[HN Gopher] Decred proposal: Change PoW/PoS Subsidy Split From 6...
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Decred proposal: Change PoW/PoS Subsidy Split From 60/30 to 10/80
Author : 100001_100011
Score : 38 points
Date : 2021-12-12 14:56 UTC (8 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (proposals.decred.org)
(TXT) w3m dump (proposals.decred.org)
| kzrdude wrote:
| What's decred? What's special about it and is it one of the
| bigger cryptos?
| rolltotheriver wrote:
| Decred is a SOV crypto. It has governance, a treasury fund,
| staking rewards. It has a very low supply. So much of it is
| locked into the staking pool.
| SahAssar wrote:
| What is SOV crypto?
|
| Searching for it seems to bring up a specific coin
| (https://sov.foundation/) but I'm guessing that is not what
| you mean.
| tromp wrote:
| SoV = Store of Value.
|
| It's often used to describe a capped supply.
|
| As if that implies preservation of value.
| chizhik-pyzhik wrote:
| Decred was created in 2013 as "bitcoin but with governance".
| You can earn it through both proof-of-work AND proof-of-stake
| mining. Users who participate in proof-of-stake mining can vote
| on proposals such as this one. (Their voting power is roughly
| equivalent to how many DCR they've locked up.)
|
| It got a lot of attention when Bitcoin was having its block
| size limit controversy around 2015 (which led to the fork
| between bitcoin/bitcoin cash).
| tracedddd wrote:
| Decred is a cryptocurrency who's core offering is an expanded
| governance system. Although at the top it's pretty much run by
| the company right now.
| ryanlol wrote:
| This is kind of hilarious. They seem to be upset that the miners
| are selling their coins and therefore are sabotaging the
| cryptocurrency by pushing the price down.
| paulgb wrote:
| Yes, I'm curious to know more context on why they see miners
| selling the coins as proof that they are malicious actors
| trying to keep the price down. The very nature of PoW is that
| miners typically have high expenses, and need to sell coins to
| pay their power/hardware bills. To the extent that this _hasn
| 't_ happened in bitcoin, it's because capital is currently
| cheap enough that some of the big miners prefer to hold the
| bitcoin and borrow against it to cover expenses.
| gitfan86 wrote:
| The utility of Bitcoin is that it allows you to bypass
| government and regulations and high cost money transfer
| services. The price should reflect that utility and anything
| beyond that is day trading or beanie baby style speculating
| mgraczyk wrote:
| And worth stating that the "other side" is the proof of stake
| participants, who hold the currency and want the price to stay
| high.
| Grimburger wrote:
| Both groups have just as much incentive for the price to be
| higher, it's a moot point.
| mgraczyk wrote:
| That's not true. The miners have a large capital investment
| in mining equipment which can be used for other purposes
| (or they rent, in which case the same reasoning holds).
| Proof of stake participants have their capital in the
| system's currency. The PoW are less sensitive to price
| because they lose less capital for the same change in price
| as compare to PoS participants.
| Grimburger wrote:
| > Proof of stake participants have their capital in the
| system's currency.
|
| Their capital can also be moved to other proof-of-stake
| coins with complete ease, I'd argue that's far less
| friction than repurposing your mining ASIC's for other
| coins on a whim. An ASIC is useless unless it runs the
| same algorithm, which in Decred's case is basically no
| other coins.
|
| > The PoW are less sensitive to price
|
| Yes, and as such more likely to ride the out fluctuations
| rather than create a self-sustaining wave of those who
| secure the network selling out all their holdings and
| moving elsewhere.
| mgraczyk wrote:
| This and paulgb's reply are both good points, but I think
| that we can do a very simple analysis to explain most of
| what is going on.
|
| Suppose that miners only mine and stakers only stake.
| Maybe we could justify why that is the case, but for
| simplicity we can start with a model where that's just
| taken as given.
|
| Also suppose that participants do only two things with
| their mining and staking rewards. They take profit by
| selling, or reinvest.
|
| Miner's reinvest by selling the token and buying more
| equipment or funding operations. Stakers reinvest by
| staking more token without selling.
|
| All else being equal between the two except for the fact
| that one is mining and the other staking, the miners will
| sell more of the currency.
|
| Under this simple model, it's easy to see why miners are
| more sensitive to price in the short term and are more
| likely to sell. Of course this model isn't perfect, but I
| think it's close enough to explain the structure of the
| debate.
| paulgb wrote:
| Decred has ASICs available, and (hardware) miners are
| usually the largest fixed cost for miners, so Decred
| miners do have a fairly large interest in keeping the
| price high at least in the medium-term of their
| hardware's lifetime. Unless other cryptos of similar size
| are also using BLAKE-256 as their hash algorithm.
| lozenge wrote:
| PoW can jump to another coin without writing off their
| investment (into hardware), PoS can't.
| koolba wrote:
| With PoS it's even more liquid as you can dump your
| tokens and buy them on a new network to stake their.
| Assuming the tokens are worth anything.
| mgraczyk wrote:
| I don't know how decred works, but typically there are
| consensus level barriers to this to mitigate "nothing at
| stake" attacks. For example you may need to lock the
| tokens for weeks or months to use them as stake, and it
| may be impossible to trustlessly transfer ownership of
| locked tokens.
| tracedddd wrote:
| Decred has ASICs and there is nothing they can
| realistically jump to.
| [deleted]
| tivra wrote:
| It's not because miners are selling but because HOW they are
| selling. I recommend reading these two well-researched blog
| posts if you want to know the details:
| https://medium.com/@tacorevenge
| TheAdamist wrote:
| If there's nothing else the coins can be used for, selling is
| the logical conclusion, holding is just being the sucker who
| sells last.
| young_unixer wrote:
| (also applies to dollars)
| ohgodplsno wrote:
| The sucker who sells the last dollar has other problems,
| most likely the total collapse of a superpower means that
| not being able to trade your dollar is not going to be the
| most preoccupying thing on your mind.
| [deleted]
| KarlKemp wrote:
| Sure, in the sense that both this potted plant and this
| currently inactive volcano could soon start ejecting red-
| hot magma. Because one of every x billion "things" are
| active volcanoes, and these are both "things".
| [deleted]
| rolltotheriver wrote:
| The large mining groups are mining Decred just to sell it for
| Bitcoin. They are helping Decred at all. This didn't happen to
| Bitcoin during its early days, if so it wouldn't have survived.
| rolltotheriver wrote:
| Edit. They are NOT helping Decred at all
| WJW wrote:
| Miners being in it for the money instead of for the ideology?
| What a shocker.
| paulgb wrote:
| It's a store of value!*
|
| * as long as miners are benevolent and don't sell it
| tracedddd wrote:
| There's nothing wrong with a neutral, politically
| uninterested party running the infrastructure for profit
| reasons. In fact it's probably better than a bunch of
| charged and opinionated members trying to sway influence
| one way or another.
| cblconfederate wrote:
| miners are supposed to be in it for the money
| mikeiz404 wrote:
| Wouldn't it be roughly equivalent for a miner to put the amount
| spent on overhead and recurring cost such as electricity into
| staking and then sell or "dump" the staking rewards assuming the
| % payout is the same? It seems given enough time, with all be it
| potentially new entities, you risk being back at where you
| started.
|
| However I'm not familiar with Decred and only have a general idea
| of PoS.
| chizhik-pyzhik wrote:
| I imagine that the difference in profitability between PoW and
| PoS is arbitraged away over time. If it's a lot more profitable
| to PoS mine, some of the PoW miners would just switch over,
| which in turn makes PoW slightly more profitable for everyone
| still doing it.
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(page generated 2021-12-12 23:01 UTC)