[HN Gopher] PGPP (Pretty Good Phone Privacy) Beta Launch
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PGPP (Pretty Good Phone Privacy) Beta Launch
Author : todsacerdoti
Score : 63 points
Date : 2022-08-11 17:53 UTC (5 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (invisv.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (invisv.com)
| NoImmatureAdHom wrote:
| I would love to buy your product, but won't yet. I need a few
| things:
|
| 1) You should explicitly test with privacy-respecting Android
| flavors like GrapheneOS. I assume it would work using the
| sandboxed play services hack, but I'm not sure.
|
| 2) You need another exit aside from London. U.K. has weak data
| protections, facilitates U.S. spying, doesn't even offer access
| to the real internet any more (they run a firewall and mandate
| various other kinds of nannying), and, generally, seems like it's
| sliding down the path towards some sort of oppressive
| surveillance state.
|
| 3) I need to be able to pay with cryptocurrency, ideally Monero.
| barathr wrote:
| Thanks -- to your comments / questions:
|
| 1) we have tested with GrapheneOS and it does work. Relay works
| well with GrapheneOS. With some amount of configuration, the
| mobile plans also work, though it can be a bit tricky to set
| up.
|
| 2) We have many egresses (via Fastly) -- across North America,
| South America, Europe, and Asia -- and more planned. The London
| egress is used when you're on mobile data by default, but if
| you're on WiFi then you can egress elsewhere.
|
| 3) Not sure about that at the moment, but we've gotten the
| request from multiple folks.
| pledess wrote:
| It looks like the U.S. trademark for "PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY"
| (Registration Number 2015027) has "Cancellation Date April 24,
| 2020" even though the one for "PGP" (Registration Number 1914615
| - with the identical "computer programs for data communications
| applications, and for the encryption and authentication of
| electronic information" description) isn't canceled.
|
| Was this relevant to making the "likelihood of confusion" low
| enough that there's no risk of needing to rename the Pretty Good
| Phone Privacy product?
| deathgripsss wrote:
| Has the source code been audited?
| buzzy_hacker wrote:
| So without this, your internet activity on a mobile phone can be
| linked to you even with a VPN?
| prschmitt wrote:
| Yes. With a traditional VPN you are trusting that VPN provider
| with all of your traffic. They know your identity and
| everything you do. The two hop architecture we use decouples
| that information such that neither hop has both the user's
| identity and their usage information. In our case, the second
| hop is Fastly.
| buzzy_hacker wrote:
| Yes, that's true. But let's say I trust my VPN provider and
| do not trust my cell service provider. Does PGPP add value
| for me in that case?
| throwaway67743 wrote:
| I commented on a previous post and while it's sort of been
| answered here i think it still merits being included:
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32397969
|
| I still do find it disingenuous to omit it entirely as it implies
| that all possible issues are averted which they absolutely are
| not, even if IMEI wasn't a factor.
| barathr wrote:
| Just wanted to say hi - I'm one of the co-founders of this effort
| and would love to answer any questions or discuss further.
|
| Also wanted to add, since this is a common question: does PGPP
| protect all identifiers or just some? As with most privacy
| systems, just some. Our aim is twofold: 1) to decouple a user's
| human identity from their network identities (mobile and
| Internet) and 2) randomize their network identities. We view
| decoupling as pretty fundamental to practical privacy -- to
| decouple who you are from what you do. Who you are in the context
| of the network is your human identity, often associated with the
| main point of contact you have with the network and billing --
| your subscription and SIM, your broadband connection and its IP
| address and your home address, etc. That information has been
| used as the key upon which datasets can be attached. The goal
| then is to decouple across entities -- the different parties who
| have data -- and across uses -- the different mechanisms of a
| network protocol, such as authentication and connectivity.
|
| Other identifiers such as hardware identifiers aren't inherently
| attached to a person and aren't always used by networks, but even
| when they are, removing them is insufficient -- as our colleagues
| at UCSD found in recent work, phones can be identified at the
| PHY, without even using a unique hardware identifier.
| sneak wrote:
| Does this also randomize the IMEI, or just the IMSI?
|
| Seems like if the same IMEI shows up over and over again with a
| different rotating IMSI then the jig is up.
| barathr wrote:
| The IMSI. We don't do anything with the IMEI ourselves (it's
| in the category of hardware identifiers that I'm mentioning
| above). Some phones can change them when rooted, some can't.
| The network attach process doesn't use the IMEI inherently by
| spec, but some cell cores can query for it (for example, to
| block stolen phones). It's not a network identifier, and
| strange things sometimes happen with the IMEI that don't even
| affect connectivity --
| https://www.androidauthority.com/duplicate-imei-vivo-
| india-1...
| throwaway67743 wrote:
| I think you should clarify this, changing the IMEI in most
| countries is a criminal offence, do not keep brushing this
| topic off.
| sneak wrote:
| > _The network attach process doesn 't use the IMEI
| inherently by spec, but some cell cores can query for it
| (for example, to block stolen phones)._
|
| How widespread is this practice? Do the major US carriers
| know my IMEI?
|
| I tend to believe that they do from what I've seen in their
| web interfaces, and that IMSI rotation alone is basically
| pointless from a privacy standpoint.
| barathr wrote:
| This is one of the problems with mobile -- there's isn't
| any one universally correct answer to this (or most
| questions), so I'll answer to the best of my knowledge.
| IMSIs are what are associated with your identity (because
| it's your SIM and service) in a normal mobile plan, and
| it's what was (is?) used by carriers when they aggregate
| / analyze / sell location data.
|
| IMEIs can be queried by a network core (not the tower)
| and US carriers probably do this every once in a while to
| check against their stolen phone database. It can be
| changed on some devices but not others. It's not
| inherently tied to you as a person but of course it is
| tied to that device.
|
| For those who don't need mobile data service of any sort,
| I think that PGPP Relay does what's needed -- decouples
| your IP from your identity -- and you can use WiFi
| networks without revealing anything.
| sneak wrote:
| > _IMEIs can be queried by a network core (not the tower)
| and US carriers probably do this every once in a while to
| check against their stolen phone database. It can be
| changed on some devices but not others. It 's not
| inherently tied to you as a person but of course it is
| tied to that device._
|
| It's also linked to the rotating IMSI, so all of the
| rotating IMSIs that are used at the times the IMEI is
| interrogated are linked together from a metadata
| standpoint.
|
| They're also all linked to every other IMSI that was ever
| used with that IMEI (at the times the IMEI is
| interrogated).
|
| > _US carriers probably do this every once in a while to
| check against their stolen phone database_
|
| Hourly? Daily? Monthly? Only on first-time seeing a new
| IMSI?
| biktor_gj wrote:
| Probably on every connect, there are ways to randomize
| your IMEI on every boot on certain phones though (that
| might be not very legal in some countries)
| throwaway67743 wrote:
| Please familiarise yourself with how cell networks
| actually work, you can't throw out comments like this
| because it's just not true.
| throwaway81523 wrote:
| Um what? Is PRZ involved? Is he ok with your using that name?
| He had something called PGPFone a long time ago, though it
| didn't get much traction. There have also been tons of other
| encrypted voice programs.
|
| Obscuring traffic patterns without stupendous amounts of dummy
| traffic is quite difficult. That someone is connected to your
| network at all is already a huge giveaway. I have trouble
| seeing how something like this can work without a very big
| operator (think Cloudflare or AWS) being involved, and anything
| that size would have to get in bed with regulators. It's a lot
| easier if you're only trying to do low bandwidth text.
| mrex wrote:
| >He had something called PGPFone a long time ago, though it
| didn't get much traction.
|
| Does anyone have a copy of it? I can't find it ANYWHERE.
| Actually used it way back when, it worked surprisingly OK and
| was the first softphone I used.
| nibbleshifter wrote:
| What payment methods are available, and what data do you
| collect for billing?
|
| Could I pick up an eSIM compatible Android tomorrow for cash at
| the local pawn shop, and get service using your system without
| handing over anything identifiable?
| barathr wrote:
| Right now we use Stripe (mostly because it's the the most
| rock solid choice for payments) -- we don't ask for name or
| email, though of course Stripe could know that as a card
| processor. But our approach goes back to decoupling human
| identity from network identity -- what that payment says is
| that the holder of that card is a subscriber of the service
| but not, for example, what network ID you got.
| nibbleshifter wrote:
| Once you accept some kind of privacy coin (monero) I'll be
| delighted to buy a years service upfront.
|
| I imagine many others will be in the same position.
|
| Obviously taking crypto will mean upfront prepayment of
| accounts (like prepaid mobile credit) instead of monthly
| billing and will require some reworking.
| unknownaccount wrote:
| Why not accept cryptocurrency?
| sneak wrote:
| Your somewhat evasive answers don't really instill
| confidence.
|
| The answer is no, you cannot. Payment cards are PII.
| barathr wrote:
| I don't see what was evasive, happy to answer in more
| detail if there's something you're seeing not answered
| above. We use Stripe as a credit card processor -- so we
| have what Stripe's (very well documented) APIs provide.
| That reveals that you purchased the service, but we don't
| know anything about the _network_ identity you have nor
| your Internet usage, because architecturally we don 't
| have that information.
|
| I understand that revealing that information to Stripe
| may not be acceptable -- not sure what to say to that.
| We've gotten requests for other forms of payments and we
| can consider it, but we don't support anything other than
| credit cards at the moment. (There are credit cards that
| aren't linked to a person, if that's a better option.)
| nibbleshifter wrote:
| > There are credit cards that aren't linked to a person
|
| My desire to know more intensifies.
| selectodude wrote:
| https://www.amexgiftcard.com/
|
| Go to the grocery store, buy with cash, you're good to
| go.
| sneak wrote:
| No. All payment cards in the United States require strong
| government identity and KYC, per US federal law. To
| activate these cards you must provide identity
| information. Providing false information is a crime.
| jjulius wrote:
| >No.
|
| No. Gift cards can be purchased in-person in the US, with
| cash. Said gift cards are activated at the register upon
| purchase. These can then be gifted to someone else, and
| further activation (or registering your personal
| information with the card) is not required.
|
| Edit: I just checked the Visa gift card issuer's site for
| a card I have (and never had to activate or provide
| personal information to), and for shopping online it just
| says:
|
| >In the Payment Method section, enter the Card
| information as you would a credit or debit card. In the
| Billing Address section, fill in your name and address.
|
| So when I check out online, I can enter any information
| that I like, presumably as long as it ties back to a
| valid address of some kind - there is zero effort on the
| part of the card issuer to verify that I am who I say I
| am. I would _only_ need a PIN when making purchases with
| it as a debit card in-person. I should make it clear that
| I 'm not saying that providing false information is
| legal, just that the point about being required to
| provide "strong government identity" to activate gift
| cards has been false for a long time.
| cmroanirgo wrote:
| You can buy visa gift cards for cash
| nibbleshifter wrote:
| I haven't been able to do that in Europe without
| providing ID for well over a decade.
| NoImmatureAdHom wrote:
| Thanks for working on this, I can't wait to give you my
| money.
|
| It seems like you're misreading a key market segment if you
| don't offer cryptocurrency payments (particularly Monero).
| codethief wrote:
| Hi barathr, thanks for joining the discussion! Having had a
| brief look at your paper and the Usenix slides[0], I've got
| three questions:
|
| - Given that your Android app is security-critical for its
| users, are you planning on open-sourcing it in the near future?
|
| - How exactly does your app work on Android? How does it rotate
| the IMSI? (I don't know a lot about eSIMs but I would have
| thought a regular app can't easily change the carrier/network
| settings.)
|
| - As for the relay functionality, I suppose on Android this
| "simply" sets up a VPN once the network connection is
| established?
|
| [0]:
| https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentat...
| throwaway743 wrote:
| Definitely want to try this, but the full feature cost is much
| more than my monthly phone bill. Does this route through a server
| at all (overhead costs) or is everything contained locally?
| Trying to understand the level of rationale for such a cost.
|
| If it's contained locally, it's likely you could make more in
| volume than with a higher price.
|
| Also, it's deceptive/leaves a bad taste in mouth with having the
| Play Store show an "Install" button rather than purchase, only to
| open the app to a paywall. Using this dark pattern could end up
| hurting user perception/the app's reviews.
| barathr wrote:
| Hmm, thanks for that feedback. I think (hope?) people wouldn't
| think that service like this was free (the prices reflect the
| costs). We say pretty clearly on our site what the prices are
| and are trying to be upfront. It's true that the payment isn't
| handled by Google but by Stripe, so you aren't buying it on the
| Play Store, but that's because it's a network service,
| something that isn't under Google's normal payment processing.
| max-b wrote:
| The $5/month price is for the Relay functionality which
| provides the 2-hop traffic tunneling. I'm guessing(?) that's
| not more than your monthly phone bill?
|
| The $90/month price is for unlimited mobile data, so it would
| in theory replace your phone bill entirely.
| wjko21 wrote:
| Can you give a run-down what's involved in getting service? Would
| I need to register with you and get an app or something? Which
| devices are supported? Do I need rooted device?
| barathr wrote:
| You can just install the app on a normal device and subscribe
| to the service on first run. For PGPP Relay, almost any Android
| device (and maybe even Chromebooks) works fine. For PGPP Mobile
| plans, you'd need an eSIM capable device (e.g. Pixel 4 or newer
| or Samsung S22).
| JediPig wrote:
| anything funded by gov is going to have a backdoor... this is
| funded by Princeton / Gov...
|
| So no, make a different solution.
| prschmitt wrote:
| This was a research project that we undertook while at our
| respective universities. We decided to spin it out as we think
| it's useful. We are not funded by the government or Princeton
| (while Princeton owns the IP).
| syrrim wrote:
| >PGPP does not support traditional phone calling/SMS and doesn't
| include a phone number. Instead we recommend that users install
| and use more secure apps such as Signal and Matrix for voice and
| video.
|
| Doesn't signal require a phone number to use? Or did they fix
| that?
| barathr wrote:
| It does, but you can use any number, even a VoIP number. (And
| you can connect to the VoIP provider with PGPP Relay enabled.)
| baobob wrote:
| Just a little feedback (worth a dime or a damn, you decide),
| but I come here for the comments first to judge whether
| clicking the link is worthwhile. The problem discussed in the
| parent comments would completely rule me out as a user:
| solving privacy is not a technical problem, it has always
| been a usability problem. This is primarily why your namesake
| failed - variations on wizardry that ultimately result in a
| user still having to jump through hoops to accomplish simple
| tasks sounds like the same thing all over again to me
| barathr wrote:
| I tend to not take this as a black and white matter -- I
| see privacy as a layered problem -- at multiple
| network/software layers -- and as a policy and user
| behavior question. No single response, whether user
| education, policy, technology, etc. can perfectly solve
| something as complex and nebulous as privacy. (It gets
| worse when we think about the contextual nature of privacy
| -- that what we want out of it depends on the parties
| involved, even the time of day.)
| chmod775 wrote:
| I don't like that this is piggybacking on the recognizable name
| of an open standard and not-for-profit software while being
| considerably less open (Where's the RFC? Where's the source
| code?) and being for-profit.
|
| This is a bit like calling your company "Red Cross
| Pharmaceuticals" despite not being affiliated with them.
| jimhi wrote:
| You assign users a temporary IMSI which is done in the cloud
| right?
|
| How does this protect against IMSI catchers and Stingrays if they
| are done local to you? Local cell tower spoofing?
|
| Also, this is just for data? So if you have another SIM for
| voice/SMS this is completely negated?
| prschmitt wrote:
| By decoupling the user identity from a permanent, globally
| unique IMSI, we make IMSI catcher / Stingray attacks less
| "useful" as the IMSI is changing and isn't tied to the user.
| They can attack your IMSI, but it won't be tied to you and it
| is ephemeral.
| fire wrote:
| what does "high-speed" mobile data mean in terms of actual
| throughput?
| prschmitt wrote:
| As with all mobile service it really depends on coverage in
| your area. The baseline service is LTE.
| trinsic2 wrote:
| So what happens when the major mobile networks decide to stop
| allowing PGPP to use their network?
|
| I seen this happen before. I used to use the "Private Buyer"
| Payment service to anonymously pay for services privately. They
| had issues with payment processors preventing their payments from
| going through. I gather largely due to the privacy aspects of the
| service. That was in the early 2000 and I think the went out of
| business after 3-5 years.
| barathr wrote:
| It's true, they could. The one thing that is perhaps helping at
| this moment is that they've come under scrutiny for their (bad)
| privacy practices -- both from the media and from the FCC.
| Ultimately we see privacy as a layered problem, from a
| technological standpoint and a social standpoint -- we need
| layers of protection across the network and software stack and
| also a combination of policy, technology, and user behavioral
| changes.
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