[HN Gopher] Full key extraction of Nvidia TSEC
___________________________________________________________________
Full key extraction of Nvidia TSEC
Author : vitplister
Score : 571 points
Date : 2021-11-23 07:19 UTC (15 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (gist.githubusercontent.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (gist.githubusercontent.com)
| pabs3 wrote:
| Seems the other TSEC exploits mentioned might refer to these:
|
| https://github.com/CAmadeus/falcon-tools
| https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-3439...
| londons_explore wrote:
| These appear to be sha256 hashes of the keys, not the keys
| themselves...?
| zarzavat wrote:
| I assume that's so it doesn't get immediately DMCA'd. They can
| either distribute the keys separately or other people follow
| the paper and the keys will become known.
| motohagiography wrote:
| Hat is off to the author for executing like that. I feel like I
| missed out by never playing games, as cracking them seems like
| the real game behind the game.
|
| From a design perspective, this is why you don't have your entire
| ecosystem depend on a shared secret stored in secure hardware,
| even if they're written when the chip is still in the flasher at
| the fab. You need either to diversify your keys in the flasher,
| or do an initialization/personalization protocol to update the
| keys to new unique per-console ones so that a crack like this
| isn't portable across every other customer device. As a design
| consideration, it means the customer has to be online to
| personalize the device to get their unique keys, but that's the
| trade off.
|
| The beauty of demonstrating this attack is that if you think game
| consoles with security modules are vulnerable to having ecosystem
| compromising shared secrets extracted, wait until you see phones.
| bo1024 wrote:
| ......or this is why you let people own the hardware they
| purchase and give up on this ridiculous "secure" boot idea?
| marcodiego wrote:
| Some features in NVIDIA chipsets, like changing the operating
| frequency, needs (hardware checked, I think) signed binary blobs.
| This prevents the open source nouveau driver from achieving good
| performance. Does this hack helps in this front?
| SSLy wrote:
| no, this is about Tegra platform
| salawat wrote:
| That doesn't necessarily rule it out. Cryptography is one of
| those things that once you get it down, you stick with it. It
| is entirely possible this may give enough insight into
| Nvidia's SOP with cryptography to extend the PoC proven on
| Tegra to something like their firmware signing functionality
| in GM 204 cards. At least, I haven't seen anything that
| stands out enough to downright disclude the possibility from
| possibly nudging things down the road, in theory.
| encryptluks2 wrote:
| This seems to indicate that this involves the Nintendo Switch,
| but that it only involves older models where the first layer of
| security was broken and now a second. Wouldn't the new models
| have patched the first layer of security by now where this
| wouldn't result in anything of value?
| freeone3000 wrote:
| Yes, HAC-0001-001 (better battery life) and HDH-001 (Lite) use
| a new ROM revision with this patched out. But there are a _lot_
| of original Switches out there.
| Faaak wrote:
| Holy cow. Reading these recaps I feel a lot the Impostor
| Syndrome. I think I'm competent on what I do, but when I see
| those guys it's hard not to feel really dumb.
|
| Congrats to them !
| atemerev wrote:
| The same, of course, but now I know this: if you want to learn,
| you will learn. If you spend 10 years keeping the passion, you
| will become a magician. Most of us still have at least 10 years
| of life remaining to spend on something exciting.
| vadfa wrote:
| Take into account that this particular post glosses over a
| looot of stuff. A more detailed write-up would not make you
| feel that dumb.
| ChuckNorris89 wrote:
| _> A more detailed write-up would not make you feel that
| dumb._
|
| Errr, no. Just because you would have more details and
| everything would seem easier to understand and it's simple to
| sit on the couch and be like _" yeah that looks simple, I
| could have done that"_, because that still glosses over the
| huge amount of research and the number of trails and errors
| the author put in not just during this project but throughout
| his career to get to this point where everything _Just
| Works(tm)_ for him so he can make it look simple for everyone
| else.
|
| Just like with Edison and the light bulb, even if the end
| result seems very simple in hindsight, the process of getting
| there is definitely not.
| vadfa wrote:
| This is like studying a technical subject in university...
| As you said, you wouldn't know how they reached that
| knowledge, but at least you would understand how the matter
| itself works.
| sumtechguy wrote:
| I still fall into that same trap. Oh wow these guys amazing
| (they probably are). But when you watch a presentation it
| has this weird effect of compressing what took them
| weeks/months/years to do into a 45 min presentation, making
| you feel really bad. I try to remind jr devs the same
| thing. I am showing you this thing I have been working on.
| They had no idea I was working on it. But suddenly I have
| hundreds of lines of code and it all 'just works'. It makes
| me look like a wizard to them. But I remind them I spent
| the past 4 months working on that thing, do not feel bad or
| stupid. It just takes time and failing thousands of times
| over and over.
| snthd wrote:
| To loosely paraphase Feynman - the fact the author can
| explain it so clearly to those not deep in the field
| demonstrates a real understanding and depth.
|
| (Feynman said something like, if you can't explain it to a
| layman you don't really understand it.)
| nkurz wrote:
| Maybe, or maybe not. Presumably that "more detailed write-up"
| would be something like the third footnote:
| https://yifan.lu/2019/02/22/attacking-hardware-aes-with-dfa/.
| Despite being much more detailed, I still felt just about as
| dumb! :)
| baq wrote:
| on the contrary, it'd make me feel a lot dumber...
| wingerlang wrote:
| You can do a lot with persistence too. I recently tried to
| reverse engineer some software protection. Ultimately I
| decided to cut my losses but the 2-3 weeks I spent on it
| was a very gradual chipping into more and more advanced
| stuff. Now imagine having years of experience, and chipping
| away over years. One "wow" moment in a blog article might
| have taken 3 months of headaches to reach.
| fragmede wrote:
| Reading the blog post, it sounds like a supergenius' long
| weekend, so the timeline O(months) is not to be skipped
| over. 1% genius, 99% perspiration. Or more recently, "an
| overnight success after trying for 10 years".
| Cthulhu_ wrote:
| Same, but I keep reminding me that I grew up with different
| interests and a different set of skill sets. Web development
| and the like sounds boring in comparison though.
| secondaryacct wrote:
| And maybe these guys would have trouble delivering week after
| week productive changes in a system used for important things
| by important people.
|
| After all, all this genius did is open a nintendo switch to
| eventually run software made by you for free. The contrary of
| productive work I d say and close to parasitism.
|
| Or so you can tell yourself when you feel down :D
| x3ro wrote:
| I think that allowing me to run whichever software I
| choose, on a device I paid lots of money for is, is a great
| service to society. Essentially the exact opposite of
| parasitism, especially considering these people are doing
| it for free.
| dylan604 wrote:
| Yes, but you did buy the device knowing full well its
| limitations and obviously felt it was worth it in the
| end.
| southerntofu wrote:
| The trillion dollar question is how to get rid of
| parasitic corporations (capitalism) ruining our lives for
| a profit, making it so we need dedicated hackers to do
| something as "simple" as owning our hardware.
| asimpletune wrote:
| I think voting... more
| southerntofu wrote:
| How so? Has voting ever brought any major social change?
| If anything, history has shown that when a vote threatens
| the status quo, an armed coup financed by the industry
| (and often foreign imperialism) will take place (see:
| Allende, Sankara, etc).
|
| I think the situation about voting is summarized pretty
| well by this funny rap clip form the 2016 USA elections:
| https://yewtu.be/watch?v=D9Qv6S_GtLo
| djbusby wrote:
| Most big societal change was done through riots, not so
| much voting.
|
| Boston Tea Party, Union strikes/riots, guillotine.
|
| Oligarchs slow boil the proles until they pop.
| erikbye wrote:
| No trouble, but man, how boring.
| alickz wrote:
| Computer Science is a wide field. You are not an impostor for
| not understanding all components of the field.
|
| For example, an oncologist is not expected to have the same
| understanding of bacteria as a microbiologist and they aren't
| an impostor for not knowing.
|
| But I feel you, whenever I read the more technical posts on HN
| I feel the same way.
| saagarjha wrote:
| In this case it's computer science paired with a bit of
| hardware engineering ;)
| tomxor wrote:
| I agree with both of you, but still kinda feel like this is
| wizardry in action...
|
| Because it comes from that special perspective of being able
| to xray through the entire stack, all the way down the
| physics of the electronics driving the thing while keeping
| the context of all the other layers in mind to see how
| different parts can be manipulated to get the results you
| want. I get the most enjoyment out of my work when doing this
| with higher level layers, but being able to do it at the
| hardware end must feel exhilarating, because that's really
| how it all works.
| rmbyrro wrote:
| I sometimes feel like that and agree with other comment about
| the oncologist.
|
| To add one cent: most of us have to be "productive" in a sense
| that requires us to use a LOT of abstractions.
|
| The author went the other way, understanding how things work
| under the hood in quite a deep level.
|
| It's truly awesome, but you also have to appreciate how
| abstractions have their place in modern software dev industry.
| tomc1985 wrote:
| I've been out of the security game for a while, this almost reads
| like fiction. Good god this is nuts. I've heard of extracting
| keys with timing attacks but this is even more impressive!
|
| Also, apparently the Switch perma-pwn got pwned? Sad face...
|
| Also also, I hope other popular cryptoprocessors aren't so
| vulnerable?
| Mindwipe wrote:
| > Also also, I hope other popular cryptoprocessors aren't so
| vulnerable?
|
| You might be surprised, but also this chip wasn't intended to
| be used to secure a chain of trust but had to be press ganged
| into service after being let down by the main bootrom, which
| was done by a team at NVidia without much experience of doing
| these things and made a lot of elementary errors. And being
| used for a games console is painting a big target on your back.
|
| But ultimately a lot of secure chipset areas have been subject
| to a lot of... learning on the job shall we say. Things are
| much better than they used to be, but you don't have to go back
| many years before things get very hairy. People constantly say
| they want more OS version support for Android, but I would not
| want to use a five year old processor from Samsung or Qualcomm
| if I cared about the hardware backed security on my phone.
| my123 wrote:
| > but you don't have to go back many years before things get
| very hairy
|
| For the NV TSEC-equivalent Falcon successor on Ampere, it's
| indeed not vulnerable to this attack because that security
| subsystem was made much more secure.
|
| But that's an arch released in... 2020.
| mschuster91 wrote:
| > People constantly say they want more OS version support for
| Android, but I would not want to use a five year old
| processor from Samsung or Qualcomm if I cared about the
| hardware backed security on my phone.
|
| What I would really like is a modern Android that doesn't
| brick half the security features by e-fuse when I root it and
| many apps refuse to run properly afterwards - why the fuck,
| for example, does the PayPal app refuse fingerprint unlocking
| after rooting but other apps don't?! All this incentivizes me
| as the user is to choose an insecure password that I can
| actually remember.
| striking wrote:
| I'm fairly certain you're not eFused out, but you would
| have to give up your root and let your phone powerwash
| itself if you wanted things to go back to normal.
| mschuster91 wrote:
| Samsung Knox fires an e-fuse the moment you flash an
| alternative boot image.
| no_time wrote:
| Its a small miracle paypal doesnt flat out prevent you from
| running the app when rooted.
| scandinavian wrote:
| > Also, apparently the Switch perma-pwn got pwned? Sad face...
|
| All erista units (the ones with the bootrom flaw) are still
| pwnable.
|
| 6.2.0 was released on November 19, 2018 - first indication of a
| new hack was posted on twitter Nov 24, 2018 by @elmirorac and
| atmosphere 0.8.0 was released on Nov 29, 2018. So the fix he
| talks about in the paste lasted for around 10 days before a new
| one was generally available.
|
| That's why he says:
|
| > And it would have been perfect if not for the many security
| flaws in TSEC secure boot.
| a-dub wrote:
| so how does this voltage glitching stuff work exactly? are caps
| to ground/buffers removed/defeated? is it timing dependent?
| (sounds like they're sending i2c messages to the power circuitry
| here?) do people do things like setup precise triggers or hook up
| function generators to kick the supply voltage around and just
| wait to get lucky?
| bonzini wrote:
| See here: https://yifan.lu/2019/02/22/attacking-hardware-aes-
| with-dfa/
| Retr0spectrum wrote:
| More commonly, voltage glitching does rely on removing
| capacitors etc., and extremely precise timing (nanosecond
| resolution, or below).
|
| However, the fun part about this particular attack is that it
| does not require quite the same level of precision. The voltage
| is dropped incrementally until the CPU starts to make faulty
| calculations. It just so happens that AES is one of the most
| complex operations, and thus, the first to start faulting.
| voxadam wrote:
| If you're interested in voltage glitching and other power
| analysis attacks you should take a look the excellent open
| source ChipWhisper.
|
| https://chipwhisperer.readthedocs.io/en/latest/tutorials/cou...
|
| https://chipwhisperer.readthedocs.io
|
| https://www.newae.com/chipwhisperer
|
| https://embedded.fm/episodes/286 (podcast interview)
| pjc50 wrote:
| Hilariously it appears you can just direct the system to turn
| down its own supply voltage for you (I2C to the PMIC, as you
| spotted), and that one of the levels has a bit error rate
| that's low enough to run programs most of the time but triggers
| a bit flip in AES often enough to leak the key.
| bradfa wrote:
| A properly designed crypto subsystem that cared about
| security would detect the voltage drop and either refuse to
| operate or would have its own local power regulation circuits
| such that a system level voltage reduction wouldn't impact
| it.
|
| I presume the CPU here was _VERY_ cost conscious and so
| trade-offs were made.
|
| I have no background in gaming but have worked with flawed
| "security" solutions. Often the business does not care that
| the engineers explain how flawed some security thing is
| before release, if there's more money to be made by not
| fixing it then it won't get fixed. Often doing all of the
| right things is _MUCH_ too expensive, either in dollars,
| size, or power.
| Mindwipe wrote:
| > I presume the CPU here was VERY cost conscious and so
| trade-offs were made.
|
| It was also more intended as a media chipset and they
| managed to flog it to Nintendo, and was an early effort by
| the team involved.
| baybal2 wrote:
| > would have its own local power regulation circuits such
| that a system level voltage reduction wouldn't impact it.
|
| How do you know if external voltage is low if you check it
| against... a voltage derived from it?
| joshvm wrote:
| Almost all micros have brown out detection so you can
| tell if the device undervolts, and typically you can
| force the device to auto shut down/reset if that
| condition trips using an onboard programmable fuse. I
| don't know how much of an attack surface your typical BOD
| circuit is though.
|
| https://microchipdeveloper.com/8avr:bod
| pjc50 wrote:
| This is called brownout detection, and it's a common
| feature even on low-end microcontrollers. As the other
| commenter says, it's derivable from a bandgap reference.
|
| In re "properly secured system": it's a cost-sensitive
| games console for children, while there's a big incentive
| against piracy ultimately there's a limit to how much you
| can defend. And this is the _second_ line of defense, the
| bootloader having been breached earlier.
| floatboth wrote:
| The whole "games console" context also comes waaaay after
| the chip was made -- it's not a custom for-Nintendo chip!
| tegra210 was previously used in the Nvidia Shield 2015,
| then the Google Pixel C (also from 2015) and the Jetson
| TX1 dev board.
| baybal2 wrote:
| Bandgap reference can't tell anything about body bias
| voltage, unless it itself built on top of insulator
| thebruce87m wrote:
| Isn't that what bandgap voltages are for?
|
| https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandgap_voltage_reference
| blincoln wrote:
| Yes to all of your questions. A lot of it can be automated with
| e.g. a ChipWhisperer.
| dbuder wrote:
| Yes and after a while it isn't luck. Reportedly state actors
| and bigcorp even go so far as to decap chips, laser off
| security features/caps/whatever and do stuff like inspect the
| memory with a microscope. There is another youtube channel that
| is even more impressive but Liveoverflow
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FktI4qSjzaE has some videos
| defeating AES with device that makes it much easier.
| zwirbl wrote:
| Now I'm curious, which channel is even more impressive?
| LiveOverflow is definitely great
| dbuder wrote:
| Can't find it, however you might be interested in this
| article from HN earlier in the year. Written/done by an
| intern.
|
| https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/10/15/theres-a-hole-in-
| yo...
| amboar wrote:
| One of my favourite talks is Decapping Chips the Hard Way by
| Adam Laurie and Zac Franken: https://youtu.be/0Z4aF-qiziM
|
| That was 8 years ago
| sannysanoff wrote:
| how long before they will introduce special bad sectors on
| floppy disks, - sorry, wrong epoch, - special half-faulty
| components required for proper execution in chips to
| disable chip simulation/reverse engineering.
| Semaphor wrote:
| I'll never forget the crack that I downloaded back in the
| days. It came with a PDF or image of a CD you were
| supposed to print, so you could drill through the burned
| CD at exactly the proper position. This was supposed to
| defeat the hardware dongle the software otherwise
| required. Can't remember what software it was and never
| tried it to find out if this was a prank or actually
| worked, but I loved that as a kid :D
| Agentlien wrote:
| That sounds unlikely to work. I had a professor at the
| university who started his lecture on ECC by saying he
| always drilled a hole in all his CDs since he knew it
| would work anyway.
|
| Or perhaps the ECC simply works well enough that there's
| no perceptible data loss for audio?
| aasasd wrote:
| Wouldn't the CD explode soon after it got to speed? This
| happened plenty to discs that were just not made
| uniformly enough.
| a-dub wrote:
| i think your leg was being pulled.
|
| that said, one of the first copy protection schemes
| involved writing specific sectors to a magnetic disk with
| an invalid checksum. when the program would start, it
| would verify that reading those sectors would return an
| error, but if you used a regular disk copy program it
| would not copy the invalid sectors- either resulting in
| an aborted copy or a copy that would zero out the bad
| sectors on the target which would not produce the
| expected read errors on startup telling the program it
| had been copied.
| xyzzy123 wrote:
| Yes, there are schemes that deliberately exploit
| difficult-to-reproduce manufacturing defects, for things
| like fingerprinting / making hard-to-clone things.
|
| The general field is called PUF (physically uncloneable
| functions)
|
| https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_unclonable_funct
| ion
| azalemeth wrote:
| This effectively already exists. The Xbox One SOC
| apparently monitors its own voltage and shuts down /
| doesn't function if it falls out of spec [1] as part of a
| totally OTT suite of anti-engineer techniques.
|
| As an aside, I _hate_ all of this. If someone made an
| open console, I 'd buy it in a second. I realise that's
| probably my computer running linux next to me, but
| still...
|
| [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U7VwtOrwceo
| michaelt wrote:
| Almost all microcontrollers have a feature like that -
| chiefly because at power-on the voltage rises gradually,
| and if it started running before there was a high enough
| voltage for it to run _correctly_ you get a bunch of
| reliability issues.
| h2odragon wrote:
| > If someone made an open console,
|
| Steam Deck?
| Eduard wrote:
| What is OTT?
| johntb86 wrote:
| The Z80 had deceptively-designed transistors designed to
| throw off reverse engineers: https://twitter.com/kenshirr
| iff/status/1331425858268012545
| snthd wrote:
| Why are there valuable keys on the device? I (wrongly) assumed
| the device would only contain public keys to verify signed code.
| Namidairo wrote:
| They're AES keys, so the keys to decrypt and encrypt are the
| same. (Symmetric key)
| ChuckMcM wrote:
| Wow, this was the first I had read about m2m i2c injection hacks
| to mess with the PMIC. That is a clever trick!
| sva_ wrote:
| The concept of undervolting the chip, causing bitflips, to do a
| differential fault analysis[0] seems like a stroke of genius. I
| had no idea AES could be broken in such a fashion, of interfering
| with just the last 1-2 rounds of the cipher.
|
| I wonder if it will be mitigated by requiring a larger minimum
| voltage?
|
| [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Differential_fault_analysis
| Mindwipe wrote:
| Either that or pausing crypto operations without the required
| voltage, but that reduces your fault tolerance.
| baybal2 wrote:
| > I wonder if it will be mitigated by requiring a larger
| minimum voltage?
|
| How would you detect low voltage without a reference voltage?
| hashimotonomora wrote:
| p-n junctions have a threshold forward voltage.
| baybal2 wrote:
| Which will not tell you anything without knowing the body
| bias voltage on CMOS, which is set relative to power rails.
| frumiousirc wrote:
| which is temperature dependent
| 95014_refugee wrote:
| How do you think "reference voltages" work?
|
| (Also, temperature sensors. Sheesh people.)
| exikyut wrote:
| Ha, that mentions "DFA was also applied on AES", citing a 2005
| reference. Is the OP article being understatedly humble? ;)
| sdfgsdvf wrote:
| Voltage glitching for secret/rom extraction has a long and
| storied history.
|
| It's the basis of how DirecTV cards were compromised in the
| late 90s/early 00s.
| Scoundreller wrote:
| Or a good cover for the leakers
| monocasa wrote:
| I've seen the technique reproduced enough that I'm pretty
| convinced it's not a cover.
| jesuspiece wrote:
| Hardware attacks never cease to amaze me. nice work, thanks for
| sharing
| sarahmike wrote:
| I they can make online so I decided to look into it. Well, it was
| all true and has totally changed my life. This is what I do. Copy
| Here---->>>www.foxlineblog.com
| 1_player wrote:
| As a boring software engineer nowadays, these hackers "for fun
| and profit" make me proud of our profession. They're like a Robin
| Hood version of Alan Turing & co. working on cracking the Enigma
| encryption. No matter how tight the black box is, there is always
| a gap somewhere.
|
| I've done some reversing when I was younger, cracked some
| software and hardware locks, there's nothing as exhilarating as
| breaking through something that looked impossible. Well done!
| jackjackk0 wrote:
| Just recently bumped into a podcast on the xbox hacker scene
| (https://darknetdiaries.com/episode/45/) and was really
| fascinated by the dedication, ingenuity and talent of these
| people. I am also amazed that you don't hear often enough
| stories of them receiving job offers from the companies they
| targeted/"hacked".
| 1_player wrote:
| What's great is that it's mostly done for the street cred. To
| show off how cool you are, you need to work in the public,
| and present your results for all to see, for free.
|
| "This is how cool I am. I have cracked it before everybody
| else."
|
| They're positioned on the complete opposite of the modern
| corporate, capitalist Internet, keeping computers open and
| still cool. For that, I salute them.
| __alexs wrote:
| While I'm sure street cred plays a factor there is also
| good money in being able to break the protections to enable
| piracy.
| bri3d wrote:
| I don't think this is true anymore, having had experience
| in this space.
|
| In the "bad old days," you could make a moderate (nothing
| like Silicon Valley engineer money) sum by selling
| exploits to modchip manufacturers, as they'd then use
| this to drive their hardware sales - pretty simple model.
| The last one of these I remember being particularly
| popular was the PS3 "True Blue" dongle.
|
| These days, exploits aren't particularly useful to drive
| hardware sales as they're mostly hardware free. So
| there's not a ton of monetary value - yes, you could try
| to sell a "custom firmware" for a few months, but once
| the exploit is reversed, it's game over for your income
| stream.
|
| Cheating is probably the only major revenue stream left
| in console exploitation, and as far as I know it's not
| popular enough to drive high prices for console exploits.
| Compared to phone exploits (wanted by nation-level actors
| and shady security firms for mostly evil purposes), ECU
| exploits (easier to protect and worth more per install),
| and PC exploit bug bounties, I think console hacking is
| pretty low on the lucrative scale, which is why so much
| more of it is done in the open.
| deelowe wrote:
| There seems to be some suspicion that there is a cottage
| industry forming around undetectable cheats for
| streamers... Not sure how true this is.
| KennyBlanken wrote:
| This wouldn't surprise me in the least, in shooting
| games. People don't like watching someone getting their
| ass kicked.
|
| Also, to succeed as a streamer you have to stream ~40
| hours a week or more, and there's something called "aim
| fatigue". After an hour or so without breaks, your aim
| goes downhill. Anyone who maintains amazing aim for hours
| of continuous play is cheating. That's why you see
| experienced, successful streamers taking breaks, or
| interspersing "hang out time" or a non-aim-based game,
| etc.
|
| Stream framerates / compression can make it difficult to
| tell what's going on, and using a controller means it's
| nearly impossible to see whether their controller
| movement matches on-screen movement. But controller aim
| assist is so strong in many games these days that if you
| have experience with a controller you can easily dominate
| all but the top mouse and keyboard players.
|
| Shooting-based games just aren't fun these days. Between
| the cheaters and the streamers you get your ass handed to
| you pretty regularly, except when matchmaking throws you
| an easy game to keep you from rage-quitting.
| R0b0t1 wrote:
| They haven't been fun for a long time. I realized ages
| ago performance was mostly ping based. You had to have
| skill if your ping was OK, but if you didn't have a good
| ping, no amount of skill would help you.
| throwaway09223 wrote:
| Are you sure? How exactly would this be monetized?
|
| By publishing the exploit they lose any market advantage.
| jjoonathan wrote:
| For real. The talent in the game industry is insane.
| Recently, I got my mind blown by the Unreal Nanite team:
|
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eviSykqSUUw
|
| The core of it is a respectably sophisticated LOD building
| algorithm, as you might expect, but the sheer amount of
| engineering horsepower they put into driving it into
| production just boggles the mind.
| TaylorAlexander wrote:
| Oh cool talk! I was impressed by that system when it was
| announced and I had no idea they had released an explainer!
| 14 wrote:
| I used to follow he Xbox 360 hacking scene and the number of
| things these guys did would blow your mind away. Most notable
| when Microsoft increased the size of their games from the
| standard 7.5gb to something like 8gb. There were no 8gb DVD's
| on market where you could burn the games. Initially hackers
| truncated the games and it worked for a bit with unnecessary
| buffer data removed but Microsoft got wise to this and found
| out how to detect it and banned a bunch of people using
| truncated games. What happened next was amazing. Hackers
| found a way to flash the DVD burner drive of certain models
| to actually burn 8gb on. 7.5gb disc! The outside edge of the
| disc is actually not entirely used the disc writing software
| would leave it alone I believe reason being it is
| inconsistent in quality at the very edge and you may get a
| bad write if you use it. Well hackers didn't care if you may
| get a bad write you may also get a good one. They hacked
| certain DVD drives I believe the one I ended up buying was a
| lite-on drive with certain firmware. I then flashed its
| firmware and was now able to write on the outer edge of the
| disc doing the previously impossible. That is only one scene
| form the Xbox hacking days I fondly remember. Genius if you
| ask me.
| Scoundreller wrote:
| It's like overclocking "what if I told the cpu to... just
| go faster?"
| MaxBarraclough wrote:
| If you haven't seen it, there's a great talk on YouTube on
| the Xbox One's security. Surprisingly, it's from a senior
| Microsoft engineer.
|
| _Guarding Against Physical Attacks: The Xbox One Story --
| Tony Chen, Microsoft_ -
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U7VwtOrwceo
|
| Discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21325421
| MayeulC wrote:
| How coincidental, I was reading this two hours ago after
| finding it in my documents while sorting trough them.
|
| I can really recommend this, if only as a cautionary tale
| against password reuse.
| iamtedd wrote:
| I love hearing these stories too!
|
| Here's a video of someone finally cracking into the Sega Saturn
| well after the console was current commodity:
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jOyfZex7B3E&t=202s
| JohnBooty wrote:
| He eventually released a commercial product, the Satiator,
| and I'm happy to say that it works great and is very well
| supported by the creator himself and the community!
|
| For those unfamiliar, the Satiator is an adapter of sorts
| that lets you load Saturn ISOs onto an SD card and play them
| via the Saturn's MPEG adapter slot.
|
| Unlike many solutions on various consoles that bypass the
| optical drive, no hardware modifications are required. Your
| Saturn stays intact; it's truly plug-and-play.
|
| This sort of thing is important. Consoles (specifically
| moving parts, like the optical drives) and physical media
| from the 90s are failing. Surviving consoles and games can be
| quite expensive; even thousands of dollars. Emulation is
| imperfect and introduces lag. Satiator and other flashcarts
| let us play these games on original hardware and bypass these
| issues.
| dylan604 wrote:
| Not game related, but this is what I like about the
| MagicLantern hack for Canon cameras. It's just some data on
| your card that gets loaded at boot. If you use a card
| without the data on it, the camera boots/peforms as a
| regular stock camera. No hacking of the software on the
| camera itself.
| sarahmike wrote:
| I they can make online so I decided to look into it. Well, it was
| all true and has totally changed my life. This is what I do. Copy
| Here---->>>www.foxlineblog.com
| sydthrowaway wrote:
| Seriously, security is an utterly pointless field
| 1MachineElf wrote:
| What is a TSEC?
|
| EDIT: Well, some clever guy ;-) reminded them
| that the T210 chip (the main CPU) has a proprietary NVIDIA
| "security processor" called TSEC, which has: [2]
| (1) its own SRAM (protected from the rest of the
| system) (2) its own "secure boot" (protected
| from the rest of the system) (3) bus mastering
| capabilities (4) and.. is able to DMA to ARM7's memory
| jaywalk wrote:
| Tegra Security Co-processor
| vigneshdasan wrote:
| GST on IT sector will attract 18% on software services provided
| by software companies. https://www.breziot.com/
| punk_ihaq wrote:
| How is this remotely relevant to the post or any other
| comments? Please do not spam.
| JohnCurran wrote:
| > If you can get 1-2 bitflips in the last two rounds, you can
| solve for the key.
|
| What about the bit flips allows the key to be solved for? That is
| the part of this I don't understand
| hkopp wrote:
| The magic to me is that the CPU glitches are caused completely on
| the software side. With dedicated hardware such as flying probe
| testers this attack is state-of-the-art afaik. But glitching the
| CPU only with software, i.e., causing hardware bugs only with
| software is what really surprised me.
| yborg wrote:
| It seems from accomplishments like this from amateurs that state
| level actors will have compromised any current "secure" or
| "trusted" computing platform.
| make3 wrote:
| I'm not sure why you claim that this is an amateur. Yes, this
| is likely a project done in their spare time, but there is no
| reason to think that this person is not a professional security
| analyst
| Jugurtha wrote:
| I love everything about this. It has brought joy to my day.
| xaduha wrote:
| Why aren't more devices use smartcards for signing/crypto? They
| are omnipresent, satellite TV receivers had them, phones have
| them, banking cards ARE them. And yet gaming console
| manufacturers would rather invent their own measures to combat
| pwnage/piracy.
| wmf wrote:
| The TSEC is basically a smart card built in to the SoC.
| [deleted]
| floatboth wrote:
| A cheaply made smartcard chip should be much easier to breach
| than the main SoC. Both because it's way simpler, older process
| silicon... and much more importantly because you have an
| external bus going to it. Now that the big consoles use semi-
| custom SoCs, their NUMBER ONE principle is to not trust
| anything that's off the main silicon die.
|
| See the Xbox security talk:
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U7VwtOrwceo
| mschuster91 wrote:
| > satellite TV receivers had them
|
| And regularly get their card security schemes busted.
|
| The advantage that smartcards currently have is that not many
| people are looking into their security outside of pay-TV
| pirates. Phone users don't have a need to hack their own SIM
| cards, friends of OpenBTS simply use blank SIM cards, bank
| users don't need to hack their own cards, and card cloners have
| a hard time getting physical access to the chip on a victim
| card for long enough to run a software-based attack (since the
| ATM eats the card and spits it out when done, it is easy enough
| for a skimmer device to clone the stripe while the card passes,
| but outright impossible to establish electrical contact with
| the chip).
|
| What _is_ interesting to hackers is anything where NFC can be
| exploited, and as a result - at least to my knowledge - there
| currently is no tag-based authentication that can 't be cloned.
| xaduha wrote:
| > And regularly get their card security schemes busted.
|
| It was wild west, proper ones were never cracked to my
| knowledge. But it's probably safe to say because of that they
| are as secure as they are now.
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conditional_access#Digital_sys.
| ..
|
| > there currently is no tag-based authentication that can't
| be cloned.
|
| Smartcards use ISO 14443, not NFC. Those are related
| standards I think.
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO/IEC_14443
|
| MIFARE tags and cards (which you can clone) are not
| smartcards (which you can't clone)
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIFARE
| Mindwipe wrote:
| > It was wild west, proper ones were never cracked to my
| knowledge.
|
| Some did, some got close. Most card based systems have to
| replace the cards every five years or so when their intel
| suggests groups are getting nearer cracking them.
|
| Ultimately the reason is cost. The conditional access
| vendors who work on those cards spend a lot lot lot of
| money on it because that's their entire business and they
| need to work for a long time or you pay out tens of
| millions in postage and support. Most chipset vendors shrug
| their shoulders after two years because it's out of support
| and they don't care, everyone else gets broken too. In this
| case Nintendo probably got some significant compensation of
| Nvidia that hurt them, but it was Nvidia's first real go at
| it and they fluffed it.
| xaduha wrote:
| > Most card based systems have to replace the cards every
| five years or so when their intel suggests groups are
| getting nearer cracking them.
|
| Do they still? Proper smartcards like javacards can be
| updated by the receiver, it wouldn't affect existing
| customers if there's a protocol version change or
| something like that. It's pirates and missed revenue they
| need to worry about. In any case with internet so
| widespread those satellite TV networks were on their way
| out for a long time.
| elzbardico wrote:
| Do ATMs in the US still read the magstripe?
| voxadam wrote:
| Yes, unfortunately. We're a more than a little bit behind
| the rest of the civilized world.
|
| Even my debit card which includes a mandatory EMV smartcard
| provides for an easy downgrade attack if the chip fails to
| read three times.
| oh_sigh wrote:
| Does this txt seem to end early for anyone else? How does one go
| from the bit-flipped output to the key?
| nemothekid wrote:
| That's covered in the referenced article,
| https://yifan.lu/2019/02/22/attacking-hardware-aes-with-dfa/,
| in the `Extracting keys` section
| louthy wrote:
| Heh, I had a little laugh to myself reading this bit:
|
| > (2) its own "secure boot"
|
| As soon as you see the quotes, you know what's coming! It's like
| Chekhov's gun :)
| jturpin wrote:
| I'm sure this took a lot of effort and more knowledge than I'll
| ever have. All of this effort could have gone to doing something
| constructive, and instead it's gone to breaking a system so that
| a small handful of people can run software (be honest, game
| emulators) on it, and presumably support further piracy of the
| system. There are already a trillion devices out there that can
| run emulators, we don't need another one.
| hsbauauvhabzb wrote:
| What is the implications of breaching these keys?
| toxik wrote:
| Are these numbers "illegal" to share like the BluRay key?
| throaway46546 wrote:
| Remember Digg?
| edg-l wrote:
| interesting related article:
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illegal_number
| IiydAbITMvJkqKf wrote:
| Based on the file contents, these are just the sha256 hashes of
| the keys, not the keys themselves.
| toxik wrote:
| Right, but the actual key itself then?
| Y_Y wrote:
| Like this?
|
| > sha256(csecret_01)=43449338c1bc8ceb1b3232a611f955f9095254f492
| 117a158528589cd16f2930 NVIDIA TSEC code signing key
|
| Hopefully not.
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(page generated 2021-11-23 23:02 UTC)