PEACE BY COMPULSION
SOME PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE PATH OF THE OPERATION OF THE PROPOSED LEAGUE OF PEACE—IT WOULD NECESSITATE A RADICAL CHANGE OF POLICY ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES

BY
JAMES BROWN SCOTT
[DIRECTOR OF THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR UNIVERSAL PEACE]

In regard to the proposition to employ force to compel international peace, it seems to me that the use of force cannot be safely entrusted to any nation or group of nations; that the United States would not consent to grant such a right to a power or group of powers; and that, therefore, we should not ask that we ourselves be allowed to use force in certain cases.

One can easily think of cases in which we would not consent to arbitrate. For instance, if Denmark should sell St. Thomas to Germany, or if Mexico should make a cession of Magdalena Bay to Japan, we would undoubtedly insist that the cession in either case was void, as contravening our policy, and, if the cessionaire refused to cancel the cession, we would prevent the occupation of the territories in question by force. We would not submit the question to an international tribunal, because under international law Denmark and Mexico would have the right to make such cessions. We could not or would not submit the question to a Council of Conciliation, because its recommendation would be against a policy which the people of the United States insist upon. If the foreign country insisted upon the cession and took possession, as it would have the legal right to do, war might result. There are other illustrations. I merely mention two which have figured from time to time in the press.

It may be well, however, to give a further sample or two. Suppose that Russia and Japan should fall out over their rights in Manchuria, and Russia or Japan should use force against the other. Would the United States be willing to use its land and naval forces against either one or the other of these two great powers? Or suppose that the demands which Japan might feel justified in making upon China, either now or during the course of the war, or indeed after its termination, should be of a kind which China could not accept without sacrificing its independence, and Japan should thereupon use force, although China offered to submit the question to arbitration, would the United States, as a party to the League of Peace, use its land and naval forces against Japan? Or would the United States be willing to become a party to a League which might have pledged its good faith to do so?

And speaking of the proposed League of Peace, I notice that its partizans do not contemplate the use of force to compel the execution of a judgment. Force is to be used to get the parties into court or before the Council of Conciliation; that is to say, in case of a nation that refuses to submit its case to the court or to the council and invades the territory of the country with which it is in controversy, the members of the League bind themselves to unite their forces with the other party willing to arbitrate, and to use their forces thus combined against the nation going to war instead of arbitrating the dispute. If public opinion can be depended upon to execute the award, cannot public opinion be depended upon to force nations into court, if only the controversy be made public and public opinion be given a chance?

The suggestion of a League of Peace is very attractive in that it does not propose any particular kind of solution, but contents itself with the statement that the difference, whatever it is, shall be settled peaceably, leaving it to the parties in dispute to determine the form and nature of the adjustment. Some of the speakers at the Philadelphia gathering, in referring to the proposition of using force against a recalcitrant nation, admitted that the United States would need to change its policy in order to become a party to the League, but felt that the United States should be willing to do so. I gather the impression that such speakers had in mind the use of force by the United States against other countries, not the use of force by other parties to compel the United States to settle a dispute peaceably which our people might be unwilling to arbitrate or submit to a Council of conciliation. We might be willing for instance, to combine with other nations to use force against a weak power, but I doubt whether we would be willing to use force against a nation such as Germany over the Servian question, and I feel sure that we would be unwilling to allow foreign nations a right to use force against us.