[HN Gopher] A story about pivots
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       A story about pivots
        
       Author : james_impliu
       Score  : 112 points
       Date   : 2021-01-22 13:53 UTC (9 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (posthog.com)
 (TXT) w3m dump (posthog.com)
        
       | tylermenezes wrote:
       | To me the biggest takeaway is, as always, you should care about
       | what you're building, or you're unlikely to find success.
        
         | thisisbrians wrote:
         | Stated another way: the goal shouldn't be to build something,
         | but to solve a problem for someone. Building should be a means,
         | not an end.
        
       | herval wrote:
       | This is a gem! They did _exactly_ what one should do to build a
       | new business: find market fit _before_ spending a ton of time on
       | an idea, even if you're "passionate" about it. As engineers, it's
       | very easy to get overly attached to an idea or project, specially
       | when it seems you're the only one it resonates with, or you've
       | invested a lot of time on it already.
       | 
       | Best of luck to PostHog!
        
         | baxtr wrote:
         | There's is a fine line though. They actually spent a lot time
         | on building things. You could even argue they could have gotten
         | there earlier in some cases. But in general I agree!
        
       | SamuelAdams wrote:
       | My favorite story of a pivot comes from anon on HN [1]:
       | 
       | In 2009, the startup where I was working was hitting the skids,
       | and our investors (correctly) were not willing to back us. We all
       | kept grinding for a month or two in honorable futility, but after
       | a while, my bank account depleted and I had to go.
       | 
       | To make various ends meet and to keep my mental health during the
       | wind down however, I took up some contract work that I found
       | through various friends in the SF startup scene. One company that
       | I really liked and did some small stuff for was Burbn, which was
       | a mobile-only location check-in that was hinged around taking
       | photos of your location.
       | 
       | Missing my friends in NYC (I made a lot of friends in SF, but my
       | inner circle were my college buddies from CMU; I went to tech and
       | they went finance, sigh), I decided to leave SF to head to NYC
       | and get a fresh start.
       | 
       | As I was leaving, I wanted to tie up a few loose ends, so I
       | emailed my contact at Burbn and said I was likely to be
       | unavailable for any more work, but that I liked the project and
       | hoped for the best for him. He responded and said that he was
       | near funding on a small pivot, and that if I was interested,
       | there might be a full-time role available. I declined - I was
       | mentally done with SF and the startup scene (Larry Chiang, 111
       | Minna, the rise of FB spam-crap like RockYou, etc.) as it was
       | then.
       | 
       | That person was Kevin Systrom; that pivot was Instagram.
       | 
       | [1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18063362
        
       | wpietri wrote:
       | I really appreciate when people are transparent. There's a lot of
       | good wisdom here.
       | 
       | A decade back I co-founded a startup. My cofounder, a brilliant
       | product manager, had what seemed like a great idea. Great enough
       | that he quickly got a fat check for the whole seed round. We
       | could have just started building, but both of us were big fans of
       | using user testing to guide product development, so we instead
       | did a lot of user tests.
       | 
       | Six or eight weeks later, we were down at Sand Hill Road for our
       | first board meeting. At this point, according to our VCs,
       | normally they'd just hear about plans. But my co-founder got up
       | and explained that of the 6 key assumptions in our product, 2 and
       | maybe 3 were false. The thing they'd given us money to build was
       | a bust. The room was very quiet. Then he went on to explain the
       | next idea we'd come up with and got them excited about that.
       | 
       | Something we learned later is at the same time we'd raised a seed
       | round, two other companies raised large A rounds to go after
       | basically the same idea. They spent the next 18 months (and north
       | of $10m) trying to make it work.
       | 
       | Not only did that make us feel a lot better about having pivoted,
       | but it was an important lesson to me: _the best failures are
       | those with the smallest craters_. We bought the same knowledge
       | for less than 1% of the money spent.
        
         | dillondoyle wrote:
         | Would you be willing to expand a bit on the user tests?
         | surveys? Counting signups for interest? I'm wondering about
         | other ways to test without a MVP
        
           | exdeve wrote:
           | I bet they just talk to people, show them the app and watch
           | how they use it. This is the quicker and meaningful user
           | testing I know
        
             | wongarsu wrote:
             | It also doesn't require actually building the app, the user
             | can just tell you which action they take and you draw the
             | next app state on a piece of paper
        
           | wpietri wrote:
           | Sure! It depends a lot on the product. But in our case, a key
           | interaction was on Facebook. So we pretended to be doing
           | market research on social media and brought a lot of people
           | in for user tests. Eventually we'd have them log in to
           | Facebook on our test computer, asking them what they though
           | of various posts.
           | 
           | What they didn't know was that we used Greasemonkey to alter
           | the Facebook page, inserting fake feed items using their real
           | friends. (We told them at the end if they didn't figure it
           | out.) Some people liked what we were doing, but a lot hated
           | it. So many that it was clear we'd never get the market
           | penetration we wanted.
           | 
           | My cofounder did a 5-minute video talk about it if you'd like
           | more details. https://vimeo.com/24749599
           | 
           | As an aside, surveys are worse than useless for this. Look
           | for things that let you understand live user reactions in
           | circumstances that are as real as possible. Signups are a
           | good metric, especially if they'll give you a credit card
           | number up front. But if you can, always back the metric with
           | live user tests and discussion with real users. If you're
           | patient and ask good questions, you can learn a ton.
        
         | jjtheblunt wrote:
         | > the best failures are those with the smallest craters.
         | 
         | what a fantastic quote!
        
         | Winterflow3r wrote:
         | Would you be open to discuss points 2 and 3 - the key
         | assumptions that were wrong - a bit more?
        
           | wpietri wrote:
           | I honestly no longer recall. My cofounder gives a short talk
           | here that will give you an idea, though:
           | https://vimeo.com/24749599
        
         | baxtr wrote:
         | Great story! What happened to the two other companies? Did they
         | fail?
        
           | zhoujianfu wrote:
           | One is Uber and the other is Lyft.
        
           | keithwhor wrote:
           | One is Dropbox and the other is Box.
        
             | [deleted]
        
           | wpietri wrote:
           | They did fail. For what it's worth, we did as well. I think
           | our eventual product idea was much better than our first one,
           | though, and I think our fatal mistake was not about lack of
           | user demand, but on building too much on the theory that we
           | could use Facebook for viral growth. As we were about to go
           | for our A round Facebook changed a lot of things to de-
           | emphasize apps and posting to people's feeds, so our growth
           | numbers fell off a cliff. Turns out investors only like
           | hockey sticks when they go up.
        
       | Jugurtha wrote:
       | Hey, James... Thank you for offering me a code to get a PostHog
       | mug shipped, but I won't use the code now. I'll use it when you
       | get to a few billion dollars of revenue. It's rude to turn down a
       | gift and I want my mug : D
       | 
       | All the best to you and your team :)
        
       | afterwalk wrote:
       | posthog looks like a great product. But it's interesting that a
       | product offering with "open source" and "on your infrastructure"
       | still has "cloud" as the first tab in the pricing. (Not a
       | criticism at all, just pointing out the interesting dynamics of
       | the open core business model)
        
         | james_impliu wrote:
         | We're about to change our deployment strategy actually!
         | 
         | We think the future for open source is offering private cloud,
         | where we have some sort of control pane to manage upgrades
         | without needing access to your data. That's a win for privacy
         | reasons but mean we don't have to go at the pace of our users
         | with the least powerful on premise servers.
        
           | afterwalk wrote:
           | That sounds interesting. Out of curiosity does AWS have
           | streamlined support for vendor deployments? (I don't work in
           | large organizations so have never seen how non-saas
           | deployments work)
        
       | progre wrote:
       | How much can you change an MVP and intended customer and still
       | call it a pivot?
        
         | wpietri wrote:
         | Eric Ries, the guy who coined the term, has 2 categories:
         | pivots and leaps. The analogy he used is basketball footwork.
         | If you keep one foot planted, it's a pivot. Reviewing the
         | article:
         | 
         | 1 -> 2: Pivot, as it's still in sales.
         | 
         | 2 -> 3: Pivot, as they kept the sales focus and "predictive
         | analytics".
         | 
         | 3 -> 4: Seems like more of a leap.
         | 
         | 4 -> 5: Pivot, as it's still developer surveys.
         | 
         | 5 -> 6: Leap.
         | 
         | Both are fine, honestly. But one should favor pivots over
         | leaps, as you have less to re-do. A leap is a desperation ploy.
        
           | progre wrote:
           | Nice to learn the origin of the term in this context. My only
           | other exposure to it is through SQL
        
         | james_impliu wrote:
         | Ha! I never thought of the terminology this way - some of these
         | are hops some are pivots!
        
       | danr4 wrote:
       | As a user and (recent) contributor to PostHog, I find it pretty
       | incredible how good enough it is for such a young product, and
       | the pace of releasing new features.
       | 
       | I really hope you'll be able to sustain it.
        
       | 147 wrote:
       | Super impressed with your story and how much progress you've
       | made. It sounds like you're constantly taking action, even though
       | some might argue about the pivots or hops you've made.
       | 
       | I'm curious about a few things.
       | 
       | I'm most curious about the tactics you all used to find potential
       | users and customers to talk to. Aside from using the YC network,
       | were you going on LinkedIn and doing cold out reach?
       | 
       | Less important but how crappy/embarrassing were the MVPs you were
       | showing people?
        
         | james_impliu wrote:
         | The weird thing was that the people I'd helped with nothing in
         | it for me ended up being the best place to start. It was often
         | friends at startups who need a website building, or some
         | friendly advice.
         | 
         | That's not super helpful if you've not already done that:
         | 
         | * Real life groups were pretty helpful. You can't go to these
         | aiming to sell, but if you go aiming to learn and genuinely
         | just get advice, they work well. * LinkedIn was pretty good,
         | looking for people that I knew through others and asking them
         | really nicely if I could talk about something we wanted to
         | build. When we had better ideas that solved pain points they
         | had, that were more unique, the response rate was much higher.
         | This doesn't work well for "recruiter-saturated" user profiles
         | like developers, who just ignore a lot of what goes on there.
         | 
         | The MVPs weren't that bad - they'd work smoothly on the things
         | that were new and special BUT they often totally lacked core
         | functionality. We built with django so we could use django
         | admin to do things like add users/change passwords.
        
       | snarkypixel wrote:
       | One pro-tip when building a product that you don't yet have
       | product market fit for is to be a bit more general in your
       | technology choices and naming conventions.
       | 
       | Ideally, you don't lose 100% of the work you've done in the past
       | when pivoting. The database should ideally stay the same with the
       | infra, deployment tools, etc. The code structure should stay
       | similar with various internal libraries (i.e. logging, synching
       | data, etc.)
       | 
       | In a way, it also help to make good architecture decisions
       | because rather than hack a one-off, it's easier to spot the right
       | abstractions that can be re-used across products.
       | 
       | Same with naming.. instead of naming all your things based on the
       | product name, just use fun/code names, so when you pivot or re-
       | brand, you don't have to rename everything or need to deal with
       | legacy product names.
        
       | ignoramous wrote:
       | Great write-up.
       | 
       | > _Along our journey ( /series of failed ideas), we got
       | frustrated having to send all our user data to 3rd parties to
       | understand our product usage. It felt wrong and it meant we'd
       | lose a bunch of user data that would have been quite useful. So
       | we built PostHog._
       | 
       | I wouldn't call PostHog a pivot, but rather focusing on something
       | else entirely, and really solving one's own pain-points; often a
       | well-trodden way of finding product-market fit [0].
       | 
       | > _There were a load of features we wanted conceptually - but it
       | was when we realized that the strategy was being open source
       | first and foremost that we felt more excited than we ever had
       | before. When that clicked, we knew we 'd just fallen in love with
       | this idea. We started building on January 23rd, 2020._
       | 
       | Given 'tis the season of FOSS projects pivoting to non-FOSS
       | licenses; as a FOSS developer, I am interested in PostHog's pivot
       | from "FOSS alternative to Heap / Amplitude" to "source-available"
       | [1] instead :)
       | 
       | [0] https://archive.is/66opo#selection-118.161-118.162
       | 
       | [1] https://github.com/PostHog/posthog/blob/master/ee/LICENSE
        
         | timgl wrote:
         | We do have a completely FOSS version here:
         | https://github.com/posthog/posthog-foss :). The only difference
         | is support for Clickhouse and some advanced permissioning
         | stuff.
        
       | FL33TW00D wrote:
       | Is the mom test actually worth the money? I've seen it touted in
       | a few places and again here.
        
         | snarkypixel wrote:
         | yes!
        
         | foxgrover wrote:
         | Yes
        
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       (page generated 2021-01-22 23:01 UTC)