(i) He will detach scouts to the front, and if necessary to the flanks, to cover his advance.
(ii) He will be careful to co-operate with the companies on his flanks, to cover their advance by fire, and to maintain the direction.
(iii) He will keep the battalion commander acquainted with any change in the dispositions of the enemy, and pass on any useful information received from the scouts.
(iv) He is responsible that his supply of ammunition is complete, and will make the necessary arrangements to bring up a further supply; he will also ensure that the ammunition of disabled men is collected and distributed.
(v) He will exercise a general control over the fire of his company.
(vi) He will, if opportunity offers, lend aid to other companies by enfilading, or firing obliquely on, a portion of the enemy’s line.
(vii) He will lead his company in the assault.
(viii) If the assault succeeds, he will lose no time in rallying and reforming his company, in replenishing ammunition, and if necessary securing the position against counter-attack by means of entrenchments.
3. When two or more officers are present with a company, one will always be with the firing line.
4. Half-company commanders in the firing line will place themselves where they can best supervise the skirmishers. Their duties in action are as follows:—
(i) They must be constantly on the look out for the signals of the company commander, and of the scouts.
(ii) They must maintain the direction.
(iii) They will see that fire is not wasted, and that it is concentrated on important targets.
(iv) They will observe the enemy’s movements, and report at once to the company commander.
(v) If the assault succeeds, they will lose no time in rallying and reforming their half-companies.
(vi) During the advance they will take all leaderless men of other companies and corps under their command, and keep them until the action is over, or the force re-forms.
5. The frontage occupied by a company acting independently depends on the nature of the operation. There may be a considerable gap between the frontal and the flank attacks; and a portion of the company, extended at wide intervals, may be told off merely to hold the enemy, while the remainder, at closer intervals, make the decisive attack.
The rule that a strong firing-line should be established in a good fire-position at a decisive range must always be observed by the portion of the company which is told off for the decisive attack; and although the men need not be so close as in the case of larger forces, still, to dislodge an enemy of nearly equal strength, the firing-line, at decisive range, should not be weaker than one rifle to every two or three yards of front.
6. When the company is acting in concert with the remainder of the battalion, its frontage, as a rule, will be assigned by the battalion commander.
7. The company commander must always be guided by circumstances in deciding on the strength of his firing-line, and on the formation of the remainder. The general procedure will be to gradually reinforce the scouts, when they are checked by the enemy’s fire, and thus build up a firing line, which, at decisive range, shall be strong enough to gain superiority over the enemy’s fire. This procedure is, however, by no means to be regarded as invariable. It might be desirable, for instance, to deploy the whole company at once in the firing line.
S. 153 (3). This may sometimes be advisable on open ground without cover, when less loss would be incurred than by gradually reinforcing a weaker firing-line.
8. In order that tactical unity may be maintained as long as possible, it will usually be advisable that complete squads or sections be extended on the first advance, further reinforcements being furnished by the other squads of the same sections, or other sections of the same half company.
151. General Rules.
1. The battalion commander is practically in the same position as the commander of a brigade, with the exception that he has under him eight small units instead of four large units.
2. Nevertheless, so limited are his powers of personal control upon the field of battle, that success, as a rule, will depend on the clearness and comprehensiveness of the order which commits his companies to the attack, as well as on the manner in which he has trained his company leaders. It is of importance, therefore, that the battalion should never be hurried into action; but that time should be taken for a survey of the ground, for the issue of orders, and for the instructions to be given by the company leaders to their subordinates and the men.
3. A battalion, whether acting alone or forming part of a larger force engaged in an attack, will be sub-divided into three bodies, viz., firing-line, supports and reserves, on the same principle as laid down in S. 129. The firing-line, which in the first instance will not exceed a quarter of the whole battalion, will usually be furnished by the same companies as the supports, whilst the reserves will be supplied by the remainder, and be under the direct control of the battalion commander.
When the battalion forms part of a larger force, the commander will employ his reserves in strengthening such portions of his firing-line as most require reinforcement, the whole battalion, as a rule, being eventually absorbed into the firing-line.
4. When the battalion is acting independently, the commanding officer will act on the same principles as the commander of a larger force. He will detail certain companies for the flank attack, and others if necessary, for a holding attack, or for a feint. He will make arrangements from the companies of the reserve for the protection of the flanks against counter-attack, and if the ground permits, for covering the advance by long-range fire. He will retain a portion of his battalion as a general reserve at his own disposal; and select a portion of the enemy’s line against which the decisive attack will be pressed home.
He will assign a portion of the objective to each company that forms part of the firing-line; but it should seldom be necessary for him, if his company leaders are well trained, to indicate the formation to be adopted.
5. The battalion, on reaching the zone of distant fire, will form lines of company columns, preceded, and, if necessary, flanked by scouts.
6. It is impossible to lay down any rule as to the number of companies in the firing-line. But it is always advisable, when the battalion first forms for attack, whether it is acting alone or with others, to put in no more than are actually required at the moment; the remainder being kept well in hand, but in such formations as will enable them to take advantage of cover, and avoid unnecessary loss.
Before the enemy’s exact position is ascertained, the advance must be cautious and deliberate, and it is dangerous in such circumstances to place several companies alongside one another on a broad frontage.
152. Orders.
The orders issued to a battalion will differ in degree but not in principle from those given to a larger force, S. 131; as a rule they will be issued verbally, but in any case they should be personally explained by the commanding officer when the position comes into view.
153. Distribution of the companies in the decisive attack.
1. In order to establish a strong firing-line within decisive range of the enemy’s position, it is desirable that, making allowance for losses, there should be, at the commencement of the attack, at least 125 rifles to every 100 yards of front, exclusive of that portion of the reserves which will furnish the final reinforcement necessary to deliver the assault. These 125 men are disposed in several bodies, the bodies in rear, i.e., the supports and reserves, supplying the successive reinforcements which gradually build up the firing-line to its maximum strength.
2. Whether these 125 rifles are furnished by two or more companies must be determined by the commanding officer.
3. To extend whole companies in the firing-line at the outset, the supports being formed from other companies, is a proceeding which can seldom be justified; leading as it must to a premature admixture of tactical units, and to the surrender, at an unnecessarily early period, of the control of the firing-line. The rule that all reinforcements should be furnished as long as possible by the same unit should never be infringed.
4. When the battalion is acting in concert with other units, the frontage assigned to it, if the attack is intended to be decisive, must be in proportion to its strength.
5. Battalions should be constantly exercised in forming for the attack from a position of assembly, the frontage being always varied, and a different number of companies told off to the firing-line and the reserve. It is only by practice that a commanding officer can acquire the facility of recognising at once how many companies should be extended in firing-line, and how many allotted to the reserve.
154. The firing-line and supports.
The formation of the firing-line and supports, and the distance of the latter from the firing-line, will be determined by the company commanders. There is no necessity that these should be the same in every company so long as the general principles laid down for the attack are intelligently applied.
155. The reserve.
1. Next to the conception of a sound plan of attack, and the issue of clear and comprehensive orders to the company commanders, the most important duty of the officer commanding a battalion is the handling of his reserve. It is by means of the reserve that he makes his influence felt in action, and by reinforcing the firing-line at the right time and at the right place keeps the attack moving and eventually attains the superiority of fire. But judicious feeding of the firing-line is not all that is required. Not only must its flanks be protected, and its advance covered by long-range fire; but if the enemy is well-trained, counter-attack is always to be apprehended; and—what is also dangerous—a sudden reinforcement of the defence, when the struggle for fire-superiority is at its height may take place. It should be the aim, then, of the officer commanding, so to husband his reserve, that while prosecuting the attack with vigour by means of timely reinforcements, he may still have a sufficient force at his disposal to meet emergencies. From first to last, therefore, he should retain at least a portion of the reserve in his own hand, for even a half-company may be of the greatest service in repelling a sudden counter-attack, or in forming a rallying point if the attack is repulsed.
2. If heavy losses are to be expected before a strong firing-line can be established within decisive range of the enemy’s position, the reserve should be stronger than the firing-line and supports. If, on the other hand, the opposition is weak, or decisive range can be reached under cover, the reserve may be of the same strength as the firing-line and supports. It is to be observed, however, that the firing-line and supports here alluded to are those engaged in the decisive attack; companies engaged in a holding attack, or in a feigned or false attack, are not to be counted when calculating the strength of the reserve.
3. It may be advisable to divide the reserve into two distinct bodies, one following the flank attack, the other the frontal attack.
4. When the flanks (or flank) of the battalion are exposed, a portion of the reserve will be told off as a protection against counter-attack and for extended patrolling.
5. On open ground, in order to avoid unnecessary loss, the reserve must advance in several lines of skirmishers. In close country, the reserve should move in as compact a formation as the ground will permit, due regard being paid to the protection of the flanks.
6. The initial formation of the companies in reserve will be decided by the officer commanding, and will depend altogether upon the ground. Wide intervals are not so essential as for the firing-line and supports, and on ground which is little exposed to fire company columns, or columns of fours may be resorted to with advantage. It will seldom be necessary, however, that the formation of each successive line should be identical; and, during the advance, the formation of each company will be altered, in order to take advantage of cover or to avoid shot-swept spaces, at the discretion of its own commander.
156. Holding Attack.
The holding attack will be carried out by a battalion in accordance with the principles already laid down; the frontage being larger, and the reserve smaller than in a decisive attack, S. 139.
157. Instruction.
It is always advisable, in instructing a battalion, to hand over the entire control of the companies in firing-line or reserve, with the exception of the portion retained at the disposal of the officer commanding, to their own leaders, and to give each of the latter a free hand in carrying out the task assigned to him. Such a method, with inexperienced company officers, may at first lead to mistakes and misunderstandings; but as soon as these officers gain confidence, become accustomed to working in concert, and understand what is required of them, energetic combination will take the place of hesitation and bewilderment, and the officer commanding will find himself supported by a body of zealous and self-reliant assistants, capable of executing his intentions without depending on continual instructions.
Moreover, the practice of carrying out an attack by the co-operation of several independent units is the only method possible in a hotly contested action.
It must be made clear whether the battalion is supposed to be acting alone or in conjunction with other troops.
158. General Rules.
1. The rules for the battalion in attack apply in all respects to the brigade, and even to larger forces of infantry, with the exception that in the position of assembly the brigade or division will usually be drawn up in line, or lines, of battalions in quarter column or lines of company columns, and will advance as far as the zone of distant fire in this formation. The commander assigns to the battalion leaders their respective tasks, leaving them perfect freedom as to the manner of execution, and the way in which they form their commands.
2. The frontage of the brigade will depend on the situation, as also the strength of the brigade reserve. The latter should always consist of a complete unit or units, of which a small portion may be kept back at the crisis of the attack to form a rallying point in case of reverse, S. 132 (3).
3. The orders issued by the brigadier will be in the same form as those issued by the officer commanding a larger force, S. 131.
4. The brigadier will be accompanied by signallers, who will maintain communication with all the battalions of the brigade during the attack.
159. General Rules.
1. The best battle-formation for the infantry of a division engaged in a decisive attack, and, generally speaking, in all attacks, is the two brigades placed alongside each other, dividing the front, and regulating their own reserves. If the division is acting alone, it is important that, as a general rule, the divisional commander should retain two complete battalions as general reserve. During the action the divisional commander should be accompanied by a party of mounted signallers.
2. The divisional commander assigns to the brigadiers their respective tasks, leaving them perfect freedom as to the manner of execution.
3. The orders issued by the divisional commander will be drawn up and issued as directed in S. 131, and “Combined Training,” S. 115.
4. If the divisional commander finds it necessary to detach a battalion, or in an unforeseen contingency to give an individual battalion direct orders for the execution of some movement, he should at once inform the brigadier to whom the battalion belongs.
5. In the instruction of the brigade or division a most useful exercise is to practice deployments for attack under different suppositions, such as an enemy occupying different extents of front, an enemy suddenly discovered in position half-right, half-left, or flanking the line of march.
160. Distribution of Infantry for defence.
1. Infantry detailed for the defence of the entrenchments will generally be distributed in two bodies, viz.,
(i) Firing Line and Supports.
(ii) Local Reserves.
For the decisive counter-attack, a separate body, The General Reserve, which has nothing to do with the immediate defence of the entrenchments, will be retained in the hands of the officer commanding.
2. The strength of the firing line will depend entirely on the extent of the field of fire and the character of the cover. If the conditions are favourable to the defence a few men can easily protect a wide front. If there is any chance of a surprise, or of the position being attacked by a sudden rush, the firing line should be as dense as is compatible with the free use of the rifle by every man engaged.
3. The duty of the supports is to replace casualties in the firing line, and they should therefore be posted near at hand and under cover. In strong positions very small supports will be quite sufficient, or they may even be dispensed with altogether.
4. The duties of the local reserves are to deliver local counter-attacks, to reinforce the firing line at critical moments, and to protect the flanks; they will also furnish the outposts and supply detachments to occupy temporary positions, either in front or beyond the flanks of the entrenchments. S. 161 (7), also “Combined Training,” 125 (4). Local reserves should be well covered, especially from artillery fire; but there should be no obstacle to their being brought rapidly to the front.
161. Occupation of the position.
1. It is far more important that every man should see well to the front, and be well covered, than that the front should be regular and continuous.
Each section, or even each squad, may have its own entrenchment. These entrenchments will not necessarily be in one general line. The main consideration is a good field of fire and provision of oblique or enfilade fire to support other parts of the line.
2. Weak points should be strongly held. Between the points held spaces may be left unoccupied, provided they can be swept by an effective cross-fire.
3. When there is no time to entrench every man must improvise cover for himself, and this should be constantly practised in peace. When the troops occupy entrenchments every man should see that he can use his rifle effectively, and if necessary make the improvements necessary to enable him to do so.
4. The distance of all prominent objects and exposed points on the probable lines of attack should be carefully ascertained, noted and communicated to the men.
If time permit, these distances should be defined by marks.
5. If possible, objects which might assist the enemy in finding the range should be removed, and all works and entrenchments should be hidden with bushes, grass, &c.
6. Arrangements should be made to ensure that men, if suddenly called on at night to man the entrenchments, fire in the required direction. This can best be done by so designing parapets, loopholes, &c., that the line of fire of a rifle resting on them grazes the ground in advance for some distance.
7. In addition to the outposts, which will protect the front and flanks of the position, troops may be specially detailed to take up temporary positions to mislead the enemy, embarrass his reconnoitring patrols and delay his advance, S. 160 (4); such troops should be withdrawn before they become seriously engaged, care being taken not to mask the fire of the main position during the retirement.
162. Entrenching a Position.
1. Trenches on the sky-line afford so excellent a target, that such a position, especially if the enemy has good artillery, should always be avoided. They may, however, be constructed on the sky-line and left unoccupied for the purpose of deceiving the enemy.
2. When placed at the foot of slopes that trend towards the enemy they have the advantage that fire from them is more grazing than it would be if they were placed higher up the slope, but a retreat under fire from them will probably involve heavy loss. It is, as a rule, easy to conceal them in such a position. On the other hand, the field of fire from low-lying trenches is often very limited, and it is generally more easy to open up communication with the rear when trenches are close to the crest-line than when they are much in advance of it.
3. Trenches which can bring fire to bear at decisive range on to the ground over which the attack must pass, and which are themselves concealed from the attackers in the early stages, are most valuable in surprising the enemy at the most critical period of the attack.
4. Trenches should always be concealed and head cover provided when possible, covered communication from the rear should also be provided when time is available.
5. Important tactical points and such others which, owing to the dead ground in their vicinity, constitute a weakness to position, should be further strengthened by placing barbed wire entanglements or abattis in front of them, trenches being so placed as to bring an effective fire to bear on such obstacles.
6. When time admits, deep trenches just in rear of the crest-line may be usefully provided to give cover to the supports or the garrisons of the advanced trenches till they are required.
163. Fire.
1. As the difficulties of ammunition supply and want of knowledge of ranges are not so great as in the attack, it will often be expedient to open fire at long ranges in order to oblige the assailant to deploy and adopt a definite course of action which it will be difficult for him to rectify when exposed to fire.
Long-range fire may also be used to deceive the enemy as to the dispositions and strength of the defender, and to check the advance of reinforcements.
The employment of long-range fire must, however, be regulated by the effect produced on the enemy. If this is observed to be small, it will be wiser to reserve ammunition for closer ranges where better results may be expected, and on occasion it may be advisable to encourage the enemy’s advance by a weak fire or by withholding it entirely, and to receive him at decisive ranges with a fire of the greatest intensity possible.
164. Machine Guns.
1. In defence, as in attack, machine guns may be employed singly, or in pairs.
2. They should not be isolated, and are not adapted for use against lines of widely extended skirmishers, but are most suitable to protect flanks, to flank salients or portions of the line, to cover obstacles, to deny the passage of defiles to the enemy, or to bring a heavy fire to bear from ground which, owing to its narrow frontage, is unsuited for the deployment of infantry. If employed in the firing line, they should be carefully concealed. Alternative positions connected by a covered communication should be prepared, if possible, for use in case they come under effective artillery fire.
3. If not utilised for these purposes they should be retained as a reserve of fire, either in the hands of the battalion commander or brigadier, to be used to check the advance of hostile reinforcements, to meet turning movements, to support the firing-line in crises, to prepare and cover the counter-attack, or against close deep formations at long range.
4. In pursuit they should endeavour to operate against the flanks of the enemy from decisive range.
165. Position of the Reserves.
1. The local reserves will be in their respective sections. For the protection of the flanks they will be echeloned in rear of the flanks or of one flank if the other is unassailable. If the flanks are secure, the most suitable position for them, if it provides good cover, is in rear of the centre of the section to which they belong.
2. The general reserve will usually be posted in rear of the centre of the position, until the direction of the counter-attack can be decided; but in certain cases, as when, for instance, the defender is equal or superior in numbers, it may be echeloned in rear of that flank where the ground offers the greatest facilities for the counter-attack.
3. The reserves should be most carefully hidden until the moment for action arrives. If no natural cover is available, artificial cover should, if possible, be provided for them.
166. Duties of Officers Commanding Reserves.
1. The officers commanding the reserves, whether local or general, must make themselves acquainted with all ground over which they may have to act. They should know the direction of all roads and tracks; and they must keep a watch, by means of staff officers and patrols, on the progress of the engagement, so that they may anticipate orders, and have their troops formed up ready to move as soon as they are called for.
167. Local Counter-attacks.
1. Local counter-attacks, which are the special duty of the local reserves, may be made at any moment. Should the enemy gain some local success either in the position itself, or on ground close to it, whence he could seriously threaten the defence of the position, the necessity for counter-attack becomes imperative. In such cases, the sooner the attack is delivered the better, so that the enemy may have no opportunity of strengthening the ground he has gained.
2. Local counter-attacks are delivered on the initiative of the officers in charge of sections of the defensive line. They should seldom be carried far in advance of the entrenchments; and directly the enemy’s firing-line falls back, the troops should be reformed as rapidly as possible.
4. Local counter-attacks should also be delivered when the enemy advances to the assault. Bayonets will be fixed when his line arrives within a few hundred yards of the position, every available man brought up into the firing-line, and the charge met with rapid fire, and if that fails to stop him, with a counter-charge. In this counter-charge, which should be practised at all manœuvres, the men will cheer, bugles be sounded, and pipes played.
168. Decisive Counter-attack.
1. The decisive counter-attack will be delivered by the general reserve, it will usually be directed against the enemy’s flanks, and in such a manner as to threaten his line of retreat, although opportunities for breaking the centre may sometimes occur. The counter-attack should come, if possible, in the form of a surprise, and should be carried through with the utmost vigour and resolution; all ranks should understand that they must press forward until the last reserve has been thrown in.
2. To judge the right time for the decisive counter-attack is as difficult as it is important. The most favourable moment is when the enemy has expended his reserves in endeavouring to storm the entrenchments. If, however, the defending force is carefully concealed, or if the enemy is led to believe that the front is much longer than it really is, he may commit mistakes such as exposing a portion of his force without hope of support from the remainder, extending his front so far that the greater part of his force is in the firing-line, exposing his flanks, or posting his reserves in the wrong place; and these mistakes, all of which are favourable to the counter-attack, may occur at any period of the engagement—. It is important, therefore, that the course of the action should be closely watched, that the staff should make arrangements for incessant patrolling, constant observation, and the rapid transmission of reports, and that the general reserve should be prepared for immediate action throughout the fight.
3. When launched to the attack the firing-line, as a rule, should be thicker than at the commencement of an ordinary attack, and it is unnecessary that it should be preceded, though it must always be flanked, by scouts. A portion of the force should be echeloned in rear, in order to deal with the enemy’s reserves.
4. The formation in which the general reserve will carry out the counter-attack cannot be laid down; but care should be taken that the troops composing it are formed up in such a manner as to be able to advance and come into action in any direction with the least possible delay.
5. It is possible that there will be little time for issuing detailed orders, but the direction and manner of carrying out the counter-attack should be carefully pointed out to all subordinate commanders, who will explain the same to the troops, and impress on them the importance of getting to close quarters as quickly as possible.
169. General Rules.
1. When acting independently the company will act in accordance with the principles enumerated in S. 160. The reserve will, as a rule, undertake the defence of the flanks, in addition to its other duties. It may often be conveniently placed in rear of the centre.
To deceive the enemy as to the extent of the position scouts must be employed in place of larger bodies, and they should be encouraged to use all sorts of stratagems, such as constantly changing their positions, opening rapid fire, &c., &c., in order to effect their purpose. Concealment is imperative.
All dead ground in front or on the flanks of the position should be carefully observed.
2. When acting in battalion, a company told off to furnish a portion of the firing-line will usually keep a part in support. But it will often be advisable to extend only a few men at first, and to retain the remainder in rear until the enemy’s infantry advance to the attack, but they should be able to reach their places in the firing line without being observed by the enemy.
3. The occupation of the ground allotted to a company will be carried out in accordance with S. 161.
170. Duties of the Subalterns, Section, and Squad Leaders.
1. They are responsible that communication is maintained between the different portions of the company, that all movements of the company are at once reported, that the fire is kept under control, that the men aim at the targets pointed out to them, and that all instructions as regards cover, concealment, ranges, and water are scrupulously observed.
2. They will see:—
(i) That every man has good cover.
(ii) That the firing-line is well hidden, the existence of entrenchments concealed, and every man is in such a position that he can use his rifle.
(iii) That ranges are taken and communicated to the men.
(iv) That every man has plenty of ammunition and a full water-bottle, and that the ammunition from the killed and wounded is collected and distributed.
(v) That the support knows the position of the firing-line.
3. They will ascertain the position of the dressing station and of the reserve ammunition.
4. They will report to the company commander all movements of the enemy and any opportunity which appears to be favourable to counter-attack.
5. They will see that their flanks, if exposed, are protected by scouts.
6. They will be careful to keep in communication with the companies or either flank.
171. Duties of the Company Leader.
Nothing in the previous section is intended to relieve the company commander of his responsibility in all that concerns his command. He will make arrangements for the distribution of fresh supplies of ammunition, but it is important he should not allow himself to become too much engrossed in details which should be looked to by his subordinates.
In defence, the occupation, to the best advantage, of the ground allotted to him, is the company commander’s first duty.
172. General Rules.
1. If the front is very extended, or if it runs through close or broken country, it may be broken up into sections of defence.
2. When acting independently the officer commanding will himself give the signal for the decisive counter-attack. This attack will, as a rule, be commanded by the officer specially detailed to command the general reserve.
173. Duties of the Commanding Officer.
1. He will see that the reserve ammunition is conveniently placed.
2. He will ensure that communication is maintained with the troops on either flank.
3. He will report all movements of the enemy.
4. If he commands a section of the defence, he will watch for opportunities for local counter-attack.
5. He will keep up communication by means of his signallers with his brigadier.
6. He will fix on some central position, where he can receive reports, and communicate rapidly with all portions of his force.
7. He will arrange for first treatment of casualties on the spot, and for their transfer to the dressing station of the bearer company.
8. He will make himself acquainted with the best line of retirement to the rallying position.
174. General Rules.
1. The duties of a brigade or divisional commander are practically the same as those of the officer commanding a battalion.
It may be repeated, however: (i) that the rule of detailing a complete unit, with an adequate staff, for the delivery of the decisive counter-attack, should always be observed; (ii) that the position of the officer commanding should be carefully selected.
2. On an extended field of battle, and particularly in broken country, it is not always easy to find a place where the firing-line can be supervised, and the opportunities for counter-attack observed before it is too late to take advantage of them; and in some cases, the officer commanding will have to rely entirely on the reports of his staff officers and the subordinate commanders. It is essential, then, that the system of collection and transmission of information should be complete and thoroughly understood; in peace exercises as much attention should be paid to this most important point as to training officers and men to make clear, concise and useful reports.
175. Supply and transport of ammunition in the field.
1. Service ammunition and regimental reserve.—A battalion takes with it into the field, in regimental charge,
| Service ammunition. | 100 rounds per rifle, carried by the soldier; |
| 4,000 rounds packed on the carriage of the machine gun[8]; | |
| Regimental reserve. | 2 boxes on each of eight pack animals (i.e., one pack animal per company); and 16 boxes in each of five S.A.A. carts, also 6,600 rounds per machine gun in one S.A.A. cart. (1,000 rounds for Short L.E. rifle and for machine gun, and 1,100 rounds for L.M. or L.E. rifle are carried in each box). |
On the march one pack animal will be in rear of each company; four S.A.A. carts (including that carrying the machine gun ammunition), will be in rear of the battalion; the remaining two carts will form a brigade reserve.
Officers commanding battalions will arrange for the replenishment of this ammunition at every favourable opportunity. They are responsible that the ammunition carried by the men is complete, and that when ammunition is expended, it is replaced with the least possible delay.
2. Brigade Reserve.—A brigade reserve of small arms ammunition will be formed by two S.A.A. carts being detached from each battalion, these will follow in rear of the brigade. Each brigadier will detail a mounted officer to take charge of the brigade reserve.
3. Divisional Reserve.—A divisional reserve of 100 rounds per rifle and 8,800 rounds per machine gun is carried in the small arms ammunition section of the ammunition columns of brigades of divisional artillery, each of which will supply one of the infantry brigades of the division to which they belong. The same number of rounds for corps troops is carried in the special section attached to the ammunition column of the horse artillery brigade. The divisional reserves are in artillery charge.
4. Ammunition Park.—Fifty rounds per rifle and 9,000 rounds per machine gun.
5. General arrangements in the action.—In action the ammunition pack animals will be advanced as close as possible to their respective companies, every advantage of cover being taken in doing so; two S.A.A. carts will follow as close in rear of the supports to the firing-line as the hostile fire will permit, one being usually in rear of each wing; the remaining cart will follow in rear of the battalion reserve. The cart carrying the machine gun ammunition will move as directed by the officer commanding the machine guns. During an action the regimental reserve ammunition carried in the carts will be in charge of the serjeant-major, who should get into communication with the supports and also the brigade reserve by means of signallers.
The brigade reserve of ammunition will follow in rear of the centre of the brigade, or as the General Officer Commanding may direct. It should be accompanied by signallers, who should maintain communication with the various regimental reserves.
When a S.A.A. cart with the supports is emptied, it will be replaced by a full cart from the regimental reserve, the empty cart being sent back to the brigade reserve, when it will be replaced by a full one. As soon as there are four empty S.A.A. carts with the brigade reserve the officer in charge will send a message as follows to the officer in charge of the divisional reserve: “Send up four S.A.A. carts to the —th brigade.” It is, however, unnecessary to wait till four carts are empty, if ammunition is urgently required.
On the arrival of the carts from the divisional reserve, the horses will be unhooked and changed, and empty carts sent back to the divisional reserve.
In the event of a brigade in action being ordered to advance through woods or over broken ground where communication cannot be maintained, the S.A.A. carts of the brigade reserve may be distributed between battalions, and the divisional reserve would conform to the general movement.
In the case of a battalion being detached to any distance a similar course would be pursued, a brigade reserve being reformed as soon as possible.
6. Instructions for the officer in charge of the brigade reserve of ammunition.
(i) He will as soon as possible open up communication with the divisional reserve and also with the various regimental reserves.
(ii) A mounted orderly will be sent to him from the divisional reserve to be used only for the purpose of communicating with the divisional reserve. He will communicate with the regimental reserves by means of signallers.
(iii) The earliest opportunity is to be taken (when four S.A.A. carts are empty, or sooner if necessary) to fill up empty carts from the divisional reserve. The brigade reserve should be regarded as available for the brigade generally, and also in case of necessity it will supply ammunition to any troops engaged.
(iv) Men and horses belonging to the brigade reserve are not to be sent to the divisional reserve.
Men and horses belonging to the divisional reserve are not to be sent further to the front than the brigade reserve, except in a case of emergency.
(v) Empty S.A.A. carts are to remain with the brigade reserve until they are replaced by full ones.
(vi) Receipts prepared by the officer in charge of the divisional reserve will be signed by the officer in charge of the brigade reserve for the number of full carts received by him.
(vii) After an action or during a pause in the engagement all deficiencies of ammunition must be made good from the divisional reserve.
7. Battalion arrangements for issuing extra ammunition.—Each company commander will detail one non-commissioned officer and two privates to act as ammunition carriers (if the company is strong, three privates should be detailed). Only men of strength and activity should be selected for this duty, the importance of which cannot be overrated.
Whenever a serious engagement is imminent, officer commanding battalions will issue to the men 50 rounds from the S.A.A. carts, so that, if possible, every man shall carry 150 rounds on his person. The extra ammunition should generally be issued before leaving the halting place of the previous night.
During an action every opportunity will be taken for supplying ammunition to the firing line by sending some up by carriers or with reinforcements. The carriers bring the ammunition from the pack animals (or from the S.A.A. carts) in canvas ammunition bags, and distribute it to the men in the ranks. The bags, when not in use, are carried on the pack animals. The loads are not to exceed 600 rounds to each carrier.
When more ammunition is required by the firing-line it will be taken forward by any men at hand, acting as carriers.
The carriers will move direct to the companies for which they are destined. If there is a difficulty in their getting back they may be retained in their ranks till the action is over.
It is the duty of section and squad commanders to make sure that all ammunition from the killed and wounded is collected and distributed.
The system of carrying ammunition by hand, here provided for, is not to prevent every endeavour being made to push the S.A.A. carts as far forward as practicable. They ought, in ordinary circumstances, to get within 1,000 yards of the firing-line, and in broken and undulating ground considerably nearer. With pack animals, it should be practicable to get within 500 yards of the firing-line.
The immense importance of having a supply of ammunition out of sight of the enemy, and yet within easy reach of the firing-line, will justify great risks being incurred in getting it to such a position.
176. Entrenching Tools.
1. The entrenching tools of a battalion are carried on two tool carts and on eight pack animals (i.e., one per company).
A brigade reserve of entrenching tools is carried on one G.S. wagon.
2. On the march, the pack animals carrying the tools will be with those carrying the ammunition, i.e., one in rear of each company.
3. In action, the pack animal carrying the tools will keep as close to its company as the enemy’s fire will admit, but the driver must use his discretion in doing so; for instance, on bare open country it will seldom be advisable to advance the animals close to the firing line, whereas when advanced positions have been secured, it will usually be necessary to take tools at once up to the firing line, in order that the position may be strengthened against counter-attacks.
The tool carts will usually accompany the ammunition cart with the reserve, and will be under the serjeant-major, the tools, if necessary, being carried forward when required by men from the reserve.
The brigade reserve of tools will remain with the brigade ammunition reserve, and will be under the orders of the officer in charge of the latter.