[HN Gopher] BreakingFormation: AWS CloudFormation Vulnerability
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       BreakingFormation: AWS CloudFormation Vulnerability
        
       Author : gregmac
       Score  : 69 points
       Date   : 2022-01-13 16:23 UTC (6 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (orca.security)
 (TXT) w3m dump (orca.security)
        
       | psKama wrote:
       | They keep calling it a zero-day although it is not. I dont know
       | which one is worse, if they don't know the meaning or they are
       | trying to make it look like something more important than what it
       | really is.
        
       | darrenkopp wrote:
       | Why did they blur the information when there are pretty advanced
       | de-blurring algorithms out there? Seems like if you want to
       | redact the information you need to completely omit the subsequent
       | pixels rather than just adding a blur effect. Perhaps since the
       | issue is fully resolved and I would guess that AWS rotated
       | everyone's credentials?
        
       | rorymalcolm wrote:
       | https://twitter.com/colmmacc/status/1481670721449385984
       | 
       | There appears to be a denial of components of this from senior
       | AWS figures, not a blanket denial but I think some of the
       | statements could be a potential overreach.
        
         | andrewguenther wrote:
         | https://twitter.com/colmmacc/status/1481682859324760070
         | 
         | More detail from Colm here.
        
         | cle wrote:
         | That definitely sounds plausible. AWS services undergo
         | mandatory security reviews and threat modelling that usually
         | cover these scenarios exhaustively. A lot of work and
         | complexity goes into scoping down credentials for defense-in-
         | depth protection, to protect against exactly these kinds of
         | issues.
        
         | stingraycharles wrote:
         | Wait, so they managed to make AWS trigger a request on their
         | own bucket using AWS internal credentials, and they extrapolate
         | that this means they now have access to $everything ?
        
           | andrewguenther wrote:
           | Even worse, they got AccessDenied when making that request
           | and then extrapolated that they have access to $everything
        
             | stingraycharles wrote:
             | That's ridiculous, it's entirely possible that these are
             | one-time credentials for a single purpose and/or severely
             | limited in scope.
             | 
             | Not saying that it's a certainty it's not, but if you make
             | such a claim, you should better have some evidence to back
             | it up.
        
         | tptacek wrote:
         | FWIW: I trust Colm McCarthaigh probably more than anybody else
         | working in this field.
        
           | QuinnyPig wrote:
           | Wholeheartedly endorse. I just wish AWS would every once in a
           | while _get ahead_ of the messaging on stuff like this. They
           | knew it was coming, there 's a principal engineer quote in
           | the blog post, but right now there isn't any official
           | statement past "tweets."
        
             | [deleted]
        
             | bink wrote:
             | It's just speculation as to how this went down, but having
             | been in this position before it's usually not an easy thing
             | to handle. If there's a dispute about impact a responsible
             | researcher will usually say "I still plan on publishing
             | this information on X date". This gives the company time to
             | both convince the researcher the impact isn't as severe as
             | they think and also to prepare a public response for that
             | date.
             | 
             | An irresponsible researcher will either say "I'm gonna
             | publish because I think it's high impact" and not give a
             | date (and then often publishing with no notice on a Friday
             | afternoon) or won't even provide notice.
             | 
             | It's often impossible to know which type of actor you're
             | dealing with until it's too late. I've even had people
             | claim they won't publish until X date and then publish
             | early. You can't just provide public notice or you'll both
             | piss off the researcher and run the risk of accidentally
             | giving the impression a low impact bug is actually high
             | impact.
        
             | [deleted]
        
       | andrewguenther wrote:
       | > Our research team believes, given the data found on the host
       | (including credentials and data involving internal endpoints),
       | that an attacker could abuse this vulnerability to bypass tenant
       | boundaries, giving them privileged access to any resource in AWS.
       | 
       | This is bullshit and their own report indicates the opposite.
       | Hugely irresponsible of Orca to include this kind of unfounded
       | speculation in their report. But also this is what AWS gets for
       | having a "if there's no customer impact, there's no disclosure"
       | security policy, it leaves the door open for this kind of shit.
        
       | cateof wrote:
       | Seems like the AWS Glue exploit [1] discovered by the same team
       | is the more critical one of these two. The CTO of Orca confirmed
       | that they were able to access an admin role in an AWS service
       | account, and from there assume roles in customer accounts with
       | service roles that trust the glue service [2].
       | 
       | 1: https://orca.security/resources/blog/aws-glue-vulnerability/
       | 2: https://twitter.com/yoavalon/status/1481691075672694793
        
       | CedarMills wrote:
       | I wouldn't trust Orca's word. They're pretty shady and have
       | implemented some questionable tactics in the past to get
       | customers/vendors.
        
         | belter wrote:
         | Can you provide some examples? Not doubting you, but some
         | references would be useful.
        
       | tptacek wrote:
       | Ok, you don't need to name single-vendor SAAS serverside
       | vulnerabilities.
        
         | rrdharan wrote:
         | Looks like that ship has sailed.
        
       | cle wrote:
       | > The AWS security team coded a fix in less than 25 hours, and it
       | reached all AWS regions within 6 days.
       | 
       | That is really fast. It reminds me of the Google DHCP takeover
       | vuln that Google sat on for 9 months
       | (https://github.com/irsl/gcp-dhcp-takeover-code-exec).
        
       | onphonenow wrote:
       | I'm not understanding how "breakingFormation" provides access to
       | other account data.
       | 
       | They tried it on their own account and were denied. AWS uses
       | these crypto tokens, so it's request -> IAM signed ->
       | Cloudformation -> S3.
       | 
       | Is there maybe a gap where if someone is using S3 a lot, the
       | forward session token thing can be worked around (ie, the
       | Cloudformation service WOULD still have a valid token for another
       | accounts S3 bucket)?
       | 
       | The easy thing here is set up 2 accounts, and actually test it.
       | Curious why they didn't do that.
        
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       (page generated 2022-01-13 23:01 UTC)