https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2954173 Skip to main content PDF iconDownload This Paper Open PDF in Browser Add Paper to My Library Share: * * * * Permalink Using these links will ensure access to this page indefinitely [https://papers.ssrn.] Copy URL Algorithmic Entities 95 Washington University Law Review (Forthcoming). UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 17-09 69 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2017 Last revised: 23 Feb 2018 See all articles by Lynn M. LoPucki Lynn M. LoPucki University of Florida Levin College of Law Date Written: April 17, 2017 Abstract In a 2014 article, Professor Shawn Bayern demonstrated that anyone can confer legal personhood on an autonomous computer algorithm by putting it in control of a limited liability company. Bayern's demonstration coincided with the development of "autonomous" online businesses that operate independently of their human owners--accepting payments in online currencies and contracting with human agents to perform the off-line aspects of their businesses. About the same time, leading technologists Elon Musk, Bill Gates, and Stephen Hawking said that they regard human-level artificial intelligence as an existential threat to the human race. This Article argues that algorithmic entities--legal entities that have no human controllers--greatly exacerbate the threat of artificial intelligence. Algorithmic entities are likely to prosper first and most in criminal, terrorist, and other anti-social activities because that is where they have their greatest comparative advantage over human-controlled entities. Control of legal entities will contribute to the threat algorithms pose by providing them with identities. Those identities will enable them to conceal their algorithmic natures while they participate in commerce, accumulate wealth, and carry out anti-social activities. Four aspects of corporate law make the human race vulnerable to the threat of algorithmic entities. First, algorithms can lawfully have exclusive control of not just American LLC's but also a large majority of the entity forms in most countries. Second, entities can change regulatory regimes quickly and easily through migration. Third, governments--particularly in the United States--lack the ability to determine who controls the entities they charter and so cannot determine which have non-human controllers. Lastly, corporate charter competition, combined with ease of entity migration, makes it virtually impossible for any government to regulate algorithmic control of entities. Keywords: corporations, charter competition, internal affairs doctrine, business associations, artificial intelligence, entity migration, reincorporation, beneficial owners, terrorism, corporate disclosure, autonomous entities, algorithms, regulatory competition, financial action task force Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation LoPucki, Lynn M., Algorithmic Entities (April 17, 2017). 95 Washington University Law Review (Forthcoming)., UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 17-09, Available at SSRN: https:// ssrn.com/abstract=2954173 Lynn M. LoPucki (Contact Author) University of Florida Levin College of Law University of Florida Levin College of Law ( email ) P.O. Box 117625 Gainesville, FL 32611-7625 United States PDF iconDownload This Paper Open PDF in Browser Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN? 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