[HN Gopher] Microsoft has detected nation-state activity associa...
___________________________________________________________________
Microsoft has detected nation-state activity associated with
NOBELIUM
Author : qwertyuiop_
Score : 171 points
Date : 2021-10-27 14:25 UTC (8 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (www.microsoft.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (www.microsoft.com)
| lodovic wrote:
| "The targeted activity has been observed against organizations
| based in the United States and across Europe since May 2021.
| NOBELIUM is the same actor behind the SolarWinds compromise in
| 2020, and this latest activity shares the hallmarks of the
| actor's compromise-one-to-compromise-many approach."
|
| Just tell us which country.. It's probably one of two options.
| schleck8 wrote:
| Russia, Mitre profile is here:
|
| https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016/
| rvnx wrote:
| Russia according to the previous deductions of the US
| government about this group
| chrisseaton wrote:
| Russia isn't a nation-state though.
| hdjjhhvvhga wrote:
| In the context of cybersecurity this term has a specific
| meaning and refers to an adversary that has the highest
| level of resources usually attributed to a state.
| ssklash wrote:
| What do you mean by this? Is it because they didn't
| explicitly say "The Russian Federation"? Because we both
| know that's exactly what they meant, and that it is most
| certainly a nation-state.
| chrisseaton wrote:
| A nation-state is a state that perfectly aligns with a
| nationality. Hence nation-state. A nation that is also a
| state. The Russian Federation is a state with many
| nationalities within its borders. So it isn't a nation-
| state.
|
| Other classic examples of non-nation-states are the UK
| and the US.
|
| https://www.quora.com/Is-Russia-a-nation-state
| ssklash wrote:
| I think you misunderstand the use of nation-state in the
| context of threat actors then. It simply means government
| backed, as opposed to a private entity like a ransomware
| gang or NSO Group. Splitting hairs about nationalities is
| irrelevant when talking about who is behind a
| cyberattack.
| maigret wrote:
| Indeed, in security this term works well because it means
| often "not explicitly related national agents acting for
| the state". This loose coupling allows the responsible
| states to deny accusation while harming their target
| through unofficial partners (national or not).
| KoftaBob wrote:
| > It simply means government backed, as opposed to a
| private entity like a ransomware gang or NSO Group.
|
| I would be incredibly surprised if Israel's intelligence
| didn't make use of NSO tech, especially since their
| founders came right out of Unit 8200, their military
| intelligence cyber warfare division.
| [deleted]
| chrisseaton wrote:
| If you don't mean 'nation-state' then why use that very
| specific technical word instead of just saying 'country'?
|
| It's like saying 'I saw a 2019 Ford Focus in blue' and
| then when someone points out it was actually a green
| Dodge saying 'well I just meant any car why are you
| splitting hairs'.
| unethical_ban wrote:
| Is this the first time you've heard the term "nation-
| state" in cybersecurity context? Used as an adjective,
| "nation-state adversary" flows better/sounds cooler than
| "government-backed adversary" or "country-level
| adversary".
|
| You may be right in poli-sci class, but that's just how
| it is in cybersecurity. To use your framework, it would
| be like me colloquially asking "do you have a car?" and
| someone responding "yeah, a Jeep Wrangler". Car =
| automobile. But I wouldn't be that casual when filling
| out my auto's title information.
| ssklash wrote:
| In cybersecurity, and in the attribution of cyberattacks
| especially, nation-state actor _is_ a very specific
| technical word. Words mean different things in different
| fields, and in this case the word is very clear and
| obvious in conveying what is intended, which is a
| government backed threat actor.
| rvnx wrote:
| https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/uploads/securityp
| rod...
|
| From this map, you can clearly see that Microsoft uses
| nation-state and country interchangeably
| dragonwriter wrote:
| > If you don't mean 'nation-state' then why use that very
| specific technical word
|
| Nation-state has at least two specific uses in its field
| of origin (political science), which are closely linked
| conceptually though very different. It can mean either a
| state that is approximately one-to-one with a nation as
| became something of a European norm after after the Peace
| of Westphalia, or it can be the structural kind of
| sovereign that became the norm in the same space after
| the peace of Westphalia (a synonym for the latter sense
| is "Westphalian sovereign").
|
| When the context is more legal/structural the latter use
| dominates, when it leans more to the social the former
| use does.
|
| The cybersecurity use matches the latter use.
| SahAssar wrote:
| Could you give examples of states that you consider to be
| nation states? It seems like there must be a sliding
| scale, and basically any state would fail a "perfectly
| aligns" test, so I'm guessing there is some lesser
| definition to go by.
| chrisseaton wrote:
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nation_state#In_practice
| cronix wrote:
| Pedantic arguments don't change the substance.
| [deleted]
| devit wrote:
| The first link has this text: "Today, we're sharing the latest
| activity we've observed from the Russian nation-state actor
| Nobelium. This is the same actor behind the cyberattacks
| targeting SolarWinds customers in 2020 and which the U.S.
| government and others have identified as being part of Russia's
| foreign intelligence service known as the SVR."
| decebalus1 wrote:
| AFAIK the SolarWinds attack was found to be linked to the
| Russian government.
| emkoemko wrote:
| was it? what if China is using the CIA "Marble" program as
| well? or even the US could be doing it. I don't doubt Russia
| is doing cyber warfare but how can anyone without seeing the
| hacker doing his thing really know for sure what state it
| came from?
| decebalus1 wrote:
| > how can anyone without seeing the hacker doing his thing
| really know for sure what state it came from?
|
| IDK, maybe using the same type of reasoning which helps
| convict criminals in cases where there are no witnesses.
| Keyframe wrote:
| They did a few days ago: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-
| issues/2021/10/24/new-act...
| criddell wrote:
| Russia. Saved you a click.
| skjhhhhhhhnnn wrote:
| >which the U.S. government and others have identified as
| being part of Russia
|
| Microsoft is not making their own determination of who the
| state actor is and is just letting the three letter
| agencies' finger pointing fly with no evidence. There is
| however significant evidence indicating a country other
| than Russia in the FBI's Solarwinds report that contradicts
| the headlines if you read the body of the report.
| Ansil849 wrote:
| > There is however significant evidence indicating a
| country other than Russia
|
| Such as?
| emkoemko wrote:
| CIA? look at Vault 7 "Marble" program.... and you really
| think hackers don't do what the CIA does? could be anyone
| basically... China etc etc and are probably doing the
| same crap as the CIA with their "Marble" program
| attributing the hacks to another state.
| cronix wrote:
| Look! The comments in the code are in Cyrillic!
| Therefore, it can only mean that... /s
| djbusby wrote:
| ...it was copied from Stackoverflow?
| mrRandomGuy wrote:
| Less than 1 hour old account created to say that there's
| significant evidence that Russia isn't behind this
| without saying what evidence....
| rvnx wrote:
| Well it's not really right to censor his answer.
|
| The narrative US = good, Russia = bad is true but only if
| you are in the US. In Russia you see the complete
| opposite.
|
| Both US and Russian intelligence have lied in the past,
| it's part of their job.
|
| For example, the intelligence agencies don't have the
| right to spy or attack their own population (as far as I
| know), but there is nothing that forbids them to ask an
| ally to do it and put the blame on someone else.
|
| Russia denies doing it, and both US and Russia have
| interest into collecting this data, so starting from
| there, it's important to keep an open mind that the
| interactions between countries are not black & white.
| 369548684892826 wrote:
| Weird because Russia isn't really a nation-state.
| dragonwriter wrote:
| > Weird because Russia isn't really a nation-state.
|
| Its a nation-state in the functional sense (a Westphalian
| sovereignty) but arguably not in the politico-social
| sense (a nation-state in the functional sense that is
| also aligned with a single national identity and vice
| versa), though like most Westphalian sovereigns where
| that is true, works very hard to align national identity
| with the state, and the former sense is mostly a clear,
| concrete distinction [0] while the latter sense is a
| platonic ideal which is, at best, approximated, so binary
| inclusion/exclusion is always something of an arbitrary
| line-drawing exercise.
|
| [0] And mostly corresponds to status in international
| law, but there are exceptions
| kube-system wrote:
| It has somehow become common for people to use "nation-
| state" almost interchangeably with "state" without fully
| considering the connotations it implies. Regardless,
| there's not a clearly agreed upon threshold of how much
| national identity must be shared to qualify as a nation-
| state, nor was Microsoft intending to make any sort of
| commentary on national identity.
| whatshisface wrote:
| > _there 's not a clearly agreed upon threshold of how
| much national identity must be shared to qualify as a
| nation-state_
|
| The best place to draw the line is Texas. More national
| identity than Texas and you're a nation-state, less and
| you're a state. The nationality of Texas is undefined in
| this scheme, which is just as they would have it.
|
| P.S. people call extremely well-funded cybersecurity
| adversaries "nation-state adversaries" because those
| three words start with the letters NSA. It's a joke about
| US national security being the greatest threat to US
| private security.
| dragonwriter wrote:
| > The best place to draw the line is Texas. More national
| identity than Texas and you're a nation-state, less and
| you're a state.
|
| When used in the politico-social sense that invokes
| national identity, nation-state still takes as a minimum
| requirement the functional sense of Westphalian
| sovereignty, which Texas lacks. Texas would probably be
| considered a nation-state in both senses if it was a
| nation-state in the functional sense; but as a
| subordinate unit of a Westphalian sovereignty it is not a
| nation-state in the functional sense, much less the
| narrower social sense.
| tptacek wrote:
| The "nation-" at the beginning of the term also doesn't
| add any context that is useful to understanding the
| story. People should just try not to use that term unless
| they're making some kind of sociological point. It's
| "state-level adversary", or something similar.
| dragonwriter wrote:
| > The "nation-" at the beginning of the term also doesn't
| add any context that is useful to understanding the story
|
| Yes, it does, it distinguishes Westphalian sovereigns
| (like thr U.S.) from federated states (like Rhode
| Island).
| pvg wrote:
| _distinguishes Westphalian sovereigns_
|
| This introduces the much more serious meta-problem of
| distinguishing commenters who merely happen to use
| 'Westphalian' from Lyndon LaRouche fans.
| tptacek wrote:
| It does that by abusing a term that isn't directly
| applicable, and meanwhile there is no serious ambiguity:
| when people say "state-level actors", nobody thinks
| they're talking about Nebraska. People talk about
| "statecraft", not about "nation-statecraft".
| dragonwriter wrote:
| > It does that by abusing a term that isn't directly
| applicabl
|
| It is directly applicable, and not at all a used; the
| broader functional (Westphalian sovereign) and social
| (the functional definition + two-way close mapping to a
| nationality) definitions of "nation-state" are both
| technical definitions widely used (and distinguished by
| context) in the field from which the term originates.
| (Just like "consistency" has different meanings in a CAP
| context vs. an ACID one, except with less ambiguity for
| "nation-state", because compared to the functional and
| social definitions of "nation-state", the CAP and ACID
| definitions of "consistency" are far more likely to both
| be plausibly relevant in the same context.)
|
| The common use in cybersecurity is exactly the functional
| definition, not an abuse of terminology.
| [deleted]
| emkoemko wrote:
| more likely its NSA/CIA... i mean how can anyone even know,
| look at NSA/CIA program "Marble" its designed to do this
| make their hacks look like Russians are doing it etc.
| shireboy wrote:
| I don't really like the way attribution for these sorts of
| things happens. Conspiracy theories aside, we do have a
| history of questionable attribution (Gulf of Tonkin, Iraq WMD
| to name two). So a rational mind is right to be skeptical and
| ask for evidence before accepting a narrative whole cloth.
|
| Instead, we are rarely given any evidence at all. In the
| article cited, we're just supposed to trust that Microsoft
| knows it's Russian government and can prove it. When we _are_
| given some explanation, it's usually pretty weak: IP
| addresses are from XYZ country, metadata in a word doc is ABC
| language, etc. Add to that you have criminal elements that
| may or may not be controlled by their government.
|
| ...and then when you do question, you're downvoted, accused
| of being a shill, etc. I understand this sort of thing can
| rarely be proven 100%, and there is a need to protect
| intelligence sources and methods, but given that we should
| stop speaking and behaving as though things are 100% certain.
| Personally I'd like to see articles present more evidence
| and/or summarize into a percentage. "We rate the likelihood
| this is XYZ branch of Russian government at 60% due to the
| following factors: ...."
| lodonnell9213 wrote:
| There will likely be some form of confidential agreement
| with another party who supplied the info to MSFTIC,
| however, I also agree with your statement.
|
| Microsoft has been quite lax lately with a lot of things,
| you only need to see the stuff Kevin Beaumont is posting
| (ex-MSFT employee - senior cyber) about them knowingly
| hosting malware in OneDrive (standout as a OneDrive user),
| and knowing about a lot of issues and potentially being
| rather passive about fixing them.
|
| I love MSFT products, but lately from what I've been
| reading, their attitude to a lot of things security lately
| is a bit worrisome to me, I could be completely wrong as i
| don't know what's happening internally, but it's also
| slightly worrying from one of essentially, the most
| powerful cyber security firms around.
| jcrawfordor wrote:
| I think the major problem for organizations like MSTIC is
| that the vast majority of information they have access to
| came from other companies under strict confidentiality
| agreements. This is the norm in information security, most
| intelligence sharing goes through large vendor security
| centers or ISACs. In order to encourage/facilitate that
| sharing, these organizations require all of their members
| to agree to non-disclosure regimes (the "traffic light
| protocol" classification scheme is common in ISACs).
|
| It creates a bureaucratic situation where a company might
| have a great deal of data points to base an attribution on,
| but is prevented from disclosing 95% of them... not
| necessarily out of concern about source protection, but
| simply by contract with the data source(s).
|
| There's a long-running controversy within the industry
| about whether or not this situation is productive. The
| confidentiality agreements make corporations more willing
| to disclose data due to reduced risk of reputational damage
| and liability. But it also tends to make research and open
| communication more difficult and vague. The federal
| government has been through basically the exact same
| controversy over the last two decades regarding
| intelligence sharing, and to further complicate things it's
| common for there to be government elements (e.g. DHS)
| involved in these circles that mean there are also
| confidentiality agreements between government agencies and
| private industry that enforce many of the same rules.
|
| At its core, this comes out of a fundamental tension of
| liability and the law: is it better to do research that
| will produce damning material in lawsuit discovery, or to
| avoid doing the research and remain ignorant to the
| problem? Various industries have various half-solutions to
| this problem (e.g. Patient Safety Organizations in
| healthcare that are exempt from discovery), but the
| dominant one in information security reflects the roots of
| the industry in the intelligence community: anonymity of
| sources and confidentiality of information.
| JumpCrisscross wrote:
| > _you have criminal elements that may or may not be
| controlled by their government_
|
| We can debate whether the Kremlin controls Russia's
| criminal elements. What is apparent is it's unwilling to
| pursue them. So much so that they practically live in the
| open.
| capableweb wrote:
| I'd say there are more countries in the running for this than
| two. Possible options: China, US, Russia, Israel, North Korea
| and more
| emkoemko wrote:
| probably CIA/NSA didn't we learn about this already how they do
| this type of stuff and leave fake evidence that it is some
| other nation doing it?
|
| its their "Marble" program, that was leaked in Vault 7
|
| "Marble is used to hamper forensic investigators and anti-virus
| companies from attributing viruses, trojans and hacking attacks
| to the CIA,"
|
| so how can anyone really say who did what when it comes to
| cyber crimes? unless you have a camera watching the person
| doing it?
| colechristensen wrote:
| One would expect every intelligence group and sophisticated
| criminal to attempt to misdirect in exactly this way.
| TheRealDunkirk wrote:
| I would also expect Russian/Chinese hackers to get someone to
| come into such a discussion such as this, and deflect
| comments against them towards the CIA/NSA, as you have done 4
| times already in this small thread. Who can believe anything
| any more, in the post-modern over-information age?
| [deleted]
| dragonelite wrote:
| Ooh yeah Vault 7 but we all know all nation states spy and
| hack each other. We are in a whole new world where we now
| have bipolar situation of Eurasians vs Anglo-Saxons going
| full spectrum warfare against each other.
| jszymborski wrote:
| Something I've been thinking a lot about is that news of nation
| states attacking NATO member systems often make headlines, but
| there is little about NATO members attacking these same nation
| states.
|
| This sort of results in an impression that there is a capability
| asymmetry between the two. Is that true? Or do we just not hear
| about it.
| wayoutthere wrote:
| No asymmetry, we only hear about it when successful. One thing
| to also keep in mind is that intelligence organizations like
| the CIA typically work through intermediaries such that a
| cybercrime organization in South Korea may not know they're
| executing an attack on China on behalf of the CIA -- they may
| have already wanted to do so for their own reasons and the CIA
| just made sure they found the right info to execute it.
|
| The Chinese media would label such an attack as a US hack on
| China, while the US media would report it as a Korean hack on
| China (meaning you probably never hear about it at all unless
| you're in the business).
| papito wrote:
| There is no asymmetry in capability but there is an asymmetry
| in the desire to provoke. Russia has solidified its role in the
| world as essentially - a geopolitical troll. "Stabbing in the
| back", the thing they accuse everyone else of, is the strategy.
|
| NATO does not _want_ this fight, and they do not have the
| hierarchy of plausible deniability, which the Russian security
| services have perfected to a form of art.
|
| "Independent" hacking groups do jobs for the government, in
| exchange to freely conduct mercenary for-profit attacks without
| fear of being jailed.
|
| NATO countries don't have this system. If they do something,
| they do it without proxies.
|
| https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/01/dutch...
| naasking wrote:
| > There is no asymmetry in capability but there is an
| asymmetry in the desire to provoke.
|
| Or asymmetry in the desire to report it. Any country reports
| threats against them wide and far, and they downplay or
| ignore any threatening actions they make.
|
| > NATO countries don't have this system. If they do
| something, they do it without proxies.
|
| Colour me skeptical. "Open and transparent" is just not how
| intelligence services operate.
| Cycl0ps wrote:
| The Darknet Diaries podcast just released an episode on a similar
| attack (via MSP) if you're interested in hearing what this looks
| like from a remidiation standpoint
| nray wrote:
| * "detected state activity", or even "detected foreign state
| activity". WTF does "nation-state" mean? Bhutan?
| zelag wrote:
| Kinda off topic, but I'm wondering who names these threat actors?
| connordoner wrote:
| I'd love to know this too!
| rvnx wrote:
| Marketing managers and security researchers in private
| companies giving them names. The same reason high-profile
| exploits have nickname (heartbleed for example).
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cozy_Bear for the sources for
| each name
| rvnx wrote:
| Well, it's explained here for Microsoft: https://www.microsof
| t.com/security/blog/2021/10/25/microsoft...
| ConcernedCoder wrote:
| I'm sure marketing knows it's easier to sell remediation for
| "heartbleed" rather than "smurfkiss"
| Igelau wrote:
| Randomly pulled from list of Beyblades and marijuana strains,
| it would appear.
| slowhand09 wrote:
| Locutus of Borg probably...
| mox1 wrote:
| Initially this started internally at the US Government.
| Probably mostly the NSA, but then the vernacular spread. Kinda
| useful when having conversations to say "Cranky Frog" and not
| "China special operations group 304 PLA #122"
|
| The names were classified (Secret perhaps?), but at some point
| the US Government realized everyone was kinda using these names
| in conversations, probably not all at the secret level. These
| names had leaked out too much, they needed new names.
|
| So they decided to rename them with new Secret names, and just
| kinda let the old names become utilized. They tried to hide the
| old <-> new name mapping because the new name mapping was
| classified.
|
| Crowdstrike started as mostly former FBI / NSA employees. They
| liked using all these names to identify actors. But they
| realized they didn't want to use classified names. So they came
| up with their own very boring names (APT1, APT2 ,etc.). While
| others had always done this internally (Microsoft had names,
| Google had internal names, etc. etc.), Crowd strike utilized
| these names very publicly and it just kinda took off.
|
| I think the US Government at some point realized they could
| just use Crowdstrike names and avoid all of the Classified name
| mess, so they just utilized crowd strike names as well. So now
| Crowdstrike names are mostly the go-to. Unless you are
| micrososft, then you keep using your names....
|
| My guess is Somewhere at Ft Meade an analyst has produced a
| massive, beautiful chart mapping all this shit together, and
| her sole job is to keep it updated.
|
| ...or this is my best guess anyway.
| Arrath wrote:
| I was idly thinking while reading the Journalist & Pegasus
| story from a few days ago[1], that some of the names for these
| exploits and groups, like KISMET, NOBELIUM, and HIPPOCRENE
| FACTOR especially, sound like codenames from a Destiny Lore
| Card[2] or something. Must be a fun exercise to brainstorm some
| of them up, if nothing else.
|
| [1]https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28980382
|
| [2]https://www.destinypedia.com/Grimoire:Allies/Rasputin#Ghost_
| ...
| Grimm1 wrote:
| I just got off the Destiny subreddit, why must you drag me
| back in!
|
| They really do though, some RASPUTIN level AI just naming
| things.
| ping00 wrote:
| I believe that individual vendors (MSTC, FireEye, Talos, etc.)
| name threat actors differently. If you're interested, I'd
| highly recommend this page by CrowdStrike:
| https://adversary.crowdstrike.com/en-US/
|
| It's very interesting to see how humans naturally tend to craft
| identities for faceless, nameless adversaries, which I think is
| very interesting from a social standpoint. Also the artwork in
| the website above is just plain cool IMO :)
|
| Although the vendors share information quite freely, I think
| there's hesitation on a vendor mutually adopting another
| vendor's threat actor name because it implies more substantive
| research on the latter's part, which is usually a no-no in a
| field like this. Ofc, I'm sure there are exceptions.
|
| edit: I also wanted to give Thai CERT a shout out and add a
| link to
| https://www.thaicert.or.th/downloads/files/Threat_Group_Card...
| which is less flashy than the CrowdStrike compendium, but well-
| detailed
| hdjjhhvvhga wrote:
| > It's very interesting to see how humans naturally tend to
| craft identities for faceless, nameless adversaries, which I
| think is very interesting from a social standpoint.
|
| It's quite simple: you need a name (preferably unique) in
| order to refer to it in communication.
| staticassertion wrote:
| It's more than that. "FancyBear" is not a random name.
| sdw1 wrote:
| Really appreciate the Thai CERT link -- I was really
| interested in seeing that Crowdstrike information presented
| in a format that's not about to pitch me the Crowdstrike
| Cinematic Universe or next-gen-Rainbow-6-arena-MMO or
| whatever they're going for. The glitchy elements/animations
| made it actually stressful for me to read.
| Jyaif wrote:
| Nobelium is an incredibly stupid name. They might as well go
| all in and name them "plutonium" or "anthrax".
| The-Bus wrote:
| Best thing to do is give them non-threatening names like
| Beige Team or Fanny Pack.
| vmception wrote:
| Its just individuals deploying their code over clearnet with
| computers they found on darknet RDP marketplaces
|
| The authorities are so incompetent in generating consequences
| that they have go with the idea that Putin signed off on the
| action himself, just to deflect
|
| "A dozen intelligence agencies" are all going to have the same
| evidence: a non-VPN IP address
|
| People are really gullible, remember when even just that turned
| into a partisan thing a few years ago? lulz. idiots.
| fname wrote:
| This might help: https://www.securityweek.com/whats-threat-
| group-name-inside-...
|
| For Microsoft specifically, we leverage the periodic table of
| elements when naming nation states.
| tommek4077 wrote:
| Lol, this stuff happens since forever with webfacing servers.
| Thats why you dont use 'root' or 'admin' as a ssh user. Just some
| PR fear mongering stuff to get the newbies in the cloudspace
| instead of hosting own servers.
| slt2021 wrote:
| Just a fear mongering article intended to SELL extra Azure
| services for $$$ that in theory maybe fix some of the Microsoft's
| own Security vulnerabilities. Like internet facing RDP (aka
| Ransomware Deployment Protocol) server.
|
| Notice how everyone in this thread is scared of "nation-state"
| and Russia - this is the exact emotion and reaction Microsoft
| wants. After fear of some "god-level Russian state hacker
| superpower" is seeded, the next logical step is to SELL some
| crappy cloud subscriptions for $$$ and keep milking your fear and
| making money.
| toss1 wrote:
| The fact that MS wants "to SELL extra Azure services for $$$"
| and the fact that RUS, CCP and other nation/state actors often
| attack those services are not mutually exclusive.
|
| Claiming that the notice is false simply because some aspect of
| it it may also align with some profit sounds like an entry-
| level fallacy spouted by Qanoners, or an actual RUS twitter
| troll posting their daily dezinformatsiya, or just the everyday
| paranoia of those who flock under those banners.
|
| Do you have any actual evidence that the notice is false?
| lame-robot-hoax wrote:
| "Please don't post shallow dismissals, especially of other
| people's work. A good critical comment teaches us something."
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