The nature of Intention:
Foresight accompanied by desire.
Intention distinguished from expectation.
Intended consequences not always expected.
Expected consequences not always intended.
Intention extends to the means and necessary concomitants as well as
to the end.
Intention Immediate.
Ulterior—Motive.
Malice—wrongful intention.
Ambiguity of the term malice, which relates either to the immediate
or remote intention.
Concurrent motives.
The irrelevance of motives in law.
Exceptions to this principle.
The theory of criminal attempts.
The four stages of a completed crime: Intention, preparation,
attempt, completion.
Distinction between preparation and attempt.
Attempts by impossible means.
The jus necessitatis.
Its theory.
Its partial allowance in practice.
The nature of Negligence.
Subjective and objective uses of the term.
Negligence and intention opposed and inconsistent.
Negligence not necessarily inadvertence.
Negligence essentially indifference.
Negligence and intention the two alternative grounds of penal
liability.
Negligence Wilful or inadvertent.
Simple or inadvertent.
Negligence immediate and remote.
Negligence and want of skill.
The duty of carefulness:
The necessary basis of liability for negligence.
When it exists in the criminal and civil law.
The standard of care:
Not the highest possible.
That of the ordinarily careful man.
Negligence in law and in fact.
Degree’s of negligence.
Distinction between gross and slight negligence not recognised by
English law.
Culpa lata dolus est.
Significance of this proposition.
Negligence and constructive intent.
Criticism of other theories of negligence:
(1) That negligence is inadvertence.
(2) The objective theory.