Infantry Training | Project Gutenberg

1. It is impossible to lay down a fixed and unvarying system of attack or defence. Although such system might appear capable of modification to meet different conditions, yet constant practice in a stereotyped formation inevitably leads to want of elasticity, accustoms all ranks to work by rule rather than by the exercise of their wits, and cramps both initiative and intelligence. In peace exercises, where blank cartridges take the place of bullets, the inherent and paralysing defects of a normal system may easily escape notice; in war they betray themselves in waste of life and failure.

It is therefore strictly forbidden either to formulate or to practise a normal form of either attack or defence. To the training of the troops in movements before the enemy, general principles and broad rules alone are applicable; and the practical knowledge of these principles and rules can only be instilled by intelligent instruction and constantly diversified exercises on broken ground.

2. In no two military operations is the situation exactly the same. The character of the ground, the extent of the co-operation of the other arms, the strength and moral of the opposing forces, their physical condition, and the objects they wish to achieve must always differ.

3. The attitude originally assumed by either, or both, of the opposing forces, may be reversed during an engagement. A vigorous counter-attack by an army offering battle in a defensive position may throw the adversary on the defensive; or an assailant may fight a delaying or retaining action in one part of the field, while in another part his action may be essentially offensive; but these and other variations in a combat resolve themselves in every case into attack and defence.

4. Since the conditions of modern warfare render decentralisation of command in action an absolute necessity, no good results are to be expected unless the subordinate leaders have been trained to use their intelligence, and unless they have been given ample opportunities of acting on their own judgment in attack and defence, and have constantly, in peace practices, been called upon to consider the necessity of departing from their original orders.

Nor can the results be good if commanding officers fail to realise the very limited extent to which they are able to exert their powers of command under fire, and if, in peace, they attempt to exercise a personal control which would be impossible in action. They should be most careful, therefore, to act in peace practices exactly as they would in war, and abstain from all interference which would be impracticable under fire.

5. During the combat, as at all other times, the commander of every body of troops is responsible for the local protection of his command against surprise.

6. Ample information, both before and during an engagement, is so exceedingly important that methodical and complete arrangements should be made to obtain it. Nothing should be left to chance. All available means should be employed. In every command some simple method of collecting and transmitting reports should be established and the system should have been practised beforehand.

1. The difficulties of command are much increased by the fact that the leader can no longer personally control and direct all ranks by word of mouth, and that even under long range fire the mounted officers must often dismount.

2. During the fight, the commander of a considerable body of infantry can only influence the course of the action by the employment of his reserve. Nevertheless, the influence of the commander, if exerted in the proper manner, viz., by means of clear, comprehensive, and concise orders, framed after careful reconnaissance, made known to all the subordinate leaders, and providing for the combined and simultaneous action of his whole force, will be very great.

3. The commander’s position will, as a rule, be selected so that he can obtain an extensive view. It should be sufficiently central to facilitate the receipt of reports and the issue of orders. The subordinate leaders will take post where they can best exercise supervision over their commands, watch the enemy, and receive and transmit orders.

4. Keeping in view the paramount importance of decentralisation of command, it is essential that superior officers, including battalion commanders, should never trespass on the proper sphere of action of their subordinates. Personal example has undoubtedly an extraordinary influence, especially under heavy fire, and there are times when every other consideration must be sacrificed to leading or steadying the troops. But any attempt to exercise personal control over all portions of the force must inevitably lead to the neglect of other duties, such as feeding the firing line at the right place and time, protecting the flanks, meeting counter-attacks, reporting to, or communicating with, the superior commander, and maintaining connection with adjoining units. Moreover, all unnecessary changes of position by an officer commanding any considerable body of troops are to be deprecated, as interfering with the timely reception and transmission of reports and orders.

5. No great success can be expected in war, nor is it possible to develop the powers of judgment in peace, unless each leader is allowed ample latitude in choosing the means that he considers best adapted for dealing with tactical situations. It is only when his methods are manifestly wrong that there should be interference; and it is always to be remembered, in peace practice, that while negligence, forgetfulness, and disobedience call for the severest censure, errors of judgment should be treated differently. It is through mistakes, pointed out and explained by competent authority, that future error is avoided and a capacity for correct and rapid decision is developed.

On the other hand, independence which neglects the object indicated in the orders of the superior, disregards the importance of co-operation, and imperils, without reason, the unity of command, must be firmly repressed.

1. The attainment of superiority of fire is a necessary preliminary to the achievement of decisive success. Fire superiority may be obtained, other factors being equal, by superiority of numbers, better leadership, more perfect armament, greater accuracy of fire; better use of cover; surprise.

Troops should, as a general principle, seek to secure superiority of fire by accuracy rather than rapidity, but as rapid fire can produce great results in a short space of time, circumstances will often occur which will justify the large expenditure of ammunition which its employment demands.

2. An intelligent distribution of fire is of the first importance. For example, concentration of fire is of great value, and when there is a choice of targets, preference should be given to that which, at the moment, is of the greatest tactical importance.

The great ranging power of the rifle will also frequently afford opportunities of concentrating fire from a wide frontage on to important localities, and of directing an effective oblique or enfilade fire against portions of the enemy’s line.

Even when the enemy is invisible he may be subjected to considerable loss by directing fire so as to sweep the ground of which he is known to be in possession.

3. The longer the range the greater will be the volume of fire necessary to produce effect, and the more important will be an accurate knowledge of the distance.

4. Economy of ammunition should be effected not by limiting fire when needed, but by judiciously timing its use, and by reserving it altogether if no advantage is to be gained. Pauses in fire are necessary both for the purpose of maintaining control, and for the regulation of expenditure of ammunition; moreover, sudden bursts of fire will produce greater results than slow continuous fire.

5. The control of fire is in the hands of the company commanders and their subordinates. To the company commander, as a general rule, must be left the choice of the moment of opening fire, but to the half-company, section and squad leaders, who will be in the firing line, must be left the choice of targets. They should always bear in mind, however, that if an exceptionally favourable target presents itself fire should at once be opened, notwithstanding the fact that no orders have been received. The only exception to this rule is when orders have been given that fire is to be withheld until the enemy comes within a certain range.

Fire discipline means strict attention to the signals and orders of the commander, combined with intelligent observation of the enemy. It ensures the careful adjustment of the sight, deliberate aim, economy of ammunition, and prompt cessation of fire when the target disappears, or the leader sounds his whistle.

It requires of the men endurance of the enemy’s fire, even when no reply is possible; and, when superior control no longer exists, a cool and intelligent use of the rifle.

The extreme width of the area of ground struck by the bullets of an effective shrapnel is about 25 yards.

The limit of the forward effect of shrapnel at effective range on level ground is about 300 yards.

THE ATTACK.

Nature of an Offensive Action.

The normal type of an offensive battle is a methodical progression from point to point, each successive capture weakening the enemy’s hold on his main position, and paving the way for a further advance; and each successive advance being deliberately prepared and systematically carried out.

1. Infantry, whether in the holding or in the main attack, is formed into three bodies, distributed in depth:—

The first to develop the attack. This portion will be divided into Scouts and Firing Line, portions of which may be kept back as Supports until required.

The second to reinforce, and, if possible, to complete the attack. This portion will consist of Reserves in the hands of battalion, brigade and other commanders.

The third to be employed, if necessary, in completing an attack, to confirm a success, or meet an unforeseen emergency. This portion is termed the General Reserve, and remains at the disposal of the commander of the whole force.

2. The General Reserve should only in very special circumstances fall short of a quarter of the body to which it belongs.

On the other hand, the leading body of infantry should be as small as possible, and, exclusive of the supports, should seldom exceed a quarter of the whole.

1. While the commander, under cover of the advanced guard, is reconnoitring the position, the infantry of the main body will receive orders from him to occupy a position of assembly (i.e., a position out of range, and if possible, out of sight), and will assume a preparatory formation.

2. As a general rule, a portion of the force will be told off to hold the enemy, another portion to deliver the decisive attack, and sometimes a third portion to distract the enemy’s attention by feints.

3. It is generally essential that attacks should be delivered against front and flank simultaneously.

The moral effect of a flank attack is so great that the main effort will usually be made against the flank.

4. It is advisable that the arrangements for the flank attack should be made as soon as the enemy’s position has been reconnoitred, and the force detailed for the operation moved off to a position of assembly whence it can move directly on the objective.

Surprise is so important an element in outflanking attacks, that every advantage should be taken of the ground to conceal the movement to this position of assembly even if the march be somewhat lengthened. The scouts should be instructed to be more than usually careful to keep out of sight.

5. The orders for the attack will usually be issued when the troops are in the position of assembly; more rarely when they are in column of route. In both cases the procedure will be the same. The subordinate commanders will be called up and receive their instructions; and the force told off into three distinct bodies, as laid down in S. 129.

6. The modern conditions which obtain on the battlefield tend to prolong the duration of an action, and it may be several days before either side can gain a substantial advantage over its adversary. In such cases arrangements will have to be made for strengthening localities gained, sending up ammunition, food, and water to the firing line, and for replacing exhausted troops during the night.

1. Before assuming formation for attack every commander will carefully explain to his subordinates what their particular task is.

The officer commanding will draw attention to any positions or peculiarities of ground he intends to turn to account during the advance, indicate the arrangements to be made for a covering fire, and prescribe, when necessary, which portion of the force is to direct. He will point out any ground which might favour counter-attack.

2. Verbal explanations should, if possible, be given when the enemy’s position first comes within view, and the commanders of all ranks given an opportunity of being shown their objectives, of scrutinising the ground, and explaining the situation to their subordinates.

3. When the objectives cannot be seen from the spot where the troops receive their orders, or where, from the character of the intervening country the objectives cannot be clearly seen through the advance, or when detours to avoid impassable ground have to be made, the direction of the attack should be distinctly stated by reference to a map when possible, and the compass bearing of it given. Staff officers, or others acquainted with the ground may also be employed to guide the columns.

4. For further instructions on this subject see “Combined Training,” S. 115.

5. It is important that a complete system of signalling between all parts of an attacking force, in addition to other methods of communication, should be arranged, S. 124 (6).

1. Scouts, Firing Line and Supports.—The duties of the scouts are detailed in S. 87.

When scouts can advance no farther they will lie still until absorbed by the advancing firing line.

The duties of the firing line are to gain ground to the front, and, if checked by a superior fire, to hold on until reinforced.

The supports reinforce the firing line as soon as the latter can make no further progress.

It is undesirable that all the supports should be thrown into the firing line simultaneously. It will very often happen that only certain portions of the firing line are hard pressed or unable to advance, whilst during the advance to decisive range a crowd of men in the firing line is always to be avoided. On the other hand, in certain conditions, especially on very open ground, to hold back at the outset portions of the force allotted to the firing line may result in their not being able to go forward at all when required to reinforce, or in serious losses when doing so.

2. The Reserves.—The reserves provide the reinforcements required to bring the firing line up to its maximum density of one rifle per yard, and to maintain it at such until a superiority of fire over the defence has been gained; a portion of the reserves should be held in hand, if possible, to furnish the further reinforcements and impetus necessary to deliver the assault, S. 137.

The reserves will also cover the advance of the firing line by long range fire, wherever the ground will admit of it; when opportunity occurs they bring an outflanking fire on the enemy’s position; they protect the flanks against counter-attack; and, in addition, may be called on to supply a fresh firing line after a successful assault, should the enemy take up a second position.

3. The General Reserves.—This force, which is under the direct control of the commander of the whole force, is to be employed to meet eventualities; it should be prepared to meet counter-attacks, and in the case of success to march rapidly to the front to take up the pursuit; in the case of a reverse the general reserves may serve as a rallying point, but before deciding to hold back such portion of his force for this purpose, the commander must consider whether he cannot achieve success by employing the whole of his available force in breaking down the defence.

A commander can only exercise a direct influence on his command so long as he retains at his disposal a portion of his force with which to meet the varying contingencies of an engagement. If he keeps in his own hands a strong reserve, he will have it in his power to take instant advantage of any mistake the enemy may commit, to restore the battle should the leading troops meet with a serious check, to meet a counter-attack, or, in case of need, to provide the additional strength required to drive the attack home.

1. Beyond distant ranges formations in lines of columns are generally convenient for infantry about to attack.

At long ranges infantry in large deep columns offer a better target to hostile fire than when in line. But troops in lines of small columns are less vulnerable than when in line, as they are able to take more advantage of the ground.

At effective ranges troops in any formation except lines of skirmishers will suffer heavy losses.

At decisive ranges the extended line must be considerably reinforced in order to bring an effective fire to bear against the defence, for no advance can be made within this zone until the enemy’s fire is greatly shaken.

2. It may be concluded, then, that infantry attacking a well armed enemy across open ground will, in the initial stages of the attack, be in lines of company columns, which, as effective ranges are approached, will give way to lines of skirmishers widely extended; and that as decisive ranges are approached and it becomes necessary to break down the enemy’s fire, to enable any further advance to be made without undue loss, the firing line will have to be reinforced until eventually, in order to obtain the maximum fire effect and thus establish a superiority of fire, it contains as many men as can use their rifles effectively.

1. As a general principle troops should, if possible, not be launched to the decisive attack unless their movements can be covered by the fire action of other bodies specially told off for this purpose, and posted in such a position that they can watch the progress of the attack. The fire of such bodies will necessarily be delivered at long range. The firing line, however, should endeavour before opening fire to advance as close to the enemy’s position as possible consistent with not suffering undue losses. The actual distance at which fire should be opened must depend on the effect of the enemy’s fire. Minor losses may be accepted, but sooner or later, according as the ground is favourable or unfavourable, the severity of the enemy’s fire will render a reply imperative.

2. To enable the attack to be prosecuted it is clear that from this moment the hostile fire must be met by fire of greater power, its intensity and duration being dependent on the effect produced. Moreover, from this point forward movement will, as a rule, be contingent on the mutual fire support afforded to one another by neighbouring bodies, and on the effects produced by the covering fire brought to bear on the enemy’s line whenever the ground admits of such action, by supports, reserves and the troops specially told off for this purpose.

Covering fire should be delivered so as to strike the enemy, disturb his aim, and compel him to seek shelter when the assailant is exposed or in difficulties. In such circumstances intensity of fire is of the first importance; but fire should be reserved when the assailant’s progress is satisfactory, or when he is under cover.

3. It has been stated that the assailant in a decisive attack should, except in the case of troops detailed for covering fire, reserve his fire for those ranges at which fire action is likely to be most effective, but in certain circumstances it may be advantageous to commence firing at long range.

(i) By troops engaged in a flank attack, in order to secure the advantages of enfilade fire.

(ii) When a favourable target presents itself.

(iii) In a holding, or demonstrative action, to prevent the enemy from changing his position, or to deceive him as to the true objective.

(iv) To concentrate a powerful fire from an extended frontage on an important locality in the hostile position.

(v) To oblige the enemy to expose his dispositions.

(vi) In pursuit.

(vii) In siege warfare, to harass the enemy.

4. Long range fire requires a large expenditure of ammunition, and it is necessary, if it is to produce a corresponding effect, and if waste of cartridges is to be avoided, that it should be carefully controlled and concentrated, and that the distance should be accurately ascertained; or if this is not possible, that a considerable depth of ground should be evenly swept by fire by the use of combined sights.

1. Both in attack and defence the most intimate co-operation between the artillery and infantry must be aimed at, if the latter are to derive the full advantage of the support of the former. In the preliminary stages of the attack the advance of the infantry will draw the fire of the defence and thus find a target for the artillery, whilst the fire of the latter, combined with that of other covering bodies, will enable the firing line to approach in extended order towards the enemy’s position without undue loss.

2. In the subsequent fire action the artillery and infantry must co-operate in shaking the fire of the defence so as to admit of the further advances of the firing line, which should take advantage of the slackening of the fire of the defence, caused by the fire of the quick firing artillery covering the advance, to push in closer to the enemy’s position.

3. At the crisis of the engagement, preparatory to the assault, the artillery and infantry must combine to bring the heaviest possible fire to bear against the point or points against which it is proposed to drive home the attack, in order that a superiority of fire over the defence may be rapidly established; and at no other time is the close co-operation so important, if the full effect of the two arms is to be obtained.

The procedure of the troops engaged in the decisive attack is governed by the following principles:—

1. Success largely depends on the close and intelligent co-operation of all parts of the force engaged, and the attacks delivered by different portions of the force should as a rule be simultaneous, for this purpose communication between them must be carefully maintained.

2. The main object of the attack is to attain a superiority of fire by establishing the strongest possible firing line, on good fire positions within decisive range of each objective, preparatory, if necessary, to capturing it by an assault. Whether the objective be the defenders main position, or an advanced position, the attack will be conducted on the same principle.

3. To reach decisive range with as little loss as possible, the advance, which will be covered by the fire of the artillery and reserves, should be rapid and energetic, and be made in successive lines of skirmishers widely extended and preceded by scouts; the firing line should avoid opening fire until either the defenders, or their position, can be clearly distinguished, if the results are to justify the delay and expenditure of ammunition entailed; when once this point is reached, the first line of skirmishers should be reinforced in order that the fire may be effective, S. 134 (2).

The further advance will now be a matter of the greatest difficulty, for the reinforced firing line will offer a considerable target to the defenders, and that at decisive range; it will only be possible to approach closer to the enemy when the movement of one portion of the firing line is supported by the fire of the remainder, but whether the advance to the next fire positions is to be made by alternate rushes of complete portions of the firing line, or by pushing forward a few extended men as from a fresh starting point, covered by the fire of the rest, and gradually reinforcing them, thus building up a fresh firing line, must depend on varying circumstances such as the nature of the ground and the volume of the enemy’s fire, and the choice of method must therefore be left to subordinate commanders, who alone will possess any control at this stage of the fight.

4. On open ground and at effective ranges long lines of men rising simultaneously, and making even short rushes forward, will generally suffer heavier losses than small bodies suddenly moving forward, as the latter surprise the enemy, and thus for a time avoid his aimed fire. The rush should be continued only as long as the surprise lasts. The closer the ranges, the shorter should be the rushes.

5. It is by no means necessary that the firing line should be everywhere of the same density. It is from covered positions that fire is most effective; and it is at these points, therefore, that force should be concentrated.

6. The firing line, which will be continually strengthened by successive reinforcements, will thus fight its way forward until the immediate objective is enveloped, or partially enveloped, at the closest range by a strong firing line, which, in combination with the artillery will bring as powerful a fire as possible to bear against the defence, in order to rapidly establish a superiority of fire preparatory to the assault.

7. Positions affording cover in advance of the enemy’s main position, which may be seized or occupied, should, if necessary, be put in a state of defence; here the troops will re-form and a further advance made by repeating the process of attack against the next objective, as from a fresh starting point.

As soon as it becomes evident that superiority of fire has been attained, which is generally made known by movements to the rear along the enemy’s line, or by the decreasing accuracy and volume of his fire, the troops detailed to drive home the attack will close in on the firing line, and carry it forward to the assault.

The signal for this decisive movement should, as a rule, come from the senior officers present, and be sounded on the bugle. But the method of advance must be left to the company officers, for at such short range it is not possible to transmit the necessary orders all along the line.

During the delivery of the assault on the enemy’s position, the men will cheer, bugles be sounded, and the pipes played.

If the assault is successful, the attacking troops should pursue the enemy with their fire and re-form for a further advance.

After each successful assault, the task of rallying the men, and of forming a defensive line until the advance can be resumed, will generally fall to the subordinate leaders. This will be much facilitated if there are bodies in rear, well in hand, which can be sent forward to carry on the attack, and, as may sometimes be possible, rush the enemy’s second position before he has recovered from the loss of the first.

All important points won should be at once placed in a state of defence, with a view to serving as supporting points for a fresh advance, S. 136 (7), and “Combined Training,” S. 122.

1. In order to prevent the enemy from reinforcing that portion of his line against which it is intended to drive home the decisive attack, other portions of his line, and particularly that portion near which his reserves are believed to be, must be threatened or held by a display of force. In order to mislead the enemy as to the direction of the main attack, and to prevent him, when the crisis of the fight approaches, from thinning those portions of the line which are only threatened, and meeting the decisive attack with nearly his whole strength, the troops engaged in the holding attack must act with vigour when the attack develops, and be prepared to convert their demonstration into a real attack as soon as the right moment arrives.

2. These troops must therefore be in sufficient strength to enable them to advance against the enemy’s position with a good chance of success. As a rule, it will be advisable in the preliminary stages of the action to extend the firing-line at wide intervals, to keep the reinforcing lines well back, and, owing to the danger of a counter-attack, not to permit the firing-line, unless the ground is peculiarly favourable, to advance within decisive range, S. 145 (2). Sudden outbursts of heavy fire at different points, and the use of machine guns, will give effect to demonstrations.

Feints are in their nature much like holding attacks, but are usually carried out by small forces which have little offensive power. The feint should not be made prematurely, otherwise its true character will become apparent to the enemy too soon.

The endeavour of the commander of a party told off to feint will be to divert the enemy’s attention from the locality whence the decisive attack will be launched. He should be allowed great independence in action.

Troops told off to outflank the enemy will generally act on identically the same lines as those detailed to assail the front, for, as a rule, flank attacks are locally frontal attacks. The very fact that he is being attacked simultaneously from two different directions, that his line of retreat is threatened, and that a part of his force is exposed to enfilade fire, must have a most serious effect on the enemy’s moral, and consequently on the accuracy of his aim, and the promptitude of his manœuvres; whilst the new front will probably not be so strong naturally as the main front. The flank of a position should, therefore, be the object of particular attention. If the force detailed for an outflanking movement actually succeeds in placing itself in prolongation of the enemy’s line, before he can change position, or while he is in the act of changing position, a surprise will have been effected, and if the opportunity is utilised with due vigour, an immediate and overwhelming success should be the result.

If the enemy is surprised, it is of the utmost importance to reach decisive range as rapidly as possible, and to increase the demoralisation which the surprise will have already produced by pressing forward to close quarters with the greatest energy. In such conditions, the deliberate advance from cover to cover, and the gradual building up, by means of successive reinforcements, of a powerful firing-line, should be discarded, and the firing-line be strong from the very first. Nevertheless, it will still be necessary to retain a portion of the attacking force in reserve to meet counter-attacks and unforeseen contingencies.

The incidents of a battle and the nature of the ground constantly offer opportunities, even to troops engaged in a frontal attack, for bringing an enfilade or oblique fire to bear upon part of the enemy’s line, thus facilitating the advance of other portions of the attacking force, or even causing the evacuation of some important post. Commanders of all ranks, therefore, however small the parties they command, must always be on the look-out for such opportunities of lightening the task of their comrades.

1. The preparatory formation of infantry is line, or lines, of battalions in lines of company columns at varying intervals and distances.

2. After leaving the position of assembly, formations will be regulated by commanders in conformity with the rules laid down in S. 133.

3. The firing line will, except in the preparatory stages of the attack, be in skirmishing order, though in the final stages of the attack, preparatory to the assault, the men may be as close to one another as will admit of them using their rifles effectively. In open ground the bodies in rear will also be in skirmishing order; but during a protracted fight, when the firing-line is making slow progress, officers commanding bodies in rear of the firing-line should utilise all cover, closing them sufficiently to enable them to execute any manœuvre that may be ordered without confusion or delay.

4. In wooded or close country, or when there is no chance of coming under unexpected fire, the bodies in rear of the firing-line may move in lines of company columns.

5. These bodies should move in as compact a formation as the nature of the ground allows; but the importance of a rapid extension to the front should always be held in view. Battalions or companies echeloned to the rear in order to protect a flank should adopt a formation which will enable them to change direction in order to meet cavalry or counter-attack with the utmost rapidity.

1. The frontage occupied in attacking, having regard to the fact that the position should be enveloped, must as a rule be greater than that of the defence. It is unnecessary, however, that the attacking force should be in equal strength along the whole front. Those portions of the position against which the main attack is not directed should be engaged by a holding attack, and the flank which is not to be seriously attacked may be observed or merely threatened by a feint. Troops engaged in holding attacks and feints should try to deceive the enemy as to their real strength. They may occupy, therefore, a comparatively wider front than the troops detailed for the decisive attack.

2. Troops engaged in a decisive attack must follow a different procedure. The object is to establish the strongest possible firing-line at decisive range from the position, S. 153 (1).

Against a weak enemy, however, or an enemy holding an exposed position, or when the advance is covered by a very superior artillery fire, the frontage allotted to a battalion may be greater than under normal conditions. But it is always to be borne in mind that troops extended at very wide intervals are peculiarly susceptible to counter-attack, and that their attack is certain to lose in vigour and resolution.

3. In the case of a company, or small force, attacking independently the men need not be so close as in the case of larger forces.

1. The distances between the several bodies in which troops are distributed for attack depend upon the nature of the ground, and the weapons of the enemy, and they must be fixed by the officers in immediate command.

2. The scouts should be sufficiently far in advance of, and on the exposed flanks of, the firing-line, to protect it from surprise. In close or undulating country it will be necessary to provide for connecting links in order that there may be no danger of touch with the advanced scouts being lost, and of reports, verbal or by signal, failing to reach the commanders of the firing-line. In wooded country the distance may be decreased.

3. In close country, and in wood-fighting, the distances between the several bodies into which an attacking force is divided should seldom exceed 200 yards. In open ground greater distances are necessary, except against a badly-armed enemy.

4. The distance of the general reserve should be usually greater than that between the other bodies in order that it may not be prematurely drawn into the fight.

5. The general rule is that the troops in rear should be brought closer to the firing-line, the nearer the moment for the assault approaches.

An arbitrary rule as regards intervals is undesirable. Each portion of the force engaged will generally be told off to attack a particular section of the enemy’s line, and the frontage to be occupied by each left to the discretion of their commanding officers. It is essential that there should be a clear understanding as to responsbility for searching, and, if necessary, clearing, all dangerous ground which lies between units. This should be notified in the orders for attack.

1. Each unit should be given a point to move on. Nevertheless, in moving through woods, or over ground so close that it is impracticable to fix a point to march upon, a unit of direction, which should march by compass bearing, or by some well-defined landmark, such as a road or stream, is the only means of avoiding confusion and delay, S. 131 (3).

2. A change in the direction of the line of march is effected by giving a fresh point or points to move on.

3. When once a firing-line has been formed, a change of direction under fire will be effected either as described in S. 48, or by forming a new firing-line in the required direction from the troops in rear, the old firing-line being withdrawn.

4. Undue rapidity tends to exhaust the men, and thus impair the accuracy of their fire. During the earlier stages of the attack, the ordinary pace should, therefore, be maintained.

5. When the defender’s fire begins to tell seriously the advance must be continued according to circumstances as laid down in S. 136 (3).

1. The effective use of a machine gun depends on the promptitude of its commander in utilising opportunities which are, as a rule, very brief.

2. Machine guns form an integral part of the battalion to which they belong, and will, as a rule, be employed under the orders of its commander. This should not, however, prevent general officers commanding brigades from detaching machine guns from their battalions, especially in the case of reserve battalions, and employing them either massed or in groups should the tactical situation so demand. It must be remembered, however, that when massed their position will be more easily discovered, and they will form a large and vulnerable target for the enemy’s fire.

3. Machine guns may be employed with advantage in the attack in the following conditions:—

(i) To cover the advance of the firing line by engaging the enemy from positions in close support of it.

The gun should generally be regarded as a long range weapon and in ordinary open ground it would rarely be advisable to push it into the firing line, where it would offer a conspicuous target to the fire of the enemy, but in a broken or enclosed country, where the gun could be brought up under cover, occasions may arise where it could be usefully employed in a forward position.

When the ground is favourable, the gun would with advantage accompany that portion of the reserves told off to cover the advance of the remainder by long-range fire.

(ii) To bring a concentrated fire on any particular spot.

(iii) To assist in repelling counter-attacks to which the firing line may suddenly become exposed, and in the protection of the flanks against cavalry or counter-attack.

(iv) To bring fire to bear upon an enemy from a position on a flank of the battalion. The gun would, when so placed, be less liable to draw the fire of the enemy upon the infantry which it is supporting.

(v) To give effect to holding attacks by sudden outbursts of fire.

(vi) To establish possession of points gained.

4. The machine gun commander must be fully acquainted with the orders given to the infantry he is acting with and with all subsequent orders issued. It is his business to watch his infantry, and conform to their movements and keep touch generally. He should be allowed great liberty of action.

5. Especial care must be exercised to bring the gun into action without exposing it, and to screen it when in action. Machine guns should generally be used singly, though occasions may occur when it may be advisable to use them in pairs.

THE COMPANY IN ATTACK.

1. In executing an attack independently, the company commander will employ his four sections in accordance with the principles laid down in the preceding pages. He will see that his advance is protected by scouts; and after as thorough a reconnaissance as his means permit, he will carefully explain to the subordinate leaders and men the object to be attained and the plan of action, and will make certain that all understand what is expected of them. He will tell off the company into firing-line and support, arrange, if possible, for outflanking the enemy, keep a small reserve in his own hand, and act generally in the same manner as the commander of a considerable force.

2. In executing an attack in conjunction with the remainder of the battalion, the company commander must explain to his subordinates and men the orders he has received, and the method in which he intends to carry them out. During the advance he should place himself where he can best watch the firing-line and the enemy, and at the same time issue orders to his support. His duties in action are as follows:—

Terms applied to ranges.	Rifle.	Field Art.	Heavy Batteries.
	Yards.	Yards.	Yards.
Distant	2,800 to 2,000	6,000 to 4,500	10,000 to 6,000.
Long	2,000 to 1,400	4,500 to 3,500	6,000 to 4,000.
Effective	1,400 to 600	3,500 to 2,000	4,000 to 2,500.
Decisive	600 and under	2,000 and under	2,500 and under.

PART IV.

INFANTRY IN ATTACK AND DEFENCE.

THE ATTACK.

Nature of an Offensive Action.

THE COMPANY IN ATTACK.