[HN Gopher] Costly Airbus paint flaw goes wider than the Gulf
___________________________________________________________________
Costly Airbus paint flaw goes wider than the Gulf
Author : 1cvmask
Score : 90 points
Date : 2021-11-29 14:46 UTC (8 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (www.reuters.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (www.reuters.com)
| trhway wrote:
| looking at that mesh over carbon skin it is really hard to
| imagine how any paint can adhere long term there given the flight
| conditions, temp changes ,vibration, etc. Went out of curiosity
| to check out how Boeing solves the issue on 787 and voila, Boeing
| didn't disappoint :
|
| https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-removed-lightning-str...
|
| "Boeing removed a feature that protects its 787 planes during
| lightning strikes as a cost-cutting measure, even after FAA
| experts objected"
|
| Mind you, that is 2019, after the 737 MAX crashes, it is like the
| 787 department just didn't get the memo. Or may be there weren't
| any memo inside Boeing.
| belter wrote:
| 3 months ago....
|
| "Qatar Airways grounds 13 Airbus A350s as fuselage degrading"
|
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28098888
| aurizon wrote:
| That lightning limiting conducting screen is too inherently
| flexible for the coating they used - it aged and became brittle
| and cracks appeared as the screen flexed. They are cosmetic AND
| protective to stop the naked screen from mechanical abrasion and
| fatigue flexure. They will watch and replace the coating when it
| gets bad
| diskzero wrote:
| Imagine doing the walk-around inspection as part of the flight
| crew and seeing that sort of degradation? The flight crews were
| possible told it wasn't a major issue and to keep on schedule. As
| a pilot myself, I get very concerned whenever I see any sort of
| abnormal surface feature. I am lucky in that I can cancel my own
| flights.
|
| Any commercial pilots here willing to share their experience with
| this sort of thing? In the US, the FAA gives the pilot command
| over the flight, but I imagine companies take a dim view of
| pilots canceling flights over certain maintenance issues.
| kazinator wrote:
| Aircraft paint has to provide a tough, weather-proof surface
| that can withstand being blasted by dust and hail at 900 km/h.
|
| When you call it cosmetics, you're likening that to eye shadow
| or lipstick.
|
| No engineer would care to be named as the source of that
| idiotic statmeent.
| OldHand2018 wrote:
| Halfway through the article is this extraordinarily helpful
| information (given that I know nothing at all about aircraft
| paint):
|
| > When Airbus 15 years ago launched the A350, it chose to follow
| Boeing's new 787 in using carbon-fibre instead of metal.
|
| > Experts say the lighter jets consume less fuel but are harder
| to deck out in a way that makes paint stick.
|
| > The new jets also need a layer of metallic mesh to dissipate
| lightning strikes because carbon-fibre is not conductive.
|
| > Finally, unlike metal, carbon does not expand and shrink as
| temperatures change. Yet paint does, resulting in a tug of war
| between plane and paint that can cause peeling over time.
|
| > Problems reported by Qatar Airways and some - though far from
| all - other A350 operators suggest this is happening earlier than
| expected, two people familiar with the design said.
|
| > The problem may have been compounded by the paint's especially
| weak adhesion to titanium rivets, they added.
|
| I wonder how dissimilar the paint and/or painting process is to
| the 787. Perhaps it will one day suffer the same issues.
| kabes wrote:
| From the article:
|
| > Airbus is also not alone in facing problems. Boeing has had
| paint issues and a phenomenon known as rivet rash, or flecks of
| missing paint, on its competing 787s.
| missedthecue wrote:
| You'd think we'd have more sophisticated paint in this day and
| age.
| AnimalMuppet wrote:
| Paint isn't a new technology. Paint _on that kind of
| material_ , though, is new enough to not be well understood
| yet.
| melony wrote:
| Are the wings painted too? Would it result in detachment of the
| airflow?
| jacquesm wrote:
| Yes, especially the leading edges undergo a lot of protection
| because otherwise the structure underneath would suffer from
| the continuous impact of airborne particles, insects,
| precipitation and so on.
|
| Detachment of airflow across the whole wing would require a lot
| of damage, normal inspection would result in such a plane to be
| grounded well ahead of that happening.
| ComputerGuru wrote:
| > Airbus says there is no risk to the A350's safety - a point
| echoed by the other airlines, which have not grounded any jets
| and describe the issue as "cosmetic."
|
| Talk about parties with vested interest in a "nothing to see
| here, keep moving" conclusion. The only opinion that actually
| matters here is that of the regulators.
| cjrp wrote:
| Certainly looks more than cosmetic in the photos, surely has an
| effect on the aerodynamics if you're flying around with mesh on
| show.
| cowgoesmoo wrote:
| It might increase parasitic drag by a tiny amount, which will
| reduce fuel efficiency, but these planes have so much thrust
| that the increase in drag is negligible to the actual
| operations of the aircraft.
| FlingPoo wrote:
| There is an excellent documentary on the Boeing 787 on Amazon
| Prime Video. Very detailed on how it is built, what materials,
| engines, everything.
|
| It's called "The Great Boeing 787"
| second--shift wrote:
| I recently rode in an Iberia Air Airbus A350. I was struck by how
| the paint seemed to be dirty / droopy under the windows. This was
| supposedly a ~10 year old plane (I forget the tail number, so I
| can't look it up).
|
| https://imgur.com/a/TWNWPQs
| andor wrote:
| That's an A330. The A350 did not yet exist 10 years ago.
| [deleted]
| m0llusk wrote:
| Arguably this is a much greater problem than it at first appears
| because it exposes a serious and fundamental problem with our
| materials development processes. Currently development of new
| products is going faster than we can understand the qualities and
| limitations of those products. How exactly this happened and what
| is the best response is not clear. Because of how these materials
| are made a failure of the exterior coating can potentially render
| that whole aircraft unfit for safe use similar to how metal
| fatigue can lead to progressive cracking. What kind of exterior
| would be best for such a radical carbon fiber structure being
| exposed to extremes of heat and cold and pressure is wide open
| question, and how best to patch a damaged structure is also
| difficult to asses.
| NikolaeVarius wrote:
| > Arguably this is a much greater problem than it at first
| appears
|
| You can make the argument. Doesn't mean its true or has any
| relevance.
| erect_mom wrote:
| on the contrary, it absolutely makes it true and relevant.
| [deleted]
| rossdavidh wrote:
| I think some of the responses are missing the larger point
| here. Every new tech has unknowns and potential issues, some of
| which don't come to light for years. If it takes 20+ years to
| go from initial small-scale uses to volume production on big
| projects (e.g. Airbus), then sometime during those years many
| of the issues will come to light.
|
| It's pretty clear that technology is accelerating (and has been
| for a long time). What is not as clear is that our ability to
| artificially age products, in order to test how they will stand
| up over time, has always only been part of the way in which
| problems were found. Another, perhaps more important, and
| certainly more authoritative way, is to look at how they
| actually hold up over time. If technology takes long enough to
| go from small-scale uses to volume production, that's good
| enough. At some point, and perhaps we've reached it, the pace
| of technological change is fast enough that we end up relying
| almost entirely on testing methods that try to simulate long-
| term aging in a short amount of time. These methods won't
| always do the job.
|
| Notably, none of these issues are unique to aerospace.
| JumpCrisscross wrote:
| > _none of these issues are unique to aerospace_
|
| Aerospace has slowed in its pace of innovation relative to
| other industries in the last decades. Its long design times
| similarly mitigate this line of broad criticism.
|
| The bleeding-edge materials on this plane didn't fail. Paint
| over copper mesh did. That paint might have had some novel
| features, but nothing unknowably new. We don't even have
| evidence this was a material interaction versus QC failure.
| ghshephard wrote:
| I've read this paragraph a couple times - and what I find
| intriguing is how it's the sort of thing that GPT-3 can write
| based on the initial news statement. Every sentence in it is
| somewhat tautological. Maybe I'm just more suspicious, but I
| can envision a time (uh, maybe it's already here?) when forums
| like HN start to get peppered with AI commentary...
|
| This sentence, though - seems to be without any basis:
| "Currently development of new products is going faster than we
| can understand the qualities and limitations of those
| products."
|
| I would think that in 2021 we know _far_ more about the
| "qualities and limitations" of products under development -
| through virtue of more sophisticated testing, more
| sophisticated test equipment, and advanced analytical
| capability.
| hulitu wrote:
| You forgot quality tailoring. See Boeing for examples.
| SmellTheGlove wrote:
| Funny, I had a similar reaction. The wording is just strange.
| Like on Reddit when bots are trying to create fud.
| hinkley wrote:
| I'm having "MongoDB is webscale" flashbacks.
| m0llusk wrote:
| Carbon fiber airframes are new and have displayed
| unanticipated failures. Maybe they should have had more
| testing or more should have gone into reliable inspection and
| repair. We as a society may come to appreciate demonstrated
| robustness as much as novelty and efficiency.
| carabiner wrote:
| What's 2 + 2?
| mixedCase wrote:
| GPT-3 can do some kinds of basic arithmetic. Specially so
| memetic calculations (if that's a thing) like 2+2.
| bityard wrote:
| > Maybe they should have had more testing or more should
| have gone into reliable inspection and repair.
|
| Hindsight is so very easy to deploy from the comfort of the
| HN comments section.
|
| If everyone was this pessimistic, nobody would ever get
| things out of the R&D lab and into the real world.
| hulitu wrote:
| There are other industries beside "code fast, break
| things often and let the user test it". In some
| industries a test not done on time or skipped can cost
| later a lot of money.
| wishawa wrote:
| What is today's date?
| xwdv wrote:
| I wasted time reading a paragraph by an AI? That comment
| should be downvoted, as should any AI generated comments.
| cromka wrote:
| > I would think that in 2021 we know far more about the
| "qualities and limitations" of products under development -
| through virtue of more sophisticated testing, more
| sophisticated test equipment, and advanced analytical
| capability.
|
| Not to mention that the current state of knowledge is based
| also on what we've learned so far about existing good _and_
| bad technologies.
| Gravityloss wrote:
| Well at least carbon fiber composites are not new, used in
| Formula 1 probably when most posters here weren't born.
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McLaren_MP4/1
| JKCalhoun wrote:
| Ha ha, I was a teenager.
|
| Formula 1 though were never looking for 50-year integrity for
| their cars. While your example establishes the beginning of
| the use of carbon fiber, it seems otherwise orthogonal to its
| present use in commercial aircraft.
| Gravityloss wrote:
| 1981 is hardly the beginning. It was for example used in
| the Airbus A300, which entered service in 1974.
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_A300
|
| Infamous but acquitted from the rudder incident on American
| Airlines Flight 587
| https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Fractured-carbon-
| fibers-...
| jacquesm wrote:
| > Currently development of new products is going faster than we
| can understand the qualities and limitations of those products.
|
| This indicates a very superficial understanding of materials
| science. No, development of new processes and materials does
| not go faster than our understanding is progressing, they are
| progressing in lockstep.
|
| The only thing that occasionally happens is that accelerated
| aging testing and lightning damage testing does not turn up
| issues soon enough for them not resulting in visible damage
| during operations. But aircraft are inspected with great
| regularity and such defects will almost always be noticed in
| time. To the best of my knowledge this particular defect has
| not resulted in any planes crashing.
|
| There were some more substantial issues with early planes using
| composites but those were to the best of my knowledge resolved,
| it is of course entirely possible that as these airframes age
| that new issues will crop up. The main question around these is
| usually what was the cause, bad maintenance, bad process during
| application (for instance: a respray by another entity than the
| manufacturer) or a manufacturing error, and that in turn leads
| to the question of who will pay for the damage. It isn't rare
| for there to be additional factors involved, such as issues
| like these being used to pressure a manufacturer into absorbing
| costs or waiving cancellation fees on surplus orders.
|
| So before jumping to conclusions about our ability to develop
| new materials you'd probably have to absorb a lot of
| information about this particular issue, it is likely a lot
| more complex than a superficial reading would tell.
| mirekrusin wrote:
| Also if they didn't bother to test such relatively straight
| forward thing as paint for those conditions, what kind of
| confidence can one have that other parts have passed those kind
| of tests?
| kabdib wrote:
| Go read Bruce Sterling's 1993 article on something relatively
| straight forward, like glue: https://www.reddit.com/r/HFY/com
| ments/3zode9/bruce_sterling_...
|
| I've done a bit more reading about paint; if anything, it's
| even more complicated than glue (bigger design space, for one
| thing: https://www.essentialchemicalindustry.org/materials-
| and-appl... )
| ethbr0 wrote:
| > _such relatively straight forward thing as paint_
|
| Think about high performance paint as a very thin surface
| that happens to be applied in liquid form.
| jacquesm wrote:
| You can bet that they did test for those conditions. The
| question is what combination of elements here is causing the
| problem, which is likely not an easy to answer question.
| Paint is complex, especially airplane paint.
| the-dude wrote:
| TFA argues that is not a safety issue.
| throaway46546 wrote:
| https://archive.md/YKiA1
| 1cvmask wrote:
| It seems that victim blaming is not something specific to just
| Boeing. Airbus blamed Qatar airways and the hot weather till
| similar issues emerged with planes of Finn Air and Air France in
| colder climates.
|
| Whatever happened to the customer is always right?
|
| Guess it is easier to victim blame when you operate in essence a
| duopoly. Competition is critical to solve these issues in the
| long run.
| smnrchrds wrote:
| Boeing also initially blamed pilots for 737 MAX crashes, until
| too many of them crashed, the regulators caught up and grounded
| the planes, and forced them to take responsibility. It seems
| like shifting the blame is the norm in the airline industry.
|
| https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-11-16/are-boein...
| slownews45 wrote:
| I thought Boeing blamed it on a combination of poor
| maintenance practices by the relevant airlines, poor handling
| and response to inflight error messages and maintenance
| requests on previous flights that left the issue unaddressed,
| and then weaknesses on the pilot side during the accident
| flights?
|
| I personally think they went a bit overboard with the revised
| procedure memory items.
| smnrchrds wrote:
| I am no expert, but I remember the main culprit was that
| Boeing had insisted no further training is required for
| pilots to avoid some sort of expensive recertification.
| _Weakness of pilots_ was the direct result of this. Pilots
| having experience with previous 737 planes were told in no
| uncertain terms that they can fly this new plane the exact
| same as the previous one and no further training or testing
| is required or even available. They did just that, but
| actions which would have saved the plane in previous
| generations ensured its crash in the MAX generation.
|
| And Boeing had the audacity of blaming the pilots when they
| inevitably died in crashes.
|
| > _In vivid detail, the documentary pieces together what
| Boeing knew about the potential for disaster with the 737
| Max and when the company knew it. Pasternak says in the
| film that in 2012, a "Boeing test pilot was flying the MAX
| in a flight simulator and trying to respond to an
| activation of MCAS, and that resulted in what he described
| as a catastrophic event. It showed that if that had been in
| real life, he [could] have lost the airplane. They realize
| from that moment on, even a Boeing test pilot may have
| trouble responding to MCAS."_
|
| > _Yet internal communications explored in the film show
| that Boeing was determined to maintain the status quo:
| avoiding potential scrutiny by the Federal Aviation
| Administration that would add costs; keeping new simulator
| training for pilots to a minimum; and even requesting that
| MCAS be removed from pilot training manuals._
|
| https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/video-clip-
| boeing...
| WalterBright wrote:
| The Frontline episode is a mess of misinformation and
| omission of crucial facts. I submitted on the Frontline
| site a list of omitted facts and corrections supported by
| cited FAA documents. The moderators refused to post it.
|
| I used to watch Frontline regularly. Although they had an
| obvious left wing bias, I thought they made good faith
| efforts to present the facts.
|
| No more. I no longer watch Frontline nor consider them a
| reliable source of news.
|
| BTW, the "Aviation Disasters" did an episode on the
| 737MAX that was pretty decent (although a bit shallow due
| to time constraints), so it is possible to do a good
| story on it. Recommended.
| sokoloff wrote:
| > Boeing had the audacity of blaming the pilots when they
| inevitably died in crashes.
|
| That wasn't a great look, but Boeing is correct that if
| the pilots had _followed the existing checklist memory
| items_ for stab trim runaway, the airplanes would not
| have crashed.
|
| The difficulty is that prior generations had breakout
| switches which would inhibit the stab trim from running
| in a direction counter to the control column deflection.
| That obviously won't work for the intended purpose of
| MCAS (to give flight control feel in opposition to
| excessive pitch up).
|
| The checklist item for runaway trim is not "stop stab
| trim by deflecting control column" but rather "stop stab
| trim by throwing the stab trim cutout switches". Pilots
| who used the "deflect control column" technique contrary
| to the checklist would have gotten away with the error in
| non-Max 73s, but not in the -Max edition. That's pretty
| far from "0% pilot contribution" to the mishap IMO.
| WalterBright wrote:
| The first Lion Air flight crew correctly followed the
| runaway trim procedure and landed safely. The next crew
| on the same airplane crashed.
|
| Boeing then issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive
| to ALL 737MAX PILOTS:
|
| "Initially, higher control forces may be needed to
| overcome any stabilizer nose down trim already applied.
| Electric stabilizer trim can be used to neutralize
| control column pitch forces before moving the STAB TRIM
| CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT. Manual stabilizer trim can be
| used before and after the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are
| moved to CUTOUT."
|
| https://theaircurrent.com/wp-
| content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MA...
|
| which the EA pilots did not follow.
| slownews45 wrote:
| Excellent point.
|
| A lot of focus is on pilots, but the safety chain was
| also weak. Maint, communication with flight dept,
| communication to subsequent pilots etc, training dept and
| required experience / education to fly. Not a good combo.
| Someone with 200 hrs of time, plane badly maintained, no
| good handoff around prior issues etc.
|
| I still think Boeings safety model with humans as the
| backup for computers probably doesn't work in a world
| where a large majority of pilots lean on fully fly by
| wire (computerized) planes. Someone with 240 hours, a
| bunch of that just sim time - can they hand fly a plane
| in its entire envelope?
|
| This is where Boeing sounded really tone deaf. They built
| a model around humans as backup, a very US centric model
| (ie, folks with tons of general aviation experience just
| as a hobby from young ages, military flight experience
| etc) which was not really appropriate here.
| sokoloff wrote:
| There's a genuine question as to whether someone with 240
| hours should be holding the yoke of a jet airliner. For
| me, that answer is "hell no!" as we saw in Colgan 3407
| (and others) which led to the FAA 1500-hour minimum for
| an ATP.
|
| At 240 hours, I couldn't be trusted with a Bonanza.
| slownews45 wrote:
| Yes, in the US we (now) think of 250 as too low.
|
| 1,500 is pretty dang high. Persoanlly, 500 - 1000
| wouldn't be unreasonable in my view.
|
| Major airlines might still be at 3,000+ hours.
|
| Remember, it used to be in the US you could also fly as a
| FO with a commercial pilots license at 250 hours!
|
| FAA Commercial Pilot is 250 (50 of which need to be in
| powered airplane). https://www.aopa.org/training-and-
| safety/active-pilots/safet...
|
| 50 hours behind the actual yoke? 200 lives 30,000 feet in
| the air?
|
| Overseas, some of the cadet / local pilot programs - you
| get pretty low time and/or connected pilots into the
| seat.
|
| "The committee noted that these deficiencies had been
| identified previously in training and reemerged during
| the accident flight. When the MCAS activated, it took the
| first officer four minutes to locate the proper checklist
| because he wasn't familiar with required memory items.
| During training, the same pilot had shown unfamiliarity
| with Boeing and airline standard operating procedures and
| had weak aircraft handling skills, the report revealed.
| His training record reflected numerous deficiencies,
| including "major problems" controlling the aircraft."
|
| There is a reason Boeing initially said there might have
| been some pilot factors. They look at that memory item
| checklist, and think, trim problem, stab cutout memory
| item.
|
| In the US they have Capt Sully (glider / fighter pilots,
| lots of experience, with a strong FO) gliding a plane
| with two engines out to a safe landing. So human in the
| loop kind of works in the US. Could you program a
| computer for that? Probably, but not there yet.
|
| That said, I still blame Boeing to a large degree. If you
| are going to sell new planes to countries that have this
| type of system, you must design the plane for purpose.
| Ie, low time pilots who struggle / are connected / can't
| be fired etc - you don't then design the plane assuming
| the human in the loop will have hand flying ability to
| step in. That was pure greed, roll out this type of plane
| in the US / EU / UK etc. Good maintenance, good safety
| reporting systems (ASAP etc) work out the kinks, then go
| overseas.
|
| First Max 8 to Malindo air!!? Really??
|
| They really need to get to airbus and beyond envelope
| protection etc in these markets.
|
| I'm also curious about checkrides overseas. Stuff like
| engine out on takeoff etc is just hammered into folks in
| the US.
| slownews45 wrote:
| The old procedure was
|
| Control Column - Hold Firmly
|
| Autopilot - Disengage. Do NOT re-engage. Control pitch
| attitude manually with column and electric trim.
|
| If runaway continues, stab trim cutout (both) to cutout.
|
| http://www.b737.org.uk/images/runawaystab2000.jpg
|
| The new procedure is not that much different.
|
| With PK-LQP - previous flight it took 6 minutes for them
| to get to this procedure - and it was suggestion of a
| dead-heading pilot. This resolved things. Despite going
| through this exact issue on previous flight, the next
| flight takes off, same issue develops because of
| underlying maintenance issue, they were dealing with this
| for 8 minutes, 28 activations of incorrect trim but with
| a fatal outcome.
|
| Yes, MCAS was a bad design, yes it increased risk. I'm
| not sure it was a "nothing could be done" type situation.
| Better maintenance? Better communication between flights?
| Stab trim cutout earlier if you don't like how the
| automatic trim is working?
|
| Airbus has historically pushed more automation / flight
| protection. My own suspicion is Boeing will go that way
| as well, ie, human in loop model they had (where human
| fixes the computer going crazy) just doesn't work well
| especially for folks flying these big jets without much
| earlier GA / manual flying time.
|
| For example, in the US, a pilot would have done lots of
| manual flying on small planes first, and so might be a
| bit less automation dependent and better able to take
| over when computers go crazy. Also more hours before you
| fly the big jets (think 1,500 hours flight time). Usually
| a 4 year degree.
|
| Overseas, you can come off the street and be flying a jet
| with 200 - 240 hours of time including sim time? That is
| a TON less flying time, probably very very little manual
| stick and rudder flying. A fair number of saves in the US
| have come from folks with great stick and rudder flying
| experience, even things like glider experience you just
| don't have overseas.
|
| There usually is something called differences training
| for variants like this. Wouldn't cover MCAS, and is
| usually brief, but not normally zero. I'm surprised they
| did zero differences training if that was the case - that
| is very unusual. You've got to do normally at least an
| hour or two. A new variant is not unheard off, 737
| probably has something like 12 variants under one type
| certificate. I would check your source there that no
| differences training came up.
| WalterBright wrote:
| The problems were:
|
| 1. poor MCAS design
|
| 2. poor maintenance
|
| 3. pilots not following runaway trim emergency procedures
|
| The media pretty much never mentions (3).
|
| Note that 3 flights experienced the MCAS malfunction. 1
| applied runaway trim emergency procedures, continued with
| the flight, and landed safely.
|
| https://theaircurrent.com/wp-
| content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MA...
|
| 2018 - 035 - PK-LQP Final Report http://knkt.dephub.go.id/k
| nkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/2018%20-%20...
| WalterBright wrote:
| For those who don't like what I wrote, I encourage you to
| read the cites, which are official documents, rather than
| what journalists who literally know nothing about flying,
| piloting, or aircraft design, imagine is true.
| bobthepanda wrote:
| Shifting blame is the norm, period.
|
| Remember the coverage around Toyota's stuck accelerators, or
| the woman who suffered third degree burns from McDonald's
| coffee?
| lotsofpulp wrote:
| > Whatever happened to the customer is always right?
|
| The customer not being right.
| lostcolony wrote:
| >> Whatever happened to the customer is always right?
|
| Enough people worked retail to know that's a lie.
|
| But yes, this is the sort of thing Airbus should have responded
| better to, even if it was without any real promise of making
| things right (i.e., "We are investigating fully as to what has
| happened here and will seek to make things right if we find
| this in any way weakens the structural stability of our planes,
| known the world over as some of the (insert whatever marketing
| speak)")
| Bayart wrote:
| >Whatever happened to the customer is always right?
|
| That never made it to Europe to begin with.
| lorenzfx wrote:
| It did, at least as a proverb. E.g. In German there is a
| saying "der Kunde ist Konig" (customer is king)
| bserge wrote:
| Judging by the quality of German customer care/support,
| that has got to be sarcasm :D
| distances wrote:
| Ans that's very good. Customers are wrong most if the time
| really, so it's generally better to have honest service
| providers that aren't bending to ridiculous customer demands.
| erect_mom wrote:
| could you expand in this point?
| rob74 wrote:
| If you apply that proverb to a customer who is trying to haggle
| with you over the price (or other contractual details) of their
| ordered planes, soon _you_ will be paying _them_ to take your
| jets...
| jollybean wrote:
| "Whatever happened to the customer is always right?"
|
| These are serious issues with massive costs and liabilities. We
| don't resort to platitudes at that scale.
|
| 'Who is Right' should be as objective as we can feasibly
| determine and it may be complicated.
| erect_mom wrote:
| the customer is always right?
|
| you're old school. i like that.
| throwaway0a5e wrote:
| >Guess it is easier to victim blame when you operate in essence
| a duopoly.
|
| The lesson the public repeatedly teaches to MBA types is that
| the narrative matters more than reality. It makes complete
| business sense to blame the customer.
| slownews45 wrote:
| The standard is a fair bit higher now in airplane safety than
| it was. The 787 issues make you realize this (shims /
| flatness stuff etc). Go back 50 years this wouldn't have
| gotten a second look in most cases (and yes, there were more
| fatalities).
| callmeal wrote:
| >Whatever happened to the customer is always right?
|
| The full quote is: "In matters of taste, the customer is always
| right."
| tcskeptic wrote:
| _Whatever happened to the customer is always right?_
|
| Have you ever met a customer?
| nate_meurer wrote:
| We have a lot of them where I live. They're always in the
| stores and restaurants trying to get stuff. I mostly shop
| online so I don't run into too many of them, which is nice.
| flyinglizard wrote:
| It's because of trust and money. Saying something is wrong is
| very expensive in this business, in outright money to fix
| (hundreds of millions - or more if this is fleet wide) and in
| public perception ("A350 is unsafe!").
|
| Much easier to water down the issue and turn it to a mutual
| blame game.
| reaperducer wrote:
| _Whatever happened to the customer is always right?_
|
| Marshall Field, the man who coined that phrase, went out of
| business. His department store got eaten by Macy's.
| trimbo wrote:
| Marshall Field died in 1906. Marshall Field's was an
| independent public company from 1930 until 1982.
| reaperducer wrote:
| OK, fine...
|
| Marshall Field's, _the company founded by_ the man who
| coined that phrase _and which used it as a slogan and
| marketing campaign for decades_ , went out of business. It
| _eventually_ got eaten by Macy 's.
|
| Happy?
| [deleted]
| [deleted]
| S_A_P wrote:
| I'm not even close to an aviation expert but I'm curious if we
| are reaching a point where aerospace tech is too complicated.
| Both major manufacturers are having issues with their latest
| generation of planes. I'm curious what someone with expertise
| thinks about Boeing and Airbus' issues
| jacquesm wrote:
| If you look back through history you'll find that every major
| technology shift in aviation was marked by a period of some
| instability after which the initial problems were ironed out
| and then the new planes usually ended up being more reliable
| than their predecessors. This goes for the shift to composites,
| but also for the shift to jets, pressurized passenger
| compartments, widebodies and so on. The impressive thing is
| that the first take on these is usually so close to the final
| one that the differences can be overcome without a complete
| redesign.
|
| But mistakes (such as the rectangular window problem with the
| de Havilland Comet, and more recently, the attempt to keep the
| same type certification for a completely redesigned airframe)
| do happen and when they do, unfortunately, the results can be
| terrible.
| sithadmin wrote:
| You could basically make this statement every year since
| commercial airliners were introduced. For commercial air
| transport, the 'bleeding edge' (which I put in quotes because
| it's actually quite conservative, relative to the bleeding edge
| in other fields) has always suffered from minor (and sometimes
| major and deadly) product quirks. Military aircraft even more
| so.
|
| This is also why there's a very strong industry preference for
| airframes that are 'tried and true' - e.g. 737 variants up
| until the MAX, A320 and A330, etc.
| Someone wrote:
| And it's also unavoidable. To really know how an airplane
| will age during its lifetime, you have to build it and use it
| for 50+ years.
|
| That would mean all 'in service' aircraft would be based on
| 50+ year old designs. That clearly is undesirable, if only
| because it would be too expensive.
|
| So, instead, one uses models for the effects of aging, for
| example by repeatedly freezing and heating parts while they
| also are being stressed physically and are under intense UV
| lighting. Those models can be wrong, but if you're using new
| tech, you can't afford to wait with selling airplanes until
| you know they are right.
|
| (Of course, this isn't limited to the aircraft industry; it
| happens in all engineering. For example, hard disk
| manufacturers don't run new hard disk technology for decades
| to measure its MTBF, either)
|
| Sometimes, such models need major adjustment, as happened
| with https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Comet.
| ethbr0 wrote:
| I guess GP's point could be summarized as "Does the amount
| of complexity required to improve planes _now_ exceed our
| ability to manage? "
|
| Curious in responses from that perspective. Are airframes
| that much more complicated? Or just better due to advances
| in aerodynamic understanding, but not much more
| complicated?
|
| And same question for engines. Are modern high-bypass
| turbofans more complex?
| timw4mail wrote:
| I'm not sure there exists a more complex set of requirements for
| paint than for aircraft. Extreme cold to surface temperatures,
| the requirement to flex with adhered surfaces without cracking,
| plus the desire for a paint job to last for years.
|
| It looks like conductivity is also desired, to some degree, to
| help the metal surfaces dissipate lightning.
| throwaway0a5e wrote:
| >I'm not sure there exists a more complex set of requirements
| for paint than for aircraft. Extreme cold to surface
| temperatures, the requirement to flex with adhered surfaces
| without cracking, plus the desire for a paint job to last for
| years.
|
| That's basically a walk in the park compared to anything that
| needs to deal with unearthly temperatures and harsh chemicals
| at the same time. Furthermore, air (and airborne water) isn't
| very abrasive which helps a lot even if you do go through it at
| hundreds of miles per hour.
|
| You can more or less think most modern paint as a plastic
| coating. High speed air with the occasional water droplet or
| Canadaian goose, easy. Abrasives, hydrocarbons, high
| temperatures, not so easy.
| kuschku wrote:
| Wouldn't e.g. landing and starting from an airport near the
| sea with constant saltwater droplets in the air also damage
| the paint?
| OldHand2018 wrote:
| I really liked the old American Airlines scheme where they
| just didn't paint the airplane. It was beautiful.
|
| But in the modern age, if you need a metal mesh around a
| carbon fiber fuselage then not painting the airplane is
| probably not an option. Sad.
| nickff wrote:
| > _" I really liked the old American Airlines scheme where
| they just didn 't paint the airplane."_
|
| It wasn't quite that simple. I believe the 'bare metal'
| finish actually had a layer of protective varnish painted
| on, to protect the metal from oxidation (anyone who has
| handled bare aluminum can tell you that it develops a layer
| of oxide very quickly). In addition to that, the panels had
| to be specially chosen and very carefully handled, as small
| blemishes were very obvious.
| jaclaz wrote:
| Don't forget that besides the thermal effects, the plane hull
| contracts and expands due to external air pressure and internal
| pressurization.
| EMM_386 wrote:
| Wow. People were speculating that this was a ruse by Qatar to get
| out of contracts with Airbus.
|
| After seeing the images, that's no ruse. And that appears to be a
| bit more than "cosmetic".
| Canotdohng wrote:
| Feedback from Qatar is always taken with a grain of salt given
| the long history of Akbar Al Baker using fallacious pretexts to
| engage in ruthless contractual fights.
| JackFr wrote:
| The more I learn about them, the more astonishlgy complex and
| amazing technological marvels modern commercial jetliners are.
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