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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

arXiv:2503.21145 (cs)
[Submitted on 27 Mar 2025]

Title:How to Secure Existing C and C++ Software without Memory Safety

Authors:Ulfar Erlingsson
View a PDF of the paper titled How to Secure Existing C and C++
Software without Memory Safety, by \'Ulfar Erlingsson
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    Abstract:The most important security benefit of software memory
    safety is easy to state: for C and C++ software, attackers can
    exploit most bugs and vulnerabilities to gain full, unfettered
    control of software behavior, whereas this is not true for most
    bugs in memory-safe software.
    Fortunately, this security benefit -- most bugs don't give
    attackers full control -- can be had for unmodified C/C++
    software, without per-application effort.
    This doesn't require trying to establish memory safety; instead,
    it is sufficient to eliminate most of the combinatorial ways in
    which software with corrupted memory can execute. To eliminate
    these interleavings, there already exist practical compiler and
    runtime mechanisms that incur little overhead and need no special
    hardware or platform support.
    Each of the mechanisms described here is already in production
    use, at scale, on one or more platforms. By supporting their
    combined use in development toolchains, the security of all C and
    C++ software against remote code execution attacks can be
    rapidly, and dramatically, improved.

Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Software Engineering
          (cs.SE)
Cite as:  arXiv:2503.21145 [cs.CR]
          (or arXiv:2503.21145v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
          https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2503.21145
          Focus to learn more
          arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Ulfar Erlingsson [view email]
[v1] Thu, 27 Mar 2025 04:20:47 UTC (15 KB)
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