[HN Gopher] High-Security Mechanical Locks (2020)
___________________________________________________________________
High-Security Mechanical Locks (2020)
Author : walterbell
Score : 124 points
Date : 2022-04-26 12:52 UTC (10 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (swiftsilentdeadly.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (swiftsilentdeadly.com)
| pclmulqdq wrote:
| I used to be into locksport, and particularly high-end locks. A
| word of warning: A friend of mine once put a high-end $400
| padlock on his storage unit when he stored his college stuff over
| the summer. It is the only storage unit in that facility that was
| ever broken into. A thief saw the lock, thought they must be
| hiding something good, and came back with a crowbar to lever the
| door open. Nothing was stolen but I think they were expecting a
| huge drug stash.
| YPPH wrote:
| Nice. My "library" consists only of Abloy Protec2 and BiLock NG
| locks. It's interesting to see some of the others out there.
|
| One lock this article doesn't refer to is EVVA MCS, which uses a
| magnetic element as well. I hope to add it to the collection one
| day, but haven't yet found a justification.
|
| On the other hand, my front door is still a standard pin tumbler,
| I figure nobody is going to pick my front door open when they
| could just as easily break the adjacent window.
| Cthulhu_ wrote:
| One thing though; if they pick the door, there will be no
| obvious trace of a break-in and the insurance may not pay out.
| It's kinda better to force them to break the window. And they
| might be reluctant to do so because it causes a lot of noise
| and hopefully draws the attention, making it less attractive to
| do so.
| YPPH wrote:
| I guess so, but I'm not sure picking or bumping residential
| locks is heard of where I live. Last time I was burgled they
| used a crowbar to force entry by breaking the lock. Even
| that's rare. The overwhelming majority of burglaries here are
| opportunistic based on unlocked doors/windows.
|
| There's a LockPickingLawyer video on YouTube [1] where he
| shows you a simple modification that seizes the lock upon
| picking attempts. I would do this, but unlike him I only have
| one entrance door, so in the event it is seized I'd have to
| break in.
|
| [1] https://youtu.be/7JlgKCUqzA0
| adenner wrote:
| The lock is only there to keep people honest. Opening the
| door/breaking a window etc. will trigger the home alarm
| system as well as being caught on camera. Killing my internet
| and jamming the cellular backup is not really a huge concern
| in my area as there are plenty of more ripe targets (attached
| garage doors left open all day etc.)
| pmoriarty wrote:
| Are these all "if you have to ask you can't afford it" type of
| locks?
| jfindley wrote:
| At least in some locations insurance companies may reward you
| with much lower premiums if you have sufficiently secure locks,
| alarm systems etc when the value of your contents is high
| enough (maybe you inherited some valuable art work or
| something).
|
| It's typically done in thresholds too - start off with a small
| reduction in premiums, then a big one, then they won't insure
| you at all unless you fit this stuff.
| LeifCarrotson wrote:
| No, the Abloy Protec2 described is 'just' $280.
|
| Whether this is outrageous compared to a $28 'builder-grade'
| deadbolt at a box store depends on the value of the things
| inside and the probability of an attempt at a theft.
| giantg2 wrote:
| Agree. I wanted to get something better, just because why
| not? I ended up just going with some commercial schalge
| that's just slightly more durable than the standard ones,
| came with reinforced strike plates, etc. There's not a lot of
| crime in my area and there's not much that someone would want
| to steal.
|
| One thing to consider if sticking with "normal" locks is that
| you can still get the reinforced strike plates, pick a key
| design that makes bump keys or raking less effective
| (supposedly), not hiding a key, etc. Nothing is perfect. You
| can have the best doors and windows and someone can still
| knock a hole in your wall if they really want to.
| michaelt wrote:
| In my country, I can buy an Abloy PL341/25 padlock with Protec2
| core for PS63.50 [1] which is about $80. I can get a shitty
| padlock for 90% less.
|
| So, the price isn't out of reach for the average computer
| programmer, but you pay a substantial premium over bottom-of-
| the-barrel products.
|
| [1] https://www.barnsleylock.co.uk/abloy-pl34125--
| pl34150-padloc...
| dimensionc132 wrote:
| Lock Picking Lawyer (on youtube) destroys these locks "security"
| features and picks them usually in under 3 minutes.
|
| Secure locks generally do not exist.
| duckfacts7 wrote:
| They do. There are locks that are over 100 years old in design
| that nobody has ever published a picking method or tool for
| publically (kromer protector comes to mind).
|
| Beyond that most locks that require specialized tooling to pick
| or are ranked above red belt on the lpu rating chart are more
| than secure enough for even commercial purposes. The chances of
| an intruder successfully picking say abloy protec 2, clavis
| f22, opnus mmxII, assa twin combi, etc are infinitesimally
| small compared to them trying to brute force entry through
| another opening like a window
| formerly_proven wrote:
| You shouldn't get a wrong impression from LPL videos, he
| practices picks extensively and said he only starts recording
| when he's pretty sure he can pick the given lock consistently.
| bryanlarsen wrote:
| There are locks he can't pick.
|
| https://twitter.com/LockPickingLwyr/status/10701189010973818...
| dimensionc132 wrote:
| .....yet
| duckfacts7 wrote:
| Ever. LPL is wildly over rated by the laymen. Most of what
| he picks isn't even remotely high security. Been waiting
| for him to do a pick and gut of an assa twin he received
| years ago but it's never going to happen. If you want to
| see someone who is as good as the hype says they are, try
| artichoke2000
| bryanlarsen wrote:
| The tweet is from 2018. If he can't do it in 3.5 years,
| it's reasonable to suppose he never will be able to.
| dimensionc132 wrote:
| someone should ask him if he had success in the meantime
| bryanlarsen wrote:
| If he succeeded he'd make a video. He hasn't.
| evilotto wrote:
| Given enough time, any lock can be broken into, and no
| manufacturer will claim their lock is foolproof. Even safes are
| rated only for how long they will deter a determined thief,
| e.g., a TL-15 safe will resist break-in for 15 minutes.
| sklargh wrote:
| I wonder what the probability detection* tradeoff looks like
| between the noise of breaching a door with a high security lock
| and picking the lock.
|
| *detection in the act of breaking in, not ultimately.
| giantg2 wrote:
| I'd imagine it is a huge difference. Especially considering the
| author has dogs that will continue to make noise after they
| hear a loud noise.
|
| And of course in the event that the owner wasn't home, a break
| in would leave noticeable damage where picking would not
| (unless they failed and the anti pick pins got stuck).
| aidenn0 wrote:
| Lock Picking Lawyer picks and disassembles various locks,
| including an ASSA with two sidebars[1]. Note that it's far easier
| to pick a lock that you are prepared to pick clamped into a vise
| on your workbench than one in the field.
|
| 1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uX0TtY8W24c
| walterbell wrote:
| Graham Pulford's 2007 book, https://archive.org/details/high-
| security-mechanical-locks-a...
|
| _> High-Security Mechanical Locks comprehensively surveys and
| explains the highly technical area of high security locks in a
| way that is accessible to a wide audience. Well over 100
| different locks are presented, organized into 6 basic types. Each
| chapter introduces the necessary concepts in a historical
| perspective and further categorizes the locks. This is followed
| by detailed 'how it works' descriptions with many pictures,
| diagrams and references. The descriptions are based on actual
| dissections of the real locks._
| koblas wrote:
| One thing that usually overlooked in many high security lock
| discussions is the key stock thickness. If you look at a typical
| house key side by side with the high security version it's
| notably thicker and more durable.
|
| Prevents breaking a key off in a lock by a large factor.
| eatbitseveryday wrote:
| Just a thought. Even if you think someone may not pick your lock,
| it may be easy to drill it open by destroying the pins. I've done
| that once in a lock inside my home we didn't have a key to.
|
| Higher security locks may be made out of stronger metals,
| preventing this.
| giantg2 wrote:
| Yes, the article talks about anti drill pins designed to break
| bits. The locks may still be made out of brass, which might
| actually improve their function as the bit is spinning faster
| when it hits the hardened pin.
| bombcar wrote:
| I wonder how well they'd defend against hole saws, especially
| if you went for one larger than the keyway.
|
| Of course, many doors are easily defeated themselves by a
| sawzall.
| somewhereoutth wrote:
| Different kind of lock, but I discovered the other day that the
| tumbler combination lock box I use for my car keys while surfing
| can be trivially picked - and there are youtube videos.
| Apparently this has been a big problem in SF in the last few
| years. Perhaps a dial combination lock box (e.g. Kidde) will be
| more secure.
| zie wrote:
| See LockPickingLawyer on Youtube, but basically every lock you
| can buy in a store is full of zero days. The only thing keeping
| them "safe" is most criminals are to lazy to learn the known
| zero days by watching a Youtube video or three and practising a
| little.
| Chirael wrote:
| Of the "lock box" type key holders, it seems like the Kidde
| mini-safe box is pretty decent (see
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZLg86_C7rrs) - though it's not
| a doorknob hanger so to install it properly you'd want to screw
| it into something sturdy.
| somewhereoutth wrote:
| seems like they have ones with a shackle:
| https://www.kidde.com/home-safety/en/us/products/key-
| securit...
| cryptonector wrote:
| Ok, but if the LockPickingLawyer doesn't try breaking it and fail
| (or take long enough to succeed that the desired effect is
| achieved), I'm not buying it.
| yccs27 wrote:
| On the topic of "novel, non-pin-tumbler mechanisms": I can
| recommend the videos by Stuff Made Here [1][2], where he designs
| two novel anti-picking lock mechanisms, and the related video [3]
| where LockPickingLawyer tries to pick and bypass them. Together
| they give a whole new understanding of lock design and picking
| methods.
|
| [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_7vPNcnYWQ4 [2]
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2A2NY29iQdI [3]
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ecy1FBdCRbQ
| swighton wrote:
| Glad you enjoy my locks :) Making locks is very interesting,
| but it reminds me of why they say you shouldn't write your own
| encryption. Even if the theory is sound, it just takes one
| little mistake for someone to bypass all your grand designs...
| Terry_Roll wrote:
| So as you make locks, why dont magnetic keys that repel pins
| get used to make it harder to pick a lock?
|
| After all how would lock picking lawyer measure the magnetic
| strength of the pins?
| endiangroup wrote:
| AD: and here I was about to appeal to HN to get this article
| over to you! Hope it inspires another version, you had some
| wonderful novel concepts in your lock(s).
| skazazes wrote:
| Shane, heartfelt thanks for what you are doing. Having spent
| a large portion of my career in early childhood STEM
| education, 'edutainment' is the best means I have come across
| to communicate complex topics while capturing attention of
| youth. You are in my personal 'Top 5' and your content is now
| my go to recommendation to friends/parents.
|
| P.S. I used to work as a retail educator at MakerBot, while
| you were with FormLabs. SLA always blew my FDM centric mind
| blenderdt wrote:
| I think you proved it's great to write your own encryption
| because your will learn a ton of new stuff ;)
|
| But yes, don't use it in production before the
| LockPickingLawyer took a look at it.
| giantg2 wrote:
| I've sort of daydream about better locks some times. The vast
| majority of the locks in the US are trivially easy to pick. It
| probably not worth the money though since most criminals don't
| pick locks, and the ones that do have better targets.
| linsomniac wrote:
| Any recommendations on "decent" combination locks? I've been
| using Sesamee, mostly because of my grandfather's recommendation
| "I had this on my footlocker and you ain't gonna saw through it".
| But it is open to a feeler attack by the dials.
| xarope wrote:
| 3..2..1 lock picking lawyer let's go!
| giantg2 wrote:
| What? I don't understand.
| Alekhine wrote:
| There's a popular youtube channel called "Lockpicking Lawyer"
| where a guy reviews locks. He's an incredibly skilled picker.
| taneq wrote:
| From the few I've watched, most of the time he just seems
| to end-run around the supposed security of whatever it is.
| The double-crescent-wrench trick is a classic, "here take
| this super expensive fancy electronic lock, watch what
| happens when we just snap it in half with two tools I can
| fit in my pocket."
| camtarn wrote:
| He tends to do several videos in a row on a theme - for
| instance, slicing through 'cut-proof' bags, or snapping
| shackles with spanners, etc. But you just need to go back
| maybe ten videos and you'll find that the majority of his
| content by far is about lock picking.
| Arrath wrote:
| How is that in any way a detriment to his content? He's
| highlighting the utter failure of the product to provide
| the security it purports to. See: where he opens the
| small safe with a plain kitchen butter knife
|
| Maybe if he was blatantly 'cheating', by using a battery
| powered sawzall or an oxy-arc torch to just blast off the
| lock. But he uses more mundane items, like the knife, or
| two crescent wrenches.
| camtarn wrote:
| I think the Ramset videos might count as 'cheating' -
| there probably aren't many locks designed to take the
| force of a .22 blank powder charge to the body and
| survive. And the ones about shooting locks with a 50 cal
| rifle _definitely_ count ;) Still really interesting to
| see the limits of lock endurance nevertheless - really
| underscores the idea that no lock is undefeatable, it 's
| just about how far somebody is willing to go to defeat
| it.
| maxerickson wrote:
| It's $100 at Home Depot, if people are gonna market locks
| as being tough it's a reasonable test.
| camtarn wrote:
| Huh, I had no idea they were that cheap! Always assumed
| it would be some multi-hundred-$ professional gadget.
| capitainenemo wrote:
| As I recall the double crescent wrench thing was mostly
| for demo purposes, and to show how he thought he had a
| more effective technique than another youtube channel.
|
| While he sometimes he does destructive attacks just to
| highlight weak security (zinc, plastic) or poorly fitted
| parts, the vast majority of his videos are picks, often
| using specialised tools, like the disc detainer he helped
| design.
| pugworthy wrote:
| > disc detainer he helped design
|
| You mean, to quote, "the tool that Bosnian Bill and I
| made"?
| capitainenemo wrote:
| yeeeeep ^_^
| giantg2 wrote:
| Oh, ok. Maybe I'll check that out. Thanks! At first I was
| thinking about the legal implications of owning/carrying
| picks depending on state.
| Chirael wrote:
| The U.S. branch of TOOOL (the Open Organization of Lock
| Pickers) maintains a web page detailing lock picking laws
| by state: https://toool.us/laws.html
| giantg2 wrote:
| Nice. This looks much more permissive than what I
| remember from decades ago.
| r90t wrote:
| After this one, I dont expect any lock to resist him:
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qV8QKZNFxLw
| bryanlarsen wrote:
| He has acknowledged that there are locks he can't pick
| yet: https://twitter.com/LockPickingLwyr/status/107011890
| 10973818...
|
| IIRC, he has since picked the referenced lock (Abloy
| Protec), but hasn't yet picked the Abloy Protec2. I
| imagine most of the locks referenced in the original post
| are in the same category.
| tromp wrote:
| This new Bowley Rotasera Disk Detainer Lock with 9^8 =
| 4,304,6721 combinations looks like it could resist for
| some time:
|
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UQ8vvD-z8eQ
| areactnativedev wrote:
| https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=lockpickinglawy.
| ..
| rolivercoffee wrote:
| Little click out of two...
| pugworthy wrote:
| And as always, have a nice day.
| WelcomeShorty wrote:
| Changing the locks to my house / apartment is the first thing I
| do for us, my parents and our kids.
|
| Personally I most of the time choose the Abloy Protec2, since I
| love the technology and the keys too.
|
| I never understood "security people" who would spend a week
| hardening their OS but did nothing about their locks.
|
| If you want to "get into" the art of opening locks without
| violence (most of the time :) ) I would suggest attending a
| meeting of the fine folks of ToooL
|
| https://toool.nl/Toool
| Arainach wrote:
| >I never understood "security people" who would spend a week
| hardening their OS but did nothing about their locks.
|
| Very different threat models. Computers are available to anyone
| on the internet or the authors of any software I choose to
| install; remote attacks require very few resources and are
| common.
|
| Physical attacks are different. The odds of anyone choosing to
| attack my particular house are very low; they can't attack
| thousands of houses at once, so basic techniques such as "being
| slightly less attractive than my neighbors" work well. As a
| standard residential house, picking the lock isn't the way
| anyone's going to get in. They could break the window next to
| the door. They could kick a door in. They could climb to the
| second level and open a window. They're not at all likely to
| pick my lock, though.
|
| I advocate for using a decent consumer lock (i.e. not Kwikset -
| Schlage is sufficient IMO) with a properly installed deadbolt
| and strike plate but no further for most people.
| KennyBlanken wrote:
| > never understood "security people" who would spend a week
| hardening their OS but did nothing about their locks.
|
| I don't understand someone spending an absurd amount of money
| on a very high security deadbolt for a residential application.
| Burglars don't pick locks to get into houses. They force the
| door with crowbars, or break a window / open the latch, or
| climb to a second floor window that people rarely lock, and so
| on.
|
| Unless your door frame is sufficiently strong enough and the
| door secure enough as well, spending hundreds of dollars on
| very high security deadbolts is stupid.
| mewse-hn wrote:
| I recently ordered new deadbolts for my house and I chose ones
| (kwikset 980) that were defeated quickly by LockPickingLawyer.
| His video actually caused Consumer Reports to pull a
| recommendation of that lock.
|
| My reasoning was:
|
| - Lockpickinglawyer basically gets into everything (I guess
| except the Abloy being discussed in these comments)
|
| - These locks were affordable for ANSI grade 1
|
| - These locks are user re-keyable (I was looking at schlage B60N
| - affordable and nice, but basically would have had to pay a
| locksmith to get keyed alike)
|
| - Lockpickinglawyer's video showed me a much more complex
| mechanism, and picking process, than a standard pin tumbler lock
|
| I think a lot of people take his videos and have the binary
| thought process "lock was defeated therefore the lock is crap",
| but if you watch enough of them there is a lot of nuance. He
| defeats high security locks that are nevertheless robust and
| tricky enough to trust on your front door.
| davio wrote:
| Agreed - if people really want in, they'll use technology
| ranging from rock through a window to cordless angle grinders
| before they'll invest time in learning how to pick locks.
| mmcgaha wrote:
| So true. Most physical security is just an illusion. After
| watching gun safe opening videos, I have been thinking about
| emptying the gun safe and building a false wall to hide my
| guns.
| racnid wrote:
| For weapons storage, the secret is, like everything else,
| defense in depth and monitoring.
| walterbell wrote:
| Any recommendations for monitoring?
| gjvc wrote:
| if you spend money on a good lock, make sure you buy an equally
| high-end door and frame.
| pmoriarty wrote:
| Any recommendations?
|
| And how does one tell a high quality door/frame from one that's
| not?
| alfanick wrote:
| And when you buy a good lock and good door and good frame,
| don't forget to put them in a building made of concrete or
| bricks...
| Chirael wrote:
| You don't necessarily have to replace the whole door frame, you
| can buy an aftermarket frame reinforcer like Door Armor to
| distribute the force of a kicking attack (which is a lot more
| common than lock picking) across the frame. You can also make
| sure to get thick strike places and long (3") screws to make
| sure the door latch and deadbolt are sliding into things that
| are actually screwed to the house framing rather than held in
| by tiny screws that will just rip out with a good kick.
| harambae wrote:
| One thing I didn't see him explicitly mention, but if you can get
| your hands on blanks you can replicate any key bitting (even
| Medeco biaxial and angled) with a file and enough dedication
| (with the exception of moving/magnetic/electronic elements, which
| he does bring up).
|
| So then it's a game of getting blanks or a subset-blank that will
| fit in the keyway. I don't see anyone in here that has linked to
| the relevant Defcon video on Medeco duplication here:
| https://youtu.be/ij0c-236O0k
|
| Also relevant (KeyMark tends to be the one used on exterior
| apartment doors): https://www.thingiverse.com/thing:5249568
| gehwartzen wrote:
| Even without a blank you can sometimes do it. I used a printed
| photocopy of a office key and then modified my existing
| (already cut) key of the same type by adding layers of metallic
| epoxy and filing them back down to the correct hills and
| valleys. Was a pain but it got me a "master" key to all the
| doors in a building I worked at. Be careful if letting someone
| borrow the master key even for just a few minutes.
| gorgoiler wrote:
| EVVA 3KS is such a bloody beautiful key profile.
|
| I really recommend owning one just for the sheer beauty of the
| engineering.
|
| https://www.evva.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/3KS-key-s...
| btbuildem wrote:
| It's cool to see high-end locks address the key duplication
| problem. With 3D printers and phone cameras it's become quite
| easy to duplicate keys. I've tried this just for fun with my own
| key -- it's a little tedious, but definitely doable by a
| determined amateur.
| tristor wrote:
| Abloy Protec2 is definitely a winner. Their padlocks are great as
| well, because they use hardened bodies even for their small
| travel locks. I used these on my Pelican case when I went around
| the world and had multiple attempts while checking in my camera
| gear to break in by "security personnel" in sketchy places, and
| nobody succeeded at doing anything other than marking the
| shackle. Someone also tried to pick it and failed.
|
| The reality is, of course no security is perfect. In the case I
| used it the easiest path in was cutting the hinges on the case,
| but that would have been obviously and permanently destructive.
| Removing the lock and replacing it would theoretically get me
| onward traveling prior to noticing, where-as a destroyed case
| would have gotten me to immediately implicate the likely
| perpetrators.
| YPPH wrote:
| Can't wait for a TSA compliant Protec2 lock! /s
| tristor wrote:
| I don't use TSA compliant locks on my luggage when I check
| it. There is NO legal requirement to use a TSA compliant
| lock. The legal requirement is that the TSA must be able to
| inspect the luggage. You can get around this by requesting
| pre-inspection as part of checking your luggage (which is
| required for firearms and some other types of checked luggage
| in the US, anyway). Pre-inspection is typically done in the
| presence of the passenger, who can then relock the luggage
| before checking it.
|
| In other countries, pre-inspection is typically required as
| well, but they don't have any concept of "TSA compliant" in
| the first place, that's a US thing.
|
| TSA compliant locks are a ridiculous concept and nobody
| should ever use them for anything. Certainly not for anything
| important you travel with.
| Daneel_ wrote:
| I strongly recommend checking out Deviant Ollam's talk
| about flying with high security locks:
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfqtYfaILHw
| giantg2 wrote:
| If I remember correctly, a requirement for checking
| firearms is that the lock be _non-TSA_.
| tristor wrote:
| This is correct, if you want to be absolutely sure that
| the TSA won't mess with you, just fly with firearms. On
| the flip side, this comes with its own challenges for
| international travel and in certain states (NY, in
| particular, has stupid laws and even more stupid
| enforcement of those laws).
| giantg2 wrote:
| If I understand correctly, NY law doesn't matter so long
| as you are on the secure side of the terminal and just
| passing through. I think I do remember someone getting
| hosed because the airline basically did an unexpected
| layover/cancelation to someone in NY and essentially
| forced them to take possession of something NY deemed
| illegal.
| YPPH wrote:
| They're also remarkably insecure.
|
| 3D printable master key plans are readily available on the
| internet. At one point Chinese marketplaces were selling
| prefabricated master key sets.
|
| And if that's not bad enough they can be easily raked open.
| pmoriarty wrote:
| _" Someone also tried to pick it and failed"_
|
| How did you know someone tried to pick it?
| tristor wrote:
| Marks left on the keyway.
| pmoriarty wrote:
| Are those marks visible with the naked eye or do you have
| to use magnification to see them?
|
| Are there any pics anywhere that show what such marks look
| like, and could they be caused by anything other than
| picking?
| tristor wrote:
| > Are those marks visible with the naked eye or do you
| have to use magnification to see them?
|
| Visible with the naked eye
|
| > Are there any pics anywhere that show what such marks
| look like, and could they be caused by anything other
| than picking?
|
| Sure, it's possible they could have been caused by
| something else, but it's unlikely given the context.
|
| Yes, there are photos, but I'm not able to share them at
| the moment. When I travel internationally to "sketchy"
| places, I always photograph my luggage thoroughly before
| and after transiting.
| formerly_proven wrote:
| http://www.lockpickingforensics.com/
| walterbell wrote:
| Abloy is also available as a standard knob lock or
| interchangeable cylinder core for some Schlage/Yale locks,
| https://securitysnobs.com/Knob-Lock-with-BiLock-or-Abloy-Pro...
| & https://securitysnobs.com/Abloy-Protec2-Schlage-
| Interchangea...
| [deleted]
| achn wrote:
| I had an Abloy Protec2 euro lock on my front door and was happy
| with the mechanism at first, but it did not last. The lock
| failed in the locked position after 3 years triggering
| significant cost to remove the cylinder body from the mortise
| lock. The drill-out took 5 seconds at most...
| nabla9 wrote:
| That's an outlier.
|
| Abloy Protec2 has huge installed base and they are extremely
| durable and reliable. Failing after 3 years is rare.
| jhugo wrote:
| > The drill-out took 5 seconds at most...
|
| This is the far more concerning part.
| cortesoft wrote:
| I totally appreciate geeking out on something like this, and take
| no issue with people who are really into these locks.
|
| However.
|
| I find this argument to be a bit silly:
|
| > If you get in without my notice, you may be lying in wait for
| me inside.
|
| The risk to the average person for this type of threat is so low,
| that you are more likely to die because you fall in your shower
| and rescuers can't get through your door than an assassin lying
| in wait inside your house to get you when you walk in.
| alias_neo wrote:
| I see your point, but I disagree to an extent.
|
| Emergency services should probably assume permissions to kick
| in your front door if necessary to save your life, I'd
| certainly give that permission if required explicitly.
|
| That said, the real point is that emergency services don't need
| to be surreptitious, they're also welcome to put a brick, axe
| or anything they have to hand through my living room window if
| that serves the same purpose (assuming my front door was too
| tough to kick in, etc).
| giantg2 wrote:
| Fire departments have great (destructive) tools for forcible
| entry.
| bombcar wrote:
| Yeah, no lock will slow someone down if they don't care
| about the noise.
|
| You need some _serious_ walls and doors before you get
| something that can 't be opened with the fire truck. It'll
| make a hella noise, though.
| cortesoft wrote:
| Yeah, emergency services picking a lock is probably not a
| realistic scenario, but probably not that much more
| unrealistic than an assassin picking your lock and waiting in
| your house to kill you.
| Chirael wrote:
| Sometimes emergency services will try simple lock raking or
| lock/door bypasses in an effort to not destroy the
| lock/door unnecessarily, as it can put a financial burden
| on the occupant. I think in some circles they refer to this
| as "respectful entry", e.g.
| https://coastalfiretraining.com/
| maicro wrote:
| Related concept for digital security:
| https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf
| DennisP wrote:
| True, but not everyone is an average person. Kidnapping is a
| concern in some places, some people are famous and
| controversial, etc.
| cortesoft wrote:
| Sure, but even then, are most kidnappings from home?
| linsomniac wrote:
| The "lying in wait" argument, to me, feels like it assumes that
| the door I enter through is really the only point of access. It
| may be obvious if someone broke in through the front door or
| the window next to it, but it might be weeks before I notice if
| someone forced the garage door and gained access there. There
| are several points of access that I wouldn't notice before it
| was too late for a lying in wait type attack. Most of those
| would require breaking glass though.
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