[HN Gopher] Tor in 2022
___________________________________________________________________
Tor in 2022
Author : Sami_Lehtinen
Score : 178 points
Date : 2021-12-21 08:25 UTC (14 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (blog.torproject.org)
(TXT) w3m dump (blog.torproject.org)
| masterof0 wrote:
| Honest question: What would be the use case for Tor, as is
| compromised[1] and painfully slow (judging from my personal
| experience, using it in the US and Asia, across the years). Is
| there any occasion where it will be better to use Tor than your
| self-hosted VPN?
|
| 1- https://restoreprivacy.com/tor/
| beardog wrote:
| It comes down to statistics. Using a VPN you are using 1
| entity, so all a state actor needs to do is view that one
| entity's traffic. This may be time consuming and legally
| challenging if the entity is trustworthy and has servers spread
| across the globe, but there is still only 1 point that they
| need to monitor - I suspect many VPN service users are not
| randomly switching servers. You said "self hosted" VPN which if
| you are doing that at home it provides no _anonymity_ (which i
| 'm assuming is the point of the comment since the context is
| Tor). If you host it at a server you are anonymously renting
| (good luck doing that without opsec failure), it is still only
| your traffic there, you have no benefit of blending in with
| others.
|
| With Tor, you can be assured that your attacker needs to
| monitor more than some % of the network (which can be done
| either by running nodes themselves or having a wide view of
| netflow data). Alphabet soup agencies are capable of this, but
| these attacks are expensive and non-trivial which is why
| historically the FBI and such use browser exploits the most.
| You shouldn't rely on Tor alone to protect your life if your
| adversary is highly skilled or funded, but chalking it up to a
| VPN is completely discounting the benefit gained from a larger
| anonymity set in the world's biggest onion routing network.
| masterof0 wrote:
| Thank you.
| edmcnulty101 wrote:
| It's one added layer of protection.
|
| Combine Tor with a VPN.
|
| If your life is on the line with your content the more layers
| of protection the better.
| beardog wrote:
| Tor+VPN has various trade offs and is not good for everyone.
| Generally i would say most people would not benefit from it.
|
| https://matt.traudt.xyz/posts/vpn-tor-not-mRikAa4h/
| ipaddr wrote:
| Why not tor over tor then?
| bigwavedave wrote:
| "You're very clever, young man, very clever- but it's
| tortles all the way down!"
| foxfluff wrote:
| Wow there's so much FUD, hyperbole, and rigged language there.
| "Interesting" exchanges alright.
|
| They go ahead and make _FBI_ and _backdoors_ bold to shock the
| reader but conveniently rest of the context is left out. The
| actual context being Roger giving a talk about Tor at one of
| these conferences where you also have government entities voice
| their (guess guess) desire for backdooring and wiretapping the
| internet (while tech people from the industry aren 't
| convinced). The same shit you see discussed openly in the
| public all the time anyway, probably just with more pleading
| from the FBI because it's so hard to solve crime without
| industry's help. Nothing unusual here. The wording of this
| fudpiece sounds like it's trying to implicate the Tor developer
| in planting backdoors for the FBI, which is not at all what the
| exchange is about if you read the context.
|
| "Tor privately tips off the federal government to security
| vulnerabilities before alerting the public" is also complete
| FUD. I'm so glad I read the whole stack of FOIA'd documents
| before this text.
|
| The context here is that BBG (Broadcasting Board of Governors)
| is using Tor to circumvent censorship in places like Iran,
| China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. Alright you can call that a
| propaganda arm of the US government if you're so willing, but
| anyway, Tor is one of the tools they rely on. They need Tor to
| circumvent censorship, so they need to address vulnerabilities
| in Tor that make it easy to censor.
|
| This "vulnerability" isn't one that FBI uses to catch a drug
| dealer or a hacker, it's a vulnerability that makes it easy to
| fingerprint and block Tor traffic. Now Tor's use has
| historically been quite easy to detect and block (see e.g. this
| FAQ entry from 2008 [1]) and fixing that has been a long road,
| I don't know where exactly they stand today. The
| "vulnerability" is just one among many and the possibility of
| fingerprinting TLS has been mentioned in the FAQ. It's not the
| kind of vulnerability you would have to scream and alert the
| public to (they should've already been aware that it is
| possible identify and block Tor traffic). Rather, it's
| something they should quietly research and figure out a
| solution to and hopefully stay ahead of the game w.r.t. regimes
| that may attempt to block Tor.
|
| Discussing the draft proposal for fixing this TLS fingerprint
| vuln with the people who they are working together with to keep
| Tor useful in Iran etc. is exactly what the Tor project ought
| to do! The fact that these people happen to be employed by the
| U.S. Government doesn't seem particularly relevant. But suuure,
| "privately tipping off the feds to a vuln while keeping the
| public in the dark" is a nice way to twist it.
|
| Here's the thing, there are issues with Tor, there are issues
| with anything because there is no technical solution to perfect
| anonymity. I would not bet my life on Tor. But knowing what
| it's good for and what its limits are, Tor is a very useful
| tool, and IMHO it can only get better if it gets more users and
| more relays. I would always recommend being vigilant and
| looking out for bugs, backdoors, and other sketchy stuff, but
| this fud piece just doing a disservice against itself with all
| the hyperbole. It sounds more like they've got an axe to grind.
|
| [1]
| https://web.archive.org/web/20080415073019/https://wiki.torp...
|
| > The original Tor design was easy to block if the attacker
| controls Alice's connection to the Tor network --- by blocking
| the directory authorities, by blocking all the relay IP
| addresses in the directory, or by filtering based on the
| fingerprint of the Tor TLS handshake. Some government-level
| firewalls could easily launch this type of attack, which would
| make the whole Tor network no longer usable for the people
| behind the firewalls.
|
| Sect. 7.1:
|
| > Note that all your local ISP can observe now is that you are
| communicating with Tor nodes. Similarly, servers in the
| Internet just see that they are being contacted by Tor nodes
|
| See also the linked _DRAFT_ "Design of a blocking-resistant
| anonymity system"
| https://web.archive.org/web/20080322054926/http://www.torpro...
| ziddoap wrote:
| A point-by-point look of your source is a bit much for these
| comments (and they raise some great points that I either agree
| with or can't thoroughly rebut), but there's some interesting
| things in there that make me question the poster. They exclaim
| against being accused of spreading FUD, but use extremely
| emotional language and talk in absolutes when the reality is
| much less clear.
|
| For example, they say " _2017 court case proves FBI can de-
| anonymize Tor users_ ", but immediately handwave the _how_
| away, because it 's classified. Well then, that's not really a
| strong _proof_ of Tor being compromised -- there are several
| ways the FBI could de-anonymize Tor users that have nothing to
| do with Tor itself (people being compromised by javascript,
| people posting pictures with metadata, people linking back to
| real-life accounts, people inadvertently posting identifiable
| information, people posting quasi-identifiable information that
| is correlated over time, people downloading XYZ that has a
| beacon in it, etc.)
|
| I also can't help but wonder, if Tor is so thoroughly
| compromised and just a glowstick, why would the author finish
| with:
|
| > _For those who still want to access the Tor network, doing so
| through a reliable VPN service will add an extra layer of
| protection while hiding your real IP address._
|
| If it's compromised to the core, a glowstick for LEA, enables
| the US government to "do spooky stuff", why bother giving a
| half-ass endorsement at the end of a hit piece?
| unethical_ban wrote:
| "For those who still want to access the Tor network, doing so
| through a reliable VPN service will add an extra layer of
| protection while hiding your real IP address."
|
| You Tor to your VPN, you don't VPN to Tor.
| ziddoap wrote:
| It is unclear to me if you meant to reply to me or someone
| else, because this is wholly unrelated to the criticisms I
| raised against the author of the source in the parent's
| post.
|
| However, I will say, using Tor to access your VPN strips
| away much of the benefit of using Tor, to the point that
| you might as well just use a VPN (sans Tor). I suppose if
| you want a single-circuit Tor connection that appears to be
| a static non-Tor IP address, sure. But blindly recommending
| one way or the other without knowing someone's use case,
| threat analysis, and risk tolerance is foolish.
| danuker wrote:
| VPNs are great at centralizing paper trails, whether the VPNs
| themselves keep logs, or the ISPs.
| schleck8 wrote:
| > Tracked as KAX17, the threat actor ran at its peak more than
| 900 malicious servers part of the Tor network, which typically
| tends to hover around a daily total of up to 9,000-10,000.
|
| https://therecord.media/a-mysterious-threat-actor-is-running...
| the_cramer wrote:
| One thing i didn't catch is how they are sure that this is
| "one" great actor. Surely some of these servers were registered
| with the same fake mail address, but it seems that otherwise
| they are spread around the world and pretty anonymous. Did i
| miss something?
| oauea wrote:
| It's hinted at in the article that these servers are not
| stock servers, and the author is able to detect similar
| divergent behavior in all of these nodes, implying they are
| all the same non-standard tor software that is doing...
| something.
| mmastrac wrote:
| In one of the articles, the modified servers were noted as
| also having an email associated that participated in the
| tor mailing lists.
| hereforphone wrote:
| I asked this same question on HN a short time ago. The
| modifications are advanced and not public, so anyone using
| them is suspected of being related to the same entity. There
| are also potentially other signature-worthy variables being
| observed as well.
| TechBro8615 wrote:
| Another mistake Tor tends to make is assuming 1 IP = 1
| server. In theory someone could point 9,000 IP addresses at a
| single server. In practice this would be obvious when the
| bandwidth for it sucks, but it could easily be a single
| cluster of servers in one location with a bunch of addresses
| routing to it.
| [deleted]
| wellthisisgreat wrote:
| God, but why Alegria? I hope it's some kind of Facebook reference
| superkuh wrote:
| Tor in 20202: We've succesfully killed off 90% of all actually
| used (as opposed to botnet) tor onion services and we're happy
| about it. We're protecting our end users from themselves by
| forcing the removal of Tor v2 protocol from the codebase. We
| don't care because onion services were never really something we
| cared about, just an add-on to trick people into thinking Tor was
| a real network worth building a community in. It isn't. Tor is
| _only_ for people who want a pseudoanonymous clear web proxy.
| Forget .onion domains.
|
| https://www.darkowl.com/blog-content/tor-v2-depreciation-shi...
|
| https://blog.torproject.org/v2-deprecation-timeline/
|
| https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-dir-onions-seen.html
| ziddoap wrote:
| > _We 're protecting our end users from themselves by forcing
| the removal of Tor v2 protocol from the codebase._
|
| All of your links describe why V3 is more secure and superior
| to V2. Are you whining about the increased security, or am I
| misunderstanding your post?
|
| If I'm not misunderstanding, why was the over one year of
| warnings and multiple years of discussions not enough time to
| prepare?
| superkuh wrote:
| Removing the v2 code from clients and falsely stating v2
| onions aren't valid URLs is lying to users to protect them
| from a potential future threat. But that protection comes at
| the cost: the destruction of the entire 15 year history of
| communities and interlinking and search indices for
| onionland. To protect the community they have destroyed it.
|
| A v3 community might come in the future, and I hope it will,
| but right now v3 .onions are pretty much just bots and a few
| big names that have created new v3 services. The rest is
| botnet v3 .onions.
|
| What I want, what everyone in the tor project comment thread
| on the depreciation post wants, is for v2+v3. Not just v2.
| Even now most tor relays support v2 and will until the tor
| project puts out a version consensus flag that blocks older
| tor. But they can't do that any time soon because most tor
| infrastructure still supports v2.
| ziddoap wrote:
| I'm still not understanding why the 15 year history of
| communities was not able or willing to act on the 13 months
| of warning, and months of discussion before that. There was
| more than ample time to prepare.
|
| Surely you don't expect a project like Tor to simply ignore
| security forever going forward because "people still use
| it"? Should Tor just stay V2, security be damned? I don't
| think Tor's main goal is to ensure your community stays
| friends; the goals are a bit loftier.
|
| I wonder if you hold the same views on any other security-
| related thing like cryptography or password storage. We'd
| still be at 8 character, lower-case only, truncated
| passwords "because people built infrastructure for it".
| superkuh wrote:
| Because tor v2 and v3 are not compatible. You can't just
| make all the links everyone ever made on any site, or
| entries in any search index, suddenly point to a new URL.
|
| You can announce v2 is going to disappear and say that
| everyone should try to port what they can, but most
| don't. Only the big sites and their users actually have
| any pseudo-continuity through their efforts. And even
| then all the links stop working.
| ziddoap wrote:
| The fact that people didn't port is not an argument that
| they shouldn't have ported.
|
| Tor is primarily a security and privacy project. Arguing
| that they should keep an insecure version because people
| decided to ignore the security implications of that
| insecure version is an _awful_ argument. Especially when
| those people had well over a year to execute.
|
| Your use case for Tor seems to be unrelated to the
| projects goals.
| npteljes wrote:
| I just don't get GP's point. If the workings of the
| system compromise its entire premise, of course they
| upgrade the system so that it matches the original
| intentions. It's like they shouldn't have deprecated old
| SSL and TLS versions, because some web services still
| only use those. I can't imagine an active community
| having trouble with this.
| saurik wrote:
| The problem is that the URLs themselves got deprecated:
| the entire interlinked ecosystem got destroyed. Maybe
| think of what would happen if all of our current TLDs got
| deprecated tomorrow, and in a year or two support for
| them would start getting dismantled. Every single link
| anyone has ever posted on Hacker News is now broken. Now
| what?
|
| You are all making it sound like this isn't some big
| deal: that people just needed to "get their act
| together"... but how do you rebuild the world wide web
| after breaking every link in the web? Whose job is it
| even to fix every single link on every single page and
| stored in every single comment in every single database?
|
| Now, you can certainly argue that the old system was
| broken by insecurity and thereby _had_ to die. But that
| just means the entire concept of onion services was some
| temporary art project more than a platform on which
| people could build the kind of ecosystem we have on the
| "normal" world wide web. At best, it means that people
| needed to come up with some extremely different way of
| thinking about what those .onion addresses really were,
| as they were clearly more like IP addresses than
| hostnames.
|
| I personally can't help but think there could have been
| some better transition plan. Like maybe a mechanism where
| people can leave cross-signed redirects from v2 to v3
| domains, and maybe even they would only be honored if
| signed before some date, or maybe there is a
| disambiguation dialog for competing redirects that also
| shows the time the redirect was published (these being
| attempts to deal with "in the future someone could crack
| this and start making arbitrary redirects for any old
| site").
|
| But that clearly didn't happen and now that entire
| ecosystem is dead. Maybe it will rebuild, and maybe one
| day it will be stronger than it is now, but frankly...
| when that happens, wouldn't you expect people to start
| pointing out that the cryptography of the ECC curve they
| are using is now subject to breaking by quantum computers
| or whatever we have in another 15 years? Maybe they will
| handle that transition better, or maybe the mere thought
| of that will serve as a lesson to not rebuild inside that
| design.
|
| Truly, though, a design that doesn't take this into
| consideration from the beginning is inherently flawed. As
| I noted in passing earlier: these .onion names were
| clearly more like IP addresses, and so you needed some
| kind of translation later on top of that to provide later
| portability. As much as I often hate on the current
| players in "decentralized DNS" (for various reasons that
| they could have avoided), that's the kind of concept that
| clearly is going to win the day going forward.
| ziddoap wrote:
| > _Now, you can certainly argue that the old system was
| broken by insecurity and thereby had to die. But that
| just means the entire concept of onion services was some
| temporary art project_
|
| An insecure Tor is less than worthless.
|
| Tor is not trying to be a community or be the next
| geocities. It is an evolving security and privacy
| project, adapting to the landscape as it needs to, in an
| effort to anonymize and protect it's users.
|
| > _a platform on which people could build the kind of
| ecosystem we have on the "normal" world wide web_
|
| This was never the goal of Tor, and may be the source of
| your frustrations. Tor has one fundamental mission:
| deploying free and open source _anonymity and privacy
| technologies_.
|
| It is a shame that links will be broken, and it sucks
| that you feel like something you built up is being torn
| down. But arguing that it should be kept insecure because
| of the friends you've made along the way is exactly the
| opposite of Tor's mission statement.
| forgotmypw17 wrote:
| Basically, this. Until Tor provides human-readable and
| -memorable addresses again, I'm considering it a deprecated
| project.
|
| I asked them about it at a talk when V3 was first being
| introduced, and they said they're working on a solution. Since
| then... ::crickets::
| rank0 wrote:
| How could you accomplish this without some sort of
| registration?
| forgotmypw17 wrote:
| The way it was already accomplished previously: short
| addresses, which, although not easy, are possible to
| remember.
|
| 16 characters is doable, especially if it starts with 5-8
| letters of word(s). 56 characters is not realistic.
| beardog wrote:
| Zookos triangle is hard to solve but arguably has been by
| projects like namecoin and similar ETH-sphere projects
|
| geti2p.net also has community registrars for .i2p domains
| and includes a built in hosts file of many of the sites,
| this involves a level of trust in the registries.
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko%27s_triangle
| beardog wrote:
| .onion was never very human friendly, i won't deny that v3 is
| worse in that regard but it wasn't feasible for everyone to
| generate gems like facebookcorewwwi. Most v2s having only a
| few vanity bytes at most were arguably unsafe since that
| allowed phishers to more easily trick users, i know the same
| applies to v3
|
| This is a very non trivial problem
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko%27s_triangle
| est31 wrote:
| > https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-dir-onions-seen.html
|
| Your link shows that there were about 170k v2 onion addresses
| in September 2020, while there were about 550k v3 onion
| addresses at that same date. The trends were only pointing up
| for v3 addresses while pointing down for v2 ones.
| superkuh wrote:
| I can't blame you for just skimming, but you've come away
| with a mistaken interpretation.
|
| Yes, there are a ton of v3 onions created quite suddenly but
| they don't stick around for long and aren't associated with
| human people. The Tor project technical blog on v3 onion
| services suggests most of the v3 services are "barely used"
| and setup to merely act as slave services for a malicious
| botnet. https://blog.torproject.org/v3-onion-services-usage .
| Human people actually run websites (and other services) from
| v2 addresses and there are far more of them even now than
| actual human used v3 addresses if you can extrapolate
| anything from onion descriptor information in the hidden
| service directory.
| najqh wrote:
| aws-user wrote:
| isn't tor under the control of US intel agencies now? is there an
| alternative darknet?
| schleck8 wrote:
| I hope not. Tor being used for whistleblowing and censorship
| circumvention is one thing, but the onion network is pure
| anarchy and probably the worst case scenario of what the
| internet could become.
|
| https://youtu.be/iItLpwkQMUQ&t=277
| ipaddr wrote:
| It is useful as a free-for-all outside of censorship.
|
| You probably don't want an area free from censorship most
| people don't. I browse with safe images enabled when
| searching google images. Once in awhile I'll open it up and
| see a world that didn't exist before. I don't think that
| world should be removed even if I rarely visit.
| belorn wrote:
| Mesh networks that don't operate as an overlay network could in
| theory be pretty effective to avoid large-scale traffic
| correlation attacks. If we assume that the US has effective
| control over the whole backbone network, and enough control
| inside the network of most commercial available ISP's, then
| there isn't much mixing networks can do. An adversary can
| always observe, inject, throttle, speed up, block and otherwise
| disturb the network flow in order to determine who is talking
| to whom.
| wongarsu wrote:
| Tor never claimed resiliency against large-scale traffic
| correlation attacks. Anyone who can look at a sufficient
| portion of all internet traffic has a good chance of
| deanonymizing TOR users. The Snowden revelations could lead one
| to believe that the US is sniffing enough traffic to make this
| viable, but it's anyone's guess if they collect and synchronize
| enough data to make deanonymization of TOR users viable.
|
| I2P always looked more promising to me, and more open about its
| threat model [1] and potential mitigations. But it's not built
| for browsing the open internet, so it has a somewhat different
| niche.
|
| 1: https://geti2p.net/en/docs/how/threat-model
| darau1 wrote:
| I wish more people ran TOR nodes. I intend to run one when I
| can.
| pph wrote:
| To be fair it's not like you can run one from your home
| connection. I mean you could, but it wouldn't be a good
| idea, unfortunately.
| wongarsu wrote:
| Running an exit relay from home would be a very bad idea,
| and if your IP frequently changes you might not be picked
| as guard relay. But I don't see why you couldn't run a
| middle relay from home, as long as you don't have a
| traffic cap.
| R0b0t1 wrote:
| You can run an exit relay from home, at least in the US.
| There are some ISPs (mostly on the East coast, afaict)
| that may not help you, but most of them seem to
| understand how the laws work.
|
| In other countries you may not have such luck.
| 8bitbuddhist wrote:
| Running an intermediate/middle node is generally safe.
| You want to avoid running an exit node.
| kentiko wrote:
| Running a middle node got my IP banned from some
| services, even services provided by my ISP.
| post-factum wrote:
| Indeed, some CDNs like Akamai do not bother
| distinguishing relays from exit nodes and just ban
| everything.
| crazysim wrote:
| Does this apply to snowflake relays?
| notriddle wrote:
| The whole point of Snowflake relays is that nobody knows
| about them. If Akamai knows about it, then it failed.
| darau1 wrote:
| I've never heard of snowflake relays. What are they?
| chalst wrote:
| A new tool from Tor:
|
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29634636
| haakon wrote:
| I've been running a Tor relay from my home for a decade,
| at least. It's not an exit relay. Never had any issue.
| [deleted]
| kmeisthax wrote:
| Tor was originally written by US intel agencies specifically to
| provide cover for spies. The release of the software to the
| public was specifically to provide plausible deniability for
| those spies. So there's always going to be some level of
| control and knowledge the US has about the network.
|
| If your threat model is anything weaker than a hostile nation
| state then Tor is still probably good enough to use as a
| darknet. If you're doing anything illegal over Tor then you
| probably should be more worried about OPSEC failures or rubber-
| hose cryptanalysis.
| hereforphone wrote:
| Are you sure it was supposed to provide "cover for spies"?
| AFAIK onion routing was an invention of the US Naval Research
| Laboratories and was public from the beginning. If you want
| "spies" to use it, you don't want them connecting to known
| gateways. High anonymity (simplex) is why number stations are
| still a thing.
| 0xFFFFFFFFF wrote:
| Do number stations still a thing? Here in Europe there are
| just some beacons that broadcast the same message daily but
| no other activity whatsoever.
| hereforphone wrote:
| They're still a thing as recently as a year or two ago
| when I looked into it. They're "perfect" in that the
| receiver can't be identified from the message or its
| channel (other than catching him with his radio), and
| that the message cannot be reversed (encoded w/ a one
| time pad). So they're hard to replace.
| DarylZero wrote:
| One time pads aren't perfect. The same secret has to be
| stored on both sides and can be compromised from either
| side.
|
| OTP has to be delivered preserving secrecy. Transmitting
| a public key only needs to preserve integrity.
| rickdeveloper wrote:
| > If you want "spies" to use it, you don't want them
| connecting to known gateways.
|
| The best place to hide a tree is in a forest.
|
| If you have both 'normal' users and spies connecting to
| this host, who will tell who's the spy?
| jimbob45 wrote:
| Not for us common folk, I don't think so.
|
| Sure, they can listen in on you all they want, but what good is
| any of that if they can't use it against you in a court of law?
| noman-land wrote:
| Ever hear of parellel construction?
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction
| ravenstine wrote:
| In regards to your second question, yes, there is I2P.
|
| https://geti2p.net
|
| It's better than Tor in a few ways, in particular how it
| handles DDOS attacks. I2P is also more focused on facilitating
| hidden services (eepsites) than being a clearnet proxy.
|
| There's also Yggdrasil, although it doesn't seem particularly
| concerned about anonymity.
|
| https://yggdrasil-network.github.io/
| GekkePrutser wrote:
| For i2p, is there something like tails? Like a hardened read-
| only OS built to avoid the usual client opsec failures?
| zikduruqe wrote:
| https://letsdecentralize.org
|
| Here are a few options.
| Zababa wrote:
| Not really related to the article, but what's the origin of
| picutres like the one used in the article? A few years ago
| https://www.humaaans.com/ was all the rage, is this something
| like this too? I can't imagine that each of these images is
| individually produced, I feel like they are assembled, but I
| can't find the origin.
|
| Edit: answering my own question, https://blush.design/ (link
| found on the humaans page) has things that look a lot like that.
| So that's probably the origin. There are multiple artists listed
| on the website (https://blush.design/artists) but I can't tell
| which one did what. I can understand that it's very practical to
| be able to mix and match parts of images like that, but I
| personally find them very unappealing. But seeing how much they
| are used, maybe most people like them?
| schleck8 wrote:
| It's called Alegria and all hip tech companies use it. It's
| pretty widely hated
|
| https://www.reddit.com/r/starterpacks/comments/jwsagt/big_te...
|
| https://www.reddit.com/r/starterpacks/comments/groh5e/big_te...
|
| https://youtu.be/lFb7BOI_QFc
| tvanantwerp wrote:
| I once heard it called "toddlers' bauhaus" and I'm sticking
| with that.
| solarpunk wrote:
| I've only ever seen it referred to as Corporate Memphis[0].
|
| [0]https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporate_Memphis
| vageli wrote:
| Alegria is mentioned in the third paragraph in the article
| you linked.
| chrissnell wrote:
| Eh, it's more common than that. I worked for a roboinvestor
| tech company that paid an artist to draw a bunch of this crap.
| The deal was that it was supposed to appeal to Gen-Zers, with
| diverse racial cartoon characters doing their best not to look
| like they were at work. It seemed super cringey to me at the
| time
| vlaabx wrote:
| mmastrac wrote:
| It reminds me of the styles from the 60s/70s, like from David
| Ahl's BASIC Computer Games.
|
| https://www.worthpoint.com/worthopedia/1974-basic-computer-g...
| nextstep wrote:
| I wish that Apple had chosen to use Tor for their private relay
| feature instead of building their own (closed) system. It could
| have been a huge increase in traffic for the Tor network but
| instead they built a worse version.
___________________________________________________________________
(page generated 2021-12-21 23:01 UTC)