thought they
| needed.
|
| https://www.forces.net/news/whats-difference-between-
| armoure...
|
| Yeah many AFV are undergunned compared to a tank, and we
| can always want more firepower and more armour, but
| trade-off on support and things like that starts to break
| down.
|
| The point is if you say you want 'protected mobility and
| direct fire to support infantry' then you don't need a
| tank, you just need any AFV.
|
| People normally want tanks for anti-tank - well that may
| well be better done by infantry for the foreseeable
| future - and for shock action, but that doesn't seem to
| work brilliantly in the current environment either as in
| most environments it's going to be the tank getting the
| shock not you.
| andrewflnr wrote:
| What critique of tanks on the modern battlefield doesn't
| also apply to any other armored vehicle? The same
| weaknesses and weapons apply to all of them, and the
| payloads, troop carrier, big gun, etc, can also be
| supplied by other means if that works out. So I can't see
| why distinguishing tanks, AFVs, and IFVs helps this
| discussion...
|
| Anti-tank can't be the only role for anti-tank, by the
| way, or they never would have been invented. I don't buy
| that line of argument at all.
| chrisseaton wrote:
| Most AFV have some kind of integral infantry support
| (literally in the back) while a tank needs to be battle-
| teamed to do that. Battle-teaming is hard to do because
| inevitably the two vehicles don't quite match capability.
|
| I didn't say tanks only did anti-tank - I said they also
| do shock action. It's the only reason they exist in that
| it's the only thing that they are needed for that you
| couldn't do with another AFV.
| CamperBob2 wrote:
| Who uses small-arms fire against tanks? I'm sure tanks can
| withstand arrows and crossbow bolts too, but that won't help
| in an environment where the enemy has a healthy supply of
| Javelins.
|
| When your weapon costs >10x more than the weapon needed to
| eliminate it with near-100% certainty, your weapon is
| obsolete. Tanks for the memories.
| DeWilde wrote:
| Nobody will use small-arms against a tank because it has no
| effect. That is the point.
|
| Humans are also vulnerable to bullets yet we still use them
| on the battlefield. Cost of bullet vs human is probably a
| bit more than 10x.
|
| There are no perfect weapons, tanks are vulnerable to ATGMs
| but if used correctly will overrun an ATGM positions. Ita a
| game of rock papper sciscors but with more than three
| options :D.
| newsclues wrote:
| People (insurgents) who lack RPGs and other ATGMs.
|
| There are cases within the the last few years such as the
| siege of Marawi where small arms attacking armoured
| vehicles sensors disabled the vehicles.
| jasonwatkinspdx wrote:
| > rely on always-on active radar which means you're lighting
| yourself up.
|
| Because these systems have to work in formation without
| interfering with each other, they use pseudo random noise like
| signals and correlation based receivers. They're also mmw
| systems working at short range. It's not quite the suicidal
| beacon you're assuming, because it ends up the folks who design
| this stuff are in fact aware of the principle of emissions
| control.
| chrisseaton wrote:
| Yeah of course they try to reduce the emissions as much as
| they can within physics. But the appetite for _any_ emissions
| is extremely low in a peer or near-peer fight.
| dr-detroit wrote:
| Kaibeezy wrote:
| The only defense I could find was to plow soil up onto them.
| Still a slowdown and vulnerability.
| chrisseaton wrote:
| You always try to cover an obstacle with fire, so the idea is
| while they're milling around slowly piling up soil they're
| vulnerable to fire. You can see in some of the photos the
| troops looking down on the obstacle from I presume potential
| fire positions.
| mellavora wrote:
| > You always try to cover an obstacle with fire,
|
| I misread your comment to mean flames/burning stuff (not
| weapons fire), and wanted to pause for a moment to admire
| your approach to life.
|
| :)
| spyremeown wrote:
| I live in Aachen, Germany, and there are a bunch of these near
| the tri-border with the Netherlands and Belgium. I think most
| people don't even know what they are, and some of them are so
| covered with dirt and vegetation only a keen eye can spot them.
|
| Still a very nice piece of history.
| pfdietz wrote:
| As I'm sure you know, there was a lot of fighting around there
| in October 1944.
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Aachen
| exar0815 wrote:
| Was immediately thinking about those, passing them every
| morning on my way to work, as they weren't removed except where
| the road is!
| bamboozled wrote:
| _As with any fortification, they are not indestructible. A well
| prepared force can employ engineers to destroy the blocks with
| relative ease and create paths through the dragon's teeth.
|
| This occurred on many occasions during WWII._
|
| So not really that good at stopping tanks?
| inasio wrote:
| Reminds me of my Starcraft strategy (definitely not competitive,
| playing vs the computer) to build tons of supply depots as dragon
| teeth, worked also because advancing hordes would not only open a
| path, but want to destroy them all, leaving them vulnerable
| amalcon wrote:
| Warcraft 2 had sole-purpose obstacles you could build for this.
| However, most people didn't use them. Farms were more cost
| effective in that role and also gave you army capacity.
|
| I always thought this was why Starcraft didn't have those: why
| complicate things when people can just use supply depots
| anyway.
| mkup wrote:
| I agree, but IIRC Warcraft 2 hadn't sole-purpose obstacles
| which can be freely constructed by the player, only Warcraft
| 1 had those ones. Though in Warcraft 2 sole-purpose obstacles
| were available as a preexisting objects on the map.
| Nition wrote:
| Total Annihilation also had sole-purpose obstacles you could
| build for this and they were called... Dragon's Teeth.
| piva00 wrote:
| I played competitive SC:BW and WC3 and when thinking about
| building placement and base design you always take in
| consideration paths of invasion to block weak points, e.g.:
| access to your workers gathering resources should be blocked as
| much as possible; create choke points inside the base to use as
| killing zones; use choke points to break enemy units' path
| finding; block off ramps with supply buildings to block vision
| and place a turret with range on the border of the killing zone
| on the ramp; keep a turret to defend against air drops or
| flying units coming for your workers.
| LordHeini wrote:
| That is used in competitive as well (usually a single depot or
| turrets) to mess up the path finding. Or as sim city where the
| whole base is designed to block paths or mess up the ai so that
| it funnels trough choke points.
|
| Destroying buildings takes a lot of shots so it is often very
| hard to push those structures. Since the damage is not used on
| the more dangerous units.
|
| Actually that is quite similar to the real thing because
| obstacles like dragon teeth need active protection from troops
| behind as well.
|
| Otherwise it is quite easy to move some engineers up end place
| some explosives or dig dirt over them.
| gigaflop wrote:
| SC2 for context:
|
| From watching pros play, an early wall-off can be vital. At
| their level of play, slipping in 1 to 3 combat units can have
| devastating early effect. Terrans can easily solve this by
| including a supply depot in their wall, which can be raised
| or lowered at the push of a button. Or a building that can
| lift off and reposition.
|
| Another take: Especially in a Terran vs Zerg game, the Zerg's
| creep kind of acts like an inverse blockade. Since Zerg units
| move faster on it, and the Zerg player will have vision of
| what's on the Creep, the Terran will often prefer to slow-
| crawl their siege tanks and etc closer, and be forced to use
| resources to clear out the Creep before moving too far in.
| Stronger Terran players can often be proactive about pushing
| back Creep, and have an easier time applying pressure.
|
| For those who don't know, Creep is a purple-ish goop that
| covers the map terrain (requires active effort to propagate),
| and Zerg are bug-looking alien things that grow out of eggs.
| Terrans are the humans.
| jollyllama wrote:
| "Fixed fortifications are a monument to the stupidity of man." -
| George S. Patton
| brudgers wrote:
| The Maginot Line worked perfectly.
|
| It denied the best line of attack to the enemy.
|
| The mistake was relying on the terrain of the _unfortified_
| Ardennes to deny a line of attack through the Low Countries.
|
| Patton hisself was rather caught out by the same thinking in
| the winter of 1944.
| rstupek wrote:
| Patton wasn't in command of the forces opposite the Ardennes
| nor was he in charge of the forces in the Western Front.
| hef19898 wrote:
| One can only wonder why that was... Maybe someone should
| ask Omar Bradley waht he did differently.
|
| On a more serious note, while Patton wasm't in charge, he
| was still a high ranking General and had some influence.
| nordsieck wrote:
| I get what he's saying: the Maginot line was a pretty epic
| blunder.
|
| But it's easy to over generalize what he's saying.
|
| It's absolutely best practice for modern infantry to improve
| their defensive posture while staying in place. You can see
| this by the extensive trench system both sides of the Ukraine
| war have constructed whenever positions get fixed for even a
| relatively short period of time.
| [deleted]
| alan-crowe wrote:
| You also need to watch out for the geopolitical issues before
| the war starts. Imagine that country A and country B are
| rivals, but each has its own internally divided politics with
| Fighters versus Peace-niks. In country A the Fighters bully
| the Peace-niks into accepting an increase in "defense"
| spending. Country B isn't deceived, and country B's Fighters
| try to persuade country B's Peace-niks to agree to more
| defense spending. Having succeeded they still have to decide
| how to split the money between tanks and static defenses.
|
| The naive analysis just looks at the military effectiveness
| of the options. But there may be political implications.
| Perhaps if country B spends the money on tanks, that gets
| noticed in country A. That changes the politics in country A
| and lets the Fighters there persuade their own Peace-niks
| that more "defense" spending is needed. Whoops! The money
| that country B spends on tanks doesn't help defend country B
| as much as you would expect, if in unleashes counter-spending
| in country A.
|
| What about country B spending the money on static defenses?
| That could help Peace-niks in country A push for cuts in
| country A's "defense" spending. That would multiply the
| effectiveness of country B's spending on static defenses.
|
| I don't think it worked like that with the Maginot Line.
| Nevertheless, what a General says about military
| effectiveness misses part of the story.
| jcranmer wrote:
| > I get what he's saying: the Maginot line was a pretty epic
| blunder.
|
| What is often forgotten about the Maginot Line is that... _it
| worked_ , it did exactly what it was supposed to. The failure
| was in French military leadership, largely for reasons that
| probably would have played out the same without the Maginot
| Line (e.g., refusal to believe intelligence reports, slowness
| in response, etc.).
| jmcomets wrote:
| Just adding to this for the uninitiated-but-curious: the
| German army invaded by going around the line. This meant
| taking tanks through the Ardennes, a bordering region
| consisting of mountains and forests, not quite the Panzer's
| ideal terrain...
|
| Nowadays it's still used as a French expression to describe
| a "seemingly impassable defense that's useless in the end".
| iso1631 wrote:
| One thing I read recently said one of the aims of the
| maginot line was to delay the Germans (it did -- they had
| to go through NL/BE), and another was to ensure they went
| through BE and thus brought the British in to the fight
| (due to a UK/BE defence guarantee). It did that too.
| dmichulke wrote:
| I think the British also guaranteed Poland, so they we're
| already in in September '39
| mrguyorama wrote:
| Wasn't that that "Quiet war" ie, both france and great
| britain had guaranteed poland, and declared war, but
| didn't actually push out troops or really do anything
| until france was invaded?
| goodcanadian wrote:
| Phoney War. War was declared, but no real fighting was
| going on:
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phoney_War
| breischl wrote:
| But when the line was conceived and built, they couldn't
| have known Germany would invade Poland first.
| jollyllama wrote:
| While Patton's quote is open to interpretation, the Maginot
| Line is a case where he's dead on. What was the opportunity
| cost of building these giant and somewhat extravagant
| fortifications? Hindsight is 20:20 but maybe things could
| have worked out better for the French if they had used the
| massive amounts resources in a different way.
| bluGill wrote:
| Who knows, but the plan itself was sound and it worked.
| It forced Germany to go via small route and thus made
| much less land that needed to be defended. They just
| didn't have a plan to defend that land - if they had a
| workable plan Germany would have been in real trouble -
| their troops were overextended on hindsight. It worked
| because France was incompetent not because Germany had a
| great battle plan.
| bnralt wrote:
| Indeed, I believe the initial plan was to continue the
| line, but Belgium opposed it. And the Ardennes was
| thought to be difficult enough terrain that it didn't
| need to be strongly defended. It was actually the
| Ardennes that failed expectations as defensive terrain,
| not the Maginot line (though as you noted, it would have
| worked as defensible terrain if there was more competent
| leadership).
|
| It's kind of like building a giant fence around an area,
| then leaving an opening in the middle of it, and then
| deciding that you don't need to have people guard that
| opening. And when people inevitably get through the large
| unguarded opening, you declare that fences are idiotic
| and useless.
| vkou wrote:
| Continuing the line was an impossibility because it would
| have driven the low countries straight into aligning with
| the Axis.
|
| Just because political concerns ruin your tactic, doesn't
| mean those political concerns aren't real. The Maginot
| line was great tactically, but worse than useless
| strategically, because it completely failed to achieve
| it's big-picture objective - keeping the Germans out of
| France.
| bnralt wrote:
| The low countries were against it because they feared the
| Axis, and didn't want to be left on the other side of
| defensive fortifications. But in the end they fell to the
| Axis anyway, so I'm not sure how not continuing the long
| helped.
|
| Either way it's a moot point. As I said, the Ardennes
| would have been an effective barrier if it was better
| defended. You can't leave an unguarded opening in your
| fence and then declare that fences are useless.
|
| Yes, France still fell in the end. Static defenses
| weren't able to overcome weak leadership, but -
| importantly - it's mobile forces weren't able to overcome
| it either. In the end the mobile forces ended up being
| _much_ more susceptible to poor leadership than the
| static defenses, leading to a large chunk of the army
| getting disastrously cut off (and the need to get
| evacuated from Dunkirk).
| foobarian wrote:
| > Yes, France still fell in the end
|
| For a little bit, anyway. But what does that actually
| mean? I often wonder what would have happened had Germany
| not pursued genocide, and just stopped at France. It's
| not like the French people would magically turn German
| overnight. Would the resulting entity end up like a
| confederacy?
|
| Same reasoning with Napoleon, too. What if they had
| stopped before the Russia disaster?
| bluGill wrote:
| Poland has treaties with France and England: both were in
| process of mobilizing after the fall of Poland. I think
| it is inevitable that England would have at least made
| some attempt at war.
|
| Though I wonder if Hitler could have made things worth if
| he had not started the Eastern front. (I'm not clear on
| how that started, and Stalin wasn't to be trusted)
| yamtaddle wrote:
| Right--it's not like they'd have done better without it.
| Odds are they would have lost even sooner, in fact. The
| little air war after Poland was invaded would have
| instantly been a bloody ground war in the West, too, rather
| than most of the action on that front waiting until Germany
| marched through the low countries. Not like they'd have
| been better off with that border unfortified--it likely
| bought them some weeks or months, not that it mattered for
| the ultimate outcome. Hell, without it, Germany may have
| decided to attack West first, then turn East, rather than
| vice-versa.
| bell-cot wrote:
| Critical context for the Maginot line in the first few
| paragraphs here:
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France#Central_front
|
| Quick summary: The French Army's high command was
| stuporhumanly slow and weak in their response to the German
| attack through the Ardennes (just north of the north end of
| the Maginot line). _Especially_ considering how quickly the
| German Army had conquered Poland less than a year earlier.
| And had conquered Denmark just one month before. And was
| wrapping up the conquest of Norway at the same time as they
| started attacking France...
|
| If you know in advance that your soldiers are solid (and the
| French soldiers were) but your military high command will be
| worse than useless - then relying on fixed fortifications is
| actually the _best possible_ national strategy. Your good
| soldiers can hold out for a while in the fortifications,
| taking (mostly) not-too-horrible casualties, without needing
| any orders from or action by your brain-dead high command.
| bombcar wrote:
| Militaries are always fighting the last war - it's really
| hard for some reason to get them to recognize changes in
| warfare, and blitzkrieg caught them with their proverbial
| pants down, and then they _did nothing_.
| bell-cot wrote:
| True... _somewhat_. But read a detailed history of the
| Battle of France. And compare the command performance of
| the B.E.F. (under General John Vereker, Lord Gort) with
| the command performance of General Maurice Gamelin
| (C-in-C of the French Armed Forces) and the next tier or
| two of French generals under him.
|
| For Lord Gort - it wasn't his country, he'd only been
| appointed to command the B.E.F. the prior September, and
| he'd been shuffled through a lot of different jobs in the
| prior decade. (Including time spent in China and India -
| hardly useful experience for WWII in Europe.) Still, Gort
| and his immediate subordinates got their sh*t together,
| moved fast and made good decisions in very new, chaotic,
| and challenging circumstances, and did extremely well.
|
| For Gamelin & Co. - it _was_ their country, defending it
| against a German invasion had been their d*mn-obvious Job
| # 1 since _at least_ the German invasion of the Rhineland
| (March 1936), and they 'd been building the Maginot line
| since 1930. Yet their performance in the event was
| laughably slow and weak even by the _1914_ standards of
| French General Joseph Gallieni. (Who had been recalled
| from retirement, was in obvious poor health, and had
| served most of his career in French overseas colonies.)
| hef19898 wrote:
| I'll take any quotes from one of the most self engranding
| generals of WW2 with more than a grain of salt. Especially one
| who ended the serving under one of his former subordinates,
| Omar Bradley. Patton did have a talent for PR so, including
| catchy quotes.
| frozen11b wrote:
| You realize that Patton's quote about fixed fortifications does
| not apply to dragon's teeth which are not actually fixed. He
| was more addressing the Maginot line and other such fixed
| defensive permanent positions.
|
| Edited cause voice to text can be dumb
| xnorswap wrote:
| It's funny to say they're not fixed when they're still here
| 70 years after having been laid.
|
| The ones near me even have a little plaque describing the
| date on which they were laid.
| exabrial wrote:
| Dang, beat me to it.
| ISL wrote:
| Here's Patton in a foxhole:
| https://www.bridgemanimages.com/it/american-photographer/gen...
| throwawayacc4 wrote:
| A foxhole isn't necessarily a fixed fortification though.
| ISL wrote:
| They sure don't move.
| aidenn0 wrote:
| That's an easy stone to throw when you are fighting a war on
| foreign soil. Particularly since the allies struggled to oust
| Germans from several fixed fortifications in Europe.
| rjsw wrote:
| The one at Metz managed to stop him.
| melling wrote:
| I was just trying to find that line from the movie. My Google
| skills failed me.
| ridgered4 wrote:
| While that applies to World War II it seems like medieval
| castles or WWI trenches were pretty effective.
| nimbius wrote:
| Give me 25lbs of easy mix Dexpan and a hammer drill, and ill
| show you a gravel pit in about three hours.
| MagnumOpus wrote:
| Three hours are a very long time when pounded with artillery
| or raked with automatic arms...
| arethuza wrote:
| Didn't someone make a similar comment about Cheyenne Mountain
| and SS-18s with 25Mt warheads?
| chrisseaton wrote:
| You're going to survive three hours of pre-targeted direct or
| indirect fire?
| 6stringmerc wrote:
| How would this work in very thick clay like I have here in
| Texas? Caliche is the native term.
| ISL wrote:
| TIL about Dexpan. Clever idea.
|
| Also, as sibling says, good luck hammer-drilling under fire.
| mattkrause wrote:
| Do you need the hammer-drill if you can coax the OPFOR into
| firing onto their own fortifications?
| gamblor956 wrote:
| For those talking about the "3 hours under fire": Dexpan is
| an expanding cement that cracks concrete over a few hours.
|
| Once placed into a hole or crack, you don't need to hang
| around to do anything.
|
| The reason for the hammer drill is to make holes in the
| dragon's teeth to put the Dexpan into. For that, you only a
| minute per tooth, and it doesn't matter _where_ you put the
| hole, so you can use the teeth as cover from defensive fire
| while you drill.
| mcguire wrote:
| Somehow, this sounds like one of those "use paintballs to
| blind enemy tanks" things that work out better in theory
| than practice.
|
| A snazzy demo video for an anti-personnel artillery round:
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G18Rwoa7c1kt25
|
| The demo starts at :20 or so.
| piva00 wrote:
| You forgot the 3 hours of complete ceasefire you will
| require.
| dadarourou wrote:
| In Switzerland, we call them Toblerones, because they have the
| same shape as the chocolates.
| mauvehaus wrote:
| Are the tank traps also getting smaller as the result of
| shrinkflation? The 200g to 170g change in Toblerone bars is the
| first example in the Wikipedia article:
|
| https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shrinkflation
| layer8 wrote:
| It would make a lot of sense if the tanks shrinkflate as
| well.
| daedrdev wrote:
| That idea is more credible than you might think, videos of
| Russian Dragon Teeth show smaller spikes more spread apart
| without a base slab.
| layer8 wrote:
| I suddenly feel the urge to spread a crackpot theory that the
| pyramids of Giza are really the remnants of a range of dragon's
| teeth protecting against giant forgotten-ancient-civilization
| tanks.
| akiselev wrote:
| I believe Dr Daniel Jackson proved conclusively that they were
| used as landing platform for Ha'tak class capital ships.
| layer8 wrote:
| The one doesn't exclude the other.
| 323 wrote:
| The ones which Russia is now deploying in Ukraine don't appear to
| be anchored in the ground, just laid on top of it - you can just
| push them away with a bulldozer or a group of people.
| tedmcory77 wrote:
| Former infantry here - One of the things that was drilled into
| my head, obstacles should always be covered by fire to deter
| these sorts of things. If you can't cover it by fire, then
| maybe it's not worth putting on obstacle on.
| ddoolin wrote:
| By fire do you mean weapon fire? Sorry, maybe it's obvious
| but my brain keeps jumping to literal fire.
| tedmcory77 wrote:
| Yea, either direct (person with a rifle) or indirect
| (artillery/mortars). Ultimately obstacles slow, not
| prevent.
| tedmcory77 wrote:
| This wiki article provides good clarity, especially the
| "obstacle negotiation" part.
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obstacles_to_troop_movement
| HonestOp001 wrote:
| Correct, weapon's fire.
| ASalazarMX wrote:
| Excuse me, do you mean weapon's fire, or actually the
| bullets they project after firing?
|
| Sorry beforehand, I can't resist mocking military speak.
| sa46 wrote:
| Also former infantry: To expand the point, in US Army
| doctrine, an obstacle has one of four effects, block, turn,
| fix, or disrupt.
|
| Typically, you use obstacles in engagement area development
| as part of a defense. An obstacle that's not observed isn't
| valuable because it's easy to circumvent. You can probably
| use a bulldozer (guessing, I was light infantry, not a
| tanker) to breach the dragon's teeth relatively quickly so
| the obstacle doesn't have the intended effect. However, it's
| much harder to breach the dragon's teeth if someone is
| shooting at you. Now you need an armored bulldozer, or enough
| suppressing fire to cover the breach.
| gerdesj wrote:
| Sounds like a job for something like Python if they are
| unanchored. Or an AVRE.
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Python_Minefield_Breaching_Sy
| s...
| Arrath wrote:
| You do have to be careful with these systems, they like
| to go boom:
|
| https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1590087764070268928
|
| Video description: Drone video of a Russian armored
| column advancing when a mine-clearing vehicle gets hit,
| suffers earth shattering kaboom when the mine-clearing
| charge goes up.
| AnimalMuppet wrote:
| Or a remote-controlled bulldozer. (Though that could be
| jammed...)
| marginalia_nu wrote:
| Where is Marvin Heemeyer when you need him.
| hdjjhhvvhga wrote:
| Based on what we've seen in Ukraine so far, I have absolutely
| no expectations.
| favorited wrote:
| I saw a video of a Russian tank approaching an anti-tank
| mine sitting in the middle of the road, and they just...
| drove over it, causing detonation. It wasn't camouflaged at
| all, it was just sitting there.
|
| I'm not sure what the soldiers in the tank expected. Maybe
| they missed the "don't drive over obvious mines" day in
| tank school.
| pfdietz wrote:
| I wonder how many fake mines had also been placed on the
| roads.
| watwut wrote:
| Tanks don't have all that great visibility, soldiers
| sleep a little in bad conditions, often eat a little +
| crappy food and are under high stress. Triple so in
| Russian army by all accounts I read.
|
| Drivers in cars in best conditions fail to notice things,
| so it is not all that surprising that Russian army
| soldier would not notice things.
| codenesium wrote:
| Probably thought it was the run over and blow up kind not
| the kind with a magnet.
| pmontra wrote:
| Quoted from the article
|
| > One of the best methods of overcoming these obstacles was
| by bulldozing soil over them.
|
| I also thought about it before that point. But
|
| > However, in many situations this was much easier said than
| done while under fire.
|
| I didn't consider this. I'm only a keyboard tactician.
| DeWilde wrote:
| Source on that?
| 323 wrote:
| Video of them being installed. At 0:17 sec it's clear they
| are just laid down:
|
| https://twitter.com/saintjavelin/status/1580011095573827585
| ok_dad wrote:
| Right next to trenches where they can be pushed into and
| covered in dirt. I would laugh if it weren't for the fact
| that people are dying to these clowns.
| dmix wrote:
| https://www.reddit.com/r/NonCredibleDefense/comments/ycj5zl/.
| ..
| kazinator wrote:
| But imagine there were other obstacles interspersed among them:
| barbed wire, landmines. The Wikipedia article mentions tactics
| like that.
| dkjaudyeqooe wrote:
| Or drag them out of the way with... a tank.
| 6stringmerc wrote:
| Something something OSS 'easy field sabotage manual' and
| "Screw this I didn't want to be here in the first place"
| fatigue...
| ASalazarMX wrote:
| I was wondering if firing at the teeth would be a good
| tactic. Even a space one tank wide would make a big
| difference.
| Moru wrote:
| If you know the exact location a tank will be in at a
| certain time, the term "sitting duck" comes to mind. There
| is nothing effektive to stop a human that wants to get from
| point A to point B. Except for another human.
| ancientworldnow wrote:
| The video in question is a kill zone intended to be covered by
| fire. The obstacles only need to impede movement. If you stop
| to remove them, you will get destroyed (if the plan holds).
| foobarian wrote:
| While on the topic of ways to stop tanks, there is also the
| "hedgehog," or the "Czech hedgehog [1]."
|
| [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czech_hedgehog
| arethuza wrote:
| Ancient hill-forts in the UK often have _cheval de frise_ which
| are pretty similar in concept e.g.
|
| https://www.geograph.org.uk/photo/3966108
| worstenbrood wrote:
| Dont forget https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tankgracht
| saiya-jin wrote:
| Swiss have their own version in the western part, called now
| Toblerone line, built after WWI. Now a tourist attraction with
| hike paths around them, each block weighting 9 tons (and it runs
| 10km straight up to Jura mountains), the line basically cutting
| off westernmost part of country (basically Geneva) off the rest.
|
| They don't treat it as something ancient though, there is also
| modern part of it integrated into road [1], but nothing I could
| notice on highway though. Bear in mind this would protect
| Switzerland from an attack from France, which these days seems...
| unprobable.
|
| [1]
| https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Toblerone_Line_road_...
| i_am_proteus wrote:
| Should you have a forest handy, abatis will also serve:
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abatis
| canadianfella wrote:
| malfist wrote:
| Interestingly this is a very effective defensive tactic for
| factorio. Offsetting bollards channels enemies through choke
| points that leave them vulnerable and predictable, as well as
| slowing them down.
| [deleted]
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