https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.11753 Skip to main content Cornell University We gratefully acknowledge support from the Simons Foundation, member institutions, and all contributors. Donate arxiv logo > cs > arXiv:2402.11753 [ ] Help | Advanced Search [All fields ] Search arXiv logo Cornell University Logo [ ] GO quick links * Login * Help Pages * About Computer Science > Computation and Language arXiv:2402.11753 (cs) [Submitted on 19 Feb 2024 (v1), last revised 22 Feb 2024 (this version, v2)] Title:ArtPrompt: ASCII Art-based Jailbreak Attacks against Aligned LLMs Authors:Fengqing Jiang, Zhangchen Xu, Luyao Niu, Zhen Xiang, Bhaskar Ramasubramanian, Bo Li, Radha Poovendran Download a PDF of the paper titled ArtPrompt: ASCII Art-based Jailbreak Attacks against Aligned LLMs, by Fengqing Jiang and 6 other authors Download PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract:Safety is critical to the usage of large language models (LLMs). Multiple techniques such as data filtering and supervised fine-tuning have been developed to strengthen LLM safety. However, currently known techniques presume that corpora used for safety alignment of LLMs are solely interpreted by semantics. This assumption, however, does not hold in real-world applications, which leads to severe vulnerabilities in LLMs. For example, users of forums often use ASCII art, a form of text-based art, to convey image information. In this paper, we propose a novel ASCII art-based jailbreak attack and introduce a comprehensive benchmark Vision-in-Text Challenge (ViTC) to evaluate the capabilities of LLMs in recognizing prompts that cannot be solely interpreted by semantics. We show that five SOTA LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, Claude, and Llama2) struggle to recognize prompts provided in the form of ASCII art. Based on this observation, we develop the jailbreak attack ArtPrompt, which leverages the poor performance of LLMs in recognizing ASCII art to bypass safety measures and elicit undesired behaviors from LLMs. ArtPrompt only requires black-box access to the victim LLMs, making it a practical attack. We evaluate ArtPrompt on five SOTA LLMs, and show that ArtPrompt can effectively and efficiently induce undesired behaviors from all five LLMs. Subjects: Computation and Language (cs.CL); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2402.11753 [cs.CL] (or arXiv:2402.11753v2 [cs.CL] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2402.11753 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Luyao Niu [view email] [v1] Mon, 19 Feb 2024 00:43:31 UTC (968 KB) [v2] Thu, 22 Feb 2024 18:40:03 UTC (968 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: Download a PDF of the paper titled ArtPrompt: ASCII Art-based Jailbreak Attacks against Aligned LLMs, by Fengqing Jiang and 6 other authors * Download PDF * HTML (experimental) * TeX Source * Other Formats license icon view license Current browse context: cs.CL < prev | next > new | recent | 2402 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations * NASA ADS * Google Scholar * Semantic Scholar a export BibTeX citation Loading... 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