[HN Gopher] Credit Suisse Loses 4.7B
___________________________________________________________________
Credit Suisse Loses 4.7B
Author : cwwc
Score : 129 points
Date : 2021-04-06 10:50 UTC (12 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (www.wsj.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (www.wsj.com)
| andys627 wrote:
| Who took the other side of this bet? Ie who made 4.7b?
| alex504 wrote:
| Whoever sold the jesus guy stock
| yellowstuff wrote:
| This wasn't really a two sided bet, Archegos bought a lot of
| stock and essentially borrowed a massive amount of money to buy
| even more stock, then the stock lost value.
|
| If Company X is worth $60B on Monday and $40B on Tuesday then
| some people who were short could make a lot of money, but in
| general $20B of value has been destroyed and the world is
| poorer on Tuesday.
| flerchin wrote:
| In 2019 they reported ~$20B profit. So this is like one quarter's
| profit. You win some, you lose some.
|
| https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/assets/corporate/docs/ab...
| ckastner wrote:
| You mean they reported ~$20B in _revenue_. Profit was $3.4bn.
| flerchin wrote:
| Correct! I don't spend a lot of time reading annual reports.
| thehappypm wrote:
| If this is true, why post a comment about one?
| osrec wrote:
| As someone who has worked in the Investment Banking industry for
| a while, I'm always amazed that risk professionals get paid
| significantly less than the front office guys. This in turn
| attracts less talented people in risk, who can then be outsmarted
| by the whipper snappers in the front office teams.
|
| If IBs don't want to lose bucket loads of money every so often,
| pay your risk guys a bit more so you hire the same calibre of
| individual that would otherwise end up on the
| trading/structuring/quant desks.
| noisy_boy wrote:
| The entire model is balancing risk and reward. Being careful
| means you'll be eaten by your competitors, your shareholders
| will punish you and executive comp will take a hit - what is
| the point of playing the game then? Instead reward taking risks
| and if shit hits the fan, there are always heads that can roll
| (if need be), fines that can be negotiated with DOJ/SEC and
| ever-sneakier tactics can be invented to structure even more
| clever deals - it is all just normal part of doing business.
| The two execs that got fired would have been handsomely
| rewarded if Bill Hwang's bet went the right way, irrespective
| of the recklessness.
| osrec wrote:
| Yeah, but the "measure of recklessness" needs to go beyond
| just value at risk and portfolio sensitivities. Those things
| can be gamed by clever people and risk can be easily hidden.
|
| Unfortunately, most risk managers I knew barely understood
| the theory enough to identify the hidden risks in the books
| they oversaw. Most even struggled to get the right data out
| of the systems to do their jobs properly!
|
| You do make a valid point - if the recklessness somehow pays
| off, you're a hero (eg. Paulson).
| saucoidev wrote:
| I agree but i this is still playing the same game, and it's the
| rules that need changing
|
| There is a system set up which incentivizes your employees to
| screw over their own company, by taking more risk than they
| should, frontrunning their own clients, etc. And it
| necessitates setting up your own internal police (compliance,
| risk) just to make sure they don't get too out of hand.
|
| There are personal incentives there for the IB people to try to
| outsmart and get something past risk, or avoid getting caught
| by compliance, not to try to do what's best for the company or
| their client
| mason55 wrote:
| > _and it 's the rules that need changing_
|
| Why? The shareholders & execs were free to impose stricter
| compliance and risk rules. They chose not to.
|
| As long as you don't have contagion spreading to the rest of
| the financial system then who cares. The new rules put into
| place re: bank capitalization after the GFC seem to have
| worked here. Shareholders & execs are taking the hit, the
| rest of the banking system doesn't seem to be affected, and
| everything seems to have worked as it's supposed to in this
| case.
| itsoktocry wrote:
| > _pay your risk guys a bit more so you hire the same calibre
| of individual that would otherwise end up on the trading
| /structuring/quant desks._
|
| Reverse the causation here: they don't pay risk guys enough
| because they don't _really care_ about the risks they are
| taking.
|
| Because, you're right, if they cared they could solve issues
| like this tomorrow.
| SkyMarshal wrote:
| They do care about the risks they're taking and invest a lot
| of money into risk management. But the real risk management
| is in buying politicians with campaign donations, lobbying,
| and revolving door jobs after they leave office. Favorable
| regulations, weak punishments, and bailouts are much more
| effective. Bank risk departments are just risk theater.
| vmception wrote:
| Exactly, I always like to remind myself of the New York State
| court cases that reaffirmed Compliance Officers are at-will
| employees, and can be fired for any reason, like raising
| compliance issues.
|
| Some people are regulatory hires.
| ethbr0 wrote:
| I think it can be chalked up to cost center vs profit center.
|
| Staffing trading makes money.
|
| Staffing risk costs money.
|
| It's inevitable the latter is going to get the short end of
| the stick, probably the bare minimum requires to satisfy
| regulation, when salaries are allocated.
| rwmj wrote:
| Has anyone senior working at Credit Suisse lost any money here?
| There's your answer.
|
| (Perhaps in hypothecated future gains in share options - but
| even there, maybe not.)
| bidirectional wrote:
| Yes, of course they have. How does a company losing a sum
| equal to nearly 2 years of profit not have the most dramatic
| impact on senior officials at said company? Where do you
| think the executive bonuses and value of shares (not just
| options, senior officials will already be vested) come from?
|
| Beyond those losses, the head of investment banking _and_ the
| head of risk were both fired yesterday.
|
| The real problem is lower down the ranks, where someone on
| the trading floor can take outsized risk to boost their
| potential bonus, where worst case scenario they're fired
| without much ceremony and get another job somewhere else.
| Spinnaker_ wrote:
| It's called the Bob Rubin trade. For years you stack up
| risk and profit immensely from it ($125 million). When
| things eventually blow up you simply... step away.
|
| So sure, people were fired, but it's not like they are
| giving back all the money they made.
| osrec wrote:
| Lara Warner (Chief Risk Officer), was fired today, so I guess
| she's lost a fair bit.
| [deleted]
| tibbydudeza wrote:
| @ArchegosFO
|
| Martian Institute of Technology (MIT) - Online class of 1945 I
| give bad financial advice
|
| Already a twitter parody account :).
| lordnacho wrote:
| As a former fund manager, I have some things to explain and some
| things to ask.
|
| First, the thing to explain:
|
| Basically CS was one of several Prime Brokers. This basically
| means the guy who lends money to the speculators. Same as buying
| a house, you have a down payment that's your money, and then a
| bank lends you between 115% (boom times) and 30% (safe as houses)
| of the value of the house. If the house falls in value and you
| can't pay the mortgage, the bank can sell your house, and
| hopefully that will mean they recover their entire loan. Note
| that they only lose once the value has declined by your down
| payment amount.
|
| I actually knew the boss of a PB who got fired because a rich guy
| came in and wanted a lot of leverage, the risk managers said no,
| and he overruled them. And then the customer proceeded to lose
| hundreds of millions speculating, and it ate the bank's capital.
| So it's not the first time that risk gets overruled.
|
| So somehow, CS has lost $4.7B on this Archegos financing, after
| Archegos lost whatver they put up. From what I gather, Archegos
| had $10B of equity in total? Typically (sensibly) you don't put
| all your eggs in one basket as a fund, even a quite concentrated
| fund.
|
| How big was the position?
| incrudible wrote:
| It was not a loan, it was a total return swap on leveraged
| CFDs. CS took the market risk for a fee, picking up pennies in
| front of a steamroller.
| lordnacho wrote:
| Principle is the same. There's still some kind of margin
| maintenance with swaps (I traded swaps too). Plus as the PB
| you can ask for sensible terms.
| sschueller wrote:
| Well they seem to be getting run over by a steamroller every
| other week. Greensill is already yesterdays news...
| CapriciousCptl wrote:
| Archegos was at 15% equity / gross positions and had stakes as
| large as 25% in their investees. Their positions were enormous,
| concentrated and not reported on a 13F because Archegos was a
| set up as a family office. All according to WSJ. What they were
| thinking, who knows, but I bet it involves lots of talk about
| beta, other greek letters and VaR.
|
| https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-archegoss-epic-meltdown-...
| duxup wrote:
| I read elsewhere (can't read this article) that some other
| banks had made similar deals with Archegos, but they saw the
| trouble coming and were able to offload their exposure / shares
| (sell the house using the analogy) before other banks and thus
| were able to get out with limited or no losses.
|
| Does that sound right?
|
| It seems strange to me that using the house analogy ... there's
| potentially WAY more than say a 15 percent loss (using the 115%
| number) if other lenders decide to nope out.
| lordnacho wrote:
| Disregard the 115%, that's from the pre-GFC times when banks
| used to give you more money than you needed to buy the house,
| plus some more to buy a car.
|
| You're right there were several deals, but again, you're
| allowed to ask questions as a PB. Clearly if you're lending
| money to a guy who is borrowing from a bunch of other people
| to do the same thing, you should have a think about it.
| duxup wrote:
| >you should have a think about it.
|
| Yeah in a couple other articles it seems some banks refused
| to lend to / cut off Archegos at some point(s). These guys
| who are all leverage all the time ... seems inevitable they
| get it wrong.
| tedunangst wrote:
| Turns out banks don't like telling other banks what all
| their internal positions are.
| freebee4567 wrote:
| if you are levered 10 to 1 and the stock has an implied vol of
| 10% you only need a 1 SD move to eat all your capital. Viacom
| is now at 60% implied vol so they could get those losses with a
| position as small as $10 billion.
| lordnacho wrote:
| That implied vol is annualized. It follows a square-root law,
| so that daily is something under 4% (60/sqrt(trading days)).
| chrisgp wrote:
| Just curious, is that still true if your model of daily
| returns isn't gaussian? If prices have intermittent shocks
| (Ornstein-Uhlenbeck, etc) is the daily vol much higher?
| fractionalhare wrote:
| _> From what I gather, Archegos had $10B of equity in total?
| Typically (sensibly) you don 't put all your eggs in one basket
| as a fund, even a quite concentrated fund._
|
| It was $20B. Hwang's whole schtick from the outset of his
| family office was to hyper lever up on high growth companies.
| By doing this he went from $1B to $20B of actual capital in
| about 2 years. Then he blew up spectacularly because he was
| levered up about 5x in a ridiculous concentration.
|
| There's no royal road to excess returns, etc. He probably could
| have kept this going longer, but sooner or later one of his
| superholdings was going to have a market event sparking a loss
| (like VIAC) and even his volume wasn't going to be able to prop
| up the price anymore. Chain reaction from there.
|
| This is a good cautionary tale: going around to a bunch of
| banks and getting crazy leverage _Big Short_ style doesn 't
| always end in a lionizing outcome. In fact it usually doesn't.
| What sucks is the leverage is going to be demonized here, when
| the actual problem is Hwang's lack of transparency (albeit
| legal) to his brokers and his frankly stupid risk management.
|
| Plenty of funds safely chug along for years running at 3-4x
| leverage, they just have the good sense to keep beta < 1 and
| stay roughly market neutral in their long/short holdings...
| dcolkitt wrote:
| > Big Short style doesn't always end in a lionizing outcome.
|
| That movie was the worse thing that ever happened for a
| generation of traders. It reinforces all the worse biases
| traders tend to have. The moral of the story was to make a
| single concentrated bet, to throw risk management to the
| wind, to double down as you lost money, and to completely
| ignore any expert that disagreed with your investment thesis.
|
| In reality for every Michael Burry, there's 100 stubborn
| overconfident idiots who YOLO everything into a bet that
| blows up in their face. First off, it's much better to make
| as many small independent bets than to have one big trade.
| It's also better to make trades with a fixed, ideally short,
| time horizon. Even if you're ultimately right, without a
| catalyst, the market can remain irrational longer than you
| can remain solvent.
|
| Finally the best traders tend to be extremely open minded and
| willing to change their views on a dime. The human mind is
| heavily biased towards overconfidence. Good traders should be
| flipping their views as evidence comes in. This has been
| empirically verified by Philip Tetlock. The best forecasters
| are those who are quickest to change their mind. If they hear
| some expert with an opposing opinion, they don't dig in their
| heels like the heroes of The Big Short.
|
| The problem is the qualities that make a great narrative hero
| are almost exactly the opposite of those that make a great
| trader or forecaster. We love a story about a bold
| contrarian, who goes all in on a single bet, and sticks to
| his guns no matter what obstacles come his way. The story
| practically writes itself.
|
| But it's precisely this mythologizing that causes this style
| of trading to be the least rewarded in the market. Everybody
| wants to be the hero of their own story. There's way too many
| Michael Burry wannabes, and not nearly enough George Soroses.
| lotsofpulp wrote:
| >What sucks is the leverage is going to be demonized here,
| when the actual problem is Hwang's lack of transparency
| (albeit legal) to his brokers and his frankly stupid risk
| management.
|
| Seems to me the onus is on CS and other prime brokers to
| require Hwang to disclose or otherwise do due diligence on
| his other bets.
| fractionalhare wrote:
| They can wag their finger, but they don't legally have
| recourse for finding out this information ahead of time if
| Hwang and his existing lenders don't volunteer it. That's
| just the current state of play with margin lending.
| lotsofpulp wrote:
| Then the onus is on CS to correctly price that risk, or
| not lend the funds.
| fractionalhare wrote:
| And that is why heads of risk lost their jobs this week!
| occamrazor wrote:
| Personally I don't understand why so many people are blaming
| Hwang and Archegos. He lost his own money and the money of
| the banks who gave him leverage _without_ a proper risk
| assessment. I haven't seen any claims that Hwang lied to the
| banks and it's the banks' job to do due diligence and apply
| sane risk management practices.
| fractionalhare wrote:
| I don't personally have any skin in the game, but of course
| I blame him for losing his money. It's his fault, who else
| would I blame? Pretty cut and dry case of terrible risk
| management here. What seems controversial?
|
| Nobody held a gun to his head and told him to load up crazy
| leverage on a highly concentrated basket of equities... And
| the banks that lent him money didn't have transparency as
| to his leverage elsewhere.
| lordnacho wrote:
| I think it's more an awe for the scale of capital
| destruction.
|
| In the end this isn't a domino that topples the whole
| financial system, risk was taken by a guy who had money,
| and banks who are capitalized to lose money now and again.
| TuringNYC wrote:
| >> From what I gather, Archegos had $10B of equity in total?
| Typically (sensibly) you don't put all your eggs in one basket
| as a fund, even a quite concentrated fund.
|
| >> How big was the position?
|
| I think you're trying to get to "how was the loss so big?" The
| size of the position is only part of the answer.
|
| The other comments answer the size of the position. But there
| are several other factors here.
|
| They probably liquidated too late -- they ended up liquidating
| with giant block trades. That unwind also cost a lot because
| the block trade is at a discount to market value. Further, the
| larger the unwind, the bigger the price hit you take.
|
| Finally, these types of unwinds can spook others in the market
| and further drive down the price.
| satellite2 wrote:
| Or too early as most of the liquidated assets regained a lot
| Friday afternoon and almost everything by Monday...
| mannykannot wrote:
| According to Matt Levine, Archegos's positions in sevaral
| companies was large enough that it had, by its own actions,
| significantly driven up their prices. The bubble burst when one
| of these companies - ViacomCBS - issued new stock with the
| intent of capturing more of this sudden interest, and sales of
| the offering fell way short of expectations.
| mensetmanusman wrote:
| It would be hilarious if it was Viacom's unexpected new greed
| that sparked the ensuing "bank run" by the bankers, ha
| ethbr0 wrote:
| In insane scenarios like this, is there anything preventing a
| company from issuing new stock, waiting for the price drop
| from liquidating major holders, and buying back an equivalent
| amount?
| tim333 wrote:
| There's a bit of a lag while they file paperwork to issue
| the new stock.
| BlasDeLezo wrote:
| I lost 50 Euros once. I was very upset all day.
| herodoturtle wrote:
| "Archegos was a fund run by and managing the personal fortune of
| Bill Hwang, an investor who had built up large positions in
| companies worth billions of pounds, despite a previous insider
| trading conviction."
|
| "Credit Suisse's investment bank under Chin acted as prime broker
| to Archegos funds, lending it large sums of money to allow it to
| build up bigger positions in the shareholdings of quoted
| companies. Hwang had placed big bets that certain stocks,
| including Chinese technology company Baidu and US media group
| ViacomCBS, would see their share prices rise. When the stocks
| fell, both Hwang and his lending banks suffered heavy losses."
|
| This reads as if Credit Suisse was bankrolling a maverick fund
| manager's speculative investments.
|
| Strikes me as a rather unhealthy disregard for risk, and
| completely goes against the spirit of capital preservation.
|
| That's four thousand seven hundred million dollars down the drain
| - by one of the world's most prestigious banks.
|
| Leaves a bitter taste in my working class mouth.
| robk wrote:
| the money went somewhere. unless you hold CS shares it may well
| have gone into your retirement fund's allocation indirectly.
| who knows, but you're probably no worse off.
| jerf wrote:
| A casual reading of that may make it sound like Credit Suisse
| made some sort of conscious decision to lend money, but from
| what I see in the financial industry, lending is handed out
| like candy on Halloween, almost right down to the bowl left out
| on the street that says "Take Two" and uses the honor system.
| It's just "leverage". It came with the account and they used
| it, and it's likely very minimal oversight was ever exerted
| beyond basic automated checks asserting that sufficient assets
| were in place to be margin called if necessary.
|
| I see a lot of people calling this the "everything bubble", but
| to my mind, history may record this as the "leverage bubble".
| With such low interest rates and free money being shoveled out
| of the helicopter as fast as it can with more than a whiff of
| desperation about the whole exercise, there's leverage
| everywhere, and leverage stacked on that leverage, and
| leveraged assets being held up as collateral for levered
| leverage. It seems, at least for today, that this was not The
| Great Deleveraging, but at some point in the not-too-distant
| future one seems inevitable to me.
|
| (Subject to the usual "the market can remain irrational longer
| than you can remain solvent" timing issues, in that I wouldn't
| dream of trying to call a date on this, but I can't help but
| think The Great Deleveraging is inevitably coming, when
| something somewhere pops like this, and the act of margin
| calling to make up for it pushes down other assets in value,
| which causes more margin calling and assets getting
| automatically sold, which pushes down other assets in value,
| which causes more margin calling and asset selloffs, and it
| just doesn't stop until there's hardly a speck of leverage left
| in the market and valuations are a smoking crater, along with
| every account that was based on leverage. A basic understanding
| of differential equations would suggest that it's likely the
| market will at some point experience a phase transition, where
| we don't gradually go from this being impossible, to kinda
| happening more and more as leverage increases, but instead we
| can go in very short time from this being essentially
| impossible to completely inevitable, and nobody actually knows
| when this threshold will be crossed.)
| NortySpock wrote:
| This feels like history rhyming...
|
| "[T]he practice of 'buying on margin' allowed a person to
| acquire stock by expending in cash as little as ten percent
| of the price of a stock. The balance was covered by a loan
| from a broker, who was advanced the money by his bank, which,
| in turn, accepted the stock as collateral for the loan.
| Credit was easy, and the Federal Reserve System did little to
| restrict the availability of money for stock investment." --
| article on the stock market crash of 1929
|
| https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-
| almanacs-...
| xhkkffbf wrote:
| Which differential equations? The heat equation/option
| valuation doesn't seem to have such a possibility built into,
| right?
| jerf wrote:
| I don't have a specific one in mind, just the intuition
| that recursive processes can have a lot sharper of a cutoff
| than a less differentially-minded intuition might suggest.
|
| You can also look at it probabilistically, rather than
| differentially. Consider even just "If the probability of a
| margin call causing a margin call is X, and a margin call
| occurs, how many margin calls will occur in a chain?" The
| number sharply goes up as your raise the probability close
| to one, it doesn't just smoothly increase. It's even worse
| once you add in to the model that the probability is not
| independent, but as more occur the probability of the next
| one _also_ would increase. Especially if you add that non-
| independence in, what you 'll see is a phase change, where
| you get a surprisingly sharp transition between "a margin
| call doesn't usually cause another one" to "a never-ending
| cascade of margin calls occurs", rather than a smooth one.
|
| (I may post a model of this. Someone may beat me to it,
| too. It's not that hard.)
| jerf wrote:
| I'm not saying this is an accurate model of the financial
| system, just the sort of thing I was going for:
| import random import itertools def
| withProb(p): return random.random() < p
| def avg100(f): return sum(f() for i in
| range(100))/100 # Independent probabilities;
| look what happens as you get close to 1. def
| marginCallChain(prob): total = 0.0
| while withProb(prob) and total < 100000:
| total += 1 return total #
| Dependent probabilities: def
| marginCallDependent(prob): total = 0.0
| while withProb(prob) and total < 100000:
| total += 1 prob = 1 - 1 /((1 / (1 -
| prob)) * 1.01) return total
|
| If you play with that with something like "avg100(lambda:
| marginCallChain(.95))", you can find that the chain
| starts extending a lot as you get close to 1. It's not a
| terribly sharp phase change, though.
|
| "avg100(lambda: marginCallDependent(.95))" shows more
| interesting behavior. That only slightly raises the
| probability of the next margin call based on the fact
| that one occurred, and what you can see is that around
| .93-.95, you start seeing that every once in a while, the
| probability manages to occasionally work itself up to
| effectively 1 and the chain hits the upper limit I set.
| As you raise up towards one, you start to see it more and
| more often; .96 still sometimes manages to have a run of
| 100 without a crash, but even .965 the odds that one will
| occur in that run of 100 start to approach 1. There's a
| phase change between where 100 runs of the model have
| almost no probability of having a runaway to where the
| probability of at least 1 runaway is quite probable, and
| it's more sudden than a linear understanding of the
| process would suggest.
|
| Again, this is not a model of the financial system; this
| is a simple model of the point I was making.
| xhkkffbf wrote:
| Okay. I see your point. I just tend to think of "phase
| change" as something different. But if the idea is that
| margin calls beget more margin calls, I can't disagree.
| herodoturtle wrote:
| I just wanted to quickly say thanks for taking the time to
| reply to my comment with so much insight.
|
| I don't have anything valuable to add, but hell, your
| response was very interesting to read!
|
| It also sent me down some fun rabbit holes on credit cycles.
|
| Cheers from South Africa.
| tootie wrote:
| I don't work in hedge funds and have only a superficial
| understanding, but it seems the operative word of "hedge" was
| completely ignore here. He plowed a huge chunk of his positions
| into two companies and didn't offset with any swaps or other
| risk absorbers. This seems like downright malpractice and not
| just a bad luck.
| bidirectional wrote:
| Eh, all is fair in love and war. The bank are charging a risk
| premium on any transactions with him, it's their fault if
| they underestimate it. It's a family office, not a hedge fund
| taking outsider capital, so he's entering into transactions
| with willing counterparties using his own money.
| QuestionC wrote:
| > This reads as if Credit Suisse was bankrolling a maverick
| fund manager's speculative investments.
|
| Archegos had secured identical positions with a number of
| investment banks, including Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and
| Nomura.
|
| Credit Suisse was just stuck holding the bag while other banks
| quickly unwound their positions.
| ashconnor wrote:
| Layman here. Why was Credit Suisse left holding the bag
| instead of the losses being distributed between the banks?
| Was it because they were the broker?
| kristjansson wrote:
| The other firms were better at listening to the music, and
| knew that it had stopped?
| herodoturtle wrote:
| This comment reminded me of that awesome scene by Jeremy
| Irons in Margin Call :-)
| arthurcolle wrote:
| Be first, be smarter or cheat
| lotsofpulp wrote:
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ag14Ao_xO4c
| tedunangst wrote:
| Because they were last to sell.
| tumetab1 wrote:
| Insert MEME: Here we go again :D
|
| On a serious note, this is funny to read after the initial
| reports that this had a small and contained impact. Let's hope no
| further cascading bankruptcies happen.
| itsoktocry wrote:
| > _Here we go again :D_
|
| Maybe so. There was a year between Bear Stearns Asset
| Management funds blowing up in 2007, and Lehman failing...
| jgalt212 wrote:
| Reg T is very loosely applied, and there are all sorts of work-
| arounds (TRR swaps, etc) and the regulators just don't seem to
| care that Reg T is being violated in spirit if not in letter.
|
| https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/regulationt.asp
|
| I interviewed for am equity swaps trading position many years
| ago, in full disclosure to me the prospective employer let me
| know that applying Reg T to derivatives transactions would be
| very bad for their business.
| Spinnaker_ wrote:
| Reg T only covers initial equity leverage for retail investors.
| It probably doesn't apply to anyone you hear about in the wsj.
|
| There are basically no all-encompassing, market-wide
| regulations for institutions.
| cromka wrote:
| As a (soon to be former) employee, I was already pitched in the
| AM today by a headhunter referring to this loss.
| sorokod wrote:
| Also ( no paywall ) Guardian article
|
| https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/apr/06/credit-suis...
___________________________________________________________________
(page generated 2021-04-06 23:02 UTC)