[HN Gopher] Guide to cognitive biases
___________________________________________________________________
Guide to cognitive biases
Author : sonnyp
Score : 184 points
Date : 2021-08-13 11:12 UTC (11 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (en.shortcogs.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (en.shortcogs.com)
| db_admin wrote:
| While i do not see the immediate use for me personally beyond
| being an interesting read, i must confess that this is a great
| domain name.
| sumtechguy wrote:
| Bias is a good way to look at news sources and someone trying
| to sell you something. Many of these use your bias against you
| to fool you and/or manipulate you into something. Either buying
| something or thinking something.
|
| Knowing what your bias is and which ones you fall into help you
| cope and guard yourself against them.
| queuebert wrote:
| https://en.shortcogs.com/bias/blind-spot-bias
|
| (Just kidding.)
| nodejs_rulez_1 wrote:
| Apex Fallacy is not listed again:
|
| https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Apex%20Falla...
| rtkwe wrote:
| I think that's better a better fit for a logical fallacy chart
| than a cognitive bias list.
| necheffa wrote:
| I wouldn't exactly call the urban dictionary a reliable source.
|
| Doing a DuckDuckGo for "apex fallacy" turns up a bunch of incel
| and mgtow sites.
|
| Is this even a _real_ fallacy?
| leereeves wrote:
| The first result I see on DDG for "apex fallacy" is
| RationalWiki, which is a left-wing site. The definition there
| is "when someone evaluates a group based on the performance
| of best group members, not a representative sample of the
| group members."
|
| I can see why that's not included in most lists of fallacies.
| It's just a specific example of cherry picking, a well known
| fallacy that is already included in the lists.
| dane-pgp wrote:
| It also most likely occurs when the speaker identifies with
| the group whose performance they are over-estimating, and
| imagines that a similar level of performance can be imputed
| to them.
|
| Such cases are likely the result of the ingroup half of the
| Ultimate Attribution Error, where positive characteristics
| are seen as inherent properties of members of the ingroup,
| but exceptional when displayed by members of the outgroup.
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultimate_attribution_error
| mopierotti wrote:
| This is my first time seeing this one mentioned, but I'm
| curious, what makes something a "real" fallacy?
|
| It seems like it's a real mistake that people make. I guess
| one could categorize it as a more specific case of
| misunderstanding a distribution of values. (In the same vein
| as mean vs median, outlier skewing, assuming unimodal vs
| bimodal distribution, etc.)
| necheffa wrote:
| The "realness" is determined by the signal to noise ratio.
| In this case I find mostly joke sites, memes, and sites
| trying to sell a political/social agenda using it.
| dougSF70 wrote:
| As Richard Feynman said: The first principle is that you must not
| fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool.
|
| Most cognitive biases are effective ways of fooling your self.
| hairofadog wrote:
| This is what I take from it. As mentioned upthread, so many
| people see lists like this and think it's a way to prove other
| people wrong; when I look down the list I think, yep, gotta be
| careful to avoid that one. Yep, that one is a minefield for me
| specifically.
|
| It takes a lot of work to think critically, and the hardest
| work is thinking critically about the things that align with
| your biases. It's amazing how many people can see it in other
| people but not themselves.
| dougSF70 wrote:
| Seeing it in others and not yourself is the ultimate
| confirmation bias.
| InternetPerson wrote:
| You can also view these as tools. Like, these are the rules
| of thumb that the brain lazily relies on. So if you're
| pitching something, maybe try slipping a couple of these
| biases in there... (just don't make it too obvious!)
| djoldman wrote:
| > Cognitive biases refer to the identifiable and indexable errors
| that are found in our judgment in a predictable and systematic
| way.
|
| Ok.
|
| Clicking through to the first one:
|
| > The Barnum effect is a cognitive bias that induces an
| individual to accept a vague description of personality traits as
| applying specifically to themselves.
|
| Then they give an example story of something reading like a
| horoscope.
|
| The story could reasonably describe a large swath of people so I
| fail to understand how this is an "error" on the part of someone
| thinking that it describes them.
| cainxinth wrote:
| The key word is 'specifically.'
| djoldman wrote:
| I think this makes sense if specifically meant "only" but it
| doesn't. It means "exact": Specifically: in a
| way that is exact and clear; precisely.
|
| The story can specifically refer to multiple people. There is
| no definite error here as I see it.
| dane-pgp wrote:
| The word "specifically" can also be used as an antonym of
| "generally", meaning "by most people, or to most
| people".[0] If a story applies to most people, but someone
| reading the story doesn't consider that possibility, then
| they have made a small error.
|
| [0] https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/gen
| erall...
| throwaway98797 wrote:
| What's the use of this really?
|
| Many of these are used as ammunition for arguments vs. clarifing
| reasoning.
| projektfu wrote:
| It's useful when evaluating your own actions and reasoning,
| especially when you might have a vested interest in the result.
| From evaluating investment opportunities to understanding the
| state of science in an area, being aware of cognitive biases
| can help you get to the real truth.
| disease wrote:
| Pardon my cynicism, but you could use these as a guide for
| drawing money from people that are predisposed towards having
| many strong cognitive biases. There seems to be a near
| limitless number of people with money suffering from extreme
| social isolation in addition to narcissistic personality
| disorder. These people have little interest in reality and will
| happily give you their money if you play into these biases.
| AlbertCory wrote:
| Bingo. These (the authors) are people with no ideas of their
| own, but they still need funding. So they "classify" other
| people's ideas and make some nice graphics.
|
| Read "Thinking Fast and Slow" (which, to their credit, they
| do list as a resource) and skip the rest of their grant
| seeking.
| [deleted]
| npteljes wrote:
| What's the use of knowledge of optical illusions? So that you
| know that "seeing is believing" is not 100% dependable.
|
| Also you just listed their "use" in your very comment. People
| build upon these to convince others, and if you would like to
| be less manipulated, then they are useful to know.
| tomcooks wrote:
| Getting closer to the truth, that's why greek philosophers
| created logic and focused part of their studies on it.
|
| Using shields (against self-sabotaging traps) as ammo to
| destroy others is very dumb, but yes it happens.
| lhorie wrote:
| Knowing about them is supposed to be an introspection tool to
| help you make better arguments/philosophies. For example, I've
| seen some ex-christians who decided to turn atheists by
| learning more about cognitive biases, and then realizing that
| some of their former religious arguments were circular
| reasoning or appeal to authority or whatever.
|
| There is a bit of a dunning-kruger effect to be sure: accusing
| other of cognitive biases that one just stumbled into on
| wikipedia is itself going off-topic. It takes a bit more effort
| to actually internalize it.
|
| On a semi-related topic, I find it a bit weird the way people
| think about "winning an argument". People usually prize being
| "right", but if you think about it from a strictly selfish
| perspective, you don't really gain anything from that outcome,
| whereas learning seems like a better outcome.
| mistermann wrote:
| > For example, I've seen some ex-christians who decided to
| turn atheists by learning more about cognitive biases, and
| then realizing that some of their former religious arguments
| were circular reasoning or appeal to authority or whatever.
|
| Similarly, there are some people (a much smaller number I
| would expect) that have moved from atheism to "spirituality",
| for the same reasons.
| lhorie wrote:
| Yeah, I'm one of those, though I'm not sure my belief
| system qualifies as spirituality. The gist in these cases
| is realizing that atheism is not the opposite of
| christianity (in the sense that there ought to be a
| conflict between two incompatible ideologies) and that
| there's quite a bit more depth and breadth to theism, moral
| frameworks and philosophy in general than the who-is-more-
| right crowd might think.
| mistermann wrote:
| Totally agree - my general take on it is that standard
| Atheism and Christianity/etc (as understood & practiced
| by the average person) are incredibly simplistic, but
| most people in either ideological camp are fairly
| oblivious to it.
| throwaway98797 wrote:
| I've become disillusioned with knowledge in general.
|
| A lot of what i _know_ turns out to be wrong or disproven. I
| do just as well acting emotionally and impulsively as i do
| when i think logically.
|
| Not to mention following what everyone is doing is fine most
| of the time. Starting to feel that knowledge is a trap. Only
| way out is to not play.
|
| Only exception is for basic math/physica that I can grok.
| lhorie wrote:
| The mantra I follow is "strong opinions held weakly"
| (meaning, strive to be as well-informed as I can, but be
| willing to change my mind to even the polar opposite of my
| current view in light of new evidence)
|
| IMHO, the key is in realizing that your ego has a tendency
| to gets tangled with the notion of being right. It's a lot
| easier to "let go" if you internalize the idea that your
| worth/identity is not the same thing as your beliefs and
| that a lot of what you think you "know" is actually not
| factual knowledge, but merely interpretation or inference
| of previous experiences.
| Uehreka wrote:
| When I see someone on Facebook/Twitter link to a site like this
| to demonstrate that the person they're arguing with is "doing a
| fallacy", I just accuse them of Appeal To Authority. I feel like
| these kinds of sites are often just used to shut someone down by
| saying that they're doing something wrong, without actually going
| through the work of following through with why the "fallacy"
| makes their argument weak. Also, in my experience
| fallacies/biases are often more indicative of a weak argument
| than a wrong one.
| bradrn wrote:
| Well, if you really want to go this route, you can beat them at
| their own game and accuse them of Arguing From Fallacy. (A nice
| illustration: https://theupturnedmicroscope.com/comic/logical-
| fallacies-ar...)
|
| That being said, I do think it's important to avoid fallacious
| reasoning -- it helps in making arguments clearer. As mentioned
| above, just because someone uses a fallacy doesn't mean their
| conclusion is wrong, but it _does_ mean that you can prove
| their argument wrong. (And any reply should ideally be phrased
| in these terms: 'your argument has problem X' is easier to
| respond to than 'your argument has fallacy Y'.) Furthermore it
| means they are thinking less clearly than they perhaps should
| be.
| lhorie wrote:
| > accuse them of Arguing From Fallacy
|
| But then, you're just doing an ad hominem...
| entropicdrifter wrote:
| That's not an ad hominem. You're attacking their argument,
| not them as a person.
|
| An ad hominem would be like saying, "Oh yeah, well you're
| an alcoholic", for instance, as though that could discredit
| their argument even if it were true.
| robbedpeter wrote:
| I know I am, but what... am... I?
| netr0ute wrote:
| The Fallacy Fallacy doesn't actually do anything because it
| is covered by itself and creates a loop.
| ElFitz wrote:
| And that's how you get a stack overflow.
|
| Always remember your exit condition when doing recursion,
| folks!
| entropicdrifter wrote:
| I'd say the bigger problem is that it's roughly equivalent
| to saying, "Just because my argument is bad doesn't mean
| I'm wrong."
|
| I mean, yes, that's true, but you have yet to prove
| yourself correct, so why should anyone change their mind?
| mistermann wrote:
| > just because someone uses a fallacy doesn't mean their
| conclusion is wrong, but it does mean that you can prove
| their argument wrong.
|
| One way this can go wrong is if the two people are thinking
| at different levels of abstraction or dimensionality
| (variables), especially when one or both participants don't
| understand what that means (which seems to be "most" people
| in the general public).
| overboard2 wrote:
| What do you mean?
| eivarv wrote:
| And by extension, fallacious reasoning means that you have no
| good reason to take what the reasoner is arguing as true
| (unless they can a non-fallacious argument) - right?
|
| The fact that an argument is fallacious doesn't necessarily
| mean that the conclusion is wrong, but there does (logically,
| by necessity) exist (at least) a non-fallacious argument for
| a correct conclusion.
| rtkwe wrote:
| Yeah I remember seeing a lot of people deploying the fallacy
| list(s) as an argumentative tool to say "ha! you're argument
| vaguely resembles this 'fallacy' so you're instantly wrong."
| It's a lot less now I think, they've fallen out of style I
| guess, or I'm just getting in/reading less pointless arguments.
| imwillofficial wrote:
| The lengths people will go to, to avoid thinking, is
| impressive.
| hsn915 wrote:
| I call this the "fallacy" fallacy.
| TeeMassive wrote:
| > When I see someone on Facebook/Twitter link to a site like
| this to demonstrate that the person they're arguing with is
| "doing a fallacy", I just accuse them of Appeal To Authority
|
| It's called the fallacy fallacy
| (https://yourlogicalfallacyis.com/the-fallacy-fallacy)
|
| But yeah, pointing to websites like these, especially with no
| other explanation is annoying and pointless (although I have
| been a bit guilty of that too). Projection through accusation.
| ElFitz wrote:
| Also, a cognitive bias isn't necessarily a fallacy.
|
| It's only a prism that deforms our perspective of the world.
|
| Fallacies are a different beast altogether.
| teclordphrack2 wrote:
| I ain't got time to teach you, so yeah, appeal to authority and
| teach yourself.
| magila wrote:
| IME cognitive bias has become a popular talking point among the
| left which is used to dismiss those who disagree with them.
| I.e. if you don't buy into identity politics and other "woke"
| views it's because you are succumbing to cognitive biases.
| projektfu wrote:
| That's funny. I consider myself "left" but find these
| dismissive charges of bias deployed a lot by libertarian
| debaters.
| kodah wrote:
| Libertarians might too, the two aren't mutually exclusive.
| I also don't think it's something to get defensive about.
| I'm left and I've certainly seen the behavior that the
| poster mentioned. That said, what I'd say to both of you
| (that I've learned as well) is that the left and the right
| are not monolithic groups and are highly fragmented in
| various ways. This can lead to the obvious misunderstanding
| the other side for the words and attitudes of a few and
| judging your own group (thinking highly or negatively) for
| your own perceived bedfellows rather than your actual
| bedfellows.
| npteljes wrote:
| These biases are also played out as deliberate argument
| tactics, and they work really well, especially on those who
| can't detect it. Basically each of them is also guide how to
| be more persuasive, if you don't care about playing dirty.
| denton-scratch wrote:
| Correct.
|
| Politicians deploy fallacious arguments all the time.
| Inserting fallacious arguments into speeches in such a way
| that they aren't obvious is part of basic political
| speechwriting.
|
| The task facing a politician is to build a cohesive
| coalition out of a bunch of people who don't really share
| much. Many of them couldn't distinguish a fallacy from an
| obscene act. Political speech is persuasive speech, and
| accurate reasoning is rarely persuasive.
| Peritract wrote:
| I don't think 'cognitive bias' is used half as dismissively
| or dishonestly as 'woke' is.
| 411111111111111 wrote:
| People increasingly argue with fallacies, so it shouldn't
| come at a surprise that the frequency in which they're
| pointed out increases as well.
|
| Public discord really has taken a nosedive and I'm surprised
| you seem to be okay with people using fallacies to strengthen
| points. Their points might even be correct, but reflection
| gets increasingly harder the more you accept these fallacies
| as arguments.
|
| I'm often speechless how pretty influencial
| YouTubers/streamers wholeheartedly believe something based
| purely on fallacies. All the young viewers which aren't able
| to identify them most definitely become even more susceptible
| to this kind of logic, worsening the situation in the future.
| damagednoob wrote:
| It also tends to derail the conversation and you end up arguing
| about fallacy definitions instead of the actual point.
| teachrdan wrote:
| It's a bit funny because Appeal to Authority isn't a fallacy.
| The actual fallacy is Appeal to Incorrect / False Authority:
|
| "An appeal to false authority is a fallacious argument that
| relies on the statements of a false authority figure, who is
| framed as a credible authority on the topic being discussed."
|
| https://effectiviology.com/false-
| authority/#:~:text=An%20app....
| nostromo wrote:
| > The _actual_ fallacy
|
| ... according to linguistics researcher with a website. He
| sounds like as much a false authority on philosophy as anyone
| else.
| entropicdrifter wrote:
| From the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
|
| 9. The ad verecundiam fallacy concerns appeals to authority
| or expertise. Fundamentally, the fallacy involves accepting
| as evidence for a proposition the pronouncement of someone
| who is taken to be an authority but is not really an
| authority. This can happen when non-experts parade as
| experts in fields in which they have no special competence
| --when, for example, celebrities endorse commercial
| products or social movements. Similarly, when there is
| controversy, and authorities are divided, it is an error to
| base one's view on the authority of just some of them. (See
| also 2.4 below.)
|
| https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fallacies/
| tomcatfish wrote:
| The point the parent was making is that citing authority
| isn't a bad thing to do. Citing authorities in _a different
| field_ often is, though.
|
| (Citing a doctor on the common cold is not a fallacy, but
| citing a doctor on global economics is)
| nostromo wrote:
| And in doing so they cited a linguist about philosophy.
|
| And it doesn't matter anyway - thankfully we use science
| now and not philosophy to determine truth.
| eivarv wrote:
| Does it actually matter?
|
| An argument doesn't get any more or less fallacious based on
| who believes in it (the authority, in this case) - that's not
| an argument in itself.
|
| It might be reasonable (a useful heuristic) to lean to the
| side of the expert, but the fact that an expert believes
| something doesn't in itself make the conclusion correct.
| teachrdan wrote:
| To the contrary, if someone is a correct authority, their
| statements have more weight on their domain of expertise.
| While all of us on HN are very clever and could think of a
| number of exceptions, I would trust a climate scientist as
| a legitimate authority on climate change over a religious
| leader or a PR person.
| eivarv wrote:
| I too would trust a climate scientist as a legitimate
| authority on climate change over a religious leader or a
| PR person - but that's not what I'm discussing.
|
| I'm saying global warming isn't true _because_ scientists
| believe it to be true (this would be a fallacious
| argument).
| entropicdrifter wrote:
| That would be a fallacious argument because it does not
| follow (non-sequitur) that the beliefs of scientists can
| cause shifts in reality, but nobody was arguing that.
|
| They were arguing that it is logical to conclude that
| climate change is real because the overwhelming consensus
| among climate scientists (the actual domain experts) is
| that it is real.
| eivarv wrote:
| That's not an argument that deals with whether climate
| change is real or not - but whether it's reasonable to
| _believe_ it is, based on one 's own lack of
| understanding in combination with making (reasonable)
| assumptions.
| eloeffler wrote:
| There is also a very poster-suited svg over at wikipedia that
| categorizes cognitive biases:
| https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/65/Cognitiv...
|
| (There are also hyperlinks to the corresponding wikipedia pages)
| nrjames wrote:
| Similar sites that are a good reference:
|
| https://yourbias.is
|
| https://yourlogicalfallacyis.com
| wombatmobile wrote:
| Why are there so many of these cognitive biases? Can we infer
| they persist widely because they confer some benefit?
| jampekka wrote:
| I think it's mostly because they are quite ad-hoc and
| superficial. It's often not even clear what is the normative
| behavior that the bias is deviation of, or whether that
| normative behavior is somehow better than the "biased" one.
| It's a weird scene.
| hsn915 wrote:
| They are only a problem if you trying to use your cognitive
| power to prove mathematical theorems or discover natural
| physical laws. Which are not things that our brains are
| designed for.
|
| In all other situations, they are working as expected.
|
| e.g. risk avoidance is very important because one single
| mistake in risk assessment (underestimating a real threat) can
| wipe you out.
| deltasixeight wrote:
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m26jz1YyIk8
|
| The short but very very accurate documentary above (2 min)
| explains why.
|
| Basically, evolution does not reward survival of the "smartest"
| or survival of the person with "less cognitive biases."
| glial wrote:
| This is an active area of research in the cognitive science
| world.
|
| First, 'bias' is defined with respect to an ideal rational
| actor with perfect information and infinite computing power.
| The reasons for this are mostly historical (rational animal,
| Homo economicus, etc), but it also serves as a useful baseline
| 'ideal observer' model to compare human behavior against.
|
| In the 1950s, Herbert Simon coined the term 'bounded
| rationality' to describe rationality within a set of
| computational bounds. For example, if we have finite working
| memory and limited computing time, but were still trying to
| make _optimal_ decisions within those bounds, what behavior
| would we see? In this case, decision making turns from
| unconstrained to constrained optimization. What may LOOK like a
| 'bias', with its connotation of sub-optimality, may actually be
| optimal behavior given constraints.
|
| More recently, people like Gerd Gigerenzer suggested that human
| decision making is largely composed of heuristics and tricks
| that enable 'fast and frugal' responses to scenarios. They
| don't need to be perfect, just good enough - and 'cheap' enough
| with respect to time that they are worth developing. This is
| probably true to a certain extent, but to me it's
| scientifically unsatisfying, as there is no general principle
| (except for 'cognitive miserliness') to explain behavior - and
| specifically, there is no longer a way to specify 'normative'
| or expected behavior in any given situation.
|
| More recently still, there is a trend to revive Simon's
| perspective under the name 'Resource Rationality'. Tom
| Griffiths is one of the active researchers in this field. The
| idea is the similar to Simon's - we have limited 'cognitive
| resources' and strive to be rational. Griffiths and others have
| attempted to show that many behaviors that are traditionally
| called 'cognitive biases' are actually predicted if we are
| behaving optimally but with constrained cognitive resources.
|
| From the resource rationality perspective, a cognitive bias is
| a way that a solution to unconstrained optimization differs
| from a solution to a corresponding constrained optimization
| problem. Roughly speaking, any combination of limitation on
| (memory, computation, time, energy, information) will produce a
| 'bias', and different scenarios we encounter push up against
| these boundaries in different ways, leading to a plethora of
| 'biases'.
| acituan wrote:
| > a cognitive bias is a way that a solution to unconstrained
| optimization differs from a solution to a corresponding
| constrained optimization problem
|
| That is a narrow and incorrect definition IMHO. Two resource
| constrained solutions can also differ wildly in their
| rationality (or reality approximation if you will) and there
| is no resource unconstrained general intelligence in the
| universe so we wouldn't even really know what that
| normativity looks like.
|
| Biases are more of a classification of errors specific to our
| cognitive machinery; framing errors, recall errors, precision
| errors, proportionality errors, inference errors etc wrt the
| best we could have done with it.
| glial wrote:
| Yes it's narrow. I was trying to summarize the 'resource
| rationality' approach, and there are certainly other
| legitimate accounts of cognitive bias. My interpretation of
| that work is that it's a project to convert the list of
| cognitive biases _from_ a classification of errors _to_ a
| general generative principle.
| calny wrote:
| I found Daniel Kahneman's Thinking Fast and Slow persuasive on
| this question. I don't have a psych or neuro degree, but
| Crudely speaking and possibly butchering it: the mind reflects
| two types of thinking, which Kahneman terms System 1 (fast) and
| System 2 (slow). System 1 is closer to instinct and helps us
| respond quickly in, for example, fight or flight situations.
| System 2 requires significant mental effort to more thoroughly
| analyze things like complex math problems. It's easier to coast
| on System 1 thinking. The book provides examples and much
| better and more in depth explanations. There was a replication
| controversy about some of it, but still very worth reading I
| think.
| wombatmobile wrote:
| Fair enough. I've read Kahnemann's book, and hadn't
| considered how to integrate it with TFA.
|
| The sheer number of cognitive biases presented in TFA, and
| the overlap of the categorisations had me bamboozled.
|
| But yeah, if these are System 1 staples then I can imagine
| how they might have made do for regular people for a long
| time. Some biases and prejudices affirm survival in a less
| civilised setting eg prehistoric tribes that compete for land
| and food with neighbouring tribes.
|
| So perhaps it is the compact of civilisation that opens up
| the vistas for System 2 thinking to yield benefits.
| scns wrote:
| Check out this one on a large screen: https://upload.wikime
| dia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/65/Cognitiv...
|
| While still bamboozling, it brings some order and visual
| overview (in a beatiful way IMO), plus links for further
| study.
|
| All credit for posting it belongs to:
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28168269
| queuebert wrote:
| Thinking there's a reason for it is probably a bias, too.
| rtkwe wrote:
| They don't have to have an individual benefit (or even be an
| intentional thing), evolution isn't great at perfecting things
| it deals very well in just good enough and doesn't really have
| a great mechanism to deal with small issues with small effects
| to reproductive strength. See the recurrent laryngeal nerve for
| a pretty simple example of it. [0] It has little/no downside to
| reproductive ability so there's no reason to 'fix' it
| evolutionarily speaking.
|
| For the vast majority of our time evolving the biggest issue
| was spotting a stalking predator or hidden danger before it
| could hurt us or spotting food better than other chimps/homo
| */lizards (at various points on the evolutionary history). For
| that quick efficient pattern matching is what you need not
| solid reasoning about large groups so that's what we've got.
|
| [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recurrent_laryngeal_nerve
| Traster wrote:
| I think the most obvious answer to this is that understanding
| the world perfectly is impossible (for an individiual human in
| a finite lifespan), and so in reality we use a whole slew of
| hacks and simplifications. Things fall to the ground at about
| 9.8m/s. Is that true? No. Is it helpful to assume it's true,
| sure. And so it's extra-ordinarily easy to therefore find
| conditions where these simplifications don't hold. We optimize
| for survival and reproduction. Anchoring[1] is a great example
| - as long as no one knows about anchoring, anchoring is a great
| technique for negotiation, in fact there are studies that show
| some form of anchoring is optimal. It's far more optimal to use
| these cognitive biases than to invent new algorithms for life-
| because most of these are incredibly difficult problems- what
| is maybe more surprising is how effective our cognitive biases
| are and how they've propogated, isn't it more crazy that we're
| all fairly good at applying these intuitive rules of thumb?
|
| [1]: Setting an initial price in order to later favourably
| negotiate a price.
| eivarv wrote:
| My own speculation basically boils down to: Human minds are
| primarily meaning-seeking machines, to such a large extent that
| we even create meaning where there is none (apophenia).
|
| Take pareidolia, for instance - it's likely been more
| evolutionary advantageous to see faces where there are none
| (and thus flee tot often), as opposed to not seeing faces where
| there are faces (and thus be eaten).
|
| And in evolutionary terms, not everything that exists has some
| benefit. Some features just haven't been subject to
| evolutionary pressures; Not selected _for_ , just not selected
| _against_. Vestigial features are prime examples of this.
| xondono wrote:
| Because discovering a "new bias", like discovering new market
| failures, is an instant path to book authorship and possibly
| the nobel.
|
| A lot of them could frankly be considered versions of the same
| bias, or combinations of some of them.
|
| Others are not bias at all, just a result of bad thinking.
| phtrivier wrote:
| The page dedicated to COVID-19 [1] is probably the most
| depressing thing I read today (and I read twitter.)
|
| Also, among the generaly sane page, there is this bit:
|
| > Conspiracy theories regarding the COVID-19 pandemic are
| plentiful and varied. One of them suggests that the authorities
| declared a health emergency in order to force the population to
| accept a vaccine that they do not need, in order to promote the
| economic domination of the pharmaceutical industry. Several types
| of information can be presented in support of this theory, such
| as proposals for alternative treatments to COVID-19, some data
| taken out of context from vaccine approval protocols, or annual
| death rates from seasonal influenza.
|
| > While this information may hold some veracity, it is not
| sufficient to support the conspiracy theory put forward when
| compared to scientific studies carried out by both the
| pharmaceutical industry and public health authorities.
|
| Hardly playing the Devil's advocate, this is the crux of the
| problem : once you're sincerely convinced that scientists are
| wrong (which is bound to happen faced with novelly) and
| governement are lying to you (which is bound to happen because
| governements are full of politicians), isn't it _rational_ _not_
| to believe scientists, and not to trust governements ?
|
| So the rules of the game for scientists are to never ever be
| wrong, and governments to never ever lie.
|
| But of course, it's not the case, and the "right" thing is to
| believe scientists because they're right "in general", and to
| trust politicians "to a degree". But how is advocating that not
| falling in "appeal to authority" ?
|
| Etc, etc, etc...
|
| At least I'm having those brain farts in a quiet office with a
| cat on my nap and two jabs in my arms, instead of in a ICU :/ ...
|
| [1] https://en.shortcogs.com/biais-covid
| glial wrote:
| > once you're sincerely convinced that scientists are wrong ...
| and governement are lying to you
|
| This is the crux. How did those beliefs form? I would argue
| that in many cases, it wasn't a dispassionate weighing of
| evidence and calculation of probabilities. If not that, then
| what? We might also ask - in whose interest is it that citizens
| don't believe scientists or the government?
| ohhhhhh wrote:
| There's more than enough evidence that the government is
| lying to you. Past and present.
| phtrivier wrote:
| > scientists are wrong
|
| Every medical scandal (For example, in the French Antilles,
| the scandal around "chlordecone", a pesticide, is supposed to
| be fueling anti-vaccine fear today.) Earlier uncertainties
| about masks, vaccinne efficiency, vaccines from different
| countries, possible early treatments, etc...
|
| Even though the "consensus" settles quickly, the dust of the
| discussion remains in the air for very long. Media is playing
| a part here, ironicaly because "not blindly trusting the
| authority" and "presenting a balanced view of facts" is good
| for ratings.
|
| > ... and governement are lying to you
|
| Do we really need to test this hypothesis :) ? Of course it
| is a generalization that "all governments are lying all the
| time". But it is such an easy one to make...
| glial wrote:
| > Media is playing a part here, ironicaly because "not
| blindly trusting the authority" and "presenting a balanced
| view of facts" is good for ratings
|
| Yes, this is part of it. Of course scientists are wrong
| sometimes, but it's in _someone 's_ interest to stoke
| general distrust.
| phtrivier wrote:
| Sure.
|
| I would love to have a way to quantify how much of the
| distrust is knowingly fueled by "chaotic" actors (snake-
| oil salesmen, foreign powers, cynical policitians, etc..)
| vs how much is "baked into" the history, political and
| mediatic structure and, as the original content
| explains... in our brains.
|
| History and brains being unfixable, I hope there is
| something we can improve in the structures.
| dane-pgp wrote:
| Suppose you are the ruler of a country which views
| geopolitics as a zero-sum game, because your goals are
| incompatible with those of other nations. It is therefore
| in your interest to cause other governments to be
| distracted with internal mistrust and divisions and
| health crises, so that there isn't a strong unified
| position to take action on the world stage.
|
| As a test of this theory, look at which countries have
| this sudden mistrust of authority, and which country(s)
| they would refuse to buy a vaccine from; then look at
| countries which don't have this problem and consider
| whose vaccine they buy.
| wombatmobile wrote:
| Is there somewhere a guide for preventing and/or overcoming these
| cognitive biases?
| dionidium wrote:
| Honesty and a willingness to accept that you're just as biased
| as anyone else can get you pretty far. A reasonable enough test
| might be: do you believe anything to be true that you wish
| weren't true? If every explanation you adopt for every social
| ill, every natural phenomenon, every historical event neatly
| fits a model that generates no discomfort, do you think it's
| more likely that the world really is that way or that you're
| privileging particular explanations?
| mistermann wrote:
| > Honesty and a willingness to accept that you're just as
| biased as anyone else can get you pretty far.
|
| I am very confident that there is a phenomena whereby someone
| can do this, but that in doing so their mind is in a certain
| "mode" of some kind (abstract, for starters), but when the
| mind is in a different mode (discussion _or arguing_ about
| object level ideas, culture war topics tend to work best),
| the knowledge that they formerly had becomes inaccessible,
| often even if reminded of it.
|
| My armchair theory is that this plays a part in it (but there
| are surely other things going on):
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State-dependent_memory
| kords wrote:
| I like this book: "The Art of Thinking Clearly" by Rolf
| Dobelli. It has some tips on how to avoid some of them.
| https://www.amazon.com/Art-Thinking-Clearly-Rolf-Dobelli/dp/...
| optimalsolver wrote:
| https://www.amazon.com/Rationality-AI-Zombies-Eliezer-Yudkow...
| acituan wrote:
| _Practice_ cognitive behavioral therapy and specifically their
| cognitive distortions, eg fill in a "daily mood log" form (look
| it up). Reading about distortions _propositionally_ is not
| going to get you better, you have to train yourself finding
| them in the context of your life. Turns out most of the time we
| are bummed there is a high chance of these biases being in
| play.
| metta2uall wrote:
| For those who prefer video there's Julia Galef's channel:
| https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCz-RZblnhjXK_krP1jDybeQ
|
| She is a co-founder of the Center for Applied Rationality &
| host of the Rationally Speaking podcast.
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