[HN Gopher] "Privacy".com-Yeah Right
___________________________________________________________________
"Privacy".com-Yeah Right
Author : d4a
Score : 133 points
Date : 2022-10-03 14:38 UTC (8 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (ersei.net)
(TXT) w3m dump (ersei.net)
| badrabbit wrote:
| Ahhh FFS, this post is complaining about third party KYC
| providers. Give me a break, in what world can you get a visa or
| mastercard without KYC? They provide privacy not anonymity,
| payment privacy that is not hiding your identity privacy. Your
| payments are private. Your payment info can't be easily tracked
| across the different cards you create. That's it.
| vorpalhex wrote:
| It's not the existence of KYC, it's that their KYC provider is
| slimey and not privacy respecting. Selling your data to
| potential bidders is a no go.
| [deleted]
| badrabbit wrote:
| Pretty sure selling your passport pic is illegal, as far as
| name, address and IP all major banks are doing this already.
| jiveturkey wrote:
| That's what the post is complaining about, but the problem is
| quite deeper. The KYC bit is actually ok IMO -- you're giving
| your identity to places that likely already have it.
|
| What this kind of article _should_ be about is the same thing
| that VPN is about. privacy.com actually _removes_ privacy. Now,
| instead of VISA being the only aggregator of your purchase
| data, privacy.com is also. Either way, the merchant and VISA
| know your purchase history. Now, so does "privacy".com.
|
| If you want to hide something from your bill so that someone
| else in your household doesn't see it, then ok. If you want to
| hide your address and name from a merchant (say for a digital
| downlaod) then ok. If you actually want more privacy,
| privacy.com is the opposite of what you want.
| tchened wrote:
| > Either way, the merchant and VISA know your purchase
| history. Now, so does "privacy".com.
|
| how does the merchant know your purchase history if you're
| using virtual cards with bogus info?
| public_defender wrote:
| I agree that most of the comments here amount to handwringing
| (or not understanding what amount of "privacy" is legal), but
| also, what KYC is really necessary for a company like this? If
| I understand correctly, all they do is pass through
| transactions. They don't hold customer deposits or provide
| credit. Isn't all this third party verification a little much?
| smachiz wrote:
| The point of KYC is to make money laundering harder (and
| other transactions that the various governments want to
| track/police). To that extent, yes, they need to be able to
| show a regulator who was making those transactions.
|
| The actual funding source/bank behind them won't see any
| detail beyond "privacy.com".
|
| Any card issuer (or virtual card issuer) has to do this.
| public_defender wrote:
| My point is that privacy doesn't need to do KYC because
| there is no possibility of the customer evading regulators.
| Assuming that privacy answers subpoenas, they would be able
| to give the government detailed transaction info and a bank
| account which would identify the customer. KYC at this
| level of abstraction doesn't seem to solve any kind of
| legal problem. I'm glad to be educated by an expert,
| though.
|
| Edit: A sibling explains a good liability reason for this,
| which makes sense but would not imply any legal reason.
| smachiz wrote:
| How do you validate that they own the bank accounts if
| you don't know who the user is?
| public_defender wrote:
| They only verify control. They do the method of making
| two small deposits and asking what they were.
| fragmede wrote:
| Which is why KYC is required. Two small deposits just
| means you have access to someone's bank account, not that
| you're actually them. Money launderers will pay mules to
| use their bank account to move money around.
| badrabbit wrote:
| It is a legal requirement for their bank and for mastercard.
| Kye wrote:
| Privacy is backed by an actual credit card ever since they
| restructured things to get around most sites rejecting their
| cards due to mistaking them for prepaid.
| solumos wrote:
| > what KYC is really necessary for a company like this? If I
| understand correctly, all they do is pass through
| transactions.
|
| Products like this are particularly susceptible to fraud,
| especially given that they're charging your bank account
| directly. Without any KYC, if I as a fraudster get access to
| your bank login, I can basically drain your account. That
| opens up a ton of liability to Privacy. Also, the card
| networks tends to be pretty risk-averse with allowing issuing
| products access to their networks if there's a lot of fraud
| going through their services.
|
| So, it's much easier to put KYC in place in order to avoid
| the headache of dealing with fraud/AML/etc
| public_defender wrote:
| Ok yes, I can see that they would want to have some
| insulation from having banks charge them back on whole user
| accounts. That makes sense.
| jqpabc123 wrote:
| The first step to getting an account at privacy.com is to
| surrender your privacy --- including private access to your bank
| account login credentials.
|
| To paraphrase Nancy Reagan, "Just say no".
| nopenopenopeno wrote:
| It would have been funnier if they used privacy.org.
|
| I never expected them to provide any privacy of any sort, but I
| don't think they could make matters worse. Privacy.com has been
| extremely convenient for me, private or otherwise.
| tempsy wrote:
| I have the Apple credit card.
|
| If you just want to generate 1-time credit card numbers to use
| once it's the best experience imo - can easily do it in the
| Wallet app.
|
| Also lots of these subscription websites now detect card
| generated from something like a Privacy.com is prepaid and will
| prevent you from using it which defeats the purpose. Not the case
| with Apple.
| drdaeman wrote:
| > If you just want to generate 1-time credit card numbers to
| use once it's the best experience imo - can easily do it in the
| Wallet app.
|
| I'm sorry, but how? To best of my awareness, there is only one
| virtual card (though it has a rotating CVV) and the only option
| I see is "request new card number" that should be used in event
| of having the current number compromised. I don't see any way
| to have multiple virtual cards there.
|
| Well, technically there are 3+ cards - the physical card
| (without a CVV, so not really useful), the virtual card (see
| above), and one-per-device Apple Pay cards numbers (probably
| not useful unless merchant accepts Apple Pay).
| tempsy wrote:
| Yeah its just one at a time. I still find this useful for one
| time use on a website or free trial.
|
| If you want multiple cards with limits Citi does this and
| it's exactly the same as Privacy except you can use your
| credit card.
| darknavi wrote:
| I didn't realize that Apple CC could do this. I really wish
| Chase could.
|
| The main reason I don't use Privacy any more is because you
| can't back it with a credit card (only debit/bank) and I want
| the CC points.
| sholladay wrote:
| Privacy.com also allows setting monthly/yearly spending limits,
| or even setting the card as single-use. Does Apple have
| anything like that?
| CharlesW wrote:
| > _Does Apple have anything like that?_
|
| Not that I can find, which is why I use Privacy.
| tempsy wrote:
| Citi does this.
| tempsy wrote:
| No it's just the ability to generate new credit card numbers
| on demand
|
| If you want various virtual cards with varying limits I also
| noticed my Citi card allows me to do this. It's just a little
| clunkier but it's actually more robust than Apple's feature
| if you wanted a unique number per website.
| jrochkind1 wrote:
| Oddly, my Citi card does not seem to have this. Guess I
| need a new card.
| fragmede wrote:
| It's not for all account holders:
| https://www.cardbenefits.citi.com/Products/Virtual-
| Account-N...
| no-reply wrote:
| Privacy cards are now credit cards[0]. So no, they won't get
| stuck at "We don't accept prepaid cards". [0]:
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32585893
| aorth wrote:
| Privacy.com is great. I've been using it for years on the free
| plan. I use short-lived, vendor-specific cards a few times per
| month.
|
| The author is complaining about the service's name not matching
| _their_ expectation of what the service is supposed to do. I don
| 't think that's fair. The Privacy.com homepage summarizes the
| service very well in my opinion. You give Privacy.com your
| financial information so you don't have to give it to a dozen
| other companies, and you get to control when and how those
| companies use that information by setting limits on spending or
| card duration.
|
| The author was expecting this to be a cryptocurrency tumbler or
| what?
| Chalene34 wrote:
| bel_marinaio wrote:
| privacy.com is one of my favorite companies.
|
| They have saved me from fraud 2x in 3 years. Then I simply closed
| that "card" with the click of a button. No need to call my bank,
| cancel my debit card that I use at ATMs, and wait a week for a
| new card
|
| I don't have to worry about remembering to cancel free
| subscriptions. I set the card max at $1. This has saved me
| multiple times from the free trial scams that you need to opt out
| of. Free trials should be opt in after the trial. Opt out is a
| scam to trickle money into a company from non customers.
|
| They stopped a contractor from charging me over $2k when I
| specifically told them they needed to tell me how much before
| charging me. Of course they didnt tell me and tried to run the
| charge. Privacy put a stop to their BS.
|
| It is mostly automatic or easy to set up once you are using
| Privacy. Some banks have started to offer similar digital card
| numbers similar to Privacy.
| jiveturkey wrote:
| Not starting, this kind of virtual card service has existed
| long before privacy.com came on the scene.
| buildbuildbuild wrote:
| The use of third party KYC services like Onfido is widespread in
| the cryptocurrency space as well, where over-compliance is the
| norm right now. Consumers are given little choice as to which
| provider stewards their ID scans, bank statements, biometric
| data, etc.
|
| This user experience has trained the most vulnerable, non-tech-
| savvy audiences to provide just about anything requested when
| asked for ID verification. Including to phishers.
|
| If you push back too hard against arbitrary, invasive KYC
| requests, you start down a path towards becoming unbanked.
|
| The USA is badly in need of modern consumer privacy regulations.
| cmeacham98 wrote:
| If you think this one is bad: look at Plaid, which literally
| phishes users bank credentials as "fintech".
| edgineer wrote:
| Last I checked, privacy.com uses Plaid, too. When privacy.com
| had asked me to use Plaid to add a payment method, Plaid's
| privacy policy talked of gathering transaction information
| and using it for advertising among other things.
|
| I think Plaid's stance was that if the host service (the one
| asking you to use Plaid) wanted to be invasive then it's up
| to them, or if this host would be upstanding and maintain
| your privacy, that could happen, too. It was up to the
| customer to check their policies. But this limitation was not
| spelled out nor promised that I could see.
|
| Their policy may have changed since then.
| anamexis wrote:
| "Phishing" implies fraudulent deception.
| buildbuildbuild wrote:
| I think their growth numbers would have looked much
| differently if they had transparently disclosed the reality
| on their login form from day one:
|
| "Plaid will store your plaintext password and use it to
| periodically access your bank account."
|
| Burying truth deep in a TOS is seen by some as deceptive.
| jefftk wrote:
| I doubt this would have affected signups that much: most
| people interested in their service don't care much.
|
| (Though instead of "access", which could imply "take
| money out" to some people, they'd probably use a more
| descriptive term)
| 2Gkashmiri wrote:
| why can't banks have oath like authentication so this BS
| doesnt happen?
| twelve40 wrote:
| because there are close to 20000 of them in the US, and
| while chase has the resources to do oauth properly, not
| every junky credit union can afford that
| jrochkind1 wrote:
| Few/no small credit unions (or banks) have their own
| bespoke online portal they developed just for them. They
| use a vendor. I bet a few vendors would cover a pretty
| large % of those 20K banks.
| twelve40 wrote:
| what's in it for them anyway?
| jrochkind1 wrote:
| I don't know, what's in it for the big banks either?
| Probably the same thing as what's in it for smaller banks
| and their vendors? Apparently nothing, or not enough?
| Unless customers are going to use the feature to choose
| their bank? Or it saves the bank money from avoiding
| fraud? Maybe one or the other will be so eventually.
|
| When it is, the vendors/platforms that "junky credit
| unions" use will add it, same thing as when big banks
| will add it. A vendor that small banks and credit unions
| use for their online platform probably has the same order
| of magnitude of aggregate consumer customers as a big
| bank has, I don't see why it wouldn't be about as do-able
| for one of those vendors as a big bank.
| PainfullyNormal wrote:
| > "Plaid will store your plaintext password and use it to
| periodically access your bank account."
|
| That's terrifying.
|
| I'm looking into privacy.com as an alternative to using
| my real debit card number online because it gets stolen
| at least once a year. Having my bank account itself
| compromised does not sound like an improvement. Then
| again, how often do banks get hacked and have their
| credentials compromised? At least as often.
| dawnerd wrote:
| I believe plaid has oauth integration with the larger
| banks now. I remember using it with chase and chase
| showing me an auth and permission approval request
| screen.
| cmeacham98 wrote:
| I believe they've improved it now, but their login page
| literally used to say "Plaid" nowhere, and at least for my
| bank (Bank of America) looked almost identical to the
| official login.
|
| Here's an example: https://d1hzvs60s6jsjg.cloudfront.net/IM
| AGES-1/208624076/pla... Does this look like it's going to
| be shipping your credentials off to be stored by a third
| party?
| junon wrote:
| "Phishing" does not mean what you think it means. Blame the
| banks for Plaid's need to exist.
| cmeacham98 wrote:
| Phishing generally means "pretend to be X to get user's
| info/credentials for X", do you have a different
| definition?
| junon wrote:
| Phishing is typically tricking an individual into
| divulging sensitive information. Credential stealing is
| typical, but still a subset.
|
| Plaid uses banking credentials on a user's behalf. Yes,
| it's similar to using stolen credentials because... it's
| the same thing, except consent, audits, insurance, etc.
| all play a role whereas with criminal activity they do
| not.
| cmeacham98 wrote:
| This seems to be some weird semantic angle where because
| Plaid is audited that makes what they're doing not
| phishing? I'm not sure I agree with that definition or
| that it is particularly common.
|
| That said, if it makes you feel better, pretend my
| comment read "Plaid pretends to be the users' banks in
| order to trick users into giving Plaid their bank
| credentials and stores those credentials without their
| knowledge or consent".
| junon wrote:
| That _is_ the definition of phishing. This is why
| "vishing" is "voice phishing", etc. Phishing is stealing
| information. It's not a "semantic angle" - it's the
| definition of phishing. You're free to consulting a
| dictionary to fact check me.
|
| Plaid is not phishing, by any true definition of the
| word.
| cmeacham98 wrote:
| Like I said, pretend I said "Plaid pretends to be the
| users' banks in order to trick users into giving Plaid
| their bank credentials and stores those credentials
| without their knowledge or consent" if it makes you feel
| any better.
|
| I'm content with my comment if you agree Plaid's behavior
| matches phishing with the only exception being how they
| use the credentials afterwards.
| fragmede wrote:
| But it's how they use the credentials afterwards that's
| core to the disagreement over your use of the word
| phishing. Which is to say, you don't like or trust them,
| fine, but Plaid isn't a scam that's going to try and
| steal your money with those credentials it's gotten.
| Which makes it not phishing. Phishing involves an
| attacker trying to get those credentials in order to
| steal yo shit. Plaid is trying to perform a service on
| your behalf.
|
| If I go to a store and pick up some items and leave with
| them is that stealing? How about if I pay for them?
| cmeacham98 wrote:
| Like I said, pretend I said "Plaid pretends to be the
| users' banks in order to trick users into giving Plaid
| their bank credentials and stores those credentials
| without their knowledge or consent" if it makes you feel
| any better.
| junon wrote:
| Plaid does none of that. They don't trick you. Having
| used plaid software before, it's pretty clear what's
| happening.
| collegeburner wrote:
| ahahahaha man who do you think is the one who added all this
| KYC shit and who scares companies into over compliance... and
| you want more regulation as a solution. we could start by
| removing all KYC requirements and fighting crime as crime
| instead of imputing some criminality to a financial
| transaction. like even if it's part of a criminal enterprise
| the transaction itself isn't the "wrong" part.
| ex3ndr wrote:
| Onfido is state of the art service for ID verification and very
| trustworthy.
| markovbot wrote:
| Then why do they have all those incredibly questionable things
| in their privacy policy? What makes them "trustworthy"? I've
| never heard of them, but from reading this blog post it seems
| like yet another evil company trying to suck up PII from
| unsuspecting victims and sell it.
| Kiro wrote:
| And that's why you shouldn't trust a random blog. They
| completely misrepresented that paragraph. Here's the full
| quote:
|
| "As part of a business transfer. Onfido may disclose your
| personal information to an actual or potential buyer,
| investor or partner (and its agents and advisers) in relation
| to any actual or proposed divestiture, merger, acquisition,
| joint venture, bankruptcy, dissolution, reorganization, or
| any other similar transaction or proceeding"
| markovbot wrote:
| how is that different from what the blogpost said?
|
| edit: to be clear, the blog post has listed, among other
| complaints:
|
| > Onfido may disclose your personal information to an
| actual or potential buyer (note "potential")
|
| which you seem to be confirming from your own review of
| their policy. What did the blog post misrepresent?
| Kiro wrote:
| Omitting the context very clearly makes it sound like
| they sell your personal information, when the paragraph
| is actually referring to disclosing the data in an M&A
| transaction. The "buyer" here is not a buyer of data but
| the buyer of the company. Even you said "from reading
| this blog post it seems like yet another evil company
| trying to suck up PII from unsuspecting victims and sell
| it".
| markovbot wrote:
| It actually wasn't that particular line that made me
| think they were selling personal information, it was
| mostly the other three points in that list which you seem
| to be ignoring:
|
| * Each of Onfido's and/or Provider's third-party vendors
| may have access to the facial scan data
|
| * Onfido is in no way linked to or responsible for the
| practices of other Providers. Onfido encourages you to
| read Company's privacy policies and terms and conditions,
| as well as those of other Providers, which may apply to
| the use of facial scan data extracted from photos and
| videos.
|
| * Onfido may disclose your personal information... or
| other third party where we believe disclosure is
| necessary... to protect your vital interests or those of
| any other person
| Kiro wrote:
| And I replied to "how is that different from what the
| blogpost said?", not the other points but you got me
| curious so here goes:
|
| * "Each of Onfido's and/or Provider's third-party vendors
| may have access to the facial scan data"
|
| This is actually "Each of Onfido's and/or Provider's
| third-party vendors may have access to the facial scan
| data to store the data, to maintain backup copies, and to
| service the systems on which such data is stored.".
|
| Completely standard and another misrepresentation by the
| blog trying to paint it like they send the stuff
| everywhere when it's just about their storage and backup
| solution.
|
| * "Onfido is in no way linked to or responsible for the
| practices of other Providers. Onfido encourages you to
| read Company's privacy policies and terms and conditions,
| as well as those of other Providers, which may apply to
| the use of facial scan data extracted from photos and
| videos."
|
| Nothing strange whatsoever. Again completely standard in
| GDPR that you need to have to to acquit yourself.
|
| * Onfido may disclose your personal information... or
| other third party where we believe disclosure is
| necessary... to protect your vital interests or those of
| any other person
|
| This is actually "To comply with laws. Onfido may
| disclose your personal information to any competent law
| enforcement body, regulatory, government agency, court or
| other third party where we believe disclosure is
| necessary (i) as a matter of applicable law or
| regulation, (ii) to exercise, establish or defend our
| legal rights, or (iii) to protect your vital interests or
| those of any other person; and"
|
| Wow, probably the worst misrepresentation. This blog is
| straight-up misinformation and slander. Thanks for
| highlighting it.
| volandovengo wrote:
| Privacy.com is a great service. I use them all the time to
| generate 1 time use card numbers for sites & then cancel the card
| so they cannot mysteriously charge me. I've been with them for
| years & their CEO is a wonderful & smart person.
|
| When you're allowing strangers to perform financial transactions
| - you're taking on risk that the money that is sent needs to
| actually be funded. They need to conform to KYC laws like all
| fintech providers - so yes, they will require knowing a little
| bit about you to operate in the United States like all financial
| institutions.
| hirundo wrote:
| That part is fine. The part that isn't is where they require
| you to give your personal information to a third party who has
| very weak controls on how they share it. Your endorsement makes
| me interested in trying the service, but I have the same "nope"
| reaction to the non-privacy as the author of this post.
| dynm wrote:
| But they apparently require government photo ID that gets sent
| off into the cloud? You can most certainly get a regular credit
| card without that, so it doesn't seem analogous. They also
| intentionally hide this requirement so that you don't find out
| about it until after you've signed up, which is a pretty
| devious dark pattern.
| vorpalhex wrote:
| KYC does not require the use of sketchy 3rd parties who leak
| data like a sieve.
| fillskills wrote:
| What makes you think OnFido is sketchy? It's a pretty popular
| platform for ID verification.
|
| 3rd party verification has become a standard in the
| fintech/insuretech industries since its very hard and risky
| to do KYC on your own. Also personally I don't trust having
| all the random companies I transact with maintain my KYC
| info. At least in theory, the experts at ID verification have
| strong enough incentives, motivation and expertise to keep my
| data safe, reducing the attack surface area.
|
| Not affiliated with either party.
| lcnPylGDnU4H9OF wrote:
| FWIW, they are at least willing to put this in their
| privacy policy:
|
| > Whenever legally possible, we seek to protect the
| information we share by imposing contractual privacy and
| security safeguards on the recipient of the information.
| This is particularly important in cases where the recipient
| is located in a country that has different or lesser
| privacy laws than those of the country where the
| information was originally collected. In some cases,
| however, it's not possible for us to do so -- for example,
| when we have a legal obligation to disclose information to
| a government authority and that government authority isn't
| willing to enter into such contractual safeguards.
| drdaeman wrote:
| Check the article. It has quotes from their ToS that can be
| roughly summarized as "we'll sell all your data to whoever
| pays and you have no control over this".
| Kiro wrote:
| No, that's not what they are saying at all. The quote on
| the blog is misleading and leaves out important pieces.
| Here's the full thing:
|
| "As part of a business transfer. Onfido may disclose your
| personal information to an actual or potential buyer,
| investor or partner (and its agents and advisers) in
| relation to any actual or proposed divestiture, merger,
| acquisition, joint venture, bankruptcy, dissolution,
| reorganization, or any other similar transaction or
| proceeding"
| Kiro wrote:
| Nothing sketchy about Onfido. You're hating on them all over
| this thread based on nothing but one sentence from their
| privacy policy, quoted on a random blog. A sentence that's
| not even saying what you think it's saying.
|
| Here's the full paragraph:
|
| "As part of a business transfer. Onfido may disclose your
| personal information to an actual or potential buyer,
| investor or partner (and its agents and advisers) in relation
| to any actual or proposed divestiture, merger, acquisition,
| joint venture, bankruptcy, dissolution, reorganization, or
| any other similar transaction or proceeding"
| nine_k wrote:
| Privacy.com is not about hiding your identity from authorities.
|
| It's mostly about hiding the fact that the same person, you, are
| paying to merchant A and merchant B. It allows you to easily have
| a card per merchant, and lock it to the merchant so that when its
| number is stolen, it can't be used anywhere else.
|
| The domain name is a bit lofty, yes.
| d4a wrote:
| Author here.
|
| My concern wasn't that Privacy.com knows who is using their
| service, but with rather how they choose to know that
| information through a third party (Onfido) and how terrible
| Onfido's privacy policy is.
| dessant wrote:
| Recently I've signed up with Paddle, and they have opted to
| verify user identities with Onfido, so they have asked for a
| government ID and a selfie. I have contacted Paddle and
| refused to provide a selfie, so they eventually asked me to
| upload my ID too in place of a selfie and manually approved
| the submission.
|
| Paddle has no excuse for collecting selfies, they are
| providing services to businesses that can be verified in more
| humane and secure ways, such as an electronic signature.
|
| Verifying people with selfies is a degrading and insecure
| practice, especially when you encounter Onfido during the
| installation process of a bank's app that you already have an
| account with, opened in person at a local branch in the EU.
| This bank also asks you to create a video of yourself and
| submit your speech to configure their mobile banking app. I'm
| sure the data will be useful for someone when Onfido
| eventually gets hacked, or just sells your biometric data.
|
| My hope is that biometric data collection for online account
| verification will become illegal once all EU member states
| have intoduced electronic IDs which have an NFC chip. The
| verification should consist of a person holding their ID next
| to their phone, and the online service would only receive the
| minimum amount of personal data to complete the verification.
| Kiro wrote:
| Maybe you should quote the whole thing instead of making it
| sound like they sell the data?
|
| "As part of a business transfer. Onfido may disclose your
| personal information to an actual or potential buyer,
| investor or partner (and its agents and advisers) in relation
| to any actual or proposed divestiture, merger, acquisition,
| joint venture, bankruptcy, dissolution, reorganization, or
| any other similar transaction or proceeding"
| junon wrote:
| Then why drop a steaming pile of shit on the company who's
| not directly at fault via the title? For clickbait?
|
| I've used privacy.com for years. Never had an issue. Never
| had to validate my identity. Never had any issues with
| support. If used as prescribed (setting limits on cards etc)
| it fits in directly to where it belongs in my threat model.
|
| What a strangely charged article.
| [deleted]
| withinrafael wrote:
| Not directly at fault? Privacy.com _chose_ to use Onfido. I
| don 't think the author's complaint is misplaced.
| junon wrote:
| Using a company and having proper contracts and
| agreements with them to be properly protected is not
| malice, especially since the company is well known and
| assumedly adheres to regulation.
|
| I'm not sure what you want privacy.com to do differently.
| markovbot wrote:
| I think the ask was pretty clear: not to share
| confidential identification information with sketchy
| companies that are clearly sharing that information with
| everyone.
| junon wrote:
| So you're saying Privacy should reinvent the wheel with
| an incredibly difficult, terrible-to-manage process,
| itself requiring an entire company worth of people and a
| huge support staff, laden with insane amounts of red
| tape, just to perform a small function of their business,
| instead of contracting out another company that
| specializes in doing this exact thing?
|
| This seems like a larger security/privacy surface area
| than the latter approach.
| markovbot wrote:
| No, i didn't say that, nor did the post. You keep making
| these absurd leaps. Privacy.com advertises themselves as
| being private. I expect them to be private. They're the
| ones who chose to hinge 100% of their marketing strategy,
| all the way down to their name and domain, on how very
| private they were.
| bluehatbrit wrote:
| OP's original point is that a company marketing
| themselves as a privacy tool are forcing customers to use
| a 3rd party for processing very personal identification
| data. That 3rd parties TOS, which binds customers of
| privacy.com, says they can and will share data with
| anyone they want for any reason. That's nearly the
| antithesis of the privacy the company is marketing itself
| on.
|
| Privacy.com don't have to use Onfido, there are other
| options out there. There could be a myriad of reasons why
| they chose Onfido over the competition but the TOS bind
| the privacy.com users and they don't offer any
| alternative.
|
| For a company leaning on "privacy" as their primary
| marketing tool, this is a double standard. It doesn't
| mean Privacy.com is a bad company with horrible people
| building a terrible product. They're just calling out a
| company for doing something seemingly opposite to their
| marketing, and saying that's why they personally aren't
| using the product.
|
| You can disagree with OP but doesn't make their point
| wrong, invalid, or stupid.
| dessant wrote:
| They should just verify identities without selfies, like
| most payment providers. This trend of using selfies comes
| from shady crypto companies that were eager to pretend
| that their users have been verified, while also
| benefiting from the collected biometric data.
| croes wrote:
| So it wasn't privacy.com who chose Onfido?
|
| If your contractor chooses a bad subcontractor, who do you
| blame?
| junon wrote:
| Privacy.com is not a contractor, firstly. IMO that's a
| weak analogy at best. I've asked elsewhere - what do you
| want privacy.com to do differently?
| croes wrote:
| To use another service to do the user identification or
| at least to offfer an alternative.
| onetimeusename wrote:
| I agree with you but the thing is I don't remember doing any
| of that stuff to use privacy.com. I hope they just changed
| their policy and that I haven't forgotten about uploading
| identification and photos of myself. I normally would not
| tolerate that.
|
| All I remember is using the plaid bank API which is itself
| probably very dangerous and a poor decision to allow.
| gruez wrote:
| >It's mostly about hiding the fact that the same person, you,
| are paying to merchant A and merchant B.
|
| What merchants out there are cross-correlating credit card
| numbers to deanonymize people? Can you even do it in a way
| that's PCI compliant? If you're actually interested in
| preventing random merchants from tracking you, I think credit
| card numbers are the least of your worries. Your
| billing/shipping information, which is almost always collected
| is much more revealing about you and can't be anonymized. Given
| this I do think the name of "privacy".com is misleading. At
| best it's stopunauthorizedcharges.com.
| junon wrote:
| That's not what it's about. It's the same reason why you use
| many passwords across all your sites. If one is breached,
| using privacy.com means your card information is not globally
| vulnerable to the point you have to get a new card,
| invalidate all your old ones, worry about personal
| information being correlated etc.
| flutas wrote:
| >It allows you to easily have a card per merchant, and lock it
| to the merchant so that when its number is stolen, it can't be
| used anywhere else.
|
| In my experience even that can fail. I had a card number stolen
| from them, charged to the tune of $200+, and their support
| refused to even entertain the idea of it being fraud, and when
| I mentioned a chargeback they basically said "we don't do
| those, because we have contracts with vendors."
|
| A payment stop at the bank sure worked though.
| 1shooner wrote:
| >I had a card number stolen from them, charged to the tune of
| $200+
|
| I'm curious, how did this happen specifically? In my
| experience, all privacy.com virtual cards default to being
| merchant-locked to the first place you use them. Did the
| merchant run an unauthorized transaction on the card?
|
| I've had online payment info compromised once, and
| privacy.com caught it cold (and also clearly demonstrated
| that the vendor had mishandled the payment info, despite
| claiming otherwise).
| flutas wrote:
| Honestly no clue, different vendor than the card was setup
| for.
|
| This was during a big wave of unauthorized activity being
| attempted on their cards as well, a lot of friends reported
| blocked charges for random amounts at like a
| retirement/hospice home(?) at the time.
|
| This was like 3+ years ago, and my only guess now (read:
| can't remember if this is true) is that the card had never
| been charged to the merchant, only pre-authed. But even
| then I'd expect the pre-auth to lock it to a merchant.
| 1shooner wrote:
| Interesting, looks like there was some kind of attack on
| privacy.com in 2020[0] that caused transactions to be run
| from vendors without them.
|
| 0. https://blog.privacy.com/a-different-type-of-card-
| fraud-anat...
| flutas wrote:
| Thanks for digging that up! I knew they made a post about
| it. Didn't notice before that they tried to say they
| "made (everyone) whole".
|
| Maybe they think that not sending me to collections after
| I stopped the payment at the bank and closed my account
| is "being made whole."
| jrochkind1 wrote:
| Woah, that is concerning. Making it harder, rather than
| easier, to chargeback fraudulent uses is not what I'm looking
| for.
| flutas wrote:
| > Making it harder, rather than easier, to chargeback
| fraudulent uses is not what I'm looking for.
|
| Honestly I'm still confused by the whole thing.
|
| I told them that it was a fraudulent transaction that I
| didn't approve, they then kept asking me for tracking
| numbers and finally closed the support ticket, and would
| close any further ones instantly on me with this reply.
|
| https://i.imgur.com/EyjCGiU.png
|
| Never mind the fact that it was a completely separate issue
| than what they would keep replying to me about, the fact
| that they included the line of
|
| > At this point, the only possibility is that the shipment
| was stolen after the delivery. This is no longer a case
| where the merchant is at fault. Hence, the case would be
| concluded in the merchant's favor.
|
| is a complete disregard for visa's rules. The fact that
| they wouldn't even _let me_ open a dispute is the biggest
| factor of "wtf" here to me.
| badRNG wrote:
| >is a complete disregard for visa's rules
|
| Visa is probably easier to deal with in the case of fraud
| than what it sounds like privacy.com is like.
|
| I use a single CC for everything (that I'm willing to pay
| with a CC for.) It's been compromised to the point that
| charges went through 2-3 times over the past decade and a
| half. CC company caught the fraud each time,
| automatically charged-back each of the fraudulent
| transactions, and overnighted me a new card. They also
| moved all of my recurring charges to my new card
| (somehow.) From what I understand, all of the big 4 CC
| companies operate more or less the same in this regard.
|
| This thread has eliminated the chance of me using
| Privacy.com in the future. If they can't make dealing
| with fraud _at least_ as easy as a regular CC (which is
| quite painless, there 's no reason to use them.
| dathanb82 wrote:
| > They also moved all of my recurring charges to my new
| card (somehow.)
|
| If you're curious about how this works, read up on "Visa
| Account Updater".
| jrochkind1 wrote:
| I have never had to actually pay for any fraud, the
| bank's fraud detection alwasy catches it, it's never even
| showed up on my bill.
|
| But I end up having to cancel and get a new credit or
| debit card about once a year. And this actually is really
| inconvenient, when you think of all the places you have
| stored a CC that have to be updated.
|
| I guess my bank doesn't do automatic updates of any
| recurring subscriptions, I've always had to deal with it
| manually. (And in charitable contributions, amazon,
| paypal, stripe, grubhub, etc etc etc).
|
| That was making me consider privacy.com instead... but if
| I'm doing it cause of that fraud inconvenience, which
| right now is just an inconvenience which I have no worry
| whatsoever would result in actual $$ (cause it's happened
| so many times now and it's never even been a threat), and
| switching to privacy.com may eliminate having to update
| card numbers everywhere when fraud happens but actually
| _increases_ my risk of actually being out the $$ (or
| increases the amount of time I have to spend dealing or
| fighting with customer service or fraud recovery support
| anywhere) -- forget it.
| [deleted]
| rachel_lithic wrote:
| Hey @flutas, I'm sorry to hear about your experience. Send me
| a note at rachel@lithic.com and I'll look into this further
| for you.
| jimmygrapes wrote:
| As somebody who doesn't use any of these services, your
| request for somebody to contact you at a lithic.com address
| in response to concerns about privacy.com issues is uh....
| well, it reads like the 3rd slide in a corporate SCORM
| annual "phishing awareness" training.
| Sirened wrote:
| hey jimmy grapes, sorry to hear you had a bad experience
| with a Lithic employee. Please email us at
| lithic@gmail.com with your SSN and mothers maiden name
| and we'll have this dealt with shortly
| Vox_Leone wrote:
| kitsunesoba wrote:
| Yeah, my main use of Privacy.com has been with web payment
| portals that look old/unmaintained or otherwise untrustworthy
| (surprisingly common with state government sites).
|
| If there's a better option for this use case I'm all ears,
| though. Reading sibling comments that Privacy won't actually
| stop charges past set limits is disconcerting.
| DerekBickerton wrote:
| The name is doublespeak and not concerned with privacy as an
| ideal, it's really just to manage CCs in a sane way, like using
| a CC once and then disposing of it so you don't get unexpected
| charges. Also it limits the blast radius if a vendor gets
| breached and your legal name is not exposed. (So you need to
| sacrifice your privacy to privacy.com to get privacy on other
| vendors). They need to rebrand as 'SaneCard' or something
| similar.
| junon wrote:
| No, they don't. One of the main features is being able to put
| in any billing information you want and they'll accept it.
| Typically a bank will validate the name and sometimes the
| address against your account on file. Privacy ignores it.
|
| This IS a privacy enhancement in many cases.
| twelve40 wrote:
| Nope. You have to go through KYC with them, give them your
| address, last 4 of social, dob, and yes, I got stuck on
| identity check too. Just because it didn't happen to you,
| doesn't mean it doesn't exist.
| DerekBickerton wrote:
| This. You have to waive your privacy to privacy.com to
| get privacy on vendors/merchants. If I lived in the US I
| would happily waive it to privacy.com, since I buy stuff
| on e-commerce sites _a lot_. Enough times that I would be
| pissed if my personal info got leaked. Also being able to
| manage my card and lock it to specific vendors is sorely
| needed and should be a feature on all CC providers.
| junon wrote:
| Privacy is not binary though. It's not "either you have
| complete privacy, or none".
| junon wrote:
| You misread my comment. When I check out on a website
| using a card _generated by Privacy.com_ , I can put any
| billing information into the checkout form on the site.
| prophesi wrote:
| Huh, I've been using privacy.com and had no idea about
| this. Thanks! Keeping the blast radius of leaked billing
| info to privacy.com instead of a myriad of merchants
| sounds like a good deal.
| INTPenis wrote:
| I worked in domain registrations in the early 2000s and it's
| funny how we used to put stock into what sort of TLD a domain
| used. Like .com would clearly be a commercial entity, while .org
| would be more non-profits, open source, public domain and stuff
| like that.
|
| Anyways, they're probably harvesting your payments and selling
| that info. I've noticed that since the card issuers have such
| high security requirements, and audits, a lot of little
| businesses have cropped up who are trying to act as middlemen to
| your payments. Because they just found a backdoor to getting all
| your payment history without hacking your card issuer. I believe
| privacy.com is one such business.
| solumos wrote:
| That might be true if they weren't also the card issuer[0]. The
| main way they make money is on interchange, which for a card
| issuer is a kickback of up to 2% from Visa/Mastercard/etc [1].
|
| [0] - https://techcrunch.com/2021/05/20/privacy-com-rebrands-
| to-li...
|
| [1] - https://www.adyen.com/blog/interchange-fees-explained
| INTPenis wrote:
| So privacy.com themselves handle the transaction from their
| own account then? I stand corrected. I assumed that you
| registered your card with them and they just acted as an
| inbetween.
| badrabbit wrote:
| You "believe" without any evidence? To the contrary my bank
| card purchases were resulting in targeted ads but privacy.com
| cards have not shown any sign of that after using them for over
| a year.
| INTPenis wrote:
| Yes I believed to be more specific, you've changed that
| belief with your facts. Thanks.
|
| But I still do believe this practice goes on here in Sweden
| where small businesses are offering services that act as man
| in the middle between the consumer and the card issuer. And
| therefore they're able to harvest your transaction data,
| which is gold.
| bombcar wrote:
| Belief kind of implies lack of evidence, more a feeling or a
| faith, after all.
| badrabbit wrote:
| I agree in this case
| avipars wrote:
| Mainly about managing debit cards...
| notyourneighbor wrote:
| Lets break this abysmal post down into what appears to be the
| point: Privacy.com flagged you for some unknown
| reason and asked you to verify your identity. You learned that
| Onfido exists and googled the name and (LOL) decided you would
| spend 45s on Wikipedia and then read a privacy policy written
| not-for-you, and then post yourself on HN so you can "inform
| others."
|
| Lets not even bother with the fact that flagging for further
| identification happens at every financial company that exists.
| People are flagged all the time for a number of reasons dictated
| by ML/AI that is not always right. "I've never had this happen
| before." That's not how math works. As I am not a
| lawyer, I probably missed some more bits as well.
|
| We can tell. And you did. You missed the part where you have to
| read and comprehend more than three or four words at a time. That
| or you intentionally excluded the pieces that invalidated
| everything that got you to the front page of HN. I'd wager it's
| the former. Allow me to do the research you pretended to do:
|
| First and foremost, there are regulations on how PCI/PII data can
| be stored. I'll assume you read about reading about or pretended
| to read about PCI so I won't go into the details you don't care
| to understand (but should). Each of Onfido's
| and/or Provider's third-party vendors may have access to the
| facial scan data
|
| When a company hosts with providers like AWS, GCP, etc, those are
| considered "third party." If you curl the onfido website you can
| see that it's hosted on S3 (or at least parts of it are). It's
| very likely that onfido is storing data in S3 which _means a
| third party has access to store the data, make backups, etc_. You
| also excluded THE IMPORTANT PART on previous line that said
| _Onfido securely stores all selfies, videos, photos of identity
| documents, and facial scan data in an encrypted format._
| Onfido may disclose your personal information to an actual or
| potential buyer (note "potential")
|
| I'm going to go out on a limb here and assume you've never owned
| a company who's had an offer to exit. When company A purchases
| company B they first have to evaluate that business and decide if
| they want to buy it. Since you think like Twitter I'll clear
| something up for you: acquisitions don't happen by posting on
| twitter "I want to buy Twitter." This is a standard bullet point
| in every privacy policy. When you are approached by a potential
| buyer you sign a slew of NDA's and other _legally binding_
| documentation that prevents any party from sharing the details of
| the agreement.
|
| Believe it or not, startups don't have enough time, money,
| energy, resources to rewrite every little feature required to run
| a business. Visa and Mastercard also have their own ways of
| sharing your private information. Does that also mean to start a
| privacy focused fintech company you need to write the entire
| american payment system? Onfido may disclose your
| personal information... or other third party where we believe
| disclosure is necessary... to protect your vital interests or
| those of any other person
|
| Jesus Christ. I don't even know how you pieced that together so
| I'll _actually quote_ the document: To comply
| with laws. Onfido may disclose your personal information to any
| competent law enforcement body, regulatory, government agency,
| court or other third party where we believe disclosure is
| necessary (i) as a matter of applicable law or regulation, (ii)
| to exercise, establish or defend our legal rights, or (iii) to
| protect your vital interests or those of any other person;
|
| This is American and guess what: you have to comply with the law.
| I know in your fantasy world of impotence masquerading as
| activism you think you can "privacy" your way around it, but
| guess what? You can't. Any company operating in <insert country>
| has to comply with the laws. "I use Proton and they are privacy."
| I'm sure you do, and they're privacy because the laws permit it
| until they don't.
|
| So what do you do? You try to deprive a company who's actively
| trying to do what you pretend to do with your useless tantrum.
| jedberg wrote:
| > There must be a way to follow local laws and regulations to
| prevent financial fraud without violating their privacy to this
| extent, right?
|
| Sadly no, there really isn't, unless you lobby congress. These
| laws were written with law enforcement in mind, not privacy.
| RVRX wrote:
| They actually don't let me use my primary email as they
| specifically don't allow accounts to use a Yandex email. They
| said the reasoning was to prevent non-US citizens from creating
| accounts, and that I would have to use another email address...
| rachel_lithic wrote:
| Rachel here, I lead Operations at Privacy.com. Wanted to clarify
| our data collection and retention process, and our position on
| privacy.
|
| Our goal is to make sure that customer data spends as little time
| as possible with third-party providers like Onfido. Onfido's
| general policy is that they will not save customer data longer
| than a year but they set up different contractual agreements
| based on what customers stipulate. We've stipulated that they
| delete data after 30 days.
|
| The "Privacy" in our name is about making sure our customers'
| personal and payment information is kept private from merchants
| and from fraudsters.
|
| We offer a financial service that comes with legal and regulatory
| requirements and we have to gather details like address, social
| security number, and phone number to authenticate a user's
| account. If you know of other KYC providers that have more
| privacy-forward policies, we're open to exploring.
|
| Happy to discuss more. You can drop me a note at
| rachel@lithic.com.
| ramesh31 wrote:
| Privacy.com was a perfect expression of "Your business is our
| feature".
|
| Practically every major card issuer provides native virtual
| numbers now.
| zcmack wrote:
| i have quite a few credit cards and haven't seen this feature
| on a single one. discover eliminated this feature years back.
| rectang wrote:
| How does one go about getting such numbers? Do a web search for
| "$BANK_NAME virtual credit card number"?
| nathancahill wrote:
| Really? Visa/MasterCard/Amex have Click To Pay but it's on the
| merchant to offer it. This is the opposite of Privacy.com where
| the customer can choose to use it.
| public_defender wrote:
| 1) I have three different major credit cards and none of them
| have this feature. Your comment is still true in the abstract
| though, so I hope the amex product team is reading.
|
| 2) For a knowledgeable consumer, there is huge incentive to use
| services like this to prevent the credit companies from being a
| single point of financial data aggregation. But--and here I
| guess I'm talking to amex again--if disposable or per-merchant
| card numbers are widely offered by card providers, I'd expect
| most people would just use those instead of a more robust
| provider like privacy.com.
| groovybits wrote:
| Younger audiences may not remember, but yes: major card
| providers _used_ provide virtual card numbers back in the day.
|
| This is a feature of the past, and most providers don't do it
| anymore. The only one I know of is Capital One's Eno:
| https://www.capitalone.com/digital/eno/virtual-card-numbers/
| fragmede wrote:
| Citi does:
| https://www.cardbenefits.citi.com/Products/Virtual-
| Account-N...
|
| Bank Of America retired theirs (and lost the retirement
| page): https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:
| -9i6Vr...
| groovybits wrote:
| Wow, I have a Citi card and I never knew! I don't think
| I've ever been promoted this feature before.
|
| I remember BofA used to. When they closed it, I thought
| everyone else followed suite.
| ineptech wrote:
| Sooner or later we're going to need a federal dept of is-this-
| guy-who-he-says-he-is. No startup can solve this; it's not
| profitable enough to do right. The last resort for authentication
| will always be "go to a place and talk to a human" and the gov't
| is the only entity who is willing/able to staff a brick-and-
| mortar office in reach of everyone in the country.
|
| I know some people are afraid of the feds having a centralized
| and accurate registry of citizens, but the alternative (that
| every company who takes payments must have their own separate,
| partial, and inaccurate registry) causes a lot of problems.
| throitallaway wrote:
| It's definitely a problem in the US. When setting up an account
| with treasury.gov there's a good chance you'll have to verify
| your identity, and the only way to do that is to go to a bank
| that you do business with that has a "Medallion Guarantee." I
| wish we could get to the point of having government issued
| smart cards for verifying identity. I would be elated if my US
| passport also functioned as a smart card.
| fragmede wrote:
| ID.me's trying, but it should really be a government run
| service and not a private corporation.
| ineptech wrote:
| In my preferred alternate reality, Keybase was (somehow)
| purchased by the feds instead of Zoom and used for exactly
| this purpose.
| fillskills wrote:
| If you think about it, there is a way this is done already in
| the real world - using Notaries. Notaries verify your
| 'documents'. Not that's they are experts at sensitive data
| storage, but there could be something to learn from the
| 'distributed' system of notaries.
| ineptech wrote:
| Notaries already exist. The proof that they are not a good
| solution to this problem is that they're not currently being
| used to solve it. All the companies doing hokey things like
| asking people to take a picture of themselves holding their
| ID and so forth could just start asking them to find a notary
| instead. AFAIK none of them do and I'm not clear on why
| you're thinking they would or should.
| fillskills wrote:
| You are right - current notary system may not be optimal
| for this use case. What I meant to say was that in my
| understanding, my main issue with 3rd parties such as
| OnFido etc is my lack in trusting them with my information
| and secondly storing that info in a central repository. If
| a bad entity gets access to that database, they now have
| very detailed information about me.
|
| I would rather prefer a decentralized & secure way that can
| be accesses via an API by companies such as privacy.com
| etc. The distributed piece is solved by Notaries. Could we
| learn something from how the notary system works that can
| be leveraged to build out a modern distributed ID
| verification system.
| collegeburner wrote:
| or... the feds stop requiring everyone to go through this KYC
| bullshit and we accept that anonymity or pseudonymity is
| hecking valid.
| jaywalk wrote:
| This is what Notaries are for. Maybe we could find a way to
| more efficiently utilize their services instead of creating yet
| another federal agency to intrude on our lives?
| ineptech wrote:
| You've misunderstood the problem we're trying to solve.
|
| Right now, N companies have N partial records of my identity,
| with varying ages and accuracy levels. Company A has my name
| and phone number, company B has my email and name and my
| previous phone number, company C has a copy of my driver's
| license from two years ago, etc. N partially accurate
| versions of my identity, floating around, getting bought and
| sold and merged together with buggy perl scripts, forever.
| Notaries do nothing to solve this.
|
| Whence comes this fear? How would the government having an
| accurate list of the citizenry, and storing a key for you so
| you can attest your identity, intrude on your life? Doesn't
| having to scan a copy of your ID and send it to your
| [bank/insurer/crypto account/hosting company/employer/etc]
| intrude on your life more?
| drexlspivey wrote:
| Estonia government issued electronic IDs have a computer chip
| that can digitally sign data.
| jedberg wrote:
| In defense of Privacy.com, they've helped prevent me from being
| defrauded multiple times. I use them any time I'm buying from a
| website where I don't trust they will keep my CC secure (like
| paying local utility bills).
|
| Sure enough someone tried to use my one-time-use utility card
| multiple times. Once they charged it for 16 cents which how card
| runners test the cards to see if they are valid. Normally those
| won't show up on any alerts you may have, because most banks
| don't alert below $1.
|
| But privacy.com does.
|
| I actually prevented about 1000 stolen cards from being used
| because I was able to inform the local utility that their
| database had been breeched before they even knew about it, and
| they were able to let the CC companies know before the card
| runners could use them.
| borski wrote:
| Completely the same experience here.
| cortesoft wrote:
| > Normally those won't show up on any alerts you may have,
| because most banks don't alert below $1.
|
| My Chase credit card is set to text me on any charge over $0. I
| have received alerts for under a dollar.
|
| Also, I have been using a credit card extensively for 20 years,
| and I don't take many precautions (other than having text
| alerts for all purchases). I will put that number anywhere I
| want to buy something without even thinking about it.
|
| I have had many fraud ATTEMPTS over the years, but I have never
| once lost money because of it. Having to change my credit card
| number has been annoying, but I am not sure it has been more
| annoying than it would be if I had to use a different number
| for every purchase.
| baseballdork wrote:
| I think that this is a totally valid approach. I merely
| prefer using privacy because it locks a card to a vendor and
| I can set limits (or simply pause a card) per vendor
| trivially.
|
| In fact, this weekend I got a notice from wilsoncombat that
| their payment processor had been hacked and card info had
| been leaked, which I had suspected when I received a
| notification that a charge ($0.15) had been declined on the
| card I used with them in March. The charge was declined, and
| I was able to close that card and not have to redo my card
| info in every place I have a card linked.
| Raed667 wrote:
| Companies using Onfido [0], Stripe Identity[1] or other similar
| services, just want to move the "trust/fraud" problem one layer
| away without throwing internal resources at it.
|
| It is a hard problem, and using a 3rd party service is more cost
| effective than staffing a department to do manual verification.
|
| [0] https://onfido.com
|
| [1] https://stripe.com/en-fr/identity
| whodev wrote:
| I absolutely love Privacy.com for the service they provide. It's
| fantastic to be able to create a one time use card for a web
| purchase. I even have one connected to my Walmart app that allows
| me to pay in store via the QR code.
| kornhole wrote:
| I use and like the service for what it does. Has anybody found a
| competing service?
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