[HN Gopher] The Greedy Doctor Problem
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The Greedy Doctor Problem
Author : ignored
Score : 5 points
Date : 2021-11-18 20:20 UTC (2 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (universalprior.substack.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (universalprior.substack.com)
| titanomachy wrote:
| The suggested stable equilibrium in the doctor-detective scenario
| is that the doctor makes accurate diagnoses and the detective
| makes random guesses, leading to a 50% split of income between
| the two agents.
|
| If we assume that the doctor and detective are both adversarial--
| i.e. they assign utility to _preventing_ us from learning about
| ground truth--then what 's stopping them from using some other
| strategy that preserves this payout scheme without giving us
| useful diagnoses?
|
| Even worse, if _only_ the doctor is adversarial, then it can
| bribe the detective by letting the detective win, say, 51% of the
| time in exchange for keeping their shared source of randomness a
| secret.
| kuiper0x2 wrote:
| The obvious, obvious thing is to simply pay the doctor a fix
| priced each month wether they diagnose you with something or not.
| Well above what they would earn elsewhere.
|
| Their incentive then becomes to keep a good relationship with you
| so you continue to pay them. The best way to do that is to keep
| you healthy and happy.
| gwerbret wrote:
| I agree with the idea of paying the doctor a flat fee every
| month, but in my variant, the doctor has to repay you the
| entire sum you've paid to date, with 10% interest, if you
| succumb to any preventable illnesses; in other words, the
| doctor now has some real skin in the game. S/he becomes
| motivated not only to keep you well, but to keep the fees
| reasonable.
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(page generated 2021-11-18 23:03 UTC)