https://www.ggd.world/p/why-has-fertility-plummeted-across [https] The Great Gender Divergence Subscribe Sign in Share this post [https] Why has fertility plummeted across East Asia? www.ggd.world Copy link Facebook Email Note Other Why has fertility plummeted across East Asia? [https] Alice Evans Jan 19, 2024 11 Share this post [https] Why has fertility plummeted across East Asia? www.ggd.world Copy link Facebook Email Note Other Share Let me suggest 5 major drivers: 1. Meritocratic civil service exams encouraged heavy investment in education. China institutionalised this first, but the system then spread across East Asia. Education became seen as the pathway for social mobility. 2. Education fever has spawned an arms race of intensive parenting. 3. Within China, fertility fell earliest in the more individualist northeast, where there is less onus on lineage. 4. Economic development has spawned cultural liberalisation, weakening pressure to bear multiple sons. 5. Given heavy expectations of parenting and cultural liberalisation, one child is increasingly seen as enough. To understand all these interactions, we need to trace cultural evolution over the past 1500 years. Buckle up. The Great Gender Divergence is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. [ ] Subscribe [https] Image Bloomberg News 2024 Imperial examinations East Asians strongly value education and believe it to be the pathway to social mobility. This may go back to China's 6th century keju civil service exams. This meritocratic institution has been enormously important - argues Yasheng Huang in "The Rise and Fall of the East". The keju provided a meritocratic pathway to respectability. Candidates wrote their answers in a private booth, their answers then were transcribed. Double-blind exams. It was the premium channel to upwards mobility - far more efficient than commerce, religion, intelligentsia and political opposition. This was common knowledge. Stories about commoners being propelled to the elite functioned as an 'opium of the masses'. The Chinese dream, so to speak. If you memorised Confucianism, you could achieve great riches. During the Ming, two to three million men regularly took the qualifying tests. The most intelligent and ambitious men spend years (if not decades) memorising ancient texts. Answers were already established; there was no room for questioning or creativity. The keju system was also adopted in Vietnam, Korea, and Japan. undefined Examination cells, Beijing (Wikipedia) In Korea, the Joseon Dynasty institutionalised and glorified the gwageo imperial examinations (958 to 1894). A family could only be considered noble if one member (from the last four generations) had passed the gwageo and served in government. The crimson certificate was treasured and handed down from generations. Aristocratic status depended on Confucian memorisation. I suggest that imperial examinations and widespread beliefs in meritocracy spawned 'education fever'- right across East Asia. Yes, this was costly, but under Collectivist families socialised children to honour their parents and make their ancestors proud. Crimson certificate issued to those who passed the civil service exam from 1892. (The National Library) Crimson certificate issued to those who passed the civil service exam from 1892. (The National Library) High skills at low wages enabled growth Given East Asian's belief that education was the pathway for social mobility, they heavily invested in their children's education. Daughters were sent to factories to fund their brothers' education. East Asian economies developed rapidly, partly because their labour force was highly-skilled, but relatively cheap. Education fever thus aided economic growth. Education fever has spawned an arms race of intensive parenting Education fever comes with costs; it has generated an intense arms race. 'Chicken parents' micro-manage their children's time-tables to optimise intellectual performance. Competitive investment means that parenthood is seen as extremely costly and labour-intensive. [https] Translation: "Various cram schools". Source No alt text provided for this image Translation: don't turn your children into chicken babies. Parents should let go of their educational anxiety. Source Fertility fell earliest in more individualist regions of China, where lineage was less important. East Asian families strongly believed in the importance of bearing sons to continue the patrilineal line. This belief was especially strong in China's south east. A new paper by Weigang Gong^, Meng Zhu^, Burak Gurel, Tian Xie reveals a hitherto unrecognised aspect of China's cultural heterogeneity. They calculate the concentration of surnames in 3000 Chinese counties, as well as the proportion of the top three surnames in administrative villages. In Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Jiangxi provinces, a single lineage may encompass the entire village. Lineage is extremely important. Image The spatial distribution of the proportion of the top 20 surnames in each county in the total population (2005). Gong et al 2021 [https] Regional Comparison of Lineage Development in China (2006). Gong et al 2021 Yangzi River Basin and the Northeast appear to have been more individualist, even in the 1980s, before marketisation and urbanisation. Married men were much more likely to form their own independent nuclear families. In Southern China by contrast, married men tended to remain with their parents. Image Proportion of male youth living separately from their parents. Gong et al 2021 These patterns persisted in the 1990s. [https] Proportion of male youth living separately from their parents (1990). Gong et al 2021 Households are also much smaller in Northeast China, the Yangzi River Basin, the Jianghan Plain, the Dongting Lake Plain, and the Chengdu Plain. Families tend to break apart. [https] Household size, Census data, 20210. Gong et al 2021 Lineage development is also associated with higher fertility. In the South, reproduction may be motivated by the moral obligation to bear heirs. Where lineages are less central, there may be far weaker compunction to continue the family line. [https] Average number of births. 2010. Gong et al 2021 Lineage development is also associated with sex ratio at birth. This makes sense. If patrilineal lineage is paramount, there should be a strong preference for sons to continue the lineage and worship ancestors. [https] Sex ratio at birth, 2010. Gong et al 2021 As you see, the southeast has highest son preference, more collectivism, more multi-generational families, and higher fertility. Yangzi River Basin and the Northeast appear to have been more individualist, even in the 1980s, before marketisation and urbanisation. Married men were much more likely to form their own independent nuclear families. Economic development has spawned cultural liberalisation and gender equality, weakening the pressure to reproduce more male heirs East Asia's economic development has fostered cultural liberalisation and gender equality - as I have previously theorised. As the whole of China becomes more individualistic, there is less social pressure to bear male heirs and continue the lineage. Given high female employment, daughters are increasingly seen as sons because they demonstrate filial piety and provide for their ageing parents. Moreover, East Asian women can no longer be bullied or shamed into becoming workhorse wombs. As former factory worker turned journalist, Lijia Zhang writes: "Women have changed. They don't care to be only the reproductive tool of the family or the state". All this reduces the onus and desire for multiple children. East Asian fertility has plummeted due to cultural liberalisation occuring alongside education fever Ironically, the education fever that aided East Asia's economic development in the 20th century now presents a challenge for development in the 21st century. Parenting comes with heavy expectations to micro-manage and optimise children's educational success. Meanwhile, East Asians have also culturally liberalised and become far more gender equal. The pressure to bear multiple sons is now far weaker. As a result, many couples would rather stop at one child. My theory thus explains why fertility was initially lower in China's more individualistic northeast, has since fallen in the economically developed and culturally liberalising south east. figure 1 The trend of birth rate changes in 31 provinces in mainland China from 2011 to 2019. Zhang, Ding and Hu 2022 The Great Gender Divergence is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. [ ] Subscribe 11 Share this post [https] Why has fertility plummeted across East Asia? www.ggd.world Copy link Facebook Email Note Other Share Previous Comments [https] [ ] Top New Community No posts Ready for more? [ ] Subscribe (c) 2024 Alice Evans Privacy [?] Terms [?] Collection notice Start WritingGet the app Substack is the home for great writing This site requires JavaScript to run correctly. Please turn on JavaScript or unblock scripts