Samuel Lake, who is called the father of the “even-keel submarine,” a device the use of which has given the German submarines such terrible efficiency, gives some interesting views of the future of this terror of the seas in an interview published in a prominent daily paper. We have all seen during the past year how mechanical and chemical invention has added to the horrors of war. The query most vital to the future of peace is as to whether the further development and perfection of such devices will not make war so horrible that it will be impossible.
Mr. Lake is the head of a great submarine shipyard at Bridgeport, Conn., and speaks with the authority of an expert.
He expresses his firm belief that when the submarine is fully recognized and when the governments of the great nations fully prepare themselves for defense and offense with such craft, “there and then naval war will cease!”
Submarine preparedness will not end marine warfare merely by making it horrible, for horrors do not deter men from belligerency, but by making successful operations by other naval vessels impossible. Mr. Lake thinks that Germany has been moved to keep her fleet locked up in safe harbors more by fear of the allied submarines than by fear of the allied dreadnoughts. It is to be noted that the Allies have not made such effective use of submarines in this war as the Germans have, but this is not because the Allies are not equipped with these under water craft. They have, in the aggregate, more than Germany has, but they have had few German sea-going craft to operate on. The German merchant marine was swept from the seas at the very outset of hostilities, and the German fighting craft, except the submarines, have been kept safely hidden.
Applying his theory to the elucidation of a proper defensive policy for the United States, Mr. Lake says: “The United States can make itself so strong that it will be practically beyond attack by providing itself with a sufficient number of submarines of a defensive type.” In this view the creation of a big submarine navy by this country would not be a policy of aggression, for the submarines can not be effectively used to attack shore defenses or to land armies abroad, but it would be simply a provision of prudence to guard our own shores from hostile fleets and hostile armies.
A fleet of submarines, provided with sufficient freeboard and buoyancy to permit themselves to ride at anchor comfortably in all weathers, fitted with submarine signals, searchlights, sound-receiving apparatus and wireless, if there were enough of them to form a cordon about the city or harbor to be defended, could not, in Mr. Lake’s opinion, be beaten.
He estimates the number needed for the effective defense of our east and west coasts at one hundred and fifty, the cost of which would not be more than the cost of five super-dreadnoughts. He also believes that the speed of the submarines can be developed to 25 knots an hour, which is the maximum speed of the larger and heavier craft of the great navies. This would enable them to surround the big battleships coming near our coast, and in many cases to pursue them farther out to sea. The smaller ones could be shipped by rail if it should be found necessary to quickly concentrate a fleet of under sea boats at any particular point on sea coast or lake or river. These smaller submarines Mr. Lake calls amphibious boats, and they would be in addition to the large submarine craft stationed in or near the harbors. In a comprehensive statement of the general merits of this plan of national defense, the inventor says:
“The moment a hostile fleet appeared near any port, submarines could be rushed to that port in such numbers as were deemed necessary—and they would ‘get’ the hostile fleet. No doubt about it.
“Really, for coast defense, such a fleet of submarines could be more speedily mobilized than the fastest fleet of battle cruisers and super dreadnoughts.
“If an attack threatened Charlestown, submarines could proceed by rail from New York at thirty-five miles an hour, in certain safety.
“Delivery of such boats as I refer to could begin within nine months, and three or four a month could be delivered thereafter, using only existing facilities.
“We have plenty of shops which could turn out the gasoline engines they would need. Diesel oil engines are superior for a boat can be run twice as far on a given quantity at one-fifth the cost, and the heavy oil used in Diesel engines is non-explosive, but the disadvantages of gasoline could be largely overcome by carrying the fluid in tanks outside the boat. Thus a supply for 500 miles of cruising could be carried without danger.
“I believe this suggestion for the provision of amphibious submarines to be the most important suggestion for the defense of the United States which has been made in many years. It offers the quickest, the most effective, and the least expensive defense so far imaginable.
“Our capacity for turning out craft of this type would be enormous.
“All lake and ocean yards could build the hulls, all the automobile and boat engine building plants could build engines for them, and there are several electric appliance and storage battery plants that could build the electrical equipment.
“To my mind, the day is close at hand when the only safe place for a battleship will be an interned pond closely protected against land attack.
“And let us consider the cost of maintaining such a defensive fleet in time of peace, comparing it to the cost of the conventional modern naval fleet. To man a submarine of the coast defense type will require twenty men, while the amphibious submarines which I have suggested can be manned by crews of ten men each.
“Say we had fifty of the amphibious boats. That would require a total of 500 men. Estimate the force necessary to man the coast defense type at 3,000 men. Thus, less than 4,000 men would give us a perfect defense for every harbor in America, and, I think, could prevent any invading force from landing elsewhere on our shores.
“The system would be immensely superior to our present coast defense system, each fort or group of forts of which defends only a small radius of territory immediately adjacent thereto. This submarine defense, through its mobility, would defend not only our harbors, but every inch of our shore line.”
A banker pointed out recently that too much stress might be laid on the fact that the extra business being done by arms and ammunition making concerns is of a temporary sort. The profits entailed, he said, would not prove to be simply an unexpected inflow of cash to be distributed to stockholders and considered merely as a gift of fortune. The extraordinary earnings would be used in part to strengthen the position of many companies for the future, funded debts in the way of long term issues as well as temporary loans would be liquidated and working capital sufficient for increased manufacturing needs would be laid aside. Knowledge of this far-reaching value of war orders, the banker thought, was receiving more consideration from thoughtful investors than the desire for big extra dividends.
Pauperism is decreasing in the United States, according to the latest statement issued by the U. S. Census Bureau. “The ratio of almshouse paupers has steadily declined at every census since 1880,” declares the bureau’s last bulletin. In detail, the bureau reports that one third of the paupers in the almshouses in 1910 were under fifty-five years of age and one third over seventy years of age; the males outnumbered the females two to one, and there was a preponderance of persons of foreign birth.
The important fact brought out, however, is that the almshouse population is not only actually decreasing but is also steadily assuming a more shifting character, which means that the poor-houses are becoming merely a temporary shelter instead of a permanent home for the unfortunates who are compelled to take advantage of their hospitality.
The Socialists are working overtime in an effort to frighten the people with their tales about the tenant farmer. They point out that the tenant farmers have increased much faster than homeowning farmers, there being about 8 per cent. of the latter as against about 16 per cent. of the former. Recently the United States government made an investigation into the condition of the tenant farmer in the three states of Indiana, Illinois and Iowa and from this we find that the average size of farms managed by tenants for the three states is 172 acres; that the average income of each farm is $1,732, and the average expense $740, leaving for the average tenant farmer an income of $992 a year.
Mother: “Willie, I’m shocked at you. Do you know what becomes of little boys who use bad words when they play baseball?”
Willie: “Yes’m. They grow up and become golf players.”