[HN Gopher] I've locked myself out of my digital life
___________________________________________________________________
I've locked myself out of my digital life
Author : edent
Score : 617 points
Date : 2022-06-07 11:36 UTC (11 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (shkspr.mobi)
(TXT) w3m dump (shkspr.mobi)
| dgellow wrote:
| Damn, I'm really sorry for you, that sounds like a traumatizing
| experience to go to. I wish you the best.
|
| Edit: wait, it is hypothetical?! Not sure how I feel about this,
| the whole article reads like a real situation, learning it is
| hypothetical from other comments makes me feel I've been
| emotionally manipulated...
| PontifexMinimus wrote:
| I get past this by writing down by usernames/passwords in a
| physical book. Of course, this wouldn't help me if I lost the
| book.
| Asooka wrote:
| This is exactly why I try to opt out of any two factor
| authentication on some of my accounts. Yes, the 7 symbol password
| isn't very secure, but it's truly random and I remember it well.
| If anything happens, I can log into the account from anywhere and
| regain access to the rest of my stuff. If anyone knows how I
| could convince Google as well to let me opt out of two factor
| authentication, I would be very grateful. Obviously not for my
| phone account, nor for my professional account. Just for my
| personal email.
| ulzeraj wrote:
| Bitcoiners who like to take their self custody seriously often
| use tools like fire resistant metal plates to write their
| recovery seed words through a center punch tool. Products like
| the coinkite seed plates backup exist but it is also possible to
| roll your own using washers and bolts. For BIP39 only the first 4
| letters of each word are necessary. You can also setup multisig
| or seed x0r to make sure a thief doesn't breach into your seeds
| with just one plate, often stored on multiple geographic
| locations.
|
| I wonder if some similar strategy exists for normal master
| passwords. Could be a nice idea for a low-tech-product-for-high-
| tech-solutions product. Perhaps a metal card where the user can
| manually punch a QR code.
| epigramx wrote:
| I noticed many people in this thread have the delusion perfect
| security can exist; perfect security is impossible; there are
| always drawbacks. You have a choice to make: it's either hard for
| you to unlock the relevant secret to the point of possibly being
| locked out yourself or: you make copies of secrets or use other
| redundances which makes the unlocking easier but the security
| lower. In most cases the reasonable choice is to make it hard
| even for you to fully unlock all the secrets but not to the point
| that is nearly impossible because at the very least: you may want
| to have inheritance.
| throw457 wrote:
| I keep an encrypted backup and second yubikey at my workplace.
| hprotagonist wrote:
| Those are two streams I sure as hell don't want to cross!
| willis936 wrote:
| Which is exactly why it makes for a good out-of-band
| failsafe.
| kalleboo wrote:
| I work from home...
| throw457 wrote:
| Maybe visit your relatives once in a while and use them as a
| data drop. It's really not that big of a problem he makes it
| out to be. He screwed up.
| kalleboo wrote:
| All my relatives live on other continents :(
| durnygbur wrote:
| During my whole career there was only one workplace in which I
| would store stuff critical for my personal life.
| jb3689 wrote:
| This reminds me of the time I worked for a disaster recovery
| company in their backup provider division. You could choose to
| encrypt all of your data end-to-end, but doing so meant you had
| to be responsible with the encryption keys; we could not bail you
| out if you lost them. Unsurprisingly clients were a lot less
| interested in that option once we had this conversation
| orangepurple wrote:
| Safety deposit boxes are an unequivocally terrible idea. They
| have very few safeguards, subject to seizure easily, and contents
| are uninsured or minimally insured.
|
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20545276
|
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27106695
| wintermutestwin wrote:
| I get that SD boxes aren't as great as we'd expect them to be,
| but they can still be part of a reasonable disaster recovery
| strategy:
|
| I live in a fire prone area. I have a safe deposit box 30 mins
| away in a place that won't burn. I keep a HD there with all my
| photos on it. I refresh the drive monthly. The chance that this
| small credit union with maybe 100 boxes will lose, toss or sell
| my box on fire day is pretty minimal.
| orangepurple wrote:
| I concede that they may be OK as storage unit for backup
| copies which can be replaced relatively cheaply and may work
| well if you check that your backup still exists and
| functions. Just don't be like that watch collector that lost
| everything.
| javajosh wrote:
| It's probably worthwhile to keep backup identity documents and
| data with a trusted local friend who's number and address you
| have memorized. Hopefully they are not out of town or suffering a
| calamity, too!
| system2 wrote:
| Answer:
|
| KeePass + FTP file + Local Backup + Google Drive backup. (Can be
| done automatically.)
|
| KeePass file keeps backup codes for 2FA as well. Even if lose my
| laptop, house or any other digital media, I can still connect to
| my ftp or email.
| EGreg wrote:
| It's simple ... just have offsite backup and sync (TM)
|
| As for bootstrapping your identity, consider having a couple
| devices that need your biometrics to generate a password and
| unlock stuff, and store them in various banks or buried under a
| tree.
|
| If you ever get amnesia, you can always implant the location info
| in your ass like Jason Bourne.
| martin_a wrote:
| Lots of made up problems here.
|
| Officials will provide you with replacement/temporary documents
| in a relatively short time, when you have lost them due to a fire
| or sth. else.
|
| With those you can start rebuilding your infrastructure. Get new
| credit/debit cards, buy a new phone, get a replacement SIM from
| your provider, that way get access to your 2FA system again...
|
| Yeah, it's inconvenient and will take some time, but it's not
| hopeless.
| snowwrestler wrote:
| If your 2FA was based on the device itself, like an
| Authenticator app, a new phone with a replacement SIM will not
| help you.
| martin_a wrote:
| I see. That's a single point of failure, introduced by
| yourself. Might be good for some, bad for others.
| [deleted]
| IAmNotAFix wrote:
| This raises the question: How does having your password manager
| breached compares to losing access to your password manager?
| uniqueuid wrote:
| I'm just as guilty as everybody for not doing this, but ...
|
| perfect is again the enemy of good. Instead of a technically
| superior backup with rotation and all, it may be better to have
| some arbitrary, incomplete old backup lying around on a disk at
| someone's place.
| makeitdouble wrote:
| I'd freak out if a friend came to me with a disk and told me to
| keep it safe.
|
| Imagining someday I go on vacation and valuables are stolen,
| including that disk. Now that friend's supposedly personal data
| is compromised, as of course they would set a lower protection
| on something that is supposed to be used during emergencies.
|
| Same if the disk gets corrupted because we didn't realize it's
| stored next to the fan, and 2 years were enough to have an
| impact.
|
| Or we lose it when moving but nobody realizes the loss.
|
| So many weird scenarios, I'd feel more confident if they gave
| me their kid to raise for 5 years.
| danieldk wrote:
| _Imagining someday I go on vacation and valuables are stolen,
| including that disk. Now that friend's supposedly personal
| data is compromised, as of course they would set a lower
| protection on something that is supposed to be used during
| emergencies._
|
| Just use LUKS or FileVault full disk encryption. Your friend
| just has to memorize one password. If it gets stolen, it's as
| good to a thieve as random data.
|
| _Same if the disk gets corrupted because we didn't realize
| it's stored next to the fan, and 2 years were enough to have
| an impact._
|
| I would tell them to make more than one off-site copy. It's
| their responsibility to not just depend on you.
| makeitdouble wrote:
| TBH I wouldn't expect someone stealing hard drives along
| more valuable stuff to just plug it to their Windows
| machine and call it a day because it doesn't mount.
|
| Also the thief doesn't need to be the one dealing with the
| data, the same way people stealing cars are usually not the
| ones brokering them, and brute forcing an offline password
| wouldn't be crazy long considering it's supposed to be
| memorable (possibly by more than one person)
|
| Just to say, spreading backup hard disks here and there,
| and assume everything will be fine even if some of them get
| lost in the wild feels like a pretty laid back attitude in
| contrast to the length spent on having a fully functional
| 2FA system.
| aaronmdjones wrote:
| LUKS these days supports Argon2, which has configurable
| time, memory, and parallelism parameters; brute-forcing a
| single weak password can be as slow as you want it to be.
| The offline backup of my pass(1) repository on a thumb
| drive on my keychain takes more than 3 minutes to unlock
| on an i7-7700K.
| latency-guy wrote:
| The someone could be your bank with a safety deposit box. The
| payment is usually annual and not very expensive IMO at $60 -
| $150 a year.
|
| Of course, you're open to the risk of loss in a bank robbery,
| but how often do those happen anyway?
| lupire wrote:
| Bank closing office and trashing box is a bigger risk.
| tgsovlerkhgsel wrote:
| I wouldn't freak out. I'd store the disk with the same amount
| of care that I store my own disks, and I would insist that it
| is 100% encrypted with free space either encrypted or wiped.
| (If theft of a powered-off storage medium compromises the
| data, you're doing it SERIOUSLY wrong.)
|
| Someone who is storing disks offsite is unlikely to have only
| one copy. I'd offer to review his backup strategy with him,
| but other than that, I'm "dumb storage", how my friend uses
| it is his business. I'd also make clear what expectations are
| if law enforcement or someone with a gun comes for the disk
| (they're getting it, that's what the encryption is for and
| I'm not going to jail/dying for something that should be
| solved with replication).
| Aeolun wrote:
| Do you mind me thinking these reactions are kinda weird? I
| imagine I'd say 'sure' throw the disk on the shelf, and not
| worry about it any more until they show up years later to
| get their disk back.
|
| Then it'll either work or not, but spending any time
| worrying about what might -with some infinitisemally small
| chance- happen seems pointless.
| lupire wrote:
| If they messed up their system, you offer sympathy and
| assistance. Not your fault or problem.
| uniqueuid wrote:
| Yes, the disk should definitely be encrypted, but it could be
| using a rather weak password that you can memorize. The key
| is not to put too much trust in anything, but also not
| overengineer the solution. Just like DVDs - you hand an old
| disk to someone without the expectation that it is usable,
| but it can become a safety net to recover some of your most
| important data. Lots of copies keep stuff safe.
| nicknow wrote:
| Easy to memorize does not equal weak (i.e., easy to brute
| force.) You can use natural language to create very
| difficult to guess or brute force but incredibly easy to
| remember passwords.
| no_time wrote:
| >we didn't realize it's stored next to the fan
|
| Huh how would that shorten the lifespan of any storage
| device?
| mellavora wrote:
| fan might generate magnetic fields.
| ghaff wrote:
| Backups are not binary. As _part_ of a backup strategy, it may
| be worth the $200 or so for a USB drive to have a somewhat
| stale year old backup of last resort sitting in a parent 's or
| friend's closet somewhere. (Presumably encrypted.)
| renonce wrote:
| One of the good things that cryptocurrency brings is secure
| cryptography devices like Ledger. It has a secure screen that
| allows you to copy 24-word mnemonic to a sheet of paper and
| recover everything from it in case you lost/damaged your device.
| The mnemonic can be carved onto a piece of metal that would
| survive fire or locked into bank safe so as to survive incidents
| like this. It has proven to work reliably for exchanges where
| billions of dollars are at stake. And best of all, it supports
| U2F so you can sign in to regular websites with it.
|
| I hope that such technology would find its use outside the crypto
| world and help us keep our identity safe.
| maccard wrote:
| How is that any different to the recovery codes section? OP
| could have carved their one use passwords into the floor, for
| example.
| iLoveOncall wrote:
| How is that any different than carving your password manager's
| recovery key on a piece of metal?
| renonce wrote:
| A nice thing to do if you don't have Ledger. But in case you
| change your password because of a laptop compromise you have
| to change it on all devices and carve it again.
|
| Ledger is much safer so you shouldn't need to do it more than
| once. Just make sure the mnemonic never enters the digital
| world - don't point a camera at it.
| reedlaw wrote:
| One way to circumvent this is to use a strong passphrase to
| deterministically generate the PGP/SSH key [1] to unlock other
| passwords. The SSH key could grant access to a remote server with
| backups and the PGP key could decrypt passwords using pass [2].
| Of course, the "master" passphrase must be kept safe or
| remembered.
|
| 1. https://github.com/skeeto/passphrase2pgp
|
| 2. https://www.passwordstore.org/
| chexum wrote:
| pass is great for availability, I think I have several friends
| even in other countries (if a VPS wouldn't be sufficient) that
| would lend me space with a shell account for a "pass git push".
|
| Of course, the gpg key is an issue, just as well the password
| or the ssh key for those accounts. In addition to
| passphrase2pgp, you could also use paperkey and keep it storage
| and/or a bank safe. I, for one, store my GPG key on a Yubikey.
| Of course, I would have thought I'm storing it safely, but it's
| left in my laptop for a few days now, so chances are I would
| simply leave it there in an actual emergency. However, pass
| also supports (re)encrypting with multiple keys, and one more
| Yubikey can then be kept with friends/family, and it can also
| store backup SSH keys.
|
| Having multiple copies of ssh and GPG keys and the
| passwordstore git repo, chances are great to be able to recover
| most of the online presence.
|
| If a phone/tablet itself can be saved, it could also host
| another mirror of the GIT repo (for example with an app like
| Working Copy), accelerating recovery.
|
| paperkey: https://www.jabberwocky.com/software/paperkey/
| Aeolun wrote:
| For some reason, I did not appreciate this hypothetical. I spent
| my whole blog post feeling sorry for this person only for them to
| suddenly declare it was all fake, and then immediately ask for
| money.
|
| Normally I'm quite good about these things, but this was too
| much.
| system2 wrote:
| Yes, at least it is not to his personal account.
| sillysaurusx wrote:
| Agreed, and I'm surprised no one else is saying it.
|
| It activates the "I was just assaulted" empathy regions of my
| brain. Seeing that it was fake was like, oh, not assaulted,
| just lying for literary effect. Okay.
|
| Like everyone else, I'm glad they're ok, and didn't have to
| suffer through this.
| jamespo wrote:
| Yes, I got a similar feeling as to when I watched Fargo which
| lied about it being a true story
| martinhath wrote:
| The very first line in the post is "Imagine ...". Was it not
| clear that what followed what hypothetical, or was the post
| edited after you commented?
| Aeolun wrote:
| I'm not sure if there was any edit or not, I certainly felt
| it actually happened, though I'll admit there were a few
| discrepancies.
|
| E.g. the picture of the burning house is a McMansion, but the
| author indicates they live in the Uk. The passport is clearly
| _set_ on fire, etc. But I could justify these as 'well,
| obviously there is nothing left, so the author just took a
| random picture of a burning passport'.
| edent wrote:
| OP here - I haven't edited the post. It always started with
| "Imagine..."
| kup0 wrote:
| Agreed, it should have been noted upfront that it was
| hypothetical
| unethical_ban wrote:
| I am working toward a setup where I am certain my critical data
| will not be lost due to broken phones or house fire. I'm also
| working on a strategy for death, amnesia, etc. for my friends to
| help if I ever forget my own password or pass away.
|
| My strategy (some parts still being implemented):
| * Use a password manager (Keepass) * For anything 2FA, it
| either can use Authy (has backup service) or has backup codes.
| * Authy backup code and all other backup codes are in password
| manager * Password manager and all important digital data
| is stored in AWS Glacier
|
| To be implemented: * Instructions for disaster
| recovery printed and stored in AWS * Master password to
| Keepass written in envelope in my house * AWS accounts, S3
| buckets and Shamirs secret sharing configured so that any 2/5
| friends or family can login to AWS, get a copy of my safe, and
| together unlock it in case of death or disaster
|
| AWS Glacier Deep Archive costs about $1/TB/month and is highly
| redundant, so for cold storage and DR is perfect for this.
| Shamirs secret sharing is a cool tech for breaking up secret data
| between people to allow the reconstruction of a secret key.
|
| Links:
|
| https://keepass.info/ - cross platform password safe
|
| https://authy.com/ - Free 2FA with backup service
|
| https://aws.amazon.com/s3/storage-classes/glacier/ - Info on AWS
| Deep Glacier
|
| https://rclone.org/ - Great tool for backing up from local to any
| kind of cloud storage - I use it for encrypted uploads to AWS
| Glacier Deep Archive
|
| https://iancoleman.io/shamir/ - Web tool for Shamir Secret
| Sharing
| night-rider wrote:
| Once you know your master pass phrase in Bitwarden + email you
| can get back in. Providing of course you don't enable 2FA, which
| could lock you out if your Yubikey gets destroyed. Bitwarden has
| an 'attachments' feature so you can upload the QR code seed image
| used to setup TOTP so you can set up all your TOTP accounts again
| in an authenticator app in a worst case scenario.
| sph wrote:
| Having no 2FA on your password manager is incredibly reckless.
| That and your email are by far the two most important things
| you own.
| buro9 wrote:
| I do this.
|
| But I also enable 2FA and store the seed for that publicly...
| on the internet. Just without any context at all as to what it
| does.
|
| By itself the 2FA seed is useless. You need to know what it
| does, and you also need the email (it's not my public email)
| and the password (which is very strong).
|
| I also have a set of plain instructions that my partner has
| explaining how to Bitwarden and access all the things if
| needed, including how to use a 2FA app, etc.
| night-rider wrote:
| Worth noting: Bitwarden gives you a recovery code incase you
| lose your 2FA device. So as Terrence Eden said: invest in a
| safety deposit box and store the recovery code there. Or
| memorize it if you can.
| wazoox wrote:
| My passwords and important documents are sync'ed to the cloud, my
| office PC, my home PC, my home Mac, and my laptop. If for some
| reasons the three places (office, home, and DC) which are in a
| circle of about 40 km are destroyed at the same time, I probably
| could care less as there would be some major disaster like a mega
| earthquake, thermonuclear war, etc.
| [deleted]
| pqs wrote:
| My country issues ID cards. Police has biometric data on me
| (fingers and photo). I guess in my country I can easily obtain a
| new ID card and from here, prove my identity to the different
| providers. I guess it is very hard still, but better than
| nothing. Isn't it?
| layer8 wrote:
| Right. Unless you use a completely anonymous service payed by
| mailing cash in, you should be able to bootstrap your way back
| in, it just may take some time. I'll say that a company whose
| daily business depends on some 2FA-protected service should
| ensure that they have redundant second factors stored at a
| different location.
| bombcar wrote:
| Most places allow you to "bootstrap" back up from nearly
| nothing, but it can involve getting a copy of your original
| birth certificate from the county/hospital, etc.
|
| This is also a reason why you should keep _all_ expired IDs
| around in a safe location separate from your normal life; even
| an expired passport /driver license can help get the
| bureaucracy to get you setup again.
|
| When you're in a situation like this, you're working to
| convince the person at the DMV counter that you're who you say
| you are, and expired IDs, along with utility bills, etc, can go
| very far.
|
| Convincing a computer is much more difficult, which is the
| point of this article.
| [deleted]
| bennyp101 wrote:
| So I do actually use a safety deposit box at the bank he mentions
| - and I think it is worth the PS20 a month.
|
| It does contain a backup yubikey (which is set as a master for
| creating new ones) as well as a printed paper copy of my private
| key. The 2nd slot on it stores the secret key for my 1password so
| I can get back into that if needed.
|
| I use Authy for 2FA which is backed up with a decent password
| that I know - but would be pretty tricky to guess.
|
| The bank have a photo of myself and wife, along with signatures -
| so when you go to access it they compare your photo (I had to
| show ID last time as I had grown a beard which looked nothing
| like me) and have you sign to access. So I think even if I had
| lost my card with my account details on it, I should still be
| able to get back into my digital life.
|
| Edit: Even if the safety deposit key is destroyed, you can get a
| replacement for <insert fairly high amount of money> if it came
| to it.
| butz wrote:
| Time for my "carve your 2FA recovery codes into rock" startup to
| shine. I might even offer offsite backups: store your rock with
| codes in my back yard with public access, the trick here is - no
| one knows which stone is whose.
| HillBates wrote:
| joemazerino wrote:
| Incredibly telling. How did he fake the pictures of the phone,
| yubikey etc.
| joshstrange wrote:
| Google images?
|
| I mistook the initial "imagine" but read to the end to see it
| was hypothetical. That said the passport burning set off alarms
| in my head. The rest was within reason, even the house on fire
| (thought the non-lightning-proof fire safe sounded fishy) but
| he had time to take a picture of his passport while it was on
| fire and he didn't try to put it out? Unrealistic.
|
| I guess I should have been skeptical of /any/ pictures for that
| matter, especially the house since "how would he take the
| picture if his phone was fried".
| productceo wrote:
| This.
|
| I never understood MFAs. In terms of ability to "log back in", it
| creates more "weakest links", where failure of one can lock me
| out of all.
|
| Most consumers don't, but I use 3+ phones at a time, picking up
| whichever one has battery and is near me, and replace phones
| multiple times a year. MFAs and similar "future-looking" security
| solutions seem to target majority cases, whereas I think such
| security solutions need to support edge cases.
|
| Currently, my best guess is magic links where I can set aliases
| like "this particular email" to be the source of truth, such that
| I can lose a device or two and still access the email, and still
| replace entire email if email is compromised (or regularly, just
| for best practice). But definitely does not feel satisfying...
|
| Big respect for experts who are thinking about this problem day
| and night to solve it for the humankind. Seems hard and is
| definitely critically important!
| Whitespace wrote:
| This recently happened to me after my laptop and phone were
| stolen on vacation. Everything is in 1Password. I of course
| didn't have the recovery paper with me. I recently changed my
| iCloud password to be more secure, and luckily I remembered it.
| But I needed 2FA to log in still.
|
| I had to go to an AT&T store, port my phone number to a different
| iPhone, restore from an iCloud backup using the SMS 2FA, and then
| I could finally log into 1Password for my passwords and MFA.
|
| If I didn't have a memorable iCloud password this would have been
| impossible without the 1Password recovery paper.
|
| Devices are often lost/stolen on vacation where the myriad layers
| of protection are extremely hard -- if not impossible -- to
| penetrate.
| jen729w wrote:
| If you (the Royal 'you', I'm not having a go at _you_ ) have
| 1Password and you do _not_ have a printed, sealed copy of your
| recovery steps safely hosted at a best friend or relative's
| house then I think you're bonkers.
|
| It's so easy. Print it out. Write your password on it. Put it
| in an envelope and seal it. Give it to someone - suffice to say
| you trust this person with your life - who doesn't live next
| door (otherwise their house burnt down along with yours).
|
| You never need do anything ever again, other than not change
| your master password.
| joshstrange wrote:
| This is why some of my most important accounts (iCloud, Google)
| are passwords that I've forced myself to memorize. I've been
| stuck in the chicken and egg quagmire before and it really
| sucks. iCloud is particularly bad especially on the phone
| because none of the popups have password manager support so you
| have to manually go look it up, navigate back to whatever
| prompted for the password, and re-trigger the dialog.
| nicoburns wrote:
| Yeah, I have a few key passwords (email and password manager
| being the main ones) memorised, and also stored written on
| paper in a safe place. Password manager also explicitly
| _doesn't_ have 2FA enabled so I should always be able to access
| that so long as I have an internet connection.
|
| Now that I think about it, I might need to rethink my 2FA
| strategy for email to ensure that's also accessible.
| petesergeant wrote:
| I've got several little USB drives with the recovery key on it,
| although at the moment I'm also trying to use Anki to memorize
| it...
| wintermutestwin wrote:
| >a memorable iCloud password
|
| Serious question: Once you have this, why bother with a
| password manager? Why not just keep a password spreadsheet in
| iCloud?
| corrral wrote:
| Password managers plus biometric auth mean I almost never
| even need to copy-paste a password, let alone type one. I
| just hit "fill" and it fills it in. For most of the services
| I use these days, I've never typed _or manually pasted_ the
| password, ever, not even once.
| Sirened wrote:
| A password manager mitigates other threats that a spreadsheet
| in iCloud Drive does not, such as a program just directly
| reading it and ruining your life. And, anyways, password
| managers give you auto fill which is a significant quality of
| life improvement.
|
| A memorable password is not a bad password, if done right. I
| have a password for both my google account and Apple ID
| that's easy to type because when you're in device setup you
| can't auto fill and so random passwords are a huge pain
| nicknow wrote:
| When I was doing IT ops for a company, we had a little
| program that generated 4 random common words and put a
| symbol between them (!.@#$%). Super easy to type and fairly
| easy to memorize, but according to every password checker
| also really hard to crack.
|
| "Broth.Dogs.Run.Blue" is 10x easier to remember than
| "$#kdSk$SWE223" but 1000x times more secure. Probably more
| so, because you are less likely to have to write it down to
| remember it.
| Whitespace wrote:
| As joshstrange mentions above, iCloud password prompts don't
| support password managers, which is the main reason why I
| have a memorable one.
|
| Password managers are more useful to me than a spreadsheet in
| iCloud. I don't see why having a memorable iCloud password
| implies I should get rid of a password manager.
|
| Do you have a spreadsheet of passwords in a cloud account
| somewhere?
| doctorhandshake wrote:
| For this reason on long trips I travel with a laminated
| recovery password inside the zip of a 'secret pocket' in a
| belt.
| bombcar wrote:
| One nice thing about recovery passwords is you don't need to
| put the account name/email with it (you'll presumably
| remember that).
|
| That reduces the risk of losing it a bit.
| [deleted]
| rsync wrote:
| Easy solution would have been to backstop your secrets in a cloud
| storage account run by a firm that you can call on the phone and
| talk to a Unix engineer in California.
|
| It would have been a pain and we would have made you jump through
| all kinds of weird hoops and I would have to be personally
| involved... but we'd have gotten you in.
|
| After 21 years of this we've seen all of this - customers die,
| people are in comas, admins get fired... we've helped everyone
| and treated them like human beings.
|
| And yes - it does cost a bit more than backblaze.
| edent wrote:
| As I said in the post, if the company can grant access to me -
| they can grant access to themselves, or a malicious insider, or
| my twin sister.
|
| The pertinent question is - are you happy with that trade-off?
| rsync wrote:
| "As I said in the post, if the company can grant access to me
| - they can grant access to themselves, or a malicious
| insider, or my twin sister."
|
| Well, presumably the access is to (seemingly) random,
| gibberish data that you have stored with (borg, restic,
| etc.). So you'll need to remember a last-ditch passphrase to
| your own encryption if you're using us for your backstop.
|
| We encourage _all_ of our customers to encrypt their data
| here - regardless of their use-case - and we don 't hold
| those keys.
|
| I can't overstate to you _just how suspicious_ and spidey-
| sense-tingling we get when someone says they are locked out
| and can we help them get back in. We get very adversarial and
| we have a LOT of tests we can apply to their claims.
|
| The reason other firms don't do this isn't because it's not
| workable - but because it is time consuming and "not
| scalable".
| nicoburns wrote:
| If you're able to remember a password, then why would you
| need to call support?
| rsync wrote:
| We're talking about two different passwords - the
| password to your rsync.net account and the _passphrase_
| to (duplicity /borg/restic/etc.) that you used to create
| your failsafe backup here.
|
| If you use an SSH key with a passphrase, etc., to access
| rsync.net that could, indeed, be an authentication that
| you lose because your phones and laptops and yubikeys
| burn in a fire.
|
| But if you can authenticate to a human being, which you
| can here (after a lot of probing and testing), then the
| _only thing you need to remember is your borg
| passphrase_. Or duplicity. Or gpg pipelined through tar
| ... or whatever.
| mst wrote:
| Also, for a bunch of cases, you can use something akin to
| a multi-step ceasar cipher.
|
| Yes, the obvious case of e.g. rot13 isn't exactly helpful
| security wise, but if you select e.g. 4, 22, 18 as the
| rotation order now you only need to be able to memorise
| -that- to get your passphrase back from an otherwise
| unmarked file lying around in the same (or other)
| storage.
|
| Obviously, think hard about your threat model for that
| one, but if (as I keep procrastinating) I ever put
| backups of such stuff on something like rsync.net I'd
| give something akin to that approach serious
| consideration as being an acceptable trade-off overall.
| 2OEH8eoCRo0 wrote:
| Interesting. It seems that there is no digital life. There are
| bits of information out there that only you can unscramble but
| there is nothing other than passwords binding these to your
| identity.
|
| How is this solved in the real world? Gated access and
| obfuscation? Having a safe that is perfect and indestructible
| (encryption) only to rely on a flimsy key (yubikey, remembering
| passwords, etc.) is asking for trouble.
| DeathArrow wrote:
| I memorized a very long password, so if everything digital burns,
| breaks or is stollen, I can go online and retrieve the rest of my
| passwords.
|
| That very long password is made by applying an self made
| algorithm, so in case I forgot it, I can recreate it.
| pass_throwaway wrote:
| I don't use a password manager. Instead, I have a formula in my
| head to generate a unique complex password for each site or
| online service based on its domain name and some other optional
| parameters, if the site has password constraints (eg. no special
| characters, short maximum length).
|
| I have an encrypted plain text file (just a .txt in an encrypted
| macOS disk image) containing all of the parameters (if any) to
| generate the passwords for each site, which I keep on Dropbox,
| accessible at public URL I have memorized. This lets me easily
| update my password parameters file (open the disk image on my
| computer, update the .txt file, close the disk image).
| joshstrange wrote:
| Why not just use a password manager, store the emergency
| recovery kit in Dropbox or at a public url (encrypt the kit
| with a password you know)?
| pass_throwaway wrote:
| In addition to the fact that password managers can be single
| points of failure for reasons other than credential loss,
| sometimes I need a password on a device where my password
| manager is not available (eg. a friend's device).
| moffkalast wrote:
| This is the way to go imo, password managers sound cool and may
| prevent password reuse leak problems but what they also are is
| a single point of failure for all your accounts.
|
| It's swapping a problem that doesn't affect you (especially
| with 2fa being a thing for everything now) for a much larger
| critical problem that can seriously screw you.
| AdmiralAsshat wrote:
| The problem with this technique is that if it's generated
| algorithmically with no "randomness" to it, someone else can
| figure it out.
|
| You might be doing everything right, but perhaps your vendor's
| database gets breached, and your plaintext password for Adobe
| gets posted on the darkweb. So if someone sees that your
| plaintext password is "1a2s3d4fAdobe5g6h!", they might then
| infer how you "construct" your password, and then go try
| logging into your Amazon account with the same email address
| and "1a2s3d4fAmazon5g6h!" as the password.
| pass_throwaway wrote:
| The algorithm is considerably more complicated than that.
| Somebody would have to get ahold of several of my passwords
| (and the names of the services they lead to) to figure out my
| algorithm. For that to happen, someone would have to invest a
| large amount of resources to specifically target me, in which
| case I probably have bigger problems to worry about than some
| relatively low-stakes online accounts getting compromised.
| For extremely sensitive accounts (eg. bank, primary email) my
| passwords do not follow this scheme.
|
| Remember, the vast majority of password reuse attacks are
| automatic credential stuffing, not deliberate, individual
| targeting.
| kingaillas wrote:
| Nobody is going to bother with reverse engineering your
| algorithm, or even bother targeting you individually, when
| it is orders of magnitudes more likely your passwords will
| be revealed via a garden variety database breach/leak. That
| low stakes online account you have? That's also the one
| likely to have their user account/password database stolen,
| which was stored plaintext.
|
| Basically the threat model I am worried about is: random
| website gets hacked and loses its password database. So if
| criminals hack two such sites and correlate email
| addresses, they will see two essentially fully random
| passwords for me. If that happens to you, they might notice
| a pattern in website url and prefix/postfix characters.
| pass_throwaway wrote:
| Once that happens, a criminal could notice your password
| is more of a pattern than a full random password (of
| typable characters).
|
| But in order to do anything beyond hacking the single
| compromised account, the criminal would have to reverse
| engineer my algorithm, which, as you said, nobody would
| bother doing.
|
| In addition, the algorithm is complex enough that it
| would be hard for a casual observer to distinguish the
| embedded domain name from general password randomness.
| Your scheme ideally would rely on not tying all your
| accounts together with the same email address
|
| That is true, but this only becomes relevant when an
| attacker is manually searching for my email across
| multiple password dumps (as opposed to an automated
| credential stuffing attack), which means I'm being
| specifically targeted.
| kingaillas wrote:
| >which means I'm being specifically targeted
|
| I don't know about that. Various episodes of Darknet
| Diaries make it clear stolen password databases are
| searched for any matching email accounts, which of course
| depends on the motivation level of the attackers. I
| suspect a simple "check all emails in this one database
| for a match in the other database" isn't that large of a
| hurdle. Your average CS101 class might include an extract
| emails, sort, merge-compare type of assignment.
|
| And yes, like so many others here, you apparently have
| the goldilocks algorithm. Easy/simple enough for you to
| generate on the fly yet secure enough to resist all but
| nation-state attackers.
|
| To that I say - congrats. But the GENERAL advice to the
| public at large is that the rest of humanity isn't as
| awesome as you are, and THEIR password generating
| algorithms of generated characters plus domain name are
| easily deduced from a single sample, thus making password
| managers far far superior to protecting against actual
| real world threats ("crappy website has lousy security
| and got breached through zero fault of mine") and not the
| frequently imagined threats ("I am the target of a
| concerted effort by extremely sophisticated attackers
| with infinite time/budget").
| giancarlostoro wrote:
| Random tangent, but do we even need .mobi domains anymore? The
| web became responsive to mobile, so I fail to see a case where it
| makes sense, and with Google having made .app it even defeats the
| idea that they could be used to market apps. Whoever runs that
| TLD missed the mark there honestly.
| kingcharles wrote:
| I went to jail. When I got out, of the thousands of online
| accounts I had created over the previous 20 years I could only
| get back into about 3 of them.
|
| I'm probably about to return to jail, and now everything is MFA,
| so I have no idea how to set this up so that my friends and
| family can get into my accounts. My phone will be dead within
| weeks, so I'm going to lose my number, which is a primary factor
| in many logins.
| epigramx wrote:
| The mistake here, is that 2FA is used in a circular logic hence
| it's not useful to use it. If you must avoid 2FA being a problem
| in a situation like this just don't use it; remember a password
| or otherwise keep it secure; never lose it.
| Andrew_nenakhov wrote:
| This is a very good example of vulnerability introduced by badly
| organized security system. One does not keep backup access codes
| in places which are unavailable in case of a failure of primary
| access methods. Store your 2FAs in a separate phone kept in a
| SAFE, a combination to which you do remember. Also, adding 2FA to
| a password manager is probably excessive, just use a really long
| password which is easy to remember. Like
| "HowOn5EarthsCanAPersonForgetHisPazzw0rdToPasswordManager?",
| that'll be enough.
| [deleted]
| avsteele wrote:
| With no second factor you are vulnerable to anything that could
| sniff your password. I guess this is fine as long as you never
| log on from any untrusted machine/location?
| viraptor wrote:
| Also any phishing you don't notice, or many browser hacks. A
| good 2fa (u2f, fido) authenticates you to the service, but
| also verifies the service is what you expect.
| fullstop wrote:
| The author's codes were kept (on paper) in a safe, but the
| contents were destroyed in the fire.
| roopepal wrote:
| Just in case you did not notice, this did not actually
| happen, it was a hypothetical.
| superultra wrote:
| I wonder if one workaround isn't to store info like 1Password key
| and password - not username - in a pdf with a simple, easily
| remembered password, in an email IMAP account with a similarly
| easy password? Could even be a bitly link to a Dropbox file.
|
| I know that creates a huge security hole but it's only one if
| someone else is able to identify which account it applies to.
| tpool wrote:
| - "Sadly, the fire-proof safe wasn't lightning-strike safe and is
| now obliterated."
|
| But... the lightning strike caused a fire. That shouldn't mean
| the fire is "extra hot" or something like that.
|
| I'm disturbed, as I keep these kinds of thing in _my_ fire safe
| for just such a reason.
| ubermonkey wrote:
| Fire safes are rated by time and temperature.
|
| A particularly intense house fire could exceed the parameters
| of one's safe.
| leksak wrote:
| It was all hypothetical
|
| > In the meantime, please rest assured that my home is still
| standing. But, if you can, please donate generously to the
| DEC's Ukraine Humanitarian Appeal
| dav_Oz wrote:
| For anyone confused about _heat_ and _temperature_ (which in
| everyday speech get often mixed up) here is a good
| thermodynamics recap about the definition.[0]
|
| A lightning strike can _heat up_ the air around it because of
| its relatively high electrical resistance; up to 50k
| degrees[1].
|
| The change in temperature (average kinetic energy of the air
| molecules) itself can be seen in the lighting flash (creating
| for split seconds an awesome "plasma channel", effectively
| ripping apart the molecules in its dendritic way through
| hundreds of MV) and consequently heard (if near enough) as a
| pressure wave, a quick rolling thunder rumble.
|
| Relative to the vast amount of air around a typical lightning
| discharge event with its characteristic current flow [2] this
| "temperature" cannot sustain itself so it disperses very
| quickly. However under the right conditions (flammable
| materials, humidity etc.) this can jumpstart the chemical
| process of "burning". Because of the multitude of variables
| this ain't straightforward [3] as often depicted in movies. So,
| no the lightning itself cannot "damage" the integrity of a safe
| but the secondary effects of the environment around it i.e.
| continuing heat source. (For convenience I've left out the
| scenarios regarding possible EMP damage and its secondary
| effects).
|
| [0]https://www.khanacademy.org/science/chemistry/thermodynamics
| ...
|
| [1]https://www.weather.gov/safety/lightning-temperature
|
| [2]https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6953689/table/e
| ...
|
| [3]https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6953689/#!po=85
| ...
| rowanajmarshall wrote:
| Replace "house hit by lightning" with "house hit by missile
| strike and now occupied by the Russian Army", a very real
| scenario nowadays, and you have the same problem again.
| makeitdouble wrote:
| As a LockPickingLawyer fan, I sometimes wonder if these "fire-
| proof" safes would actually withstand a fire, as there is so
| much bullshit labelling going on.
| ipsi wrote:
| Well, this article is a hypothetical, but fire-proof safes are,
| like anything with "proof" in the name, _not_ fire-proof,
| merely fire-resistant. It 's theoretically possible for a
| lightning to strike in the worst possible place and trigger an
| unusually hot fire, one that exceeds the maximum tolerance for
| your safe. House fires can apparently hit 1500F, and if you've
| cheaped out on your safe then you might be in trouble (e.g.,
| the Amazon Basics Fire Safe "can protect your belongings at
| 1200 F for 20 minutes").
| altairprime wrote:
| The 2017 Tubbs wildfire burned so hot that it melted fireproof
| safes, as I understand it. Something about 50-100mph winds and
| incompetent forest fuel management making the fire burn extra
| hot?
| Filligree wrote:
| A fire-proof safe is a safe which won't be destroyed by a fire.
|
| That doesn't mean it won't heat up.
| netsharc wrote:
| That would violate the laws of thermodynamics...
|
| They usually have a rating of how much fire heat they can
| sustain before the insides get uncomfortable for paper...
| abofh wrote:
| About 420 degrees, the question is duration, not
| temperature.
| Zachsa999 wrote:
| Use a password manager to that allows custom encrypted vault
| storage, and gives the installer for free.
|
| Use a basic password to store the vault and installer offsite,
| with a memorized string of random words that fit together in such
| a way that you will not forget, bury a paper in your garden.
|
| I recently caught myself hosting a password manager on a home
| server, with the data stored in sql on the same machine both
| credentials of which were on the self-hosted server.
|
| Be careful with your passwords folks
| pif wrote:
| > All my passwords are stored in a Password Manager.
|
| And that is the problem!
|
| I've never bought the hype about a different password for each
| service. I've 4 passwords in total, sorted by importance, and
| each new service gets the one most appropriate according to the
| data it manages.
|
| So, having Hacker News pirated means my Quora account is at risk:
| so what?
|
| And really important stuff (read: banks) is protected by two-
| factor authentication anyway.
|
| > In the boring analogue world - I am pretty sure that I'd be
| able to convince a human that I am who I say I am.
|
| Not really, if you have spent your whole life introducing you as
| "qjkhgjbhjhgjhgj" to one person and "opiqnbasvwnezc" to the
| other.
| bigDinosaur wrote:
| This literally is saying that if someone compromises one of the
| passwords you use for all the important stuff like banking,
| they've literally just gained access to every important account
| you have which can be life changing in a very bad way.
|
| Props on using four passwords instead of just one, though.
| pif wrote:
| > And really important stuff (read: banks) is protected by
| two-factor authentication anyway.
| bigDinosaur wrote:
| Still a bad idea, you're leaking information for social
| engineering attacks either against you or the company
| holding your account.
|
| Anyway your 2FA is acting to make your passwords actually
| unique, in a sense, I suppose. Not that I'd necessarily
| trust it on its own.
| pif wrote:
| The worst information leaks are passwords written on a
| post-it, and they are usually the outcome of obnoxious
| safety rules.
| emaro wrote:
| > I've never bought the hype about a different password for
| each service.
|
| It's not a hype. Any reasonable security expert will recommend
| you this. Because passwords evidentially get leaked. And most
| people are (I'm sure you aren't) vulnerable to social
| engineering, especially if the attacker has access to other
| accounts like HN or Quora.
|
| I surely hope that you don't reuse the password of your email
| account.
| pif wrote:
| > I surely hope that you don't reuse the password of your
| email account.
|
| That one is very important for me and is not reused at the
| moment.
|
| > Any reasonable security expert will recommend you this.
|
| Not when you get to the point that you cannot manage them in
| your head any more, and you need one more service (or piece
| of hardware) that you need to protect (via a password and/or
| physically).
| fzeroracer wrote:
| > So, having Hacker News pirated means my Quora account is at
| risk: so what?
|
| This is all well and good until you encounter hackers that sell
| off your account(s) for spam or other malicious reasons and
| pretend to be you while doing whatever illegal services or
| transactions you can think of. If you can't think of reasons
| why hackers can't make your life hell when they get access to
| your accounts then you're not thinking hard or creatively
| enough.
| MarkusWandel wrote:
| My digital life isn't as cloud-based. Most of it is in locally
| stored files. For example, my Gmail account is synced to a local
| Thunderbird instance and all my photo and video storage is local.
|
| I have two sets of backup hard disks (each set is a current one,
| and an old one, both of which get synced; the old one only with
| the more important stuff since it is smaller). Both sets are LUKS
| encrypted. One set lives in the filing cabinet at the office
| (during the COVID lockdown it was at a friend's house). An
| automatic nag system bugs me if either set hasn't been updated
| for 40 days.
|
| Updating them is semi-manual. Plug them in, enter the decryption
| code, run a script stored on the disk itself that gathers all the
| data - from all over my LAN - that needs backing up. When it's
| done, unmount and unplug the disk. Make sure one set is always
| offsite - update set A, take it to the office, store it there,
| bring set B home, update it.
|
| It's not perfect. If the sort of disaster in this article were to
| strike, I'd potentially not have the last month's data. But I
| would have all my passwords (backed up on these disks) and if I
| had something that gives a last-resort recovery code, that too
| would be on there - in a separately encrypted sub-filesystem that
| I know the password to. This is so the super sensitive stuff
| isn't even decrypted fulltime on my home machine.
|
| I should have readable copies of all the important physical
| documents and cards in this separately encrypted subfolder too,
| but currently don't.
| ClumsyPilot wrote:
| Why use such drives instead of like a NAS that you can access
| remotely? Isn't this more hasstle?
| 0xCMP wrote:
| It is likely to protect against accidental or malicious
| modification of the data. eg ransomware.
|
| Also not being "in use" makes it less likely to have a
| mechanical failure.
| bombcar wrote:
| Off-line backups prevent entire classes of issues; for
| example, off-line backups can't be destroyed by a virus or
| ransomware attack.
| MarkusWandel wrote:
| To me these hard disks are one step removed from optical
| backups, which I used to make. The more "offline" the better.
| Even the currently local set is kept unplugged between
| updates. Also keeping a NAS at another location means having
| internet access at that location. The work network/firewall
| would not permit this use, for one thing.
| 0x53 wrote:
| I use a variation of the USB to a friend method that I call
| horcruxing. Several USBs distributed to different friends that
| contain enough info for me to get back into my cloud synced
| password manage (plus a copy of all the passwords I have at that
| time). The USB is encrypted with a password I have memorized.
| devit wrote:
| You are supposed to have an offsite backup that you can decrypt
| with only a password you remember, precisely in case this
| happens.
| kalleboo wrote:
| Two-factor authentication terrifies me.
|
| For my bank from my country of origin that I maintain, I get a
| battery-powered RSA token. From that I can generate a mobile 2FA
| token in an app that I can use to log in for day-to-day
| transaction. If I lose the devices with the 2FA token, I have to
| pray that that CR2032 is still alive or I lose access to that
| account until I spend thousands of dollars on international
| flights (replacing the battery resets the device)
| tragictrash wrote:
| It shouldn't. You can just use authy, which allows you to
| onboard devices using your phone number, and then a password to
| decrypt the existing entries. If you use 2fa with authy,
| remember that password, and remember your password Manager's
| password, something like this scenario won't ruin your life.
| kalleboo wrote:
| My bank doesn't use TOTP but rather the Swedish BankID system
| for 2FA
| jimmydorry wrote:
| You open yourself up to a much more devastating attack vector
| though: sim swapping.
|
| If someone can convince the human at the other end of the
| line that they are you and that they lost their phone, in
| most countries and with most telco's, they will be able to
| get up and running with a new SIM with _YOUR_ number.
|
| Resettting your Authy password via SMS is then just a step
| away.
| avh02 wrote:
| Yeah i stopped using authy the first time a token was
| automatically seeded this way (may have been another way,
| but it was automatic and I didn't like it because I was
| also using the seed on my Pebble which i could then no
| longer do with this method). i prefer manual control over
| stuff like that and definitely don't want it assuming some
| magic is okay.
| unethical_ban wrote:
| I don't believe you are correct. I believe an existing
| installation of Authy is required.
|
| >Can I reset my Backup Password?
|
| > Yes, it is possible to reset your Backup Password by
| tapping on Change Password in the Backup Password area of
| the Settings menu within the Authy app. You will have to
| ensure all 2FA account tokens are decrypted on your device
| (No red lock icons). Once a user resets their Backup
| Password on a device, all other devices with the Authy app
| for this user's Authy account will require entering this
| new Backup Password.
|
| https://support.authy.com/hc/en-
| us/articles/360036077534-Aut...
| jackson1442 wrote:
| You can reconfigure Authy to require an existing device to
| let you in as well. It won't prevent the "absolutely
| everything is fried" case but it's better than most
| password managers.
|
| If someone tries to use SMS/Voice to activate Authy on my
| account it just gets rejected.
| gtsteve wrote:
| Authy requires a backups password to restore, or least it
| can be configured to. Of course, hopefully you remember it
| in a disaster situation. If you have a cloud password
| manager you can end up in a chicken and egg situation.
| mst wrote:
| I am, on the whole, more concerned about self-DoS via fire
| or similar disaster than I am about sim swapping.
|
| Other people's threat models will certainly differ though,
| and whether mine is well chosen is certainly open to
| question.
| atleta wrote:
| Google authenticator will also backup your keys to the google
| cloud so installing it on a new device will just work.
| You'll, of course, need to remember your google account
| password and not set it up with authenticator as the second
| factor.
|
| (I don't know much about authy, I only use it to access m
| sendgrid account, but I didn't like the fact that it used SMS
| for setting up or restoring an account.)
| tluyben2 wrote:
| With 'old' banks (and other systems that use these tokens)
| with a physical token, you can (often?) not do that.
| usrn wrote:
| IMO the primary reason they're pushing 2FA is for the people
| who are careless enough to eg log into their personal email on
| their work computer.
|
| I wish there was an exam you could take that would get you a
| "computing license" that you could show to bypass a lot of this
| stuff.
| MetaWhirledPeas wrote:
| > eg log into their personal email on their work computer
|
| Can you elaborate on the specific risk here?
| heretogetout wrote:
| It can also reduce fraud reports -- if a transaction was
| authenticated with 2FA then it's less likely the fraud claim
| is legit and more likely it can be tossed.
| Gigachad wrote:
| Enforcing 2FA is the most effective security rule ever
| created. Vastly more effective than password rules, rotation,
| user education, any anything else ever tried.
|
| With 2FA, almost all of the traditional attacks are
| impossible and the only one left is specially crafted fake
| login pages.
| usrn wrote:
| Meh.
|
| You're right when you're dealing with large groups of
| people which is exactly what I said in my original comment.
| If you understand these issues passwords on their own are
| fine. 2FA has some nasty edge cases that make it very easy
| to lose access to your account (which is what everyone in
| this thread is talking about.) So as always you're
| balancing security and availability. For some people the
| proper balance means just password authentication makes
| sense.
|
| The best IMO would be client side certificates but no one
| except maybe Github supports those.
| LocalPCGuy wrote:
| No, passwords on their own are never "enough" for you to
| be secure as you only control your side of the equation.
| You don't know if the place you are storing it is doing
| so in plain text, storing a decryption key right next to
| it, etc. Even if you are careful (I know what you said
| above), the network you are on could be compromised
| despite your best efforts/knowledge. Or any number of
| other things that could make it trivial for someone to
| gain access to your account in the event they gain access
| to simply the password.
|
| I don't claim 2FA is perfect, it has its own host of
| issues as is being discussed. But it isn't just for "the
| masses that don't understand how to make strong passwords
| or how to be secure". Certs are good, but they need to be
| made simpler than they are now for the very people you
| claim 2FA is for or they won't be adopted (one of the
| reasons they aren't more ubiquitous, IMO). And some certs
| implementations have issues with account recovery as well
| if you lose access to them.
|
| It's a really hard problem that you do a bit of
| disservice to when you dismiss it as "just a problem of
| the plebes".
| envy2 wrote:
| > You don't know if the place you are storing it is doing
| so in plain text, storing a decryption key right next to
| it, etc.
|
| Any service that is storing passwords in plain text is
| probably not implementing 2FA in an safe way, either.
| LocalPCGuy wrote:
| That really isn't an argument against my point, that it's
| very hard to verify what is happening once you click
| submit with your password.
| IAmNotAFix wrote:
| > careless enough to eg log into their personal email on
| their work computer.
|
| Can you explain why that is an issue?
| bbarnett wrote:
| Employers keylog. How safe are those logs, for one?
| recursive wrote:
| A lot of work computers MiTM all traffic using a corporate
| certificate authority. A middle box tears apart the
| requests, and repacks it using its own cert.
| causi wrote:
| I would suggest keeping an eye on the voltage with a meter and
| when it starts to drop solder on a second battery while you
| replace the first, the same way people replace game cartridge
| batteries without losing SRAM saves.
| tgsovlerkhgsel wrote:
| That's a great recipe to fumble and accidentally reset the
| device.
| causi wrote:
| How? The original battery provides power while you're
| soldering on the backup and the backup is solidly soldered
| on while you swap out the original. How could you be so
| clumsy you rip out a solder joint?
| kalleboo wrote:
| What if it's only held in by the case itself and not a
| clip? Then I'd disconnect it simply by opening the
| device?
| causi wrote:
| Since you knew it was a CR2032 I assumed you were already
| familiar with it.
| kalleboo wrote:
| I just guessed by the physical size of the device. I
| guess it could be a smaller coin cell as well.
| shoghicp wrote:
| You are correct. Those BankID physical devices have
| tamper switches that erase RAM on device opening.
|
| An alternative is debit card bankid (as a smartcard, then
| add Mobile BankID back), but it's being deprecated soon.
| jbarberu wrote:
| A bit OT, but at least for the Game Boy you can pop the
| cartridge (front of the case off) into a console (GBA is
| especially good as it only covers part of the cart), power it
| on and then replace the battery. The game save will remain.
| Or you can use something like the GB Operator and backup the
| game save, replace the battery and then rewrite it to the
| cart :)
| unethical_ban wrote:
| 2FA can be "backed up" by either using a 2FA soft token program
| that allows for backups, like 2faone or Authy, OR by the
| services themselves granting backup codes for emergencies. For
| my threat profile, I have no problem storing my 2FA backup
| passwords/codes in my master password safe. If that is
| compromised, I was doomed anyway.
|
| If a service does not allow the use of "generic" TOTP ala Authy
| or Google Authenticator, AND it does not allow for one time use
| backup codes, then I do not use 2FA with that service unless
| required. My main bank forces the use of their own built in 2FA
| (Symantec VIP on the backend) which pisses me off. My work uses
| Okta and RSA. Oh well.
| kalleboo wrote:
| Pretty much all the banks in my country (Sweden) use a local
| national digital ID system called BankID which is issued by
| the banks themselves to mobile devices as a second factor and
| gets tied to your national ID number (and once issued by your
| bank is used by your bank, other banks, the government for
| tax filing/address change/receiving official mail digitally
| instead of physically, signing contracts for e.g. apartments,
| and even retailers to address auto-fill).
|
| All the banks I know of require 2FA in the form of either a
| physical, battery-powered RSA token (sometimes in the form of
| a EMV card reader) or a valid BankID.
|
| The assumption is you live in the country and can just visit
| a branch if you have any trouble, which works for 99% of
| customers. But not for me.
| BruiseLee wrote:
| I lost access to my bank account in UK because my token ran out
| of battery. The only way to fix this is to fly to London and
| show up in person. This is a pain because I can't even figure
| out my account balance - and this is something I must report
| for U.S. taxes.
| Macha wrote:
| There's a youtuber/streamer I sometimes watch, an American
| living in Ukraine until the war. She fled to Portugal when
| the invasion started, and paid for an item with her credit
| card enroute. This triggered an automated lockout from the
| card suddenly being used abroad.
|
| The bank's bureaucracy advised her to unlock it she needed to
| go in person to her home branch in Ukraine (which has a
| decent chance of being a pile of rubble given her
| neighbourhood was hit by shelling in the time after she
| left).
| lowercased wrote:
| Similar thing happened here to my wife (US, bank in UK). "We
| don't send those out any more, just use your phone". But...
| a) my wife didn't have a phone at the time (not one capable
| of running their only supported version of their app) and ...
| one of the signup questions was asking about bank balance
| (or... recent transactions, etc) - but... there's been no
| recent transactions and we don't know the balance because...
| we can't log in.
|
| This was... ~ 6-7 months ago. I'm unsure what options are
| left, or... if my wife sorted it out (she did recently get a
| newer iphone, and that may have been able to get it sorted).
| userabchn wrote:
| The Bank of America app only lets you install it if your
| Google (or presumably Apple) account country is set as
| America. I am abroad but needed to use the app. I had to
| create a VPN on an American cloud instance and connect my
| phone to it so that I could set my country to America and
| install the app.
| ratww wrote:
| Similar experience here, but when using the mobile app.
|
| My bank in my country of origin also used to use a token,
| but they changed to a "token app" in the phone about 10
| years ago.
|
| However to authorise this app I had to use an ATM. Since
| this bank only has ATMs in one country, this means I
| couldn't lose or trade my phone.
|
| After I moved I kept a super old iPhone in a drawer only
| for this bank, but at some point the app kept threatening
| me to upgrade, otherwise it would stop working in the next
| version. But I couldn't upgrade because my decade-old phone
| was too old for the new version.
|
| Since even blocking my debit card via phone required using
| the "token app" (something incomprehensible to me), it
| became too risky to keep this account.
|
| At this point I had no recourse but to close the account.
| ricardobeat wrote:
| Keep OTP recovery codes in a separate online account (rarely
| used) with a strong password you can memorize. This lets you
| recover accounts even if all your devices are gone.
| jjnoakes wrote:
| I think for most people, a rarely used account with a strong
| password would be very hard to memorize for a long time.
| kilroy123 wrote:
| This is one of my great fears. I'm a nomad and all my possessions
| are in two bags I carry around with me from country to country.
| It's much easier for this to happen to me.
|
| Not sure what the solution is?
|
| In the past I've tucked away a piece of paper with recover codes
| on it at a family members house. So in such an emergency I could
| call them up and tell them where it is.
|
| I should really do that again.
| Comevius wrote:
| Recovery codes can be stored publicly, but deniably on the
| internet. It would be like finding a hay in a haystack. No need
| to call anyone, just download a picture of a cat and decrypt
| it.
| ClumsyPilot wrote:
| This is a cool idea and I've been contemplating it myself -
| but if you don't control the picture, whay if someone chabges
| it or recompresses it, then its binary changes and you are
| screwed.
|
| You are better off with a famous historical text, like in
| 'invincible' they sued Frankenstein. But it has to be with a
| clear and indusputed original, not something that has mutiple
| translations.
|
| What if _drumroll_ its a good uisecase for blockchain? Like
| use hash of block number 200 or smth.
| Comevius wrote:
| Not exactly how it works, steganography can produce a
| plaintext, picture or whatever as a cover for the
| ciphertext, but the cover is not going to be identical to
| the original. Consequently steganalysis will be able to
| recover the ciphertext.
|
| But with deniable steganography you can use a fake key to
| decrypt the ciphertext, so the guy standing behind you with
| a $5 wrench can see that you have nothing to hide.
| doctorhandshake wrote:
| When I was nomadic I traveled with my 1pass master password
| (and that only, no other context) on a laminated card in the
| zippered 'hidden' pouch of a travel belt meant to hide money. I
| figured I might get mugged by someone who knew to look there
| but that I could perhaps hope to convince them that the card
| was worthless and keep it even if they took my devices, cards,
| and cash.
| nicbou wrote:
| What about snail mail to a relative?
| alexpotato wrote:
| I would imagine you could reach an agreement with a digital
| savvy lawyer (or law firm) to provide a service to:
|
| - store important information - have human processes to get you
| access if needed
| lupire wrote:
| This is called "escrow" and is extremely common.
| joshstrange wrote:
| If you use something like 1Password maybe setup an email
| address only you know about that you send yourself (from the
| new email) an encrypted zip with your 1Password Emergency
| Vault? Then you have 3 bits of data (4 if you don't save your
| master password which we can assume you know) protecting your
| backup: account name, account password, zip password, and vault
| master password.
| oefrha wrote:
| 2FA with password manager is pretty much asking for trouble. Any
| compromise that is capable of leaking my master password can't be
| stopped by a second factor.
| sph wrote:
| What do you mean? I need both my Yubikey and my password to log
| in to my password manager. If my master password gets leaked
| somehow, they still need my Yubikey, which is on my person at
| all times.
|
| The CIA could infiltrate my house when I'm sleeping and steal
| my Yubikey, but any other idiot on the internet that wants my
| data has no chance, which is what I'm most concerned about.
| SnowflakeOnIce wrote:
| I suspect they are thinking of TOTP-based schemes for 2fa,
| not hardware-based 2fa. With TOTP-based 2fa, you can store
| the seeds in your password manager, which ends putting them
| next to the passwords themselves, all in one place.
| oefrha wrote:
| To leak my master password, "any other idiot on the internet"
| needs to do one of four things: (1) backdoor my password
| manager; (2) install a keylogger to capture it while I'm
| typing it in; (3) somehow grab a copy of the encrypted
| database and crack it offline; (4) read my mind. (1) is game
| over; (2) with that level of access they can also steal
| everything while the password manager is unlocked; (3) with
| offline cracking, any 2FA protection just extends the
| password, and my master password is strong enough for any
| idiot on the Internet; (4) can't defend against magic.
| sph wrote:
| Sorry, I'm not sure I follow. First you say that 2FA is
| useless if someone gets your master password, which is
| wrong, now you argue that stealing a master password is
| very hard.
|
| What exactly is your point?
| oefrha wrote:
| I outlined all the scenarios where the master password
| can be stolen. In none of the scenarios does a 2FA offer
| additional protection.
| sph wrote:
| Yes it does, because 2FA means you need BOTH the master
| password and the second factor device to log in. Stealing
| the password is not enough. That is the point of 2FA.
| oefrha wrote:
| The point is in none of the scenarios 2FA isn't
| compromised at the same time or is even needed (except in
| the offline cracking case, where cracking password +
| token is harder than cracking just password, but with a
| reasonable password both are practically impossible).
| Read again. Consider realistic attack vectors instead of
| repeating dogma.
| fzeroracer wrote:
| 2FA, especially hardware based 2FA protects you from
| scenarios that could involve leaking of your passwords
| (such as many common MITM attacks, phishing, spoofing)
| and makes cracking a DB incredibly hard for your average
| hacker if they somehow get their hands on it. And you
| would have to define a 'reasonable password' because I
| could guarantee what you consider reasonable is orders of
| magnitude easier to crack than a 2FA + password solution.
| It objectively reduces the amount of attack vectors to
| gain access to your accounts.
|
| Calling it dogma when 2FA has known security advantages
| is just wrong.
| rvieira wrote:
| It's not perfect (nothing is?) but to ease my 2FA fears I keep
| two copies.
|
| One on authenticator app on my mobile.
|
| Another as keepassXC TOPT entries in a file in a USB stick.
|
| To have a perfect mirror requires adding both (mobile and
| keepassXC) when enabling 2FA for the first time, as few services
| allow to see the 2FA key after enabling it.
| ductsurprise wrote:
| How many times this happened to you?
| throwaway72937 wrote:
| Almost all of my digital life is in three places: 1) Google 2)
| Dropbox and 3) LastPass
|
| I make it a point to pay for all of these, even though the free
| tier might have been good enough. I hope (maybe naively) that
| will help me get to a human if some disaster happens.
| ClumsyPilot wrote:
| I like how we have to hope your money will get you what you
| paid for.
|
| We really need to eatablish precedent that this state of
| affaira is not acceptable.
| RalfWausE wrote:
| Something like this DID happen to me a few years ago... but
| really? If i don't regard the lost documents (ID, drivers
| license, ownership documents...) took me a few months to get
| newly issued and there is still a gmail and amazon account out
| there i will perhaps never be able to log in again there was
| really no big problem.
|
| This is also the incident that convinced me to NEVER leave my
| current bank: I am at a tiny, tiny local bank with perhaps 50
| employees... so, they did know me and it was no problem to get
| money and a new set of cards. The funny thing is: Before that
| incident i was contemplating about moving to a more modern bank
| which offers an app...
| the_af wrote:
| > _i will perhaps never be able to log in again there was
| really no big problem._
|
| If you use Google as your identity provider and Gmail as your
| recovery (or registration) email for every online service you
| use, it's a big problem.
|
| Remember: you don't remember all those passwords (if you do,
| they are probably weak) so you need the recovery email. But you
| cannot access your email, because you lost both your phone and
| 2FA to log in elsewhere. So it's not just Gmail, it's every
| online thing you use.
|
| But maybe you don't use Google and Gmail like this. Maybe you
| have a separate username/password for every single online
| thing. Ok... what were those passwords again?
| RalfWausE wrote:
| In some instances i could remember the password in others...
| now, i just created a new account if i did think i would need
| the service. Overall, even if i did not gain ANY of this
| accounts back it wouldnt really harm my life. I would have to
| recreate some stuff from memory, find some other providers,
| all things considered it would have been more of an
| inconvenience than a real problem.
| the_af wrote:
| Some of these accounts may be services you sank real money
| into. Say, Steam or iTunes or whatnot. Or maybe you've
| built a reputation out of these accounts. Maybe you lost
| access to a blog or some other thing where you wrote or
| stored important stuff that matters to you.
|
| If your stance is "hey, it doesn't matter if I lose all
| access to my online life" then yes, I can see why this
| wouldn't be a problem _for you_.
|
| This article wasn't meant for you then, but for the rest of
| us.
| RalfWausE wrote:
| The morale of the story from my perspective is: Dont rely
| on online services. Anyone should remember: A cloud is
| nothing else than vapour...
| ClumsyPilot wrote:
| Stop using GMail, use a real company with real customer
| support.
|
| Even the cheapest, randomest local email provider from
| fasthosts to namecheap have people that will talk to yoy and
| fix problems.
|
| Microsoft outlook has real support too.
| the_af wrote:
| I don't understand this answer.
|
| Let's say you are using Microsoft as your identity provider
| (can this be done? never seen it) and Outlook as your
| recovery email. How does this help in this scenario:
|
| - You lost your phone and laptop.
|
| - You lost your 2FA device.
|
| - You lost your recovery codes.
|
| - You lost any way of demonstrating you are who you say you
| are.
|
| How is Microsoft Outlook going to help you? Are you going
| to call a Microsoft support person over somebody else's
| phone and tell them to please help you? I don't think the
| problem is _Google_ in this scenario (I 've no love of
| them, mind you).
|
| Asking people to stop using Google and Gmail strikes me as
| unrealistic as asking them to stop using Facebook.
| jackson1442 wrote:
| The biggest benefit of a paid email provider is you have
| a paid stake in it. If you're locked out, you're still
| paying for the service so they have an interest in
| restoring your access so you continue paying.
|
| A lot of places will let you back in if you can provide
| some transaction metadata like last charge date, billing
| address, last4 of card, etc.
| vorpalhex wrote:
| Oh, when you call support they will go through a
| verification process. Worst case you send them a copy of
| your (new) drivers license/photo ID. As long as the
| person on the other end is a human, this isn't a problem
| but if you are facing Google which has no support, you
| are screwed.
|
| > as unrealistic as asking them to stop using Facebook.
|
| I don't use Facebook. Not an issue. Several family
| members also don't use it. I keep in touch with people by
| calling them by phone every few weeks.
| the_af wrote:
| > _if you are facing Google which has no support, you are
| screwed_
|
| I agree Google has enough horror stories that make me
| dread the day disaster decides to strike.
|
| I do have the suspicion their support is not entirely
| automated though. There are online groups of "volunteers"
| where, if you post asking for help and provide _some_
| evidence, your request will be magically expedited. This
| makes me think Google 's official stance is "no human
| support", but really there is _some_ unofficial support.
| Still terrible, but something to consider.
|
| > _I don 't use Facebook_
|
| That's why I said what's unrealistic is asking people to
| _stop_ using Facebook. For people who already use it.
|
| As an aside, having people call me on the phone every two
| weeks just to see how I'm doing sounds like an annoyance
| to me.
| ClumsyPilot wrote:
| I am talking spesifically about email - with namecheap
| you can literally show them your ID document, they have
| your phone number on file and they can call you. They
| have to help you access the service you paid for,
| otherwise you have grounds for a lawsuit.
|
| I have not tried this with microsoft, but ai imagine it
| should be similar.
|
| There is nothing special about Gmail, why do you have to
| use it?
|
| I had this warning 14 years ago when a friend's gmail was
| stolen and their support (back when they had it) refused
| to lift a finger despite him selding a scan of his ID,
| etc. I am never using free service for something vital
| again.
| the_af wrote:
| > _There is nothing special about Gmail, why do you have
| to use it?_
|
| I'm terrified of Google's support, but:
|
| - It's free.
|
| - I've been using Gmail for over a decade. Why would I
| switch? I've tons of data in there, and most people I
| care about know this is my email.
|
| > _they have your phone number on file and they can call
| you_
|
| Do you mean the phone I just lost in the fire? (in this
| scenario)
| ClumsyPilot wrote:
| > would I switch? I've tons of data in there, and most
| people I care about know this is my email.
|
| Surely fact that you have a lot of data is precisely the
| reason you need to safeguard it?
|
| Copying all old emails to a new account takes a few
| clicks in outlook/thunderbird/whatever you prefer
|
| Setting up forwarding takes a couple minutes. This isn't
| like leaving WhatsApp where you are stuck
|
| > Do you mean the phone I just lost in the fire?
|
| I can walk into a physical store of my phone company and
| have a new simcard in minutes
| the_af wrote:
| > _I can walk into a physical store of my phone company
| and have a new simcard in minutes_
|
| This doesn't work in all countries.
|
| > _Setting up forwarding takes a couple minutes. This isn
| 't like leaving WhatsApp where you are stuck_
|
| I find this unsatisfying. In this day an age, your email
| is often your id. I don't feel comfortable with my id
| being one thing to some people, and another to others,
| without rhyme or reason. I'm also not comfortable with
| having forward configured in an (allegedly) unsafe
| account I may lose access to.
| vorpalhex wrote:
| If Google locked your email tomorrow, what would you do?
|
| This can and does happen.
| the_af wrote:
| I don't know, and it terrifies me. I don't have a good
| answer to this. This is why TFA resonates with me.
|
| I think we need some sort of unified online identity that
| is relatively easy to recover in case of accidents but
| very hard for hackers to crack/steal, and also that this
| identity cannot depend on the whims of Google, Facebook,
| Microsoft or any corporate provider with arbitrary and
| opaque appeals procedures.
|
| I don't know what a truly achievable and satisfying
| answer would be like. I've lost some sleep over this :(
|
| And don't get me started on backups of irreplaceable
| digital things like photos of your loved ones. I've
| really lost sleep over this. I do have some backups, but
| it's a chore and none are foolproof.
| vorpalhex wrote:
| I'll share my solution.
|
| I have "recovery capsules". Some are electronic (high
| quality usb drive) and some are dead tree on waterproof
| paper. These get me back into my password manager and
| require things I know to decrypt. USB drive contains
| needed decryption software for lots of platforms. This
| bootstrap data almost never changes.
|
| Emails, clouds, photos, etc get backed up automatically
| onto a homelab which stores data on ZFS. I manually do a
| backup (semi-automated, plugging in the drive to the dock
| is manual still).
|
| I had a buddy I exchanged backups with but lost that
| situation, so I need to find a new one or two, but that
| gives me offsite backup.
|
| Admittedly this isn't perfect - if my local city melts
| then I am screwed but also I probably have bigger
| problems then anyways.
| wintermutestwin wrote:
| >Before that incident i was contemplating about moving to a
| more modern bank which offers an app...
|
| I use two tiny credit unions and each of them offers an app.
| causi wrote:
| It's almost comedic that the point of backups is to remove the
| single point of failure and then security paranoia creates new
| ones.
|
| _Perhaps what I should have done is stored all my backup codes
| and recovery keys on a USB stick and then given them to a
| friend?_
|
| If you're going to be _that_ secure, put them on a USB stick and
| bury it in your yard or in the hollow of a tree. Easier to update
| and won 't be destroyed when your house burns down.
| pcthrowaway wrote:
| This obviously requires you to have a yard, which is probably
| not that common for city dwellers (even people renting houses
| shouldn't really be digging up their yard, and if you live in a
| duplex quadplex, you're sharing that yard with some number of
| neighbours of varying trustworthiness)
| foobarian wrote:
| I wonder if you could just store a microSD card in a weather
| proof container taped or attached magnetically to the
| underside of a bench or other urban fixture. Place 5-6 of
| them for redundancy and keep them up to date.
| jerf wrote:
| While I've yet to have this problem, I've actually been
| mentally keeping track of my ability to bootstrap back up.
| LastPass is trying to get me to add TOTP or other 2FA, but even
| though it promises (for now) that my master password can still
| get me in, I've resisted, because the password manager is my
| linchpin, and I _need_ to be able to get in there just with
| "what I remember", and I don't want another way in where I'm
| not continually practicing that and keeping the memory fresh.
|
| I also every so often take a backup of the LastPass DB and put
| it on my local Nextcloud, which get encrypted backup to S3
| every night.
|
| 2FA is a lot less scary at work, where I have administrators
| and coworkers who can vouch for me face-to-face and reset it if
| necessary. I feel like there isn't a widespread understanding
| that personal authentication is a much harder problem than
| corporate authentication for that reason. It is easy to end up
| accidentally webbing together all your personal authentication
| until your current phone is your one and only token. Heck, with
| all the 2FA flying around now it's probably possible to get
| yourself into a situation where the only way to authenticate is
| using something else you're already authenticated to and you
| can't bootstrap back up if that expires unexpectedly. If we're
| not there we're getting close.
| 369548684892826 wrote:
| Another thing - flash storage that hasn't been powered up for a
| few years will probably have lost data. Better to get backup
| codes down on paper.
| aaronmdjones wrote:
| Large-capacity flash drives are very cheap; and you can write
| the same data (e.g. archive files) many times to the same
| drive to guard against some filesystem or file-level
| corruption.
|
| There are also tools like par2(1) that can create parity
| recovery data for files; you could write those many times
| too.
|
| My online backup solution that backs up the root filesystem
| for all of my machines generates a rolling tarball of that
| and then creates par2 recovery data for that tarball at 10%
| redundancy, and keeps 30 days of tarballs in addition to the
| current snapshot of the filesystem itself. This is because I
| store them on high-capacity spinning rust drives, which do
| have a small but non-zero data error rate.
|
| Additionally, forensic tools like photorec(1) can recover
| these files even from severely damaged filesystems.
|
| Then the only things you need to worry about are "device
| doesn't enumerate at all when I plug it in" and such. I'm
| sure you can have 2 devices side-by-side to mitigate that.
| Inhibit wrote:
| This happens. I've had SDCards sitting in devices long enough
| unpowered that they required a format when spun back up.
| zrail wrote:
| I have my 1Password emergency kit, with the password filled in,
| stored on a water-sealed USB drive[1] which I store in a fire
| box in my house. The combo should mean, modulo a much hotter
| fire than most typical house fires, that when the fire
| department puts out the house I can just cut open the melted
| fire box and extract the very wet but still functional drive. I
| haven't tested this, of course, and I might take the above
| advice and put a second copy somewhere else.
|
| [1]:
| https://www.corsair.com/us/en/Categories/Products/Storage/US...
| digitallyfree wrote:
| I store them in Keepass files and then bury them/give to a
| friend/save in the cloud/whatever. It's just a single password
| that you remember, with no reliance on an external
| authenticator or like. And if someone finds your files, they're
| useless without the password.
|
| If you store them on cloud, you should obviously do so on a
| service with no 2FA and a password you remember. The first
| priority is that you can access it anywhere and the main
| protection comes from the encrypted Keepass file.
| raverbashing wrote:
| This is why, while 2FA is important, it's not a panacea (and
| things like the article do happen - which is why I'm always very
| skeptical of "2FA everything" people)
|
| Some passwords you absolutely do have to memorize. And that is
| fine. I keep those good passwords for services run by
| professionals.
|
| Also recovery codes exist
|
| (side note if the pictures are correct - the sim card and the
| Yubikey might be salvageable)
| Helmut10001 wrote:
| Thanks for listing this overview and worst case scenario. I can
| say, for myself, that my current setup covers this situation.
| Everything is immediatly synced to my server located offsite,
| through IPSEC, meaning I have at every time at least two copies
| of data that are physically separate. My password manager needs a
| password file and key. the key I remember, the password file is
| in my encrypted ZFS volume on my server. If my phone (dies), I
| can still get the password file from my laptop or from the
| server; if the server dies, I still have it on my laptop or
| phone. It is extremely unlikely that all three die at the same
| time. Yet, even for this scenario, I have a printed out list of
| password of my password manager, hidden at a location that is
| usually inaccessible. Of course, I follow the 3-2-1(-0) rule,
| providing additional piece-of-mind beyond that "worst case".
|
| So yes, I agree fully: Prepare for worst (and hope for best).
|
| For anyone thinking about self-hosting, I suggest to place your
| server not at your main place - host it offsite (e.g. at your
| parents house). Makes you also better in remote work and produces
| overall more stable systems (because driving 100km is a painful
| motivator).
| HPsquared wrote:
| An idea for the key file: this can also be something you can
| reproduce, like a text file with a sentence acting effectively
| as a 'second password'. Or some other thing that you can
| recreate from scratch.
| Helmut10001 wrote:
| Yes, good point.. the keyfile is basically comparable to OTP,
| just that it is more flexible. In my case, it is indeed a
| file with specific format (keepass), but other systems ar
| emore open.
| _pdp_ wrote:
| There is a 3rd way which is not widely adopted yet and it
| requires to handover some personal documents, but that is to use
| an IDV service as a fallback. There are obviously some
| disadvantages as well I am sure you can think of.
| ruuda wrote:
| How do you still have access to your blog to be able to publish
| this article?
| withinboredom wrote:
| Read the last paragraph.
| navhc wrote:
| The article ends with "In the meantime, please rest assured
| that my home is still standing." So presumably it's all
| hypothetical.
| netsharc wrote:
| Also the very first paragraph is "Imagine...".
|
| I missed both of these, and wondered why an HN commenter said
| luckily everything is fine..
| ntoskrnl wrote:
| The first paragraph also says "Imagine..."
|
| I skipped over it the first time around, but that made the
| rest of the post hit harder. This was pretty well written.
| edent wrote:
| Thank you
| dcow wrote:
| It doesn't even take a lightning strike to get into this type of
| situation. September rolls around and everyone gets a new iPhone.
| Many forget to migrate their password manager over before sending
| their old phone back. Unlike the author who clearly thinks a lot
| about disaster scenarios and redundancy and recovery, more casual
| users do not. Some get lucky and are logged in to their password
| manager on their desktop. Some not so much and are even locked
| out of their AppleID credentials. Even if you remembered to
| migrate your password manager, you might not have remembered to
| bring your MFA code app.
|
| This is the entire impetus behind Uno's productized Shamirs
| Secret Sharing recovery scheme:
| https://www.uno.app/blog/replacing-passwords-with-people. Our bet
| is that, like the author questions in the OP, for most people
| with a trusted network of friends and family, the main threat
| vector is not hackers and nation states trying to take over their
| digital lives, but rather nature, age, and accidents, etc. And
| that social redundancy is an _acceptable_ risk in order to
| mitigate the tendency we have to want to be our own single point
| of failure.
| spixy wrote:
| > sending their old phone back
|
| What does it mean? Where back?
|
| Why do you need to log into a password manager on other device
| (desktop)?
| dcow wrote:
| Apple will send you the new iPhone and a box for your old one
| if you're in the iPhone upgrade program. Similar story with
| other carrier trade-in programs.
|
| Generally you can view your master secret on other installs
| of your password manager which is enough to get you
| bootstrapped back in on a new phone if you lose yours.
| password4321 wrote:
| Trade-in/up perhaps?
| teej wrote:
| It's interesting to note that Facebook just decided to sunset
| its trusted contacts feature.
| dcow wrote:
| Have they talked at all about why? An interesting point about
| our implementation is that, unlike Facebook, Uno is not a
| custodial emergency contact recovery service. So we're not in
| the business of trying to KYC all your friends and accept a
| "multi-sig" credential access request. We're shamirs all the
| way down so we don't have what I imagine would be a pretty
| large admin overhead for something that isn't really FB's
| product.
| shakes_mcjunkie wrote:
| This happened to me but because I broke my phone. My broken
| phone had Google Authenticator on it and I don't have my backup
| codes since I've had authenticator for years and never thought
| to redownload them. Anyways, now I can't login to my Facebook
| or Twitter anymore. Facebook doesn't seem to have any kind of
| account recovery and the methods they say I can use (e.g. log
| in from another device and you'll get a notification) don't
| work. I even have my phone number logged with them but
| apparently not as part of 2 factor, so I can't recover my
| account that way either.
|
| TBH this experience has really made me question using an
| authenticator app every again.
| spixy wrote:
| Try Microsoft Authenticator, it can backup to cloud.
| dicknuckle wrote:
| Authy is great. I've started duplicating my MFA codes to
| KeepassXC so the OTP can be generated from my desktop or
| mobile in two different ways. I do love how KeePass will
| just start generating codes by pasting the secret into this
| format:
| otpauth://totp/Chrome:USER?secret=XXXXXX&period=30&digits=6
| hn2017 wrote:
| Yep, I've seen this as well with a friend. This is one huge
| reason why SMS is not a bad option. (convenience vs security)
| FollowingTheDao wrote:
| We are all now on the precarious stilts of technology.
|
| Apple is the worst regarding this scenario. They force 2FA like
| you are a child. I get it, in most cases 2FA is great, but my
| lifestyle makes it a problem.
| jonnycomputer wrote:
| I very nearly was not able to login to my Apple account on a
| new computer because I did not have an old device to verify,
| and of course I hadn't kept the master recovery key where I
| could remember where to find it.
| tpetry wrote:
| The problem is more that you have to use Apple's 2FA which is
| linked to their devices. You lose them all at once because you
| are robbed? Good luck!
|
| There isn't any way to get a TOTP key you can store in a
| password manager.
| danieldk wrote:
| I was under the impression that the _Secure iCloud Keychain
| recovery_ functionality that was added in the last iOS /macOS
| update could be used to recover.
|
| https://support.apple.com/nl-
| nl/guide/security/secdeb202947/...
| https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212513
|
| Unfortunately, the recovery procedure is not described
| anywhere, so I am not completely sure...
| satysin wrote:
| You can still get a TOTP code from Apple via SMS to your
| trusted phone numbers. When it prompts you for the TOTP code
| select "Didn't get a verification code?" and you can pick one
| of your trusted phone numbers no problem. I have had to use
| this in the past and it works fine.
| polote wrote:
| The issue here, is that OP planned for his house to be destroyed
| and having is phone OR not having is phone but still having his
| house. But didn't plan for having his house destroyed AND loosing
| its phone.
|
| One can still imagine a scenario where you can loose your phone
| AND your house AND another recovery method etc
| danbrooks wrote:
| I was a little skeptical of the fire when all of his ID documents
| were only half-burned. :)
| tpetry wrote:
| That problem is solved by how 1Password works:
|
| * Your password vult is encrypted locally and stored on their
| servers (just an encrypted file!) * To unlock the vault, you need
| the password and the generated master code. * The master code is
| a PDF to print, which you can give someone you trust - they still
| only have half of the things to get access.
|
| The losing of digital life is completely solved. Just print that
| damn PDF give it to your parents and remember your password.
| wintermutestwin wrote:
| Once you have printed out your master key, you might as well go
| back to writing passwords on a sticky note...
| ClumsyPilot wrote:
| I swear to god sometimes I feel our proffesion mostly
| consists of people that are a weired combination of arrogant
| and alternatively gifted. They do not value and do not
| understand how the rest of society does things.
|
| Hundreds of years ago we have invented this cool thing called
| a Safe. It works better than 90% of tech-based security
| systems out there. Write something on a piece of paper, put
| it behind a locked door, and you will be safe from 99% of
| scams and attacks that exist. If someone breaks into your
| house, and get this piece pf paper they will be leaving real
| fingerprints, and real police will get involved. If noone
| breaks into your house, then only select few people are ever
| near that safe.
| ghaff wrote:
| And even absent a safe... Absent a trusted family member
| pulling an inside job, how much risk is there really for an
| average--or even not so average--person to having accounts
| compromised because someone found passwords written down on
| a piece of paper somewhere in their house.
|
| Yes, perhaps the equation changes if you have
| roommates/family you don't really trust.
| mst wrote:
| The trick is to then store it somewhere that anybody who came
| into posession of it would be unable to figure out -what-
| master key it was for.
|
| If a friend of mine has an arbitrary chunk of ASCII stored
| under their google contacts under a name only they and I
| recognise, absent rubber hose cryptoanalysis of them it's not
| going to be an issue, and frankly I don't consider that
| relevant to my threat model - if somebody's -that- excited
| about my accounts they'll start with the rubber hose on me at
| which point all bets are already off.
| JoeAltmaier wrote:
| Not really solved - forgetting a password is where you started.
| Does it help to say "Just remember the password!"?
| sillysaurusx wrote:
| It's a lot easier to remember one specific password.
| Especially when you need to enter it at regular intervals.
| bigDinosaur wrote:
| Not solved, because your parents could lose a piece of paper
| (I'd say that's actually a fairly high risk, not just
| theoretical). Anyone could lose a piece of paper, for that
| matter. You want multiple, distributed across at least three
| continents to be sure. The same with your password. ;-)
| micromacrofoot wrote:
| Put it with your will. If you have kids or any amount of
| savings you should have a will. Store it in two separate
| locations (your house, and someone else's).
| benhurmarcel wrote:
| I just store a copy at work. I figure I'm unlikely enough to
| lose all my possessions without dying at the same time that
| my workplace gets destroyed.
| tpetry wrote:
| Sure, you don't have to stop at distributing just once
| copy...
| horsawlarway wrote:
| Even then - this is a fairly ugly solution. You're
| dependent on an external entity to be responsible with your
| stuff in the case of an emergency.
|
| I love my friends and family, but I'm not sure I'd trust
| them to keep a random file/paper for years on end "just in
| case" and still be able to find it when I need it.
|
| Personally - I went with the "extra yubikey in a safe
| deposit box" approach, and it still feels super shitty.
|
| I'm not at all a fan of "code is law".
| the_af wrote:
| It doesn't even scale. This assumes you're the only one
| with PDFs to share. What if you have siblings and other
| relatives, and all of them are tech-savvy -- if they
| aren't now, in the future they will be -- and want to
| store the PDFs with your parents.
|
| What, are your parents going to be running a PDF storage
| service, classified by person? That's too much to ask of
| them (for most parents).
| xtracto wrote:
| All these "rebutals" to the pdf approach sound like those
| infomercial TV ads where people have trouble doing normal
| day to day things.
|
| Like... mass enail the PDF to several members of the
| family and be done with it. Can it happen that 5 people
| at once lose their email access? Sure, but the
| probability is minuscule.
| the_af wrote:
| The comment I was replying to was about _physical paper
| copies_ , not emails.
|
| Distributing digital copies of your password store to
| your friends and relatives could maybe work. Be sure
| you're using a really strong password (that you can also
| remember by heart), because you cannot trust each friend
| will store the file responsibly away from prying eyes.
|
| Remember the scenario:
|
| - You lost access to your recovery codes and any
| handwritten notes, so you better remember the master
| password by heart.
|
| - But this master password better be really strong,
| because each of your N friends you distributed your files
| to is a potential leak to hackers and thieves.
|
| - (Tangentially related: remember you have no
| authenticator either, so your password store better
| include recovery codes, otherwise without 2FA you're
| screwed)
| mrtranscendence wrote:
| > What, are your parents going to be running a PDF
| storage service, classified by person?
|
| I mean, it's a piece of paper. They could write the name
| of the person on the paper, keep them alphabetized, and
| store and search through hundreds of them easily (let's
| assume they're rabbits with hundreds of children). There
| may be all sorts of problems with this approach but I
| don't think burdening parents with paper storage is one
| of them.
|
| Edit: of course, if they _were_ rabbits I wouldn 't trust
| them with paper storage. Rabbits are notorious chewers.
| the_af wrote:
| I dunno. I've already burdened my parents with plenty of
| things, and so have my siblings. I don't know that I want
| to make them responsible for storing random bits of paper
| they may or may not forget about.
| tpetry wrote:
| I don't know how you or your friends/parents store
| important documents but everyone in my bubble has
| multiple document binders with critical paperwork to
| keep. Adding a single paper to them is no problem, and
| the paper is not lost. Stuff is never removed from those
| binders, just new ones added.
| mst wrote:
| Back when my parents were still in the land of the
| living, I would've been entirely comfortable believing
| that the odds of them failing at that would've been low
| enough that (odds of that failing * odds of my needing
| that data) would've been stupidly low - low enough I'd've
| accepted the risk and stopped worrying about it on the
| basis the likelihood of a problem at that point was
| significantly lower than many other at least as awful
| problems and I should focus on mitigating those instead.
| Aeolun wrote:
| > I'm not at all a fan of "code is law".
|
| You can always _not_ use two factor auth.
| horsawlarway wrote:
| And I don't in certain cases (even when I'd like to).
|
| But it's getting increasingly hard to opt out of 2fa on
| some services.
| the_af wrote:
| But not using 2FA comes with its own set of problems. The
| kind of problems 2FA was introduced to mitigate.
| latency-guy wrote:
| And what if someone dies? We'd need something that would do
| periodic health checks. Preferrably during off-peak hours..
| natly wrote:
| What if you don't really have friends. Not really an uncommon
| thing.
| mst wrote:
| My first thought in that case would be to store fragments in
| multiple semi-trusted places that don't know which other
| semi-trusted places are involved with Shamir's Secret Sharing
| so "knowing what a majority of the semi-trusted places even
| are" is a prerequisite to recovery.
| dewey wrote:
| Put it in a safe deposit box or store it at a notary like a
| will. There's multiple ways to store a piece of paper offsite
| without having friends or family.
| horsawlarway wrote:
| You still have to be able to prove to THOSE entities that
| you are who you say you are.
|
| And I say that as someone who has a spare yubikey sitting
| in a safe deposit box.
|
| Eventually, this would probably work out, but it still
| feels super shitty.
| gpmcadam wrote:
| do you clone the ubikey or enroll two different keys? i
| struggled to find providers who let you register a second
| key
| horsawlarway wrote:
| I enrolled two different keys.
|
| It's a pain in the butt, and it's very limiting because
| adding another secure service means going to the bank, so
| I try to limit the 2fa through yubikeys to things like my
| password manager, my keycloak instance, and other very
| important accounts.
|
| My take is that 2fa is still not there yet, and I'm a
| little worried about the push for webauthn, since I
| foresee a lot of potentially lost accounts.
| tymscar wrote:
| You can't clone a yubikey
| OJFord wrote:
| You can store keys generated off-device though. Depends
| which protocols you care about.
| nicknow wrote:
| It's SUPPOSED to be a shitty/frustrating/annoying
| process, not easy. This is your "break glass in case of
| emergency" solution - you don't want to ever use it and
| you want it to be super hard for someone else to
| compromise it.
|
| We have plenty of ways to make this easy but if all those
| avenues are blocked because of some black swan event, you
| need a backup - and that backup can't be too easy because
| then it invites attack.
| maccard wrote:
| That's not a technical problem though. Going to a bank
| and saying "my house burned down, here's an affidavit or
| a notarised document stating I am who I say I am" is
| fairly likely 5o get you access again.
| makeitdouble wrote:
| Delegating half of the problem to someone else is not what I'd
| call "completely solved".
|
| I suppose your point is, nobody should live a life where they
| can't trust someone to keep that pdf for them, but it feels to
| me like solving a technical problem through social means.
| That's a fresh take, but it also relies on so many assumptions.
| lupire wrote:
| Account security is social. It's using social means to solve
| a social problem, with a technical bridge.
| ClumsyPilot wrote:
| But this technical problem is unsolvable, our industry lived
| in arrogance of pretending they solve problems they can't
| actually they don't, and blaming the user when it fails
| sylware wrote:
| huh? In my country, everybody is registered in several
| administration databases with enough data to re-id you anywhere,
| anytime, and they even have biometric data (usually your finger
| prints) and medical data (they know where you have scars, and
| have probably some DNA infos).
|
| In the information age, ppl have to be sure their administration
| and corpos are using this power sanely for the Right(TM) stuff or
| things will turn to ...
| edent wrote:
| The UK - for better or worse - doesn't have a centralised ID
| system. Biometrics aren't routinely logged unless you get
| entangled with the law.
|
| I may be registered in several different databases. But how do
| I prove that I am me? If the answer is that I know my mother's
| maiden name and address history - that means a fraudster could
| also access those accounts.
| sylware wrote:
| Passports usually have, at least, your finger prints in the
| chip. And as I said, they have tons of data on you (pics,
| medical stuff, telecom, etc). It all depends on how ez it is
| for the competent administrative services to access those
| databases (do you really think the MI6 does not have access
| to those database?)
|
| Why do you think having microsoft having access to the global
| networks of IT professionals via its owned linkedin database
| is something that should not even be possible?
| robjan wrote:
| UK passports don't have fingerprints. The only biometric
| data is depth information calculated from the photo you
| provide.
| sylware wrote:
| I doubt this is the case, because I can bet that US
| customs require way more than that.
| edent wrote:
| I literally live in the UK and have a recently issued
| passport. No fingerprints were taken.
|
| https://www.gov.uk/apply-renew-passport
|
| The US authorities do take fingerprints on entry. But
| they have nothing to compare them with.
| sylware wrote:
| I have contradicting info: the US requires biometric
| passport on entry, that with significant biometric data.
| [deleted]
| jen20 wrote:
| As of 2010 most UK passports have biometrics in them. Not
| strictly routine but many are likely to have them.
| edent wrote:
| Can you show me where on https://www.gov.uk/apply-renew-
| passport it asks for a biometric other than a photo?
| sylware wrote:
| If you don't have "enough" "good" biometric data, your
| passport is invalid to go to the US... so...
| phphphphp wrote:
| I went through the process of considering this recently, and
| considered a safe deposit box, but as mentioned, they're not
| viable in many places. I eventually settled on multiple security
| keys, distributed across multiple locations I have access to. And
| it got me thinking, is there a business opportunity in providing
| secure storage for security keys? Safe deposit boxes are, as the
| post notes, either mythical or extremely expensive and
| inconvenient.
|
| I can come up with a few challenges to running such a service,
| and a few solutions, but I ultimately come back to thinking:
| nobody smart enough to use a security key is going to trust some
| third-party to store their emergency key, no matter what security
| methods are implemented. Am I right in that assumption?
| withinboredom wrote:
| Probably correct. The correct answer is something I'm working
| on for fun. Basically, witness encryption of a sort. If you can
| cryptographically/mathematically prove something has happened,
| you can decrypt a "bootstrap" of your digital life. I'm working
| on the tooling/encryption bits now, but I already have a (not
| published) service that monitors phones/computers for
| "liveness" and provides a cryptographic proof that they are
| dead when they go offline for a configurable amount of time.
| You can use that as an input for the witness encryption, along
| other inputs. You can just store that file in the open, maybe
| encrypting only your 1password master key or a backup code to
| your email.
| viraptor wrote:
| I've got an escape hatch for most of my auth. An encrypted file
| with my bitwarden backup and recovery codes exists in a public
| not listable s3 bucket under a random uuid file name. I've got
| its (partial) name stored with friends without any context. I
| hope I'll never have to use it...
| nmlt wrote:
| Why not publish that uuid (not yours but generally)? If the
| file is properly encrypted why not keep it in a public GitHub
| repository for example?
| viraptor wrote:
| Because given enough time all encryption will fall or become
| very affordable to crack, so it's not in my interest to have
| it scraped and stored somewhere forever.
| dpcx wrote:
| For those that follow the "take a backup drive to a relatives
| house" - how do you actually do the backups in that case? Do you
| have two backup jobs running, one for "the important stuff" and
| one for the rest of the system, and the important stuff just goes
| to the other disk? I'm trying to get better about this, but this
| is something I've never fully understood.
| satysin wrote:
| I have an old SFF Dell OptiPlex at my mothers house in another
| country. It isn't on 24/7 as I have it set to power on
| automagically weekly so it is up during my scheduled backup
| window. If I need it any other time a simple phone call to my
| mother and she can hit the power button. Then I can just access
| it thanks to WireGuard.
|
| The setup is simple, it runs Debian with four drives. The OS
| and primary data is RAID1 then two independent drives that a
| script automatically keeps everything in sync so I have three
| copies of everything over four drives.
|
| I also have two USB flash drives with it (but not connected)
| that have an identical OS setup on so should the local system
| drives die I can ask my mother to pop in the USB and boot it up
| and still access the 2nd and 3rd backup drives. It all works
| when I have tested it out although never needed to actually use
| it.
|
| This isn't for multimedia of course just my _really_ important
| stuff such as 2FA recovery keys, scans of passports and legal
| paperwork, etc. As it is only a few GB I don 't bother to
| delete anything ever, I only ever add so even if I rescan in
| stuff it doesn't replace the old copy.
|
| It is all encrypted on my end first so even if someone steals
| the machine the data is as safe as it is anywhere else.
|
| Is it perfect? Nah but it is more than good enough and hasn't
| failed me. I also have local backups of course, this is really
| my last resort kind of thing.
| michaelt wrote:
| Things that change regularly get encrypted and backed up to the
| cloud.
|
| The _credentials for accessing those backups_ get encrypted and
| backed up at a relative 's house.
|
| So you almost never need to update the data at the relative's
| house. Although you might want to check they haven't lost it
| from time to time :)
| alexpotato wrote:
| I remember reading a story about backups right after one of the
| California wildfires and the author said something like this:
|
| "I used to store my backups in the garage and thought myself
| smart since they were physically separate from my desktop. Then
| ENTIRE NEIGHBORHOODS burned down and I realized I needed more
| physical distance"
| bityard wrote:
| This is essentially an extreme version of the the "digital
| bootstrapping" problem that I ponder more regularly than is
| probably healthy. It often seems like an intractable problem but
| I think n decent solution that doesn't require a lot of work
| looks like this:
|
| 1. Have an encrypted file of secrets that you can access with an
| offline password manager like KeepassDX. This file contains not
| only the logins to your web accounts, but also all of your
| financial information like bank accounts and credit cards,
| drivers license number, social security numbers, etc. Protect it
| with ONE strong password that you memorize. Use it daily to
| reinforce memorization. All other accounts you have, secure them
| with a random password and put them in this file. You only want
| to remember the ONE master password. You can use browser and
| browser extensions for sites that don't matter much in the grand
| scheme of things but NOT for critical sites like bank accounts
| because we all know browsers are the #1 target of attackers and
| regularly face security problems.
|
| 2. If you have multiple devices, share the KeepassDX file
| somewhere "in the cloud" with something like Nextcloud or similar
| proprietary service that actually syncs a copy to the local
| device. You basically want it available in multiple places,
| automatically if at all possible. I wouldn't post it publicly,
| but don't fret too much about it falling into the wrong hands
| because if you remember, it's protected by a strong password that
| you have memorized. For added safety, copy the password file to a
| thumb drive every month or so and keep it in your car or your
| desk at work.
|
| 3. Keep all of your important digital data (financial records,
| family photos, etc) on a NAS in your house. If you live alone and
| just have one "main" computer, then an external disk will do.
| Encrypt the disks, put the key in your password manager.
|
| 4. Back up your NAS to remote storage every night. This can be a
| raspberry pi at a relative's house, or a cheap VPS, also with
| encrypted disks that only you have the key to.
|
| There are many variations to this, but the overall idea is to
| have ONE strong master password that you memorized and are forced
| to recall regularly which protects ONE file containing ALL of
| your secrets, ONE place to store your important documents, and
| MULTIPLE distributed backups/copies of all of these.
| sph wrote:
| Sorry to hear that, @edent, and as someone that just got a
| Yubikey [1], it sounds like I need to place the spare one at a
| geographically distinct place ASAP, rather than in a lockbox in
| my house. Easier said than done.
|
| --
|
| 1: only my mail and password manager are protected with my
| Yubikeys. As long as I can have access to one key, I'm safe.
| Which means if I lose access to both my FIDO keys, I'm fucked.
| sph wrote:
| Ah, I should read to the end before commenting. Happy to know
| the house is still standing.
| downtownview wrote:
| Has someone posted a resource, or checklist of actions I can
| take, or backups I should make to avoid getting in this
| circumstance?
| secult wrote:
| My bank is changing my MFA from SMS to mobile banking auth with
| each and every mobile banking app update. I tried to explain them
| to not do so, as when I break, lose my phone, it's quite easy to
| use a spare or get even a new sim card with the same number, but
| for anything else (buying a new phone, changing limits for cash
| withdrawal for a new phone, buying a ticket for public transport
| to a physical phone shop) I need the MFA code. Which I don't have
| of course. And surely I don't remember the unique 9 digit random
| identifier that is written on my bank contract to access mobile
| banking hotline. Shitlock.
| EVa5I7bHFq9mnYK wrote:
| I thought about this and decided I should try to protect myself
| against various disaster scenarios, most probable first
|
| I lose my electronics
|
| thiefs steal my electronics
|
| hackers pown me
|
| I have a stroke and forget everything
|
| I die suddenly
|
| cloud raid gives up
|
| house on fire
| Macha wrote:
| This is ultimately why I haven't made the leap to Yubikey style
| auth. My backup plan depends ultimately on something I know (the
| password to a backed up copy of my password vault which contains
| 2fa codes for essential services, and backed up totp codes which
| are encrypted with a password in that vault for the rest).
| wly_cdgr wrote:
| I have a password strategy I like, and I'm gonna share it because
| you might like it too.
|
| * Create a master password root. Do not write it down anywhere -
| memorize it
|
| * For every account that requires a password, add a unique suffix
| to the root
|
| * Write down the suffixes in a file locked with the master
| password root
|
| * Do not use a password manager. Enter passwords manually; since
| they all share the same master root, you are very unlikely to
| ever forget it
|
| * If you do forget it anyway despite all this, you probably have
| bigger problems. Or maybe not, but then again, none of this shit
| matters anyway
| red0point wrote:
| So if any single one of your used services leaks your password,
| you're essentially screwed since the root can be determined.
| Have you heard of haveibeenpwned.com?
| wly_cdgr wrote:
| Ok, so some guy in Croatia now knows the root, so what? How
| does that help them? They can't access the other suffixes
| without physical access to my home computer. Not to mention
| they have no idea which part is the root and which part is
| the suffix
| dontbenebby wrote:
| Thanks for this OP.
|
| If you want to bootstrap your way out of scenarios in the OPs, a
| passport card is proof of identity and citizenship.
|
| What I do currently, is I have a smartphone with a wallet case,
| which has a passport card, credit card, insurance card, and a bus
| pass with enough fare to take a 28X[1] to the airport.
|
| I actually just sat down to have a cortado and clean my go bag,
| because I had to use my mace and haven't been able to replace it.
|
| (I the past I had a smaller "TSA friendly" messenger bag that I
| got at an Army Navy store plus a larger black backpack which can
| contain... well, pretty much anything that's legal in PA for me
| to put into it, but since I'm a grown adult, things like
| sharpies, a gerber multi tool, gum bands, an umbrella, noise
| cancelling headphones, and several batteries and the cables to
| connect them to my devices are perfectly reasonable things to
| carry around with me on a rainy day.)
|
| Then, you keep that plus whatever weapons you think you need next
| to your bed.
|
| I'm left handed, so usually my phone and a large knife and mace
| go next to the bed[0].
|
| Then there is a locked door with a Louisville slugger next to it.
| Beyond that is a second door with two chains, and something else
| beside that one, with the walkway in between littered with
| hazards.
|
| And on top of all that, I often keep a radio going so it's
| ambiguous if I'm home, since my landlord likes to enter my unit
| uninvited and not even leave a tag behind noting they were there,
| despite several warnings that I was perceiving their illegal
| behavior as threatening.
|
| (Much like your post, I had a fire scare -- my dad claimed to
| know someone from the mafia who might burn my home down, and I
| had an outlet spark out around the same time, along with a series
| of odd people lurking around, some of whom still return to my
| home to this day despite frequent reports)
|
| I'd love to have my passport card in a safe deposit box, but the
| last bank I looked into that with abused their access to the
| information I was looking for one.
|
| (They said there was a waitlist, so since I thought I'd be
| staying long term, I just kept my passport in a safe, or separate
| from my passport card in case I had an extreme incident, like
| having my favorite bag broken open because I had to mace someone
| in the face, then choke them to nearly to death when they didn't
| take that strong hint to get away from me.)
|
| Anyways, thanks for sharing, and if anyone has any advice on my
| security setup, I'm happy to take feedback.
|
| (I'm trying to avoid making the thing on my bedside a handgun
| loaded with .22 hollowpoints, and the thing beside the door a
| shotgun loaded with buckshot small enough to not penetrate a wall
| and kill my neighbors if I need to fire it, but I'm very annoyed
| I feel a need to note this level of detail and ask for feedback,
| given the conversations I've had off of this site leading up to
| today.) -- [0] The intent being to mace them, then stab them if
| they don't give up, then retreat to safety to call a lawyer. Not
| an ambulance. I'm not your caregiver. I'm not your friend. Come
| into my home and make me feel unsafe at night, and be prepared to
| die.
|
| [1] The 28X is the route that takes you to the airport in 412,
| it's what I reccomend anyone who cannot abide by the rules of
| civil society look into rathrt
| https://www.portauthority.org/PAAC/apps/pdfs/28X.pdf
| nicknow wrote:
| I would need to recover access to my password manager and my 2FA
| authentication tool (which is cloud backed up.) My password
| manager has recovery codes and my 2FA has a recovery process.
| Those - and, actually my email service's recovery codes (although
| technically not needed, since I can use the password manager and
| 2FA but this would speed up my time to access) - are in hard copy
| and stored in my safe and at a safe at a relative's home several
| hundred miles away. For additional security, there is a word
| written on the envelope at the relative's house that the relative
| knows to require I provide if we are not in-person (to prevent
| someone faking a call and asks for the information.) The document
| is also sealed and included with my Will, which is held by my
| trusted executor.
|
| With that document I can recover access to my complete digital
| life.
|
| The advantage is nothing changes. New accounts are added to my
| password manager and 2FA, but nothing needs to change on the
| recovery process side.
|
| There are some other ideas I have, if I didn't have a trusted
| relative/friend, who I could give the document to but I haven't
| felt the need to implement them.
| catchmeifyoucan wrote:
| Maybe biometric login isn't a bad idea, since you'll have your
| fingerprint
| tomkaos wrote:
| I don't 2FA my password manager and email because of the fear of
| being lock out of everything. I travel a lot and some country I
| can't received sms. What hapen if I got stole everything. Loose
| access to my email, bank account .. I don't event know people
| number because it's in my phone.
| jclem wrote:
| 1Password "forces" (strongly suggests to) you to physically print
| a recovery kit with both your master password and secret key on
| it. I keep mine in a safe deposit box in another part of the
| city. Of course, losing access to this box is a concern, but
| -\\_(tsu)_/- I suppose I could also bury it somewhere remote too
| without the QR code or my identifiable information in it, or mail
| a copy to a family member.
| cbanek wrote:
| I've been thinking about this recently in terms of end of life
| type stuff. By the time I die (hopefully), access to digital
| accounts will be a major part of end of life care. Being able to
| deactivate accounts, set up things, or notify them to close is so
| much easier if you just have the passwords and details up front.
| Of course I use 1Password for the passwords. I'm working with an
| estate attorney to help with a living trust and will for all the
| legalities too. But I'm going to give my attorney the 1Password
| recovery PDF for sure. And of course, attorneys generally have
| pretty good document storage and recovery scenarios too.
|
| So not just someone who is locked out, but doesn't know my
| passwords. How can they be given the keys at the right time to do
| what they need? (Like if I'm in the hospital, etc.). It's a hard
| problem.
| atleta wrote:
| Protecting your password db with a physical key sounds pretty
| stupid. I was always wary of 2FA for exactly this reason. It's
| something that you can lose or damage. Actually, it's pretty
| common to kill your most used 2nd factor, your mobile.
|
| The solution here is pretty simple: learn 2-3 strong passwords.
| Definitely learn the strong password for your password manager
| and a primary email account, that you can usually use to reset
| the password to all the other accounts anyway. And don't use 2FA
| for those. I only ever use 2FA if it is enforced by a service.
| The real danger of not using 2FA is in your password being
| stolen. (Using strong passwords protect against brute forcing
| them.)
|
| Also, about the hypotheticals: offline IDs (like passport and ID
| card) should be relatively easy to get hold of and once you have
| those you can have your bank account back. You obviously don't
| need to know your bank account numbers (that's not a password)
| and you can't fake your mother's name when you submit your data
| to a bank (because that's part of your ID information and it's
| almost certainly in your ID document anyway). Otherwise yes, use
| a random string whenever stupid sites ask for 'password
| reminders' or security questions.
|
| EDIT: fix typo.
| bergenty wrote:
| Yep lost my phone when I was outside the US. Couldn't get it
| replaced for a month and lost all access to any accounts that
| had 2FA set up for that amount of time. It's also almost
| impossible to get your sim replaced when you can't show up in
| person and show identification I learned.
| evouga wrote:
| Every article about 2FA lists the primary email account as the
| _most_ important account to secure with 2FA, precisely because
| it can be used to reset all other passwords. And yet
| interestingly when I Google "why use 2FA?" the entire first
| page of results lists only spurious reasons (protection against
| phishing, brute-force cracking, social engineering, password
| reuse) and not the actual reason 2FA is potentially useful for
| securing a single-use, strong password (protection from
| keylogging and MITM attacks).
|
| The thought experiment in the linked article makes it clear
| that using "something you own" as the second factor for your
| primary email account is not a good idea. I'm not sure what the
| best solution is, but I agree that the risk of having your
| single, strong email password intercepted is lower than that of
| losing your stuff.
| jzdziarski wrote:
| First, I'm so glad this turned out to be hypothetical, and you
| didn't have to suffer through such a catastrophic loss. Second,
| if you had actually suffered such a loss, your digital life would
| hopefully be the last thing on your mind, and you'd just be glad
| to have your life and your family - the only real things that
| matter in this world.
|
| That said, planning a strategy for offsite data storage or a
| secondary authenticator is of course wise. A safety deposit box
| or other offsite location that you can frequently refresh and
| keep up to date would be a good investment. If you're worried
| about keeping a master key to your life in a single place, you
| could separate your data and your authenticator. The how likely
| depends on your threat model, several people on this site may
| find it insufficient. To whatever degree you obfuscate or
| complicate your recovery path, you also increase the risk of
| losing access to it yourself.
|
| You might also consider it's not necessarily the "thing you have"
| that might go MIA, but due to physical injury, age, or just
| forgetfulness, the "thing you know" could also be at risk. I
| realize this the older I get. Finding a secure way to store a
| master password in the event you cannot recall it, or perhaps in
| the event of your death, is something you may also consider. In
| this case, I would avoid a cipher or something else you're likely
| to forget.
| fmajid wrote:
| A stroke can happen at any age.
| fencepost wrote:
| This is also very relevant for family or trusted access. We had
| a hell of a time after my father had a stroke (recovered now)
| even though I had access to his computers and KeePass database
| - he had plenty of things where phone access was needed but
| nobody knew his unlock pin and it was required to reactivate
| fingerprint unlock.
| kodah wrote:
| Building on the last paragraph, I keep my root PGP key on an
| encrypted USB drive. There's several files that are encrypted
| by the root key, but they're mostly like password manager
| recovery phrases as well as things like my birth certificate,
| social security number, and various government IDs I've used.
| There are two copies of this USB, one travels with me at all
| times, the other is securely stored and accessed twice a year
| to ensure it's still performing. Both USB keys have fuses that
| will blow if opened up. This makes it so that for the rest of
| my life I will remember one password.
|
| Passwords can also be made more memorable. For instance,
| because a password manager remembers the rest of my passwords,
| I made this one what I call a "pattern password". On a US
| keyboard I could type it in seconds without looking, but it
| would be too complex to guess.
| mid-kid wrote:
| Can't agree more with the last paragraph. Not too long ago, due
| to my keyboard breaking, I was forced to type my password
| manager's master password on an unfamiliar keyboard with an
| unfamiliar layout, and I just blanked. I type it frequently
| enough on my phone, so I tried typing it there too, but
| probably due to a combination of mild distress and actively
| trying to _think_ about what I was typing I couldn 't do it
| there either. I eventually decided to try again later and later
| that day I managed to type it correctly.
|
| Rest assured, this situation probably sounds as bizarre as it
| felt. Randomly forgetting something I type every day isn't
| something I had considered a possibility until then. Maybe a
| password without as many non-alphanumeric characters would've
| aided in avoiding this situation, but I get the feeling it
| could've happened with any muscle-memoried password.
| empyrrhicist wrote:
| Had that happen with a four digit numeric bank pin once, and
| several times since then with pass phrases. I tend to get
| stuck on whatever wrong pattern I entered first and have to
| try again later.
| DonHopkins wrote:
| I posted this earlier:
|
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21862160
|
| There's a much more evil prank than that:
|
| A user was having a really bizarre problem: They could log in
| when they were sitting down in a seat in front of the
| keyboard, but when they were standing in front of the
| keyboard, their password didn't work! The problem happened
| every time, so they called for support, who finally figured
| it out after watching them demonstrate the problem many
| times:
|
| It turned out that some joker had rearranged the numbers keys
| on the keyboard, so they were ordered "0123456789" instead of
| "1234567890". And the user's password had a digit in it. When
| the user was sitting down comfortably in front of the
| keyboard, they looked at the screen while they touch-typed
| their password, and were able to log in. But when they were
| standing in front of the computer, they looked at the
| keyboard and pressed the numbers they saw, which were wrong!
| alistairSH wrote:
| Holy crap. That's amazingly evil. And not at all what I
| thought you were going to say
| Arrath wrote:
| Oh my god that car prank you linked was incredible.
| jlg23 wrote:
| Being fed up with people asking to use my laptop (some 20
| years ago), I cleaned its keyboard and put the caps back on
| at random. "Yes, of course you can use it, here you are!
| Oh, sorry, I forgot the keyboard..." Peace and undisturbed
| working ensued...
| chmod775 wrote:
| Many people with mechanical keyboards (as in non-disposable
| keyboards) can probably relate to this, having put some
| keys back the wrong way after cleaning.
| ChrisMarshallNY wrote:
| Great prank (the car swap). Must've cost quite a bit,
| though.
|
| If you have an iPhone, this app is pretty damn hilarious:
| https://apps.apple.com/us/app/action-movie-fx/id489321253
|
| It's done by Bad Robot (JJ Abrams' company). Shows how easy
| it is to do really good special effects, these days.
| ajxs wrote:
| My employer made me use an SOE Macbook that had the
| 'butterfly keyboard'. Many of its keys would only work
| haphazardly. Once I made the mistake of setting my password
| using the laptop's keyboard instead of the external one I
| normally used. It had me going for ages before I realised
| there was one letter in the password missing!
| lobocinza wrote:
| This happened to me ~2 times I think due to exhaustion
| and/or stress. Just had to sleep to remember.
| thatjoeoverthr wrote:
| Once I got home and found my toddler had completely
| shuffled the letters on my keyboard.
| gnicholas wrote:
| I find it incredibly annoying that my iPad wants to
| automatically capitalize the first letter of most text-
| entry fields. I heard somewhere that some sites have made
| the first char of their passwords case-insensitive because
| of this, but IDK if this is just lore.
| concordDance wrote:
| It's a really scary fact that people try and ignore but:
| neurons die.
|
| They do this all the time.
|
| They don't come back.
|
| The information associated with them is just gone. Often the
| information can be reconstructed from other neurons that
| still work, but not always.
| grogenaut wrote:
| sometimes i just cant get the password but will get it a bit
| later when not anxious.
| mixmastamyk wrote:
| You just described tech interviews. ;-)
| isolli wrote:
| It reminds me of the time I tried to type my password on a
| keyboard with a French layout, but responding as if it had a
| US layout. It turns out, even if you think you know where all
| these special characters are, finding them under pressure
| (three tries before you're locked out) with misleading visual
| cues is hard!
| ncpa-cpl wrote:
| Some countries even use more than one keyboard layout, so I
| try to stick to special chacters that dont change from
| keyboard layouts. Like dot comma and space.
| grog454 wrote:
| I had a similar problem once. I normally use the dvorak
| layout but was on a qwerty keyboard. I don't remember exactly
| why, but I had to muscle-memory type the password as if the
| keyboard was dvorak and manually remap the characters using
| an image of a dovrak layout on top of a qwerty keyboard.
| frostwarrior wrote:
| My approach to that is to follow xkcd advice with an
| emergency password which looks less like a random string
| but more like a real world phrase.
|
| I try to use my local language and some obscure local slang
| to avoid being guessed by an international dictionary.
| Sohcahtoa82 wrote:
| > My approach to that is to follow xkcd advice with an
| emergency password which looks less like a random string
| but more like a real world phrase.
|
| Yeah, for my master password, I use a slightly misheard
| line from an episode of a 90's TV show. Googling my
| misheard version in quotes only gets 6 hits, and it's 30
| characters long, so very unlikely to get cracked even
| without replacing letters with symbols or adding a
| suffix.
| sabellito wrote:
| Few years ago I went to a store and paid with my card and
| 4-digit password. Not 20 minutes later, at another store, I
| just couldn't remember the password anymore, missed it 3
| times and got my card blocked.
|
| I had to make a new card because I couldn't remember the
| password to unblock it at the bank.
|
| I had that card and password for 3-4 years at that point,
| wasn't under any stress at all, and nothing like this had
| ever happened, nor happened again.
| thraxil wrote:
| Had the same experience. Went to an ATM one night and the
| PIN for my card that I'd used several times a week for
| probably a decade was just... gone. Never before, never
| since.
| macintux wrote:
| I've had the same experience. Walked up to an ATM for the
| second time in two days and my 4-digit PIN was simply gone
| from my memory. I never figured out what it was.
|
| That was almost 30 years ago, and thankfully it hasn't
| happened again.
| grogenaut wrote:
| I use my ATM so infrequently that it's happened to me a
| few times. I get cash reups selling stuff on Craigslist
| so I need the ATM like once a year. Luckily my ATM is
| right next to an in grocery store branch so resetting the
| pin is 3-5 minutes talking to someone irl
| LandR wrote:
| This happened to me last year.
|
| Completely out of the blue I forgot my PIN, the PIN I had
| used every day for years. I was at an ATM trying to
| withdraw cash, got it wrong twice. It was just gone.
|
| Luckily I cancelled it before the machine ate it, but I had
| to borrow money from someone to get a taxi home.
|
| I had to request a new PIN and I still can't remember what
| it was. I now keep my pin in my phone under a contact.
| tarsinge wrote:
| It has already happened to me blank on the 4-digit PIN I
| have since more than 5 years. Never thought I could forget
| something so short I use so often.
| Vinnl wrote:
| I've had this happen to me multiple times, and more often
| now that so much payment is contactless here (even though I
| still have the same code as when it wasn't). Additionally,
| something as simple as a different machine (the most recent
| instance was a touch screen) can throw me off as well.
| jay_kyburz wrote:
| I went for a week holiday and when I came back I couldn't
| remember the alarm code. Had to call the boss at 7am with
| the alarm blasting in the background.
| PontifexMinimus wrote:
| Some bank cards have allowed you to change the number to a
| more memorable one.
|
| The other thing you can do is make a mnemonic story to help
| you remember it.
| ntauthority wrote:
| A year ago, I had to go to a bank office and engage in some
| verification process that also required me to use the
| physical bank card with its preassigned PIN.
|
| No matter what I tried, I hit the 3-try limit for the day,
| and opted to have the same preassigned PIN sent by mail to
| my home address.
|
| When walking back home from the bank branch I realized the
| mistake I had made: I had entered the correct PIN, but had
| typed it in calculator/numeric keypad order, and not in
| phone/PIN pad order.
|
| While I've never used that PIN on a numeric keypad for a
| PC, somehow my brain associated the numbers with their
| order on a PC keypad, since I had used my PC keypad to
| unlock my PC with a PIN numerous times more than I had used
| any card terminal with a PIN.
|
| So, the next day, I returned to the bank branch office to
| try the same operation again, and indeed - I had correctly
| entered the PIN and the online banking transfer limit ended
| up adjusted just fine.
| SenHeng wrote:
| For the past decade and a half, possibly longer, Japanese
| ATMs have replaced their physical keypads with digital
| ones where the numbers are randomly placed. Imagine my
| surprised when the first times I tried to enter my PIN,
| it kept failing until I took a good close look at the
| numbers.
| urxvtcd wrote:
| I once forgot root password to my FreeBSD installation, I
| spent a lot of time trying to remember it but failed. So I
| did a reinstall, and obviously recalled it when prompted to
| come up with a new one.
| wishfish wrote:
| I was worried this would happen to me. I made an entry in
| my notes app. "Doctor Harry Bottomsmith 801-421-8623 9 am
| Friday" where 4218 was my PIN.
|
| That's saved me a few times when I blanked out. This note,
| in theory, will look completely innocuous in case anyone
| gets access to my notes.
| SenHeng wrote:
| I've had a few of these. Until years later when I
| stumbled upon them again and totally forgot how they were
| meant to be decoded.
| kibwen wrote:
| This is more generally known as steganography:
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steganography
| GTP wrote:
| >but I get the feeling it could've happened with any muscle-
| memoried password.
|
| I can confirm this. Many years ago I had to type for the
| first time a password on a classmate's iPhone (smartphones
| were just beginning to become common). The problem was that I
| didn't really know that password: what I remembered was a
| shape I was "drawing" onto the keyboard, which involved the
| numeric keypad... You see were this is going. That event was
| the one that led me to finally properly memorize that
| password.
| InCityDreams wrote:
| Mild distress? I don't think that is so rare. But, why are my
| phone numbers not in the same order as my keyboard numbers!
| At my bank i drew a blank and had to sit at the assistants
| desk/ keyboard to fire off the muscles to enter in my old pw,
| in order to enter in an otu pw they'd generated.
| remram wrote:
| This happened to me, I forgot my Android "pattern", the
| swiped pin-like thing to unlock the phone. I didn't have a
| password set. I was able to factory-reset it with my Google
| account password but I lost recent files that hadn't yet been
| backed up (photos etc).
|
| I just totally blanked. Like you said, the more I thought
| about it the less I could remember what it was like. It was
| really scary.
| makeitdouble wrote:
| > Second, if you had actually suffered such a loss, your
| digital life would hopefully be the last thing on your mind
|
| To note, our banking system is well part of our digital life.
| Europe has already a flurry of "real" banks that have no
| physical presence, and after a catastrophic loss you'll need
| that access to your bank as soon as possible.
| basisword wrote:
| This has made me think twice about using those banks (I'm
| thinking of Monzo etc.). I was already reconsidering anyway
| as all of these banks have been consistently reducing
| features and limiting usage (e.g. cash withdrawals) and
| generally making themselves worse than the 'real' banks.
| makeitdouble wrote:
| It depends on the "attack" vector you see as the most
| problematic.
|
| With a "real" bank, I had to go to an agency 5 times in a
| row to solve a paper issue because they wouldn't just
| message me about it as it was "confidential" (they couldn't
| validate our home address, though we were receiving their
| spam pretty fine), and the system was really built around
| the assumption that making you come to the agency was a no-
| brainer. The other options evolved snail mailing copies of
| the papers and waiting for them to process it.
|
| There's also the issue of "old fashion" people sticking
| more with traditional banks, making them skew their
| offerings towards these people. I was endlessly phone
| spammed with insurance and bullshit travel packs, and I
| couldn't just block them as it came from my actual agent.
| basisword wrote:
| I think I'm lucky then. My 'traditional' bank is
| paperless, has a good app and website, and I can do
| everything over the phone with relative ease if I need
| to. It's all a bit clunkier than one of the app-native
| banks (which is why I half-switched to the app bank) but
| that's the software snob in me more than missing
| functionality.
| tgsovlerkhgsel wrote:
| > Second, if you had actually suffered such a loss, your
| digital life would hopefully be the last thing on your mind
|
| It isn't though. Access to your digital resources is vital to
| recover from the loss. You need an e-mail address to arrange
| contractors, you need your contact list to reach out to friends
| for help, you need access to your bank accounts, your cloud-
| stored scans of your ID cards, ...
| reaperducer wrote:
| _You need an e-mail address to arrange contractors_
|
| No. People have been trained to think they need an e-mail
| address for real-life things, but they don't.
|
| I had a roof replaced in my last place, which involved
| multiple contractors and insurance companies. No e-mail. No
| text messaging involved.
|
| I recently moved to a new city, and setting up utilities, dry
| cleaning service, parking garage, etc... probably involved a
| dozen new accounts. I gave my e-mail address to none of them.
| Depending on the disposition of the provider, I either told
| them I hadn't set up e-mail yet since I moved, or just a flat
| "no."
|
| _you need your contact list to reach out to friends for
| help_
|
| If you're over 40, you can remember the days when it was
| perfectly ordinary to remember the phone numbers for dozens
| and dozens of people and businesses. These days, we've
| allowed computers to think and remember for us (hello,
| Stackoverflow!) so we don't have to. Memory is a normal skill
| that many people have lost or neglected.
|
| _you need access to your bank accounts_
|
| That's why it's important to have your bank accounts with an
| actual bank, with actual branches, and actual human beings to
| help you when human being things go wrong in the real world.
|
| _your cloud-stored scans of your ID cards_
|
| I can't even wrap my brain around why you'd trust information
| this important to a rental computer a thousand miles away.
|
| "Everything digital" is a marketing tool. In reality, it only
| works when it works. When things go wrong, digital shows its
| fragility.
| basisword wrote:
| >> If you're over 40, you can remember the days when it was
| perfectly ordinary to remember the phone numbers for dozens
| and dozens of people and businesses. These days, we've
| allowed computers to think and remember for us (hello,
| Stackoverflow!) so we don't have to. Memory is a normal
| skill that many people have lost or neglected.
|
| Heck, if you're over 30 you remember this. The problem
| though is that you remembered those numbers because you
| dialled them frequently from memory (and, at least in my
| location, landline numbers were much shorter than cell
| phone numbers). If you're not doing this on your smartphone
| you're never going to be able to remember the numbers. e.g.
| I can remember all of my childhood friends home phone
| numbers. I can't remember my partners cell phone number.
|
| I recently considered getting an analogue phone book and
| noting down all the numbers in my smartphone contacts book
| just in case I ever lost access to the digital version.
| grogenaut wrote:
| You likely still have a printer. Print out your contacts
| and toss them in a safe
| basisword wrote:
| Yep good call. I just realised the Mac contacts app lets
| you export it to a nice PDF I can print.
| brnt wrote:
| > People have been trained to think they need an e-mail
| address for real-life things, but they don't.
|
| The Dutch government not only defacto requires it, soon an
| Android or iOS phone with their app will be required too.
| Only very determined, very patient people with lots or
| spare time will be able to do without.
| paganel wrote:
| The Dutch people should probably protest against measures
| like those.
| brnt wrote:
| They don't, because they are largely anti-luddites.
| jay_kyburz wrote:
| I was thinking about this on the way home the other day.
| I'm the most tech savvy of all my family and friends. I
| live and breath tech. Code all day, game all night.
|
| But I'm the one who hates all smart home devices. I'm the
| one who wants a dumb TV. I would be perfectly happy with
| my dumb phone if it didn't keep pocket dialing emergency
| services.
|
| I want less tech in my life not more.
| reaperducer wrote:
| _The Dutch government not only defacto requires it, soon
| an Android or iOS phone with their app will be required
| too_
|
| What do poor people do? Or the very elderly? Or those
| with diminished mental abilities? Or people whose culture
| eschews technology?
| brnt wrote:
| They get screwed, in most cases.
| foobarbecue wrote:
| Pretend he said "phone unlock code" instead of email
| password. It's 2022. Everything is digital. Auth is
| essential.
| ghaff wrote:
| Phones break and get lost/stolen.
|
| All of us--and I include myself although I try to have
| some backup information on paper--have probably become
| too dependent on a single physical device which sucks in
| more and more information every year. See ongoing
| digitization of driver's licenses.
|
| Especially for international travel, but really
| generally, I try to make it so I'm not completely screwed
| if something were to happen to my phone.
| foobarbecue wrote:
| Yes, the "one device per phone number" restriction is
| quite annoying. I'd like to have multiple, functional
| copies of my phone. Instead I settle for a phone and a 4G
| watch, paying for one phone number for each. Since eSIM
| providers allow cloning but I haven't tried that yet.
| avh02 wrote:
| I try to still print out boarding passes when I can cos I
| don't want to deal with delays or missing a flight if my
| phone runs out of battery, especially if it's a flight
| out after a full day out and about. It's also less
| annoying at the airport fiddling with my phone to get the
| right barcode up each time it's needed (and no, I won't
| put it in to Google wallet)
| ghaff wrote:
| I don't go out of way to print boarding passes when I'm
| on the road. But certainly at home, it takes maybe a
| minute so why not?
| ddingus wrote:
| Same. Paper has no downtime.
| ska wrote:
| I stopped doing this when I realized I hadn't used a
| single paper one in about 50 flights.
| reaperducer wrote:
| You'll start doing it again after someone swipes your
| phone at the airport (yes, this still happens) and you
| miss your plane waiting in line to deal with the customer
| service agents.
| dspillett wrote:
| _> Finding a secure way to store a master password in the event
| you cannot recall it,_
|
| Currently my master credentials are on an old USB stick (a
| Yubikey device that I got in an offer, though I only use it to
| type the long password as if it were a keyboard) and printed
| (plain and as a QR to save typing issues) & stored well away
| from the things they secure. The printed copies have the lot,
| the USB version requires a prefix which I remember.
|
| This may seem risky (the old on-a-post-it-under-the-keyboard
| issue) but for my online backing and other key stuff the key
| risk is my password store which is secured by one of those
| master keys, and its main risk is someone remote getting access
| to both the key DB and the passphrase and it is properly air-
| gap secure against that. Similar for the encryption keys for
| local storage and off-site backups.
|
| _> or perhaps in the event of your death_
|
| This is a concern I've not at all addressed in my plans. The
| basics will be putting details in my will for how things should
| be accessed, but those details need to be both secure from
| inappropriate access and easy for th eright people to access
| when the time comes. Though as I have nothing much to leave to
| anyone that isn't too big a concern yet...
|
| The halfway point is a bigger matter that I (and many others)
| really should address: what if I'm incapacitated temporarily or
| otherwise? Someone may need access to my stuff to sort a great
| many things while I can't. We've had an issue with this with my
| mother who due to dementia can't even sign her name, so neither
| she nor my dad couldn't access an account that was only in her
| name without a _huge_ rigmarole of paperwork and assessments to
| sort out power of attorney. We 've since got things sorted in
| advance of further problems (myself and my brothers set up with
| joint PoA so if something happens to him too we can sort what
| needs sorting more easily) but I have nothing like that setup
| for myself for either life stuff or technical stuff (or the
| things that are both).
|
| I'm in good health as far as I know, but I'm not getting any
| younger (this year I'm on the cusp of leaving "the low 40s")
| and I've seen unpleasantly final things happen to people who
| were similarly good health as far as they knew.
| M4v3R wrote:
| > First, I'm so glad this turned out to be hypothetical
|
| I've only learned about this is hypothetical from your comment
| (yes, I'm guilty of not reading to the very end). I wish the
| author conveyed that a little more clearly.
| enriquto wrote:
| The first word in this document is "Imagine", how can it be
| clearer than that?
| [deleted]
| spiffytech wrote:
| Given all the pictures in the article, I took that to mean
| "imagine you were in my situation", not "imagine this
| happened to me".
| skeeter2020 wrote:
| This is a common setup to build empathy so doesn't always
| mean "the following is a hypothetical thought exercise",
| such as "Imagine you find your self in the same situation
| as me, your house struck by lightning..."
| lupire wrote:
| Unfortunately the Internet is rife with poor sarcasm and
| misleading titles.
| aidenn0 wrote:
| It's ambiguous; the word can be used not only for a
| hypothetical, but also a "put yourself in my shoes"
| felideon wrote:
| It also detracts from the main point, which is this _could_
| happen to someone, but, since it's hypothetical, makes it
| sounds a lot more unrealistic. The "fireproof but not
| lightning-proof" safe gave me pause, for example.
| Macha wrote:
| If he was actually locked out as described, how would he have
| made this blog post?
| dmm wrote:
| > safety deposit box
|
| A firesafe in a friend or relative's basement is a much better
| choice. Safety deposit boxes regularly get lost, tossed, or
| sold and the banks have very little liabilty.
|
| https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/business/safe-deposit-box...
| loloquwowndueo wrote:
| Only given how the article assumes everything burned down,
| your friends house would also have been struck by freak
| lightning of doom.
| wintermutestwin wrote:
| I live in a fire prone area. I have a safe deposit box 30
| mins away in a place that won't burn. I keep a HD there with
| all my photos on it. I refresh the drive monthly. The chance
| that this small credit union with maybe 100 boxes will lose,
| toss or sell my box on fire day is pretty minimal.
|
| Yes, safe deposit boxes are not always as safe as spy movies
| would have you think (or even that we should assume them to
| reasonably be), but they can still be used as part of a
| disaster recovery strategy.
| the_af wrote:
| > _A firesafe in a friend or relative 's basement is a much
| better choice_
|
| The article addresses these options and why they are not
| ideal either.
|
| Also, one thought experiment I just came up with: how many of
| your friends are you willing to let store their pendrives in
| your basement's firesafe? How often would you be comfortable
| with your friends coming to your home to update their
| pendrives?
| Aeolun wrote:
| The only thing that needs to be on this pendrive is the
| master password to the password vault and a separate
| yubikey.
| foobarian wrote:
| What is the fascination with pendrives? Can't it be a
| piece of paper?
| ridgered4 wrote:
| I suppose they might want to encrypt a pendrive in case
| it was stolen from the friends housse. But you could do
| something similar with a piece of paper.
|
| Pendrives aren't known for storing particularly well over
| the long term so they probably aren't a great choice
| anyway.
| foobarian wrote:
| I suppose an overheated safe would not be good for either
| a flash storage or paper. Maybe engrave the pdf on a
| piece of metal :-)
| bragr wrote:
| That's what the scientologists did with all of L Ron
| Hubbard's books.
|
| https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/Library/Shelf/la90/la90-1f.ht
| ml
| mst wrote:
| I know several who I believe would be fine with it, all of
| whom I see regularly, usually down our usual pub, and all
| of whom would I suspect be happy to do an update at least
| every couple months in return for me buying them a few
| drinks for the hassle.
|
| I already have multiple friends who have copies of my house
| key held in case something really stupid happens, none of
| whom found that weird and all of whom I'm willing to trust
| enough that I believe the risk of having multiple such
| copies extant but unmarked is significantly less than the
| risk of not having that fallback plan.
|
| In fact, they all considered "being one of the spare key
| holders" to be an honour more than anything else.
|
| I am very much aware that there are many people whose
| situations are very different than mine, but it works for
| me (and they're all wonderful people for whose existence I
| try to be appropriately grateful.)
| philistine wrote:
| I have a recovery code for my iCloud written down on a piece of
| paper, in an envelope marked _for my wife in case of emergency_
| , in my office at work. There is nothing written on that piece
| of paper but the code.
|
| It's not perfect security, but it's my security blanket in case
| my house burns down with my phone in it and I need to rebuild
| my whole house of cards.
| anonymousiam wrote:
| It took me about 30 seconds to ask the question: If he's locked
| out of his digital life, how did he post the story to his blog?
| From that point on I knew it was hypothetical, but it was still
| a good read and raises important issues.
| bluGill wrote:
| > or perhaps in the event of your death, is something you may
| also consider.
|
| When my dad died we were glad that he had most of his passwords
| written down. There are a lot of things like the electric bill
| that we didn't know if he had paid yet or not, and other bills
| that are entirely paperless that we have have no idea about.
| Mom would hate to have something not paid just because we
| didn't know to pay it. There is a lot of paperwork to get
| access to accounts after someone dies and that takes time. (dad
| donated his body to science so that added a couple months
| before we could even start the paperwork)
|
| Unfortunately there was one account we knew he had (because it
| showed up in quicken) and an IRA with most of his money, but it
| took us several months to figure out what bank it was at.
| Please don't do this to your family: write down all your
| accounts and their passwords in a safe place that someone
| trusted will look. (I need to take my own advice)
| ryandrake wrote:
| Anyone who acts as the "head of their household" and manages
| the family's finances, pays the bills, and manages the day to
| day home ops, do your heirs a favor and write out a Death
| Book[1] today, that contains all your various accounts,
| passwords, copies of important documents, and so on. PRINT IT
| OUT and put it in a safe or other secure place. I recently
| had two acquaintances who died pretty suddenly and young-ish
| (in their 40s). One was prepared and had his shit together,
| and it helped his family more easily pick up the pieces while
| they grieved. The other one did NOT have his shit together at
| all, and the result was even more stress and phone calls
| piled on to his family during an already difficult time.
|
| 1: https://www.marketwatch.com/story/to-help-your-heirs-
| write-a...
| Johnny555 wrote:
| Good advice - tracking down all of dad's account
| information was very laborious after he passed away - we
| found an insurance policy that covered my mom that I assume
| he didn't know about since he never made a claim.
|
| We have our list printed and locked in a firesafe (which is
| bolted to the floor and not easy to find for a thief), as
| well as electronically in a shared 1Password vault shared
| between my wife and I. My sister (and executor of our will)
| knows that the paper is in the fire safe, just in case
| something disastrous happens to both my wife and I. They'll
| need a locksmith to get in the safe though.
| codetrotter wrote:
| > the "thing you know" could also be at risk. I realize this
| the older I get.
|
| Years ago, when I was in university, I had a couple of machines
| in my room running FreeBSD with full-disk encryption. These
| machines were powered on for a few months without reboots until
| one day when the power went out.
|
| Having not typed in the password in months, and at the time
| using the kind of passwords consisting of long word with a lot
| of numeric and symbolic substitutions, I was unable to decrypt
| the disks of my machines.
|
| I lost a fair bit of data that day, but it taught me a valuable
| lesson.
|
| These days, any passwords that I use for full disk encryption I
| make sure to
|
| 1. Regularly use. Meaning I'll reboot machines and retype the
| passwords on a regular basis. Likewise, I connect external
| encrypted disks on a regular basis and decrypt them with their
| passwords.
|
| 2. Use pass phrases with many words but without any numbers or
| special characters. See also https://github.com/ctsrc/Pgen
|
| (For websites etc I use a password manager.)
| kibwen wrote:
| This is why Android requires users to type their PIN once a
| week, even if you use biometric authentication. It's an
| essential practice that needs to be the norm for any
| biometric auth.
| bombcar wrote:
| This is where risk assessment comes into play - people often
| consider it "evaluate the attackers and how to prevent them"
| but risks include many things; hardware failures, memory
| failures, _human_ memory failures, etc.
|
| And one of the biggest risks with encryption is data loss if
| passphrase are forgotten - using encryption usually involves
| considering that _data loss_ is better than _data exposure_ -
| which is obviously true for things like passwords (you 'd
| rather forget your bank's password than have it exposed,
| because you can reset it) but not necessarily true for other
| data.
|
| This can lead to things like encrypted systems but storing
| the off-site backups _unencrypted_ because they 're off-line
| and the only real risk is theft. Again, depends on what the
| data is.
| [deleted]
| LazyEvaluation wrote:
| I'm a big fan of all lower case phrases as passwords now for
| this reason. Something like "this is my password there are many
| like it but this one is mine my password is my best friend it
| is my life I must master it as I must master my life". Very
| easy to remember. Very easy to type. Very hard to crack.
| Cheers.
| vikingerik wrote:
| What do you do for a service that demands uppercase letters,
| numerals, special characters, and no spaces?
| drivers99 wrote:
| Always have two or more yubikeys. I think every howto about those
| tells you about that. This thought experiment is a good reminder
| I need to physically separate them though.
| jackewiehose wrote:
| I don't understand the point of having 2FA with your password
| manager. When I open my password manager on a malware infected PC
| it doesn't matter how the password vault is opened. Once it's
| opened it is available in RAM and the malware is able to read it
| completely anyway.
|
| My passwords are stored in Keepass on an encrypted backup disc,
| locally and also in another household. There is no way I would
| make the accessibility to something important like that dependent
| on additional hardware.
| pertique wrote:
| I see a few use cases depending on the password manager. For
| local, it probably doesn't add too much.
|
| For cloud-based solutions, it mitigates the risk of having your
| master password snooped when typing it in public.
| basisword wrote:
| >> But, suppose I had stored everything off-site. All I'd need to
| do is walk up to the bank and show some ID which proved that I
| was the authorised user of that box.
|
| >> The ID which has just been sacrificed in tribute to mighty
| Thor and now looks like a melted waxwork.
|
| How is this not the solution? You can get new ID from the
| government and then access the box.
| krallja wrote:
| It's just that easy, huh? Here are the problems I would face
| when trying to get an ID from the government without having any
| ID.
|
| My state's DMV wants to see:
|
| * One document (with full name) proving identity and date of
| birth. [A birth certificate.]
|
| * One document (with full name and full Social Security number)
| confirming Social Security number
|
| * Two documents (with current physical address) proving state
| residency
|
| The U.S. State Department requires you to apply in person for a
| new passport if your old one is destroyed. Processing, issuing,
| and delivering it currently takes about half a year. Oh yeah,
| and you will need to bring your birth certificate.
|
| I just requested a certified birth certificate from the
| register of deeds in my county, and they said it SHOULD be
| ready by December.
|
| So, I should be able to exist again by ... next summer.
| basisword wrote:
| >> I just requested a certified birth certificate from the
| register of deeds in my county, and they said it SHOULD be
| ready by December.
|
| That's...insane. Obviously this all depends on where you live
| but 6 months to get a birth certificate is crazy. I can get
| mine in less than 5 working days after I submit my request
| (which can be done on the phone, in person, or by mail). And
| that's the standard non-priority service.
| krallja wrote:
| Yep! Absolutely bonkers. "nObOdY WaNtS tO WoRk AnYmOrE"
| etc.
|
| Luckily it's not an emergency for me, I just want a copy to
| put in my fireproof safe...
| nikanj wrote:
| This was discussed under "Bootstrapping of trust" in the same
| article. Getting new ID requires money+people who vouch for
| you, both of which you can't access without having access to
| them. It's circular dependencies all the way down.
| basisword wrote:
| Ah, I glossed over it and missed that. I guess the point of
| this is that it's an absolute worst case scenario, which is
| highly unlikely for anyone. Most people will have an out
| (e.g. in reality you probably can find someone to vouch for
| you - doctor, priest, lawyer, if not friends that live close
| by and if you can find a friend nearby asking for a lend of
| $50 for ID application in your time of need will probably be
| successful).
| tmountain wrote:
| Where I live, the DMV will issue you a new driver's license
| without any accompanying documents. They use facial recognition
| to verify your identity. This brings its own issues to the
| table, but it solves this problem.
| htrp wrote:
| Welcome to all of the problems that business continuity planners
| face.
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