It is very important to secure the intelligent co-operation of section and platoon commanders in the operations in which their company or battalion is taking part. I have read that in the Russo-Japanese War the result of one of the battles—I think at Penlin, 31st July—turned on the action of an infantry section who gained a footing on the extreme flank of the Russian line, and drove off the defenders in the immediate vicinity, opened a way for the advance of the greater numbers, and led to the outflanking and retreat of the whole Russian force. If you give your unit commanders some chances of carrying out attacks, acting as if unsupported by other troops, they will find themselves faced with the same problems which confront commanders of larger bodies in the attack, and they will be more likely, when acting in combination, to look beyond just the limits of their own commands; they will be led to comprehend the object of operations and the difficulties in the way, and will become quick to seize any opportunity to further the general plan without waiting for orders. It is true that so small a body as a section would seldom be formally told to attack an objective single-handed, but there are often occasions on service when a platoon might have to carry out an attack on a small scale, as when a few of the enemy’s riflemen are making themselves unpleasant, while not in sufficient force to do more than “snipe,” or to require the diversion against them of a whole company. Though a section as now constituted is a very small unit to work with, I think no excuse is needed for performing the attack with the smallest unit, having in view the excellent training it forms for non-commissioned officers and men. However, for this practice, it is advisable to form sections somewhat above the usual strength, by joining two together, so as to give at least eighteen rifles in the whole. After having put the sections through the exercise, you will, of course, let the platoon commanders carry out the attack with their platoons.

Put out a skeleton enemy of three or four men for each platoon or section, or one only for all to attack in turn, and post this enemy in some commanding place, with a good field of view and fire so that if possible the unit shall have twelve to eight hundred yards to manœuvre over before coming to close quarters. As an example, give out the supposition that this enemy are a cavalry patrol of the enemy, who have dismounted and are using their rifles on the company as it is on the move from somewhere to somewhere else. The section or platoon is ordered to drive them off, neutralise their fire, or hold them in check, in case they should be the forerunners of a greater number. The enemy should begin to fire on a signal from you (with your flag), which you should give as you tell off the commander for the duty. If the other units are to attack the same enemy in turn, you should halt them under cover or turn them to the rear, so as not to see too much of the method the first lot choose to carry out their job.

The method of the attack will depend on the nature of the ground—what suits one case may not suit another, and there may be two or three courses open in attacking any one position. The commander should accordingly look well at the ground before deciding how he will carry out the attack, but there are certain principles common to attacks, great or small, which he should put into practice. He should secure himself from interruption on his flanks and rear, and he should provide a supporting fire to distract the enemy and cover the advance of his main force. He cannot make large detachments or indulge in wide patrolling, nor would such small bodies as platoons be sent off to attack if such were advisable; but, at least he can post a file or two on some high ground, or, failing that, on one flank out of decisive range of the enemy, i.e., about eight hundred yards from him, with orders to keep up a steady fire until his advance masks their fire. This will prevent, or at least give warning of, an attempt to cut in on the rear. He may also send a file perhaps two or three hundred yards to either flank, to move parallel with his advance and prevent his being enfiladed at short range, if the enemy should be tactless enough to avail himself of a chance of meeting the advance by a counter-attack. Until he sees pretty well what he has in front of him, he should divide his party into two, sending one to engage the enemy and keeping the other as a reserve to support the first by fire if they get into difficulties, and to be available to carry on the attack after the other has got the enemy well busy, either by reinforcing it directly, or, better still, by continuing the advance along a fresh line leading to some position from which the enemy can be finally turned out, either by fire or by a charge, the first half joining in and advancing as soon as the enemy has turned his attention to the new attack. Both parties should keep scouts or a patrol of some sort out in front of them until the foreground is proved not to contain any hidden body of the enemy, or until the opening of fire by their own side makes it necessary for the scouts to merge into the firing line. I have seen on service a half-company go off to take post as a piquet on a long ridge; it neglected the above precautions, beyond having some scouts in front. There were four or five of the enemy on the ridge, and they waited till the scouts were close, shot some down and drove the others to cover, and then turned their fire on to the half-company, who were also driven to ground, and, as there was little cover, they were tied up till set free by some more infantry, who had to be specially sent off to move along the ridge. Had the half-company moved in two portions, the first would have contained this weak enemy, and the rear party could easily have circled round and got on to the ridge farther along, which would at once have caused the enemy to clear out. See F.S.R., I., I, as to the results of the violation of the principles of leading troops, and as therein directed, impress the principles taught on the minds of your non-commissioned officers, who are commanders, albeit only of platoons and sections.