[HN Gopher] Stop Scanning Me
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Stop Scanning Me
Author : favourable
Score : 77 points
Date : 2022-10-20 21:37 UTC (1 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (stopscanningme.eu)
(TXT) w3m dump (stopscanningme.eu)
| [deleted]
| pfoof wrote:
| Imagine: they succeed in implelenting this and suddenly some
| black hat collects all the data on the actual lawmakers. That
| would be a plot twist.
| LAC-Tech wrote:
| _In 2022, European lawmakers proposed new rules with the noble
| intent to protect children._
|
| How can a grown adult be this naive?
| hilbert42 wrote:
| Exactly. But that won't change the 'respectable' cover story.
| chabad360 wrote:
| I don't think they believe that. But the only way you get
| anywhere is by not making ad hominem attacks.
| derefr wrote:
| They know exactly what they're writing. They're not saying it
| because it's _true_ ; they're saying it because saying anything
| else would leave them open to certain rhetorical attacks from
| the people willing to manipulate their audience to get these
| bills passed.
|
| Remember: the goal of political speech isn't to convince
| reasonable people of anything; reasonable people don't need
| convincing, they just need facts. The goal of political speech
| is to (somehow) convince _unreasonable_ people of things. Which
| requires, for a start, showing deference to what they already
| believe.
| lookagain wrote:
| As per HN rules, I am here to congratulate you on making
| something both great and useful.
| favourable wrote:
| I didn't make it. It's by EDRi[0], as per the Twitter URL in
| the footer[1]
|
| [0] https://edri.org/
|
| [1] https://twitter.com/edri
| raspyberr wrote:
| Would be nice to be able to use my RSS reeder for this instead of
| giving an email address.
| sneak wrote:
| Apple intends to roll this feature out for iOS devices; they
| announced that they would do so, and they did not subsequently
| announce that they would not.
|
| I get the impression they are being compelled.
| [deleted]
| MichaelZuo wrote:
| Notably, the UN report linked is a report TO the Human Rights
| Council f a subordinate office, and not the official
| recommendation of the council itself, or any equivalent or
| superior UN organ.
|
| The actual recommendations of the OHCHR (Office of the United
| Nations High Commissioner for Human Right), who wrote the report,
| are as follows:
|
| " 56. With this in mind, OHCHR recommends that States:
|
| (a) Ensure that any interference with the right to privacy,
| including hacking, restrictions to access and use of encryption
| technology and surveillance of the public, complies with
| international human rights law, including the principles of
| legality, legitimate aim, necessity and proportionality and non-
| discrimination, and does not impair the essence of that right;
|
| (b) Conduct human rights due diligence systematically, including
| regular comprehensive human rights impact assessments, when
| designing, developing, purchasing, deploying and operating
| surveillance systems;
|
| (c) Take into account, when conducting human rights due diligence
| and assessing the necessity and proportionality of new
| surveillance systems and powers, the entire legal and
| technological environment in which those systems or powers are or
| would be embedded; States should also consider risks of abuse,
| function creep and repurposing, including risks as a result of
| future political changes;
|
| (d) Adopt and effectively enforce, through independent, impartial
| and well- resourced authorities, data privacy legislation for the
| public and private sectors that complies with international human
| rights law, including safeguards, oversight and remedies to
| effectively protect the right to privacy;
|
| (e) Take immediate measures to effectively increase the
| transparency of the use of surveillance technologies, including
| by appropriately informing the public and affected individuals
| and communities and regularly providing data relevant for the
| public to assess their efficacy and impact on human rights;
|
| (f) Promote public debate of the use of surveillance technologies
| and ensure meaningful participation of all stakeholders in
| decisions on the acquisition, transfer, sale, development,
| deployment and use of surveillance technologies, including the
| elaboration of public policies and their implementation;
|
| (g) Implement moratoriums on the domestic and transnational sale
| and use of surveillance systems, such as hacking tools and
| biometric systems that can be used for the identification or
| classification of individuals in public places, until adequate
| safeguards to protect human rights are in place; such safeguards
| should include domestic and export control measures, in line with
| the recommendations made herein and in previous reports to the
| Human Rights Council
|
| (h) Ensure that victims of human rights violations and abuses
| linked to the use of surveillance systems have access to
| effective remedies.
|
| 57. In relation to the specific issues raised in the present
| report, OHCHR recommends that States:
|
| Hacking
|
| (a) Ensure that the hacking of personal devices is employed by
| authorities only as a last resort, used only to prevent or
| investigate a specific act amounting to a serious threat to
| national security or a specific serious crime, and narrowly
| targeted at the person suspected of committing those acts; such
| measures should be subject to strict independent oversight and
| should require prior approval by a judicial body;
|
| Encryption
|
| (b) Promote and protect strong encryption and avoid all direct,
| or indirect, general and indiscriminate restrictions on the use
| of encryption, such as prohibitions, criminalization, the
| imposition of weak encryption standards or requirements for
| mandatory general client-side scanning; interference with the
| encryption of private communications of individuals should only
| be carried out when authorized by an independent judiciary body
| and on a case-by-case basis, targeting individuals if strictly
| necessary for the investigation of serious crimes or the
| prevention of serious crimes or serious threats to public safety
| or national security;
|
| Surveillance of public spaces and export control of surveillance
| technology
|
| (c) Adopt adequate legal frameworks to govern the collection,
| analysis and sharing of social media intelligence that clearly
| define permissible grounds, prerequisites, authorization
| procedures and adequate oversight mechanisms;
|
| (d) Avoid general privacy-intrusive monitoring of public spaces
| and ensure that all public surveillance measures are strictly
| necessary and proportionate for achieving important legitimate
| objectives, including by strictly limiting their location and
| time, as well as the duration of data storage, the purpose of
| data use and access to data; biometric recognition systems should
| only be used in public spaces to prevent or investigate serious
| crimes or serious public safety threats and if all requirements
| under international human rights law are implemented with regard
| to public spaces;
|
| (e) Establish robust well-tailored export control regimes
| applicable to surveillance technologies, the use of which carries
| high risks for the enjoyment of human rights; States should
| require transparent human rights impact assessments that take
| into account the capacities of the technologies at issue as well
| as the situation in the recipient State, including compliance
| with human rights, adherence to the rule of law, the existence
| and effective enforcement of applicable laws regulating
| surveillance activities and the existence of independent
| oversight mechanisms;
|
| (f) Ensure that, in the provision and use of surveillance
| technologies, public- private partnerships uphold and expressly
| incorporate human rights standards and do not result in an
| abdication of governmental accountability for human rights."
|
| However, many of the recommendations only make sense for
| countries that recognize the supremacy of international law over
| domestic law.
| BoGoToTo wrote:
| Honest question. Are these laws being put forward by groups who
| only want a plausible excuse to violate people's privacy, or is
| it misguided people who genuinely care about stoping child
| exploitation and don't care about the profound effects of
| privacy?
|
| I'm guessing the answer is 'both' but I was hoping someone might
| have insight if it leans one way or the other.
| civilized wrote:
| We live in a society where people get entered into a Child
| Abuser Database and blacklisted from society if they're
| "caught" leaving their own kid alone in a cool car for two
| minutes while they use the nearby ATM.
|
| There are definitely people who will stop at _nothing_ to do
| what they view as protecting children. What their motivations,
| whether they get some kind of sick sadistic pleasure out of it,
| I 'm not sure. But they're out there.
| irusensei wrote:
| > "Why are you against protecting the children?"
|
| > "Why are you against fighting terrorism?"
|
| And so on. You can pass all kinds of crap if you make the
| people who oppose you look like monsters. Plus, business and
| products will need to be created to support those new
| regulations. Its supper lucrative!
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(page generated 2022-10-20 23:00 UTC)