https://acoup.blog/2023/06/09/fireside-friday-june-9-2023/ Skip to content A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry A look at history and popular culture Menu * Home * Resources for Teachers * Resources for World-Builders * Book Recommendation List * Guest Posts * Contact * About the Pedant Fireside Friday: June 9, 2023 Bret Devereaux Fireside June 9, 2023 16 Minutes Fireside this week! We actually haven't had one of these in quite a while; we had a gap week in April but the last Fireside looks like it was in March! In any case, here we are and here's Ollie: [PXL_20230428_215118194][PXL_20230428_215118194]Research Assistant Cat Ollie, doing his best impression of a bagel next to his toy bagel. For this week's musing, I want to muse on the impact of the 'long peace' on modern military capabilities. For those unfamiliar with the concept, the 'long peace' is a term we apply to the period since WWII which has had a low and indeed falling level of war, both inter-state and intra-state. Normally, when I say this is something that has happened, I find I encounter a great deal of incredulity among the general public. Surely they can list off any number of wars or other violent conflicts that happened recently. But the data here is actually quite strong (and we all know my attitude towards certainty on points of real uncertainty; this is not one of them) - violence has been falling worldwide for nearly 80 years, the fall has been dramatic and relatively consistent. It could end tomorrow, but it didn't end yesterday. What I think leads to the misconception that there is no long peace is that this has also been a period of rising connectivity and information movement: wars are both fewer and smaller, but you hear about more of them. I've discussed this before a few times, but I think Azar Gat is probably right to suggest that the long peace is itself a consequence of the changing incentives created by the industrial revolution and to an even greater extent, by nuclear weapons. Prior to the industrial revolution, war was the best way to get rich (if you won) because land and conquered subjects were so much more valuable than any kind of capital investment (infrastructure, manufacture, tools, etc.) that could have been developed with the same resources. The industrial revolution changes this, both by making war a lot more destructive (thus lowering returns to successful warfare)^1 while at the same time massively raising returns to capital investment in things like infrastructure, factories and tractors. It suddenly made more sense, if you coveted your neighbors resources, to build more factories and buy those resources than to try to seize them by force. Nuclear weapons in turn took this same effect and ratcheted it up even further, by effectively making the cost of total war infinite. I should note I find this version of the argument, based on incentives and interests more compelling than Steven Pinker's version of the argument based on changing cultural mores. If anything, I think cultural values have lagged, resulting in countries launching counter-productive wars out of cultural inertia (because it's 'the doing thing' or valued in the culture) long after such wars became maladaptive. Indeed, I'd argue that's exactly what Russia is doing right now. All of that is background for a thought I had discussing with some colleagues the dismal performance of the Russian army. We have all noticed that the Russian military appears far less capable than we thought it was; frankly it seems incapable of even some of the very basic tasks of modern industrial armies engaged in conventional military operations. Shockingly, it is a lot less capable of these things than older armies of yesteryear with much more limited technology. It's not hard to imagine that even without all of the advanced technology, that by sheer mass and dint of high explosives (and basic logistical competence) that a capable mid-20th century army might well perform better than the Russian army has. Yet the odd thought I had was this: what if Russian incompetence isn't exceptional, but in fact the new normal in warfare? What is - quietly, because they haven't tried to launch a major invasion recently - most militaries are probably similarly incapable of the basic tasks of industrial warfare? Being good at war imposes a lot of costs, even if a country doesn't go to war. Soldiers need to be recruited, trained and equipped. Equipment must be maintained and kept up to date. Officers need to be mentally agile and sharp. Experience needs to be retained and institutionalized. Capable leaders need to be promoted and incapable but politically influential leaders sidelined. The state, as we've discussed, emerged as an engine to do all of these things, but these are all difficult, unpleasant and expensive things. They all impose tradeoffs. An army filled with capable, educated and talented young officers is, for instance, a significant risk to regime stability, especially for non-democratic regimes. Recruiting quality means either institutionalizing conscription (politically unpopular) or raising taxes and spending a lot of money (also politically unpopular). What kept states doing all of that was a sure knowledge that if they didn't, the cost would be state extinction. Take a modern country like Venezuela. Venezuela is a basket-case, with catastrophic inflation combined with a moribund economy almost entirely reliant on oil exports, all atop substantial internal instability. Prior to the long peace, there's little question what happens to a country like Venezuela, which is essentially a giant pile of barely guarded wealth: one - or several - of its neighbors would move in, oust the government and seize the territory and its valuable resources (oil, in this case). But because the leaders of a country like Venezuela know that, they may well try to avoid developing their country into such a weak state in the first place. Sure, bribery and corruption are fun, but only if you live long enough to use it; it's not worth ruining the economy if the only consequence is being killed when Brazil, Colombia or the United States invades, disassembles your weakened and underfunded military and then annexes the country. The reason that doesn't happen is not because the United States, Brazil or Colombia has suddenly developed morality (the USA's record as a neighbor to Central and South America is not one we ought generally to be proud of), but because it no longer makes economic sense to do so. The value of the oil and other resources would be less than the cost of maintaining control of the country. This is why, I'd argue, you see the proliferation of failed states globally: in the past it would be actively profitable for non-failed states to take advantage of them, but as a result of the changes in our economies, failed states instead represent a question of managing costs. States no longer ask if they can profit through a war of conquest, but rather if they'd spend less managing the disaster that a local failed state is by invading versus trying to manage the problem via aid or controlling refugee flows. Even by that calculation, invasion has generally proved a losing option. But that has a downstream implication on what the militaries of most countries are for. In the past, militaries were necessary to deter invasion (or to profit from your own conquests). But in a world where most invasions are - or at least ought to be - self-deterring, for countries that do not have revanchist neighbors who might launch a stupid war of conquest out of pique, the bar to reach that kind of deterrence is extremely low (and of course if your potential threat is a great power like the United States or arguably China, having a military with a meaningful deterrence value might be beyond your abilities even if you focused on it. If the USA decides that a military solution is the least-bad-option regarding Venezuela (I think this would be a mistake), there isn't much Venezuela could do about it). In that case, the traditional mission of most militaries stops being a major concern. But then note how this impacts all of those difficult decisions a state has to make in order to retain a military capable of conventional warfare. It suddenly becomes a lot harder to justify all of those trade-offs. The threat that was keeping you 'honest' is greatly reduced, if not gone. Instead, the new incentive for most countries would be to build a military in a way that aims to minimize the political costs, rather than maximize combat power or even 'security.' And I think that's exactly what we see countries doing, in different ways based on their form of government. For consolidated democracies with lots of legitimacy, which tend to be less worried about the possibility of an army filled with voters overthrowing the government, it makes sense not to build an army for conventional operations but instead with an eye towards the kinds of actions which mitigate the harm caused by failed states: armies aimed at policing actions or humanitarian operations. That also has the neat benefit of giving the country a low-cost way to 'help out' in an alliance system like NATO, which in turn serves to stabilize alliances with still-militarized, conventionally capable great powers, who then cover the issue of deterring a conventional war. Perun actually had a pretty good video walking through this logic. Alternately, for low legitimacy forms of government, like autocracies, the concern is squarely centered on internal stability, and here we see a wave of armies designed primarily for 'coup proofing.' Russia's military is actually a pretty good example of how this is done. An authoritarian government is looking to both maximize the ability of the army to engage in repression while minimize it as a threat to its rule. 'Coup proofing' of this sort follows a fairly consistent basic model (which I may elaborate on at a later date). First, command needs to be divided so that no one general or minister of defense can turn the whole defense apparatus against the leader. You can see this with how the Russian armed forces were fragmented, with Rosgvardiya and Wagner Group not reporting to the ministry of defense, but it also extends to the structure of the Russian Ministry of Defense, where the Army, the Navy and the Airborne forces (the VDV) all maintain infantry forces. Setting things up that way means that, in a pinch perhaps elite, well-paid and loyal VDV forces could be used to counter-balance grumbling disloyalty in, say, the army. Of course such fragmented command is really bad if you need to launch a conventional war, as, in the event, it was. Meanwhile, maximizing the army for repression means developing paramilitary internal police forces at scale (Rosgvardiya is an obvious example), which direct resources away from core conventional military; such security-oriented forces aren't designed for a conventional war and perform poorly at it. The People's Republic of China is also reported to have this problem: internal security and repression absorb a lot of their security funds. At the same time, if the purpose of a military is internal repression, that means the loyalty of that army - or at least its officers and elite units - is the priority. As anyone who has ever run any kind of organization knows, making people happy and making the organization run efficiently are rarely fully compatible goals. Getting a military ready for a real fight invariably involves a lot of unpleasant tasks (or expensive ones) that soldiers might rather just not do (or might rather just embezzle the resources for), and if the goal is regime stability, it makes sense to let them not do them (or embezzle the resources). Meanwhile, the state is promoting not for capability, but for loyalty, which is why a blockhead like Valery Gerasimov might still be in command 15 months into a war in which his leadership has been astoundingly poor.^2 All of which is to say, the brutal do-or-die demands (or in fancy speak, 'the pressures of interstate anarchy') which once forced most states to at least try to maintain competitive, conventionally capable militaries are fading because modern weapons and modern economies have changed the balance of incentives. Consequently, I suspect Russia is not the only paper tiger out there; the forest is likely to be full of them. Indeed, the exceptions are likely to be the handful of countries which still do feel the need to maintain competitive, conventionally capable armies either because they feel they have real security threats from revanchist powers (Israel, Taiwan, Poland, Finland, Ukraine, etc.) or because they form the backbone of an international system which requires that someone carry a big stick (the United States). Of course the big unanswered and at the moment unanswerable question is where countries like India or the People's Republic of China fit. Are their militaries remaining sharp in preparation for possible great power conflicts or are they too letting the edge dull? I sincerely hope we never find out. A world whose tanks are filled with cobwebs, where it makes little sense for most countries to focus massive resources on their militaries is a happier world. But I fear it is not yet the world we live in. On to Recommendations! First off, our valiant narrator has been at it; with so few Firesides lately, I have a bit of a backlog of his updates (and likewise a backlog in adding links to the relevant posts). In particular, he's added the series on Crusader Kings III to the Teaching Paradox playlist, as well as recording audio versions of the "One Year into the War in Ukraine" retrospective, James Baillie's excellent discussion of digital humanities and prosopography in the medieval Caucasus and Michael Taylor's look back at The Face of Battle. All now ripe and ready for your listening enjoyment! As usual for those looking to keep track of the war in Ukraine, Michael Kofman's podcast appearances over at War on the Rocks remain very valuable; his latest was on May 30th talking about the potential of Ukraine's coming offensive and is well worth your time. At time of writing, that offensive has clearly begun, but we know relatively little about how it is proceeding this early on, except that (as functionally everyone predicted), wars result in equipment losses, even fancy western equipment. I should note Kofman also has a more in-depth podcast series, The Russia Contingency, which I think is quite good but sits behind the War on the Rocks paywall. Speaking of things behind paywalls, there were a few good recent articles over at Foreign Policy that I think deserve a look, though those too are (I assume) behind their subscriber wall. Evan Thomas offers a defense of the use of nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the grounds that it was the 'least bad option.' That is not a popular position to take amongst much of the public these days (particularly in online spaces that lean left) but I think it is valuable to engage with the arguments even if one does not agree. I've made this point before but the fact is the issue is a complex one and anyone offering a simple answer is wrong. Certainty that the bombs were dropped as the last bad options is unwarranted (Soviet reception was a factor), but at the same time, certainty that Japanese surrender was immanent without the bombs is also unwarranted - our visibility into Japanese decision-making in that period remains less than perfect but it seems fairly clear that the all-important IJA and IJN intended to keep fighting. Also at Foreign policy, Derek Grossman of RAND offers something of a sanguine view of the place of American diplomacy in Oceania, particularly in the context of competition with the People's Republic of China. Once again, I don't think one needs to entirely take on board the argument for it to be useful. American discourse about everything, but especially on security tends to accentuate the negative to the point of doomerism when I think the position of the United States - or more correctly the 'status quo coalition,' an idea I'll develop a bit more in this space in July - retains strong advantages and there are in fact a lot of reasons to see potential upsides in the future generally (not the least of which is the continued decline of warfare noted above). On the history front, Evan Schultheis on Twitter decided to build a massive Twitter thread dumping information about all sorts of organic armors (textile and leather) in the ancient world which is worth a read. This is a topic I intend to return to at some point, but in the meantime Evan knows his business on military equipment. I suppose I would offer a one caveat; the first is that just because the sources do not require glued linen armor (which Evan is 100% correct, they do not) does not necessarily rule it out (though I think it makes it quite unlikely). On balance, I would tend to think the textile 'tube and yoke' cuirass was more common than leather and I'd really like to see a twined linen reconstruction which acts the way we see these act in artwork (particularly their fairly rigid structure; the 'yoke' over the shoulders stands almost upright when not tied down in artwork). That said, I suspect that such a reconstruction would act that way, and I think seeing it demonstrated would be enough to convince me. Evan also briefly mentions the unreliability of Raffaele D'Amato's work; this I would like to echo. D'Amato's arms and armor reconstructions are frequently tendentious or even just wrong and he also seems to have been involved in more than a little shady sounding things in the world of antiquities. Do not rely on D'Amato on Roman military equipment. I also really liked this r/AskHistorians response from Roel Konijnendijk (under his nom de plume of Iphikrates) on how hard ancient soldiers might train physically and how physically fit they might have been. In particular, he pushes back on the notion that all ancient warriors were 'ripped,' noting that these men were generally part-time soldiers conscripted from the farming classes and that armies of part-timers like this performed fine; the Romans conquered the Mediterranean with a citizen militia (albeit one that did train its soldiers once they were in the army and where they tended to serve long(ish) stints in service). I would suggest that, probably by the Middle Republic (but the evidence is hardly secure) the Romans seem to be doing training for 'skill at arms' and some level of fitness training was also clearly part of the mix by the imperial period (and perhaps earlier), but Roman soldiers too were not ultra-jacked supermen. We actually see a lot of senior Roman centurions represented visually on gravestones and what we see are pretty regular looking men; these are idealizing portraits, but that should tell us that if there was some ideal for Roman soldiers to be ripped like body-builders or Hollywood action stars, we'd see that. In practice, a big part of the issue here, as Roel notes, is that the modern conception of the ideal male form isn't one that performs optimally or is normally attainable. Finally, for this week's book recommendation, I'm going to recommend something perhaps a touch more sentimental than analytical, J.D. Hornfischer, The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors (2004). It would be easy, but I think wrong, to say the book was about the Battle off Samar, part of the larger Battle of Leyte Gulf, one of the most seemingly unlikely victories in US naval history, but I think it is more accurate to say that this is a book about the sailors who fought the Battle off Samar. Unlike previous recommendation Shattered Sword, which for all of its humanizing detail was first and foremost an analysis of the Battle of Midway, Hornfischer here is about the sailors more than the last stand of the title, though both matter a great deal. For those unfamiliar with the Battle off Samar, the battle, taking place on October 25, 1944, was part of the much bigger Battle of Leyte Gulf; in this part of the engagement, the Japanese Center Force under the command of Takeo Kurita - an extremely powerful battle group including four battleships including the Yamato, the largest battleship ever put to sea, plus six heavy cruisers, two light and eleven destroyers - attempting to strike the American landing force instead encountered a small US escort group, Taffy 3, consisting of 6 small, slow escort carriers and 7 destroyers (four of which were actually even smaller destroyer escorts). Yamato alone displaced more mass than the entirety of Taffy 3. At the same time, the US escort carriers, which weren't designed for this kind of fleet engagement (thus the word escort there) lacked the airpower to do serious harm to the Japanese battlegroup but also weren't fast enough to get away either. The massive Yamato was, in fact, faster than the tiny escort carriers it was chasing. The battle is thus a desperate delaying action by the US ships present, with destroyers charging ships twenty times their size in an effort to slow down the IJN advance to buy time for help to arrive. In the end, almost preposterously, the tiny ships of Taffy 3 actually turned back Kurita's Center Force and even more preposterously, inflicted more losses on the attacker than they sustained (though losses in Taffy 3 were heavy). But what I find valuable and worth reading about this book - beyond Hornfischer's writing, which is excellent, you will tear through this book - is that is focus isn't on the battle but the men in the battle. The central question of the book is really less 'how could such a victory be won' so much as 'what kind of person could win such a victory?' Doubtless to some degree the portraits of the heroes of the day are sanded to a nice, smooth heroic finish in Hornfischer's prose, but the portrait is still valuable because these sailors and officers were not the Best of the Best of the Best, they were not the elite of the US navy. These were, after all, relatively small, in theory unimportant ships; many of their crews were fairly new as were some of their officers. Instead the victors off Samar turn out to mostly be pretty regular fellows who, in a moment of crisis, saw what needed to be done and did it, understanding full well it might demand their lives (and in many cases did). And the reminder that wars are won by the efforts of the ultra-elite super-special forces that get features in Call of Duty games, but rather by the exceptional heroism of unexceptional soldiers and sailors is a good one. Share this: * Twitter * Facebook * 1. And we should note here both more destructive in the sense that casualties went up dramatically, but also more destructive in that industrialized wars are far more capable of destroying the new, infrastructure-heavy industrial methods of production. It is really quite hard for ancient or medieval armies to do meaningful long-term damage to an agricultural economy; farmers flee, crops are hard to destroy and in any case armies can't do anything to the land itself. Even a sustained collapse might mean something like only a 25% reduction in total production; by contrast Liberia lost 90% of its GDP in just six years of internal warfare from 1989 to 1995. Industrial armies can easily destroy factories, level a non-trivial percentage of a country's housing stock, torch its electrical grid and thus greatly reduce its economic production This can happen even if the country in question wins - ask Britain or the USSR after WWII. 2. It's behind the paywall, but I recommend Michael Kofman and Dara Massicot's absolutely withering podcast on "Gerasimov's Failed Offensive" for what I thought was a sharp but entirely justified critique of Gerasimov's failures. Like this: Like Loading... * Tagged * Fireside Chat * modern warfare * Warfare [3f4e8a2b40][3f4e8a2b40] Published by Bret Devereaux View all posts by Bret Devereaux Published June 9, 2023 Post navigation Previous Post Collections: Roman Roads 93 thoughts on "Fireside Friday: June 9, 2023" 1. [124f3][124f3] Konstantin Obvintsev says: June 9, 2023 at 9:49 am Yeah, commentary on Russia being not only paper tiger is apparently on point as pictures of so long awaited Ukrainian counter-offensive began to arrive. They demonstrate exactly the same behavior as Russians months prior. I would say that it looks like 'attacking in relative open ground with green troops is really hard against a peer opponent' and it would work for everyone, be it Russians, Ukrainians or let's say Americans. Loading... Reply 1. [8cb17][8cb17] Xylem says: June 9, 2023 at 11:29 am Stop making long-reaching conclusions out a single video released by Russians. Loading... Reply 2. [1c772][1c772] Adam says: June 9, 2023 at 10:03 am Concerning the long peace, I also wonder how much of it has been the gradual reduction in major powers. Interstate anarchic systems seem to be more stable when there are fewer big players around, and for the cold war, you had 2. Post collapse of the USSR, you really only had 1, until possibly China at whatever point you consider China rising to become a major power. To prevent a general war, you just needed bilateral agreement not to fight, instead of multilateral agreement, which is generally harder to get. Concerning ancient soldiers, one other thing I find interesting in their usual popular depiction is absence of injuries. These wouldn't necessarily be young men, and given the perennial nature of war at least for the Romans and a lot of the Greek poleis, you would have seen the same people fighting for multiple campaigns. So you're going to probably have a lot of people in their 30s and 40s in these armies, possibly even a visible cohort of guys in their 50s and 60s. And a lot of them might have old injuries or lingering effects from diseases or accidents, lowering their visible level of fitness. Loading... Reply 1. [8882e][8882e] Hector_St_Clare says: June 9, 2023 at 10:39 am There were other second- or third-tier powers that projected power internationally during the Cold War, it wasn't just the US and the Soviets. England, France, and Cuba all got involved in overseas wars during the Cold War, on their own initiative rather than that of their superpower ally. Countries like Israel, India, Pakistan etc. were also major players at a regional level. Loading... Reply 1. [6f596][6f596] Philippe Payant says: June 9, 2023 at 5:59 pm After the Suez crisis, England and France only got involved in overseas wars with the tacit approval of the US. Loading... Reply 2. [da049][da049] Nate T says: June 9, 2023 at 10:49 am Fewer protein shakes, more back braces. Loading... Reply 3. [ac844][ac844] Mark Magagna says: June 9, 2023 at 10:59 am Bad injuries would tend to either: 1. kill you (pretty much anything in the abdomen for instance likely killed you 99+% of the time) or 2. make it more or less impossible to have a front-line role (anything that crippled a limb or amputated fingers or toes). You might still be a general, but could not be a trooper or a centurion. Injuries would likely put you into a 'non-combat' role if you're in a legion, e.g. driving a supply wagon or something. Or they gave you a farm. Or they kicked you out and you starved. The old guys in the legion would be the ones who acquired at most minor injuries. Loading... Reply 4. [b4438][b4438] mindstalk0 says: June 9, 2023 at 5:36 pm Gat insists that European violence was declining since the Napoleonic Wars (I think; certainly since some time in the 1800s), despite various notable interruptions, and that was still a multipolar world. Loading... Reply 3. [a80f9][a80f9] Alexander Ramos Wallace says: June 9, 2023 at 10:07 am I think you're forgetting a 'not' here: "And the reminder that wars are won by the efforts of the ultra-elite super-special forces that get features in Call of Duty games, but rather by the exceptional heroism of unexceptional soldiers and sailors is a good one." Loading... Reply 4. [431df][431df] ipfromme says: June 9, 2023 at 10:09 am "the USA's record as a neighbor to Central and South America is not one we ought generally to be proud of" Thanks for including that. It is something that we could still do a lot better on. Loading... Reply 5. [de6ec][de6ec] S says: June 9, 2023 at 10:18 am Another consideration for how modern militaries are configured is their usage as a public service reverse force. During COVID we saw military medical units utilised as traditional medical services were overwhelmed, natural disaster responses in the US frequently see the deployment of national guard units, public sector strikes in the UK we have recently seen the military used to provide strike cover. Regimes that don't use their military for suppression of dissent in the authoritarianism sense still utilise them as a surge capacity for public services. Loading... Reply 6. [3d1c1][3d1c1] AJS says: June 9, 2023 at 10:20 am I wonder, do you think changes in the logistics of warfare might also have played a role in the decreased proportion of martial deaths? Like, as you point out in your logistics series, the invention of the railroad & the automobile made it wildly easier for armies to bring in food, which reduced the need to "live off the land." Would that not have also reduced the total number of people who die as a result of modern wars (or at least helped to offset the increased destructiveness of combat itself- so more people die on the battlefield but fewer total people die in war)? Loading... Reply 1. [3d1c1][3d1c1] AJS says: June 9, 2023 at 10:35 am ah just saw footnote 1; never mind! Loading... Reply 2. [5808f][5808f] Alsadius says: June 9, 2023 at 12:01 pm Insofar as modern tech has helped here, I'd wager that antibiotics have done at least as much good as motorized transport. Disease killed more than combat in virtually every war before WW2. (Well, WW1 can go either way, depending how you count the Spanish Flu.) Loading... Reply 1. [70f3b][70f3b] Richard H says: June 9, 2023 at 4:32 pm Antibiotics is a big one, but also apparently Vietnam was notable for having significantly higher survival rates (for US soldiers) than previous conflicts because, for the first time, it was plausible to regularly apply a tourniquet to a wounded soldier and get him on a helicopter to a trauma center within the "golden hour". You didn't need to stop the bleeding forever; you just needed to stop it long enough to get them to appropriate facilities. Loading... Reply 1. [705bb][705bb] Mary Catelli says: June 9, 2023 at 6:38 pm Which, in turn, led to the job of "paramedic" because victims of traffic accidents were less likely to survive than wounded soldiers. There was no one in the ambulance dedicated to keeping the victim alive. Loading... Reply 3. [705bb][705bb] Mary Catelli says: June 9, 2023 at 6:36 pm It meant that people died of hunger, not because you stole their food, but because you blasted the bridges and railroads that food came by. Transport means that many places are not self-sufficient, and I have heard it estimated that as many people died of hunger as of combat in WWII. Loading... Reply 7. [b0e9f][b0e9f] topherbrennan says: June 9, 2023 at 10:23 am > And the reminder that wars are won by the efforts of the ultra-elite super-special forces that get features in Call of Duty games, but rather by the exceptional heroism of unexceptional soldiers and sailors is a good one. Surely you meant "wars are not won by" or "wars are won not by". Loading... Reply 8. [25d33][25d33] robbbbbb says: June 9, 2023 at 10:23 am To relate to your point on capabilities: In manufacturing we worry about skills deterioration. When we don't do something for a while we lose people who know how to do it and we don't get the practice at it. 'Tribal knowledge' is lost. Most famously (from a manufacturing perspective), the United States lost the ability to build heavy lift rockets after the demise of the Apollo program. We had learned all of this stuff about big rockets and some of that knowledge was lost for a while. SpaceX has had to rebuild some of that knowledge while running his Starship heavy lift rocket. You can see this is military procurement, also. The United States Navy pays to keep the Groton Shipyards open and building subs, often at heavy expense, just so we don't lose the knowledge of how to build submarines. Manufacturing rates are low and so per-unit costs are high. Loading... Reply 9. [8882e][8882e] Hector_St_Clare says: June 9, 2023 at 10:27 am "If the USA decides that a military solution is the least-bad-option regarding Venezuela (I think this would be a mistake), there isn't much Venezuela could do about it)" Venezuela could, and would, resort to insurgency if the US invaded. Which succeeded in Vietnam and more recently in Afghanistan. (And yes, Venezuelans aren't as battle hardened as Vietnamese or Afghans, so it might not work, but maybe it would). Most Venezuelans aren't happy with the Maduro government, but that doesn't mean they would want a US occupation. Loading... Reply 1. [5808f][5808f] Alsadius says: June 9, 2023 at 12:02 pm Maybe, maybe not. There's a much smaller ideological gap there, and if the US improved conditions markedly (which wouldn't be hard, tbh) then I don't think an insurgency would see a ton of support. But the risk is too high to make it a good gamble. Loading... Reply 1. [8882e][8882e] Hector_St_Clare says: June 9, 2023 at 12:38 pm I haven't checked Venezuelan public opinion in a while- things got too depressing after the economy started tanking in 2014-2015 so I stopped really following it in detail. But, at least around 2015 or so, the largest share of public opinion in Venezuela seemed to be that: 1) the Chavez era was "good", and 2) everything went to hell with his malign and/or incompetent successor. (IIRC about 20% of people were pro-Maduro, 40-45% were pro-Chavez, anti-Maduro, and 35-40% thought the whole socialist project was bad from day one). Maybe that's changed since then, but maybe not. If that's still the case today, then I'd say there is a very big ideological gap indeed, especially since there are opponnets of the government on the far left, the right, and everything in between. A lot of people might agree that Maduro had to go but would disagree strongly about what should replace him, and the subsequent power vacuum (like in Iraq) would create lots of space for insurgencies, including by far-left groups that are very ideologically opposed to what the US stands for. Loading... Reply 2. [03ef2][03ef2] Tiercelet says: June 9, 2023 at 12:13 pm Sure, of course. (And that's another, if unstated, part of why the returns to warfare have gone negative-effective insurgency is much more practical in a world of easy point-to-point communications and ubiquitous access to small arms.) I think the point being made was rather that the Venezuelan uniformed military wouldn't present a credible deterrent threat to the US military. Loading... Reply 1. [3f376][3f376] Kevin says: June 9, 2023 at 2:36 pm Sure. The American military would go in and do what it does best, break armies and nations. But then it would do the next thing it always seems to do lately, antagonize the locals so much that the inevitable insurgency balloons. It might not be as ferocious as in Iraq or Afghanistan, but it would still be a draining sore. Loading... Reply 3. [d59fa][d59fa] Bullseye says: June 9, 2023 at 1:24 pm From the perspective of the Venezuelan state, an insurgency wouldn't matter. The insurgency would happen after the state was destroyed. Loading... Reply 10. [25d33][25d33] robbbbbb says: June 9, 2023 at 10:28 am On a different topic, I wanted to note this line: "Getting a military ready for a real fight invariably involves a lot of unpleasant tasks (or expensive ones) that soldiers might rather just not do (or might rather just embezzle the resources for), and if the goal is regime stability, it makes sense to let them not do them (or embezzle the resources)." If you'd like to see that one in action, I highly recommend the board game Fire in the Lake by GMT Games. It's a Vietnam war simulator for four players. Instead of being a two-side simulator, it includes the friction between the ARVN and US forces, and the friction between the VC and NVA. Crucially, one of the ways the ARVN get victory points in the game is to embezzle resources from US foreign aid. The game does an excellent job of noting that friction between the US and the ARVN, where the South Vietnamese would often just want to sit still and skim off the top, instead of trying to win the war. Excellent game, with some really good points on Vietnam. Loading... Reply 11. [8882e][8882e] Hector_St_Clare says: June 9, 2023 at 10:34 am "Of course the big unanswered and at the moment unanswerable question is where countries like India or the People's Republic of China fit" India has much more to fear from domestic dissent / insurgency (from communists or more importantly from various ethnic nationalist secessionists) than they do from China or America, much less Pakistan (LOL), so if their political elites are smart they will develop their military based around internal stability, suppression of unrest, "coup proofing", etc. rather than around fantasies of taking back Lahore and Karachi. Of course, lots of political leaders (in India and elsewhere) aren't very smart and spend their resources on insane fantasies all the time, so who really knows. I'd *like* for some of those ethnic secessionist projects to succeed of course, so I hope that the Indian military *doesn't* get better at crushing domestic unrest. Loading... Reply 1. [ce48b][ce48b] ad9 says: June 9, 2023 at 4:48 pm Pakistan is much weaker than India, and America a long way off. OTOH, China is a much stronger country, and right next door. And I am not aware of India ever having any problems with the elected government commanding the loyalty of its army. Secessionist movements are also something that gives you a need for an effective army, not a coup-proofed one. Loading... Reply 1. [8882e][8882e] Hector_St_Clare says: June 9, 2023 at 5:15 pm You're right, coup-proofing doesn't really belong in there. For better or worse, India's military has never shown an interest in being an independent actor in politics in its own right. I more meant that out of the different options that Mr. Devereaux mentions, I think the top priority for Indian political elites (if they want to maintain the country as it stands) would have to be suppressing domestic ethnic secessionism. I don't think China is a real threat, and Pakistan much less so. Sending an army over the Himalayas would be a nightmare. That is to say, I think a self-interested Indian government would want an effective army, but effectiveness at counterinsurgency might be somewhat different than effectiveness in fighting a formal state-level military. Although India has also expressed some interest in being a regional "police power" as well- they tried that in Sri Lanka in the 1980s (with disastrous results) and more recently has set up two air force bases in Tajikistan. We might see them, sometime in the future, try their hand at intervening in Afghanistan, maybe to see if they can succeed where America and the Soviets failed. Loading... Reply 12. [b0e9f][b0e9f] topherbrennan says: June 9, 2023 at 10:37 am I don't know if I actually believe this, but as I read you linking the Long Peace to the proliferation of failed states, I had a moment of "my god, the bomb-throwing anarchists were right! " The problem with invading Venezuela is not so much the cost of the initial invasion, but the cost of dealing with bomb-throwing insurgents (well, IED-planting insurgents anyway). What if we really do end up seeing The State as a concept decline thanks to the power of high explosives? Loading... Reply 1. [da049][da049] Nate T says: June 9, 2023 at 10:53 am High explosives have been around for awhile; if they were the key to dismantling state power, I would have expected it to have happened some time in the past century. Instead state formation has arguably accelerated during that period. Loading... Reply 2. [b4438][b4438] mindstalk0 says: June 9, 2023 at 5:44 pm The modern state has acquired vital functions beyond warfare. Macroeconomic regulation, welfare and social services, mass education, regulating pollution, policing (particularly keeping violent gangs down). Loading... Reply 13. [ac844][ac844] Mark Magagna says: June 9, 2023 at 11:01 am "For consolidated democracies with lots of legitimacy, which tend to be less worried about the possibility of an army filled with voters overthrowing the government, it makes sense not to build an army for conventional operations but instead with an eye towards the kinds of actions which mitigate the harm caused by failed states: armies aimed at policing actions or humanitarian operations. That also has the neat benefit of giving the country a low-cost way to 'help out' in an alliance system like NATO, which in turn serves to stabilize alliances with still-militarized, conventionally capable great powers, who then cover the issue of deterring a conventional war. " Or an even cheaper alternative is to have a token military and rely on the USA to do stuff. Loading... Reply 1. [5808f][5808f] Alsadius says: June 9, 2023 at 12:05 pm Yeah, but the US starts to get very cross about that after a while. It's not a policy with an unlimited shelf-life. Better to be helpful in a few easy-to-see ways, and keep Sam off your back. Loading... Reply 1. [ac241][ac241] GJ says: June 9, 2023 at 12:56 pm Also, even if the USA isn't cross, the stuff it wants to do might not align with the stuff you want to be done. Loading... Reply 14. [6a014][6a014] medrawt says: June 9, 2023 at 11:20 am My recollection about the Battle of Samar is that it took the Japanese a while to adjust to the reality of what they were fighting against, so the action started with them firing armor-piercing rounds against ships that had so little armor the shells would just punch all the way through the American ships and keep going ... which apparently didn't do that much to degrade American combat effectiveness. When the Japanese were able to switch to more appropriate high-explosive rounds, they were able to inflict much more serious damage. Loading... Reply 1. [27f3d][27f3d] seawolf1991 says: June 9, 2023 at 5:57 pm The Japanese were seeing what they wanted to see. It was a really bad habit that they had during the whole war. Loading... Reply 2. [705bb][705bb] Mary Catelli says: June 9, 2023 at 6:57 pm When they hit at all. They were identifying them as larger, armored vessels, and thus getting the range wrong, too. Well, I suppose it is a bit hard to guess how small a force is willing to attack. (The Japanese were also aware that this was not the whole of the American forces and so were worried about getting out before reinforcements arrived.) Loading... Reply 15. [36a0f][36a0f] Jack says: June 9, 2023 at 11:46 am > and in any case armies can't do anything to the land itself. Unless they have mined the dam that blocks the largest reservoir in Europe, and can inundate 4,000 Km^2 of farmland. Loading... Reply 1. [5808f][5808f] Alsadius says: June 9, 2023 at 12:06 pm That's short-term damage, not long-term. Though in fairness, destroying irrigation works is one of the few ways to genuinely harm the land that pre-modern armies had. Look what Genghis Khan did to Baghdad. Loading... Reply 2. [aa96d][aa96d] Brendan says: June 9, 2023 at 1:08 pm It takes industrial society to build the largest reservoir in Europe though. Loading... Reply 3. [05800][05800] Dillon Saxe says: June 9, 2023 at 4:02 pm That's an industrial army with industrial technology. A Preindustrial army would need to transport lots of gunpowder to a suitable dam using pack animals, which is a pretty big challenge. Although river transport being available might help somewhat, assuming said dam destroyers have an appropriate navy. A pre-gunpowder army has to sap or dig out the dam by hand, which requires the coordination and feeding of lots of soldiers which may or may not be feasible. Loading... Reply 16. [a90f0][a90f0] Andy Ashdown says: June 9, 2023 at 12:05 pm The British Army during the "long 18th Century" is a FASCINATING example of this 'coup-proofing'. To a modern perspective, the army seems fragmented, inefficient, nepotist and incredibly classist with purchased commissions and a huge gulf between officers and men. But it means that it is very difficult for one person to gain complete control of the armed forces(even the King), those who DO gain power are literally invested in the system AND are already among society's 'winners' and are more likely to support the status quo, and the sheer sprawl means supporters can be rewarded through patronage in a number of different ways. Loading... Reply 1. [aa96d][aa96d] Brendan says: June 9, 2023 at 1:14 pm This is an excellent point, and makes a lot of sense compared to the Navy, which was merit-based, professional, collegial, absolutely vital for survival in the context of interstate anarchy, and where underperforming admirals are liable to be shot. and makes a lot of sense in the context of the late 17th Century creation of the modern British Army as an institution, which was under the inescapable shadow of New Model Army's political interventions Loading... Reply 1. [b4438][b4438] mindstalk0 says: June 9, 2023 at 5:47 pm Plus a competent Navy can't obviously be used to take over, perhaps? I guess there's threatening to bombard cities. But the cities provide the food and ammo... Loading... Reply 2. [ce48b][ce48b] ad9 says: June 9, 2023 at 4:18 pm From 1688 to 1815 Britain fought the Nine Years War, The War of the Spanish Succession, the War of the Austrian Succession, the Seven Years War, the War of American Independence and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. That is six or seven major wars, all of them against a country (France) which was then several times larger than itself, of which it clearly lost one. The defeat was the one in which it fought simultaneously against America, the Spanish Empire (ruler of most of the Americas at the time), France, and Holland. And Mysore, in southern India. The war lasted eight years and bankrupted the most powerful state (France) in the enemy alliance. A few years later, during the Dutch Revolution, Britain was ready for war with France again - it was the French that backed down. Towards the end of the period, Britain also conquered most of India. That is not an example of a county facing a weak threat environment, or with a particularly ineffective Army. Loading... Reply 1. [b4438][b4438] mindstalk0 says: June 9, 2023 at 5:50 pm But perhaps the Army was successful despite being coup-proofed, for some reason? Also, the Army wasn't the only factor. For state _survival_, the Channel and Royal Navy probably are more important. I don't know the details of the various wars, but surely the Navy was important as well. And if we're going to 1815, wasn't Indian conquered by the East Indian Company rather than by the British army? Loading... Reply 17. [8202b][8202b] Brutus says: June 9, 2023 at 12:29 pm Thank you for the fantastic article, Bret. I wonder how the long peace arguments fit the roman experience and its famous pax romana? The republic endured its biggest external challenges fighting on home soil during the pyrrhic and punic wars and prevailed in due part from of its ability to mobilize vast numbers of volunteers. Once the fighting shifted overseas maybe it was because of logistical limitations but it usually fought at even numbers, almost never at an advantage. On land at least. At sea it was almost unchallenged since the first punic war. Either way not one of its state foes could to use the home field advantage to outnumber the romans on land. When fighting non state peoples in the Iberian peninsula the volunteer reliant army of the republic faltered from recruitment issues and apparently motivated both the Gracchi brothers and many other politicians who turned poor landless folk not eligible for the army into clients AKA the Marian reforms. Despite the proletarian armies the old volunteer recruitment system seems to work at full steam again in the civil wars toward the end of the republic? But with Augustus triumphant it is obsoleted as is most of the navy. Augustus dismisses half of the legions he inherited, disempowers the assemblies of the republic, citizenship now only a status marker with political pariticipation restricted to the wealthy. Regime stability becomes the main concern. Parthian/Persian empire now the only peer threat and their wars generally involve even numbers. On the rest of the vast new roman borders they almost always are outnumbered at any given theater. The state and army were kept 'minimal' to use a rough analogy to current politics. From a political science POV it could be said state capacity was deliberately lowered. The third century and its events reinforces the focus on regime stability. Assuming the arguments the late roman empire was bigger than its earlier incarnation are right then it is interesting that the solution adopted was the 'comitatenses' armies following the emperor in place of the old small praetorian palace guard. Border defenses already had been the smallest they could get away with, only way to go was up. But the main change from Diocletian and after was the division of the empire management previously handled by the small senatorial class in Rome to a complex new bureaucracy. Possibly mirroring what our host said above regarding splintered current bureaucracies. IIRC Bret also said in a previous post that the main concern behind the reforms of Diocletian was coup proofing his regime. Julian and the heavy spying apparatus by Constantius he barely escaped from might exemplify a then new normal. Comparing the third and fourth centuries it seems the reforms succeed at reducing assassinations but not so much with civil war. Repeated east-west wars until they grow very rare after Theodosius. Main exception after him was the deposition of John in favor of Valentinian III. Curiously the warlordization of the western empire continued, maybe accelerated while the eastern empire with the much tougher borders centralized and remained stable until Phocas except for a decade or so after Leo. It had to defend itself from the Persian empire and cross Danube invaders, the latter where a germanic army had first broken through but generally steppe not germanic peoples. Could it be tougher opposition forced the eastern side to, borrowing Bret's phrasing, stay honest? Loading... Reply 18. [82a47][82a47] Anders says: June 9, 2023 at 12:35 pm I've been looking a lot at Normandy - thanks to the chaps at the World War Two channel - and the talk about coup-proofing rings a bell. Hitler split the command of the troops and ordered that the Panzer reserve couldn't be released without his express permission. This is because he has no legitimacy - he's a dictator who's fighting a losing war and who has been the target of several assassination plots already. The Western allies, on the other hand, with their vast store of legitimacy from their democratic systems, could organize a monolithic structure, with one overall commander - Eisenhower - and as a result all the pieces of Overlord worked together. Obviously there were differences of opinion in the Western Allies, but there was nothing like the chronic dysfunction that was on the German side. Loading... Reply 1. [ce48b][ce48b] ad9 says: June 9, 2023 at 6:53 pm "Hitler split the command of the troops and ordered that the Panzer reserve couldn't be released without his express permission. This is because he has no legitimacy" He did have some legitimacy: The Generals Plot against him collapsed as soon as people knew he was alive and opposed to it. And a unified command in France would have been no danger to him in East Prussia. That was simply a mistake. OTOH, consider that Army, Luftwaffe and SS all had their own armoured divisions. To say nothing of the umpteen internal security organisations spying on each other. That is him playing divide and rule. Loading... Reply 19. [e8473][e8473] Pink says: June 9, 2023 at 12:37 pm "The USA's record as a neighbor to Central and South America is not one we ought generally to be proud of." Are you on crack? Or maybe that's what you learned at the School of the Americas. Loading... Reply 20. [54294][54294] Aramanity says: June 9, 2023 at 12:47 pm Russias corruption showed up in it's scrapyards of mismanaged equipment. Few countries are so careless. Places like Iran or North Korea are very corrupt but will make an effort to keep the equipment they scrape together as functional as possible. Personel investment is another matter but a rigid top down structure is amenable to corrupt regimes and will do the basics of warfare, just very ineptly. Russias failure to staff combat units and provide basic provisions were like those of a far poorer regime. Russia has very little reason to fear it's outside aggression, their propaganda not withstanding. Other corrupt regimes like Argentina or Iraq performed when push came to shove even if they were outclassed by the competition. And Russia has been correcting it's deficiencies under the tutelage of defeat. People seem to be overcompensating for previously rating them too highly. There is for instance no other country on earth, even the US, that could maintain such a volume of artillery fire. Loading... Reply 21. [89e10][89e10] Laura says: June 9, 2023 at 1:24 pm "It is really quite hard for ancient or medieval armies to do meaningful long-term damage to an agricultural economy; farmers flee, crops are hard to destroy and in any case armies can't do anything to the land itself." Interesting. I had been under the impression that "salting the earth" was done to render land infertile, but Wikipedia says it was more of a ritual thing, and in any case doing it on a large scale sounds like a logistics nightmare. Loading... Reply 1. [ce48b][ce48b] ad9 says: June 9, 2023 at 4:34 pm I imagine that in some parts of the world you could destroy the irrigation system if you tried hard enough, but why would you? You could not do it unless you had conquered the country first, in which case you have no need to destroy the very thing that makes the conquest valuable to you. Loading... Reply 2. [6a610][6a610] Steve Morrison says: June 9, 2023 at 5:36 pm Peter Gainsford on his Kiwi Hellenist blog had a post some years ago about the misconception that the Romans and others plowed enemy fields with salt. Loading... Reply 22. [6920e][6920e] Walter says: June 9, 2023 at 1:33 pm Successful modern insurgencies generally require a generous flow of resources to the insurgents. The Who/How/Where details of that happening, in Venezuela, seem unclear. Also, intervention does not actually require occupation. An A-list military can swoop in, capture / kill many of the people it doesn't like (and destroy their resources), perhaps briefly aid their opponents, then leave. Look at the 1990 U.S. invasion of Panama. Loading... Reply 23. [fda19][fda19] KimmoKM says: June 9, 2023 at 1:36 pm In an interview, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, who I think we can agree is a highly capable general, praised Gerasimov (https://time.com/ 6216213/ukraine-military-valeriy-zaluzhny/). It's undebatable that Shoigu has earned his position with his aptitude as a courtier and not with his military accumen, but I will reserve judgement on Gerasimov: he could well be capable as Zaluzhnyi says, but you can't make good decisions if your subordinates keep lying to you about situation on the ground, or your boss tells you to do this terribly stupid and no buts. Loading... Reply 1. [e3f53][e3f53] douglampert says: June 9, 2023 at 3:32 pm Gerasimov may or may not be capable, I have no strong opinion. But Zaluzhnyi has at least two strong incentives to lie about it if Gerasimov is incompetent, (1) "I'm winning because I'm better than my extremely capable foe" is a lot more complementary and helpful to Zaluzhnyi than "I'm winning because my opposite number could not find his ass with two hands and a GPS reciever", (2) My oppenent is an incompetent and Putin should fire him, would be a really silly thing to say if his opponent is incompetent and Putin should fire him. Thus, I don't consider this strong evidence. Loading... Reply 24. [e1ebc][e1ebc] Bogdanow says: June 9, 2023 at 1:58 pm "the Army, the Navy and the Airborne forces (the VDV) all maintain infantry forces. Setting things up that way means that, in a pinch perhaps elite, well-paid and loyal VDV forces could be used to counter-balance grumbling disloyalty in, say, the army." One details that's get ignored often. Russia is multination country and the Army units quite often have majority of minorities serving. As that is one of few upper mobility options (or chance for relatively well paid employments) for such minorities. On the opposite side: rich dwellers of Moskva or Petersburg rarely serve. VDV is not only elite, well-paid and loyal - but also takes care of having composition of ethnic Russians. Loading... Reply 25. [25943][25943] jrkrideau says: June 9, 2023 at 2:01 pm We have all noticed that the Russian military appears far less capable than we thought it was I must have missed that. I think that most commentators in the West expected one type of war and Russia has' from the beginning, been fighting another. The Russian military certainly has made some serious mistakes mistakes but some of their behaviour that seem to surprise the West seems to have been dictated by political considerations in the Kremlin. Overall, though, Brett has it right, if you are not actually fighting a war regularly, you are rusty if you start a new one. Loading... Reply 1. [47f61][47f61] Evan says: June 9, 2023 at 3:42 pm When your supply train becomes so backed up that it stretches stationary for miles and is an attack aircraft's wet dream, you are not a capable military. Loading... Reply 2. [ce48b][ce48b] ad9 says: June 9, 2023 at 5:10 pm "I think that most commentators in the West expected one type of war and Russia has' from the beginning, been fighting another." I remember reading on Day One that the CIA expected Kyiv to fall in three days. Apparently, the campaign they were expecting was Czechoslovakia 1968. I'm pretty sure the Russians expected the same thing. Invading a country is so much harder when it doesn't have a friendly government. Loading... Reply 3. [d59fa][d59fa] Bullseye says: June 9, 2023 at 5:52 pm I get the impression that they're trying, and failing, to fight the kind of war where you destroy the enemy's armed forces in order to make them part of your country. What kind of war do you think they're trying to fight? Loading... Reply 26. [3f376][3f376] Kevin says: June 9, 2023 at 2:17 pm Very interesting to read this about Raffaele D'Amato. I have literally several SHELVES full of Osprey's military history and uniform books, maybe 200 titles, and a fair number of these are on Ancient subjects, but looks like I have none by this fellow. So now I am aware that this is perhaps a good thing, I'm not organizing or painting miniatures armies based on suspect information. Caveat emptor, forsooth! Also interesting to note this about the presumed physiques of ancient soldiers. My personal expectation is that they would tend to leanness and wiriness, due to the diets of the times but they would be hard muscled, with their lives of constant physical labor. That builds up toughness, not so much mass, I suspect. Look at photographs of 19th century soldiers -- American Civil War, Crimean War or colonial wars British, French Foreign Legionnaires -- you don't see supermen, in fact many of these guys look downright skinny. But we know from the records how tough they were and what physical feats they were capable of, hard marching infantry, ferocious fighters. Even today's "Pathans" of the old Northwest Frontier proved more than tough enough for the elite forces of the Western militaries sent to Afghanistan. Loading... Reply 27. [ee7d3][ee7d3] alexpmc says: June 9, 2023 at 2:18 pm I would contend that Venezuela is a sort of special case with regard to RoI (Return on Invasion), given that the wealth to be plundered in the form of oil fields that with poorly maintained equipment rather like factories or knowledge hubs. Absent international (Yeah yeah, how was the play, Mrs. Lincoln) I think a Colombian invasion that was focused only on exploiting the oil fields could be quite profitable. The Colombian military has a quite a bit of experience with internal security and fighting guerilla forces. The oil wells and machinery might get damaged in the conquest, but the Venezuelans were doing a terrible job maintaining those anyway. Chevron and Halliburton would be ecstatic to come in and redevelop those fields for a new regime that could reliably promise protections from nationalization. What's keeping Colombia from doing so is the international blowback, not just from the United States, which for all it's morally dubious history in Latin America, would be unlikely to countenance an actual war of conquest, but also from the rest of Latin America. Loading... Reply 1. [8882e][8882e] Hector_St_Clare says: June 9, 2023 at 3:33 pm Venezuela's oil industry was nationalized in the 1970s, it didn't happen under Chavez. And there has been so much pressure to nationalize major national resource industries- in regimes of all different political stripes, over the last century- that I don't think any new Venezuelan regime could credibly promise the oil fields would never be nationalized in future. Loading... Reply 1. [ee7d3][ee7d3] alexpmc says: June 9, 2023 at 3:55 pm In this hypothetical scenario, the new regime would either be the Colombian government or a Colombian puppet regime. And it wouldn't need to be assurance against nationalization in perpetuity, just the couple decades it would take to pay off the initial investment. Loading... Reply 28. [c89c3][c89c3] formerlycassander says: June 9, 2023 at 2:28 pm the problem is more insidious than corruption and expense. Imagine that, for some reason, apple has to stop making phones but doesn't want to lose the ability to make phones. So they decide they'll have have their factory workers practice making them, their executives study phone making best practices and write learned papers on the subject, their engineers practice designing phones, and so on. They take this seriously, they are a well run company, and everyone tries hard. How good do you think they would be at actually making phones 20/40/60 years later, when everyone who's actually made a phone has retired? They'd be awful at it. Even if their practice was good (and that's by no means certain) it would, at best, mean freezing their existing practices in amber. Over the decades, technology, consumer tastes and the competition all would all change and changed dramatically. they can try to update, but without the feedback that comes from actually doing the thing for real and seeing if it succeeds or fails, it's impossible to know that your updates are in the right direction. And that's the state of pretty much every major military in the world. Until ukraine, there hadn't been an extended, multi-division conflict between countries with remotely modern technology in decades. Even if every person in the military and government was single mindedly dedicated to optimizing the military for war winning over other goals, they don't actually know how to do that because it's been so long since it's been done that no one knows how. Should you organize in brigades or divisions? Invest more money in SAMs or fighters? Build more submarines or destroyers? the best that can be done can do is to build systems and try to test them to see if they work at all, but again, there's no substitute for the real thing. the US, at least, has the advantage of constantly deploying substantial forces to the far side of the world and that gives it a huge leg up on everyone else, especially given how the US prefers to fight*, but it leaves a lot untested against real opposition. * Fire budget at the enemy until they surrender. Loading... Reply 29. [3f376][3f376] Kevin says: June 9, 2023 at 2:46 pm It would be fascinating (??) to see how well the US military would fight a major war these days if it didn't enjoy the advantages it has since WWII -- you know, pretty much absolute freedom of the sea, the sky, and the ability to project power across the globe and maintain a HUGE supply "tail" on non-warfighters. I remember how long it took the US to send and organize its forces to take back Kuwait in 1990-91. MONTHS, and all that without interference from any enemy. What would the Pentagon do without those sort of luxuries? Loading... Reply 1. [b4438][b4438] mindstalk0 says: June 9, 2023 at 5:57 pm AIUI the US military strategy is largely to maintain those advantages, precisely because they're necessary not luxuries. Air, sea, and logistical superiority _is_ how the US fights. Loading... Reply 2. [4491c][4491c] George says: June 9, 2023 at 6:25 pm I have read that John Eisenhower, a new graduate of West Point, got a chance to visit his father in Normandy. Looking at the mass of men and material crossing the beaches, he said, "You couldn't do this if you didn't have air supremacy." The old man snorted, and I said, "I wouldn't be here if I didn't have air supremacy." It is hard to imagine how the US could be a factor on other continents without a great deal of expenditure on everything that goes into making it possible to send well-equipped armies hither and yon. Loading... Reply 30. [e9180][e9180] 60guilders says: June 9, 2023 at 2:47 pm Regarding the effects of the long peace, it's worth noting that the French intervention in Mali required US logistical support, the European intervention in Libya would have ended ignominiously when they ran out of ammunition if it weren't for the US pitching in, and Germany had a hard time getting any weapons to pro-Western rebels in Syria due to a severe lack of transport aircraft. Loading... Reply 31. [5938b][5938b] Michael Alan Hutson says: June 9, 2023 at 3:08 pm (update registration post) Loading... Reply 32. [41c55][41c55] kyb says: June 9, 2023 at 3:09 pm I've wondered whether a long peace effect occurred in Britain after the Roman occupation. It seems that it took quite a lot of time for society to adapt to Viking raiders, and perhaps that was because all the old ways of fighting and defense had been forgotten. Loading... Reply 1. [d59fa][d59fa] Bullseye says: June 9, 2023 at 6:46 pm But the Angles and Saxons were in charge of defending against the vikings, they they hadn't lived under Rome. Loading... Reply 33. [0bb48][0bb48] intropi says: June 9, 2023 at 3:16 pm > Meanwhile, maximizing the army for repression means developing paramilitary internal police forces at scale (Rosgvardiya is an obvious example), which direct resources away from core conventional military; such security-oriented forces aren't designed for a conventional war and perform poorly at it. Is there a clear distinction between the kinds of paramilitary forces you mention here and something like the French National Gendarmerie, Italian Carabinieri, or even US Coast Guard? Because a lot of countries seem to have these services that are kind of military but kind of police, but I don't associate all of them automatically with repression. Loading... Reply 34. [1babd][1babd] Robert Irelan says: June 9, 2023 at 3:22 pm Has anyone here read the book "Only the Dead: The Persistence of War in the Modern Age" by Bear F. Braumoeller? It was published in 2019, mostly as a response to decline-of-war theorists like Stephen Pinker. Essentially, he does some statistics to demonstrate that war doesn't seem to be appreciably less deadly or common nowadays than at any point within the past 200 years. It still remains very possible for war to spiral out of control to be as deadly as the World Wars. Moreover, we won't know if war is permanently less common, on a statistical basis, for another century. Even though international orders (such as the Western liberal order) reduce war between their members, they lead to increased risk of conflicts between the order members and other nations (think of all the wars justified in the name to democracy, or the current Russia-Ukraine war). All in all a sobering book. Loading... Reply 35. [0bb48][0bb48] intropi says: June 9, 2023 at 3:23 pm > the structure of the Russian Ministry of Defense, where the Army, the Navy and the Airborne forces (the VDV) all maintain infantry forces This reminds me of a claim (made in jest) I once read that "The Unites States's Navy's Army's Air Force" (referring to Marine Corps Aviation) was one of the largest in the word. Loading... Reply 1. [ee7d3][ee7d3] alexpmc says: June 9, 2023 at 6:19 pm The USMC is one of those things that probably won't make much sense if you were designing the US military from the ground up, but there's a ton of history and tradition and mythology behind it that would make ending it a political nonstarter. Loading... Reply 36. [80a73][80a73] Marvin says: June 9, 2023 at 3:50 pm There were previous regional phases of long peace, weren't there? Pax Romana 31 BCE - 235 CE, the Balance of Power in Europe 1814-1914. Even in non-industrial or just industrializing societies the incentives sometimes line up in a way that makes rulers think war doesn't pay. So the fact that the incentives line up in a way that makes war unprofitable now doesn't necessarily mean that this is a permanent shift. (As far as I can tell the fully industrial WW2 and the Korean War were positive for the United States both economically and strategically. Now, both of those wars weren't started by the US, but it still makes me doubt that the unprofitablility of war is a hard rule.) I think another powerful incentive against wars these days is that you need the support of your population, because they supply the soldiers and the money/labor. So they need to feel like they have to gain from the war. In pre-industrial times this was easy, because they got a share in the loot. But today soldiers' pay during peace and war probably won't be radically different and there isn't any loot to be gained. (For many people, staying home instead of enlisting will be better for their advancement in life.) Perhaps this is a reason why the Islamic State was so much more successful at recruiting than other Jihadist organizations: They managed to create the illusion for some people that going there and fighting would lead to a better life than what they had before. Which is a reason to worry, because it means that outside of the current norms of war, there is room to motivate people for war. I think the current norms in consolidated democracies are rather important for the long peace. These norms demand that war is (at least officially) for the benefit of the population of the people who are conquered, which prohibits enriching the soldiers from the conquest and setting the conquered territory up as a province to exploit, instead of trying to install a democracy. Loading... Reply 1. [3f376][3f376] Kevin says: June 9, 2023 at 4:08 pm I've read articles where it's claimed that countries like India and Middle Eastern states with large numbers of young men unmarried, out of work, few prospects, are going to be more apt to go to war in the coming years just to keep these guys busy and out of domestic trouble. Apart from that, it would be a mistake to think of those periods mentioned above as "peaceful". In the case of the Pax Romana, it was merely a time of no major clashes between great powers in the Med, as had been the case previously for a long while, and no major civil wars. There was still fighting along the Roman borders, lots of fighting, and significant wars or invasions of Britain, Parthia, Dacia, Palestine, expansion up to the Rhine and Danube under Augustus, an attempted conquest of Germania -- the legions kept busy! And European states saw plenty of action between the Napoleonic wars and WWI. Apart from the many colonial wars of imperialism, there were short wars between France and Austria, the Crimean War, the wars of German unification, the Franco-Prussian War, various wars in the Balkans and between Russia and the Ottomans -- the bloodletting was more localized maybe, but still ongoing. Loading... Reply 1. [80a73][80a73] Marvin says: June 9, 2023 at 4:31 pm Well, the Long Peace had, among others, the Vietnam War and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, so it wasn't entirely peaceful either. A more major difference might be that the number of wars / war casaulties continued the downward trend for the last 80 years, instead of just remaining at a lower equilibrium. (I don't think that was the case in the other periods.) Loading... Reply 1. [ce48b][ce48b] ad9 says: June 9, 2023 at 6:17 pm The point about the Long Peace isn't that it is perfectly peaceful; just that it is far more so than previous experience might have led you took expect. I always think of this video: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=DwKPFT-RioU Loading... Reply 2. [8882e][8882e] Hector_St_Clare says: June 9, 2023 at 4:32 pm "I've read articles where it's claimed that countries like India and Middle Eastern states with large numbers of young men unmarried," In India, at any rate, the reason you have "large numbers of young men unmaried" is maybe *because* of the history of war and the way it shapes culture. Male-heavy sex ratios are mostly a problem in northern and northwestern India (the direction from which invasions always came historically, and where there were big cities and breadbaskets to fight over), much more so than in the west coast, the east or the south, and among religious groups they're especially a problem among Sikhs (who have a very strong military tradition). The explanation I've heard is that that military- and war-oriented culture has resulted in a preference for boys and the resulting patterns of female abortion / infanticide. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ List_of_states_and_union_territories_of_India_by_sex_ratio #/media/File:India_sex_ratio_map_en.svg Loading... Reply 2. [bf01a][bf01a] buckyaits says: June 9, 2023 at 6:35 pm The notion that WWII was economically beneficial for the United States is questionable at best. There was a huge increase in production directed towards war goods, but those were exported without compensation - good for GDP numbers but bad for the country. And measures like rationing have costs that don't show up in the statistics. See e.g. Higgs @ https://www.amazon.com/ Depression-War-Cold-Challenging-Independent/dp/1598130293/ for a less superficial treatment. Loading... Reply 37. [f2b93][f2b93] AC Young says: June 9, 2023 at 3:54 pm I remember reading a newspaper report years ago (over a decade, possibly two) about a new system that the British Army had brought in for their war games, where what was hit when a weapon fired was determined by lasers and sensors. I believe that they use an updated version of this for their current war games. The report mentioned that one of the surprises of the new system was how effective snipers were. Apparently under the old system it was very difficult for a sniper to convince the umpires that they'd hit anything, whereas under the new system as long as the laser said they'd hit, they'd hit. Perhaps armed forces develop the skills that they believe are most effective, but until this is tested in war, there's no way to tell if those beliefs are correct or not. The best option is war simulation, but if that isn't sufficiently close to reality, even that might not help. Loading... Reply 1. [5938b][5938b] Michael Alan Hutson says: June 9, 2023 at 4:04 pm I can't find the attribution, but there's a saying that "there's nothing stupider than an army in peacetime". Loading... Reply 38. [3f376][3f376] Kevin says: June 9, 2023 at 3:58 pm By the by, as per the post on Patreon, I very much look forward to buying this forthcoming book by our esteemed pedant! Loading... Reply 39. [ce48b][ce48b] ad9 says: June 9, 2023 at 4:59 pm "If the USA decides that a military solution is the least-bad-option regarding Venezuela (I think this would be a mistake), there isn't much Venezuela could do about it)" Well, they couldn't make it literally impossible, but they could certainly make it very difficult and expensive. A hundred thousand fatal casualties does not seem that much for the conquest of a country of 30 million, but it's not nothing. Loading... Reply 40. [ce48b][ce48b] ad9 says: June 9, 2023 at 5:47 pm "I've discussed this before a few times, but I think Azar Gat is probably right to suggest that the long peace is itself a consequence of the changing incentives created by the industrial revolution and to an even greater extent, by nuclear weapons." I would naturally agree, but I am also reminded of Geoffrey Blainey and The Causes of War. The key cause he pointed to was a belief by the combatants that the war was worthwhile - they both thought they would benefit from further fighting. If you didn't think that, you'd be a lot keener on peace. Note that this mechanism requires that at least one (and possibly both) of the combatants be wrong. It occurs to me that the less information the countries have about each other, the more likely they are to be wrong. And that it is easier now to get good information about other countries, and even ones own country, than it was in previous centuries. So we might expect such misjudgements to be rarer. Loading... Reply 41. [4491c][4491c] George says: June 9, 2023 at 6:19 pm S.E. Morison's chapter on the Battle of Samar quotes the commander of one of the sunk destroyer escorts as saying that the average enlisted man on his ship had an average of less that one year's service. Loading... Reply 42. [ce48b][ce48b] ad9 says: June 9, 2023 at 6:39 pm "This is why, I'd argue, you see the proliferation of failed states globally" Are they particular common today? Was there really higher state capacity in, say, Africa 200 years ago? Loading... Reply 43. [bf01a][bf01a] buckyaits says: June 9, 2023 at 6:46 pm Another factor on the cost-benefit balance of war, which you don't talk about at all but which I think is extremely significant, is slavery and in particular state of the international slave market. If people are problems, enslave them and have someone else take care of the cost of oppressing them, and get paid for it. Slavery changes the refugees your war generates from a cost into a salable resource to pay for the occupation. Slavery is also a threat to wield against insurgents, if one makes it clear that the price of insurgency is that random people from the community will be seized and sold off. The overall costs to this scheme are of course far greater than the benefits, but in the absence of international vigilance and reprisal of a sort that would have been unthinkable a few hundred years ago, people other than the aggressor bear the vast majority of those costs. Loading... Reply Leave a Reply Cancel reply Search for: [ ] [Search] Updates every Friday! You can support this project via Patreon, and by spreading the word! 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