A general Objection against this Theory, viz. That if there had been such a Primitive Earth, as we pretend, the Fame of it would have sounded throughout all Antiquity. The Eastern and Western Learning consider’d. The most considerable Records of both are lost. What Footsteps remain relating to this Subject. The Jewish and Christian Learning consider’d; how far lost as to this Argument, and what Notes or Traditions remain. Lastly, how far the sacred Writings bear witness to it. The providential Conduct of Knowledge in the World. A Recapitulation and State of the Theory.

Having gone through the two first Parts, and the two first Books of this Theory that concern the primitive World, the universal Deluge, and the State of Paradise, we have leisure now to reflect a little, and consider what may probably be objected against a Theory of this Nature. I do not mean single Objections against single Parts, for those may be many, and such as I cannot foresee; but what may be said against the Body and Substance of the Theory, and the Credibility of it appearing new and surprizing, and yet of great Extent and Importance. This, I fancy, will induce many to say, surely this cannot be a Reality; for if there had been such a primitive Earth, and such a primitive World as is here represented, and so remarkably different from the present, it could not have been so utterly forgotten, or lain hid for so many Ages; all Antiquity would have rung of it; the Memory of it would have been kept fresh by Books or Traditions. Can we imagine that it should lie buried for some thousands of Years in deep Silence and Oblivion? And now only when the second World is drawing to an End, we begin to discover that there was a first, and that of another Make and Order from this.

To satisfy this Objection, or Surmise rather, it will be convenient to take a good large Scope and Compass in our Discourse; we must not suppose that this primitive World hath been wholly lost out of the Memory of Man, or out of History, for we have some History and Chronology of it preserv’d by Moses, and likewise in the Monuments of the Ancients, more or less; for they all suppos’d a World before the Deluge. But ’tis the Philosophy of this primitive World that hath been lost in a great Measure; what the State of Nature was then, and wherein it differ’d from the present or postdiluvian order of Things. This, I confess, hath been little taken notice of; it hath been generally thought or presum’d, that the World before the Flood was of the same Form and Constitution with the present World: This we do not deny, but rather think it design’d and providential, that there should not remain a clear and full Knowledge of that first State of Things; and we may easily suppose how it might decay and perish, if we consider how little of the remote Antiquities of the World have ever been brought down to our Knowledge.

The Greeks and Romans divided the Ages of the World into three Periods or Intervals, whereof they call’d the first the Obscure Period, the second the Fabulous, and the third Historical. The dark and obscure Period was from the Beginning of the World to the Deluge; what pass’d then, either in Nature, or amongst Men, they have no Records, no Account, by their own Confession; all that Space of Time was cover’d with Darkness and Oblivion; so that we ought rather to wonder at those Remains they have, and those broken Notions of the Golden Age, and the Conditions of it, how they were sav’d out of the common Ship-wrack, than to expect from them the Philosophy of that World, and all its Differences from the present. And as for the other Nations that pretend to greater Antiquities, to more ancient History and Chronology, from what is left of their Monuments, many will allow only this Difference, that their fabulous Age begun more high, or that they had more ancient Fables.

But besides that our Expectations cannot be great from the Learning of the Gentiles, we have not the Means or Opportunity to inform our selves well what Notions they did leave us concerning the primitive World; for their Books and Monuments are generally lost, or lie hid unknown to us. The Learning of the World may be divided into the Eastern Learning and the Western; and I look upon the Eastern as far more considerable for philosophical Antiquities, and philosophical Conclusions; I say Conclusions, for I do not believe either of them had any considerable Theory, or Contexture of Principles and Conclusions together: But ’tis certain that in the East, from what Source soever it came, humane or divine, they had some extraordinary Doctrines and Notions disperst amongst them. Now as by the western Learning we understand that of the Greeks and Romans; so by the eastern that which was amongst the Egyptians, Phœnicians, Chaldæans, Assyrians, Indians, Ethiopians, and Persians; and of the Learning of these Nations, how little have we now left? Except some Fragments and Citations in Greek Authors, what do we know of them? The modern Brackmans, and the Persees, or Pagan Persians, have some broken Remains of Traditions relating to the Origin and Changes of the World: But if we had not only those Books entire, whereof we have now the Gleanings and Reversions only; but all that have perish’d besides, especially in that famous Library at Alexandria; if these, I say, were all restor’d to the World again, we might promise our selves the Satisfaction of seeing more of the Antiquities, and natural History of the first World, than we have now left, or can reasonably expect. That Library we speak of at Alexandria, was a Collection, beside Greek Books, of Egyptian, Chaldæan, and all the Eastern Learning; and Cedrenus makes it to consist of an hundred thousand Volumes: But Josephus saith, when the Translation of the Bible by the Septuagint was to be added to it, Demetrius Phalerius, (who was Keeper or Governor of it) told the King then, that he had already two hundred thousand Volumes, and that he hop’d to make them five hundred thousand; and he was better than his Word, or his Successors for him; for Ammianus Marcellinus, and other Authors, report them to have increas’d to seven hundred thousand. This Library was unfortunately burnt in the sacking of Alexandria by Cæsar, and considering that all these were ancient Books, and generally of the eastern Wisdom, ’twas an inestimable and irreparable Loss to the Commonwealth of Learning. In like manner we are told of a vast Library of Books of all Arts and Sciences in China, burnt by the Command or Caprice of one of their Kings. Wherein the Chineses, according to their Vanity, were us’d to say, greater Riches were lost, than will be in the last Conflagration.

We are told also of the Abyssine, or Ethiopick Library, as something very extraordinary. ’Twas formerly in great Reputation, but is now, I suppose, embezzled and lost. But I was extreamly surpriz’d by a Treatise brought to me some few Months since, wherein are mention’d some Ethiopick Antiquities relating to the primæval Earth and the Deluge: To both which they give such Characters and Properties as are in Effect the very same with those assign’d them in this Theory. They say the first Earth was much greater than the present, higher and more advanc’d into the Air: That it was smooth and regular in its Surface, without Mountains or Valleys, but hollow within; and was spontaneously fruitful, without plowing or sowing. This was its first State: but when Mankind became degenerate and outragious with Pride and Violence, the angry Gods, as they say, by Earthquakes and Concussions, broke the habitable Orb of the Earth, and thereupon the subterraneous Waters gushing out, drown’d it in a Deluge, and destroy’d Mankind. Upon this Fraction it came into another Form, with a Sea, Lakes and Rivers, as we now have. And those Parts of the broken Earth that stood above the Waters became Mountains, Rocks, Islands, and so much of the Land as we now inhabit. This Account is given us by Barnardinus Ramazzinus, (in his Treatise De Fontium Mutinensium Scaturigine.^[2]) Taken from a Book writ by Fransisco Patricio, to whom this wonderful Tradition was deliver’d by Persons of Credit, from an Æthiopian Philosoper then in Spain. I have not yet had the good Fortune to see that Book of Francisco Patricio; ’twas writ in Italian with this Title, Della Rhetorica degli Antichi: Printed at Venice, 1562. This Story indeed deserves to be enquired after, for we do not any where amongst the Ancients, meet with such a full and explicit Narration of the State of the first and second Earth. That which comes nearest to it are those Accounts we find in Plato, from the Ægyptian Antiquities, in his Timæus, Politicus, and Phœdo, of another Earth, and another State of Nature and Mankind. But none of them are so full and distinct as this Æthiopian Doctrine.

As for the Western Learning, we may remember what the Ægyptian Priest says to Solon, in Plato’s Timæus, You Greeks are always Children, and know nothing of Antiquity; and if the Greeks were so, much more the Romans, who came after them in time; and for so great a People, and so much civiliz’d, never any had less Philosophy, and less of the Sciences amongst them than the Romans had: They studied only the Art of Speaking, of Governing, and of Fighting; and left the rest to the Greeks and eastern Nations, as unprofitable. Yet we have Reason to believe, that the best philosophical Antiquities that the Romans had, perish’d with the Books of Varro, of Numa Pompilius, and of the ancient Sibyls, (De Civ. Dei, lib. 6. Dion. Halic. Ant. Rom. lib. 4.) Varro writ, as St. Austin tells us, a Multitude of Volumes, and of various Sorts, and I had rather retrieve his Works, than the Works of any other Roman Author; not his Etymologies and Criticisms, where we see nothing admirable, but his Theologia Physica, and his Antiquitates; which in all Probability would have given us more Light into remote Times, and the natural History of the past World, than all the Latin Authors besides have done. He has left the foremention’d Distinction of three Periods of Time; He had the Doctrine of the Mundane Egg, as we see in Probus Grammaticus; and he gave us that Observation of the Star Venus, concerning the great Change she suffered about the Time of our Deluge.

Numa Pompilius was doubtless a contemplative Man, and ’tis thought that he understood the true System of the World, and represented the Sun by his Vestal Fire; tho’, methinks, Vesta does not so properly refer to the Sun, as to the Earth, which hath a sacred Fire too, that is not to be extinguish’d. He order’d his Books to be buried with him, which were found in a Stone Chest by him, four hundred Years after his Death: They were in all twenty-four, whereof twelve contain’d sacred Rites and Ceremonies, and the other twelve the Philosophy and Wisdom of the Greeks; the Romans gave them to the Prætor Petilius to peruse; and to make his Report to the Senate, whether they were fit to be publish’d or no: The Prætor made a wise politick Report, that the Contents of them might be of dangerous Consequence to the establish’d Laws and Religion; and thereupon they were condemn’d to be burnt, and Posterity was depriv’d of that ancient Treasure, whatsoever it was. What the nine Books of the Sibyl contain’d, that were offer’d to King Tarquin, we little know; she valued them high, and the higher still, the more they seem’d to slight or neglect them; which is a Piece of very natural Indignation or Contempt, when one is satisfied of the Worth of what they offer. ’Tis likely they respected, besides the Fate of Rome, the Fate and several Periods of the World, both past and to come, and the most mystical Passages of them. And in these Authors and Monuments are lost the greatest Hopes of natural and philosophick Antiquities, that we could have had from the Romans.

And as to the Greeks, their best and sacred Learning was not originally their own; they enrich’d themselves with the Spoils of the East, and the Remains we have of that eastern Learning, is what we pick out of the Greeks; whose Works, I believe, if they were intirely extant, we should not need to go any further for Witnesses to confirm all the principal Parts of this Theory. With what Regret does one read in Laertius, Suidas, and others, the promising Titles of Books writ by the Greek Philosophers, Hundreds or Thousands, whereof there is not one now extant; and those that are extant are generally but Fragments? Those Authors also that have writ their Lives, or collected their Opinions, have done it confusedly and injudiciously. I should hope for as much Light and Instruction, as to the Original of the World, from Orpheus alone, if his Works had been preserv’d, as from all that is extant now of the other Greek Philosophers. We may see from what remains of him, that he understood in a good Measure how the Earth rose from a Chaos, what was its external Figure, and what the Form of its inward Structure: The Opinion of the Oval Figure of the Earth is ascrib’d to Orpheus and his Disciples; and the Doctrine of the Mundane Egg is so peculiarly his, that ’tis call’d by Proclus, the Orphick Egg; not that he was the first Author of that Doctrine, but the first that brought it into Greece.

Thus much concerning the Heathen Learning, Eastern and Western, and the small Remains of it in Things Philosophical; ’tis no Wonder then if the Account we have left us from them of the primitive Earth, and the Antiquities of the natural World be very imperfect. And yet we have trac’d, (in the precedent Chapter, and more largely in our Latin Treatise) the Footsteps of several Parts of this Theory amongst the Writings and Traditions of the Ancients, and even of those Parts that seem the most strange and singular, and that are the Basis upon which the rest stand. We have shewn there, that their Account of the Chaos, tho’ it seem’d to many but a poetical Rhapsody, contain’d the true Mystery of the Formation of the primitive Earth, (Tell. Theor. lib. 2. c. 7.) We have also shewn upon the same Occasion, that both the external Figure and internal Form of that Earth were compriz’d and signified in their ancient Doctrine of the Mundane Egg, which hath been propagated through all the learned Nations, (Ibid. cap. 10.) And lastly, as to the Situation of that Earth, and the Change of its Posture since, that the Memory of that has been kept up, we have brought several Testimonies and Indications from the Greek Philosophers, (Ibid.) And these were the three great and fundamental Properties of the primitive Earth, upon which all the other depend, and all its Differences from the present Order of Nature. You see then, tho’ Providence hath suffer’d the ancient Heathen Learning and their Monuments, in a great Part, to perish, yet we are not left wholly without Witnesses amongst them, in a Speculation of this great Importance.

You will say, it may be, tho’ this Account, as to the Books and Learning of the Heathen, may be look’d upon as reasonable, yet we might expect however, from the Jewish and Christian Authors, a more full and satisfactory Account of that primitive Earth, and of the old World. First, as to the Jews, ’tis well known that they have no ancient Learning, unless by Way of Tradition, amongst them. There is not a Book extant in their Language excepting the Canon of the Old Testament, that hath not been writ since our Saviour’s Time. They are very bad Masters of Antiquity, and they may in some Measure be excus’d, because of their several Captivities, Dispersions, and Desolations. In the Babylonish Captivity their Temple was ransack’d, and they did not preserve, as is thought, so much as the Autograph, or original Manuscript of the Law, nor the Books of those of their Prophets that were then extant, and kept in the Temple; and at their Return from the Captivity after seventy Years, they seem to have forgot their native Language so much, that the Law was to be interpreted to them in Chaldee, after it was read in Hebrew; for so I understand that Interpretation in Nehemiah, (Chap. viii. 7, 8.) ’Twas a great Providence, methinks, that they should any Way preserve their Law, and other Books of Scripture, in the Captivity, for so long a Time; for ’tis likely they had not the Liberty of using them in any publick Worship, seeing they return’d so ignorant of their own Language, and, as ’tis thought, of their Alphabet and Character too. And if their sacred Books were hardly preserv’d, we may easily believe all others perish’d in that publick Desolation.

Yet there was another Destruction of that Nation, and their Temple, greater than this, by the Romans; and if there were any Remains of Learning preserv’d in the former Ruin, or any Recruits made since that Time, this second Desolation would sweep them all away. And accordingly we see they have nothing left in their Tongue, beside the Bible, so ancient as the Destruction of Jerusalem. These and other publick Calamities of the Jewish Nation may reasonably be thought to have wasted their Records of ancient Learning, if they had any; for to speak Truth, the Jews are a People of little Curiosity, as to Sciences and philosophical Enquiries: They were very tenacious of their own Customs, and careful of those Traditions that did respect them, but were not remarkable, that I know of, or thought great Proficients in any other sort of Learning. There has been a great Fame, ’tis true, of the Jewish Cabala, and of great Mysteries contain’d in it; and, I believe, there was once a traditional Doctrine amongst some of them, that had extraordinary Notions and Conclusions: But where is this now to be found? The Essenes were the likeliest Sect, one would think, to retain such Doctrines; but ’tis probable they are now so mixt with Things fabulous and fantastical, that what one should alledge from thence would be of little or no Authority. One Head in this Cabala was the Doctrine of the Sephiroth, (Vide Men. ben Isr. de Creat. prob. 28.) and tho’ the Explication of them be uncertain, the inferior Sephiroth in the corporeal World cannot so well be apply’d to any Thing, as to those several Orbs and Regions, infolding one another, whereof the primigenial Earth was compos’d. Yet such Conjectures and Applications, I know, are of no Validity, but in Consort with better Arguments. I have often thought also, that their first and second Temple represented the first and second Earth or World; and that of Ezekiel’s, which is the third, is still to be erected, the most beautiful of all, when this second Temple of the World shall be burn’d down. If the Prophecies of Enoch had been preserv’d, and taken into the Canon by Ezra, after their Return from Babylon, when the Collection of their sacred Books is suppos’d to have been made, we might probably have had a considerable Account there, both of Times past and to come, of Antiquities and Futuritions; for those Prophecies are generally suppos’d to have contain’d both the first and second Fate of this Earth, and all the Periods of it. But as this Book is lost to us, so I look upon all others that pretend to be Ante-mosaical or Patriarchal, as spurious and fabulous.

Thus much concerning the Jews. As for Christian Authors, their Knowledge must be from some of these foremention’d Jews or Heathens; or else by Apostolical Tradition: For the Christian Fathers were not very speculative, so as to raise a Theory from their own Thoughts and Contemplations, concerning the Origin of the Earth. We have instanc’d, in the last Chapter, in a Christian Tradition concerning Paradise, and the high Situation of it, which is fully consonant to the Scite of the Primitive Earth, where Paradise stood, and doth seem plainly to refer to it, being unintelligible upon any other Supposition. And ’twas, I believe, this Elevation of Paradise, and the Pencil Structure of that Paradisiacal Earth, that gave Occasion to Celsus, as we see by Origen’s Answer, to say, that the Christian Paradise was taken from the pensile Gardens of Alcinous: But we may see now what was the Ground of such Expressions or Traditions amongst the Ancients, which Providence left to keep Men’s Minds awake; not fully to instruct them, but to confirm them in the Truth, when it should come to be made known in other Methods. We have noted also above, that the ancient Books and Authors amongst the Christians, that were most likely to inform us in this Argument, have perish’d, and are lost out of the World, such as Ephrem Syrus de ortu rerum, and Tertullian de Paradiso; and that Piece, which is extant of Moses Bar Cepha’s upon this Subject, receives more Light from our Hypothesis, than from any other I know; for, correcting some Mistakes about the Figure of the Earth, which the Ancients were often guilty of, the Obscurity or Confusion of that Discourse in other Things may be easily rectified, if compar’d with this Theory.

Of this Nature also is that Tradition that is common both to Jews and Christians, and which we have often mentioned before, that there was a perpetual Serenity, and perpetual Equinox in Paradise; which cannot be upon this Earth, not so much as under the Equinoctial; for they have a Sort of Winter and Summer, there, a Course of Rains at certain times of the Year, and great Inequalities of the Air, as to Heat and Cold, Moisture and Drought. They had also Traditions amongst them, That there was no Rain from the Beginning of the World till the Deluge, and that there were no Mountains till the Flood, (Lat. Treat. Lib. 2. c. 10.) and such like. These, you see, point directly at such an Earth, as we have describ’d. And I call these Traditions, because we cannot find the Original Authors of them; the ancient ordinary Gloss (upon Genesis) which some make eight hundred Years old, mentions both these Opinions; so does Historia Scholastica, Alcuinus, Rabanus Maurus, Lyranus, and such Collectors of Antiquity. Bede also relates that of the Plainness or Smoothness of the Antediluvian Earth. Yet these are reported Traditionally, as it were, naming no Authors or Books from whence they were taken: Nor can it be imagin’d that they feign’d them themselves; to what End or Purpose? It serv’d no Interest; or upon what Ground? Seeing they had no Theory that could lead them to such Notions as these, or that could be strengthen’d and confirm’d by them. Those Opinions also of the Fathers, which we recited in the seventh Chapter, placing Paradise beyond the Torrid Zone, and making it therefore inaccessible, suit very well to the Form, Qualities, and Bipartition of the Primæval Earth, and seem to be grounded upon them.

Thus much may serve for a short Survey of the ancient Learning, to give us a reasonable Account, why the Memory and Knowledge of the Primitive Earth should be so much lost out of the World; and what we retain of it still; which would be far more, I do not doubt, if all Manuscripts were brought to light, that are yet extant in publick or private Libraries. The Truth is, one cannot judge with Certainty, neither what things have been recorded and preserv’d in the Monuments of Learning, nor what are still; nor what have been, because so many of those Monuments are lost: The Alexandrian Library, which we spoke of before, seems to have been the greatest Collection that ever was made before Christianity, and the Constantinopolitan (begun by Constantine, and destroy’d in the fifth Century, when it was rais’d to the Number, as is said, of one hundred twenty thousand Volumes) the most valuable that was ever since, and both these have been permitted by Providence to perish in the merciless Flames. Beside those Devastations of Books and Libraries that have been made in Christendom, by the Northern barbarous Nations overflowing Europe, and the Saracens and Turks, great Parts of Asia and Africk. It is hard therefore to pronounce what Knowledge hath been in the World, or what Accounts of Antiquity; neither can we well judge what remain, or of what things the Memory may be still latently conserv’d: For beside those Manuscripts that are yet unexamin’d in these Parts of Christendom, there are many, doubtless, of good Value in other Parts; beside those that be hid in the unchristianiz’d Dominions. The Library of Fez is said to contain thirty two thousand Volumes in Arabick; and though the Arabick Learning was most what Western, and therefore of less Account, yet they did deal in Eastern Learning too; for Avicenna writ a Book with that Title, Philosophia Orientalis. There may be also in the East, Thousands of Manuscripts unknown to us, of greater Value than most Books we have: And as to those Subjects we are treating of, I should promise my self more Light and Confirmation from the Syriack Authors than from any others. These things being consider’d, we can make but a very imperfect Estimate, what Evidences are left us, and what Accounts of the primitive Earth; and if these Deductions and Defalcations be made, both for what Books are wholly lost, and for what lie asleep or dead, in Libraries, we have Reason to be satisfied in a Theory of this Nature, to find so good Attestations as we have produc’d for the several Parts of it; which we purpose to enlarge upon considerably at another time and occasion.

But to carry this Objection as far as may be, let us suppose it to be urg’d still in the last Place, that though these Humane Writings have perish’d or be imperfect, yet in the Divine Writings at least, we might expect that the Memory of the old World, and of the primitive Earth should have been preserv’d. To this I answer in short, that we could not expect in the Scriptures any natural Theory of that Earth, nor any Account of it, but what was general; and this we have, both by the Tehom Rabba of Moses, and the Description of the same Abyss in other Places of Scripture, as we have shewn at large in the first Book. Chap. vii. And also by the Description which St. Peter hath given of the antediluvian Heavens and Earth, and their different Constitution from the present; which is also prov’d by the Rainbow, not seen in the first World. You will say, it may be, that that Place of St. Peter, 2 Pet. iii. 5, 6, &c. is capable of another Interpretation; so are most Places of Scripture, if you speak of a bare Capacity, they are capable of more than one Interpretation: But that which is most natural, proper, and congruous, and suitable to the Words, suitable to the Argument, and suitable to the Context, wherein is nothing superfluous or impertinent, that we prefer and accept of as the most reasonable Interpretation. Besides, in such Texts as relate to the natural World, if of two Interpretations propos’d, one agrees better with the Theory of Nature than the others, cæteris paribus, that ought to be prefer’d. And by these two Rules we are willing to be try’d, in the Exposition of that remarkable Discourse of St. Peter’s, and to stand to that Sense which is found most agreeable to them.

Give me leave to conclude the whole Discourse with this general Consideration: ’Tis reasonable to suppose, that there is a Providence in the Conduct of Knowledge, as well as of other Affairs on the Earth; and that it was not design’d that all the Mysteries of Nature and Providence should be plainly and clearly understood throughout all the Ages of the World; but that there is an Order establish’d for this, as for other Things, and certain Periods and Seasons; and what was made known to the Ancients only by broken Conclusions and Traditions will be known (in the latter Ages of the World) in a more perfect way, by Principles and Theories. The Increase of Knowledge being that which changeth so much the Face of the World, and the State of humane Affairs, I do not doubt but there is a particular Care and Superintendency for the Conduct of it; by what Steps and Degrees it should come to light, at what Seasons and in what Ages; what Evidence should be left, either in Scripture, Reason, or Tradition, for the Grounds of it; how clear or obscure, how dispers’d or united: All these things were weigh’d and consider’d, and such Measures taken as best suit the Designs of Providence, and the general Project and Method propos’d in the Government of the World. And I make no Question but the State both of the Old World, and of that which is to come, is exhibited to us in Scripture in such a Measure and Proportion, as is fit for this formentioned Purpose; not as the Articles of our Faith, or the Precepts of a good Life, which he that runs may read; but to the attentive and reflective, to those that are unprejudic’d, and to those who are inquisitive, and have their Minds open and prepar’d for the Discernment of Mysteries of such a Nature.

Thus much in Answer to that general Objection which might be made against this Theory, That it is not founded in Antiquity. I do not doubt but there may be many particular Objections against Parts and Sections of it, and the exposing it thus in our own Tongue may excite some one or other, it may be, to make them; but if any be so minded, I desire (if they be Scholars) that it may rather be in Latin, as being more proper for a Subject of this Nature; and also that they would keep themselves close to the Substance of the Theory, and wound that as much as they can: But to make Excursions upon Things accidental or collateral, that do not destroy the Hypothesis, is but to trouble the World with Impertinencies. Now the Substance of the Theory is this, THAT there was a Primitive Earth of another Form from the present, and inhabited by Mankind till the Deluge: That it had those Properties and Conditions that we have ascrib’d to it, namely, a perpetual Equinox or Spring, by reason of its right Situation to the Sun; was of an oval Figure, and the exterior Face of it smooth and uniform, without Mountains or a Sea. That in this Earth stood Paradise; the Doctrine whereof cannot be understood but upon Supposition of this primitive Earth, and its Properties. Then that the Disruption and Fall of this Earth into the Abyss, which lay under it, was that which made the universal Deluge, and the Destruction of the old World; and that neither Noah’s Flood, nor the present Form of the Earth, can be explain’d in any other Method that is rational, nor by any other Causes that are intelligible, at least, that have been hitherto propos’d to the World. These are the Vitals of the Theory, and the primary Assertions, whereof I do freely profess my full Belief; and whosoever by solid Reasons will shew me in an Error, and undeceive me, I shall be very much oblig’d to him. There are other lesser Conclusions which flow from these, and may be call’d Secondary, as that the Longevity of the Ante-diluvians depended upon their perpetual Equinox, and the perpetual Equality and Serenity of the Air: That the Torrid Zone in the primitive Earth was uninhabitable, and that all their Rivers flow’d from the extream Parts of the Earth towards the Equinoctial; there being neither Rain nor Rainbow in the temperate and habitable Regions of it: And lastly, That the Place of Paradise, according to the Opinion of Antiquity, (for I determine no Place by the Theory) was in the southern Hemisphere. These, I think, are all truly deduc’d and prov’d in their several Ways, tho’ they be not such essential Parts of the Theory, as the former. There are also besides, many particular Explications that are to be consider’d with more Liberty and Latitude, and may be perhaps upon better Thoughts, or better Observations, corrected without any Prejudice to the general Theory. Those Places of Scripture, which we have cited, I think, are all truly apply’d; and I have not mention’d Moses’s Cosmopœia, because I thought it deliver’d by him as a Lawgiver, not as a Philosopher; which I intend to shew at large in another Treatise, not thinking that Discussion proper for the vulgar Tongue. Upon the whole, we are to remember, that some Allowances are to be made for every Hypothesis that is new propos’d and untry’d; and that we ought not, out of Levity of Wit, or any private Design, discountenance free and fair Essays; nor from any other Motive but the only Love and Concern of Truth.

Chap. X.
Concerning the Author of Nature.

Seeing the Theory which we have propos’d in this Work is of that Extent and Comprehension, that it begins with the first Foundation of this World, and is to reach to the last Period of it, in one continued Series or Chain of Nature; it will not be improper, before we conclude, to make some Reflections and Remarks what Nature is, and upon what superior Causes she depends in all her Motions and Operations: And this will lead us to the Discovery of the Author of Nature, and to the true Notion and State of Natural Providence, which seems to have been hitherto very much neglected, or little understood in the World. And ’tis the more reasonable and fitting that we should explain these Notions before we shut up this Treatise, lest those natural Explications which we have given of the Deluge, and other Things, should be mistaken or misapply’d; seeing some are apt to run away with Pieces of a Discourse, which they think applicable to their Purpose, or which they can maliciously represent, without attending to the Scope or just Limitations of what is spoken.

By Nature in general is understood all the Powers of finite Beings, with the Laws establish’d for their Action and Conduct according to the ordinary Course of Things. And this extends both to intellectual Beings and corporeal; but seeing ’tis only the material World that hath been the Subject of our Discourse, Nature, as to that, may be defin’d, the Powers of Matter, with the Laws establish’d for their Action and Conduct. Seeing also Matter hath no Action, whether from it self, or imprest upon it, but Motion, as to the corporeal World, Nature is no more than the Powers and Capacities of Matter, with the Laws that govern the Motions of it. And this Definition is so plain and easy, that, I believe, all Parties will agree in it; there will also be no great Controversy what these Laws are. As that one Part of Matter cannot penetrate another, nor be in several Places at once; That the greater Body overcomes the less, and the swifter the slower; That all Motion is in a right Line, till something obstruct it or divert it; which are Points little disputed as to the Matter of Fact; but the Points concerning which the Controversy ariseth, and which are to lead us to the Author of Nature, are these; Who or what is the Author of these Laws of this Motion, and even of Matter it self; and of all those Modes and Forms of it which we see in Nature?

The Question useth chiefly to be put concerning Motion, how it came into the World; what the first Source of it is, or how Matter came at first to be mov’d? For the simple Notion of Matter, not divided into Parts, nor diversified, doth not imply Motion, but Extension only: ’Tis true, from Extension there necessarily follows Mobility, or a Capacity of being mov’d by an external Power, but not actual or necessary Motion, springing from it self. For Dimensions, or Length, Breadth, and Depth, which is the Idea of Matter, or of a Body, do no Way include local Motion, or Translation of Parts; on the contrary, we do more easily and naturally conceive simple Extension as a Thing steady and fix’d; and if we conceive Motion in it, or in its Parts, we must superadd something to our first Thought, and something that does not flow from Extension. As when we conceive a Figure, a Triangle, Square, or any other, we naturally conceive it fix’d or quiescent; and if afterwards we imagine it in Motion, that is purely accidental to the Figure; in like Manner it is accidental to Matter, that there should be Motion in it, it hath no inward Principle from whence that can flow, and its Nature is compleat without it; wherefore, if we find Motion and Action in Matter, which is of it self a dead inactive Mass; this should lead us immediately to the Author of Nature, or to some external Power distinct from Matter, which is the Cause of all Motion in the World.

In single Bodies, and single Parts of Matter, we readily believe and conclude, that they do not move, unless something move them, and why should we not conclude the same Thing of the whole Mass? If a Rock or Mountain cannot move it self, nor divide it self, either into great Gobbets, or into small Powder, why should it not be as impossible for the whole Mass of Matter to do so? ’Tis true, Matter is capable both of Motion and Rest; yet to conceive it undivided, undiversified and unmoved, is certainly a more simple Notion, than to conceive it divided and mov’d; and this being first in Order of Nature, and an adequate Conception too, we ought to enquire and give our selves an Account how it came out of this State, and by what Causes, or, as we said before, how Motion came first into the World.

In the second Place, That Diversity which we see in Nature, both as to the Qualities of Matter, and the Compositions of it, being one Step further than bare Motion, ought also to be a further Indication of the Author of Nature, and to put us upon Enquiry into the Causes of this Diversity. There is nothing more uniform than simple Extension, nothing more the same throughout, all of a Piece, and all of a Sort, similar, and like to itself every where; yet we find the Matter of the Universe diversified a thousand Ways, into Heavens and Earth, Air and Water, Stars, Meteors, Light, Darkness, Stones, Wood, Animals, and all terrestrial Bodies; These Diversifications are still further Removes from the natural Unity and Identity of Matter, and a further Argument of some external and superior Power that hath given these different Forms to the several Portions of Matter, by the Intervention of Motion. For if you exclude the Author of Nature, and suppose nothing but Matter in the World, take whether Hypothesis you will, either that Matter is without Motion of it self, or that it is of it self in Motion, there could not arise this Diversity, and these Compositions in it. If it was without Motion, then the Case is plain, for it would be nothing but an hard inflexible Lump of impenetrable Extension, without any Diversity at all. And if you suppose it mov’d of it self, or to have an innate Motion, that would certainly hinder all Sort of natural Concretions and Compositions, and in Effect destroy all Continuity. For Motion, if it be essential to Matter, it is essential to every Atom of it, and equally diffus’d throughout all its Parts; and all those Parts or Atoms would be equal to one another, and as little as possible; for if Matter was divided into Parts by its own innate Motion, that would melt it down into Parts as little as possible, and consequently all equal to one another, there being no reason why you should stop those Divisions, or the Effect of this innate Impetus in any one Part sooner than in another, or in any Part indeed, till it was divided as much as was possible: wherefore upon this Principle, or in this Method, all the Matter of the Universe would be one liquid or volatile Mass, smaller than Pin-dust, nay, than Air or Æther; and there would be no Diversity of Forms, only another sort of Identity from the former, when we suppos’d it wholly without Motion. And so, upon the whole, you see, that Matter, whether we allow it Motion, or no Motion, could not come into that Variety of Tempers and Compositions in which we find it in the World, without the Influence and Direction of a superior external Cause, which we call the Author of Nature.

But there is still a further and stronger Argument from this Head, if we consider not only the Diversity of Bodies that the Mass of Matter is cut into, but also that that Diversity is regular, and in some Parts of it admirably artful and ingenious. This will not only lead us to an Author of Nature, but to such an Author as hath Wisdom as well as Power. Matter is a brute Being, stupid and senseless; and tho’ we should suppose it to have a Force to move it self, yet that it should be able to meditate and consult, and take its Measures how to frame a World, a regular and beautiful Structure, consisting of such and such Parts and Regions, and adapted to such and such Purposes, this would be too extravagant to imagine; to allow it not only Motion from it self, but Wit and Judgment too; and that before it came into any organical or animate Composition.

You’ll say, it may be, the Frame of the World was not the Result of Counsel and Consultation, but of Necessity; Matter being once in Motion under the Conduct of those Laws that are essential to it, it wrought it self by Degrees from one State into another, till at length it came into the present Form which we call the World. These are Words thrown out at Random, without any Pretence of Ground, only to see if they can be confuted; and so they may easily be; for we have shewn already, that if Matter had innate Motion, it would be so far from running into the orderly and well dispos’d Frame of the World, that it would run into no Frame at all, into no Forms or Compositions, or Diversity of Bodies; but would either be all fluid, or all solid; either every single Particle in a separate Motion, or all in one continued Mass, with an universal Tremor, or Inclination to move without actual Separation; and either of these two States is far from the Form of a World. Secondly, As to the Laws of Motion, as some of them are essential to Matter, so others are not demonstrable, but upon Supposition of an Author of Nature. And thirdly, Tho’ all the Laws of Motion be admitted, they cannot bring Matter into the Form of a World, unless some Measures be taken at first by an intelligent Being; I say, some Measures be taken to determine the primary Motions upon which the rest depend, and to put them in a Way that leads to the Formation of a World. The Mass must be divided into Regions, and Centers fixt, and Motions appropriated to them; and it must be consider’d of what Magnitude the first Bodies, or the first Divisions of Matter should be, and how mov’d: Besides, there must be a determinate Proportion, and certain Degree of Motion imprest upon the universal Matter, to qualify it for the Production of a World; if the Dose was either too strong or too weak, the Work would miscarry; and nothing but infinite Wisdom could see thro’ the Effects of every Proportion, or every new degree of Motion, and discern which was best for the Beginning, Progress, and Perfection of a World. So you see the Author of Nature is no Way excluded, or made useless by the Laws of Motion; nor if Matter was promiscuously mov’d, would these be sufficient Causes of themselves to produce a World, or that regular Diversity of Bodies that compose it.

But ’tis hard to satisfy Men against their Inclinations, or their Interest: And as their Regularity of the Universe was always a great Stumbling-stone to the Epicureans; so they have endeavour’d to make Shifts of all Sorts to give an Account and Answer to it, without Recourse to an intelligent Principle; and for their last Refuge, they say, that Chance might bring that to pass, which Nature and Necessity could not do; the Atoms might hit upon a lucky Set of Motions, which, tho’ it were casual and fortuitous, might happily lead them to the forming of a World. A lucky hit indeed, for Chance to frame a World: But this is a mere Shuffle and Collusion; for if there was nothing in Nature but Matter, there could be no such Thing as Chance, all would be pure Mechanical Necessity; and so this Answer, tho’ it seem very different, is the same in effect with the former, and Epicurus with his anatomists are oblig’d to give a just mechanical Account, how all the Parts of Nature, the most compound and elaborate Parts not excepted, rise from their Atoms by pure Necessity: There could be no accidental Concourse or Coalition of them, every step, every motion, every composition was fatal and necessary, and therefore ’tis Nonsense for an Epicurean to talk of Chance, as Chance is oppos’d to Necessity; and if they oppose it to Counsel and Wisdom, ’tis little better than Nonsense, to say the World and all its Furniture rose by Chance, in that Notion of it. But it will deserve our Patience a little, to give a more full and distinct Answer to this, seeing it reacheth all their Pleas and Evasions at once.

What Proof or Demonstration of Wisdom and Counsel can be given, or can be desir’d, that is not found in some Part of the World, animate or inanimate? We know but a little Portion of the Universe, a mere Point in Comparison, and a broken Point too; and yet in this broken Point, or some small Parcels of it, there is more of Art, Counsel and Wisdom shewn, than in all the Works of Men taken together, or than in all our Artificial World. In the Construction of the Body of an Animal, there is more of Thought and Contrivance, more of exquisite Invention, and fit Disposition of Parts, than is in all the Temples, Palaces, Ships, Theatres, or any other Pieces of Architecture the World ever yet saw: And not Architecture only, but all other Mechanism whatsoever, Engines, Clock-work, or any other, is not comparable to the Body of a living Creature. Seeing then we acknowledge these artificial Works, wheresoever we meet with them, to be the Effects of Wit, Understanding and Reason, is it not manifest Partiality, or Stupidity rather, to deny the Works of Nature, which excel these in all Degrees, to proceed from an intelligent Principle? Let them take any Piece of humane Art, or any Machine fram’d by the Wit of Man, and compare it with the Body of an Animal, either for Diversity and Multiplicity of Workmanship, or Curiosity in the minute Parts, or just Connexion and Dependance of one Thing upon another, or fit Subserviency to the Ends propos’d, of Life, Motion, Use and Ornament to the Creature; and if in all these Respects they find it superior to any Work of humane Production, (as they certainly must do) why should it be thought to proceed from inferior and senseless Causes? Ought we not in this, as well as in other Things, to proportion the Causes to the Effect, and to speak Truth, and bring in an honest Verdict for Nature as well as Art?

In the Composition of a perfect Animal, there are four several Frames or Compages join’d together, the natural, vital, animal and genital: Let them examine anyone of these apart, and try if they can find any Thing defective or superfluous, or any Way inept for Matter or Form. Let them view the whole Compages of the Bones, and especially the admirable Constitution, Texture, and Disposition of the Muscles, which are join’d with them for moving the Body, or its Parts. Let them take an Account of the little Pipes and Conduits for the Juices and the Liquors, of their Form and Distribution; or let them take any single Organ to examine, as the Eye, or the Ear, the Hand, or the Heart: In each of these they may discover such Arguments of Wisdom, and of Art, as will either convince them, or confound them; tho’ still they must leave greater undiscover’d. We know little the insensible Form and Contexture of the Parts of the Body, nor the just Method of their Action: We know not yet the Manner, Order and Causes of the Motion of the Heart, which is the chief Spring of the whole Machine; and with how little Exactness do we understand the Brain, and the Parts belonging to it? Why of that Temper and of that Form: How Motions are propagated there, and how conserv’d: How they answer the several Operations of the Mind: Why such little Discomposures of it disturb our Senses, and upon what little Differences in this the great Differences of Wits and Genius’s depend. Yet seeing in all these Organs, whose Make and Manner of Action we cannot discover, we see however by the Effects, that they are truly fitted for those Offices to which Nature hath design’d them, we ought in Reason to admire that Art which we cannot penetrate. At least we cannot but judge it a Thing absurd, that what we have not Wit enough to find out or comprehend, we should not allow to be an Argument of Wit and Understanding in the Author, or Inventor of it. This would be against all Logick, common Sense, and common Decorum. Neither do I think it possible to the Mind of Man, while we attend to Evidence, to believe that these, and such like Works of Nature came by Chance, as they call it, or without Providence, Forecast and Wisdom, either in the first Causes, or in the proximate; in the Design, or in the Execution; in the Preparation to them, or in the finishing of them.

Wherefore, in my Judgment, if any be of this Persuasion, it cannot be so much the Effect of their Understanding, as of their Disposion and Inclination; and in moral Things, Mens Opinions do as often spring from the one, as from the other. For my Part, I do generally distinguish of two Sorts of Opinions in all Men, Inclination-opinions, and Reason’d-opinions; Opinions that grow upon Mens Complexions, and Opinions that are the Results of their Reason; and I meet with very few that are of a Temperament so equal, or a Constitution so even pois’d, but that they incline to one Set of Opinions rather than another, antecedently to all Proofs of Reason: And when they have espous’d their Opinions from that secret Sympathy, then they find out as good Reasons as they can, to maintain them, and say, nay think sometimes, that ’twas for the sake of those Reasons that they first embrac’d them. We may commonly distinguish these Inclination-opinions from the rational, because we find them accompanied with more Heat than Light, a great deal of Eagerness and Impatience in defending of them, and but slender Arguments. One might give Instances of this, both in Sects of Religion and Philosophy, in Platonists, Stoicks, and Epicureans, that are so by their Temper more than their Reason; but to our Purpose it will be sufficient to instance in one hearty Epicurean, Lucretius, who is manifestly such, more from his Inclination, and the Bent of his Spirit, than from the Force of Argument. For tho’ his Suppositions be very precarious, and his Reasonings all along very slight, he will many times strut and triumph, as if he had rested the Thunder out of Jove’s right Hand; and a Mathematician is not more confident of his Demonstration, than he seems to be of the Truth of his shallow Philosophy. From such a Principle of natural Complexion as this, I allow a Man may be Athestical, but never from the calm Dictate of his Reason; yet he may be as confident and as tenacious of his Conclusion, as if he had a clear and distinct Evidence for it. For I take it to be a true Maxim in humane Nature, that a strong Inclination, with a little Evidence, is equivalent to a strong Evidence. And therefore we are not to be surpriz’d if we find Men confident in their Opinions many times far beyond the Degree of their Evidence, seeing there are other Things, besides Evidence, that incline the Will to one Conclusion rather than another. And as I have instanc’d in natural Complexion, so Interest hath the same Effect upon humane Nature, because it always begets an Inclination to those Opinions that favour our Interest, and a Disinclination to the contrary: And this Principle may be another Ingredient, and secret Persuasive to Atheism; for when Men have run themselves so deep into Vice and Immorality, that they expect no Benefit from a God, ’tis in a Manner necessary to their Quiet, and the Ease of their Mind, that they should fancy there is none; for they are afraid, if there be a God, that he will not stand neuter, and let them alone in another World. This, I say, is necessary to the Quiet of their Mind, unless they can attain that great Art, which many labour after, of Non-reflection, or an unthinking Faculty, as to God and a World to come. But to return to our Argument, after this short Digression——

And as that regular Diversity which we see in the Forms of Nature, and especially in the Bodies of Animals, could not be from any blind Principle, either of Necessity or of Chance; so in the last Place, that Subordination which we see in the Parts of Nature, and Subserviency to one another, the less Noble to the more Noble, the Inanimate to the Animate, and all Things upon Earth unto Man, must needs have been the Effect of some Being higher than Matter; that did wisely dispose all Things so at first, and doth still conserve them in the same order. If Man had been born into the World, and a numerous Host of Creatures, without any Provision or Accommodation made for their Subsistence and Conveniences, we might have suspected that they had come by Chance, and therefore were so ill provided for: But which of them can complain? Thro’ their various kinds and orders, what is there awanting? They are all fitted to their several Elements, and their ways of living, Birds, Beasts, and Fishes, both by the Form and Shape of their Bodies, the manner of their Covering, and the Quality of their Food. Besides, they are instructed in little Arts and Instincts for their Conservation; and not only for their proper Conservation, but also to find a way to make and bring up young ones, and leave behind them a Posterity: And all this in so fit a Method, and by such a pretty Train of Actions, as is really admirable.

Man is the Master of all, and of him a double Care is taken; that he should neither want what Nature can afford, nor what Art can supply. He could not be provided of all Conveniences by Nature only, especially to secure him against the Injuries of the Air; but in Recompence, Nature hath provided Materials for all those Arts which she saw would be needful in humane Life, as Building, Cloathing, Navigation, Agriculture, &c. that so Mankind might have both wherewithal to answer their Occasions, and also to employ their Time, and exercise their Ingenuity. This Oeconomy of Nature, as I may call it, or well ordering of the great Family of living Creatures, is an Argument both of Goodness and of Wisdom, and is every way far above the Powers of Brute Matter. All regular Administration we ascribe to Conduct and Judgment: If an Army of Men be well provided for, in things necessary both for Food, Cloaths, Arms, Lodging, Security and Defence, so as nothing is awanting in so great a Multitude, we suppose it the Effect of Care and Forecast in those Persons that had the Charge of it: They took their Measures at first, computed and proportion’d one thing to another, made good Regulations, and gave Orders for convenient Supplies. And can we suppose the great Army of Creatures upon Earth, managed and provided for with less Fore-thought and Providence, nay, with none at all, by mere Chance? This is to recede from all Rules and Analogy of Reason, only to serve a Turn, and gratify an unreasonable Humour.

To conclude this Argument; there are two general Heads of things, if I recollect aright, which we make the Marks and Characters of Wisdom and Reason, Works of Art, and the Conduct of Affairs or Direction of Means to an End; and wheresoever we meet, either with regular material Works, or a regular Ordination of Affairs, we think we have a good Title and Warrant to derive them from an intelligent Author: Now these two being found in the natural World, and that in an eminent Degree, the one in the Frame of it, and the other in the Oeconomy of it, we have all the Evidence and Ground that can be, in arguing from Things visible to Things invisible, that there is an Author of Nature, superior both to humane Power and humane Wisdom.

Before we proceed to give any further Proofs or Discoveries of the Author of Nature, let us reflect a little upon those we have already insisted upon; which have been taken wholly from the material World, and from the common Course of Nature. The very Existence of Matter is a Proof of a Deity, for the Idea of it hath no Connexion with Existence, as we shall shew hereafter; however we will take leave now to set it down with the rest in Order as they follow one another.

1. The Existence of Matter.

2. The Motion of Matter.

3. The just Quantity and Degree of that Motion.

4. The first Form of the Universe upon Motion imprest; both as to the Divisions of Matter, and the Leading Motions.

5. The Laws for Communication and Regulation of that Motion.

6. The regular Effects of it, especially in the Animate World.

7. The Oeconomy of Nature, and fit Subordination of one part of the World to another.

The five first of these Heads are Prerequisites and Preparatives to the Formation of a World, and the two last are as the Image and Character of its Maker, of his Power, Goodness and Wisdom, imprest upon it. Every one of them might well deserve a Chapter to it self, if the Subject was to be treated on at large; but this is only an occasional Dissertation, to state the Powers of Matter, lest they should be thought boundless, and the Author of Nature unnecessary, as the Epicureans pretend; but notwithstanding their vain Confidence and Credulity, I defy them, or any Man else, to make Sense of the material World, without placing a God at the Center of it.

To these Considerations, taken wholly from the corporeal World, give me leave to add one of a mix’d Nature, concerning the Union of our Soul and Body. This strange Effect, if rightly understood, doth as truly discover the Author of Nature, as many Effects that are accounted more supernatural. The Incarnation, as I may so say, of a spiritual Substance is to me a kind of standing Miracle; that there should be such an Union and Connexion reciprocally betwixt the Motions of the Body, and the Actions and Passions of the Soul; betwixt a Substance intellectual, and a Parcel of organiz’d Matter, can be no Effect of either of those Substances; being wholly distinct in themselves, and remote in their Natures from one another. For Instance, when my finger is cut, or when ’tis burnt, that my Soul thereupon should feel such a smart and violent Pain, is no Consequence of Nature, or does not follow from any Connexion there is betwixt the Motion or Division of that Piece of Matter, I call my Finger, and the Passion of that Spirit I call my Soul; for these are two distinct Essences, and in themselves independent upon one another, as much as the Sun and my Body are independent; and there is no more Reason in strict Nature, or in the essential Chain of Causes and Effects, that my Soul should suffer, or be affected with this Motion in the Finger, than that the Sun should be affected with it; nay, there is less Reason, if less can be, for the Sun being corporeal, as the Finger is, there is some remote Possibility that there might be Communication of Motion betwixt them; but Motion cannot beget a Thought, or a Passion, by its own Force; Motion can beget nothing but Motion, and if it should produce a Thought, the Effect would be more noble than the Cause. Wherefore this Union is not by any Necessity of Nature, but only from a positive institution or Decree, establish’d by the Author of Nature, that there should be such a Communication betwixt these two Substances for a time, viz. during the Vitality of the Body.

’Tis true indeed, if Thought, Apprehension, and Reason, was nothing but corporeal Motion, this Argument would be of no Force; but to suppose this, is to admit an Absurdity to cure a Difficulty; to make a Thought out of a local Motion is like making a God out of a Stock, or a Stone; for these two are as remote in their Nature, and have as different Idea’s in the Mind, as any two desperate Things we can propose or conceive; Number and Colour, a Triangle and Virtue, Free-will and a Pyramid, are not more unlike, more distant, or of more different Forms, than Thought and local Motion. Motion is nothing but a Body’s changing its Place and Situation amongst other Bodies, and what Affinity or Resemblance hath that to a Thought? How is that like to Pain, or to a Doubt of the Mind? To Hope or to Desire? To the Idea of God? To any Act of the Will or Understanding, as judging, consenting, reasoning, remembring, or any other? These are Things of several Orders that have no Similitude, nor any Mixture of one another. And as this is the Nature of Motion, so, on the other Hand, in a Thought there are two Things, Consciousness and a Representation; Consciousness is in all Thoughts indifferently, whether distinct or confus’d, for no Man thinks but he is conscious that he thinks, nor perceives any Thing but he is conscious that he perceives it; there is also in a Thought, especially if it be distinct, a Representation; ’tis the Image of that we think upon, and makes its Objects present to the Mind. Now what hath local Motion to do with either of these two, Consciousness or Representativeness? How doth it include either of them, or hold them any way affix’d to its Nature? I think one may with as good Sense and Reason ask of what Colour a Thought is, Green or Scarlet, as what Sort of Motion it is; for Motion of what Sort soever can never be conscious, nor represent Things as our Thoughts do. I have noted thus much in general, only to shew the different Nature of Motion and Cogitation, that we may be the more sensible that they have no mutual Connexion in us, nor in any other Creature, from their Essence or essential Properties, but by a supervenient Power from the Author of Nature, who hath thus united the Soul and the Body in their Operations.

We have hitherto only consider’d the ordinary Course of Nature, and what Indications and Proofs of its Author, that affords us: There is another remarkable Head of Arguments from Effects, extraordinary and supernatural, such as Miracles, Prophecies, Inspirations, Prodigies, Apparitions, Witchcraft, Sorceries, &c. These, at one Step, lead us to something above Nature, and this is the shortest way and the most Popular; several Arguments are suited to several Tempers, and God hath not left himself without a proper Witness to every Temper that is not willfully blind. Of these Witnesses we now speak of, the most considerable are Miracles, and the most considerable Records of them are the Books of Scripture; which if we consider only as an History, and as having nothing sacred in them more than other good Histories, that is, Truth in Matter of Fact, we cannot doubt but there have been Miracles in the World: That Moses and the Prophets, our Saviour and his Apostles, wrought Miracles, I can no more question, than that Cæsar and Alexander fought Battles, and took Cities. So also that there were true Prophecies and Inspirations, we know from Scripture, only consider’d as a true History. But as for other supernatural Effects that are not recorded there, we have Reason to examine them more strictly before we receive them, at least as to particular Instances; for I am apt to think they are like Lotteries, where there are ten or twenty Blanks for one Prize; but yet if there were no Prizes at all, the Lottery would not have Credit to subsist, and would be cry’d down as a perfect Cheat: So if amongst those many Stories of Prodigies, Apparitions, and Witchcrafts, there were not some true, the very Fame and Thought of them would die from amongst Men, and the first Broachers of them would be hooted at as Cheats. As a false Religion, that hath nothing true and solid mix’d with it, can scarce be fix’d upon Mankind; but where there is a Mixture of true and false, the Strength of the one supports the Weakness of the other. As for Sorcery, the Instances and Examples of it are undeniable; not so much those few scatter’d Instances that happen now and then among us, but such as are more constant, and in a manner National, in some Countries, and amongst barbarous People. Besides, the Oracles, and the Magick that was so frequent amongst the Ancients, shew us that there have been always some Powers more than Humane, tampering with the Affairs of Mankind. But this Topick from Effects, extraordinary and supernatural, being in a great measure Historical, and respecting evil Spirits as well as the Author of Nature, is not so proper for this Place.

There is a third Set or Head of Arguments, that to some Tempers are more cogent and convictive than any of these, namely, Arguments Abstract and Metaphysical; And these do not only lead us to an Author of Nature in general, but shew us more of his Properties and Perfections; represent him to us as a supreme Deity, infinitely perfect, the Fountain of all Being, and the steady Center of all Things. But Reasons of this Order being of a finer Thread, require more Attention, and some Preparation of Mind to make us discern them well and be duly sensible of them. When a Man hath withdrawn himself from the Noise of this busy World, lock’d up his Senses and his Passions, and every thing that would unite him with it; commanded a general Silence in the Soul, and suffers not a Thought to stir, but what looks inwards; let him then reflect seriously, and ask himself, What am I, and How came I into Being? If I was Author and Original to my self, surely I ought to feel that mighty Power, and enjoy the Pleasure of it; but, alas, I am conscious of no such Force or Virtue, nor of any thing in my Nature, that should give me necessary Existence; it hath no Connexion with any part of me, nor any Faculty in me, that I can discern. And now that I do exist, from what Causes soever, Can I secure my self in Being? Now that I am in Possession, am I sure to keep it? Am I certain that three Minutes hence I shall still exist? I may or I may not, for ought I see; either seems possible in it self; and either is contingent as to me; I find nothing in my Nature that can warrant my Substance for one Day, for one Hour, for one Moment longer. I am nothing but Thoughts, fleeting Thoughts, that chase and extinguish one another; and my Being, for ought I know, is successive, and as dying as they are, and renew’d to me every Moment. This I am sure of, that so far as I know my self, and am conscious what I am, there is no Principle of Immutability, or of necessary and indefectible Existence in my Nature; and therefore I ought in Reason to believe, that I stand or fall at the Mercy of other Causes, and not by my own Will, or my own Sufficiency.

Besides, I am very sensible, and in this I cannot be mistaken, that my Nature is in several Respects weak and imperfect, both as to Will and Understanding. I Will many Things in vain and without effect, and I Wish often what I have no Ability to execute or obtain. And as to my Understanding, how defective is it? How little or nothing do I know in Comparison of what I am ignorant of? Almost all the intellectual World is shut up to me, and the far greatest Part of the corporeal; and in those Things that fall under my Cognizance, how often am I mistaken? I am confin’d to a narrow Sphere, and yet within that Sphere I often err; my Conceptions of Things are obscure and confus’d, my reason short-sighted; I am forc’d often to correct my self, or to acknowledge that I have judg’d false, and consented to an Error. In sum, all my Powers I find are limited, and I can easily conceive the same kind of Perfections in higher Degrees than I possess them, and consequently there are Beings, or may be, greater and more excellent than my self, and more able to subsist by their own Power, (Τὸ τέλειον πρότερον τῇ Φύσει τοῦς ἀτελοῦς Arist.) Why should I not therefore believe that my Original is from those Beings rather than from my self? For every Nature, the more great and perfect it is, the nearer it approaches to Necessity of Existence, and to a Power of producing other Things. Yet, the Truth is, it must be acknowledg’d, that so long as the Perfection of those other Beings are limited and finite, tho’ they be far superior to us, there is no Necessity ariseth from their Nature that they should exist; and the same Arguments that we have us’d against our selves, they may, in Proportion, use against themselves; and therefore we must still advance higher to find a self-originated Being, whose Existence must flow immediately from his Essence, or have a necessary Connexion with it.

And indeed all these different Degrees of higher and higher Perfections, lead us directly to an highest, or supreme Degree, which is infinite and unlimited Perfection. As subordinate Causes lead to the first, so Natures more perfect one than another lead us to a Nature infinitely perfect, which is the Fountain of them all. Thither we must go, if we will follow the Course of Reason, which cannot stop at one more than another, till it arrive there; and being arriv’d there at that sovereign and original Perfection, it finds a firm and immovable Ground to stand upon; the steady Centre of all Being, wherein the Mind rests and is satisfied. All the Scruples or Objections that we mov’d against our selves, or other Creatures, take no Place here: This Being is conscious of an Allsufficiency in it self, and of Immutability as to any Thing else; including in it all the Causes of Existence, or, to speak more properly, all Necessity of Existence. Besides, that we exist our selves, notwithstanding the Imperfection and Insufficiency of our Nature, is a just, collateral Proof of the Existence, of this supreme Being; for such an Effect as this cannot be without its Cause, and it can have no other competent Cause but what we mention. And as this Being is its own Origin, so it must needs be capable of producing all Creatures; for whatsoever is possible, must be possible to it; and that Creatures or finite Beings are possible, we both see by Experience, and may also discern by Reason; for those several Degrees of Perfection or Limitations of it, which we mention’d before, are all consistent Notions, and consequently make consistent Natures, and such as may exist; but contingently indeed, and in Dependance upon the first Cause.

Thus we are come at length to a fair Resolution of that great Question, Whence we are, and how we continue in Being? And this hath led us by an easy Ascent to the supreme Author of Nature, and the first Cause of all things; and presents us also with such a Scheme and Draught of the Universe, as is clear and rational; every thing in its Order, and in its Place, according to the Dignity of its Nature, and the Strength of its Principles. When the Mind hath rais’d it self into this View of a Being infinitely perfect, ’tis in a Region of Light, hath a free Prospect every Way, and sees all Things from Top to Bottom, as pervious and transparent. Whereas without God and a first Cause, there is nothing but Darkness and Confusion in the Mind, and in Nature; broken Views of Things, short interrupted Glimpses of Light, nothing certain or demonstrative, no Basis of Truth, no Extent of Thought, no Science, no Contemplation.

You will say, it may be, ’tis true, something must be eternal, and of necessary Existence, but why may not Matter be this eternal necessary Being? Then our Souls and all other Intellectual Things must be Parts and Parcels of Matter; and what Pretensions can Matter have to those Properties and Perfections that we find in our Souls, how limited soever? Much less to necessary Existence, and those Perfections that are the Foundation of it? What exists eternally, and from it self, its Existence must flow immediately from its Essence, as its Cause, Reason, or Ground; for as Existence hath always something antecedent to it in Order of Nature, so that which is antecedent to it, must infer it by a necessary Connexion, and so may be call’d the Cause, Ground, or Reason of it. And nothing can be such a Ground, but what is a Perfection; nor every Perfection neither, it must be sovereign and infinite Perfection; for from what else can necessary Existence flow, or be infer’d? Besides, if that Being was not infinitely perfect, there might be another Being more powerful than it, and consequently able to oppose and hinder its Existence; and what may be hinder’d is contingent and arbitrary. Now Matter is so far from being a Nature infinitely perfect, that it hath no Perfection at all, but that of bare Substance; neither Life, Sense, Will or Understanding; nor so much as Motion from it self; as we have shew’d before. And therefore this brute inactive Mass, which is but, as it were, the Drudge of Nature, can have no Right or Title to that sovereign Prerogative of Self-existence.