[HN Gopher] John Carpenter's "Planaria": Or, the New Individualism
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       John Carpenter's "Planaria": Or, the New Individualism
        
       Author : saeranv
       Score  : 110 points
       Date   : 2021-10-03 07:58 UTC (1 days ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (www.rifters.com)
 (TXT) w3m dump (www.rifters.com)
        
       | nathias wrote:
       | This competition/cooperation ratio seems to be the key concept, I
       | wonder if anyone measured it across different systems. It seems
       | almost as a subtype of the noise/signal ratio.
        
       | carapace wrote:
       | This information about the nature of planaria is fascinating.
       | 
       | See also the work that Levin's lab is doing, e.g.: "What Bodies
       | Think About: Bioelectric Computation Outside the Nervous System"
       | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RjD1aLm4Thg and "xenobots":
       | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xenobot https://cdorgs.github.io/
       | and "Growing Neural Cellular Automata, Differentiable Model of
       | Morphogenesis" https://distill.pub/2020/growing-ca/
       | 
       | Also check out _Trichoplax adhaerens_ , an organism on the cusp
       | between single-celled and multicellular lifeforms:
       | 
       | > Trichoplax are very flat organisms around a millimetre in
       | diameter, lacking any organs or internal structures. They have
       | two cellular layers: the top epitheloid layer is made of ciliated
       | "cover cells" flattened toward the outside of the organism, and
       | the bottom layer is made up of cylinder cells that possess cilia
       | used in locomotion, and gland cells that lack cilia.[2] Between
       | these layers is the fibre syncytium, a liquid-filled cavity
       | strutted open by star-like fibres.
       | 
       | > On both sides of the septa [fibre syncytium?] are liquid-filled
       | capsules that cause the septa to resemble synapses, i.e. nerve-
       | cell junctions that occur in fully expressed form only in animals
       | with tissues (Eumetazoa). Striking accumulations of calcium ions,
       | which may have a function related to the propagation of stimuli,
       | likewise suggest a possible role as protosynapses.
       | 
       | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trichoplax
       | 
       | You can push a trichoplax through a sieve that forces the
       | individual cells to split apart and they will crawl around
       | independently and reform the organism. You can dye two trichoplax
       | different colors, split them, put the cells near each other, and
       | the cells will form a single "piebald" organism together.
       | 
       | > It is also possible to rub _Trichoplax adhaerens_ through a
       | strainer in such a manner that individual cells are not destroyed
       | but are separated from one another to a large extent. In the test
       | tube they then find their way back together again to form
       | complete organisms. If this procedure is performed on several
       | previously strained individuals simultaneously, the same thing
       | occurs. In this case, however, cells that previously belonged to
       | a particular individual can suddenly show up as part of another.
       | 
       | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trichoplax#Regeneration
        
       | sysihyk wrote:
       | I prefer John Carpenter's "Hoax Watch", tho :)
        
       | 3np wrote:
       | This resonates heavily with me. It's an intuitively interesting
       | idea. I do have one issue though (emphasis mine):
       | 
       | "a living system maintaining both a higher level of internal
       | cooperation and a lower level of internal conflict than either
       | its components or _any_ larger systems of which it is a
       | component. "
       | 
       | So say there exists some form of higher-level individual that
       | where we can be considered as components. Does its existence
       | suddenly revoke our individual-ness? I don't see why that should
       | be, why it has to be exclusive. The flatworm and the neoblasts
       | can be individuals at the same time.
       | 
       | ...But then the definition is meaningless. It'd be great to make
       | it weaker without breaking it, so to say
        
         | [deleted]
        
         | mistermann wrote:
         | > So say there exists some form of higher-level individual that
         | where we can be considered as components. Does its existence
         | suddenly revoke our individual-ness? I don't see why that
         | should be, why it has to be exclusive. The flatworm and the
         | neoblasts can be individuals at the same time.
         | 
         | A far out way of considering it is in the context of greater
         | humanity and the various pesky problems within it like anti-
         | vaxxers, climate deniers, child deaths due to malnutrition,
         | war, lack of genuine (non-illusory) empathy, etc.
        
           | munificent wrote:
           | I've had this weird thought stuck in my head over the past
           | few months as I've been reading "Humankind" and watching the
           | horrors of politics and the pandemic:
           | 
           | The idea of "human nature"--good and evil--makes a hell of a
           | lot more sense if you think of humans as a colony species
           | where each tribe is a single individual competing against
           | others.
           | 
           | It's not so much that humans are uniformly capable of both
           | good and evil. It's that what we deem "good" is mostly how we
           | treat our own tribe and what we call "evil" is how we treat
           | others. It's like trying to decide if an arm mostly good or
           | mostly evil because it washes its own body and strikes other
           | people. Those actions are fundamentally different--on
           | incompatible moral levels--because the former is done to the
           | arm's own organism and the latter to another.
           | 
           | It may not even be meaningful to try to aggregate how we
           | behave to our in-group and how we behave towards our out-
           | group into any unified metric.
        
             | mistermann wrote:
             | May I offer an alternative/supplemental approach: rather
             | than _thinking of_ the situation from the perspective of a
             | human within a tribe, _analyze_ the system from the
             | perspective of an ~alien who is _outside the system_. Treat
             | it like a standard systems analysis exercise: isolate,
             | decompose, and abstract the various objects within the
             | system. So what was formerly a person, is now an agent
             | running a sophisticated yet obviously hilariously flawed
             | biological neural network, running on top of a similarly
             | flawed set of data...and so forth and so on.
             | 
             | I find that from this perspective, all the pieces start to
             | fit together the more you think of it. Not only does what
             | we are living through increasingly make sense, after a
             | while it starts to seem logically inevitable (under present
             | conditions, that is).
             | 
             | And once you spend sufficient time on this phase, ideas
             | might start falling out of the sky on how to plausibly
             | rectify the situation.
        
             | mwcampbell wrote:
             | Do we have any hope of ever treating all of humanity as our
             | in group? Ideally we should treat people who are infected
             | with dangerous ideas not as enemies, but as we would treat
             | sick members of our tribe.
        
         | [deleted]
        
         | mannykannot wrote:
         | I think the fact that we are self-aware makes it difficult (in
         | the "it's not helpful" sense) to revoke our individuality if we
         | participate in something bigger than ourselves. To make such a
         | claim, I think one would have to propose some way, for us to be
         | components of a higher-level individual, that takes away our
         | self-awareness.
         | 
         | Philosophy has long held (though not without dispute, of
         | course!) that the world is ontologically divided into 'natural
         | kinds' that have metaphysical significance, but I side with the
         | view that ontologies are merely useful tools in epistemology,
         | subject to modification and qualification as our knowledge
         | increases, and useful in some contexts but not necessarily all.
         | Nothing breaks if we talk about neoblasts being "in a sense"
         | individuals, while also talking about planaria being "in a
         | sense" individuals, so long as it is either obvious, or we make
         | clear, in what sense we mean.
         | 
         | There is quite a continuum here: for example, slime molds are
         | even less aggregated entities than planaria. And then there is
         | the aphorism "a chicken is an egg's way of making more eggs."
        
           | bobthechef wrote:
           | > I side with the view that ontologies are merely useful
           | tools in epistemology, subject to modification and
           | qualification as our knowledge increases
           | 
           | This is incoherent. How can knowledge even exist if there are
           | no natural kinds? What exactly would you be knowing in their
           | absence? One can be mistaken about a particular predication,
           | but knowledge isn't even possible if you deny the reality of
           | natural kinds. Knowledge presupposes universals and
           | universals presuppose natural kinds. I don't even know what
           | is useful about natural kinds if they don't exist. How could
           | you even talk about usefulness in their absence? You've
           | denied the very possibility of even having a measure of
           | usefulness!
           | 
           | You seem to be taking a vaguely Kantian view of the world,
           | except that you've gone further by denying that the
           | categories of the mind are fixed AND that noumena are real.
           | Kant himself is incoherent. If noumena are unknowable and all
           | we have are phenomena and some mental schemata, then why
           | posit noumena in the first place? What's the justification?
           | In your case, how would you even make the claim you've made?
           | 
           | Look at this statement: "I think the fact that we are self-
           | aware makes it difficult (in the "it's not helpful" sense) to
           | revoke our individuality if we participate in something
           | bigger than ourselves." Putting aside the revolting notion of
           | revoking my individuality like some collectivist (sorry, I'm
           | a person, I have individuality, thanks), who is "we"?
           | Wouldn't that denote at least suggest a genus, if not a
           | species? That's just the beginning. Even if we accept that
           | science reifies some things (which it does; science is to a
           | large degree instrumentalist, but I know that only because I
           | am capable of theoretical knowledge), that still presumes the
           | existence of natural kinds and a broader capacity to know
           | them. Science just becomes a way of organizing data for
           | practical purposes (like laws that classify shellfish as
           | fruit or whatever) and less a theoretical enterprise
           | interested in knowing things as they actually are.
           | 
           | The only workable solution is one that assumes the mind can
           | know reality in principle. It can make mistakes, it can be in
           | error, but it is _capable_ of knowing. Skepticism is
           | unworkable and nothing is worse than a kind of domesticated,
           | halfway house skepticism that fails to notice the non-
           | skeptical baggage that 's being smuggled in through the
           | backdoor to produce this half-hearted in-between. Either
           | accept that knowledge is possible, or accept insanity. You
           | cannot coherently straddle both.
        
             | dsr_ wrote:
             | 1. You're arguing with the author, who isn't here.
             | 
             | 2. The problem with your approach is that people
             | instantaneously leap from "capable of knowing" to
             | "knowing", and they do this all the time.
             | 
             | So anything that reminds you that you are definitely wrong
             | is a useful tool, just as ontologies are helpful tools (and
             | wrong).
             | 
             | 3. "genus" does not exist. "species" does not exist.
             | "clade" could exist in limited cases but is inevitably
             | incomplete. (Consider that you are pointing at creatures
             | and their offspring without thinking about their
             | microbiomes, among other things.)
        
             | mannykannot wrote:
             | Given the very broad range of views on what, if anything,
             | counts as a natural kind [1,2], it would seem that if I am
             | being incoherent, philosophy as a whole is being
             | incoherent, and if knowledge cannot even exist if there are
             | no natural kinds, then we have not even taken the first
             | steps to knowledge!
             | 
             | What happens in practice, of course, is that we propose
             | that the world is a certain way based on our experiences so
             | far, without being hung up on the question of whether we
             | have truly identified the real 'natural kinds' and are
             | talking about them. We seek to validate, or refute, extend
             | and/or replace these opinions, through further study of the
             | world, in a process that is the opposite of the skepticism
             | that you seem to think my position implies.
             | 
             | If you find it helpful to think that 'natural kind' is a
             | natural kind, then go ahead, but the fact that you know
             | something about the world (a premise I am not disputing)
             | does not make your assumption about natural kinds a
             | metaphysical necessity and a prerequisite for knowledge.
             | After all, we have, over the millennia, held many now
             | demonstrably-false ideas about what sort of things there
             | are in the world, yet that has not prevented us from
             | learning more.
             | 
             | One other thing: you wrote "putting aside the revolting
             | notion of revoking my individuality like some
             | collectivist..." Firstly, note how you are presenting an
             | emotional reaction as if it were an argument. Secondly, if
             | you had paid attention to my previous post, you would have
             | seen that I am arguing that our individuality should _not_
             | be put aside on account of the arguments in the article.
             | Before you start bandying words like  "incoherent" and
             | "insanity", you should be a little more careful with your
             | own arguments.
             | 
             | [1] https://iep.utm.edu/nat-kind/ [2]
             | https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/#MetNatKin
        
           | germinalphrase wrote:
           | If we imagine that it becomes possible to 'record' full
           | sensory experiences and 'replay' them in another person _:
           | would a collective pour their meager resources into elevating
           | the life, lifestyle, and success of the single experience
           | donor such that the collective can experience a superior life
           | (as a personal state) that would otherwise be unattainable?
           | 
           | _ Mary Lou Jepsen at Openwater talked about her team's
           | efforts to create that tech in a Long Now Foundation talk
           | back in 2018
           | 
           | https://www.openwater.cc/
           | 
           | https://longnow.org/seminars/02018/oct/29/toward-
           | practical-t...
        
           | Tsiklon wrote:
           | One thing that I find interesting to think on is if there is
           | a form of self awareness so greater in scope than our frame
           | of reference.
           | 
           | That an outside entity possessing such a perspective would
           | look upon us in a fashion not unlike how we would look at
           | individual ants or bees in a hive.
           | 
           | Those animals don't have the capacity to perceive our self
           | awareness with the tools they have, perhaps more base
           | motivations but never understanding more than our actions.
           | How would we look upon a creature so much more expansive than
           | ourselves? Would widespread cthonian-esque cosmic horror
           | unfold among our kind, coupled to cultism and deification?
           | 
           | Much like the interpretation of the Thing from the alien
           | perspective linked on the source article. It's understanding
           | of the universe is so profoundly different to ours that it is
           | horrified by us.
        
             | canadianfella wrote:
             | You split your first sentence into two paragraphs.
        
       | drclau wrote:
       | If you like this, you should really pick up Peter Watts' books.
       | He is the author of the post, the owner of rifters.com and one of
       | the best hard SF authors out there. I can't recommend him enough.
       | 
       | Also, importantly, he published part of his work, including full
       | books, for free in multiple electronic formats, here [0].
       | 
       | Refs:
       | 
       | [0]: https://rifters.com/real/shorts.htm
        
         | matheusd wrote:
         | Any recommendation on where to start on his material?
        
           | _alxk wrote:
           | Blindsight is the best SciFi book I've read, and one of my
           | top 10 books of all time.
           | 
           | It's not for everyone though, I tried to get friends and
           | family to read it, I don't think a single one got through it.
           | 
           | You pretty much need Wikipedia open to make sense of it and
           | meditate on chapters. It's a challenging read.
        
           | revolvingocelot wrote:
           | "The Things", [0] as mentioned in the featured article
           | itself, is ridiculously relevant. It's the story of The
           | Thing, but told from the perspective of the Thing.
           | 
           | [0] https://clarkesworldmagazine.com/watts_01_10/
        
           | drclau wrote:
           | My personal favorite is Blindsight [0][1]. I read it multiple
           | times (3 or 4, I think) over the years.
           | 
           | If you like Blindsight, you'll probably want to continue with
           | the sidequel, Echopraxia. You can also find them bundled
           | together under the name Firefall.
           | 
           | And I think out of his main works, Blindsight is probably the
           | most accessible. It also led me to Thomas Metzinger's "The
           | Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self"
           | [2], which Watts used as a source material in his research
           | and had good things to say about.
           | 
           | The Rifters series is great, too, but there's a sort of
           | darkness or heaviness to it that may not work for everyone.
           | 
           | And bonus content, a fan made short movie based on
           | Blindsight, here: [3].
           | 
           | I hope this helps. :)
           | 
           | Links:
           | 
           | [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blindsight_(Watts_novel)
           | 
           | [1]: https://www.rifters.com/real/Blindsight.htm
           | 
           | [2]: https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/5895503
           | 
           | [3]: https://vimeo.com/myshli/blindsight
        
             | kwhitefoot wrote:
             | > If you like Blindsight,
             | 
             | Not sure that I _like_ Blindsight even though I think it a
             | great book. The same goes for some of his other books;
             | deeply unsettling
        
             | finiteseries wrote:
             | Ensure communities of people have spent years trying to
             | find books similar to Blindsight/Firefall in general to
             | scratch the itch (with 0 success), so, be careful in maybe
             | not finishing them too quickly.
        
             | joshmarlow wrote:
             | Can't recommend Watts enough - Blindsight is one of my top
             | 3 favorite novels. He periodically drops hints about his
             | progress on the sequel to Echopraxia.
             | 
             | For quick recommendations, I'd single out two of his short
             | stories (which are two of my favorite stories in general):
             | 
             | The 21 Second God - https://www.rifters.com/crawl/?p=5968
             | Malak -
             | https://rifters.com/real/shorts/PeterWatts_Malak.pdf
             | 
             | Edit: I always forget HN doesn't use markdown.
        
             | FooBarBizBazz wrote:
             | Blindsight really fucked with my head, and not in a good
             | way.
             | 
             | Books can do that. Like, read Tom Robbins and you'll fall
             | in love with the next person you see. Read Peter Watts and
             | you'll spend the next four years looking at the person next
             | to you like they're an alien who's plotting to lay eggs in
             | you without themselves even knowing it.
        
               | hallway_monitor wrote:
               | Can confirm, I think about Blindsight a lot (I think it's
               | good), and when I was 21 I fell for a girl after we found
               | out we were both reading Even Cowgirls Get the Blues
               | (Robbins)
        
             | saeranv wrote:
             | My experience with Echopraxia is that it's significantly
             | more confusing and complex then Blindsight. There are
             | chunks of Blindsight that go over my head, but in general
             | you can get the gist of it from context (and was rewarded
             | on rereads as things progressively became clearer).
             | Echopraxia somehow was not able to navigate the tension
             | between ambiguity and outright confusion. I believe Peter
             | Watts has acknowledged this as a problem in Echopraxia and
             | spent a Reddit AMA explaining to readers what the plot was.
             | 
             | I do need to reread Echopraxia though, and perhaps my
             | opinion will change after that. Blindsight was brilliant
             | enough that it deserves the extra effort to appreciate.
        
       | bobthechef wrote:
       | Questions of identity are some of the oldest in metaphysics. It
       | is important that one take a disciplined in this respect because
       | there is nothing impressive about posing half-baked "what ifs" if
       | you can't be bothered to work out the consequences to any serious
       | degree and to observe the absurdities you've gotten yourself
       | into.
       | 
       | An explanation cannot undermine the fact it tries to explain
       | without ceasing to be an explanation.
        
       | mdp2021 wrote:
       | > _Pepper et al's paper on Somatic Evolution [...] : how can
       | multicellular life evolve in the presence of Darwinian processes
       | that should, by rights, turn every individual cell against its
       | neighbors in a competition for resources? Why isn't every somatic
       | cell in it for themselves, why doesn't all multicellular life
       | devolve into cancer?_
       | 
       | > _Planarians ... [a]re not exactly worms. They're not even
       | individuals. What they are is habitats: cellular substrates
       | containing individuals. Individuals who may not even like each
       | other very much_
        
         | [deleted]
        
         | [deleted]
        
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