[HN Gopher] Implementing TLS Encrypted Client Hello [Nov 2021]
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Implementing TLS Encrypted Client Hello [Nov 2021]
Author : xrisk
Score : 27 points
Date : 2021-12-12 16:15 UTC (6 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (guardianproject.info)
(TXT) w3m dump (guardianproject.info)
| [deleted]
| kingcharles wrote:
| So, to summarize, one of the remaining issues on the Web is that
| when you browse to an HTTPS site the name of the site you are
| connecting to is still in cleartext. The reason for this is that
| you regularly have 1 IP address with multiple Web sites on it.
| The server needs to know which Web site to forward your request
| to. Once it has forwarded your request the SSL cert of that site
| takes over and all future requests are encrypted.
|
| Encrypted Client Hello would install a server-wide certificate
| that would encrypt the data from the first connection so that the
| handshake wouldn't be visible to the outside.
|
| The best a MITM could do is determine that you are connecting to
| a specific IP but would not be able to determine which site on
| that IP you are browsing.
| infotogivenm wrote:
| DNS is still a thing but there are at least decent widely
| deployed solutions.
| tkot wrote:
| And the two most popular ways to encrypt DNS queries rely on
| TLS (DNS over TLS and DNS over HTTPS).
| LinuxBender wrote:
| I am looking forward to this being supported officially in the
| mentioned daemons. The authors should also work with Qualys
| [1a][1b] _development site_ and open source developers [2] that
| test TLS configurations to add additional tests early on.
|
| [1a] - https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/
|
| [1b] - https://dev.ssllabs.com/ssltest/
|
| [2] - https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh.git
| captn3m0 wrote:
| Am I correct in assuming that this is going to be mostly
| impactful on the server side for at-risk services that are at
| risk of getting blocked using SNI fingerprinting?
|
| Since browsers will get adoption easily, but servers will need to
| make changes, wondering which operators will have the right
| incentives to upgrade to ECH, especially since it's much more
| involved than usual TLS upgrades.
| tialaramex wrote:
| As with TLS 1.3 itself, a big benefit is that the Inner
| encrypted Hello can't be inspected by whatever (inevitably
| poorly made and never updated) middleboxes are on the route
| between client and server.
|
| It isn't important to the Internet whether these middle boxes
| are put there by the Government of the People's Republic of
| China to promote Harmony, by your daughters $1000 per month
| private school to prevent her looking at "inappropriate"
| material (whether that's the 1619 project, TikTok, or porn) or
| your employer to dissuade employees from uploading PDFs of
| company secrets, the problem and the solution is the same from
| the Internet's point of view.
|
| Did you know that TLS certificate compression is an obvious,
| trivial improvement to the rapidity of secured connections that
| _could not be deployed_ for over a decade because until TLS 1.3
| the Certificate message is cleartext and so if you send one
| that looks "wrong" to some dodgy middlebox firmware written in
| 2006 your web site doesn't work?
|
| Whenever the purpose of bypassing middleboxes is explained,
| there are people who are outraged. How dare we fix the
| Internet? They were relying on FaultySoft CrapSecurity 0.0.1
| from 2006 and now we've ruined everything by bypassing it. No
| we didn't, by definition if what we did worked, your middlebox
| already wasn't protecting you. We've shattered your illusion
| and that's all. Santa Claus isn't real either.
| jeroenhd wrote:
| The incentive could be as simple as ssllabs not handing out an
| A or A+ score if your site doesn't support encrypted hello.
| I've heard of several huge companies that base the security
| rating of their websites in part in getting a good score on the
| ssllabs test, so they and their vendors would need to move once
| the test changes.
|
| I don't think it's healthy to rely on an arbitrary test like
| that for your company contracts, but it's what's happening.
| Once the feature is stable in server and client software, I'm
| sure it'll become part of the test and many big companies with
| complicated contracts will rush to implement it.
|
| There are some companies that I expect will be early adopters,
| namely companies that are sensitive in nature. Porn, specific
| medical websites, you name it. With proxied DoH and encrypted
| SNI you can set up a connection to a website privately and
| securely without ever naming it in plain text. If that website
| runs behind a big cloud host like Cloudflare, there's no way
| for your ISP or any other passively spying company to know what
| you're up to.
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(page generated 2021-12-12 23:01 UTC)