The justification for such a preventive measure, according to Westlake, lies in the right of self-defense, which applies equally against a threatening violation of neutrality. Any other concept would fail to meet the facts of life and would not correspond to the character of the society of nations as an aggregation of sovereign states with an as yet incompletely developed common code of law. In the domestic law system of every civilized country the prevention of an immediately threatening attack is a permissible act of defense, although in such a contingency even the help of the state against the law-breaker is available. In the community of international law, where this is not the case—at any rate not at the beginning of and during the second World War—the viewpoint of self-defense must apply to an even greater extent. In keeping with this concept, the British Government during this war also considered the preventive measure justified when it occupied Iceland on 10 May 1940. The British Government justified this measure clearly and correctly in accordance with international law in an official announcement of the Foreign Office, as follows:

The preventive measure was carried out by Britain, although Iceland expressly protested by a note against the occupation. I also ask to note that the United States agreed with this standpoint of law, as is proved by the well-known message from the President of the United States to Congress of 7 July 1941, and the subsequent occupation of Iceland by armed forces of the American Navy.

In accordance with these basic principles of law, the facts at hand must be examined. I have tried to clarify the facts in the presentation of evidence, and I would like to summarize the major factors which actually indicated a closely impending violation of neutrality on the part of the Allies by a partial occupation of Norway, and thereby justified the German campaign in Norway.

At the end of September and early in October 1939, Admiral Raeder, as the evidence has shown, received various items of information through the regular reports of Admiral Canaris as chief of intelligence and through Admiral Carls, which gave reason to believe in the danger of the Allies’ proceeding to occupy bases in Norway, in accordance with their plans to encircle Germany in order to put a stop, in particular, to ore imports from Scandinavia.

British flying personnel camouflaged in civilian clothing had been seen in Oslo; and survey work by Allied officers on Norwegian bridges, viaducts, and tunnels up to the Swedish border had been identified. Furthermore, the quiet mobilization of Swedish troops, owing to the danger to Swedish ore territories, had become known. Raeder was justified in considering himself obliged to report these facts to Hitler and to point out to him the danger which would arise for Germany if British and French armed forces were to gain a foothold in Scandinavia. The dangers were clear. They consisted of the cutting-off of all imports from the industrial areas of Scandinavia, in particular of the ore imports, as well as in the fact that the Allies would obtain a favorable base for air attacks, and last but not least, in the fact that the German Navy would be threatened on its flank and its operational potentialities would be limited.

The blockade of the North Sea and Baltic would have had strategically disastrous consequences. As the information did not yet allow of a final over-all picture, Raeder did not suggest immediate occupation, but only pointed out the dangers, intending to await further developments for the time being. Neither did Hitler make a final decision during this discussion of 10 October 1939 but agreed to wait. Similar information was received during the months of October and November, this time also from the naval attaché, Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, who had in the meantime been sent to Oslo, whose affidavit (Document Raeder-107) I would like to cite. It shows that the Norwegian shipping association had made tanker tonnage of about one million tons available to Britain with the consent of the Norwegian Government (Document Number Raeder-68).

In the winter of 1939-40, information took on a more definite form concerning espionage missions given by the British and French Secret Service to Norwegian agents and British harbor consulates for the purpose of reconnoitering landing facilities and examination of Norwegian railroads with regard to their capacity, particularly the Narvik line, and missions concerning information about land and sea airports in Norway. From the fact that the information from two different sources, namely, the naval attaché in Oslo and Admiral Canaris, checked and became more and more certain during the period from October to December 1939, the danger indicated appeared to keep increasing.

In addition, in December 1939 Quisling and Hagelin sent to Rosenberg—entirely independently of the sources of information which had existed up to that time—the same and similar information concerning the landing intentions of the Allies. This did not go to Raeder for the sole reason that Raeder did not know either Quisling or Hagelin at that time. Since the question involved was a purely military-strategic one, Rosenberg asked Raeder to discuss things with Quisling so that Raeder could examine the military-technical possibilities in consideration of the fact the aggression by the Allies in Scandinavia must be expected according to the information received. This is evident from the letter from Rosenberg to Raeder of 13 December 1939, which I submitted as Exhibit Number Raeder-67. Raeder considered it his duty from the purely military point of view to inform Hitler, with whom he had not discussed this question in the meantime, that coinciding information had since been received from Canaris, the naval attaché in Oslo, and Quisling. Hitler asked to speak with Quisling personally, whereupon he decided, in order to meet the threat, to make the necessary preparations for an eventual preventive measure, namely, the occupation of Norway (Document C-64, Exhibit Number GB-86).

The final decision was still deferred, and further information was awaited as to whether the danger appeared to increase. This caution and delay will readily be understood in the case of Raeder. As I have already observed, Raeder would have preferred to see the neutrality of Norway maintained, especially since he was against any conquest just for the sake of conquest. He knew, on the other hand, that an occupation required the commitment of the whole Navy, thus involving the fate of the entire Navy, and that the loss of at least a third of the whole fleet had to be reckoned with. It must surely be clear how difficult, from such political and strategic viewpoints, such a decision was for a responsible man and soldier.

Unfortunately, during the first months of the year 1940, the reports multiplied and kept becoming more certain. In March 1940 uncommonly many English-speaking persons could be seen in Oslo, and Raeder received very serious and credible information about impending measures by the Allies against Norway and Sweden. As far as landing intentions were concerned, Narvik, Trondheim, and Stavanger were mentioned. In this manner the military planning actually was not undertaken until February and March 1940, and final instructions were issued to the Wehrmacht only in March 1940. In addition, numerous violations of neutrality occurred in March 1940, which have been collected in the War Diary (Documents Raeder-81 and 82), and also the mine-laying in Norwegian territorial waters at the beginning of April.

The Prosecution has put in only a few documents against this comprehensive informative material, according to which the German Minister in Oslo, Breuer, did not look upon the danger as being so great but believed that British activities, which he also reported, tended merely to provoke Germany into opening war operations in Norwegian waters (Documents Number D-843, Exhibit GB-466; D-844, Exhibit GB-467; D-845, Exhibit GB-486).

Baron Weizsäcker’s point of view in cross-examination was that at first he did not consider the danger so great either; but he admitted that later on the facts proved that he and Breuer were wrong, while Raeder had been right in his apprehension.

This objective accuracy of the opinion of Admiral Raeder, and of the information on which he based his opinion, is shown in the various documents submitted by me and accepted by the Court.

Since 16 January 1940, the French High Command had been working on a plan which had in view, among other things, the occupation of harbors and airfields on the west coast of Norway. The plan provided, in addition, for an eventual extension of operations to Sweden and occupation of the mines of Gallivare (Document Number Raeder-79). Efforts have been made to justify this plan by stating that it was elaborated solely to help Finland against the Soviet Union.

To begin with, it might be argued in contradiction to this that an action in support of Finland does not justify any occupation of Norwegian territory. Moreover, the documents show that it was not only a question of altruistic measures in favor of Finland. During the inter-Allied military conferences on 31 January and 1 February, which preceded the meeting of the Supreme Council on 5 February, the question of direct help for Finland was relegated by the British to second place; they showed themselves to be determined supporters of an enterprise against the mines of northern Sweden. This is confirmed by General Gamelin in a note of 10 March 1940 (Document Raeder-79), and he adds that this opinion obtained the majority vote in the Supreme Council and that preparations for the Scandinavian expedition should be started immediately.

And so it came about that the Franco-British fighting forces had been ready for transportation since the first days of March; according to Gamelin, the leadership of the proposed operations in Scandinavia was in the hands of the British High Command. Gamelin adds finally that the Scandinavian plans must be resolutely pursued further in order to save Finland—I quote, “or at least to lay hands on the Swedish ore and the northern harbors.”

Lord Halifax informed the Norwegian Minister on 7 February that Britain wished to obtain certain bases on the Norwegian coast in order to stop German transports of ore from Narvik (Document Raeder-97). By mid-February, British and French General Staff officers were, in agreement with the Norwegian authorities, inspecting landing places (Document Raeder-97). According to a report by the German Legation in Stockholm, dated 16 February 1940, British intentions in this respect were to land troops simultaneously at Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik. On 21 February 1940 Daladier communicated to the French Ambassador in London, Corbin, that the occupation of the most important Norwegian ports and the landing of the first body of the Allied fighting forces would give Norway and Sweden a feeling of security; and he goes on to say that this operation must be planned and executed at shortest notice, “independently of Finland’s call for assistance.” In the event of this démarche meeting with refusal by Norway, which was likely, the British Government was to take note of the Norwegian attitude and immediately seize control of the bases it needed for the safeguarding of its interests, doing so in the form of a “surprise operation.” Whether Sweden would refuse passage through to Finland did not appear important; what is being emphasized is rather—and I quote:

On 27 February 1940, Churchill declared in the House of Commons that he was “tired of considering the rights of neutrals” (Document Raeder-97).

It is interesting to note that unanimity was achieved in the sixth session of the Supreme Council on 28 March 1940—I quote:

The view thereby adopted by the Supreme Council with reference to the vital interests of the Allies coincides exactly with the legitimate notions of the “right of self-defense” as presented by me and is in complete contradiction to the interpretation of international law propounded by the Prosecution.

The ultimate execution of the operation in Norway, that is, the landing and the construction of bases, was decided on 28 March 1940 between the authoritative British and French offices. This date was indicated at a session of the French War Council by the French Prime Minister (Document Raeder-59); and General Gamelin added that he had, on 29 March, impressed upon General Ironside the necessity of having everything ready for a swift occupation of the Norwegian ports. He said he had also informed Mr. Churchill to the same effect on the occasion of a visit to Paris.

One day later, 30 March, Churchill declared on the radio—I quote, “It would not be just if, in a life-and-death struggle, the Western Powers adhered to legal agreements” (Document Raeder-97).

On 2 April 1940 at 1912 hours, London notified Paris by telegram that the first transport was “to sail on J. 1. day,” and that J. 1. day was in principle 5 April (Document Raeder-85). On 5 April, Earl de la Warr stated that neither Germany nor the neutrals could be certain that “England would allow her hands to be tied behind her back in complying with the letter of the law” (Document Raeder-97).

The British Minister of Labor, Ernest Brown, on 6 April 1940 declared that neither Germany nor the neutrals could count on “the Western Powers’ adhering to the letter of international law” (Document Raeder-97).

On the same day—this was one day after the laying of mines by British combat forces in Norwegian territorial waters—a secret British operational order was given “concerning preparations for the occupation of the northern Swedish ore field from Narvik” (Document Raeder-88).

In this order it was specified that the mission of the “Avon” Force consisted first of all in “securing the port of Narvik and the railway to the Swedish border.” It was added that it was the intention of the commander “to advance into Sweden and to occupy the Gallivare ore fields and important points of that territory as soon as an opportunity occurs,” a formulation strikingly reminiscent of the words in the Prosecution Document L-79, “to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.”

The original plan of dispatching the first transport to Norway on 5 April was changed; for on the evening of 5 April the British High Command informed the Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy that—I quote:

To complete the story it may be mentioned that the Norwegian operation was designated by the Allies by the camouflage name of “Stratford Plan,” while the German Norwegian operation was referred to by the camouflage name of “Weser Exercise” (Weserübung) (Document Raeder-98).

All these facts go to show that, since the autumn of 1939, preparations for possible action in Norway were made by studying landing possibilities, et cetera. As from January and February 1940 the danger of an occupation of bases in Norway by the Allies was imminent. In March 1940 the execution of the scheme was ultimately decided upon and the departure of the first convoy was scheduled for 5 April. Simultaneously, mine-laying was carried out in the Norwegian territorial waters and troops were at the same time concentrated in British and French ports for the Norwegian operation. Thus factual evidence of imminent neutrality violations existed from the point of view of international law; and neutrality violations had indeed been already committed to a certain extent, as by mine-laying. This was the point where Germany, in accordance with the international concept of the right of self-defense, was entitled to resort to equivalent countermeasures, that is, to occupy Norway in order to prevent the impending occupation by other belligerent states. It was, in fact, as was shown later, high time; for Germany forestalled the Allies only because the British High Command had postponed the departure of the first convoy, originally scheduled for 5 April. The German operation in Norway must therefore be considered as legitimate according to the principles of international law.

I have the firm conviction that the High Tribunal, in view of the circumstances just presented in connection with existing international law, will conclude that Admiral Raeder, with regard to the occupation of Norway, acted from purely strategic points of view and in due consideration of international legal standards, and accordingly will acquit him of the charge made by the Prosecution.

With reference to Norway, the Prosecution has moreover charged against Raeder—and also against Dönitz—that a violation of international law is involved in the fact that, according to an order dated 30 March 1940, the Naval Forces were to fly the British ensign until the troops had been landed (Documents C-151, Exhibit GB-91; C-115, Exhibit GB-90).

This too is an error of the Prosecution as regards international law in sea warfare. The Hague Regulations on Land Warfare do expressly forbid the misuse of flags. In sea warfare, on the other hand, the answer to this question according to prevailing international law is definitely that, until hostilities begin, ships may sail with their own or with enemy or neutral flags or with no flags at all. I take the liberty, in this respect, of availing myself of Dr. Mosler’s juridical treatment of the question in his opinion (Document Raeder-66), appearing under Item 7, and in particular of his references to legal literature on the subject, according to which the use of a foreign flag is universally considered as a legitimate ruse of war and is allowed and especially condoned by British practice; this is in accordance with the historical precedent when Nelson, in the Napoleonic wars, flew the French flag off Barcelona to lure Spanish ships. This dispute is, however, superfluous in the present case, because actually these orders to fly the British flag were according to documentary evidence canceled on 8 April, that is to say, prior to the execution of the Norway operation (Document Raeder-89).

In conclusion I wish to emphasize, with reference to the subject of Norway, that after the occupation of Norway Raeder and the German Navy did everything they could to give a friendly character to the relations with Norway, to treat the country and the people decently during the occupation, and to spare them every unnecessary burden. Raeder and the commanding admiral in Norway, Admiral Böhm, moreover endeavored to conclude a peace with Norway guaranteeing Norwegian national interests. Their efforts were frustrated through the creation by Hitler and Himmler of a so-called civil administration under Reich Commissioner Terboven which, unlike the Armed Forces, was linked with the Party, the SS, SD, and Gestapo (Documents Number Raeder-107 and 129). As confirmed by Böhm in his affidavit, Raeder repeatedly intervened with Hitler in favor of treating the Norwegian people well and for an early conclusion of peace and, together with Böhm, proceeded with the utmost vigor against Terboven. Here again, the tragic fact is that the Armed Forces, despite its utmost efforts, was neither able to oppose Hitler’s dictatorial methods nor the dictatorial methods employed, with Hitler’s knowledge, by such a mediocre Reich Commissioner as Terboven. The Norwegian people who had to suffer under the occupation know—and this is the only gratification for Raeder—that the Navy was not the cause of these sufferings. On the other hand, it is interesting to know that the differences which cropped up between Hitler and Raeder with reference to Norway are precisely among the chief motives which ultimately caused Raeder to insist upon his resignation in September 1942. Other motives were that Raeder also had differences with Hitler over France, because here again Raeder urged the conclusion of peace, while Hitler, with his extreme nature, was opposed to conciliatory steps of that kind in occupied territories. Raeder also had differences with Hitler regarding Russia, because he was in favor of observing the German-Russian treaty, and declared himself opposed to breaking the Treaty and going to war with Russia.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. SIEMERS: I now come to the charge of the Prosecution with regard to a war of aggression against Russia. The charge of the Prosecution on this subject cannot be very well understood. Land warfare only was concerned, so that the Navy did not have to make any preparations, with the exception of a few in the Baltic Sea. The Prosecution itself has furthermore stated that Raeder had been opposed to the war against Russia. The only thing which might be left of the charge of the Prosecution is its claim that Raeder had fundamentally been in favor of the war against Russia also and had only been opposed to Hitler with regard to the time factor. With reference to Document Number C-170 the Prosecution states that Raeder had only recommended the postponement of the war against Russia until after the victory over Britain. In the light of Document C-170 this actually might appear plausible. In reality, however, the case is different, and the true state of affairs has been cleared up by the detailed presentation of evidence. The witness Admiral Schulte-Mönting has clearly stated, without being contradicted in cross-examination, that Raeder not only raised objections with regard to the time but that he argued with Hitler about a campaign against Russia and did so for moral reasons and reasons of international law, because he was of the opinion that the Non-Aggression Pact with Russia as well as the trade agreement should be observed under all circumstances. The Navy was especially interested in deliveries from Russia and always tried to observe the treaties strictly. Besides this basic principle of observing treaties, that is, besides this general reason, Raeder was of the opinion that a war against Russia would also be wrong from the strategic standpoint. His own testimony and that of Schulte-Mönting show that in September, November, and December 1940 Raeder tried again and again to dissuade Hitler from contemplating a war against Russia. It is correct that in Document C-170 only the strategic justification for his opposition has been recorded. However, this is not at all surprising because in the papers of the Naval Operations Staff naturally only justifications were recorded which were of naval-technical and strategic importance, but not political reasons.

I have already shown that as a general principle Hitler did not permit Raeder, as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, to intervene in questions concerning foreign policy, that is to say, in things which did not belong in his department. If Raeder did on occasion undertake this contrary to the will of Hitler in cases of special importance, then he could do so only privately, and was then unable to record these conversations in the War Diary. However, he always told everything to his Chief of Staff as his closest confidant. As a result Schulte-Mönting could absolutely confirm that Raeder in this case opposed Hitler because of misgivings with regard to morality and international law, and furthermore also employed strategic reasons in the hope of thus being able to bring more influence to bear on Hitler. Schulte-Mönting even stated—just like Raeder—that in November the latter had gained the impression, after a discussion, that he had dissuaded Hitler from his plans. I believe that this has clarified the matter, and only the tragic fact remains that Hitler paid just as little attention to Raeder’s political objections with regard to Russia as with regard to Norway and France.

A similar situation obtains with regard to the charge of the Prosecution referring to the war of aggression against the United States and the violation of the neutrality of Brazil. Both of these charges are sufficiently refuted within the framework of the evidence, so that I am only going to discuss them very briefly.

According to the statement of the Prosecution, Raeder somehow collaborated in the plan to induce Japan to attack the United States. As a matter of fact no naval strategic conferences were held between Japan and Raeder. Raeder always held the conviction that a war against the United States must be avoided just as much as a war against Russia. This attitude is understandable seeing that he had always held the opinion that Hitler should under no circumstances wage a war against Britain. Since the war against Britain had now come about, it was Raeder’s duty as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to use all his strength to fight successfully against Britain. Raeder knew the limitations of the fighting capacity of the Navy; and it was, therefore, quite out of the question that he should have collaborated in an extension of the naval war, considering, as he did, that the conduct of a war against Britain was already a too difficult task. Document C-152 submitted by the Prosecution therefore mentions only a proposition that Japan should attack Singapore and is based on the assumption that the United States should be kept out of the war. This suggestion made to Hitler that Japan should attack Singapore was correct in every respect. After all, we were at war with England, and Raeder was forced to try to concentrate all his forces against that country. He was thus justified in suggesting that Japan—as Germany’s ally—should attack England. Moreover this, the only discussion by Raeder, was not held until 18 March 1941, while Hitler had already in his Directive Number 24 of 5 March 1941 established the guiding principle that Japan must attack Singapore, which he considered a key position of Britain (Document C-175).

I should like to interpose one sentence here. It can be seen from the report by General Marshall that no common plan had been found to exist between Germany and Japan.

As Schulte-Mönting has affirmed, Raeder was just as surprised by the sudden attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor as every other German. The attempt of the Prosecution to discredit this statement during the cross-examination of Schulte-Mönting by introducing a telegram from the naval attaché in Tokyo to Berlin, dated 6 December 1941 (Document D-872), failed. In the first place Raeder probably only received this telegram after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December had already started; and besides, Pearl Harbor is not mentioned at all in the telegram.

The charge of the Prosecution with regard to Brazil has been refuted just as effectively because, after my statements during the hearing of evidence, the Prosecution did not revert to this point in any of the cross-examinations of Raeder, Schulte-Mönting, and Wagner. The charge was that, according to Jodl’s diary, the Naval Operations Staff authorized and approved the use of arms against Brazilian warships and merchant vessels fully 2 months before the outbreak of war between Germany and Brazil (Document 1807-PS).

Apart from the testimony of witnesses, this case is refuted by documents, namely, the complete excerpt from Jodl’s diary which I submitted as Exhibit Number Raeder-115, as well as by Documents Number Raeder-116 to 118. These documents reveal that Brazil had violated the rules of neutrality by permitting the United States to make use of Brazilian airfields as a base for attacks on German and Italian U-boats. The Brazilian Air Ministry had furthermore officially announced that attacks had been made by the Brazilian Air Force. Considering such conduct, which is against all the rules of neutrality, the demand of the Naval Operations Staff for armed action against Brazilian vessels is justified. So here again the Prosecution failed to prove Raeder to have committed a crime or even a violation of international law.

The Prosecution has very painstakingly submitted an exceedingly large amount of material, and the wealth of detail called for great care in the submission of evidence for the Defense. I have endeavored to deal with all the charges in the submission of evidence or in my final plea, and have made efforts to show as clearly as possible that none of them, partly on factual, partly on legal grounds, comply with the requirements of a criminal case within the meaning of this Charter. Insofar as I have not, in spite of my desire for great exactitude, dealt with certain documents, it was because they seemed to me of small importance and in any case of no importance in criminal law; for instance, the many cases in which Raeder was only mentioned because—without officially taking any part—he received a copy of the documents for routine reasons. It would have been tedious to go into such recurrent cases, even if the Prosecution reiterated these formal indications, so that one was often tempted to recall the saying of Napoleon that repetition is that turn of speech which acts as the best evidence.

I further believe that in my final plea for Admiral Raeder I may forego argumentation regarding genuine war crimes, the crimes against humanity, since I am unable to establish any connection between these and Raeder from the material submitted by the Prosecution. Also no particular charge is made against Raeder in this connection, with the exception of the two cases connected with the Commando Order, namely, the shooting of two soldiers in Bordeaux and the shooting of the British soldier Evans, who was made a prisoner by the SD on the Swedish border after he had previously participated in the midget submarine attack on the Tirpitz. Thus far the charge has been refuted by testimony insofar as it concerns the Navy. Both cases did not come, or came only later, to the knowledge of the Naval Operations Staff—just before Raeder’s departure. In both cases action was taken on the basis of the Commando Order by Hitler himself or by the SD without the knowledge and will of the Naval Operations Staff; and what is most important, in both cases the documents of the Prosecution showed that these soldiers were in civilian clothes and, therefore, were not entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention (Document Number D-864, Exhibit GB-457 and Document UK-57, Exhibit GB-164).

All the other criminal facts which the Prosecution submitted, especially applying to the East, I need not deal with, as Raeder did not participate in them. I hope that here also I shall have the approval of the Court in mentioning the handling of the Katyn case, in which the Court pointed out that Raeder was not involved and therefore refused to allow me to act as defense counsel in this connection; from this I draw the legal conclusion that Raeder cannot even by implication through the conspiracy be considered as burdened with these criminal facts, since he did not know of these events and had nothing to do with them.

The case for the Prosecution is founded on a desire to see its basic theory accepted and acknowledged, namely, the conception that so many crimes cannot have emanated from the will of a single individual but rather that they result from a conspiracy, a plot, involving many persons. These conspirators could logically, in the first place, only have been Hitler’s own collaborators, that is to say, the real National Socialists. Since however, Hitler wished to achieve and did achieve concrete results of military and economic import, something peculiar transpired: There were no specialists among the National Socialists for these tasks. Most of the National Socialist collaborators had not previously followed a trade providing technical education. Hitler, therefore, despite his desire to have only National Socialists around him, took on as key people in particular fields specialists who were not National Socialists, such as for instance Neurath for politics, and Schacht for economics; and for military tasks, Fritsch for the Army and Raeder for the Navy. The Prosecution followed this process from the angle of its conspiracy theory, without paying attention to the fact that these people, not being National Socialists, could in no way be counted among the conspirators and without taking into account that Hitler used these non-National Socialists only as technicians in a well-defined field, and only as long as it seemed absolutely necessary to him; therefore he agreed to the departure of these men, who were essentially not in sympathy with him, as soon as the differences between them seemed unbridgeable, which was bound to happen sooner or later with each of them, depending on the particular field involved.

By this all-embracing conception of the idea of conspiracy and by this extension of the Prosecution’s fight to non-National Socialists, the Prosecution abandoned the basic concept formerly propagated abroad, namely, that of fighting National Socialism but not against the whole of Germany—two ideas which at no time and in no place have been really identical, as the Prosecution now tries to make out. I do believe that thereby the Prosecution is also going back on President Roosevelt’s basic idea.

Yet another factual and legal point of view has not been taken into consideration by the Prosecution. I mean the concept of the division of competence under state law, that is to say the subdivision into individual departments. This division of competence, founded on the idea of division of labor, is essentially separative in character; it divides the field of work according to local, functional, and technical points of view. Thereby it defines positively the limits within which each division is to become active, and at the same time it defines negatively the boundaries of such activity by specifying which problems no longer concern the agencies in question, that is to say, where they must not exercise any official activity.

In a democracy additional contacts exist by virtue of general Cabinet meetings and through the Prime Minister, the Reich President, or the Reich Chancellor, as the case may be. In a dictatorship it is different, particularly if the dictator, as was the case with Hitler in the National Socialist State, exploits the segregation of the various departments with extreme skill and sees to it that they are kept as isolated as possible, with the result that all power of decision rests finally with him as the dictator, who may even play off one department against the other. The strict partitioning into governmental departments as carried out in the National Socialist State in itself refutes the concept of conspiracy and renders it extremely difficult for the individual to exceed the limits of his own department in any manner.

This significance may be illustrated by the following example: The maintenance of political relations with other states, the contracting or cancellation of agreements or alliances with other states, the declaration of war and conclusion of peace, are matters within the jurisdiction of the authority directing foreign affairs; but they are not within the jurisdiction of the agencies concerned with domestic tasks, such as for instance the Reich Finance Administration, Justice, or the Military.

Thus, since the decision concerning war and peace is not a matter for the military, the military has to accept the decisions made by the political leadership, decisions which have a binding material effect on the military authorities. The military commander must assume for his department the consequences resulting from the decision. As soon as war is declared, the military forces must fight. They do not bear any responsibility for the war, since they were not able to take part in the decision that war should be declared. Consequently, for an army the concept of war of aggression exists in the strategic sense only. Aside from that, any war it may be obliged to wage is, to the army, simply war, regardless of how it may be qualified legally (Article 45 of the Reich Constitution).

Responsibility, from the point of view of state law and criminal law, is in proportion to the extent of jurisdiction. Therefore, if the commander-in-chief of a branch of the Armed Forces is responsible solely for the waging of war, though not for the causes leading to war, his responsibility in respect to a strategic plan must be confined to the plan as such, but not to the possible origin of the war for which the strategic plan was worked out.

This officially and legally important segregation of governmental departments and the distribution of authority was, in the interest of strengthening his own power in a particularly emphatic manner, carried out by Hitler in many domains, such as for instance the creation of the “Delegate for the Four Year Plan,” whose field of work should have belonged to the Ministry of Economics; the creation of Reich Commissioners in the occupied territories, whose activity really should have come under military administration; and, finally, a fact of interest in the Raeder case, the very precise delimitation of the three branches of the Armed Forces and the elimination of the Reich Defense Minister or Minister of War who held the three branches of the Armed Forces together and unified them. The greater the number of governmental departments became, the stronger Hitler became as dictator, being the only person with authority over all the innumerable agencies. But along with this the official as well as the legal responsibility for strategic plans on the part of any one individual department decreased; in this instance, that of the Navy.

Consequently, the commander-in-chief of a branch of the Armed Forces, for instance the Navy, can in case of strategic planning only be responsible for the planning of naval strategy; he is not afforded an over-all picture of the total plan. The total plan was discussed nowhere; politically and militarily it was in Hitler’s hands exclusively, because he alone was the center where all threads, all activities of the individual departments joined.

May I add a sentence here and remind you that, for instance, in the case of the Norway action even Göring was not informed until March 1940, which is one proof of the extreme segregation of the individual departments within the Armed Forces. In addition, purely strategic planning as such cannot be criminal, because it is customary in every country and because in every country the military commander of a branch of the Armed Forces does not and cannot know to what end the political leadership will use the plan prepared by him, whether for a war of aggression or a defensive war.

The documents submitted in my document books prove convincingly that the military agencies in Allied countries as well as in Germany worked out strategic plans in the same manner, for the same areas, and at the same times, namely, in regard to Norway, Belgium (Documents Number Raeder-33 and 34), Holland, Greece, Romania; moreover, the Allied plans included the destruction of the Romanian oil fields and especially of the oil sources in the Caucasus (Document Number Ribbentrop-221 and Number Raeder-41). Particularly the plans concerning the Caucasus on the part of the Supreme Council, that is, the combined British and French General Staff, show the correctness of the statements. The Supreme Council would certainly refuse to be made politically responsible for these strategic plans, although the Soviet Union was still neutral at the time and the execution of the plans was to strike a blow not only at an enemy country, Germany, but also at a neutral, the Soviet Union, as the documents show.

The similarity of the documents concerning such plans is absolutely convincing and shows a strong parallel trend. May I point in this connection to statements I made here on occasion of the comprehensive discussion regarding the relevance and admissibility of the documents submitted by me; may I point, in addition, to Document Number Raeder-130, the letter of the Foreign Office, in which submission of the British Admiralty files is refused but in which the plans in regard to Norway and the whole of Scandinavia are admitted, with the remark that the plan was not put into effect, which fact was due only to Germany’s having forestalled the execution of the plan.

Anyone is entitled to be a pacifist and, therefore, basically opposed to the military. However, one must be consistent and take a stand not only against German military force but against any military force. One may condemn the fact that the military, as the operational authority, prepares military plans; and one may for the future insist that such planning shall be punishable. But in that case not only German military planning, but foreign military planning also must be punishable.

These points show that the Prosecution misjudges both actual and legal conditions in desiring to make Raeder responsible for political decisions, although he had nothing to do with them but always worked simply as a soldier. Just as there could be no suggestion 130 years ago of bringing before a court an admiral of Napoleon, the dictator, it is impossible now to condemn an admiral of Hitler, the dictator. With dictators, in particular—and this the Prosecution overlooks—not only the power and the influence of a military commander diminishes, but his responsibility must also diminish to the same extent, for the dictator will have seized all power and with it all responsibility—especially if he is possessed of such an extraordinary will and such immense power as Hitler. The French prosecutor stated literally and very aptly on 7 February 1946 before this Tribunal: “Hitler was actually the incarnation of all will.”

The resulting strength and power has not been sufficiently appreciated by the Prosecution, and has certainly not been taken into consideration in the presentation of the facts and the legal conclusions. How great this power is, Gustave le Bon shows in his famous book Psychology of the Masses (published by Alfred Kröner) in the chapter entitled, “The Leaders of the Masses.” I quote from it:

Hitler belongs to this second class of leaders, who, in accordance with this quotation, exercised an immense influence while, on the other hand, he was definitely unimpressive in his brown uniform.

Gustave le Bon continues:

These words make it clear enough that Raeder could not resist either.

Accordingly, only the question remains: Is it ever a soldier’s duty to revolt—to resort to open mutiny? This question will be denied by every commander all over the world and likewise by every other person with a sole exception, namely, if it concerns the case of a dictator commanding the commission of a crime, the criminality of which is recognized by the military commander himself. Accordingly Raeder could be made responsible for a military crime only, but not for a political one, because for the political crime the dictator himself must answer. When the Prosecution came to the opposite conclusion regarding Raeder, this was due—as I have already emphasized in my introduction—only to their misconception of the actual and juridical facts; they regarded Raeder as politician and soldier. But he was a soldier only. He lived for the Navy alone, for the welfare of the Navy, for which he is now equally prepared to bear responsibility to the full extent. He led the Navy along uniform lines and, aided by his officer-corps, taught it those decent views and that form of chivalrous fighting which humanity expects of a soldier. It must not be allowed to happen that, as a result of the deeds of a Hitler and his National Socialism, the officers and soldiers of this Navy be defamed by hearing their highest-ranking officer declared a criminal. From a historical viewpoint Raeder may be guilty, because he, like many others within the country and abroad, did not recognize or see through Hitler and did not have the strength to resist the dynamic strength of a Hitler; but such an omission is no crime. What Raeder did or left undone in his life occurred in the belief that he was acting correctly and that as a dutiful soldier he had to act in such a way.

Raeder is a highly esteemed officer who is no criminal; and he cannot be a criminal, since all his life he has lived honorably and as a Christian. A man who believes in God does not commit crimes, and a soldier who believes in God is not a war criminal.

I therefore ask the High Tribunal to acquit Admiral Dr. Erich Raeder on all points of the Indictment.

PRESIDENT: I call on Dr. Sauter for the Defendant Von Schirach.

DR. SAUTER: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, Baldur von Schirach, who at that time was Reich Youth Leader, in 1936 welcomed the guests to the Olympic Games in Berlin with the following words: