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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

arXiv:2305.12784 (cs)
[Submitted on 22 May 2023]

Title:Hot Pixels: Frequency, Power, and Temperature Attacks on GPUs
and ARM SoCs

Authors:Hritvik Taneja, Jason Kim, Jie Jeff Xu, Stephan van Schaik,
Daniel Genkin, Yuval Yarom
Download a PDF of the paper titled Hot Pixels: Frequency, Power, and
Temperature Attacks on GPUs and ARM SoCs, by Hritvik Taneja and 5
other authors
Download PDF

    Abstract: The drive to create thinner, lighter, and more energy
    efficient devices has resulted in modern SoCs being forced to
    balance a delicate tradeoff between power consumption, heat
    dissipation, and execution speed (i.e., frequency). While
    beneficial, these DVFS mechanisms have also resulted in
    software-visible hybrid side-channels, which use software to
    probe analog properties of computing devices. Such hybrid attacks
    are an emerging threat that can bypass countermeasures for
    traditional microarchitectural side-channel attacks.
    Given the rise in popularity of both Arm SoCs and GPUs, in this
    paper we investigate the susceptibility of these devices to
    information leakage via power, temperature and frequency, as
    measured via internal sensors. We demonstrate that the sensor
    data observed correlates with both instructions executed and data
    processed, allowing us to mount software-visible hybrid
    side-channel attacks on these devices.
    To demonstrate the real-world impact of this issue, we present
    JavaScript-based pixel stealing and history sniffing attacks on
    Chrome and Safari, with all side channel countermeasures enabled.
    Finally, we also show website fingerprinting attacks, without any
    elevated privileges.

Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as:  arXiv:2305.12784 [cs.CR]
          (or arXiv:2305.12784v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
          https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2305.12784
          Focus to learn more
          arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

Submission history

From: Jason Kim [view email]
[v1] Mon, 22 May 2023 07:29:05 UTC (3,126 KB)
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