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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

arXiv:2403.03998 (cs)
[Submitted on 6 Mar 2024]

Title:OpenVPN is Open to VPN Fingerprinting

Authors:Diwen Xue, Reethika Ramesh, Arham Jain, Michalis Kallitsis,
J. Alex Halderman, Jedidiah R. Crandall, Roya Ensafi
Download a PDF of the paper titled OpenVPN is Open to VPN
Fingerprinting, by Diwen Xue and 6 other authors
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    Abstract:VPN adoption has seen steady growth over the past decade
    due to increased public awareness of privacy and surveillance
    threats. In response, certain governments are attempting to
    restrict VPN access by identifying connections using "dual use"
    DPI technology. To investigate the potential for VPN blocking, we
    develop mechanisms for accurately fingerprinting connections
    using OpenVPN, the most popular protocol for commercial VPN
    services. We identify three fingerprints based on protocol
    features such as byte pattern, packet size, and server response.
    Playing the role of an attacker who controls the network, we
    design a two-phase framework that performs passive fingerprinting
    and active probing in sequence. We evaluate our framework in
    partnership with a million-user ISP and find that we identify
    over 85% of OpenVPN flows with only negligible false positives,
    suggesting that OpenVPN-based services can be effectively blocked
    with little collateral damage. Although some commercial VPNs
    implement countermeasures to avoid detection, our framework
    successfully identified connections to 34 out of 41 "obfuscated"
    VPN configurations. We discuss the implications of the VPN
    fingerprintability for different threat models and propose
    short-term defenses. In the longer term, we urge commercial VPN
    providers to be more transparent about their obfuscation
    approaches and to adopt more principled detection
    countermeasures, such as those developed in censorship
    circumvention research.

Comments:          In: USENIX Security Symposium 2022 (USENIX
                   Security '22)
Subjects:          Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as:           arXiv:2403.03998 [cs.CR]
                   (or arXiv:2403.03998v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
                   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2403.03998
                   Focus to learn more
                   arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
Journal reference: 31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security
                   22). 2022

Submission history

From: Diwen Xue [view email]
[v1] Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:15:02 UTC (25,370 KB)
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