RED
BLIGHT

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CHRISTIAN NATIONALIST

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Everyone everywhere who would help to make the “lure” of freedom so irresistible that the false promises of security, made by the Communists, will be seen for what they are—a delusion and a fraud.

RED
BLIGHT

by
MARY LAMAR KNIGHT

star

LORRIN L. MORRISON
Publisher
Los Angeles

Copyright, 1951
by
Mary Lamar Knight

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Paper Bound, June, 1951
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AUTHOR’S NOTE

The opinions expressed in this book represent only one individual’s point of view. They are based upon what I, myself, have seen and heard and are subject, therefore, to human error, preferences and prejudices. I ask only that they be considered in this light, and hope that they may serve to stimulate independent thinking and inquiry.

What I am reporting I have experienced personally or learned from the most reliable sources at my command. If I succeed only in a small measure in conveying my thoughts and opinions, it is, nonetheless, a load off my chest, and I shall sleep more easily for having made a sincere, if limited, contribution toward a better understanding of our present disheartening dilemma.

Mary Lamar Knight

Table of Contents

Introduction | 1
Chapter I—Incompetence or Treachery? | 7
Chapter II—Yenan Interlude | 29
Chapter III—Communist Personalities | 45
Chapter IV—Communism’s Forebears | 70
Chapter V—Communist Propaganda | 82
Chapter VI—Manchuria, the Prize | 94
Chapter VII—The Tragedy of the Generalissimo | 102
Chapter VIII—Behind the Red Curtain | 117
Chapter IX—Quo Vadis? | 131
Appendix | 151
Bibliography | 189
Index | 193
About the Author | 199

Introduction

The “lure” of Communism is the same in every country—the promise of security and a richer life for all, with less pain and effort to the individual from the cradle to the grave. We have only to think clearly, however, to realize that such promises are impossible of fulfillment in a Communist State. Never has progress been made in that direction except where there was personal freedom, initiative and enterprise, for these are the qualities that take civilization forward toward Perfection, instead of backward into Chaos. The theories of Marx and Engels have been used and misused by the Soviets. As far as their present laws are concerned, the “Yassa” of Genghis Khan would have served the purpose, had it been as well known in the Twentieth Century as it was in the Thirteenth.

In studying the historical backgrounds of those great movements which, at various times in the past, have churned up the quietude of the earth, I found that they were always propelled or motivated by extreme fanaticism. A distinctive feature of all of them seems to be the desire to change the established order by revolution and intrigue, as well as by military conquest. These movements are opposed not only by the diehards, but by the believers in evolution and slow change; not only by the wealthy and comfortable, but by the practical men of affairs. All of this has been happening since the beginning of history. Believers in the established order of things always are on the defensive. Only open and direct attack stirs them to the offensive. This last is true of the United States, and it is also true of China. It is difficult for the rulers of peace-loving nations to create or inspire prolonged hatred in those who must do their bidding. This fact has been one of Stalin’s major worries with respect to the Chinese Communists. His predecessor, Trotsky, gave them up as impossible. “The Chinese have no capacity for sustained mass indignation,” Trotsky has been quoted as saying. “As Communists they are hopeless.”

Everyone who has lived in China learns to respect and to love the Chinese people. No nation on earth has left a greater endowment in wealth of artistic accomplishment or evolved a more workable philosophy than has China. Even the poorest coolie is acquainted with some of the simple lessons contained in the Classics.

As a correspondent in China for the United Press Associations, I learned to admire the people deeply. When in 1946 I was invited by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to spend six months there as a consultant, without compensation, I was delighted at the opportunity to return. Each time, I increased my knowledge and improved my understanding of the country and made an earnest effort to comprehend the divergent forces underlying modern China and to gauge their effect upon the peace of the world.

The red blight, as everyone knows, is world wide, but I have focused my attention on China because it is the part of the world I know best. I saw the blight spread over this area with sickening rapidity in 1936, and again in 1946.

On both my trips, I travelled slowly from Singapore through most of the major cities to Manchuria, where I remained for a considerable length of time. Manchuria in 1946 had changed radically from Manchuria in 1936. The Russians had supplanted the Japanese, and two wars in the brief span of ten years had left their tragic imprint.

The more I travelled, and the more I read and studied, the more aware I became of the pattern underlying the great upheavals, not only in China but throughout Eurasia. Each eruption had moved in a cycle from tribal communism to communistic imperialism, and then to a dictatorship so despotic that its tyranny lasted in some instances for generations. Invariably, the dictatorship fell into dissolution and decline, followed by desolation and chaos. The despots engineering these movements were all nurtured on the vast steppe-lands, and they never attempted the invasion of their more civilized neighbors until their own strength was such that no opposing army could match them.

Stalin, the latest of these despots, is as barbaric as his predecessors. Certainly, no one could intimate that his methods are even remotely civilized. He has “refined” and “distilled” their characteristic brutality to an exacting degree. It took him fifteen years to turn his own people from the techniques of Lenin to those of his own fiendish thuggery. He has “conquered, bamboozled, outsmarted and trapped” more than nine hundred million people into “political and moral paralysis.”

Are we also going to fall victims to the machinations of this latest of these world shakers? Will we be sucked in through fear or blandishment? Or have we the common sense, the spiritual development and the will to save ourselves? Human nature has changed little during the history of mankind. Our challenge now is to try to develop our spiritual growth so that it will be commensurate with our fantastic material growth.

A strong Nationalism made us great, as it has all nations that have risen to world power. To maintain this power, however, requires the intelligence and wisdom of our Founding Fathers, who, by their use of initiative, ingenuity, enterprise and prayerful determination, made us the Historic United States. Is it possible that recent generations of American men and women have lost these qualities and have failed to achieve complete maturity?

I keep asking myself: Is “civilized” man intelligent enough, in the light of his own past experience, to stop this human tragedy now, and perhaps for a foreseeable future? Or, will he become hopelessly and irrevocably lost in the futile contemplation of an idyllic dream that is ages old, but that never has become a reality, and never will.

Prologue

Oh Man, thou feeble tenant of an hour,

Debased by slavery, debauched by power;

Thy love is lust; thy friendship a cheat;

Hypocrisy thy smile; thy word deceit—

Thy nature ennobled but by name,

The very beasts might bid thee blush for shame.

Lord Byron

Chapter I

Incompetence or Treachery?

“The greatest single mistake made in China, leading to our present debacle, was the withdrawal of United States forces from the Peking, Tientsin, Chingwangtao triangle in 1947.” This was done obviously at the direction of President Truman, General George Marshall and the State Department.

This statement comes from Major General William Arthur Worton, Chief of Staff, Third Amphibious Corps, U. S. Marines in China, 1945-1946, but with twelve years prior experience there. He adds: “Twenty-five thousand men easily could have maintained this important triangle—Peking, Tientsin, Chingwangtao—which would have kept the Chinese Communists from moving South of the Great Wall. They were not strong at that time, and a display of American strength in Nationalist China would have served as a deterrent to them.”

Instead, our withdrawal of U. S. forces from this strategic area was the first show of American weakness that gave the lie to both Nationalist and Communist Chinese, if not to the whole of Eurasia. The Russians constantly had complained that the Americans were occupying sovereign territory of China, but the request for us to do so had been made in 1945 by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Government for the purpose of disarming the Japanese and of stabilizing the country.

General Worton, with five officers and a handful of men first moved into the area in August, 1945, turning the civil government of China over to the Nationalists. A month later, a force of sixty-five thousand U. S. Marines moved in and occupied the area, and from then on to 1947, there was relative peace and quiet.

In view of the testimony of General George C. Marshall before the joint houses of Congress on the hypothetical issue that if we permit Chiang’s forces to attack South China, we will be starting a global war, I would like to quote General Worton on a similar issue.

“The occupation of Peking was not specifically in my orders,” he says, “but I was to occupy whatever strategic territory I deemed necessary. In the triangle previously referred to, was located the important mining area of Kailan at Tang Shan, which supplied the coal output of 150,000 tons per month, and the Nan Yuan, Pei Yuan Airfields. When I determined that the Communists would go into Peking if I did not, I decided to occupy Peking. At eleven o’clock one evening, Chou En-lai’s agent in Tientsin informed me that if I moved on Peking, the lives of every American Marine would be the price. I told him I was going into Peking, just when and where our forces would enter, and that he had better have as strong a force as I intended to have, and that I would also be supported by an air cover. We followed our blueprint, and not one of our men was scratched. We had no opposition whatsoever.”

With the withdrawal of U. S. forces from this area the coal output, supplying power as far south as Shanghai, dropped to 30,000 tons.

In Worton’s opinion, “as small a force as 15,000 troops, officered by men acquainted with China, could have kept the Reds from crossing into the coveted triangle.”

But Marshall was determined to withdraw our forces. “The State Department to this day,” says Worton, “has never asked the opinion, as far I can ascertain, of any qualified military men who spent any length of time in China, on this subject.” He adds, “Manchuria should have been occupied and we should have insisted on a joint occupation force there with our allies. Any study of China and the Far East must be predicated upon a study of our relations with China since 1784. We have consistently held to the Open Door Policy for China and the Far East. We went to war with Japan because Japan had seized the coastal areas and was controlling the communication lines of China. Many men died across the Pacific to regain China for the free world, and yet, in the course of minutes, as time is known, we have lost China. It is a truism of students of the Far East that, ‘As China goes, so goes the Orient’.”

The U. S. should have taken Dairen, Port Arthur and Cheefoo, while we were at it, and should have insisted on occupying the Kalgan Pass, gateway to Mongolia. These rightfully belonged to the Nationalist Government at the conclusion of the Japanese war, according to Worton. Another disastrous move on the part of the U. S. was the recall of Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer from the China Theater. “Wedemeyer had the complete admiration and respect of the Chinese,” he says. “Although he had been the Generalissimo’s Chief of Staff for nearly three years during the war, at no time had he subordinated himself to Chiang. Wedemeyer was first, last and always an American, and an officer in the service of his country.”

Others claim that China’s and the world’s present situation can be attributed to any number of mistakes on the part of Chiang Kai-shek, General Marshall and the United States Government. Ignoring the tragedy of Yalta for the moment, one vitally important mistake Chiang made was the decision to fly his troops into Manchuria after the war, against the advice of General Wedemeyer. His mistake was an honest one, because he undoubtedly felt that the United States, having gone so far, would see him through to the end. He knew that if China were to occupy her rightful place in the world, control of the industrial potential of Manchuria was a “must.” In spite of the fateful decision at Yalta, about which Chiang was informed several months later by Ambassador Hurley, he still could not believe that Roosevelt, whom he deeply respected and admired, would slap him in the face by giving away Manchuria.

Truman, inheriting Roosevelt’s policy of appeasement toward Russia, sent General Marshall to China in 1946 on the impossible mission of forcing the Generalissimo to accept Communists into his Government. Marshall, who at that time had the admiration and respect of the entire United States, undoubtedly had a freer hand than any diplomat in our history. Had he been unbiased in his judgement, the future of China, Asia, and probably the Eurasian Continent would have been different. He had unlimited resources to give, a neat nest egg of $500,000,000, and the decision to spend some, all, or none of it was his, and his alone.

When Marshall arrived in China, the Nationalist Armies were over-extended, that is, their supply lines were stretched so long and so thin that they could not be protected from constant Communist raids. Chiang’s Armies held the main lines of communication, to be sure, and all the large cities of North China and a few in Manchuria. However, these Armies, although many of them were trained and equipped with American arms, had little ammunition, and they were surrounded on all sides by the Soviet-backed Communist Armies. The Communists retained the initiative, could strike when and where they wished, and thus succeeded in keeping their opponents paralyzed. It was not difficult to see that the future of Chiang’s Armies was dependent solely on aid, especially on munitions, and that no country on earth but the United States could supply their requirements. To shut off this aid meant strangulation and death.

Marshall’s first act was to set up a headquarters in Chungking, where he assembled his American experts on China and started a series of conferences with Communist and Nationalist leaders. From the beginning, the Chinese Communists showed, by their every action, that their only interest was in cutting off North China and Manchuria. They had no intention whatever of joining any kind of coalition government, over which they would not have complete control. After a great deal of discussion, these conferences resulted in superficial agreement on a few points of the controversy.

Prior to his return to Washington, the General decided to make a hasty trip to Yenan, probably out of curiosity. He must have wanted a closer look at these people whose propaganda he appeared to have accepted as fact during the entire war. Whether this was emotional caprice or political expediency only history can tell. We cannot assume that he was ignorant, therefore we must assume that he knew what he was doing.

Certainly the utterances of that period indicated that Marshall subscribed to the idea that we were dealing with “agrarian reformers.”

In his testimony before Congress, Marshall stated flatly that he had known all the time that the Chinese Communists were Marxists “because they told me so,” he said. But while he was negotiating with them he certainly gave the impression to others that he did not think they were the same brand of Communists as were the Russians. This fact, in itself, makes him doubly culpable, in my opinion. It is an intent to deceive, which makes the deception all the more sinister. If he knew all the time that the Chinese Communists were the same brand of Communists as the Russians, and he still threw the weight of every decision he made in China to them, then he could not possibly have given more aid and comfort to the enemy, Stalin, had he been a member of the Communist Party.

On Marshall’s arrival at the Airport of Yenan, he was greeted with pomp and ceremony by every military unit the Communists could muster. Welcomed enthusiastically by stocky Mao Tse-tung, in his coarse homespun peasant’s garb, suave Chou En-lai, in the snappy uniform of a three-star General, and Chu Teh, wearing a Russian soldier’s fur-lined cape, he accompanied his colorful and grateful hosts on an inspection of the troops. The Cadets from the Communist Military Academy, who had hiked in some fifty or sixty miles in order to form the Guard of Honor, were the best dressed and best outfitted of all the troops in the Communist Army. While spartanly clad in coarse but neat dark blue uniforms, they gave every evidence of superb leadership and discipline. Especially trained and selected, these Cadets became the equivalent, in Communist China, of the Soviet NKVD, or uniformed police troops.

In marked contrast, there was a battalion of Ming Bing, or militia, armed with spears for the occasion and lined up for the General’s inspection. These troops were dressed in everything from long robes to dirty white jackets and vests, and decorated with rings, bracelets and earrings. Their long, rusty spears were topped with flowering pompoms of dried grain. In no respect did they differ from their forbears of two thousand years ago.

The rest of the show consisted of masses of people in the drab dress affected by the Communists. The more colorful costumes of the non-Communist Yenanese were conspicuous by their absence.

Marshall must have been impressed!

For quarters, or hotel accommodations, the General had been assigned the best Yenan cave, boasting all the comforts offered by that archaic type of dwelling. His person was safeguarded during the night by two crack soldiers armed with ancient Chinese broadswords.

Making the most of their distinguished visitor’s sojourn among them, Chairman Mao Tse-tung gave a banquet, followed by a Chinese Opera. The dinner was staged in a large bare room with cracking plaster walls. The table consisted of rough hewn boards, contrasting strangely with the lavishness of the food. Dozens of southern style delicacies were imported for the occasion: crisp, roasted Peking duck; succulent sweet and sour pork; thousand-year-old eggs—the whole washed down with copious draughts of sweet local wine. Formal speeches of mutual friendship were followed by cries of “Gambei!” or “Bottoms up!”

After the banquet, the entire party crossed the river to attend the Opera. The Communists had improvised a crude bridge over which their esteemed guest might ride, but it was so wobbly that Marshall preferred to get out and follow his car across.

The Opera was performed in an unheated, barnlike structure. It was so cold that the audience kept on their heavy coats and were provided, in addition, with blankets to wrap around their feet. In spite of the fact that charcoal braziers were placed between the stage and the first row, the temperature in the building was close to freezing, and the breath of the actors as they chanted their lines came out in puffs of smoke. These performers were Spartans indeed, changing their costumes in the draughty, unheated barn, their teeth chattering and their tawny flesh a mass of goose pimples. The costumes, in contrast to those seen on a Peking or a Shanghai stage, were fashioned of rough, drab bits of cast-off apparel, crudely sewn together and patched with whatever pieces of material could be begged, borrowed or stolen.

The show itself, like the Ballet in Moscow, was a superb exhibition of Chinese art, for, when shown to foreigners, it was free from Communist propaganda. The falsetto voices of the actors sing-songed the ancient Chinese poetry, while their bodies swayed to its rhythmic cadence. During the performance, an usher went up and down the aisle tossing hot towels to guests who called shrilly for them. These, wrung out of boiling water, gave the hall a dank, slightly rancid atmosphere, reminiscent of a river in summer. Roasted watermelon seeds were pressed generously upon the honored guest by his Chinese Communist hosts, who were noisily but skillfully cracking them edgewise between their strong front teeth and spitting out the husks.

Not all the visitor’s stay, however, was passed in entertainment. Before leaving Yenan, General Marshall sat behind locked doors with Mao and members of the Politburo. No other American was allowed to be present at this meeting. What was said is not known, but there were rumors in Communist circles that the subject of the conversations had to do with the future of Manchuria, and perhaps all of Asia.

On leaving this capital city of Communist China, Marshall returned to the United States to make his report to President Truman.

When he came back to China, Marshall made his residence in Nanking (the Nationalist capital at that time), but established a Northern Headquarters in Peiping (meaning Northern Peace), in order to work out a truce between Communists and Nationalists. The futility of this endeavor was obvious even to the Chinese GI, who nicknamed the Peiping Headquarters the “Temple of the Thousand Sleeping Colonels,” and to the American GI, who dubbed it “Marshall’s Bird Sanctuary.”

If the soldiers in the lower brackets put their tongues in their cheeks, those in the higher echelons took the mission very seriously. They kept a very sober face, indeed. Shoulder patches were issued and worn by all the members of the Peiping Headquarters and its truce teams. These were called “Ballentine Beer Patches,” due to the three rings in the emblem representing the Nationalists, the Communists and the Americans. No doubt this symbol, to some of the homesick GI’s, was a nostalgic reminder of the good old USA.

Truce teams, made up of one Communist, one Nationalist and one American officer, were sent out into the field, their purpose being to try to bring about agreement between the opposing forces. With the Chinese Communist Army and the Nationalist Army locked in a deadly battle for power, any action on the part of the third member, the United States, would be likely to aid one party only at the expense of the other. With Marshall’s preference for Mao over Chiang Kai-shek, the “truces” forced upon the Nationalist Armies at the most inopportune times, from a military standpoint, acted to the advantage of the Chinese Communist Army. Because of the slowness of their transportation and their lack of modern means of training, the Chinese Communist Armies, as in the days of Genghis Khan, were constantly in need of breathing spells. During these periods they could regroup their forces, move and gather supplies, and train their troops. Such breathing spells, provided in the form of “Cease Fire!” commands to the Nationalist Armies, upon the insistence of Marshall, came almost as a gift from Heaven.

As history has shown, Marshall threw the weight of every decision to the Communists. This, combined with the mistake the Generalissimo made in trying to hold Manchuria without American support, would appear to be at least one of the reasons for the situation in China today. In addition to the fact that Marshall favored the Communists, that he acquiesced in the sellout of Manchuria, if not all of Asia, to the Russians, the final and fatal blow was delivered to the Nationalist Government itself. The expected help in arms, ammunition, money and supplies from the United States was either cut off entirely or reduced to a trickle. Too late did the Nationalist Government recognize its precarious position and force itself to accept the fact that, apparently, we just did not care who won the fight in China, so long as it was not the Generalissimo.

Continued evidence to the above effect appeared from numerous sources. In the summer of 1950, Walter H. Judd, Representative from Minnesota, commented in public:

“Why should the Soviets think that the most important thing for American Communists to do right after the defeat of Japan was to get American assistance to China stopped?” To him, the answer seems to appear obvious, in that without the right kind of outside aid, the Chinese Government could not possibly recover. Only a handful of people appeared to understand that, to a Chinese, the idea of putting his country ahead of family interests, just was not his idea of patriotism. First loyalty, always, in a Chinese family, was to that family.

Marshall asked for patience and generosity for the European countries saying that it had taken the South fifty years to recover from only four years of civil war. But he did not seem to remember that Chiang had been fighting Japan for more than eight years, coupled with a civil war with Communists in his own country for more than twenty years. China, too, needed a little patience and generosity from us, just as much as Italy or Greece or France. And what would England have done without our patience and generosity? By comparison, were not China’s needs embarrassingly small?

One may call the Nationalist Government of China all the names there are, synonymous with corrupt, incompetent, reactionary, undemocratic—but in the light of what is known today about Communism and its stated methods, aims and ambitions, which is the lesser of the two evils—Chinese Nationalism or Soviet Internationalism?

An interesting news item came to light in a press dispatch by International News Service, dated September 19, 1950, as follows: “Marshall’s statement on Far Eastern Policy electrified the jammed committee room (Senate Armed Services Committee) because it had been accepted for years that he had authored the recommendation that peace in China be sought through a coalition government. Before this committee, Marshall repudiated all claims for having had anything to do with it, much less to have authored it by saying that it had been drawn up in the State Department while he was testifying on Capitol Hill in the Pearl Harbor investigation.” According to the same news dispatch: “The author of the Marshall Plan added that the Chinese policy was issued ‘while I was on the ocean going over there’ as President Truman’s personal representative.”

Could Marshall have meant that he had not even been consulted on such an important matter, prior to being sent to implement that policy? Hardly. Former Secretary of State Byrnes, in his memoirs entitled “Speaking Frankly,” spoke thus frankly on this subject:

“As soon as President Truman appointed General Marshall his personal representative in China, I asked the General to study the draft (of policy) so that he could help prepare the final statement for presentation to the President. The Sunday before I left for Moscow, Under Secretary Acheson, General Marshall and members of his staff met in my office. By the end of the morning’s discussion, we had agreed upon the statement of policy. Thereafter the President made no change in that policy except upon the recommendation of General Marshall or with his approval.”

I learned from an intimate source that when Marshall left for China he had in his pocket, documents outlining the policy of enforcing a coalition government on Chiang Kai-shek and also a letter from the President stating flatly:

“I understand that these documents have been shown to you and have received your approval.” What could General Marshall think himself to be, an ostrich with his head in the sand?

Much has happened since 1946, particularly as pertains to the relationship between China and General Marshall. A few excerpts from the September 15th, 1950, issue of the Congressional Record, Volume 96, Number 184, bring the matter further to a head. Senator William E. Jenner from Indiana holds the floor:

“I believe the time has come to expose this whole tragic conspiracy in which we are caught, to hew to the line of truth, and to let the chips fall where they may.... I can assure the Senate there is no pleasure, no pride of authorship, and no sense of personal satisfaction in taking this stand. There is only a growing sense of shame, of outraged decency, and of painful duty as I speak the dictates of my conscience. Even if I have to stand and speak alone, I am both unable and unwilling by my silence to be an accomplice in compounding crimes that have already been committed against my native land. Mr. President, this background is necessary because without it we cannot understand where the appointment of General George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense fits into the picture. With it, we can help the disillusionment of the American people to run its course by exposing General Marshall as a living symbol of the swindle in which we are caught. The appointment of Marshall at this peculiar juncture in our destiny is a last desperate attempt of this administration to swallow up the treachery of the past in the new treachery they are planning for the future.... Everything he has been a party to during the past ten years has helped to betray his solemn trust and to set the stage for the staggering Soviet victory that is sweeping across the earth....”

Senator Jenner’s full and documented statements cover eighteen pages of the Record but interest here is centered upon those comments bearing on China, which confirm my own first-hand information and knowledge. He goes back to April 26, 1938, when Marshall was appointed a member of the liaison committee created by President Roosevelt for the coordination of policy of common concern to the Departments of State, War and Navy. From then on, Marshall remained one of the top-ranking policy makers in our Government. Truman was aware of the closeness between Marshall and Roosevelt, and of their consultations on matters of vital policy affecting our security and the defending of our interests around the world. Was this, perhaps, a reason for Truman’s wanting Marshall as Secretary of Defense, even as a possible stop-gap in a Democratic political crisis?

“Marshall knew of the deceit and the duplicity that was indulged in by President Roosevelt during the critical years of 1939, 1940 and 1941, by which we were secretly committed to go to war.... He went along with the most criminal and outrageous betrayals of American interests and principles in history that resulted from Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam,” says Jenner. To anyone’s comment: “He was a soldier. He was taking orders,” I feel urged to ask: “Does there not come a time in everyone’s life when he has to decide whether he is first a citizen of integrity? General of the Army Douglas MacArthur made that decision in April, 1951, and made it unflinchingly.

“At Yalta,” Jenner adds, “the President did the age-old thing with regard to Asia and General Marshall knew that at Potsdam, President Truman confirmed the sellout of half the world to the Soviet Union ... this meant that American GI’s were turned into political whipping boys, betrayed by their own Chief of Staff and used for advancing the cause of Communism across the earth.... Marshall lent all of his great prestige and power to the Jessup-Lattimore-Service-Acheson line calling for a cessation of the civil war, paralyzing the Nationalist Government and withholding aid from Chiang, while he knew that the Russians were not only taking over Manchuria and northern China, but were being rearmed with captured Japanese equipment and were preparing for the eventual conquest, not only of China, but of the whole Far East.”

Harold Lamb, historian and authority on Asiatic history, has commented: “Curiously enough, when I began to study the Mongols nearly thirty years ago, I found two studies of the methods of Genghis Khan made by young American Army officers. They were George C. Marshall and Douglas MacArthur.” How differently these two men have interpreted their research, in the light of their subsequent actions!

Let me quote a remark or two from the March, 1951, issue of The American Mercury. I have high regard for the journalistic integrity of Walter Trohan, Washington, D. C., Bureau Manager of The Chicago Tribune, and concur heartily with his comments in an article entitled: “The Tragedy of George Marshall”:

“On March 19, 1950, General Marshall announced that he would not write his memoirs for these remarkable reasons:

“‘To be of any historic importance they have got to be accurate; that is one mustn’t omit, and make it pleasant reading. Now, if you do put it all in, you do irreparable harm. You almost ruin a man, but if you don’t mention that, it is not history’.”

Mr. Trohan states that these are disillusioning words, and imply that “free men must not be told the truth; they indicate that the speaker is in a mental purgatory for hidden sins which he has either observed or committed; and they emphasize the graver tragedy: that an old man who must conceal past errors from his countrymen is still exercising powers of decision.”

Trohan asks, and so do I: “Should free men trust a leader who will not trust them with the truth? By what right does a public servant say to free men: ‘You trusted me with leadership, but I will not give a true accounting because the truth might do irreparable harm’?”

Marshall has ever been quick to blame the people for the ills that may beset them—never the leaders, as warrant a remark he made following the debacle of the Korean war: “The basic error has always been with the American people”—these same American people who cannot be trusted with the truth, lest “irreparable harm” be done.

Other indications as to the stature of the man reveal themselves as isolated vignettes. When Marshall arrived in China and was met by General Albert C. Wedemeyer, even after he had read and suppressed the Wedemeyer Report, he told his junior officer of his intention with regard to forcing Communists on the Generalissimo. Wedemeyer commented in all calmness:

“General, you can’t do it. It is impossible!”

To which Marshall replied in white heat: “I am going to do it, and you are going to help me!”

Marshall’s double-cross of Wedemeyer in appointing the latter Ambassador to China in 1947 is another instance. Secretary of State James Byrnes had told Wedemeyer to go ahead and buy his civilian clothing, which he did, and as Wedemeyer was on the point of severing his last connections from the Army, Marshall learned that the Communists strongly opposed the Wedemeyer appointment and recommended instead, J. Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University. Without consulting with or informing General Wedemeyer, Marshall immediately appointed Stuart, leaving Wedemeyer to find out through second-hand sources that he was no longer Ambassador-elect to China.

A parallel action of this nature in which Marshall had a direct hand was the midnight dismissal of General MacArthur, who learned of the order when an aide heard it on a radio news broadcast and relayed it to Mrs. MacArthur.

Again, with reference to Marshall’s so-called ignorance of the China policy situation, Jonathan Daniels, in his authorized biography of Truman, quotes Admiral William D. Leahy as saying: “I was present when Marshall was going to China. He said he was going to tell Chiang that he had to get along with the Communists, or get no help from us.”

Before the removal, by Truman, of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from all of his commands in the Far East—one of the greatest acts of perfidy to go down in American history—few people realized that Marshall was not a West Pointer. This, of course, is in no way to be held against Marshall, but, during World War I, as General Pershing’s aide-de-camp, when Pershing was Chief of Staff, a promotion of Marshall to a Generalship was requested of MacArthur by Pershing.

MacArthur was willing enough, provided his military record merited it. From Walter Trohan’s documented personal files comes information that Marshall’s record lacked sufficient time served with troops. “MacArthur proposed to remedy this,” says Trohan, “by giving him command of the Eighth Regiment at Fort Screven, Ga., one of the finest regiments in the Army.” Marshall was moved up from lieutenant-colonel to colonel, but his way to a general’s stars appeared to be blocked forever when the Inspector General reported that under one year of Marshall’s command the Eighth Regiment had dropped from “one of the best to one of the worst.” It was mandatory, therefore, that MacArthur decline the promotion. Is it any wonder, today, that Truman’s action in removing MacArthur from the military scene should be most pleasing to the Secretary of Defense?

Of course, this is not the whole story, for Pershing was a persevering soldier and had no intention of giving up his determination to see Marshall become a general. In 1936, he bypassed the Army entirely, and went directly to the White House where he succeeded in persuading President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to “appoint” Marshall a general. Later, Marshall had proved himself so “acceptable” to Roosevelt that, over the heads of “twenty senior major generals and fourteen senior brigadier generals, Roosevelt made him Chief of Staff.”

I believe that the “tragedy” implied by Walter Trohan concerning Marshall lies in the current knowledge that Marshall, despite personal bravery, even stoicism, was sadly lacking in vision to match it. Thus, he became a willing tool in the hands of the opposition. He trusted Russia as an ally and, contrary to the Churchill belief, he did not care how much of Europe Stalin took, so long as we sent Russia enough tanks and ammunition to crush the German Army. He was easy prey to the insidious propaganda put out by Hiss, Acheson, Lattimore, Jessup and others who, misguided or otherwise, permitted American lives to be sacrificed to make both Europe and Asia “safe for Communism.”

We know now what was in the Wedemeyer Report. Because it disagreed with Marshall’s ideas he, personally, suppressed it. In contrast to his decision, Wedemeyer had advocated a strong defense against Communism in China, and had gained the Generalissimo’s complete approval for American supervision of all aid, financial, military, psychological—that would have been forthcoming if the report had been approved.

Marshall, as was Pershing, is for an enormous army—for pitting manpower, our most precious commodity, against the enemy, in place of our superb technological and psychological know-how. General MacArthur has shown the absurdity and the tragedy of any such commitment on our part. Should Marshall, with Anna Rosenberg at his side, be allowed to continue with plans to fight the Asiatic hordes thusly, we are, indeed, doomed. May God forbid!

Once again, in retrospect, it appears that American foreign policy had been to support the Generalissimo as long as he fought the Japanese, but to do nothing that might offend the Communists at any time. For the past ten years, or more, our Government seems to have had its bets on Communism in China—if not in all Eurasia—to win. The facts are against any other conclusion, and we must, again, assume that Marshall, the President, and the State Department know what they are doing. And if they know what they are doing, they must be doing it deliberately.

From 1946 through 1948, Marshall ordered destroyed all of the reserves of ammunition earmarked for Chiang Kai-shek. These had been stored in India and could easily have been transferred to China at the end of the war in 1945. Marshall also ordered our military mission to refuse further training and aid to the Nationalist armies.

On leaving China, General Marshall was overheard to remark enthusiastically, “There is a definite liberal group among the Communist Chinese.” This particular group included China’s “Front Man,” Chou En-lai, Communist Foreign Minister since October, 1948, and his assistant, Chiao Kuan-Hua, spokesman for the Communist delegation that was entertained in late 1950 by the United Nations, and which was housed and fed at the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria in New York City.

It is not difficult to see how Marshall contributed to Chiang’s capitulation to the Communists. How can we answer for our refusal to accept the 30,000 Chinese Nationalist troops on Formosa, initially offered by the Generalissimo to the United Nations for combat in Korea or in South China? We accepted units, even token ones, from other members of the U.N., but not from Nationalist China, who is still an official member. Of course, I know the answer is couched in the language of “Peace, peace.” But Stalin will not be provoked into full-scale war until Russia is ready for it, and the danger of letting Chiang attack south China is no more than a blind.

How can we have aided the Russians more, or brought greater tragedy to ourselves than we already have by our own actions?

Chapter II

Yenan Interlude

Prior to October, 1949, the capital of Communist China was the two thousand-year-old city of Yenan. After the capture of Peking, the leaders established grandiose headquarters in that ancient seat of emperors, known as “The Pearl of the Orient.” It was in the quaint old city of Yenan, however, that the important incubation period of these present rulers took place. Here they spent the war years, planned their strategy to take over all of China, and cemented their contacts with Moscow. From the cold, crude caves of this primitive stronghold to the glittering palaces of Peking was a tremendous leap, and doubtless it gave the conquering heroes many jolts. How often they must have longed for that unique little city, remote and quiet, in Shensi Province.

That those early carefree days on the edge of the Gobi Desert did not altogether prepare them for their present responsibilities was evidenced by the fact that after the Communists occupied Peking the municipal government staff there was temporarily retained. The new Communist mayor explained, “We have been living in the hills (Yenan) and know far less about municipal government than you do. Therefore we must learn from you.” Even Mao Tse-tung, whose word is law all over China, has already been quoted as saying, “The task of reconstruction is apt to be far more difficult than the achievement of power.”

Shensi Province boasts one of the best climates in China, dry and healthy, with many bright sunshiny days. However, it is frequently visited by suffocating dust storms from the desert, giving the inhabitants a yellow-powdered coating on the hair, face and clothing. The farm lands which were owned formerly by a few of the comparatively wealthy peasants were, in 1949, divided into little holdings or made into cooperative farms. No all-out effort was made to collectivize[1] the land, as in Russia.

The city of Yenan has a population of about fifty thousand, most of whom live in caves burrowed into the clay cliffs of three converging river valleys. Before the move to Peking, the schools and army headquarters of the city were all underground, and only outside the city were there many buildings of any size.

One of the most important landmarks was the International Hospital, located on the edge of the city in a series of caves. It was called “International” because it was supported in part by contributions from abroad. The United States had made every effort to be helpful. During the war, for the first time in its history, and largely through the humanitarianism of the China Theater Commander, Lieutenant General Wedemeyer, this hospital was one of the best equipped, if not the best equipped, in all of North China. When Mao Tse-tung’s little five-year-old daughter fell ill with pneumonia, penicillin was flown to her directly from General Wedemeyer’s headquarters. Without it she would, almost certainly, have died.

The hospital was Madame Sun Yat-sen’s favorite project There she spent many hours, allowing the patients and nurses to bask in the radiance of her sacred person. This beguilling “Saint Elizabeth,” after impassioned pleading, succeeded in 1945, in getting the United States to expedite shipment of increased amounts of medical supplies to the hospital from Communist sources. A small contingent of U. S. soldiers was stationed in Yenan as a liaison between the Communists and the Nationalists. These cartons and crates were opened, as a matter of routine inspection by Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton, Communist expert and one of the American military observers there. To his great consternation, he found that, instead of the urgently needed medical supplies, the crates and cartons were filled to bursting with Communist propaganda books and leaflets. Going directly to Madame Sun, he said, “Why, Madame, I am disappointed and astonished to find that you have abused the courtesy extended to you by the United States Government. I find that this last shipment, instead of containing medical supplies, is filled with nothing but Communist propaganda!” Madame Sun blushed prettily and replied with false calm: “I am sure that you are not aware of the many kinds of medicine our patients need here.” It goes without saying that her supplies were cut off, then and there.

Although Communists laid great stress on the good the hospital was doing for all Chinese, the conduct and methods of admissions smacked of the General Hospital in Moscow. Patients were classified in three categories: The Hierarchy of the Communist Party and their families took precedence over all; next in line were the Red Army officers and soldiers and their families; last, least and very rarely came the non-Communist Chinese.

Another distinguished landmark located just outside the city was the famous “Prisoner of War School.” Here the captured Japanese soldiers were never referred to as “prisoners,” but always as “students,” and their compound was referred to as “The School.”

Although, during the war, the Chinese Communist Armies made great claims about their successes against the Japanese, their primary purpose was to capture Japanese prisoners of war with the idea of converting them to Communism. Those who showed promise of becoming good subjects promptly were sent to Yenan, given courteous treatment and enrolled in the Communist School under Moscow-trained instructors. Students who showed little aptitude or whose loyalties were questioned were weeded out rapidly and returned to their own troops. This last proved to be a diabolical form of punishment, for a Japanese soldier is taught never to surrender, but to fight to the death. The mere fact that he had allowed himself to be captured and was returned to his own troops in good condition was clear evidence that he was either a coward or untrustworthy. His end was often the guard house or a bullet in the back of his head.

Graduates of the school were dispatched as spies into Manchuria or sent back to Japan, there to scatter the red seeds of Communism. This was referred to as going to the “Front.” When one friend would say to another, “I haven’t seen Yashi for four or five days. Where can he be?” the reply invariably was, “Oh, he’s gone to the Front!” Thus the Prisoner of War School helped to spread the red gospel throughout the Japanese-speaking areas. Its guiding spirit and conductor was Okano, now known as Sanzo Nozako, who aspired to be the Stalin of Japan, and who is said to be working vigorously to bring all the Japanese into the Communist orbit.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party had appropriated for special meetings one of the few well built halls just outside the Walled City. On its bare walls were life-size, full length portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and Chu Teh, together with a large flag bearing the Hammer and Sickle. This hall also served as Mao Tse-tung’s city residence. Only on the rarest occasions were foreigners ever received here, and at such times the portraits and flag were laboriously removed. Surrounding the hall were the best and most productive of the local farms, which had been confiscated by the Communist Hierarchy for their own use. Here they spent many weekends relaxing and enjoying life.

The office where foreigners were habitually received was in a large cave. It was decorated with life-size portraits of Stalin, Mao, Chu Teh, Churchill, Roosevelt and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek placed over a grouping of small allied flags. The general atmosphere appeared to be one of friendly cooperation based on mutual aims and interests. When foreign visitors were present, the Chinese National flag was displayed conspicuously over the gates of the compound, as a token of good will, and to create the false impression that both parties were working in harmony. On all other occasions, and in all other places, it was considered extremely bad taste to mention Nationalist China, Great Britain or the United States, especially with references to any part they were taking in winning the war.

Anyone living in Yenan at that time became aware of the complete absence of religious symbols. The ancient temples were occupied by Communist families. Religion, as in other Communist countries, had gone underground or disappeared. Even the tiny symbolic caves, so revered by the Chinese as places of worship, were never used openly. Instead, Americans often caught glimpses of Communist soldiers going through their ritual when they thought themselves unobserved by hostile eyes. Doubtless these little scenes reminded some of the better informed GI’s of similar ones enacted in Moscow, where the old peasant women braved the wrath of the NKVD and the Stalin Youth to worship at the few churches that were allowed to remain open.

The Catholic missionaries, long distrusted by the Communists, had been forced into a life of almost complete religious inactivity. Their Compound, once a busy center, had become the home of the Lu Hsun Art Academy. The old convent had been converted into dormitories for students of both sexes. In the Chapel, Communists had torn down the painting of Jesus, which was the first object seen on entering, and had replaced it with a more than life-size portrait of Stalin. The Holy Vessels and Sacred Images lay in rubble on the floor. Only the organ was left. Here, the music students practiced American jazz and sang “The Internationale.”

Ancient Pagoda built hundreds of years ago, seen from outskirts of Yenan. Caves at right are similar to those used to house the Japanese Prisoners of War.

“Ballentine Beer Patches”

Worn by Marshall’s

workers in Chungking.

The movie actress wife of Mao

Tse-tung appears pleased with the

story she has just told General

Marshall, while the latter seems

to wonder if he got the point.

Left to right: Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, Chairman Mao Tse-tung, General Chang, (Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s propaganda chief), and General Chu Teh, shown after conference in Yenan.

Mao has just proposed a welcoming toast to General Marshall, and politely listens while others do likewise. The banquet was held in Marshall’s honor.

Chinese Nationalist and American flags fly between banner welcoming Marshall, Nationalist General Chang and Communist Chou En-lai. Side banners say “Long Live Peace in the Far East!”

Saturday inspection of Caves in Yenan. Last, on the extreme far end to the right, is the cave in which Marshall was installed.

Crowds greeting Marshall on his arrival in Yenan. At extreme left can be seen the Ming Bing with their long spears. Note American and Chinese Communist flag on jeep.

Left to right: Chairman Mao, Chou En-lai, Marshall, General Chang (Nationalist), and Chu Teh. On the right are picked troops of the Communist Military Academy.

Under Communism man still competes with the lowly donkey. Here several are seen carrying fire wood in Yenan.

A camel caravan arriving at Yenan from the Gobi Desert after passing through the Great Wall. The lead camel wears a mask to frighten away evil spirits. (In photo below)—Oxen laden with bundles and wares to be sold in the Yenan markets.

The Market Place in Yenan, run by non-Communists as in the days of their ancestors.

Child-mother with twins in improvised home-made tandem baby carriage.

Caves of the Communists and Red Army seen in the distance, sheep grazing beneath them. Small house in foreground was used for storage of food.

Protestants suffered equal indignities. From outlying districts came reports of religious oppression and sometimes of atrocities. American missionaries, both by word and letter, told of the destruction not only of churches but of agricultural and hospital activities which had operated for many years to help all Chinese, Communist and Nationalist alike.

The population of Yenan was for the most part non-Communist. The distinction was not difficult to note for the Communists were easily recognized by their dull blue cloth uniforms, their bobbed haired women wearing no make-up, and their complete lack of Chinese silks and gay colors. The non-Communist majority were allowed to continue their usual occupations undisturbed, as long as they minded their own affairs. Nearly all the merchants within the Walled City were non-Communist, and all gathered daily in the big market, as they had done for generations, to display their wares in the open, on boards or on the ground. When the Communists wanted anything, they forced the merchants to cooperate by handing over a desired commodity, and at the Communists’ own price.

Due to the Chinese and Mongolian background of most of the Communist leaders, many of them did not, at first, wish their women to play any political roles or to appear at public banquets with the men. With the growing acceptance of the Russian doctrines, however, all were considered equal, and the women worked and ate beside the men. The female Communists tried to look as unlike the old fashioned Chinese women as possible. Their adopted cause had emancipated them, if emancipation meant compelling them to work as hard as the men. In Russia, after the Revolution, the women, dressed as men, were allowed to load and unload trucks, which the men drove. The rules for the masses, however, did not apply to the wives of the leaders. They were encouraged to mix freely, to wear better clothes, and to indulge in light make-up occasionally. Moreover, it is said that they all ate quantities of sunflower seeds in order to obtain the fine, firm breasts for which many a Soviet woman is famous!

Tipping was not allowed in the Red realm, for it indicated class distinction. As all classes were supposed to be equal under Communism, any breach of this regulation was severely punished. In Yenan, an American GI tried to express his gratitude to a young Communist for helping him make some furniture for his cave by offering him a package of American cigarettes. The Chinese boy frowned and backed away. “No, thank you,” he said, “I cannot accept anything for my services. We are all equal now.” The American shrugged slightly and put the cigarettes on a table. A few minutes later, when his back was turned, the Chinese boy and the cigarettes had disappeared. The following day the American soldier found the Communist youth smoking furiously behind a pile of rubbish. He learned later that the boy had been spied upon by other Communist youths who, out of envy or an excess of Party zeal, had beaten him unmercifully. After generations of accepting the traditional “cumshaw,” or little token of appreciation, it is well nigh impossible to convince a Chinese, Communist or otherwise, that this time-honored custom is wrong.

During the war, all American troops stationed in Yenan lived in caves on the level nearest the ground. This made for greater convenience in getting in and out, in line with the wish of the Chinese Communists to show the foreigner every courtesy. The Americans had one small house built primarily to shelter the electric generator they had brought with them, and here also lived the Commander of the Americans. The generator made it possible for the Americans to have the only electric light in Yenan. In contrast, the natives and families of the Red Armies burned wicks in precious oil or built small fires for occasional light. Their rule was to bed down with the sun and to arise with the dawn.

One other building allocated to the Americans was used as a recreation room, where the GI’s and a highly selected group of Chinese Communists played games and had their meals in common. This group of Communists assigned to fraternize with the Americans was headed by a fellow named Lock Ho, meaning “Old Horse,” whose job was to start arguments and to guide the Americans in their thinking. The GI’s were never allowed to fraternize with any Chinese who was not thoroughly indoctrinated, even at the Saturday night dances. Nurses from the International Hospital, students from Yenan University, girls and women from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, other students, teachers and members of families of the Communists, all were completely propagandized before being permitted, or ordered, to attend the dances. In other words, the Americans never came in contact with any Chinese who was not fully imbued with the tenets of Communism. Be it said to the credit of the Americans, the Reds, despite their efforts, were never able to work on the GI’s with any degree of success.

On hunting trips, a propaganda expert went along with the Americans, but even this could not spoil the superb sport and the pleasure that came from shooting an occasional wolf, mountain lion or tiger. The pheasant coveys were numerous and the birds huge, making them much sought-after additions to the monotonous diet. A man who was a good shot, even with an old carbine, would bring down five to ten cocks in a day. There were no bird dogs, but when Chu Teh, a fine shot himself, and a tireless hunter, accompanied the group, he had his bodyguard act as a retriever, a service the American “Imperialists” did not have.

The jeeps and trucks of the United States Army were a source of wonder and terror to the natives, who were entirely unfamiliar with any motor transportation. In this connection, pregnant women proved a special headache to the GI’s. When the donkeys or Mongol ponies, on which the pregnant ladies were riding, shied away or stood on their hind legs at the approach of a vehicle, the ladies naturally fell off their mounts screaming and yelling in their high, piercing voices as they rolled into the dust or a ditch, their bundles and belongings flying helter skelter in all directions. Even when the Americans drove slowly or stopped, the havoc wrought was considerable. Many of the pregnant riders were indignant and demanded “cumshaw,” or money, to compensate for damages to their person and pride, but fortunately there were never any serious accidents.

Many things puzzled American soldiers in Yenan. One was how a Chinese herdsman, driving dozens of sheep and pigs, could meet and pass, on a narrow mountain path, another herdsman equally encumbered. Amid ear-splitting squeals, grunts and Chinese swear words, men and animals would pass each other without loss or mishap, each going in his own direction, with his own animals intact! Surely no American could accomplish such a feat.

The GI’s had constant trouble with money. The Communists manipulated the exchange any way they wished, but always in their own favor. Nobody knew exactly how much money he was worth at any one time. Eager to procure all the American dollars and Nationalist currency possible to finance trips to the South for their agents, the Communists put up their special script in small packages to entice the Americans to purchase them for one United States dollar. They were counting heavily on the GI’s never-failing interest in a “souvenir to take home.”

Every foreigner, on entering Yenan, was thoroughly briefed by the Commander of the American Observer Group, who boarded incoming planes. This presented a clear indication of Moscow influence. All entrants were told never to use the word “coolie,” as it signified class consciousness. They were not to mention the words “Reds” or “Commies,” as these terms cast aspersions upon the dignity of their hosts. All, Communists and non-Communists must be referred to as “local people.”

American movies were shown almost nightly out of doors in summer. These were so superior to the Chinese or Russian movies that the enthusiastic natives would pull down the gates of the Compound if any effort was made to keep them out. In the winter, however, the movies were shown indoors, and only guests invited by the Chinese Communists were allowed to attend. Chu Teh was on hand almost nightly and was a particular fan of Betty Hutton’s. He returned eight times to drink in her charms as the heroine of the picture “Texas Guinan.”

The only other movies were those supplied by the Chinese Communists. Crude and boring, they were largely sent from the Kremlin, and were in Russian with no Chinese sub-titles. A leader, in a sing-song voice, gave the general idea of the picture, particularly stressing the propaganda line it illustrated. The audience, not understanding Russian, could hope for only slight amusement.

Even the Hierarchy gave every evidence of preferring American films. The lavish background in the Guinan picture made a particularly deep impression, as it was such a far cry from the way even the most important Chinese and Red Army officers and their families lived. In the upper tiers of mud caves, dug into the soft cliffs, they existed as primitively as had their ancestors thousands of years before them. Little or no furniture cluttered the Reds’ caves, and almost all their utensils were wooden bowls and horn cups. After the Americans and the British came, the local people salvaged the tin cans thrown out by the visitors and had them beaten into plates and dishes, copied faithfully from the originals by the blacksmith. Unused to comfort, their beds were skins thrown on boards or spread on the mud floors—a sharp contrast to the luxury of the sleeping arrangement built for Ambassador Hurley when he was in Yenan. This crude approach to a truly beautiful Chinese bed was seven feet long, with rope slats for a spring, rough unbleached sheets, and a pillow filled with bird seed, or millet. It later became the property of the American Military Commander and was always greatly admired and coveted by the Chinese visitors.

During these years, although life in Yenan was primitive and often carefree, the Hierarchy never lost sight of the responsibilities that lay ahead of them, and for these they tried to prepare themselves, within the limits of their knowledge and capabilities. In 1946, contrary to all Chinese Communist teachings, several American soldiers were questioned extensively by the Communist leaders on matters of capitalist etiquette and protocol. The Americans, amused at their roles of male Emily Posts, accepted the challenge in the finest American tradition. With grave faces and dressed in their best, they gave cocktail parties, movie suppers, and even formal sit-down dinners for the education of the distinguished members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Table manners and light conversation were stressed. The pupils were most appreciative of these examples of Western culture and refinement and strove in every way to learn their lessons and to act accordingly.

Hugely enjoying this fascinating taste of the foreign, they put together a so-called Jazz Band and held Saturday night dances that were entirely Western in every respect, even to a crude rendition of “The Saint Louis Blues.” Eager to have everything done in proper Western style, the Red leaders provided their teachers with a list of Central Committee Communist Party Members, arranged according to rank, and insisted that the best State Department protocol be observed and practiced rigidly. They were shrewd enough to realize, even then, that in conquering new countries, they would have to have more than one front man. At that time, Chou En-lai was their only polished negotiator. He alone was able to meet foreigners on an equal footing and was therefore obliged to be their Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Communists in Yenan, as in all countries in the beginning of their transition to slavery, adopted the term “New Democracy” and made a great display of its outward form by allowing the non-Communist peasants to “vote.” The outcome, of course, was previously agreed upon. The balloting was merely a matter of form and a means of convincing the people that they still were privileged to make their own choice. The literate cast their vote by burning a hole in the ballot with a lighted stick of punk, or incense, at the point where the name of their candidate appeared. The illiterate dropped a pea into a bowl or pitcher, placed in front of a picture of their candidate. After the voting was over and the successful candidate announced, a huge rally was held and the voter was constrained to forget his choice, if unsuccessful, in a frenzy of dancing, shouting and singing. After a few hours of this, the tired voter would wend his way slowly homeward to his mud cave, or if he were a country man, to his ancestral mud hut, often many miles away.

The roads that lead into the Walled City of Yenan are two-thousand-year-old trails used by the descendants, both man and beast, of those earliest travellers. Both inside and out of the city, little has changed. The men driving the camel caravans pad softly through the dust, their animals heavily laden with burdens of fur and other wares to be marketed in the city. They still practice the age-old custom of putting a mask on the lead animal’s head, to drive away the evil spirits. Water carriers, after dragging great buckets of the muddy liquid from the river, chant their endless “water! water!” as they go from cave to cave in the time-honored manner. Food vendors, squatting in the dusty lanes cooking bits of lamb and pork, roots and herbs over tiny charcoal braziers, cry out shrilly to the passers-by, eating occasionally from the pot with their grimy fingers. Half-naked babies crawl nearby, whimpering to their mothers, who pacify them by giving them sweetened tree bark on which to chew. Donkeys, heavily laden, and round Mongolian ponies jostle dog carts and belabored oxen. Everywhere, cotton clad coolies, bowed beneath huge bales of firewood, coal and charcoal, shuffle along the dusty streets. For, alas, although the rickshaw and pedicab or bicycle rickshaw has been banned as an occupation beneath the dignity of man, the older use of man as a beast of burden has to be accepted. For the very poor, there is nothing else to take his place.

This, then, was Yenan in 1946. Now that the Communists have won China and moved from the mud caves to the glamorous palaces of Peking, it will be interesting to watch their actions.

Will they be able to carry out their plan of communizing the entire country? And how long will this take? Will China remain China for the Chinese or, for the first time in nearly five thousand years, will the once free peoples of this basically democratic country be hopelessly enthralled by the yoke of tyranny?

The Chinese have a quality that has distinguished them. This quality is patience. The Communists too have patience, but only up to a point. Beyond that they use force to accomplish their ends.

There are literally hundreds of languages spoken in China—each province speaks a different dialect. Moreover, aside from travel between major cities, there is relatively little transportation and practically no communication between smaller cities in the interior. In view of these facts, is it not possible that the Russians will find their progress slow?

Will the Chinese absorb the Soviets as they did the Huns, the Mongols and the Tartars? Time alone will give us the answers to these questions. Time alone will prove the importance of the incubation period spent in Yenan, and whether or not it was worth the sacrifices made by the Reds. The die is cast. From it we shall learn what the future holds for Asia, for Europe, and perhaps for ourselves as well.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Collectivize means controlled farming, where the peasants are only hired hands.

Chapter III

Communist Personalities

The Central People’s Government of the Chinese Communist Party is the ruling class. It makes the policy, enforces the laws and governs with dictatorial power. Mao Tse-tung, at fifty-six, is Chairman and Supreme Commander—for the time being at least. Directly responsible to him are six Vice-Chairmen among whom is the famous Madame Sun Yet-sen. Under these Vice-Chairmen are fifty-six Supreme and fifteen Administrative Councilors, twenty Ministries and a political Consultative Committee of one hundred and eighty Active Members.

Mao Tse-tung, or Chairman Mao, is a rotund little figure, rather dejected looking, with an undistinguished face, topped by a broad forehead and a luxuriant crop of black hair. Now installed in Peking, he dresses less slovenly than in those earlier days in Yenan when a sloppy appearance was considered a badge of honor.

His name, pronounced “Mout-zz-dung,” is easily mispronounced by foreigners. Once, during the Japanese war, when Mao was in Chungking for a short time, ostensibly to coordinate the Communist forces with the Generalissimo’s war effort, he was consistently called “Mousy-dung,” by Ambassador Hurley. In conferences, and with the best intentions in the world, Hurley would keep saying, “Mr. Mousy-dung,” this or that ..., while the Generalissimo would politely cover his face with his hand to hide his smile and Mao would blush. “Mousy-dung,” in a more common Chinese dialect means “the hole in the water closet.”

Earnest and zealous, Mao, a “China for the Chinese” promoter, and therefore basically at odds with the Russians, speaks in a distinct, sometimes shrill, high-pitched voice. He has a habit of quoting from his wide reading. His oratory is forceful but, like Hitler’s, not polished. Although brilliantly educated in the Chinese Classics and familiar with ancient Greece and Rome through translations of their history and literature, up to the time he left Yenan he had never learned to speak or understand English. Nearly all foreigners relied upon his interpreter when speaking to him. In spite of this, he held one group of reporters spellbound for nearly three hours as he talked to them in the Foreign Office cave, gesticulating nervously and cracking watermelon seeds endlessly between his square white teeth. Sometimes his sober countenance and intense preoccupation would amuse foreigners. Hurley, after long hours of serious discussions, always through an interpreter of course, would, on leaving, bow in sweeping Western style and invariably say in English, “Good night, you sad little apple you,” to his politely bowing host.

Mao’s childhood was one of unusual drudgery. His father was a peasant and a domestic tyrant. Understandably, the boy’s thoughts were turned, at an early age, to revolution against authority and oppression. He chopped off his pigtail in defiance of the Manchus and joined other restless youths who had a hand in the formation of the Chinese Communist Party. A few years later, largely through his help, this party was joined briefly to the revolutionary party of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, which Russia was then aiding.

Years of civil war had taught Mao the technique of guerilla warfare, as well as the qualities necessary for leadership. He likens his guerilla tactics to the behavior of fleas. “We attack by night,” he says, “and wear out strong men.” In 1927 he became President of the first Chinese Peasants Union and has never lost his standing with it. The ignorant peasants are always impressed not only by his rugged and often ruthless qualities, but also by his great learning and his ability to write Chinese poetry in the classic style. In the early days, he won their further applause by moving freely among the people, organizing rickshaw boys into labor unions, and sometimes pulling them about in rickshaws himself, while he talked intimately of the glories of Communism.

Most of the activities of the Communist Party in the early days were carried on in the South, especially around Canton. By 1934, however, the Nationalists had gained such power that the Communists were forced to leave the Southern province of Kiangsi for the Northern caves of Yenan. This, the “Long March,” was a journey of thousands of miles, travelled on foot, partly over almost impassable trails and some of the highest mountains and largest rivers in Asia. In three hundred and sixty-eight days, eighteen major mountain passes were crossed, five of them snow-capped, and twenty-four rivers were forded. At each stop that was made, the marchers ravaged villages, impoverished the well-to-do, and persuaded the poorer peasants to join them. They whipped up such a frenzied crusade that their ranks were swelled by thousands. So strenuous was the journey, however, that at its end only twenty thousand men and women were left, ten thousand having fallen by the way. Those who survived were tough, one may be sure. A much-quoted legend has grown up about Mao, the stalwart leader, which tells how he stumbled along barefooted, refusing a wounded soldier’s offer to share a pony’s back. “No,” said Mao to the soldier, “your wounds are worse than mine. We shall suffer and fight together. That is what makes us comrades.”

Mao’s domestic career, like his political one, has been stormy. His first wife, a child, was forced upon him by his parents, at the age of fourteen. In his opinion, she does not count, and he never mentions her. His second, a school teacher’s daughter, is said to have been shot by a Nationalist General. His third was the heroine of the “Long March,” and Mao had just cause to be proud of her. Tall, frail looking, clever and high spirited, she was sometimes argumentative, behavior unheard of in a Chinese women. A female soldier, she is said to have received many wounds in battle. She also gave birth to a son by Mao during the “Long March,” but when the going became too difficult and unsafe she left the child along the way with old peasants who were unable to join the marchers.

Alas for this brave wife, when Mao met the beauteous movie actress Lang Ping, on arriving in Yenan, she was completely forgotten. He was so enraptured with the newcomer that he sent his wife to Moscow, normally a reward sought after by any Communist. In this case it was only a face-saving gesture, however, and there were rumors that the rejected woman contracted tuberculosis and died. Mao’s new marriage to Lang Ping caused a flutter of excitement and alarm in Yenan, where the Communists knew and admired the courage and fortitude of his third wife and where she was held in esteem. News of this flurry of unrest reached the Comintern in Moscow, where the practice of casually exchanging wives was recognized, if not encouraged. There Mao’s conduct was dismissed lightly, and the Chinese Communists were told that the matter was to be regarded as “personal, not a Party affair.”

During the war, Mao lived happily in a cave in Yenan with wife Number Four. Both dressed simply in blue uniforms padded with cotton in the winter. In spite of this simplicity they enjoyed more privileges than the average Communist. They ate special meals and had extra rations of cigarettes, which Mao liked to chain-smoke. He and his ex-movie starlet went, occasionally, to Saturday night dances given for the Party workers. Here an improvised orchestra struggled with Viennese waltzes, known to be Mao’s favorites, along with scattered bits of boogie-woogie. Mao also liked Chinese translations of Russian songs, but whatever the music, he and his wife swung into action with genuine enthusiasm.

On the whole, Mao’s simple life adds to his popularity. A Mao-myth, similar to the Stalin-myth, is being built up about him, and by similar means. His picture is everywhere. His words are repeated and his name is spoken with reverence. In 1937, Mao wrote a letter to Earl Browder, head of the Communist Party in the United States, in which he said, in part: “We feel that when we achieve victory (in China) this victory will be of considerable help to the struggle of the American people for liberation.” Mao signed his letter, “President of the Chinese Soviet Republic.”

Today, Mao is not only the most influential Communist in China, but probably, next to Stalin, the most powerful Red on earth. With Kremlin approval, he controls, temporarily more than four hundred and sixty million people, which is three times the population of the United States and double that of Russia. A typical student of the methods of Moscow, in spite of his devotion to Confucius and Plato, he has no compunction whatever about condemning thousands to death upon suspicion that their loyalties are slipping. Aware of this quality in him, Japanese and Korean Communist representatives have declared him, “The Symbol of the struggle for emancipation of all the peoples of the Orient.” They claim he has attained his position of power through his sincere and idealistic solicitude for China’s masses and his realism in bringing about reforms. His enemies, however, intimate that his “realism” has not excluded any means to gain his ends, from walking out of attempted peace conferences to assassinations.

The second most important man in Communist China, now that the war with the Chinese Nationalists is over, is Chu Teh, pronounced “Ju Duh,” Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Communist Armies. He is often called the “Red Heart” of Communist China, as contrasted with Mao’s nickname of the “Red Brain.” Number Two in the Hierarchy is a plump, jolly, genial-appearing fellow. Looking anything but a martinet, he has a broad, disarming smile which shows a wide expanse of pink gum. He loves to trot about chucking little children under the chin. Born with a gold spoon in his mouth, he was a reckless though courageous child who always wanted to be a soldier and kept breaking away from an early existence of luxury and high living. Rich at the outset, he became even richer through “squeeze” in a government financial post. Son of a family of overlords, he rose to power and wealth despite his addiction to opiates while still a youth. His early use of opium can be laid to his parents. They spread the thick, gooey, sweet-smelling stuff on sugar cane and gave it to him to suck at night—a common practice of the time to still an infant’s nocturnal wails.

Chu Teh had a large family of wives, concubines and children. He was past forty when he decided to leave them all and devote his entire future and fortune to the revolutionary ideal that burned fanatically within him. After squandering part of his wealth and donating the rest to the Communist cause, he plundered public funds in order to leave his large household well established in a comfortable residence.

Chu was persuaded that the revolution of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1911 had proved to be an utter failure for the masses. In his opinion, it lacked the spark of a vigorous ideological revolution, because it only substituted one bureaucracy for another. He longed to modernize China and to emulate the Marxian heroes of the West. In order to further his ambitions and to carry out his ideals, Chu put a large foot in the mouth of tradition and, having abandoned his family, swashbuckled into Shanghai to meet and mingle with the Nationalist revolutionaries. These he joined temporarily, but he was always regarded by them with a jaundiced eye. They even went so far as to try to kill him one night when a Nationalist officer invited him to dinner. Chu scented danger. Realizing at the same time that his host was naive and impressionable, he flashed one of his face-consuming smiles, followed by a rat-a-tat fire of vitriolic conversation damning Communism. He fondled the feminine entertainers, recited sensuous love sonnets, and generally made himself the life of the party. It worked. His would-be murderous host was completely captivated, and Chu escaped without a scratch! In like fashion, by such guile and beguiling ways, Chu’s predecessors, under Genghis Khan, performed the remarkable feat in the 13th century of subjugating the entire country. The old party tricks are still up to date!

A practical fellow, with more intestinal fortitude than his habits would indicate, Chu picked up his meager belongings a little later on and went to Germany to study the Marxian and the Russian Revolutions with the Communists there. He moved on up the scale to Moscow, matriculated in the Eastern Toilers’ Union, where he studied under the best Communist teachers. When he came back to Shanghai, he regaled his friends with what he had learned in Germany and Russia. “I am determined to make this work in China,” he vowed. To this end, he placed great emphasis on guerilla warfare, the people’s self-defense corps, to suppress activities of traitors, draw out information about the enemy, and guard military secrets. His military tactics are the same as those of the Huns of Attila, the Mongols of Genghis Khan and the Tartars of Tamerlane. Let the enemy be the source of supplies—the enemy being anyone who has anything you want.

As far back as 1927, Earl Browder had been in China helping the Communists plant the seeds for the future control of that country. They had planned on Chiang Kai-shek playing the role of Kerensky in Russia—that of being a temporary leader of the Chinese to be kicked out as soon as he had defeated the warlords in southern and central China. Chiang, however, was more than a match for them and succeeded in blocking their “October Revolution.” He took over, on the death of Sun Yat-sen, and ousted all of the Russian advisors and so-called “master minds,” who had been posing as friends. The Kremlin whimpered and licked its wounds, preparing a relentless revenge.

This was the only serious set-back they encountered until Tito deserted and U. S. aid in 1947 saved Greece, Italy and France. Their hatred of Chiang, therefore, was deeply rooted and they had discredited him and his government in every way prior to their take-over of the country when we, the U. S., failed China in 1946 and 1947.

In 1928, Chu joined forces with Mao, and together they founded the first Chinese Soviet Government and the Red Army in Kiangsi Province. Chu became Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army in China. With Mao, he led the “Long March” to Yenan. Unlike Mao, who will stop at nothing to gain his ends, Chu has a Robin Hood quality that makes him a friend to the poor, with whom he is ever gaining in popularity. When the peasants, for example, complain bitterly that the soldiers are stealing from them (a time-honored custom among Asiatic troops), he forces them to return the stolen goods. Often, as a matter of discipline for other offenses, and as a demonstration to convince the peasants of his “sincerity” as to looting, he gathers the entire village together and gives the populace the satisfaction of seeing the worst looters shot. “No more looting,” he says, shaking a long bony finger. “Hereafter, when we need anything we will ‘confiscate’ it from the rich, our natural enemies, who use cheap and offensive tactics against us.”

In spite of an occasional shooting, Chu is popular with his troops and has been able to recruit from one to two million guerillas, both men and women. One of the latter, a pistol-packing Amazon named K’ang K’eching, revived his temporarily restrained love life. Dressed as a man, this big-boned siren with platter-sized hands and feet, approached him one day and told him she and her companions had captured a machine gun. Would he teach her how to use it? He would, indeed, for he was delighted with this husky bit of pulchritude. He continued to teach her many other guerilla tricks, and from these lessons romance flowered. The next year she became Mrs. Chu Teh, and the newlyweds set up housekeeping in a cave in Yenan.

Sometimes, on weekends, Chu would leave his cave-office and the headaches that beset him there. Sniffing the fresh air as though it held an alien fragrance, and baring his buck teeth in a flash grin, he would ask in Chinese: “What’s cooking?” This was not idle slang with him. When soldiers in the Red Army have been rewarded for some deed, they often use the small change they receive to buy a goose which they roast and share with their comrades. A standing joke among them was that since General Chu could not be rewarded—there being no immediate superior to bestow such favor—he could always smell a goose and thereby get himself invited to a meal. Among the soldiers he was nicknamed “The Cook,” and not alone for his interest in the kitchen. Once, disguised as a cook, he was cornered behind Chiang Kai-shek’s lines. With revolvers poked into his ribs, he yelled: “Don’t shoot! I can cook for you!” The hungry soldiers, touched to their taste buds, hesitated for a closer inspection. When he was recognized and the cry “kill him!” went up, Chu whipped out a concealed pistol, shot the crier, overcame a guard and fled.

Always able to compensate by his keen wits for lack of material, he is one of the most talented products of Moscow’s training. He has taught his troops to use the old steppe dweller method of getting much needed equipment from the enemy. In addition, he has successfully augmented his supplies with material obtained from the Japanese and the Russians. In spite of Chu’s long association with Marx and Moscow, he probably has the interests of China at heart to such an extent that the Moscow yoke could cause him to revolt. Chu can be likened in the Chinese Communist Hierarchy, to Budnenie in the Russian Soviet Army and left in political isolation after his usefulness is over. Not a political figure, but entirely military, Chu will never compete with Mao.

The third most important man in Communist China, who was the Number Two during the war with Japan, is Chou En-lai. His name is pronounced “Joe-n-lie.” Like “Mousy-dung,” the name has given rise to considerable amusement. Chou himself, unlike Mao, never failed to be highly entertained when Ambassador Hurley saluted him with the familiar “Hi, Joe!”

The Party’s most polished envoy, Chou is practically the only one capable of meeting foreign dignitaries with ease. He is wily, clever at negotiation and, like the Property Man of Chinese drama, set the stage for the spectacular performance before a world audience of the talks with General Marshall in 1945. As “Chief Front Man” and one of the directors of foreign propaganda, Chou did such a consummate job that Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart told friends, “He presents his case better than anyone I have ever encountered, clearly, forcefully, urbanely.” Chou was urbane, certainly, for at a large cocktail party he charmed the peace negotiators of all three parties, including Stuart and Marshall. The tired “diplomats” sought respite in small chow and small talk, and for an hour Chou showed himself the polite, intelligent, agreeable mixer that he is. Stuart, a scholar and an intellectual, told me in Nanking: “Whenever I cannot get a point across to Chou, I talk the matter over with some of my students at Yenching University. They discuss it with Chou and a solution is arrived at immediately.”

It is no secret that the young intelligentsia of the Chinese Communist Party were reared and fostered under Stuart’s faithful hand, as President of Yenching University, near Peking. He gave his best and his all to represent the United States, yet he was an old and tired man, and his ideologies and hopes for the Chinese people were wrapped up in a belief that the salvation of their country lay in Socialism. The only group capable of carrying out these ideals was the Chinese Communist Party, which, like its dictator, was ready to prostitute Socialism and replace it with its own brand of dictatorship.

Following the cheerful little get-togethers, the negotiators would return to their arguments, hammer and sickle, and Chou’s charm was abruptly turned off. On one or two occasions, however, this charm caused the Hierarchy embarrassment. For instance, he was recalled to the “Ivory Tower” in Yenan once because Mao felt that he had gone too far in his talks with Marshall; that he had appeared to be making too many concessions, even though he told a comrade he had not the slightest intention of ever living up to any of them. Moreover, he seemed to be getting too friendly with Marshall. Chou spent many unhappy hours in the Chinese Communist dog house in consequence.

After he confessed, with mock solemnity, to the error of his ways and promised “Papa Mao” to be a “good boy,” Chou was sent back to Nanking to continue the negotiations. (Mao had to send him back anyway, because he was the only man in the Chinese Communist Party at the time who could do the job). To prove that he was now “reformed,” Chou let out a series of blasts against the United States Government that were more violent and vitriolic than any that had yet come from Communist Headquarters. Among other things, he accused President Truman of fomenting the civil war and of trying to turn China into an American Colony.

As an individual, Chou En-lai appears to many by far the most personable of all the Chinese Communist leaders. Of medium height, he is well built and well groomed. At press interviews he has a nervous habit of removing and replacing his black-rimmed glasses as he talks. His broad, handsome face is distinguished by thick eyebrows and clear cut features. He speaks English in a well-modulated, yet vibrant and dramatic voice, undoubtedly cultivated while acting in amateur theatricals in college in Tientsin. There he frequently took the feminine lead, because of his facial beauty and willowy figure, and it was there that he first learned to speak English.

I had several conversations with Chou En-lai in Nanking, always speaking through an interpreter. Once, after several hours of laborious questions and answers, I said: “Will you ask the General if he came through Moscow on his return to China from Europe?” At this, Chou threw back his head and laughed heartily. “Heck no,” he said in plain American, “I couldn’t speak any Russian then!” I should have realized that nearly all Chinese pretend they understand no English, hoping they may catch you off guard.

Chou’s grandfather was a high official in the Manchu Dynasty, his father a school teacher, and his mother an unusually well-read woman. Reared as an intellectual, if not moneyed, aristocrat, he early rebelled against the corruption of Chinese politicians. He went to France in 1920, and in Paris two years later founded the Chinese Youth Group, a branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Returning to China, he became a secret organizer of workers in Shanghai and Nanking, successfully engineering two revolts. Because of his ruthlessness he was called “Executioner,” a title that certainly belies his suave appearance.

The Nationalists always considered Chou one of their cleverest foes, and they are said to have offered $80,000 for him once, dead or alive. During the war he never actually soldiered, although he “assumed” the title of “General.” He did help to organize and served for a time with the Chinese Red Army in several minor operations in the capacity of Chief Political Commissar. With a magnificent flair for political education and propaganda, he won his present outstanding position as a member of the Politburo, which rules the Red-blighted areas wherever they may be. He learned much from Michael Borodin, Russian-born Communist, and also from Chiang Kai-shek’s one-time Russian advisor, Gallen, who later, as General Bleucher, commanded the Russian Far Eastern Army.

Chou is not afraid of work. Toiling late at night, he writes articles for the press and prepares lengthy speeches for the radio. He has been able to convert many U. S. State Department officials to the view that in helping Chiang, we were backing the wrong horse and should, instead, have put our money on the Red. From Earl Browder, to whom he wrote in 1937, we learn this: “Comrade, do you still remember the Chinese comrades who worked with you in China ten years ago?”—in 1927!

Chou is a true turncoat and has served, back and forth, both the Nationalists and the Communist Governments. One job he held during the war was liaison officer between the Nationalists and Communists in their so-called drive against the Japanese. This was a smoke screen, for when Chiang ordered Communist troops to fight the Japanese north of the Yangtse River, Chou violently objected. He knew that he and the Communists would either starve or be annihilated by the Japanese. Thereafter, the Communists pulled their anti-Japanese punches, or did not punch at all.

As “Property Man” for the great drama being staged by the Communists, Chou always listens to the prompting voice from the wings, the voice of his wife. Her’s is a strong, clear voice, the one that converted him to Communism, and the one that reminds him constantly of his duties. He met her during one of the lowest ebbs of his erratic life, in jail. Mrs. Chou is one of the hardest working and most enthusiastic and important members of the Party. Not especially pretty, she is attractive in a quiet way. In spite of illness (she is said to have tuberculosis), she remains politically active and influential. Like her husband, she once held a post in Chiang’s Government, as Finance Chairman of his New Life Movement.

More favored by Moscow than either Mao, Chu or Chou, is Li Li San, whose name is pronounced “Lee Lee Sahn.” Long ago, he and Mao quarrelled bitterly, and Li Li San fled to Russia, there to become close to the heart of the Comintern. Fifteen years later, this lean and hungry-looking agitator returned as Moscow’s appointee to the head political role in Manchuria. A rumored cause of the rift with Mao was that Li Li was caught heading an anti-Mao secret society, with Russian connivance. The angle of their Communism differs. Mao, a peasant, supports the farmers, while Li Li San, with his Moscow training, favors the city workers.

Probably few men in history have been reported dying or dead over a long period of their lives more often than has Li Li San. Nicknamed the “Tito of Red China,” when Tito was still dominated by Moscow, his career followed closely that of his namesake. After quarreling with Mao, he vanished and was presumed dead by his friends. Some years later he reappeared, with full Russian support, as a power to be reckoned with in the Far Eastern picture.

While in Moscow, Li Li had married a Russian woman and, in the Far Eastern University had trained Communist agents and sent them back to their homelands as agitators. He maintained a close liaison with the Kremlin. As Russia’s war with Japan was nearing an end, Stalin, ignoring Li Li’s petty dispute with Mao, sent him, with Marshal Malinovsky’s Russian Army of Mongols, into Manchuria six days before the Japanese surrendered. His job was to take over this “Prize of Asia,” rich in everything the Russians or anybody else needed and which no contester for world power could do without.

Another important military personality in the Communist picture is Lin Piao, pronounced “Lin Bow.” A great guerilla fighter and a natural leader of men, he is a tactical genius who served on Chiang Kai-shek’s staff and rose to become President of the Military Academy. A little later he left the Nationalists and threw in his lot with the Red Army. At twenty-eight he was given command of the First Red Army Corps, a unit that is said never to have been defeated. Lin Piao was to the Chinese Communist Army what Zukov was to the Russian Army, Chief of Staff and a military wizard.

Today, Lin, in his forties, has never gotten over his youthful tendency to blush. His agreeable face has slanting eyes that trail off into little mice tail wrinkles. He is a sloppy dresser and is over-casual in appearance. He has a good singing voice and he and Mao, who also fancies himself a singer, often join in duets. After a hearty meal when all are feeling warm and rosy from the choicest wine of the Communist vineyards, Lin likes to tune up his vocal chords and suggest that they sing Mao’s special song, “The Hot Red Pepper.”

This is the story of the Red Pepper who sneers at all the lazy vegetables for living such a spineless existence, especially the fat and contented cabbage. Finally, the Red Pepper, by means of his exceptional personality and cunning ways, incites them all to revolution.

The theory, Mao says, is that pepper is loved by all revolutionaries from Spain and Mexico to Russia. Lin, like many of the Communist leaders, has never been out of China, but because of his excellent articles in military magazines his name is familiar in both Japan and Russia.

The Hierarchy of the Chinese Communist Party has attached to it a liaison officer originally from the Third Internationale, a Syrian-American named Dr. Hatem. His Chinese name is Ma Hia-teh, pronounced “Ma-High-Da,” and he is always referred to by the Chinese as “Dr. Ma.” Fiftyish and fat, he is typically American in appearance, resembling more than anything else a successful businessman. Born in Buffalo, New York, he was educated in North Carolina and in Switzerland where he is said to have received a degree in medicine. He has been with the Communists now for about twelve years. So completely submerged is he in Communist ideologies, he insists he has forgotten his American name.

Proud of having an ardent foreign convert, the Communists still do not trust Dr. Hatem politically, although they use him wherever they need information from Americans. Because of his ingratiating manner, he is a natural to make lonely Americans open up their hearts to an old friend from home. He enjoys strutting about among his Chinese and foreign friends and bragging about his connections. His chief value to the Communists, however, is his ability to evaluate American newscasts. In the summer of 1946, he was seen almost daily at the fashionable Peking Hotel, immaculately groomed and wearing well-tailored clothes. There he spent hours eating and drinking with the foreign diplomats and correspondents.

Married to a Chinese movie actress—they all lean in that direction—he has a son about three or four years old. Mrs. Ma is a graduate of the Lu Hsun Art Academy, formerly the Catholic Church in Yenan, and is accustomed to wearing silk and using cosmetics. She finds it quite a bore to obey the Communist dictates of “cotton clothes and no make-up,” and on several occasions she has been called down for making a “spectacle” of herself. Being a Russian-language student and much younger than her husband, she was constantly in the company of a young Russian doctor who was part of the Soviet liaison group in Yenan.

Dr. Ma is a most enthusiastic Communist worker, who has remarked many times that he would gladly “kill for the Cause.” He has been known to add with emphasis, “And I would just as soon kill Americans as anyone else!” He is said, despite his loose tongue, to stand well with Moscow because he is such a willing tool.

No panorama of Communist personalities can be complete without the name of Madame Sun Yat-sen, famous in Chinese history as the wife of the founder of the Revolution that overthrew the Manchu Dynasty. Madame Sun, sister of the celebrated Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and the slightly less illustrious Madame H. H. Kung, is known widely as “one of the famous Soong Sisters.” The middle one of the three—Eiling, Chingling and Meiling—Chingling is listed on the new governmental roster as Soong Chingling, perhaps to cause less embarrassment to her family. She is in charge of the so-called “independent liberals” in the Party.

Under her maiden name, this clever conniver has had a somewhat stormy career. Claiming that she shuns publicity, she has, nevertheless, managed to stay in the limelight a large part of her life. The daughter of Charlie Soong, a wealthy merchant who had been reared by a missionary and educated in America, she was one of six children and is said to have been her mother’s favorite. Chingling has been called a pretty child and a not-so-pretty child, so that one might infer that her beauty lies rather in her personality than in her face. As a young girl, she was on the “dreamy” side, rather shy but highly emotional. When she is deeply aroused over a person or a cause, she becomes enthusiastic to the point of fanaticism, a quality that has proved alarming and distressing to the other members of her family.

Educated in the United States, she adopted the American name of “Rosamond,” by which her classmates at Wesleyan College, in Macon, Georgia, called her affectionately. Her teachers said that she was “very studious, had high ideals and was extremely interested in moral and philosophical ideas.” No timid flower, she showed a fiery temper when provoked. Very proud of her country and interested in its affairs, she often said that she considered the Revolution of 1911 the “Greatest event of the Twentieth Century.”

“Rosamond’s” English was excellent, and she wrote numerous articles for the college paper, one of which read: “When China moves, she will move the world. The Revolution has established China in Liberty and Equality, those two inalienable rights of the individual....” A copy of this was sent to her father, who was so pleased with his daughter that he forwarded to her one of the new five barred flags of the Republic of China. On receiving it, Chingling shouted with joy, climbed up and pulled down the dragon banner from the wall of her bedroom, and stomped on it crying, “Down with the dragon! Up with the flag of the Republic!”

While still in college, Chingling began a hero worship of Dr. Sun. When she returned to China, she shocked everyone by announcing her determination to marry him—this, although he was married to a woman his own age who had borne him three sons, of whom Dr. Sun Fo undoubtedly is the best known. Subsequently she became his secretary and, with skill and determination, aided by her youth and beauty, she finally overcame all obstacles and, in 1915, became the second Madame Sun Yet-sen. Basking in all the excitement and publicity she so “abhorred,” she wrote to a classmate back at Wesleyan, “Being married to Dr. Sun is just like going to school all over again, only there are no examinations to take!”

The marriage lasted until Dr. Sun’s death, in 1925. They had the usual ups and downs, but she reported to her friends from time to time that “it never lacks excitement.” The Revolution inspired by her husband, Communistic in its original structure, shifted back and forth from reactionary to conservative to reactionary.

On the death of Dr. Sun, the reins of the revolution were put into the hands of Madame Sun’s brother-in-law, Chiang Kai-shek. Never in harmony, politically or emotionally, Chiang and Mme. Sun had had many violent disagreements. Finally, in 1927, two years after her husband’s death, she confirmed her leftist sympathy by going to Moscow. There she remained for three years, studying Communist doctrines in the World Anti-Imperialist League. In self-justification, she claimed that the Nationalist Government had distorted the meaning of her husband’s original ideas, that they had always been similar to those of the Russian Revolution.

Again, in 1930, Mme. Sun, the former Soong Chingling, burst into print in an angry tirade against the Generalissimo. On January 22nd of that year, she sent a cable to the Anti-Imperialist League in Berlin, saying: “Reactionary forces in the Nationalist Government are combining with the Imperialists in brutal repression against the Chinese masses. They have degenerated into Imperialist tools and attempted to provoke war with Russia.”

Feeling ever closer to the Communists and farther, ideologically, from the rest of her family, she chose the anniversary of the eightieth birthday of her predecessor, the first Madame Sun, to take her stand, in 1946, in favor of the Chinese Communists and the Soviets. Her stinging speech was headlined in every Chinese newspaper and many abroad. There could be no doubt now that she was a full-fledged militant Communist, willing to use the powers of her brilliant mind and persuasive personality to the utmost.

Today, nearing sixty, she is third Vice-Chairman of the Communist Party, and her influence is, perhaps, the strongest and most forceful of any women member, so global are her contacts. Soon after her “elevation” to the third Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party early in 1950, she said: “China will continue to follow the policy of leaning to one side, to the side led by the great Soviet Union under the leadership of the mighty Stalin: the side of peace and construction.”

A current rumor, despite denials, is to the effect that Mme. Sun may be having another change of ideas and ideals and is, therefore, not in the good graces of General Mao who, like his mentors, Stalin and Genghis Khan, hates a turncoat.

In appearance, Madame Sun is not unattractive. She dresses simply, preferring plain silks without the elaborate trimmings so dearly loved by her sisters. She wears her neat, black hair parted in the center and drawn back smoothly from her face to form a large, soft “bun” at the nape of her neck. She speaks in a quiet voice and says exactly what she thinks.

At the Shanghai Opera one evening in 1946, Madame Wei Tao-ming, wife of the then Chinese Ambassador to the United States, was seated just behind her. Madame Sun, who was flanked on either side by well-known Chinese and American Communists, turned around at each intermission to chat with Madame Wei, who had been one of the youngest and most devout revolutionaries. I learned the subject of the conversations that evening when we returned to Madame Wei’s temporary home in the Avenue Lafayette. Livid with rage, Madame Wei said to me:

“Do you know what she kept saying to me, over and over again?”

Naturally I could not have known and said as much. Madame Wei continued:

“She berated me bitterly for not being nicer to the Communists! Me, of all people, who was one of the first and hardest working fighters in her husband’s own revolution! She said, ‘You’re going to regret it one day, if you do not change your attitude. They are in the driver’s seat, and they are going to stay there’!”

I had never seen Madame Wei so beside herself with anger. This was just four years before it was generally acknowledged that the Communists were in full authority, and the period of tenure is a matter of conjecture. Madame Sun, apparently, had seen the handwriting on the wall and had interpreted it correctly.

While there are many other Communist personalities aside from those discussed in the foregoing pages, to mention them all would do no service to this story. Those included are the ones whose names appear most frequently in the press and on the radio. To know them and their ways is to know the spirit and the methods of the unholy movement to which they subscribe.

Chapter IV

Communism’s Forebears

Who are these people who have conquered most of Europe and Asia and openly flaunt their determination to conquer the world? Where did they come from? How have they been able to enslave approximately nine hundred million people? Do they really have the secrets of the A and H bombs? Will they use them to fulfill their diabolical schemes? And when?

The answers to these questions are vital to all people—to every American, man, woman and child. Not even in the days of Genghis Khan was there such a tremendous upheaval over so vast an area of the earth’s surface, as the one we are witnessing, as we pass the half-way mark of the Twentieth Century.

Long before Moses was found in the bullrushes, the people who lived in the Northern steppe lands sucked hardship from their mothers’ breasts and grew into sturdy savages, mortally feared by their neighbors. They were Asiatics, that is, they belonged to the Yellow Race, the best known tribes of which are the Huns, the Mongols and the Tartars. Today, “Mongol” is the common name given to people comprising nearly all of Central Asia. Destiny gave a strange role to these fearless nomads. Blood-thirsty and aggressive, time and again they burst the seams of their homelands and overran most of Europe and Asia. Each time they rose to world conquest, the pattern followed was the same. Guided by the genius of a merciless and brilliant individual, the dominant tribe or clan ran the full gamut from tribal communism, necessary in the early days for self-preservation and mutual benefit, to communistic imperialism. As the tribes grew larger and more powerful, and the value of the spoils increased enormously, several leaders struggled for complete control. This struggle ended in a period of despotic dictatorship, when one man gained supreme power and wielded it ruthlessly. The period of oppression lasted, at various times in the past, anywhere from a few years to a few hundred years, depending upon the foresight and strategy of the rulers. Invariably, the dictatorship disintegrated, and the empires fell into dissolution and decline, followed by desolation and chaos. The method by which each nomad chieftain rose to power was strikingly similar. He would consistently strengthen his armies and trap his victims by guile, trickery, infiltration, and every known deceit.

Succession to the leadership of the clan, tribe or nation was not necessarily hereditary. It could pass from father to son or outside the family, just as in the Soviet Hierarchy today succession passes from Party member to Party member. Then, as now, it was the strongest physically, and the cunningest mentally, who always assumed leadership.

These primitive conquerors had several great advantages over their more civilized neighbors. One was their extraordinary physical stamina. The weeding out of the weak began practically at birth. Children, weaned from mother’s milk, were fed on mare’s milk for a few years and then were left to care for themselves as best they could.

As clans gathered around the open fires, where all the food was cooked in huge pots, the strongest men ate first; the aged and women next; and the children were left to fight over the bones and scraps. Food was abundant in the spring when mutton, game and fish were available. In the early winter the hordes lived largely on millet, and fermented mare’s milk. The latter had a high alcoholic content and was quite “heady” for the younger children. By the end of the winter, the clansmen were reduced to foraging and making raids on the herds of other tribes. The old and weak were left to perish. Only the hardiest survived.

Another great advantage of the militant nomads over their victims was their ability to ride the horse. Everywhere else in the ancient world, this animal was used only to draw the heavy war chariots. The Mongols, fearing nothing, mastered the horse and became expert cavalrymen. The resulting mobility was a tremendous asset in warfare. Without the horse, the Mongols would never have been able to conquer such vast territories. Learning to ride as children of three or four, they were superb horsemen in their early manhood and hunted with consummate skill. When they appeared upon the horizon in a cloud of dust and with a clatter of hooves, it was only a matter of minutes before each dropped down like an eagle upon his prey.

Of even more strategic importance was their conception of the fifth column. Poor always, in comparison with their neighbors, whose lands and goods they coveted, they—like their Russian descendants—developed a technique of boring from within. Ahead of them were sent humble-looking barterers or beggars, who easily bribed and cajoled their way inside the walls of a city. At the critical moment, the unfortunate citizens would find their gates open and hordes of wild tribesmen bursting in upon them with bloodcurdling yells.

Whether at home or in the field, these nomads lived in yurts, or domelike tents, made of felt and mounted on wooden carts, drawn by oxen. They spent most of their days on horseback, hunting, fishing and constantly fighting among themselves and with neighboring clans. Often they remained in the saddle for days, eating little or no food.

Between each major conquest, there were long periods when fighting was confined to the steppe lands. It was only when an outstanding genius appeared that they attempted the invasion of the more civilized countries—Europe, China or the Near East—which, throughout the ages, were constantly on the defensive against them.

One of the first of these tribes that grew to world power was led by Attila the Hun, in the Fifth Century. Slashing and murdering his way through Europe, he terrorized the entire continent and captured the greatest city of antiquity, Rome. Earlier, when Rome fell to the Goths, the citizens though that surely the end of the world had come. It was not until the Huns attacked, however, that they felt the full fury of Asiatic destruction and torture.

Attila was a typical Mongol of his day. Shaggy-headed, dirty and disheveled, his gorilla-like appearance evoked as much terror as if he had been a wild animal. With as little regard for human suffering as for the priceless treasures of Rome, he was lustful only for power, wine and women. He is said to have kept a huge harem, and, like his followers, to have left countless children by captured slaves all over Europe and Asia. Because of his merciless brutality, plundering and rape, he was called by his victims, “The Scourge of God.”

In 451 A. D., Attila was finally defeated, and while celebrating the addition of a new beauty to his harem, he died. He had taken from the world, by force, everything he wanted, because he knew no other way to get it. His vast and powerful empire collapsed like a house of cards and fell into utter ruin.

Approximately seven hundred years later came the most brilliant, the most destructive, and the most incredible of all the forerunners of Communism, Genghis Khan. He conquered not only the major part of Europe and almost all of Northern Asia, but also established powerful dynasties in Persia and China.

Born in 1162 A. D., Genghis Khan, at thirteen, succeeded his father as Chief of the Yakka Mongols. A robust lad, he was tall and broad-shouldered. His eyes set far apart, unlike those of the Mongols, did not slant and were a curious shade of green. He had high cheekbones and a sloping forehead beneath abundant red hair, which he wore in long braids down his back. His was a striking personality. He was as different from the other members of his horde in appearance as he was in mentality.

In his early years, Genghis wore the simple clothing of his tribesmen, consisting of skins sewn together with sinews. Frequently he greased his body to keep out the cold and moisture when it was necessary to sleep in the snow. He ate raw meat, and drank mare’s milk and sometimes blood which he let from the veins of his horses’ legs. Mentally the equal of any Caucasian, he undoubtedly had European blood in his veins. Perhaps that of a Princess, who knows?

Although this despot had an ungovernable temper and a wrath that could terrorize the strongest, he also had the capacity to make firm and lasting friends and loyal followers. He spoke thoughtfully and deliberately and is said to have remarked many times, “Monasteries and Temples breed mildness of character, but it is only the fierce and warlike who dominate mankind.” His eloquence could spellbind the masses.

He was an expert with the bow and arrow. His physical strength made him the leader of the wrestlers. He had been known to pick up an opponent, hold him high above his head, then break his back as though it were a bamboo reed! He enjoyed wrestling matches only when they rivaled the Roman gladiators, when the bones of the weaker adversaries were broken and crushed. He despised weakness of any kind, for he himself was a match for any man, and he had never been bested at any sport. Born of a race unwashed and illiterate, he raised his tribe of unknown barbarians to a position of world renown. Believing firmly that the Mongols were the natural masters of the world, he also was convinced that he had been chosen by Destiny to lead and control them. Thus impelled, this amazing barbarian, starting with only a tribe of wild nomads, finally conquered everything from Armenia to Korea, and from Tibet to the Volga River.

After Genghis Khan had subdued all of China, he settled down and developed into a typical oriental potentate. He lived in splendor on the present site of Peking, a far cry from his earlier primitive tent on the Gobi desert. Just so, in 1949, Mao Tse-tung sprang from the mud caves of Yenan to the palaces of Peking as China’s Number One dictator. Here, in this ancient city, Genghis, as Emperor, surrounded himself with courtiers and officials, as well as with wives, concubines and slaves.

He held high court and worked on affairs of state in a high pavilion of white felt, lined with treasured silk. Here also he entertained his friends and kept a silver table on which sat vessels of fermented mare’s milk and bowls of meat and fruit for their pleasure. Dressed in a lavishly embroidered robe and wearing a long and flaming beard, he sat at state functions on a dais at the far end of the pavilion. With him on a low bench sat Bourtai, his favorite wife. She was the real love of his life, and he claimed only the children born by her as his own. The Empress was small and dainty, with beautiful features and long hair braided with jewels and heavy coins. She was the mother of three sons who were destined to rule at a later period a domain larger than Rome’s. Other wives and concubines grouped themselves at his left, on lower platforms. His nobles sat on benches around the walls of the building, wearing long coats, bound around with enormous bright-colored silken girdles, and large, uptilted felt hats. In the center of the pavilion glowed a great fire made of thorns and dung. There was utter silence when Genghis spoke. His word was absolute law. It is said, “Any who disobeyed his word was like a stone dropped into deep water, or as an arrow among the reeds.”

Genghis Khan was almost as superstitious as he was brilliant. Believing that the character of every animal was in its heart, he hunted lions and tigers with great zest, preferring to capture them alive. He tore them open with his bare hands, pulled out the heart, and ate it while it was still throbbing. Convinced that this gave him the courage of a savage beast, he compelled his men to follow his example.

A military genius, he is known as the greatest guerilla fighter in history, but his real life work was the molding together of his vast hordes into a disciplined, well equipped, highly trained, and completely organized army. He used the forced labor of subjugated people—a significant parallel to the present day methods of Stalin, who, in order to increase the efficiency of his armies, drafted into them German scientists, artisans and technicians, as well as thousands of humbler laborers.

Genghis acquired, ultimately, over four hundred thousand warriors, countless elephant and camel trains loaded with the wealth of Croesus, and multitudes of armed slaves. “Unmatched in human valor,” it is said, “his hordes overcame the terrors of barren wastes, of mountains and seas, the severities of climate and the ravages of famine and pestilence. No dangers could appall them, no prayer for mercy could move them.”

Genghis Khan was the symbol of a new power in history. The ability of one man to alter human civilization began with him and ended with his grandson Kublai Khan, when the Mongol empires began to crack. It did not reappear again until the rise of Stalin to power.

The vast empires that Genghis established, with their accompanying devastation, was not all that he achieved. Had this been so, he would have been merely another Attila destroying with little or no definite purpose. His genius for organization and his clever statesmanship made him the model of kings, although he could not read or write when he drew up the incomparable “Yassa,” or code of conduct. This curious document, not unlike the dictates of Stalin, had three main purposes: to ensure absolute obedience to Genghis Khan; to bind together all the nomad clans for the purpose of making war; and to punish swiftly and mercilessly, anyone who violated the law, civil, military or political. With the “Yassa,” he and his heirs ruled their empires for three generations. The lash of its ruthless authority held it together.

Genghis died in 1227 A. D., leaving the greatest empires and the most destructive armies the world had ever known to that day. Not until the advent of the Tartars, a few centuries later, did another Asiatic tribe rise to world power. Led by fearless Tamerlane, they also laid waste everything in their path, in the savage manner of their predecessors. Once again the pattern was repeated. It is characteristic of the empires built by the steppe nomads that they were not the result of gradual development and expansion, but the product of a rapid growth under the leadership of a single powerful man. These men all seem to have had an evil genius for political intrigue, for exacting fanatical loyalty among their followers, and for devising ways to conquer many times their own numbers.

The aim of each of these Asiatic conquerors was to control the vast area of the world from the Pacific Ocean to Central Europe. They planned the overthrow, by force and violence, if need be, of all other governments and peoples in their path. Czarist Russia, in 1905, achieved the geographical empires of Genghis Khan, actually peopled by descendants of the same racial elements. Had they not been defeated subsequently by the Japanese, the Czars and their successors probably would have controlled all of China. In this new grouping of mankind, however, it was the half-Tartar Russians and not the Mongols, who were the dominant military factor. Today, the ruling power comes from Moscow, and not from the Mongolian East, except for the infusion of Chinese blood that has resulted from seven hundred years of constant conflict with the Celestial Empire.

With the discovery of America and her tremendous natural resources, the lust for world dominion has increased. Today, Stalin has ambitions for global mastery. His first tools of conquest are the Communists in every country. In February, 1947, as the Communist Convention in London, delegates from thirty-two countries met to reaffirm their pledges to support the Communist Party. These Communists are not members of a political party in the American sense; they are sinister and potentially powerful weapons of the Soviet Government.

Everywhere today, the “New Democracy,” or early Communism, has followed the pattern of the rise of each Asiatic despot. It repeated itself in Moscow in the early Twenties at the death of Lenin, when Stalin and Trotsky struggled for power. China, today, is passing from the first stage, the period of self-denial, of sharing the wealth, of submitting to rigid discipline and purification for “The Cause”—the Sackcloth and Ashes stage. The Chinese Communists are beginning to experience the progressive steps of disillusionment, apprehension and abject terror, as was the lot of millions of Russian peasants during the infamous Thirties.

The great and overpowering tragedy of Communism is that at no stage or time has it ever been the shining Utopia that hypnotizes the credulous common man and woman and some of the dreamers in high places in our own government. It would appear that neither Marx nor Engels understood human psychology or analyzed intelligently the lessons of history, for Socialism, in suppressing individual initiative, inevitably leads to I-Don’t-Care-ism. An economy based on share-and-share-alike, without regard to individual effort, failed in Russia because it put a premium on mediocrity and deprived man of the fruits of his own labor. It had to be replaced with “Stakhanovitism,” or piece work, which the American labor unions have fought constantly in their march toward Socialism. The Russians found that the only way to make men exert themselves without the incentive of reward was through fear of punishment. Thus Socialism has to be enforced by police methods to be at all effective. What is this but dictatorship? Socialism, Communism, Stateism—these can no more be separated from each other than can the component parts of homogenized milk.

Communist leaders, motivated by the promise of power, insist that world revolution is inevitable. The Chinese Communists, for many years, repeated an ancient legend. They said: “The Mongols still are waiting in their felt tents, for the issue to be decided. They are gathering around their yurt fires and chanting together: ‘When that which is harder than rock and stronger than the storm winds shall fail, the Empires of the North Court and the Empires of the South Court shall cease to be; when the White Tsar is no more, and the Son of Heaven has vanished, then the campfires of Genghis Khan will be seen again, and his empire shall stretch over all the earth’.” That prophesy is being fulfilled.

Chapter V

Communist Propaganda

Propaganda, thanks to a better understanding of mass psychology, has become in the past few years almost an exact science as well as an art In the hands of the Communists it is a powerful weapon, so subtle that, as in shadow boxing, one cannot judge the exact position of the enemy. With wily cleverness, it has perverted the meanings of cherished words, so that great national masses of people are no longer aware of their rightful connotations.

We, in the United States, for instance, think of Democracy as the dictionary defines it: “Government in which the supreme power is retained by the people.” The Communists have distorted this by adopting the term “New Democracy,” to represent a Communist controlled state, that is, a dictatorship.

Freedom, a beautiful word, has also been distorted. In a Western democracy, it means “liberation from slavery,” that is, the opportunity to work, live and play where, when and how one chooses, in open competition. In a Communist State, none of these things is possible. There can be no freedom where full regimentation is required. The Soviet’s claim of freeing the peasants from onerous landlords and the workers from grasping capitalists is only a blind. Any poor Chinese on the street soon sadly learns that these are being replaced by more oppressive masters, the Soviet Commissars.

Security is another wonderful word, and the Communists have been quick to realize its universal appeal. However, they use it in a purely economic sense, deliberately ignoring any but material values. Their type of security can be promised only at the price of personal freedom. It is already in operation in all penitentiaries, where the life-term convict is fed, clothed, cared for when ill, sheltered, entertained and protected from the harsh conditions of economic competition. He need not worry about any of these things. Yet it is a generally accepted fact that he would gladly and immediately trade all of the benefits he receives from his prison incarceration for the one little matter of Freedom.

The Chinese Commissar, in the footsteps of his Russian counterpart, reads to his military unit the daily propaganda bulletin.

Communist Propaganda Poster captions: Happy Are Those Who Work for the People!

Draw Water Against the Drought! Another propaganda poster.

Non-Communists looking at bulletin reporting expected visit of General Marshall to Yenan. Bulletin is put out by Communist Cultural Committee for Mass Education.

Communist propaganda poster: Produce for the People!

Communist propaganda picture showing how to Rescue the Wounded!

Besides twisting the meaning of words, the Communists have subtly changed long accepted human values and relationships. By distortion of Truth, and constant repetition of the Party Line, they gradually paralyze all individual thinking and destroy the will to resist. Russian propaganda is far more effective than was the German, and their Chinese henchmen have had to modify it slightly to adapt it for use in their country. By false promises, intimidation and persuasion, the Communists lulled the weakened opposition and made the conquest of China easier. When necessary, they never hesitated to use terror and brutality. By these two means they have established a vast web of control over the entire land of nearly five hundred million people.

The Chinese Communists have found it expedient to have two types of propaganda: one which is directed at foreigners and follows strictly the Moscow line; the other maintained for domestic consumption. The home propaganda concentrates on Chinese affairs and plays down the foreign and international angles. Slogans, or catch phrases, are evident everywhere, on billboards, in handbills, on posters, in the press and on the air channels. In this way, the slogans are repeated over and over again, until everyone becomes thoroughly familiar with them. Throughout China are heard the shouts of the victors—SERVE THE PEOPLE! PRODUCE FOR THE PEOPLE! RESCUE THE WOUNDED! BEAR SONS FOR THE PEOPLE! The latter is one of the most surprising in a land that has an annual death rate of a million from starvation and is presently suffering from the worst famine in years!

The slogans are often illustrated and used as picture posters. Gay and colorful, they frequently show a prosperous looking group standing or sitting before an enormous basket overflowing with luscious fruits and vegetables. The caption: HAPPY ARE THOSE WHO WORK FOR THE PEOPLE! Billboards and handbills in villages and towns are, of necessity, simple and elementary, while in Shanghai and other large cities they are more elaborate and sometimes quite sophisticated.

As in Germany before the war, and in Russia today, the Chinese concentrate on the children. These are often separated from their families when they are very young and sent to special schools away from their homes. The Chinese Communists, like the Soviets, are making every effort to destroy family life and ties, since family loyalty competes with their training program. The first and only loyalty must be to the State. In some schools, youngsters have been given new textbooks which begin with the verse:

“I do not love my Mama. I do not love my Papa. I love only my Country and Mao Tse-tung.” Other books show pictures of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and other Nationalist leaders and characterize them as enemies of the State who are “to be killed on sight.”

Children, otherwise well brought up and, prior to the new schooling, devoted to their families, return to their homes and face their parents with: “We don’t love you any more. We are leaving home and will fight the Nationalists ourselves, wherever we find them!”

Some of the propaganda is directed against foreigners, especially Americans. The children are taught to repeat little songs in which Americans are called “greedy and vicious capitalists,” and they are shown cartoons depicting Americans as two-headed pigs being kicked out of China.

The effect of such systematic mind-poisoning is shown in an incident that happened in North China just before the Communists took over. An American on a business trip watched a Chinese woman, carrying a baby and a large bundle, attempt to cross a narrow bridge over a little river. A tiny girl, barely old enough to walk, clung to the mother’s skirts. The planking of the bridge was wobbly and narrow. Realizing they could not all cross at once, the woman loosened the child’s hands and told her: “Wait there and I’ll come back for you.” Then, with the bundle and baby, she crossed the poorly constructed span. The American, trying to be a good Samaritan, went toward the stranded little girl to offer to take her across. At his approach she screamed in terror and ran from him. Catching up with her, he talked to her in a quiet voice for some minutes. Soon the youngster dried her tears, accepted the man’s arms, and was carried to safety. The mother turning to go back for the child, cried out in alarm at seeing her in the arms of the American. With the realization that the man meant no harm, she appeared amazed at his courtesy.

Among the near illiterate, speeches are the most effective means of propaganda, and the Chinese Red Armies have large doses of these inflicted upon them. The soldiers, following the example of their Russian comrades, are briefed on when to clap and when to cheer. Like any college football crowd, they dutifully follow the cheer leaders.

The Communists are especially proud of their so-called “Educational Program” for soldiers, and they claim that thirty per cent of the time allotted to military training is devoted to “cultural” and political work. As a result of attendance at daily classes, over eighty per cent of the troops are reported able to read elementary Chinese characters, giving them enough background to understand simplified Communist newspapers. These “newspapers” are filled with news strictly censored by the leaders, and the characters learned in school are those that enable them to read only what the posters and textbooks say. No effort is wasted on superfluous, non-political knowledge.

Bestowing tides as a reward is another Moscow-inspired incentive for the soldiers, as well as for the illiterate populace. This device is also used to encourage labor production and to throw a smoke screen over exploitation. Labor “Heroes” and “Heroines” are greatly admired in all Red-blighted areas, and any Communist who studies and works hard has a chance to be thus honored and to obtain the coveted material reward or special privilege that accompanies the title.

Russian propaganda, when modified for the Chinese, is slanted so that it may not offend them too greatly while they are still being taken over, that is, during the transition period of persuasion and deception. Shortly after the capture of Tientsin, an enormous picture of Stalin appeared beside that of Mao Tse-tung in Min Yuan Park. The people milling around in great throngs stared up at it, some in wonderment. One of them finally remarked, “Who is that other man? He is not Chinese, he is a foreigner.” In order to keep the surface smooth at first and to cause no undue alarm or suspicion among the people, the next day Mao hung alone.

The capture of Tientsin and Peking was accomplished with comparatively little fighting except on the outskirts of both cities. The plans for taking Peking had been well thought out. Secret agents, for years, had been “persuading” the people and softening up the Nationalist troops. The actual capture was cunningly timed. The Chinese New Year was chosen, with due respect to superstition, by the incoming lords of the land. They allowed the people to spend three days making their customary friendly calls upon each other, in the ancient manner, and settling up their bills and accounts. Farmers poured into the cities with supplies of meat and vegetables, and the Communists bided their time while the citizenry, ate, drank and made merry. In the Chinese calendar 1949 was the Year of the Rat, and 1950 ushered in the Year of the Cow. Time-honored superstition has it that when, in the passage of years, the tail of the Rat touches the horn of the Cow, times will be good, luck will change and the future will be successful. The Chinese were all congratulating themselves over their coming good year when the Communists, after waiting for the psychological moment, marched their armies in and took over the ancient capital.

The new masters gave the populace various choices of “surrender” terms, although they did not use the expression “surrendering.” First, the vanquished were politely invited to “Come out and join us, for we are all brothers now.” This invitation was called the “Peking way.” When anyone showed reluctance to accept, the “Tientsin way” was tried. This method involved pressure, first psychological, then if that failed, material, and finally if there was still any hesitation, physical, in the form of more or less severe beatings. In other words, the same old formula was at work—persuasion and then force.

The Chinese Communists, after the fall of the entire country, copied from their Soviet comrades the trick of inviting all the industrialists, financiers and scientists who had fled to Canton, Hong Kong and elsewhere to return to their Northern homes, where they could continue to operate their businesses as before. So in 1946 Stalin invited all the White Russians living in China to return to the USSR. The old birdie in the cage trick! Persuaded that they were going to receive fair treatment, many of the expatriate Russians gladly gave up their jobs and homes in Shanghai and Tientsin and spent their last dollars on passage to Siberia. No word was ever heard from many of them, but gradually a few letters appeared, smuggled in through Chinese friends, which told of great suffering. A few of the hardiest escaped and returned, all with the same story—Siberia, the salt mines, death. What happened to their Chinese counterparts who heeded the siren song of the victors of Peking we do not know, but we can guess.

Communist propaganda is apparent in practically every aspect of Chinese life. Only the Opera and the Russian Ballet appear to have remained relatively free from taint. The Reds are tremendously proud of both of these world renowned examples of creative art and make a great show of claiming that they are always performed in the “original.” However, when put on before strictly indoctrinated audiences, propaganda appears in the shape of Party line interpretations of dances, songs and long curtain speeches. The audience is never allowed to forget for a moment that it is there to be instructed as well as entertained.

The basic purpose of Communist propaganda, of course, is to make conquest as easy as possible. The Party line is fed to the people like opium, and it dulls their senses and makes them docile. When persuasion proves inadequate, threats and brutality are resorted to, for in a Totalitarian State no one can remain on the fence. Only through complete unity, voluntary or forced, can such a state survive. It is impossible for anyone to remain non-political.

Should both persuasion and force fail, the Communists then resort to a method which represents an all time low in evil—the use of poisonous drugs to draw out false confessions from their victims. This is called the “biodynamic” treatment. The drugs, “actedon” and “mescaline” are used to paralyze the brain, then to cause its disintegration. The doses are administered in coffee, and the victim, with nothing else to eat or drink, consumes large quantities, which are generously supplied, unaware of the effect being produced on his mind and body. When the personality has been sufficiently disintegrated or “split” by these drugs—when the sufferer has been driven crazy—a skilled psychiatrist can put the pieces together at his will and gradually evolve a completely new personality. In other words, when the physical breakdown of the individual has been accomplished, his mental collapse is brought about by the use of these fiendish drugs.

The Communists say, “The average person can be made to give in through brutality and fear, but in complicated cases the combination of neurology, or brain study, chemistry and psychiatry must be used.” Preparing the victim valuable enough for this process often takes as long as three or four months, during which time he is jailed and kept in solitary confinement. Frequently dozens of doctors, scientists, and assistants are worn out in the process of treatment. It is so diabolical that the Communists say they use it only in exceptional cases where they feel that the results warrant a demonstration to the public at large of their complete mastery over man.

The world now knows that this was the treatment administered in 1949 to Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, Primate of the Catholic church, Budapest; to Michael Shipkov, Bulgarian Translator for the U. S. Legation in Sofia; and again in 1950 to Robert A. Vogeler, American business executive in Hungary. This same heinous method has been repeated in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Eastern Germany and undoubtedly elsewhere throughout the world, though actual reports of every case have not, as yet, come into print.

The use of hypnotism as a propaganda weapon and as a device for manipulating victims also has not been overlooked by the Communists. Dr. G. H. Estabrooks, Chairman of the Department of Psychology at Colgate University, who has pioneered in developing hypnotism’s wartime uses, says:

“With the Twentieth Century’s revived interest in psychology, hypnotism has been brought to the status of a full-fledged science.”

“A person,” continues Estabrooks, “can be hypnotized against his will or without his knowledge.”

“A foreign agent working in a hospital or a doctor in his own office could,” he avers, “over a period of time, place thousands of people under his power by means of fake physical examinations.”

For instance, he explains how in wartime this masked manoeuver could enable a junior medical officer to take over the reins of the U. S. Army and lead it into total defeat.

Hypnotism, we now know, was used in addition to drugs by the Nazis to obtain a “confession” from Van der Lubbe at the Reichstag Trial and also by the Soviet Union to demoralize Cardinal Mindszenty, Robert Vogeler and others.

Mao Tse-tung, like all Moscow-trained speakers and others of their ilk, is fully aware of the power of hypnosis over large audiences. In the early days of victory, he spellbound his listeners not alone by words but also by the strength of his mesmeric will.

“Make up your minds! We abhor fence straddlers. There is no middle of the road! Not in all China, not in all the universe,” he continued. “One must be either on the side of Imperialism or on the side of Communism!”

In a speech commemorating the 28th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao, addressing a mass meeting early in 1950, said:

“Internationally, China belongs to the anti-imperialist front. To Russia we proudly look for genuine, friendly aid, and to no other country. The second world war, with the Soviet Union as the principle fighting force, defeated the great Imperialist powers, Germany and Japan. It weakened England and France, and left only one Imperialist country in the world—the United States of America! Even she suffered great losses. Her economy was smashed and her domestic crisis is acute! There is great unrest in the country, and the people have no leader. They are fighting among themselves. And yet she thinks she can enslave the world! She is nothing but a weakling! By aiding Chiang Kai-shek, she is responsible for the slaughter of millions of Chinese!”

An outburst of applause and cries of “Ding How!” (Good! Good!) greeted his words.

Mao continued, waving his arms: “In China, some Imperialism still exists in our ‘New Democracy,’ but we will work steadfastly for a complete Communist Society. Our tools are the People’s Army, Police and Communist Court. Under the leadership of the working class, we will unite to form our own dictatorship over the lackeys of foreign Imperialism. We will drive them out like dogs, howling through the streets! Let us establish a People’s Dictatorship over the reactionaries, to be known throughout the world as the People’s Democratic Dictatorship. Let us raise China from an agricultural country by eliminating all classes, and realizing the state of universal fraternity!”

Another storm of applause from the duped audience followed these closing words, along with shrill cries of “Long live our People’s Dictatorship! Long live our Chairman Mao! Long live our Comrade Stalin!”

Chapter VI

Manchuria, the Prize

Manchuria is the home of the Manchus who conquered China and ruled it until 1911. It is the Prize, the bone of contention over which the bloodiest battles have been fought, and the one area in all Asia without which neither the Communists nor the Nationalists could hope to become a world power.

Studded with Japanese industrial plants, Manchuria is known as the Pittsburgh of China, due to the fact that here both coal and iron are mined close together. Here, also, is contained seventy per cent of the industrial potential of all China. A rugged, windy land, much like our American prairie states, it is one of the few places in Asia that has a food surplus and serves as the granary of that vast region. Farmers, using shaggy Mongol ponies, till broad fields of soybeans, millet, corn, wheat and opium poppies. With the great abundance of grain, the people are able to produce beef and mutton for export.

Even before the Japanese occupation, Manchuria was a thriving center, and the conquerors, with characteristic efficiency, speeded its industrial and agricultural development during the fourteen years of their occupation. They developed the largest coal, iron and gold mines in Eastern Asia. From Manchuria alone they obtained more gold than from any other source, in addition to five million tons of iron and steel and thirty million tons of coal every year.

The great cities in Manchuria, of which Mukden is the capital, were modernized. New railroad lines were built into the outlying districts, and thousands of workers, heretofore purely agricultural, were taught to work in factories. For the first time, modern hotels and apartments covered city blocks, and Mukden undoubtedly boasted more bathtubs, per capita, than any other city in Asia, with the possible exception of Shanghai.

The Generalissimo had believed that Manchuria, when it was liberated, would become a part of the Nationalist Government. He had sent occupation troops there, had incorporated it into his rightful territory, and at the end of the war had already started repairing the damage caused by the final phase of the fighting. He was unaware of the fact that Roosevelt had promised Manchuria to Russia as her price for entering the war against Japan. He still firmly believed in Roosevelt’s friendship, because Roosevelt had promised that all Chinese territory liberated from the Japanese would be returned to China.

Although Russia kept a tight rein on the Prize, she did everything she could to help and encourage the Chinese Communists. Immediately upon entering the war, she began to supply them with arms and ammunition captured from the Japanese. At first this was done stealthily by the simple ruse of allowing the Chinese Communists to “find” these supplies themselves. After V-J Day Russia made no attempt to hide from the world her interest in, and her support of, the Chinese Communist regime. Besides supplying arms and propaganda material, she assisted her lusty child by hampering, in every way, the liberation of the Nationalist troops held by the Japanese. Since then she has continued to work closely with the Chinese Reds. Li Li San, the Kremlin’s Chinese agent, is in command. Russia, therefore, takes everything she desires for herself, first.

Russian Armies in the East are composed of Asiatics, closely related geographically, racially and politically to the Chinese Communists. In behavior they are as clumsy and vindicative as their forebears under Genghis Khan. Many peace-loving Chinese, after experiencing Red domination, cried out, “Six months under the Communists are worse than fourteen years under the Japs.”

As an example of what happens when these people overrun a country, let us examine Manchuria at close range. Russian troops taking over the country from the Japanese stripped nearly all the factories of machinery, but with characteristic inefficiency. When a machine to be sent to Russia was dismantled, no effort was made to keep the pieces together in numbered crates so they could be reassembled in another location. On the contrary, the machines were broken down in mass and the jumbled parts loaded into trucks or freight cars with no regard whatever to system. Where a machine could not be brought out through doors or windows, the whole side of a wall was pushed out and the rubble left where it fell. Completely ignorant of the delicate mechanism of precision instruments, they permitted them to be left out in the rain and snow to rust into utter uselessness. Somewhere east of the Urals, the Russians must have a tremendous pile of scrap, if it is not scattered along the line of the Trans-Siberian Railway. This inability to appreciate and handle machinery may throw some light on Russia’s frantic desire to acquire machine tools, at almost any cost. Incidentally, the same wanton disregard of everything technical applies to the looting of Eastern Europe.

Not only were Manchuria’s factories moved out bodily, piled onto freight cars and, in a desultory manner, slowly moved into Siberia, but what the troops were unable to take with them, they maliciously destroyed. Aside from the Kremlin-activated seizure of the factories, the primitive soldiers of the occupying forces, as well as just common bandits, stripped Manchuria’s cities of everything that could, by any remote chance, be useful to them. Both Chinese and Russians followed the age old Mongolian custom and gleefully stole or destroyed all personal property that they could get their hands on. Even fixtures fastened to the walls were pulled out, and door knobs, pipes and plumbing appliances were removed and turned over to the government to be made into ammunition.

The Nationalist troops that the Generalissimo had moved in right after V-J Day found it well-nigh impossible to defend Manchurian property. The Chinese Communists used guerrilla warfare almost exclusively against the villagers, their tactics being to terrorize, kill and destroy before help could come from the Nationalist troops. “Sack and pillage” kept the people in constant panic. In an endeavor to isolate and defeat the Nationalists, the Communists tore up all the railroads. Peasants were conscripted to dig up hundreds of miles of railway track. They burned the ties, levelled the roadbeds, hid or carried away the rails, and demolished the drainage structures. Practically all the bridges were destroyed by explosives, all signal towers and sidetrack mechanisms were wrecked, and every other wanton damage that fiendish ingenuity could conceive or devise was inflicted. As a final gesture of brutality, captured locomotive engineers who were known to have Nationalist sympathies had their hands cut off.

This kind of fighting completely destroyed the economy of Manchuria. From being a food and industrial surplus area, she became poverty-stricken. The people, living in barren houses without furniture or utensils of any kind, were reduced to the level of their primitive ancestors. Water became the scarcest of commodities and, with the reservoirs destroyed, had to be brought up from the dirty rivers in buckets. City transportation was at a premium. It ranged from the luxury of a pedicab, to ancient carriage bodies or automobile chassis, hauled by men, tiny ponies and dogs. A few families found a new use for the bathtub which they had been able to salvage. Mounted on rickety wheels, it was used as a public conveyance, and men, women and children sat huddled together in it. Sometimes a huge umbrella, Chinese or foreign, protected them from a scorching sun or a driving rain. It made a grotesque picture indeed!

With the disruption of transportation and the commandeering of much of the foodstuffs for the troops, obtaining food became the major problem of the people of Manchuria. Starvation stalked the cities. Mukden families were reduced to eating dung. So precious was this commodity that every horse wore a contraption under his tail resembling a large, crude dust pan to preserve even minute droppings. The very poor mixed mud with the dung, and after baking the concoction in the sun used it as food. Hawkers sold it on the streets.

Just as the Mongols under Genghis Khan burned, looted and tortured when they invaded Cathay, so the modern Mongols have behaved in like manner. Some of the more decent among them were so outraged by these tactics that they deserted and joined the Nationalists. One, a Colonel, told how he had been ordered to round up bandits and drive them at bayonet point into villages. Here they were allowed to pillage, burn and rape to their hearts’ content. While this was being done, the Communists would remain hidden a short distance away. After the terror had subsided somewhat, when the village was reduced to a shambles and the inhabitants were all but insane, the Communists soldiers would rush in and shoot the bandits, ostensibly to rescue the villagers. This technique seldom failed to swell the Communist ranks. All who resisted conversion were, of course, subjected to more drastic treatment.

Another ex-Communist told of teaching little boys of ten and twelve to use knives and pistols to murder members of their own families who refused to cooperate with the Reds. The child criminals became fugitives and were forced to join the guerrillas in the hills.

Many of the well-to-do managed to get away, where, no one knew, but the poor, aged and helpless were not exempt from the senseless fury of the Mongol hordes. They were used at times as object lessons to demonstrate the pitiless power of the Red Terror. According to an eye witness, the hands of women and children were sometimes smashed with mallets and left dangling like raw hamburgers. These utterly miserable creatures wandered insanely through the streets, moaning pitifully and gradually dying from loss of blood, infection and unendurable pain.

At other times, the Communists tied bombs around the bodies of men and women, carted them to thickly populated areas, lighted the fuses and left them to explode. This invariably happened at night, when the effect was more terrifying. These human torches were supposed to be the unreliable Quislings. The method of their disposal by the Reds shows how the latter are running true to form. In the days of Genghis Khan a Quisling was despised. When he had served his purpose, he was taken out and his throat was slit. As an example, there is the story of the Battle of Samarkand, when thirty thousand Kankali Turks, seeing that the victory was going against them, and hoping to save their lives, deserted to the Mongols. They were received in a friendly manner and shown every courtesy. Equipped with Mongol military dress and weapons, they felt welcome and honored. But, alas, after being royally wined and dined, they were massacred to a man. Like Stalin, the Mongols had utter contempt for such people.

Conquering armies, however, sometimes get a dose of their own medicine, and, when they do, it is apt to be fatal. At least it proved so in the case of the forty Russian soldiers who looted a Japanese hospital near Mukden. Finding a large vat of alcohol in the basement, they spent a riotous night, drinking and carousing. The next morning an officer found all forty of them dead. Evidently they had never heard of “rubbing” alcohol.

Today, in Manchuria, the Chinese Communists, aided by Russian technicians and advisors, are rebuilding the country for their own advantage. It is said that Stalin will use Manchuria as an experimental training station for Communism. He now controls the reconstructed railways in and out of this highly strategic area and requires banks to give them fifty to sixty per cent of their loans for industrial developments. Some private businesses were told that they would not be molested, provided they would do all they could to boost production under Communist supervision. During the last three years of civil war in China, the Manchurian farmers turned over 4,500,000 tons of grain to the Communists. In spite of this, they are being urged to PRODUCE FOR THE PEOPLE!—to raise more and more grain to be exported to Siberia. In Russia’s grandiose scheme of developing Siberia with Chinese slave labor, the wealth of Manchuria is her greatest industrial asset.

In contrast to Stalin’s close personal supervision of Manchuria, experts seem agreed that he will leave China pretty much alone, for the time being, and let Mao and other leaders of the moment believe that they are solidifying their positions. Sometime within the next one, two or three years, he may “liquidate” or “retire” them all and replace them with the out-and-out Russian Commissars. How soon Stalin will be able to accomplish this, time alone will tell.

Chapter VII

The Tragedy of the Generalissimo

Any account of conditions in China today would be incomplete without mentioning the Nationalist Government and what it attempted to achieve.

The political and social revolution inside China has been in progress many years, and these years have been turbulent ones. The Chinese, largely illiterate, were for a long time completely isolated. Many believed that China was the entire world and that a “foreigner” was a Chinese from another province. Patriotism was felt by them only where the home and family were concerned.

In 1911, Dr. Sun Yet-sen led a successful revolution and overthrew the Manchu Dynasty. Desiring to make China a modern republic, he proclaimed as his aim: “To dedicate the few score perishable years of our life to the laying of an imperishable foundation for our Nation.” To this end he gave his life.

The educated Chinese then began the creation of a modern, unified and democratic country. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, co-founder of the revolution of 1911, became its second leader in 1925, on the death of Dr. Sun. China knew no other leader until 1949.

In the beginning, the Chinese Communist and Nationalist Parties were one and the same. They were the Revolutionary Party. An admirer of the United States and Great Britain, Dr. Sun first requested their help in reorganizing and revitalizing his country, but they refused. With no alternative, he was forced to accept the aid of Russian revolutionaries who jumped at the chance to tie China up with their own impending revolution. Working with the famous Communist, Adolph Joffe, Dr. Sun drew up the policy of the new government. However, not all the Chinese revolutionaries were radical. Some were moderate liberals, and many were wealthy conservatives who desired only a more modern setup than the Manchus had. Among the latter the Soong family is certainly the best known. This family cleverly safeguarded its future by marrying one of its charming daughters, Chingling, to Dr. Sun Yat-sen; another, Meiling, to Chiang Kai-shek; and a third, Eiling, to Dr. H. H. Kung, a 75th lineal descendant of Confucius. This last was of definite psychological significance, as it united the mighty Soong family with that of China’s most revered Saint.

When Chiang Kai-shek inherited the mantle of Sun Yat-sen, he determined to carry out the policy of the revolution. His actions followed his words. Enormous progress was made during the so-called “Golden Decade,” between 1927 and 1937. China made a beginning toward industrialization and economic stability and improved her educational facilities.

This was the age of enormous industrial expansion. Railroads were constructed, telephone lines built, and even radio was introduced. Electricity and power plants were created, and merchants did a flourishing business. Tourist trade was at its height, and Chinese and American importers were cooperating harmoniously. Everyone seemed to be better off than before, the poor as well as the rich.

Chinese Communist Party | Koumintang
1910 | Period of |  |  |  |  | 1910
1912 |  |  |  |  | Dr. Sun Yat-Sen | 1911
1914 | Socialist |  |  |  | Republican |
1916 | Activity |  |  |  | Regime | 1912
1918 |  | Revolution | Kuomintang |
|  | and | Government |
1920 | Birth of Chinese | Warlordism |  |
1922 | Communist Party |  |  |  |  | 1921
|  |  |  |  | Period of |
|  |  |  |  | Cooperation |
1924 | Period of |  |  |  | Death of Dr. Sun, |
1926 |  |  |  |  | Advent of |
1928 | Russian |  |  |  | Chiang Kai-shek |
1930 |  |  |  |  |  | 1927
1932 | Interference |  |  |  |  |
1934 |  | Single  |  |  Party | Hide and |
1936 | “Long March” |  |  |  | Seek Period |
|  | Revolution |  |
1938 | Marco Polo | and |  |
| Bridge | Civil War | Reconciliation | 1937
|  |  |  |  | Period of Mixed |
1940 | “Yenan |  |  |  | Civil War, |
1942 | Interlude” |  |  |  | Cooperation and |
1944 |  |  |  |  | Anti-Japanese |
|  |  |  |  | Activities |
|  |  |  |  |  | 1945
1946 | Period of |  |  |  | End of |
| American |  |  |  | Japanese War |
1948 | Interference |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | 1949
1950 | USSR and British | Civil War | Retreat to |
| Recognition |  |  |  | Formosa | 1950

Chart showing origins of the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party, or Koumintang (KMT), as the latter frequently was called

Chart showing origins of the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party, or Koumintang (KMT), as the latter frequently was called

Thousands of Chinese enthusiastically took part in helping to build this New China, and every effort was made to instill a real spirit of Nationalism in the hearts of the people. To quote the Generalissimo, “If the National Revolution should fail, China, as a nation, would have nothing to rely upon. Should this happen, not only would China cease to rank as one of the Four Powers of the world, but she would be at the mercy of other countries.”

The period of progress, unhappily, was short lived. It had become obvious to the Japanese war lords that a patriotic, united China might, on the one hand, prove an insurmountable obstacle to their own plan to conquer and control all of Asia. On the other hand, it would be too sweet a plum to pass up! Twice during the Thirties they shelled Shanghai and in 1939 launched a full scale war of aggression. All of the cities along the coast were captured, and the Chinese were forced to move far inland.

Led by the Generalissimo, thousands of Chinese moved whole libraries, printing presses, government records and valuables laboriously up the Yangtse River to the city of Chungking. Every kind of river craft was used from a few modern boats to small sampans, junks and home-made rafts pushed by hand. All had to be either lifted out of the water and carried around the rapids in the river or be abandoned. Many families travelled on foot, each member carrying a bundle on his back. Even children of four and five had their small belongings wrapped in a large scarf and tied to the end of a stick slung over their shoulders. The road along the river valley became lined with food vendors and shoemakers who did a big business in woven straw sandals. Professors, surrounded by their students carrying modern books or ancient Chinese written scrolls, conducted classes during their periods of rest. United with their leader against a foreign enemy, the people of China revered and respected the Generalissimo.

At last the long procession of uprooted patriots reached its destination, Chungking, and here Chiang set up his military headquarters and conducted his affairs of State. The Japanese, unable to reach the city by land, attacked almost nightly by air. Without anti-aircraft guns or planes of their own, the Chinese suffered terrible civilian casualties. A great part of the city was burned by incendiary bombs.

On the ruins of the old city, Madame Chiang Kai-shek proceeded to build a model village, with schools, nurseries, libraries and churches such as she had known in America. The project proved a wonderful morale builder. Everybody for miles around took part in the construction of the unique little city, and it became the center of a broader undertaking known as “The New Life Movement.”

In this new village, personal habits of cleanliness and sanitation were taught and ways of being mutually helpful suggested. Concerts and community singing were held almost nightly. The Generalissimo, wishing to emphasize unselfish cooperation, expressed the philosophy of the movement in four simple words: “Honesty, Industry, Sincerity and Justice.” There developed, among these people at least, a feeling of pride and unity that was well on the way to becoming national patriotism. This new spirit of oneness in the face of common danger was greater than at any time since Emperor Chin caused the Great Wall to be built in 214 B. C. to keep the Huns from invading his Empire.

The Generalissimo’s gallant stand against the modern war machines and trappings of the Japanese added shining pages to the history of China. History will record a full realization of the importance of his contributions to the United States in World War II. After Pearl Harbor, while the Japanese won many military successes against the Americans and the British, Chiang’s determination to stay in the fight saved countless American lives. The Japanese were forced to keep a million and a half of their best troops in China, although these were needed desperately in the East Indies and the Islands of the Pacific, where they were trying to stop the Allied advance under General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. We in the United States, for the first time, became dimly aware of what a capable and relentless foe the Japanese could be and of the tremendous battle the Chinese had long been fighting.

The Chinese have never been a warlike nation. Their industrial development was comparable to that of Europe in the Middle Ages. Therefore, their political and economic structures were totally unable to meet the demands of a modern military struggle with Japan. Regardless of how little they had, however, they fought doggedly against increasing odds. When all surface communication with the outside world was cut off, their resistance forces burrowed underground.

Several times the Japanese offered the Generalissimo very attractive peace terms, but he resolutely declined them. He had promised to stick with his Allies to the end, to give them his full assistance to achieve a decisive victory. His confidence in Roosevelt was complete, and, like a great many Americans, British and others, Chiang believed Roosevelt incapable of injustice. He was undoubtedly familiar with the discussions at the Cairo Conference when Roosevelt, in mock seriousness, said to Churchill:

“I think all of the Chinese territory liberated from the Japanese during the war should be returned to China, including Hong Kong.”

Churchill, jumping to his feet, said emphatically, “I will never permit the return of Hong Kong to the Chinese!”

“Then I will take the matter up, personally, with your King!” said Roosevelt.

“The King of England has no authority to give away Imperial Territory,” shouted Churchill. “I alone hold that power!”

Roosevelt laughed heartily. He always enjoyed baiting Churchill, because the latter was so hot tempered and quick to jump whenever he was goaded.

Chiang took Roosevelt seriously.

During the years of the Japanese war, the Generalissimo also had to contend with the Communists. The Chinese Red Armies, while giving lip service to anti-Japanese activity, were in fact so placed militarily as to be facing the Nationalist troops, rather than the Japanese! It is true that the Communists made a number of raids on isolated Japanese posts, but this they did with the purpose of capturing soldiers whom they could then indoctrinate with Communist propaganda. Naturally the Japanese resented these raids and retaliated. Consequently, there were skirmishes now and then, but they were of little importance. The fact still remains that the Japanese fought their major war against the Generalissimo’s Armies. Wherever and whenever possible, the Chinese Communist Armies helped the enemy by attacking Nationalist-held towns and lines of communication.

The Japanese surrender, when it finally came, was received with great jubilation throughout China and the world. It was indeed a triumphant hour for the Generalissimo. Now, at long last, he was in a position to undertake a peaceful rehabilitation of his country and to pick up where he had left off when the Japanese struck. He could go forward with his program of political and social reforms and establish, first of all, a sound economy. The stage was set for his dreams to become a reality—the dream that China would take her rightful place in the world of democratic nations.

Although the American Ambassador, General Patrick J. Hurley, had told Chiang of the decision at Yalta to give Manchuria to Russia as her price for entering the war against Japan, the Generalissimo believed so firmly in the good will and friendship of Roosevelt that he was sure he would be supported in his effort to regain this important Northern province. Therefore, as soon after the Japanese surrender as possible, he sent troops to occupy and try to hold Manchuria. There his army found itself confronted by the Russian Mongolian Army bent on the same mission.

At home, likewise, the Generalissimo was faced with ever-increasing problems. The Allied and Japanese bombing had caused great destruction, not unlike that in Europe. Villages had to be rebuilt, factories and lines of communication restored. Millions of displaced Chinese were waiting patiently to be returned to their homes. Approximately three and a half million Japanese soldiers and civilians were ready for repatriation.

With great courage, inexhaustible patience and amazing wisdom, Chiang Kai-shek began his program of reconstruction and rehabilitation. He little realized that his three great Allies—Russia, England and the United States—had plotted behind his back to snatch from his hands, in his moment of victory, the one area that could change China from a backward agricultural country into a modern and powerful nation. Without Manchuria Chiang was lost. This was the juicy bone that first the Japanese, then the Communists or the Generalissimo had to have to complete their growth as a modern power. Without it each would be rendered impotent.

Chiang Kai-shek had fought for eight years to prevent the spread of Japanese totalitarianism in China. Now he was confronted with a much more vicious brand, Communist totalitarianism. He commented, “The Japanese were a disease of the skin. The Communists are a disease of the bone.”

Many people wonder why the Nationalist Armies were so ineffective and why so many of them went over to the Communists without even putting up a fight. Certainly the bulk of the Chinese are not disposed to Communism. They just want an opportunity to feed, clothe and shelter their families. Most of them do not understand Communism or any other political philosophy. Some accepted the new leadership through sheer inertia. Some of them leaned toward it in protest against stupid and oppressive government police measures, corrupt practices and bad administration. Squeeze, or graft as we call it, was never a crime in China. The Chinese people have no sense of political right or wrong, no convictions about political truths as the Western world recognizes them. As one Chinese General put it, “To take from the government is no crime.” Indeed the principal weakness of the Generalissimo was the very fact that he surrounded himself with men who did not hesitate to take all they could get from the government.

Chiang showed the same loyalty to those who surrounded him and supported him, including members of his own and his wife’s families, as President Truman, for instance, has demonstrated in his loyalty to the Pendergast machine and others who have done his bidding. The Generalissimo’s honesty and personal integrity have never been questioned by those who know him best, and who were in constant association with him during the Japanese war. General Wedemeyer has attested to this statement and he was the American Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek and knew him intimately. For us to say his Nationalist Government was corrupt and deserved to fall, amounts to the pot calling the kettle black. Such a situation exists today in Washington, D. C.

Feeding the armies was Chiang’s greatest problem. The government at first gave a lump sum to the army commanders, but many of these were unscrupulous rascals who kept most of it for themselves, allocating a small remainder to subordinates, who passed a still smaller proportion on down through the lower levels to the unprotected soldier. This was a century-old practice in China, and the hungry soldier was reduced to stealing or appropriating his food from the peasant merchants. Naturally there was always trouble between the soldiers and the merchants, with no love lost between the two. The latter lost their profits, and the soldiers reasoned that they were at least entitled to food from the people they were fighting to protect. It became increasingly easy for the Chinese Communists to win converts. They went with those who offered them food.

In spite of this tragic situation, the Generalissimo, with the same patience and strength that had made his war leadership outstanding, continued to hold the loyalty of a great number of his people. Long after his flight to Formosa, rich and poor, officer and soldier continued to fight for his principles. For example, as the Communists entered Peking, there was desperate street fighting. The commander of a battalion told his men, “We are greatly outnumbered. I cannot keep you from going over to the other side, but I have fought the Communists for eight years and I will not give up now!” Inspired by his brave stand, most of his men remained with him and formed an obstacle to the Communist advance. Finally, after an hour of hopeless fighting, and when all his men had been killed, the battalion commander manned the last machine gun himself and turned it full force on the solid front of Communist troops advancing toward him.

The Generalissimo had many such brave soldiers who fought to the death in his armies. Not all those loyal to Chiang were soldiers. In Canton, after the Communists took over, they held a great celebration featuring a long victory parade. This stopped every few miles and put on a little skit which showed the Generalissimo on his knees, with his hands tied behind his back, confessing his sins to the Communist leaders who laughed uproariously! The actor who impersonated Chiang received numerous threatening letters. When he reported this to his Soviet boss, he was told to disregard the threats and was ordered to continue his role. A few days later the actor was shot. Even behind the Red Curtain there are still snipers about. In fact there is every reason to believe that active guerrilla bands are on the prowl.

In Kwangsi Province, the Southern Province of General Li Tsun-jen, pronounced “Lee Tzun-ren,” the villagers found that if they did not cooperate with the Communists, they would be shot. On the other hand, if they did, they took the chance of meeting a similar fate at the hands of Nationalist guerrillas for collaborating with the enemy. Undoubtedly this situation existed in many other places.

Many of those who knew the Generalissimo best believed that despite the corruption that surrounded him he would go down in history as a man of integrity and high purpose. Tribute is paid him by General Wedemeyer when he says, “There are few people who can speak more authoritatively than I can concerning the sincerity and Christian humility of the Generalissimo. I had frequent, almost daily, contacts with him for nearly a year. I can vouch for his unselfish devotion to the Chinese people and for his earnest desire to provide a democratic way of life within China. Surely his loyalty and his faithful cooperation during the war fully merit our lasting friendship.”

Our assistance was denied to Chiang, and the outcome of our most grievous mistakes will be judged by future historians. Not only the United States, but some of the Chinese themselves, selfishly withheld the aid they could have given their leader and their country. In 1946, fifty of the wealthiest Chinese were called in and asked if they would each donate a large portion of their enormous fortunes, which together ran into the billions, to their government. Bowing and nodding their heads, they listened politely, but not one of them was willing to sacrifice his future security or even to jeopardize it against such stupendous odds.

Support of the State still is a secondary consideration to the Chinese. Their principal loyalty—financial, filial, and political—is to their own family. As in the ancient days, the poor, the sick and the destitute can claim the protection of their nearest relative. No matter how distant the relationship, they are given food and shelter. Be it said to their credit, there are very few asylums or orphanages in China. The family takes care of its own.

Perhaps this idea was in Chiang’s mind when he refused the enticing peace terms offered him by the Japanese at Hankow. A devout scholar, he quoted Confucius: “The men of old, when they wished their virtues to shine throughout the land, first had to govern their states well. To govern their states well, they had to establish harmony in their families. To establish harmony in their families, they had to discipline themselves and set their minds in order. To set their minds in order, they had to make their purpose sincere. To make their purpose sincere, they had to extend their knowledge to the utmost. Such knowledge is acquired through a careful investigation of things. For, with things investigated, knowledge becomes complete. With knowledge complete, the purpose becomes sincere. With the purpose sincere, the mind is set in order, and there is real self-discipline. With self-discipline, the family achieves harmony. With harmony in the family, the state becomes well governed. With the state well governed, there is peace throughout the land.”

With due respect for what the Generalissimo attempted to do in China and what he has accomplished on Formosa, I would like to quote one paragraph from a scholarly article entitled: “What Americans Don’t Know About Asia,” appearing in the June 4, 1951, issue of Life Magazine, written by James Michener, Pulitzer Prize author of “Tales of the South Pacific”:

“To appreciate the greatness of our loss (of China) one must visit Formosa. This island today is the bright spot of Asia. The Nationalist government, shaken to its withers by the debacle on the mainland, has matured astonishingly in the chastisement of defeat. It has established an enlightened commonwealth. Nowhere in Asia is the food problem more fairly handled. Nowhere are justice, human safety and property—those universal measures of good government—so respected and secured. The American cannot visit this island without one lament filling his mind: this might have been China today.”

Let us, in the United States, so act in the moments left of the immediate and perilous hours of this half-way-mark of the Twentieth Century to preclude a similar “chastisement of defeat.” May it never be said, by some lone survivor of an atomic attack, tossed upon a distant isle, the beauty, dignity and grandeur of which is strangely familiar, yet defies Paradise itself: “This might have been America.”

Chapter VIII

Behind the Red Curtain

Immediately after the Communists gained control of China and occupied it from North to South, Russian technicians and advisors poured into the country. Everyone was asking: “What are the Russians doing in China?”

From a few foreigners and Chinese, who had made an early escape from behind the Red Curtain, and from letters later smuggled out of the country, came the revealing truth. Some of the informants had lived under the Communist yoke for as long as eight and nine months, and among these was a United Press correspondent, Chang Kuo Sin.

“The Russians,” he said “began at once to fit China into the political-military bloc of Soviet dominated States which, by the end of 1949, extended from the Danube River to the Pacific Ocean. Their organization was beyond anything China had ever seen, and it certainly proved that they had been planning it for a long time. I was frankly shocked by the influence they seemed to have on the Chinese, from the very beginning.

“The ‘Big Noses,’ as the Chinese called the Russians,” he continued, “took over as fast as they could. They tried to make a good impression on the Chinese by moving right in with them. They ate Chinese food and fumbled with chopsticks, and even wore Chinese Communist uniforms made for them in Russia. They had already learned to speak Chinese and to write a certain number of characters before they arrived. Also, they had been taught some of the old Chinese customs, such as raising the rice bowl as a gesture of friendly greeting.

“The Russians brought in about seventy railroad engineers to supervise the rebuilding of the railroads and bridges damaged by the war. They were especially interested in everything military and sent movie units around to make films of Chinese strategic areas. A friend of mine, who saw them taking pictures, told me that Chinese officers, who had been trained in Russia, were showing them all of the defenses of the country.”

The original plan, in 1950, was to attack Formosa before the typhoon season began in June. The Russians knew then what the world knows now from the 1951 release of Dean Acheson’s diplomatic report of December 23, 1949, that we had written off Formosa as of no importance to our Pacific defenses. Acheson tried, in vain, to involve Lieutenant General Wedemeyer in this act of treachery. Acheson testified, June 1, 1951, that the State Department prepared the report after Wedemeyer, then Assistant Chief of Staff, suggested to the State Department that it use the Voice of America to “minimize” any damage that might result from the fall of Formosa. But we know from the complete Wedemeyer Report that the General advocated unequivocal defense of Formosa as being of definite strategic importance in our chain of defenses in the Pacific. MacArthur and Wedemeyer both had warned that the fall of Formosa would leave Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines outflanked. The following is an account of how the enemy planned to take Formosa with an offensive beginning June, 1950.

Chang Kuo Sin reported: “We are given to understand that the island will be taken by the biggest land, sea and air force that has yet been launched against any place within the Russian orbit. They will muster hundreds of fighting planes and thirty warships, plus thousands of troops for this invasion. The warships, of course, include many that went over to the Communists from the Nationalist forces.”

The Chinese correspondent was not the only one who watched with alarm the preparations for the invasion of Formosa. From every side came evidence of the size and strength of the forces assembling for the attack. The British, after recognition of the Communist Government, and in order to protect their investments, were forced into the distasteful position of giving them, by court order, ninety airplanes. Worth twenty million dollars, these planes belonged to the airline companies owned by the picturesque American flyer Claire L. Chennault, whose famous “Flying Tiger” raids on the Japanese added brilliant pages to American military history. This high-handed transfer of American-made planes, probably the best in the world outside those in use by the U. S. Air Force, to the Communists by the British was cause for alarm in official circles. The planes will undoubtedly wind up under the direct control of the Kremlin, whether or not they are used for the initial air assault on Formosa.

The ground forces were nominally to be under the command of the Mayor of Shanghai, who was said to have marshalled a picked force of one hundred and eighty thousand troops for the invasion. Their training in beach landings and personal combat was supervised by the Russians, and many of their special weapons are said to have been of Soviet make. The Mayor, a pawn of the Russians, was content to leave the military strategy entirely in the hands of his more than helpful allies.

Russian engineers were busy at every port from which the invasion might be launched. After forcing those already on the job to resign, they hired shipbuilders and began work on the dockyards, repairing the damage caused by Nationalist bombings. They assembled ships of different sizes and made them ready for invasion day. So we see that the Russians were well occupied in Shanghai.

The fact that American troops were withdrawn by the State Department from occupation in South Korea a few months earlier, left that country a more logical target of opportunity to begin their aggressive action. This explains why the Formosa attack was not made as originally scheduled in 1950.

In Canton the Russians were busy moving complete factories to Siberia, just as they had done earlier in Manchuria. This, they said, was to save them from Nationalist bombs. The real reason was that they needed them to build up Siberia industrially. Most of the Southern factories produced cement, cotton cloth or chemicals, vitally needed to support the large Siberian populace. It mattered little to the Russians that China needed these same commodities for herself. When workers complained that they could not live without their jobs, the Communist bosses said: “Well, then, come along with your plant and bring your family.” When the workers, usually encumbered with large families, would ask hopefully about transportation, they would always receive the same reply: “Can’t you walk? We did on the ‘Long March.’ You can, too.”

The Chinese are always desperately in need of doctors, and the Communists, right after taking over the country, allowed the physicians to go about their business unmolested, provided they did not discuss politics. So great was the demand for medical services that outrageous fees were charged. The Communists permitted this situation to continue, as it kept the doctors happy. With a flood raging in China and plague beginning to show itself, doctors were a priceless commodity. Even Russian doctors and scientists were brought in and added to the Ministry of Health in China.

Although the flood of 1950 was the worst one in years, it did not stop the Russians from sending food out of the country and into Siberia. The Chinese granaries were empty, and everyone was hungry. In Shanghai alone there were reported at least a hundred and twenty thousand foodless and homeless refugees, and no agency was able to do anything for them. It became dangerous for the average citizen, poor though he might be, to go out in the streets at night. Every morning a number of dead bodies were found piled up against the walls of buildings.

Mao Tse-tung, his slogans still promising “Abundance for All,” ordered a part of the army to work on the cooperative farms and offered handsome rewards for boosting food production. In Peking the worried Chinese Communists admitted that there were some nine million people dead or dying in those areas, but that they were unable to halt the shipments out of the country. Starving beggars in filthy rags, a not unusual sight in China during the famine and flood seasons, died by the score on the streets of Nanking and Shanghai, where they had come with the faint hope of finding work. These were the stronger ones; the weaker were never able to leave their villages, or else they fell along the way.

“Food is the one vital concern here,” said a letter from Peking. “Any kind of food. Even if you have money there is very little to buy, and everybody is poor down to the bone. We are thoroughly sick of the whole situation, but what can we do? Our friends are sent to jail if they complain about anything, sometimes even if they voice an opinion about the Communists that is not flattering.

“The beautiful lawns and gardens in the public parks and surrounding the homes of wealthy families have been plowed up and planted with vegetables. When this is not done within a reasonable length of time, soldiers enter, armed with guns, and ask politely: ‘You would like to have your gardens Produce for the People, would you not?’ In any case, the owner is lucky if he is permitted to keep a small share of what he is able to raise. After the gardens are taken over, it is a matter of the Camel in the Arab’s tent. Next, the valuables in the house are removed, to be sent out of the country in return for dollars and pounds. Then the troops or Party officers quarter themselves comfortably in the house, and if there is the slightest difficulty, the owners are forced out.”

Another letter said, “It is considered very bad taste, if not dangerous, to appear well off, and when I go to market I wear my oldest clothes to avoid being conspicuous. Only the Communist Hierarchy go about dressed in furs and finery, and they never go out except in shiny limousines.”

Adding to the difficulty of obtaining food and other necessities, Communists, for propaganda reasons, had put the pedicabs and rickshaws off some of the streets in the larger cities. The price of gasoline went up so high that no one could use his car, even if he still had one. Thus transportation became another severe problem. Only a few crowded, rickety busses still operated, and these were almost impossible to board. They were so packed that people clung tightly to each other at the doors, somewhat reminiscent of rush-hour in the New York subway. Those not able to get on the vehicles dog-trotted along behind. The busses never ran on any schedule, and the driver, if given a large enough bribe, would even change the route at a moment’s notice.

From a Chinese refugee now living in San Francisco, I learned that Peking families, as well as others in the Northern area, were sending their children out of the country on the pretext of aiding their fathers in business. “We try to make the Communists feel that we are cooperating with them wholeheartedly. Then, when we are sure that we have their confidence and that it is safe, we ask them if we may send our son or daughter to Hong Kong for business reasons or, better still, on work for the Party. If they are lucky enough to get away, they may have to stay in Hong Kong three or four months before they can book passage on a ship. When we hear, via the grapevine, that they are safe on board, we do not care what becomes of us.”

A tragic letter from a former military attaché in Washington during the war told of the fall of Shanghai and the stampede of hundreds of people trying to get away from the Communists. “The conquerors closed the gates of the city during most of the day and night to prevent crowds from trying to reach the railway stations or river banks and wharves. Steamships anchored in mid-stream to protect themselves from the mobs that tried to board them. Had everyone been successful in the attempt, the ships would have capsized. It was necessary to go out in small sampans and junks. Ropes with knots tied at intervals, to which people could cling, were thrown over the sides of the ships. I saw one father fasten a rope to his three children, and then the family tried to scale the ship’s side. Suddenly, when they were all about half-way up, the child at the top slipped or let go, pushing the other children with him as he fell. The parents screamed wildly and jumped into the churning, muddy water after them. Their cries were heart rending.”

In talking to Americans and Chinese who have returned to the United States, I caught many interesting and authoritative glimpses of life behind the Red Curtain. For instance, as with Stalin in Moscow, no one in China seemed to know where in Peking Chairman Mao lived. Some said he had taken over the Wagon Lits Hotel, others that he had a place in the country. Some said he appeared on the streets rarely, although he was seen at official gatherings now and then. At one such affair, Mao displayed a batch of letters, supposed to have been received from non-Communists, telling how pleased they were at the way the Communists had taken over and how courteous they had been. The tone of all these letters was flattering and to the effect that the non-Communists were impressed with their new masters. What Mao did not know, or did not mention, of course, was that the letters had been written and signed under duress and that, later, the writers had pleaded with friends going out of the country to tell those to whom the letters were addressed that nothing could be further from the truth.

The Communists strictly censored all mail coming into China, especially from the United States. Many letters were confiscated when they contained names and information about people the Reds wished to add to their files, and almost always when there was money in them.

Mao and Chou En-lai were said to be on very good terms with a number of Russian advisors. All called each other by their first names. The Chinese also were copying Russian ways with surprising alacrity. I learned that one of the most popular of the adopted Moscow customs was wife-swapping, or free love. In the New Democracy marriage was performed and terminated merely by mutual consent, Russian style. There was no exchange of vows when mating was done for the Cause, no priest or magistrate to pronounce the pair man and wife or to separate them later. Mrs. Chou En-lai told me very frankly in 1946 that she had never been legally married to her well-known husband. “The New Democracy did away with all that,” she said. “We did away with ceremonies. They are foolish and we don’t need them. Such things are for you Imperialists!”

Such laxity in marital affairs has long been the accepted custom in Russia, and indeed the Russian official often finds himself going even further, sometimes involuntarily. A Soviet army officer arriving at the Shanghai Airport not long ago looked around for his wife. She was nowhere in sight. A good looking blonde walked up to him and asked, “Are you Colonel Kovicov?” “I am,” he replied, a little taken aback. He had never seen her before and felt a faint chill when she said, “I am your wife now, on Party orders.” He knew then that he was under suspicion.

Another high official in Russia returned home from an arduous day in the Politburo and found that his “wife” had been replaced by a new and not so pretty one. “Who are you?” he asked rather sadly, and she replied, “You know who I am. I am the wife assigned to go with you to China.” It developed that this woman spoke Chinese fluently, a talent not possessed by the deposed mate. One may also infer that she was more adept at spying.

Furs, silks, cosmetics and some jewelry were said to have been brought into China at times by the Russians as rewards for faithful service, and many a smart Party woman already had a neat nest egg laid away in clothes and other commodities, such as the Communist “unmentionable” one, money.

Americans who admire China and the Chinese will be disheartened by a letter written by a retired colonel in the United States Army and an old China hand. “The campaign of hatred stirred up against the United States is impossible to realize unless you are right here on the spot,” he wrote. “We are constantly branded as the worst enemies China ever had. All the people who spent their lives here working for China and the Chinese are called spies or tools of Imperialism. At first they were polite and assured us that we could do business as usual. Later we felt that we were being eased out, and finally we were kicked out. We are all suspected of being agents of the American Government and can never go out on the street without being jostled, jeered at and spat upon. Many of us in Shanghai have been beaten, jailed and fined huge sums before being released. Two men I know have been taken out of their houses at night and beaten up. I don’t know how much longer we will be able to stay here, but you can expect us as soon as we can get away. I have plenty to tell when I do get home! It is difficult to leave, as everyone has to have a Chinese vouch for his good behavior before he can go. This Chinese friend actually becomes a hostage, and any criticism of the Communist Government on the part of the American may endanger his life.”

A correspondent in Shanghai was one of the Americans who was sure that it would be possible to “do business” with the Communists. He wrote a letter to the effect that “things really are not going to be as bad as people are inclined to believe. They have assured me that my office will not be molested and that they are very anxious to do business with the foreigners.” A few days after the Reds took Shanghai, they locked him up in that same office and confiscated his business. He was allowed to return to the States, but, like everyone else, had to leave his Chinese hostage behind him. When his American ship stopped at Hong Kong, he talked to the press. A few days later, when his ship was in mid-ocean, he received a radio message saying in effect: “Make no statements about China. Authorities holding me responsible.”

American missionaries fared no better than the businessmen. Many churches were sealed officially as they were considered “private organizations” which, under Communism, cannot exist. Christian pastors of all faiths were made to register with the police and were questioned for hours as to their attitudes toward the Russians and the Chinese Communists. They were told plainly that although the Communists “guaranteed” them freedom of religious belief—that is, a man could believe anything he wished if he did not talk about it—they intended to eliminate all freedom of religious action—that is, no gathering together for the purpose of worship would be tolerated. And this was in late 1948 and early 1949!

So much for the Americans. How did the British fare after recognizing the Communist Government? Once feared and respected throughout the Orient and now huddled together on their little island of Hong Kong, they were forced to eat humble pie from the hands of the Communists sitting on the front steps of their one-time imperial domain. At stake was their one billion, two hundred million dollar investment, the key to what was left of their Empire in the Far East.

A correspondent from Hong Kong wrote, “The city is packed with refugees, Chinese, British and Americans. It is terribly expensive. As much as three thousand Hong Kong dollars down payment is required before you can rent a room, and everything else is sky high. It is dreadfully hot, there are few parks or out-of-door places to sit, and almost nowhere to eat. The Communists are everywhere. They have closed most of the bookstores except those run by the Communists, and these carry nothing, of course, except books and magazines about Communism. Even the British bookstores are forced to carry Party literature. It was impossible to get a doctor when my wife was sick, as the Communists will not issue licenses to practice to any but British doctors, and they are so busy with the care of both Chinese and foreigners that they are worn out. With such overcrowding, many are sick, as you can imagine. I wish I could send my family home, but it is impossible. It takes many weeks or months to get reservations. We are just trapped!”

Thus the Lion’s mighty roar, that once thundered throughout the world, was reduced to a whimpering sniffle. Everywhere the British, especially in the foreign office in London, were embarrassed at the turn of events. Dr. Cheng Tien-shi, the Chinese Nationalist Government’s ambassador to Great Britain, was called in and told that England had recognized the Chinese Communist Government and that his office must be vacated. With Confucian calm the elderly Chinese gentleman faced the youthful Minister of State, Hector McNeil. The latter fingered his tie, cleared his throat and, shifting his feet uneasily, read the announcement in a strained voice. Sitting down with McNeil, Cheng recalled the days when it was fashionable to praise Chiang Kai-shek for his magnificent stand against the Japanese. He quoted Mark Anthony’s speech over the dead body of Caesar:

“But yesterday the word of Caesar might

Have stood against the world. Now lies he there,

And none so poor to do him reverence.”

Several times McNeil referred deferentially to Cheng, who is one of the greatest living Chinese philosophers, as “Mr. Ambassador.” At length, the gentle old man asked politely, “How can you still call me ‘Mr. Ambassador?’” McNeil replied, “Once an Ambassador, always an Ambassador.” The Chinese scholar hesitated a moment and then said, “In my country, we have a similar saying, ‘Once a friend, always a friend.’ Homage to force and violence is a dangerous thing. If you worship Caesar, you will die by Caesar. Why must you bury us while we are still very much alive? One day you will need us again.”

Chapter IX

Quo Vadis?

The dangers facing the United States and the countries friendly to us are becoming increasingly serious. We must recognize the fact that, as individuals, we are as responsible for what is happening today as were the people living peacefully at one time under Hitler, Hirohito and Stalin, and whom we heartily condemn for having allowed disastrous conditions to develop and get beyond their control.

Concerning the forces building up around us and the world today, we are still far too apathetic and complacent. Much of the responsibility for this must, of necessity, be placed upon our leadership. We know that America is the one bastion of freedom left in the world today, and that continued strength in it reflects the hope of the world—that is, of the free peoples of the world as well as those behind iron curtains everywhere who now know the true meaning of slavery which was sold to them in the guise of “security.”

Remaining strong entails a price. What is it? To me, above all, it requires faith in God, faith in our fellow man and faith in ourselves and other individuals of personal integrity. Meanwhile, we must first keep strong our foundations of initiative, self-reliance and individual responsibility for our actions with respect to our duties to our own country.

Unfortunately many people in America have believed the Henry Wallace theory that it was an “over-abundance” or “excessive production” which brought on the depression of the Thirties, or that has or ever could, cause any depression. But this is not true. Economists tell us today that “misdirected production, plus misdirected and over-stimulated consumption” aided our previous downfall, and that it was an abuse of our credit, both at home and abroad. But what does this mean? Was part of our trouble then, as now, caused by too many loans to foreign countries for goods bought here, and an abuse of credit to consumers (you and me) here at home? This did bring on the boom of the late Twenties and also the terrific maladjustment which the depression of the Thirties should have corrected, but which it could not, under the circumstances existing then. The “over-abundance” or “excess savings” theory—that we had so much that we could well afford to give it away—is dangerously misleading. It was invented to justify unwise, if not calculated, giving to foreign countries with the resultant weakening of our own country to a point where Social Security and many other “social laws,” including the limitation of productive effort were adopted as expediencies here at home. Outright charity to people has, throughout history, tended to destroy their moral fiber. Proud people will not, moreover, accept charity and will be determined to work out their own salvation. Finland is just such an example. Contrast that country’s attitude with France today, and even with England.

Our country, America, has always been a philanthropic one. No one, in his right mind, could or ever has, questioned the humanitarian feelings of the American body politic, but unless our assistance is selective and well timed, it cannot bring permanent relief, nor can it accomplish worthwhile objectives.

There are some who say that America has always had a hit-or-miss approach to most of her problems, and that Lady Luck has been on our side. This also is not quite so. In the 19th Century, we had a relatively free competitive society—not perfect, of course, but the best we’d ever had. The laws which govern human nature under a government of limited powers, such as we had under the Constitution before we began changing it, operated then. During that period these laws governing human nature were patterned on a system of checks and balances, remarkably similar to those dictated by God to Moses at Mount Sinai. The hit-or-miss approach became apparent only when we began to turn to government “to relieve us from our mistakes under freedom.”

We know that this nation came into being after the victory of the War of Independence. At this time, a Constitution was drawn up and ratified by the states. But there is more to it than that. A confusion in terms always has led to a misunderstanding in definition. There are some who feel quite strongly that “democracy” is a principle, and was never intended to become a form of government. The word “democracy” does not appear once in our Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or the Declaration of Independence. In our Salute to the Flag, known by every school boy and girl in America, it is the “Republic” for which we stand—not a “Democracy.” Of course the words are used almost interchangeably in the encyclopedia, and we know that the purest form of democracy envisions the realistic participation in the government on the part of all the governed. Town meetings were typical of this in the past, but as our society became more complex, it was found impractical to hold these, and as a result, representatives were selected, and a Republic evolved. It all boiled down to what might be called a practicing democracy, because people do have the opportunity today to make their desires known as to how and by whom they will be governed—that is, however, on condition that they express themselves at the voting polls.

The framers of our Constitution sought to give each department of government its due share of power, and to prevent any one of them from making itself supreme. In his “Back to the Republic,” Harry E. Atwood comments: “Almost daily Russia is spoken of as ‘the new republic.’ That phrase is as inaccurate as it would be to speak of a drunken man as a new example of temperance. To speak of Mexico as a ‘republic’ is as inaccurate as it would be to speak of fanaticism as a new form of reverence. To call Communist China a ‘republic’ is as far-fetched as it would be to speak of insomnia as a new form of rest ... for at the present time, these are all types of democracy, they are not republics....”

In the “Federalist,” James Madison said of our government: “The true distinction between these forms (democracy and republic) is that in a democracy the people meet and exercise the government in person. In a republic they assemble and administer it by their representative agents.... The first question that offers itself is whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican? It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the American people.”

We know from the experiences of other nations that perfection in government never has been found via the route of mob rule. If we think otherwise we play right into the hands of the Communists and all others who oppose our government. Unethical procedure in any established order is brought about little by little. The theory of lesser concessions is always active. In our trend toward paternalism in government we must constantly guard against the ogre of an established bureaucracy, a denying to the individual those “inalienable rights” of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” so definitely vouchsafed to him in the Republican form of government which was established in this country “under God.” With any impairment of our system of checks and balances, all power to protect every man’s God-given rights is rendered impotent.

Everywhere people are expressing the thought that, “Things just can’t go on like this,” and “What is going to happen?” Is there then, a sense of impending judgment in the very atmosphere itself? Let me illustrate the theory of lesser concessions mentioned above. Back in September, 1932, during a campaign speech at Sioux City, President Roosevelt accused the Hoover administration of being the greatest spendthrift in U. S. history; that bureaus and bureaucrats had been retained at the taxpayers’ expense, and then he proceeded to out-Hoover Hoover with alphabetical agencies to the point where cartoonists branded us “alphabetical goofs.”

The Foundation for Economic Education at Irvington-on-Hudson, has compiled some interesting statistics:

“Expended by all Presidents up to Lincoln | $1,795,319,694
“Expended by Lincoln (including the Civil War) | 3,252,380,410
“Spent by Johnson thru Taft | 19,373,146,217
“Wilson (including World War I) | 47,938,260,143
“Warren G. Harding | 6,667,235,429
“Calvin Coolidge | 18,585,549,115
“Herbert Hoover | 15,490,476,636
“Franklin D. Roosevelt (including eight years of peace) | 67,518,746,001
“Total expended by all Presidents from the beginning to July 1, 1945 | $179,630,113,645
“Total spent by Harry S. Truman from July 1, 1945, to September 1, 1949 | $191,081,394,191”

With constantly rising taxes and increased government spending, the dollar bill soon will be worthless, as will be the paper on which it is printed. A mathematician figuring hurriedly on his cuff, comments: “We’ll be back to where the South was in 1865, with its worthless Confederate money.” Why? Little by little our executive branch has usurped the functions of Congress, under the flimsy guise of a so-called “mandate” from us, the people. Unless we become aware of what we have permitted to happen in our midst, and elect people to Congress who will make the government their servant and not their master, we will soon be where the Germans were under Hitler, the Italians under Mussolini, and where the Russians are today, under Stalin—and the British to a lesser degree, under their socialist regime.

For the first time in global history, the forces are drawn between two distinct ways of life—Christianity and Barbarism. Through the cobwebs of confusion and the roadblocks of distortion we now know that our one enemy is Stalin and his particular brand of thuggery. Modern, civilized peoples throughout the universe, including those behind the iron curtain, have but one common enemy—Communism. If we do indeed believe what we profess, as Christians, to believe, “Man cannot serve God and Mammon,” how can we expect a United Nations to succeed in anything so long as the head of the Communist Governments, the world over, is represented in its midst?

All doubt and uncertainty has been dispelled as to who, where and how our enemy operates. In China we have seen the Communist system operate to the complete disintegration of human rights. Here in the United States we do not know precisely how many Communists are among us, or exactly where and how they connive. We are told on good authority (J. Edgar Hoover) that they are growing in strength and numbers as well as going underground, but we are unable to put our fingers on enough of them. Communism operates and succeeds by deception here as in the early phases of China’s recent history. It bores from within. Frequently its voice is soft and seductive, like the voice of Delilah, and equally treacherous. As we have seen though, once it has the situation in hand, it does not hesitate to use brute force.

In contrast, what we call Democracy makes its mistakes openly for all to see and endeavor to correct. Democracy, to us, means complete personal liberty, the right to live, work and play how, when and where one chooses, in open competition, and is maintained by a process of checks and balances or trial and error. We who live in this atmosphere of free enterprise, take these things for granted, while treason catches us off guard. Until we recognize this, we will continue to be at the mercy of organized political traitors both foreign and domestic. We can no longer afford to assume a casual attitude, even though history reveals that the Communism of Stalin, like other world shaking movements in the past, if given sufficient time, will fall of its own weight.

“Well,” you may ask: “If Communism is going to fall anyway, (or be pushed), why bother to do anything about it now?” The answer is simple. We must do something about it now because generations, even centuries, may elapse before it collapses without help other than human intervention. In the meantime, what will happen to us and to our children? Do we realize the long period of humiliation and degradation, with increasing controls by the Communists, that this means?

War, a global holocaust, in the not too distant future seems a much more likely turn of events. We know that Russia is expanding and improving her military force, including long range submarines and airplanes as well as ultra-destructive weapons. She has more planes than the United States and other democracies put together. We are told that Russia is making A bombs and has already had at least one atomic explosion behind the Iron Curtain. The H bomb is a logical sequel. She is capable, we understand, of delivering a surprise atomic attack against any part of the United States, while we have no sure defense against such an attack. Her submarine fleet rapidly is being patterned after Germany’s and this, with her other combat ships will make her the third greatest Naval Power. She has an army of two and one-half million uniformed troops and thousands of undercover agents to act as spies or scouts. We know that she is on a complete war footing, just as England was during the latter days of World War II and as we made an attempt to be.

This is grave food for thought. If our most responsible leaders are assured that Russia is intending to attack us within a short time, then should we not prepare and attack first, trying with the initial blow, so to paralyze the enemy that she will be unable to retaliate. This would be a terrible decision to have to make, and we may not have the chance, but we must give it serious thought.

As long as Russia feels that she is winning the cold war, however, she would be a fool to start a hot one she might lose. I do not believe that she would even let herself be goaded into it. When she is ready to strike, she will strike, of that we may be sure. It may be possible that the men in the Kremlin are hesitant about upsetting their present position, fearing counter-revolution at home and abroad. Perhaps the mighty armada is for propaganda purposes and to hold the Red Empire together. If this is so, we must never relax our own efforts behind the Iron Curtains everywhere in order to enlist the support of the unhappy 90 per cent of the enslaved people, without whose help we cannot hope to defeat the Soviet Union. Our most powerful secret weapon is not the A or the H bomb, but this same overwhelming majority of victims who fought and won a revolution only to find that they had been sold down the river at the moment of their victory.

These terrorized victims in every country are our most powerful potential allies, and we must do all in our power to make them understand that we are in sympathy with them—with their hopes and prayers for liberation—and that the only thing we reject is Communist despotism. All peoples who are denied the basic freedoms of speech, press, religion, assembly—immediately become enormous whispering galleries. There is greater “lure” in suppressed facts and ideas than there is in political propaganda. Even the threat of death will not keep people from reading forbidden material when they are hungry for news from those who may be sympathetic to their plight. But all this would take well-trained counter espionage, and it would cost money.

It would make sense to me if, first of all, we saw to it that our homeland was protected—but not by an armed camp or maintained by a disproportionate amount of military might that would hamstring our economy or deprive us of too many of our liberties. Our military forces should be trained and equipped to provide a reasonable degree of military security for the United States. Then, bring about this same type of coordination in Canada and the Latin American countries, thereby creating a modicum of safety throughout the Western Hemisphere.

In doing the above, we’d be licked before we started unless we made assurance doubly sure that we, the people, knew beyond all possibility of doubt, what was going on and why. Once we are possessed of complete understanding, and support the purpose for which we may be called upon to make the greatest sacrifices of our lives—even including our lives if need be—our objectives will thus be constantly in view. We know this would require a rebirth or a resurgence of courageous leadership, honesty and integrity—and an old fashioned “patriotism” too long lacking in our leaders. But are not these qualities still inherent within us? They were, certainly, until clever and sinister propaganda infiltrated our very marrow.

To go a step further. We know that we cannot stop with our own Western Hemisphere. Our thinking and our responsibility is now global. There’s “no hidin’ place” anywhere. Therefore we must improve our position, militarily, economically and psychologically throughout Europe and Asia by helping nations and peoples there to help themselves to keep their few remaining freedoms. Of course we have to protect certain sea and air routes to and from our best sources of raw materials.

To me, it is sheer nonsense to give, indiscriminately, whether it be money or military aid, without stipulating that we get something for it. To do otherwise is contrary to individual human nature, and yet as a nation, we have given billions in money and material—not to mention thousands of lives in Korea—without demanding anything in return. To keep on throwing good money, things and men into the hopper will bring no permanent relief, nor will it accomplish any outright objective.

We need oil from the Middle East, uranium from the Belgian Congo, or anywhere else we can get it, and we need tin and rubber from southeast Asia, plus other important things. But if we are cut off and cannot get them, then we can use our almost unprecedented ingenuity in the department of synthetics. Germany demonstrated what can be accomplished with ersatz.

I agree heartily with Generals MacArthur and Wedemeyer, and others, who have not expressed their views openly, or who have so indicated and been severely reprimanded for it, that we must have areas of operation such as the British Isles, Formosa, the African coast, Philippines, Japan, the Scandinavian Peninsula, Denmark, Iberian Peninsula and Saudi Arabia. These could be held or taken, if need be, with a minimum of manpower, for we know our weapons are far superior to those of our enemy, both in mechanics and quality, while their manpower is far in excess of anything that we can muster. From these so-called “islands” it would be possible for the allied forces to rain ultimate death and destruction on the enemy, and without them we are powerless to strike except from long range.

To those who, like General Marshall, insist that we must have an enormous land army, or armies, to go in and occupy conquered territory so as to be able to control the people, I give this answer, or make this suggestion. Why not establish colonies of people of all nationalities, who would be charged with responsibilities of teaching people how to produce or earn a living and to study forms of government suitable for creating small civil communities that could be transplanted into any conquered territory after organized resistance had been broken by the military? This would be entirely within the realm of possibility, and it would definitely conserve our most precious potential—manpower.

It has been said that: “Every despotism has an especially known and hostile instinct for whatever keeps up human dignity and independence. Materialism is the sister doctrine of every tyranny, whether of the one or of the many. To crush what is spiritual, moral, human in a man by specializing him; to form more wheels of the great social machine, instead of perfecting individuals ... is the dominant drift of our epoch.... The test of every religious, political or educational system, is what it does to man. If it injures his intelligence, it is bad. If it injures his character, it is vicious. If it injures his conscience, it is criminal.”

Expediency is the voice of danger. We must do away with the false idea that immediate and temporary gain is a substitute for moral principle. We can recognize, as did Thomas Jefferson, that: “Whenever a man casts a longing eye on office, a rottenness begins in his conduct.” We must become aware that slavery develops in direct proportion as government control becomes a substitute for self-control and responsibility. Search for the solution at the spiritual instead of the material level.

Aristotle, the philosopher, has told us: “There are a million ways to be wrong, but only one way to be right.” A principle is a very tangible “element” that we treasure as an active force of life or nature or—God. If we know, in our hearts, that a thing is right, even though the results of such thought or action may not become evident within the span of our own lifetime, and we go ahead and sacrifice the principle for expediency, ours is a crime far greater than that which was committed by the hand that “all the perfumes of Arabia could not sweeten!”

This is the day of the individual. Only you and I, as independent units, can right the wrongs that have beset our nation and the world. This is encouraging, isn’t it? Dean Russell tells us: “Fortunately for the cause of freedom, it is only as an individual that you or I can do anything at all. This is the voluntary way of accomplishing a desired objective. It is the only method that is in accord with freedom.” The opposite side of the coin is that people who have agreed to accept a bad idea band themselves together to force—by vote or otherwise—their ideas upon other people. It may all be perfectly legal, but it is dishonest. We are at perfect liberty to vote ourselves into serfdom. But it is very dangerous to believe that freedom automatically is safe because the individual vote has become so popular in America, where the “democratic” way prevails. When we vote money into our pockets, old age pensions, farm subsidies, price parities and a million other “props” to lean on, we are voting paralysis to our brains and slavery to our physical beings.

It is a dangerous thing to do, but I would like to make one prediction. Each day we live we draw nearer to a climax in human history. The immediate future is dark. Bitter conflicts at home and abroad are on the horizon. I believe that the armies of all nations will, during the next two years, be drawn inevitably toward the countries in and around the Great Pyramid of Egypt. The crisis precipitated in Iran over the nationalization of her oil industry, makes this highly probable, in my opinion. Let me substantiate further.

Toward the end of 1949, England received warning from Iran on this impending move, for she believed that only a violent act on her part could meet this extreme emergency. London correspondent Kenneth de Courcy, cabling to Intelligence Digest on April 1, 1951, stated:

“More than a year ago, a prominent Persian statesman gave Britain his final confidential warning. He said that only drastic action could save the situation. A Persian statesman flew to America and remained there for several days in an effort to lay all the facts before Mr. Truman. Attempt after attempt was made to arrange a meeting. The envoy, although carrying high credentials, was refused an interview. The Persian statesman had been one of his country’s most important and successful Prime Ministers. His prestige and influence were considerable....”

De Courcy concluded:

“The Persian situation has now been allowed to deteriorate to such an extent that no politician there dares oppose the popular movement which has been whipped up by the extremely clever work of Soviet agents. Some of the highest officials, moreover, are on Russia’s payroll, and this has been allowed to happen right under our noses.”

On Saturday morning, June 2, 1951, the following headline appeared in The Los Angeles Times:

“Truman Intervenes in Iran Oil Row.” The Associated Press dispatch datelined Tehran, June 1, 1951, continued in part:

“President Truman took a hand personally today in the British-Iranian oil dispute by sending letters to Premier Mohammed Mossadegh and Prime Minister Attlee reportedly urging moderation on both sides. The unusual move by the President indicated the extreme seriousness with which the U. S. government views the oil crisis.”

A member of Iran’s Senate who declined to reveal his name, was quoted by The Los Angeles Times article as saying:

“Why should Truman belittle himself by sending such a message?”

In my humble opinion, therefore, World War III began on June 25, 1950. Our entry into it was two days later. There will be no peace, of any importance, as I see it, until 1953 or thereabouts. I say this with a heavy heart. This war that is so pointless and was so unnecessary, had its birth in our Administration’s betrayal of China. It will have its death on a bloody battlefield in Palestine.

What a heritage we have, on the one hand, and what means for destruction on the other! How far we are today from Chaos, no man knows. It may be far later than we think. Until the time of greater enlightenment we know that a strong and forceful public opinion can be the result only of strong and forceful individual opinions. We are not, as yet, God-like creatures, but by making a supreme and prayerful effort we might become more nearly creatures like God. One small voice crying in the wilderness can be doubled and quadrupled into millions until, finally, it becomes the deafening roar of all freedom-loving peoples the world over.

“The journey of a thousand miles,” the Chinese say, “begins with just one step.” If each of us will take that one step now, toward a better understanding of how to protect our country from its enemies, both within and without, America will remain the light to which the whole world turns in the blackness of its oppression. And let us each remember that, as individuals, “it is better to light one candle, than to curse the darkness.”

In the words of our own beloved National Anthem:

“Oh! thus be it ever, when free men shall stand

Between their loved homes and the war’s desolation!

Blest with victory and peace, may the Heaven rescued land

Praise the Power that hath made and preserved us a nation.

Then conquer we must, for our cause it is just,

And this be our motto: ‘In God is our trust.’

And the Star-Spangled Banner in triumph SHALLwave

O’er the land of the Free and the home of the Brave!”

EPILOGUE

Deep in the Siberian mine,

Keep your patience proud;

The bitter toil shall not be lost,

The rebel thought unbowed.

The sister of misfortune, Hope,

In the under-darkness dumb

Speaks joyful courage to your heart:

The day desired will come...

The heavy-hanging chains will fall,

The walls will crumble at a word;

And Freedom greet you in the light,

And brothers give you back the sword.

Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin

Appendix

The Wedemeyer Report on China and Korea

Submitted to
The President of the United States
September 9, 1947

by
Albert C. Wedemeyer
Lieutenant General, United States Army

Paragraphs which have been deleted for security reasons
are indicated by asterisks.

Part I—General Statement

China’s history is replete with examples of encroachment, arbitrary action, special privilege, exploitation, and usurpation of territory on the part of foreign powers. Continued foreign infiltration, penetration or efforts to obtain spheres of influence in China, including Manchuria and Taiwan (Formosa), could be interpreted only as a direct infringement and violation of China’s sovereignty and a contravention of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It is mandatory that the United States and those other nations subscribing to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations should combine their efforts to insure the unimpeded march of all peoples toward goals that recognize the dignity of man and his civil rights and, further, definitely provide the opportunity to express freely how and by whom they will be governed.

Those goals and the lofty aims of freedom-loving peoples are jeopardized today by forces as sinister as those that operated in Europe and Asia during the ten years leading to World War II. The pattern is familiar—employment of subversive agents; infiltration tactics; incitement of disorder and chaos to disrupt normal economy and thereby to undermine popular confidence in government and leaders; seizure of authority without reference to the will of the people—all the techniques skillfully designed and ruthlessly implemented in order to create favorable conditions for the imposition of totalitarian ideologies. This pattern is present in the Far East, particularly in the areas contiguous to Siberia.

If the United Nations is to have real effect in establishing economic stability and in maintaining world peace, these developments merit high priority on the United Nations’ agenda for study and action. Events of the past two years demonstrate the futility of appeasement based on the hope that the strongly consolidated forces of the Soviet Union will adopt either a conciliatory or a cooperative attitude, except as tactical expedients. Soviet practice in the countries already occupied or dominated completes the mosaic of aggressive expansion through ruthless secret police methods and through an increasing political and economic enslavement of peoples. Soviet literature, confirmed repeatedly by Communist leaders, reveals a definite plan for expansion far exceeding that of Nazism in its ambitious scope and dangerous implications. Therefore in attempting a solution to the problem presented in the Far East, as well as in other troubled areas of the world, every possible opportunity must be used to seize the initiative in order to create and maintain bulwarks of freedom.

Notwithstanding all the corruption and incompetence that one notes in China, it is a certainty that the bulk of the people are not disposed to a Communist political and economic structure. Some have become affiliated with Communism in indignant protest against oppressive police measures, corrupt practices, and maladministration of National Government officials. Some have lost all hope for China under existing leadership and turn to the Communists in despair. Some accept a new leadership by mere inertia.

Indirectly, the United States facilitated the Soviet program in the Far East by agreeing at the Yalta Conference to Russian re-entry into Manchuria, and later by withholding aid from the National Government. There were justifiable reasons for these policies. In the one case we were concentrating maximum Allied strength against the Japanese in order to accelerate crushing defeat and thus save Allied lives. In the other, we were withholding unqualified support from a government within which corruption and incompetence were so prevalent that it was losing the support of its own people. Further, the United States had not yet realized that the Soviet Union would fail to cooperate in the accomplishment of world-wide plans for postwar rehabilitation. Our own participation in those plans has already afforded assistance to other nations and peoples, friends and former foes alike, to a degree unparalleled in humanitarian history.

Gradually it has become apparent that the World War II objectives for which we and others made tremendous sacrifices are not being fully attained, and that there remains in the world a force presenting even greater dangers to world peace than did the Nazi militarists and the Japanese jingoists. Consequently the United States made the decision in the Spring of 1947 to assist Greece and Turkey with a view to protecting their sovereignties, which were threatened by the direct or inspired activities of the Soviet Union. Charges of unilateral action and circumvention of the United Nations were made by members of that organization. In the light of its purposes and principles such criticism seemed plausible. The United States promptly declared its intention of referring the matter to the United Nations when that organization would be ready to assume responsibility.

It follows that the United Nations should be informed of contemplated action with regard to China. If the recommendations of this report are approved, the United States should suggest to China that she inform the United Nations officially of her request to the United States for material assistance and advisory aid in order to facilitate China’s postwar rehabilitation and economic recovery.

This will demonstrate that the United Nations is not being circumvented, and that the United States is not infringing upon China’s sovereignty, but contrary-wise is cooperating constructively in the interest of peace and stability in the Far East, concomitantly in the world.

The situation in Manchuria has deteriorated to such a degree that prompt action is necessary to prevent that area from becoming a Soviet satellite. The Chinese Communists may soon gain military control of Manchuria and announce the establishment of a government. Outer Mongolia, already a Soviet satellite, may then recognize Manchuria and conclude a “mutual support agreement” with a de facto Manchurian government of the Chinese Communists. In that event, the Soviet Union might accomplish a mutual support agreement with Communist-dominated Manchuria, because of her current similar agreement with Outer Mongolia. This would create a difficult situation for China, the United States and the United Nations. Ultimately it could lead to a Communist-dominated China.

The United Nations might take immediate action to bring about cessation of hostilities in Manchuria as a prelude to the establishment of a Guardianship or Trusteeship. The Guardianship might consist of China, Soviet Russia, the United States, Great Britain and France. This should be attempted promptly and could be initiated only by China. Should one of the nations refuse to participate in Manchurian Guardianship, China might then request the General Assembly of the United Nations to establish a Trusteeship, under the provisions of the Charter.

Initially China might interpret Guardianship or Trusteeship as an infringement upon her sovereignty. But the urgency of the matter should encourage a realistic view of the situation. If these steps are not taken by China, Manchuria may be drawn into the Soviet orbit, despite United States aid, and lost, perhaps permanently, to China.

The economic deterioration and the incompetence and corruption in the political and military organizations in China should be considered against an all-inclusive background lest there be disproportionate emphasis upon defects. Comity requires that cognizance be taken of the following.

Unlike other Powers since VJ-Day, China has never been free to devote full attention to internal problems that were greatly confounded by eight years of war. The current civil war has imposed an overwhelming financial and economic burden at a time when resources and energies have been dissipated and when, in any event, they would have been strained to the utmost to meet the problems of recovery.

The National Government has consistently, since 1927, opposed Communism. Today the same political leader and same civil and military officials are determined to prevent their country from becoming a Communist-dominated State or Soviet satellite.

Although the Japanese offered increasingly favorable surrender terms during the course of the war, China elected to remain steadfast with her Allies. If China had accepted surrender terms, approximately a million Japanese would have been released for employment against American forces in the Pacific.

I was assured by the Generalissimo that China would support to the limit of her ability an American program for the stabilization of the Far East. He stated categorically that, regardless of moral encouragement or material aid received from the United States, he is determined to oppose Communism and to create a democratic form of government in consonance with Doctor Sun Yat-sen’s principles. He stated further that he plans to make sweeping reforms in the government including the removal of incompetent and corrupt officials. He stated that some progress has been made along these lines but, with spiraling inflation, economic distress, and civil war, it has been difficult to accomplish fully these objectives. He emphasized that, when the Communist problem is solved, he could drastically reduce the Army and concentrate upon political and economic reforms. I retain the conviction that the Generalissimo is sincere in his desire to attain these objectives. I am not certain that he has today sufficient determination to do so if this requires absolute overruling of the political and military cliques surrounding him. Yet, if realistic United States aid is to prove effective in stabilizing the situation in China and in coping with the dangerous expansion of Communism, that determination must be established.

Adoption by the United States of a policy motivated solely toward stopping the expansion of Communism without regard to the continued existence of an unpopular repressive government would render any aid ineffective. Further, United States prestige in the Far East would suffer heavily, and wavering elements might turn away from the existing government to Communism.

In China and Korea, the political, economic, and psychological problems are inextricably mingled. All of them are complex and are becoming increasingly difficult of solution. Each has been studied assiduously in compliance with your directive. Each will be discussed in the course of this report. However, it is recognized that a continued global appraisal is mandatory in order to preclude disproportionate or untimely assistance to any specific area.

The following three postulates of United States foreign policy are pertinent to indicate the background of my investigations, analyses, and report:

The United States will continue support of the United Nations in the attainment of its lofty aims, accepting the possible development that the Soviet Union or other nations may not actively participate.

Moral support will be given to nations and peoples that have established political and economic structures compatible with our own, or that give convincing evidence of their desire to do so.

Material aid may be given to those same nations and peoples in order to accelerate postwar rehabilitation and to develop economic stability, provided:

That such aid shall be used for the purposes intended.

That there is continuing evidence that they are taking effective steps to help themselves, or are firmly committed to do so.

That such aid shall not jeopardize American economy and shall conform to an integrated program that involves other international commitments and contributes to the attainment of political, economic, and psychological objectives of the United States.

Part II—China

POLITICAL

Although the Chinese people are unanimous in their desire for peace at almost any cost, there seems to be no possibility of its realization under existing circumstances. On one side is the Kuomingtang, whose reactionary leadership, repression and corruption have caused a loss of popular faith in the government. On the other side, bound ideologically to the Soviet Union, are the Chinese Communists, whose eventual aim is admittedly a Communist state in China. Some reports indicate that Communist measures of land reform have gained for them the support of the majority of peasants in areas under their control, while others indicate that their ruthless tactics of land distribution and terrorism have alienated the majority of such peasants. They have, however, successfully organized many rural areas against the National Government. Moderate groups are caught between Kuomintang misrule and repression and ruthless Communist totalitarianism. Minority parties lack dynamic leadership and sizable following. Neither the moderates, many of whom are in the Kuomingtang, nor the minority parties are able to make their influence felt because of National Government repression. Existing provincial opposition leading to possible separatist movements would probably crystallize only if collapse of the government were imminent.

Soviet actions, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 and its related documents, have strengthened the Chinese Communist position in Manchuria, with political, economic and military repercussions on the National Government’s position both in Manchuria and in China proper, and have made more difficult peace and stability in China. The present trend points toward a gradual disintegration of the National Government’s control, with the ultimate possibility of a Communist-dominated China.

Steps taken by the Chinese Government toward governmental reorganization in mid-April, 1947, aroused hopes of improvement in the political situation. However, the reorganization resulted in little change. Reactionary influences continue to mold important policies even though the Generalissimo remains the principal determinative force in the government. Since the April reorganization, the most significant change has been the appointment of General Chen Cheng to head the civil and militant administration in Manchuria. Projected steps include elections in the Fall for the formation of a constitutional government, but, under present conditions, they are not expected to result in a government more representative than the present regime.

ECONOMIC

Under the impact of civil strife and inflation, the Chinese economy is disintegrating. The most probable outcome of present trends would be, not sudden collapse, but a continued and creeping paralysis and consequent decline in the authority and power of the National Government. The past ten years of war have caused serious deterioration of transportation and communication facilities, mines, utilities and industries. Notwithstanding some commendable efforts and large amounts of economic aid; their overall capabilities are scarcely half those of the prewar period. With disruption of transportation facilities and the loss of much of North China and Manchuria, important resources of those rich areas are no longer available for the rehabilitation and support of China’s economy.

Inflation in China has been diffused slowly through an enormous population without causing the immediate dislocation which would have occurred in a highly industrialized economy. The rural people, 80 per cent of the total Chinese population of 450 millions, barter foodstuffs for local handicraft products without suffering a drastic cut in living standards. Thus, local economies exist in many parts of China, largely insulated from the disruption of urban industry. Some local economies are under the control of Communists, and some are loosely under the control of provincial authorities.

The principal cause of the hyper-inflation is the long-continued deficit in the national budget. Present revenue collections, plus the profits of nationalized enterprises, cover only one-third of governmental expenditures, which are approximately 70 per cent military, and an increasing proportion of the budget is financed by the issuance of new currency. In the first six months of 1947 note-issue was tripled but rice prices increased seven-fold. Thus prices and governmental expenditures spiral upwards, with price increases occurring faster than new currency can be printed. With further price increases, budget revisions will undoubtedly be necessary. The most urgent economic need of Nationalist China is a reduction of the military budget.

China’s external official assets amounted to $327 million (US) on July 30, 1947. Privately-held foreign exchange assets are at least $600 million and may total $1500 million, but no serious attempt has been made to mobilize these private resources for rehabilitation purposes. Private Chinese assets located in China include probably $200 million in gold, and about $75 million in US currency notes. Although China has not exhausted her foreign official assets, and probably will not do so at the present rates of imports and exports until early 1949, the continuing deficit in her external balance of payments is a serious problem.

Disparity between the prices of export goods in China and in world markets at unrealistic official exchange rates has greatly penalized exports, as have disproportionate increases in wages and other costs. Despite rigorous trade and exchange controls, imports have greatly exceeded exports, and there consistently has been a heavy adverse trade balance.

China’s food harvests this year are expected to be significantly larger than last year’s fairly good returns. This moderately encouraging situation with regard to crops is among the few favorable factors which can be found in China’s current economic situation.

Under inflationary conditions, long-term investment is unattractive for both Chinese and foreign capital. Private Chinese funds tends to go into short-term advances, hoarding of commodities, and capital flight The entire psychology is speculative and inflationary, preventing ordinary business planning and handicapping industrial recovery.

Foreign business enterprises in China are adversely affected by the inefficient and corrupt administration of exchange and import controls, discriminatory application of tax laws, the increasing role of government trading agencies and the trend towards state ownership of industries. The Chinese Government has taken some steps toward improvement but generally has been apathetic in its efforts. Between 1944 and 1947, the anti-inflationary measure on which the Chinese Government placed most reliance was the public sale of gold borrowed from the United States. The intention was to absorb paper currency, and thus reduce the effective demand for goods. Under the circumstance of continued large deficits, however, the only effect of the gold sales program was to retard slightly the price inflation and dissipate dollar assets.

A program to stabilize the economic situation was undertaken in February, 1947. The measures included a wage freeze, a system of limited rationing to essential workers in a few cities, and the sale of government bonds. The effect of this program has been slight, and the wage freeze has been abandoned. In August, 1947, the unrealistic official rate of exchange was replaced, for proceeds of exports and remittances, by a free market in foreign exchange. This step is expected to stimulate exports, but it is too early to determine whether it will be effective.

The issuance of a new silver currency has been proposed as a future measure to combat inflation. If the government continued to finance budgetary deficits by unbacked note issue, the silver would probably go into hoards and the price inflation would continue. The effect would be no more than that of the gold sales in 1944-1947, namely, a slight and temporary retardation of the inflationary spiral. The proposal could be carried out, moreover, only through a loan from the United States of at least $200 million in silver.

In the construction field, China has prepared plans for reconstruction of communications, mines and industries. Some progress has been made in implementing them, notably in the partial rehabilitation of certain railroads and in the textile industry. Constructive results have been handicapped by a lack of funds, equipment and experienced management, supervisory and technical personnel.

On August 1, 1947, the State Council approved a “Plan for Economic Reform.” This appears to be an omnibus of plans covering all phases of Chinese economic reconstruction but its effectiveness cannot yet be determined.

SOCIAL—CULTURAL

Public education has been one of the chief victims of war and social and economic disruption. Schoolhouses, textbooks and other equipment have been destroyed and the cost of replacing my considerable portion cannot now be met. Teachers, like other public servants, have seen the purchasing power of a month’s salary shrink to the market value of a few days’ rice ration. This applies to the entire educational system, from primary schools, which provide a medium to combat the nation’s grievous illiteracy, to universities, from which must come the nation’s professional men, technicians and administrators. The universities have suffered in an additional and no less serious respect—traditional academic freedom. Students participating in protest demonstrations have been severely and at times brutally punished by National Government agents without pretense of trial or public evidence of the sedition charged. Faculty members have often been dismissed or refused employment with no evidence of professional unfitness, patently because they were politically objectionable to government officials. Somewhat similarly, periodicals have been closed down “for reasons of military security” without stated charges, and permitted to reopen only after new managements have been imposed. Resumption of educational and other public welfare activities on anything like the desired scale can be accomplished only by restraint of officialdom’s abuses, and when the nation’s economy is stabilized sufficiently to defray the cost of such vital activities.

MILITARY

The overall military position of the National Government has deteriorated in the past several months and the current military situation favors Communist forces. The Generalissimo has never wavered in his contention that he is fighting for national independence against forces of an armed rebellion nor has he been completely convinced that the Communist problem can be resolved except by force of arms. Although the Nationalist Army has a preponderance of force, the tactical initiative rests with the Communists. Their hit-and-run tactics, adapted to their mission of destruction at points or in areas of their own selection, give them a decided advantage over Nationalists, who must defend many critical areas including connecting lines of communication. Obviously large numbers of Nationalist troops involved in such defensive roles are immobilized whereas Communist tactics permit almost complete freedom of action. The Nationalists’ position is precarious in Manchuria, where they occupy only a slender finger of territory. Their control is strongly disputed in Shantung and Hopei Provinces where the Communists make frequent dislocating attacks against isolated garrisons.

In order to improve materially the current military situation, the Nationalist forces must first stabilize the fronts and then regain the initiative. Further, since the government is supporting the civil war with approximately seventy per cent of its national budget, it is evident that steps taken to alleviate the situation must point toward an improvement in the effectiveness of the armed forces with a concomitant program of social, political and economic reforms, including a decrease in the size of the military establishment. Whereas some rather ineffective steps have been taken to reorganize and revitalize the command structure, and more sweeping reforms are projected, the effectiveness of the Nationalist Army requires a sound program of equipment and improved logistical support. The present industrial potential of China is inadequate to support military forces effectively. Chinese forces under present conditions cannot cope successfully with internal strife or fulfill China’s obligations as a member of the family of nations. Hence outside aid, in the form of munitions (most urgently ammunition) and technical assistance, is essential before any plan of operations can be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success. Military advice is now available to the Nationalists on a General Staff level through American military advisory groups. The Generalissimo expressed to me repeatedly a strong desire to have this advice and supervision extended in scope to include field forces, training centers and particularly logistical agencies.

Extension of military aid by the United States to the National Government might possibly be followed by similar aid from the Soviet Union to the Chinese Communists, either openly or covertly—the latter course seems more likely. An arena of conflicting ideologies might be created as in 1935 in Spain. There is always the possibility that such developments in this area, as in Europe and the Middle East, might precipitate a third world war.

Part III—Korea

POLITICAL

The major political problem in Korea is that of carrying out the Moscow Agreement of December, 1945, for the formation of a Provisional Korean Government to be followed by a Four-Power Trusteeship over Korea. The United States-Soviet Joint Commission, established in accordance with that Agreement, reached a deadlock in 1946 in the effort to implement the Moscow Agreement due to Soviet opposition to consultations with the Commission by all Korean democratic parties and social organizations, as provided for in that Agreement. Soviet motives have been to eliminate the extreme rightist groups in the United States zone from consultations and subsequently from participation in the new government thus ensuring a Communist-dominated government in Korea. Soviet objections to such consultations have been based on the rightist groups’ openly expressed opposition to trusteeship, while the United States has taken the position that to disqualify these groups would deprive a large section of the Korean people of an opportunity to express views regarding their government.

A resumption of the Joint Commission meetings in May, 1947, following an exchange of notes between Secretary Marshall and Foreign Minister Molotov, resulted in a further deadlock on the same issue, although these notes had established a formula which would have permitted participation in consultation by the rightist groups in question. After the Soviet Government failed to reply to Secretary Marshall’s note of August 12, requesting the submission by the Commission of a joint status report or separate reports by each Delegation, the United States Delegation, on August 20, transmitted a unilateral report to Washington. An American proposal then made to China, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union for a Four-Power Conference to discuss Korea has been agreed to by China and the United Kingdom, but has been rejected by the Soviet Union.

Internally, the Korean problem has been complicated by the Soviet establishment of a Communist regime in North Korea and by the machinations in South Korea of Communist groups, openly hostile to the United States.

The latter, in accordance with their directives, are endeavoring to turn over to Koreans as rapidly as possible full administrative responsibility in governmental departments. In consequence with this plan they have organized an interim Korean legislative assembly and in general, are striving to carry out a policy of “Koreanization” of government in South Korea.

ECONOMIC

South Korea, basically an agricultural area, does not have the overall economic resources to sustain its economy without external assistance. The soil depleted, and imports of food as well as fertilizer are required. The latter has normally come from North Korea, as have most of the electric power, timber, anthracite, and other basic products.

The economic dependence of South Korea upon North Korea, and of Korea as a whole, in prewar years, upon trade with Japan and Manchuria, cannot be too strongly emphasized. Division of the country at the 38° North parallel and prevention of all except smuggling trade between North and South Korea have reduced the Korean economy to its lowest level in many years. Prospects for developing sizeable exports are slight. Food exports cannot be anticipated on any scale for several years, and then only with increased use of artificial fertilizer. South Korea’s few manufacturing industries, which have been operating at possibly 20 per cent of prewar production, are now reducing their output or closing down. In part this is a natural result of ten years of deferred maintenance and war-time abuse, but lack of raw materials and essential repair parts, and a gross deficiency of competent management and technical personnel are the principal factors.

A runaway inflation has not yet occurred in South Korea, because the Military Government has restrained the issuance of currency by keeping governmental expenditures and local occupation costs at reasonable levels; because cannibalization and the use of Japanese stocks have kept some industries going; and because the forcible collection of rice at harvest time has brought in sufficient food to maintain—with imports provided by the United States—an adequate official ration in the cities. Highly inflationary factors such as the exhaustion of raw material stocks, cumulative breakdowns in public services and transportation, and the cutting of power supply from the North might occur simultaneously. The South Korean economic outlook is, therefore, most grave.

A five-year rehabilitation program starting in July, 1948, and requiring United States financing at a cost of $647 million, has been proposed by the Military Government. A review of preliminary estimates indicates that the proposed annual rehabilitation cost would be substantially greater than the relief program of $137 million which was tentatively approved for fiscal 1948, but later reduced to $92.7 million. These preliminary estimates of costs and the merits of individual projects need careful review. It is not considered feasible to make South Korea self-sustaining. If the United States elects to remain in South Korea, support of that area should be on a relief basis.

SOCIAL—CULTURAL

Since the Japanese were expelled, the Korean people have vehemently and unceasingly pressed for restoration of their ancient culture. There is particular zeal for public education. Individual and collective efforts to reduce illiteracy have produced results meeting the praise of American Military Government officials. There will be materially better results when there are more school buildings, more trained teachers and advisors, and many more textbooks in the Korean language. Current American activities aim at adult visual education on a modest but reasonably effective scale. South Korea’s health and public-welfare work are at present fully as effective as under Japanese administration and considerably more so in the prevention of serious diseases. Even the Koreans’ eagerness for improvement cannot immediately overcome the unquestionable need for large funds for social betterment.

MILITARY

The military situation in Korea, stemming from political and economic disputes which in turn are accentuated by the artificial barrier along the 38° North parallel, is potentially dangerous to United States strategic interests. Large-scale Communist inspired or abetted riots and revolutionary activities in the South are a constant threat. However, American forces supplemented by quasi-military Korean units are adequate to cope with such trouble or disorder except in the currently improbable event of an outright Soviet-controlled invasion. Whereas American and Soviet forces engaged in occupation duties in South Korea and North Korea respectively are approximately equal, each comprising less than 50,000 troops, the Soviet-equipped and trained North Korean People’s (Communist) Army of approximately 125,000 is vastly superior to the United States-organized Constabulary of 16,000 Koreans equipped with Japanese small arms. The North Korean People’s Army constitutes a potential military threat to South Korea, since there is strong possibility that the Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces, and thus induce our own withdrawal. This probably will take place just as soon as they can be sure that the North Korean puppet government and its armed forces which they have created, are strong enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops.

It appears advisable that the United States organize, equip, and train a South Korean Force, similar to the former Philippine Scouts. This force should be under the control of the United States military commander and, initially should be officered throughout by Americans, with a program for replacement by Korean officers. It should be of sufficient strength to cope with the threat from the North. It would counteract in large measure the North Korean People’s Army when American and Soviet forces are withdrawn from Korea, possibly preclude the forcible establishment of a Communist government, and thus contribute toward a free and independent Korea.

Part IV—Conclusions

The peaceful aims of freedom-loving peoples in the world are jeopardized today by developments as portentous as those leading to World War II.

The Soviet Union and her satellites give no evidence of a conciliatory or cooperative attitude in these developments. The United States is compelled, therefore to initiate realistic lines of action in order to create and maintain bulwarks of freedom, and to protect United States strategic interests.

The bulk of the Chinese and Korean peoples are not disposed to Communism and they are not concerned with ideologies. They desire food, shelter, and the opportunity to live in peace.

CHINA

The spreading internecine struggle within China threatens world peace. Repeated American efforts to mediate have proved unavailing. It is apparent that positive steps are required to end hostilities immediately. The most logical approach to this very complex and ominous situation would be to refer the matter to the United Nations.

A China dominated by Chinese Communists would be inimical to the interests of the United States, in view of their openly expressed hostility and active opposition to those principles which the United States regards as vital to the peace of the world.

The Communists have the tactical initiative in the overall military situation. The Nationalist position in Manchuria is precarious, and in Shantung and Hopei Provinces strongly disputed. Continued deterioration of the situation may result in the early establishment of a Soviet satellite government in Manchuria and ultimately in the evolution of a Communist-dominated China.

China is suffering increasingly from disintegration. Her requirements for rehabilitation are large. Her most urgent needs include governmental reorganization and reforms, reduction of the military budget and external assistance.

A program of aid, if effectively employed, would bolster opposition to Communist expansion, and would contribute to gradual development of stability in China.

Due to excesses and oppressions by government police agencies basic freedoms of the people are being jeopardized. Maladministration and corruption cause a loss of confidence in the government. Until drastic political and economic reforms are undertaken United States aid cannot accomplish its purpose.

Even so, criticism of results achieved by the National Government in efforts for improvement should be tempered by a recognition of the handicaps imposed on China by eight years of war, the burden of her opposition to Communism, and her sacrifices for the Allied cause.

A United States program of assistance could best be implemented under the supervision of American advisors in specified economic and military fields. Such a program can be undertaken only if China requests advisory aid as well as material assistance.

KOREA

The situation in Korea, in its political, economic and psychological aspects, is strongly and adversely influenced by the artificial barrier of the 38° North parallel separating agricultural South Korea from the more industrialized North Korea.

The South Korean economic position is grave. Agriculture is debilitated and there are few other resources.

The establishment of a self-sustaining economy in South Korea is not feasible. Accordingly, United States aid should include a minimum of capital investment and should consist chiefly of items required for support on a relief basis.

Korean Communist agents are creating unrest and fomenting disorder in South Korea.

Since the United States-Soviet Joint Commission meetings have twice ended in deadlock, and offer no real hope of success, the United Nations now seems to be the appropriate medium through which a Provisional Korean Government, functioning under a Four-Power Trusteeship, can be established.

The United States may be confronted with a situation requiring decision concerning continued occupation in South Korea should the Soviet Union withdraw her occupation forces. This could reasonably be expected to occur when the Soviet-created puppet government and its armed forces are sufficiently well established to carry out Communist objectives without the presence of Soviet troops.

The creation of an American controlled and officered Korean Scout Force, sufficient in strength to cope with the threat from the North, is required to prevent the forcible establishment of a Communist government after the United States and Soviet Union withdraw their occupation forces.

Part V—Recommendations

It is recommended:

That the United States Government provide as early as practicable moral, advisory, and material support to China and South Korea in order to contribute to the early establishment of peace in the world in consonance with the enunciated principles of the United Nations, and concomitantly to protect United States strategic interests against militant forces which now threaten them.

That United States policies and actions suggested in this report be thoroughly integrated by appropriate government agencies with other international commitments. It is recognized that any foreign assistance extended must avoid jeopardizing the American economy.

CHINA

That China be advised that the United States is favorably disposed to continue aid designated to protect China’s territorial integrity and to facilitate her recovery, under agreements to be negotiated by representatives of the two government, with the following stipulations:

That China inform the United Nations promptly of her request to the United States for increasing material and advisory assistance.

That China request the United Nations to take immediate action to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Manchuria and request that Manchuria be placed under a Five-Power Guardianship or, failing that, under a Trusteeship in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

That China make effective use of her own resources in a program for economic reconstruction and initiate sound fiscal policies leading to reduction of budgetary deficits.

That China give continuing evidence that the urgently required political and military reforms are being implemented.

That China accept American advisors as responsible representatives of the United States Government in specified military and economic fields to assist China in utilizing United States aid in the manner for which it is intended.

KOREA

That the United States continue efforts for the early establishment of a Provisional Korean Government in consonance with the Moscow Agreement and meanwhile provide necessary support of the political, economic and military position of South Korea.

Appendix E to Part III—Korea

POLITICAL

Resumé of United States Policy Toward Korea

The first treaty between the United States and Korea, signed in 1882, provided that if other powers dealt unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other would exert its good offices to bring about an “amicable agreement.” During the early period of United States-Korean relations the United States considered Korea as an independent state for the purposes of fulfilling treaty obligations, although that nation was actually under Chinese suzerainty. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, when efforts were made to gain the support of the United States to avert war, the United States took the position that, while it stood for peace, it would do nothing which might cause it to assume responsibility for settlement of the dispute. Under the treaty ending the war, China relinquished suzerainty over Korea, which was in turn assumed by Japan. Therefore, the United States continued its policy of non-interference in Korean internal affairs and in 1899 denied a Korean request for American initiative in obtaining from the powers an agreement guaranteeing Korea’s integrity. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, President Theodore Roosevelt stated that the United States could not intervene to preserve Korea’s integrity since the Koreans were unable “to strike one blow in their own defense.” When Japan forced the Korean Emperor to agree to Japanese control of the administration of Korean affairs, the Emperor appealed to the United States, under the good offices clause of the United States-Korean Treaty of 1882, but his appeal was denied. Nor did the United States protest Japanese formal annexation of Korea in 1910. Thus, with little or no effort on the part of the United States to oppose such a development, Korea passed from the suzerainty of China to that of Japan and thence to the status of a Japanese colony. Efforts of Korean exiles to introduce Korea’s case at the Paris Peace Conference and at the Washington Conference of 1921-22 were rebuffed, but these exiles continued their efforts to further the cause of Korean independence, some of them in the United States. With the outbreak of World War II, the question of Korean independence was revived and Korean exiles in the United States and China began to agitate for Korean independence and official recognition. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, agreement was reached by the participating powers, later adhered to by the Soviet Union, that Korea would become independent “in due course.” This phrase caused great resentment among the Koreans who felt that they should be given immediate independence upon the defeat of Japan. This resentment was increased when the decision was reached at the Moscow Conference in December, 1945, that Korea would be placed under a Four-Power Trusteeship (the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China) for a period of up to five years. A tentative agreement in this regard had previously been reached between the United States and the Soviet Union, and when the end of the war was imminent agreement was reached between the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China that Soviet forces accept the Japanese surrender in Korea north of the 38° North parallel, while the American forces would accept such surrender south of that line. This arbitrary line, originally serving as a marker of military responsibility, soon became a complete barrier to free movement between North and South Korea. It has resulted in separation of the country into two parts, an economically unstable division which has seriously blocked efforts to establish a unified Korea.

Current Political Situation

The major political problem in Korea is that of carrying out the Moscow Agreement of December, 1945, for the formation of a Provisional Korean Government. The United States-Soviet Joint Commission, established in accordance with that Agreement, held its first meeting March 8, 1946, but finally adjourned on May 28, 1946, without having reached an agreement looking toward the implementation of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea. The failure of the Joint Commission arose from the unwillingness of the Soviet Delegation to agree to consultation with the Commission of all Korean groups, as provided for in the Moscow agreement, to assist in the formation of the Provisional Korean Government. Soviet motives have been to eliminate the majority of the rightist groups in the American-occupied zone of Korea from consultation and subsequently from participation in the new government. Had the Soviet Delegation been successful the result would have been a Communist-dominated government in Korea. Soviet objections to consultation with these rightist groups have been based on the latter’s openly expressed opposition to trusteeship. The American Delegation has taken the stand that criticism of trusteeship did not disqualify Korean groups from participation in consultation, since to do so would deprive a considerable section of the Korean people of an opportunity to be heard in regard to the formation of the Provisional Korean Government. An exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister in April and May, 1947, resulted in a resumption of the meetings of the Joint Commission on May 21, 1947, under a formula which provided for consultation by all Korean groups which were prepared to sign a declaration that they would not, after such signing, “foment or instigate active opposition” to the work of the Joint Commission or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement. After repeated sessions of the Joint Commission a deadlock was again reached in July, the Soviet Delegation returning to its position of the previous year and the American Delegation insisting upon the implementation of the formula set forth in the Marshall-Molotov letters, which guaranteed wide-scale participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations in consultation and freedom of expression of opinion by all Koreans. Further meetings of the Commission having produced no results, Secretary Marshall addressed another note to Foreign Minister Molotov on August 12, requesting that the Commission submit by August 21, 1947, a joint status report or that each Delegation submit separate reports. No reply having been received to this note and the Soviet Delegation refusing to participate in a joint report, the American Delegation on August 20 transmitted a unilateral report to Washington. Since the receipt of this report, the Secretary of State has addressed identical notes to China, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union proposing a Four Power Conference for a settlement of the Korean situation. China and the United Kingdom have indicated their willingness to participate in such a conference. The Soviet Union has declined.

Internally, the Korean problem has been complicated by the Soviet establishment of a Communist state in North Korea and by its encouragement of the activities of Communist and Communist-dominated organizations in South Korea hostile to the United States.

The rightist groups are probably the best organized parties in South Korea. They command a majority of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly and, if elections were held under present conditions would gain control of any government established in South Korea by such elections. The American authorities in South Korea are endeavoring to turn over to the Koreans as rapidly as possible administrative responsibility in the various departments of the United States Military Government, have organized a half-elected and half-appointed Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, and in general are striving to carry out a policy of “Koreanization” of government in South Korea.

Military Government Directive and Steps Taken to Implement Same

The Directive under which the United States Military Government now operates in Korea sets forth three basic United States objectives: (1) To establish an independent and sovereign Korea, free from all foreign domination and eligible for membership in the United Nations (2) to insure that the National Government so established shall be a democratic government fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people; and (3) to assist the Koreans in establishing the sound economy and adequate educational system necessary for an independent democratic state. The Directive points out that the policy of the United States in regard to Korea, in accordance with the Moscow Agreement, contemplates the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government to assist the United States-Soviet Joint Commission in preparing Korea for self-government, the creation of some form of trusteeship for Korea under the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union for a period of up to five years and the complete independence of Korea at the earliest possible moment, with subsequent membership in the United Nations. The Directive goes on to state that the American occupation of South Korea is for the purpose of facilitating the attainment of the basic American objectives in Korea and shall continue as long as it contributes to that end.

As a result of Soviet obstruction and tactics designed to eliminate the majority of the rightist groups from participation in the new government to be established for all of Korea, the American military authorities in South Korea have been unable to proceed with the initial steps required for the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government. As required by the Directive, the American authorities have made considerable progress in utilizing qualified Koreans in posts in local and provincial administration and in the administration of the United States zones as a whole. American personnel remains in the provincial administrations only in an advisory capacity and all administrative posts are filled by Koreans. In the overall administration of South Korea, all Government departments are now headed by Korean officials and Americans are utilized only in an advisory capacity, although important controversial matters may be referred either to the United States Military Governor or the Commanding General of the United States Occupation Forces for final decision. American military personnel in the Military Government are being replaced as rapidly as possible by American civilians. A Korean Interim Legislative Assembly was established in December, 1946, half of its membership being selected by the United States Commanding General from a list of Koreans recommended by Korean groups and half being elected as representatives of the various provinces and municipalities. Presently under consideration by this Assembly is a program for land reform in South Korea and the Assembly has recently adopted a general election law providing for election of officials to an Interim South Korean Government according to certain stipulated rules and regulations. In accordance with the Directive, the United States military authorities have permitted full freedom of expression to all political groups, except in those cases when the activities of certain Communist-dominated groups were clearly prejudicial to the security of American military occupation.

In seeking to attain the cultural objectives set forth in the Directive, the United States occupational authorities have caused funds to be set aside for training courses in industry and agriculture, have encouraged the establishment of teacher training schools and of summer and winter institutes for the reeducation of teachers and have in general devoted their efforts to the restoration of schools, the enforcement of new system of education and expansion of school facilities. They have also encouraged the formation of various committees for the purpose of democratizing the Korean educational administration. The implementation of these programs has been handicapped by lack of funds. Culturally, as well as politically, efforts have been made to carry out a process of “Koreanization” looking toward a free and independent Korea.

It should be pointed out that the Directive itself necessarily allows latitude of interpretation and execution and that the American authorities in Korea have functioned within the framework of that Directive.

Also, the failure to implement the badly needed land reform program has been due to the desire to await the unification of North and South Korea, at which time a Provisional Korean Government would be in a position to carry out a uniform program of this kind for the entire nation. Now that unification appears to be a matter for the indefinite future, plans are being made to carry out such a program at the earliest possible moment.

Obstructions to Realizations of United States Objectives

The chief obstructions to the realization of United States objectives in Korea have been the division of that country by the 38° North parallel barrier and the lack of Soviet cooperation in carrying out the provisions of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea. Behind the 38° North parallel the Soviet Union has established a Democratic Front Government modelled along Soviet lines and has eliminated all political parties of a non-Communist character. North Korean Communist groups have thus been able to encourage and assist the activities of the Democratic Front and other Communist-dominated leftist groups in South Korea hostile to the United States by the infiltration of agents from North Korea into the American zone of occupation. The Soviet refusal in the United States-Soviet Joint Commission to consult with all Korean political and social organizations, as the first step in the formation of a Provisional Korean Government, has so far made it impossible to realize American objectives in Korea—the establishment of a self-governing, sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.

Other obstructions to the realization of American objectives in Korea have come from sources within the United States zone of occupation:

2. Similarly, extreme leftist groups have endeavored to foment hostility to the United States and opposition to the attainment of American objectives in Korea. Such groups have been particularly active among Korean peasants in opposing the rice collection program instituted by the United States Military Government for the purpose of ensuring sufficient food for the urban areas.

Implication of Withdrawal of All United States Assistance or Continuing Present United States Policy

The American occupation forces in Korea could not remain in that country if all assistance to South Korea were stopped, since the cessation of all aid would lead to an early economic breakdown and to the outbreak of riots and disorder throughout the United States zone of occupation. The withdrawal of American military forces from Korea would, in turn, result in the occupation of South Korea either by Soviet troops, or, as seems more likely, by the Korean military units trained under Soviet auspices in North Korea. The end result would be the creation of a Soviet satellite Communist regime in all of Korea. A withdrawal of all American assistance with these results would cost the United States an immense loss on moral prestige among the peoples of Asia; it would probably have serious repercussions in Japan and would more easily permit the infiltration of Communist agents into that country; and it would gain for the Soviet Union prestige in Asia which would be particularly important in the peripheral areas bordering the Soviet Union, thus creating opportunities for further Soviet expansion among nations in close proximity to the Soviet Union.

Present American policy provides that, in view of the failure of the United States-Soviet Joint Commission to succeed in implementing the provisions of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea, the matter be referred to the Four Powers for solution. It also provides that the matter be referred to the General Assembly of the United States in the event of the failure of the Four Powers to solve the Korean problem. This indicates that the United States will continue to seek, by consultation with the powers concerned, a solution of the problem, but a failure to reach an agreement on Korea in the United Nations will require that the United States make a decision regarding its future course in Korea: whether it shall withdraw or whether it shall organize a South Korean Government and under what conditions and whether it shall give economic and military aid to such a government.

A continuation of present American policies will serve to give notice to the Soviet Union and to other nations in the Far East that the United States will not abandon Korea in the face of Soviet intransigence and that the United States will continue to insist upon the fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea.

A continuation of present American policies will serve to deny to the Soviet Union direct or indirect control of all of Korea and prevent her free use of the entire nation as a military base of operations, including the ice-free ports in South Korea.

Appendix F to Part III—Korea

ECONOMIC

South Korea has few resources except agricultural land. This area formerly obtained much of its anthracite, electric power, timber, fertilizer, and other chemical products from North Korea, and bituminous coal and food from Manchuria, but must now obtain these essential items (except electric power) as well as raw materials and repair parts for her industries, from other external sources.

Coal—The whole of Korea, particularly South Korea, lacks coal No bituminous deposits are known and existing coal deposits are of a law-grade anthracite. The coal runs high in ash, and tends to disintegrate to powder. The largest producing mine in South Korea, constituting in fact 50 per cent of the production, is located at Sam Chok on the east coast. Production involves costly rail-sea-rail distribution. This coal can be and is being used in thermal plants by pulverizing and mixing with oil, but its use is costly and maintenance of boiler equipment is heavy. In any case, bituminous coal must be imported for the operation of the railways and most of the industries.

Electric Power—Because of the unfavorable coal situation, South Korea is at the mercy of North Korea with respect to electric power because virtually all of the large hydroelectric installations are in North Korea. In 1945 there was a total of 1,240,000 kilowatts of installed capacity, 90 per cent of it hydroelectric and in North Korea. Some of the capacity in North Korea has been removed by the Russians. At the present time South Korea depends on North Korea sources for 75 per cent of its power requirements in the winter months when stream flow for its hydroelectric plants is low, and 50 per cent to 60 per cent during the rainy summer months. Conditions will be critical during the coming winter. Minimum peak requirements are estimated at 200,000 kilowatts and only 110,000 kilowatts are in sight including the area’s own generating capacity of 60,000 kilowatts—and that only if rehabilitation materials are received—plus 50,000 kilowatts from North Korea, which is all the Russians profess to be able to deliver. If North Korea power were cut off, all industrial production in South Korea would have to be suspended, and remaining locally generated energy rationed for military and emergency use. Any new plants to correct this deficiency or permit any revival of industry would require four to five years to complete, and would still be dependent upon imported coal or oil, or upon a considerable expansion of the low quality anthracite production. There is no reasonable solution to this dilemma other than to unite North and South Korea.

Forestry—The forest situation in South Korea is unfavorable. Before the war, effective programs of reforestation and erosion control were under way, but dining the war the annual cut averaged 168 million cubic feet as compared with annual estimated growth of only 113 million cubic feet. Furthermore, over two-thirds of South Korean requirements of lumber, fuel wood, and pulp were formerly supplied by North Korea. With this source cut off and coal imports and production drastically reduced, hills and mountains around the Urge cities have been literally denuded. Unless North and South Korea are united or substantial imports are provided, the needs of South Korea for fuel wood, lumber, railroad ties, and telephone and telegraph poles, make it inevitable that overcutting and denuding of forest land in South Korea will continue, with resulting increased erosion and flood damage to agricultural land.

Mineral Resources—Mineral resources of Korea are varied and rather extensive, but with a few exceptions are of low grade. There is a large deposit—over one billion metric tons—of low grade (35 per cent magnetic) iron ore at Musan in Northeastern Korea which the Japanese mined extensively before and during the war. Capacities are said to have been developed for the production of over 800,000 tons of pig iron and 350,000 tons of steel annually, but operations were possible only by large imports of bituminous coal from Manchuria and Japan.

In both North and South Korea, gold and copper were also mined, the latter as an adjunct of the former, and some lead and zinc, and a large quantity of graphite, the latter, however, of low quality. There is enough developed tungsten production in South Korea to make it an important export commodity.

Industries—The prospects for Korean industry, even in the event of early unification, are not bright. Before 1931 Japan exploited Korea primarily as a source of raw materials, rice and cheap labor. Thereafter Korea became Japan’s bridgehead to the Asiatic mainland, and with Manchuria, was developed as the mainland portion of Japan’s war potential. By 1938 there were 7,000 factories, mostly small, employing 183,000 workers, principally in the production of chemicals, textiles and processed foods. Main industrial concentrations were in the north, near hydroelectric power plants and the larger mineral deposits. This rather impressive industrial plant was not damaged by bombing, but it would be a mistake to assume therefore that Korea possesses a ready-made industrial plant which could quickly be turned to full and efficient peacetime operations. Production, at perhaps 20 per cent of capacity, was restored after the occupation, but output has dwindled as stocks of raw materials have been exhausted, and as machinery has stopped functioning for lack of spare parts and competent maintenance and operating personnel. The dearth of competent administrative supervisory and technical personnel, practically all of whom were formerly Japanese and are now evacuated, is the outstanding deficiency in Korean industries, power, and transportation systems. The unification of North and South Korea would make some of the required raw materials available, and spare parts may eventually be obtainable from Japan, but the serious deficiency of competent personnel is an unresolved problem.

Railways—Korea has an excellent standard-gauge railway system including a double-track main line from Pusan on the southeast coast to Antung on the Manchurian border, which adequately serves the country with the exception of the eastern half of Kangwon Province. However, trackage, rolling stock except locomotives, and railway communications are badly in need of rehabilitation as a result of years of undermaintenance because of wartime shortages of materials. The railways in common with the country as a whole have been badly crippled by the evacuation of the Japanese administrative, supervisory, and technical personnel. The right-of-way is excellently engineered and constructed and characterized by a profusion of concrete and masonry structures, but all of the seven million ties in South Korea will require replacement within the next seven years, and quantities of rails and fishplates are also needed. One hundred and one new locomotives of the 2-8-0 type have been provided by the Military Government, but much of the other rolling stock requires overhaul. Railway communications also require considerable rehabilitation.

Highways—There are no modern roads in Korea. The highways of South Korea are practically nonoperable for automotive traffic except from Seoul to Inchon, Kaisong, and Chunchon. Practically all supplies must be distributed throughout Korea by rail.

Shipping—The only shipping of South Korea consists of eight Baltic vessels, and 12 LST’s, operated by the Military Government coast-wise and for some trade with Japan.

Ports—There are two major ports in South Korea; Pusan, an excellent deep-water port with four large piers at the Southeast end of the peninsula, and Inchon, west of Seoul, a much smaller tidal-basin port which can accommodate four three-quarter-thousand-ton ships at dockside in the basin and larger trans-Pacific cargo and passenger vessels in the anchorage outside. Two other deep-water ports, Masan and Yosu, were mined and are little used at present. Mukko on the east coast is the export terminal for Sam Chok, the largest anthracite mining area in South Korea. The other ports of Mokpo, Pohang, Chinhae, and Kunsan are limited by unfavorable factors of nigh tidal range, and a lack of berths and port clearance facilities.

In North Korea, there are two first-class warm water commercial and naval ports at Wonsan and Chungjin on the east coast, the latter particularly desirable from a Russian viewpoint, and other ports Oongki, Rashin, Eungjin, Chinnanpo, and Simhu, the latter two handicapped by the 25- to 30- foot tides of the Yellow Sea.

Withdrawal of Japanese Personnel

As disastrous in its effects on Korean economy as the division of Korea’s people and resources by the 38° North parallel, was the evacuation of all Japanese personnel, except 500 retained in North Korea, after VJ-Day. The 700,000 Japanese formerly resident in Korea dominated all elements of the economy and supplied management and technical personnel even to the mechanic class. Koreans were denied opportunities or positions of consequence in all phases of political and economic life. It is no reflection on the individuals concerned to note that a former Korean stationmaster at Pusan is now head of the railways, or that a vocational school graduate is in responsible charge of a large hydroelectric plant not far from Seoul. It is however, an indication of an almost fatal deficiency in South Korean economy. The ultimate solution is not readily apparent.

Disinvestment

The process of disinvestment probably began in South Korea during the late thirties when the Japanese decided to put all new capital into war production and permit nonwar facilities to depreciate. Capital goods provided by the Japanese for maintenance and development in South Korea went with few exceptions to war plants such as the submarine shop at Pusan, and to the strategic transport services linking Japan with the Manchuria-North Korea industrial complex. This meant that facilities such as the north-south railroad from Pusan to Antung on the Manchurian border received the main portion of construction materials available. Other industrial establishments in South Korea were converted to war production or allowed to deteriorate. The supply of fertilizer, essential to rice culture in the exhausted paddies of South Korea, was drastically reduced in the early forties as a result of the conversion of North Korean nitrogen fixation plants to the manufacture of explosives. Exploitation of South Korea’s meager forest resources resulted in severe erosion and the destruction of crops and utilities through flooding The Japanese also depleted Korean stock-piles and withdrew skilled labor for Army service, or for the mines and factories of Manchuria and the Japanese islands. During two years of military government, the process of disinvestment has continued.

The possibility of South Korea financing a program of investment and rehabilitation out of the proceeds of exports is not worth considering in detail. Although South Korea is primarily agricultural, it is unlikely that it will be able to export foodstuff, even under the most favorable circumstances. Deterioration of agriculture, due to accumulated soil deficiencies and erosion, and an increase of population from 15 to 20 million since 1940 indicate that no export surplus of food can be expected in the next several years. The only exports which may be derived from South Korea are small amounts of such minerals as tungsten, gold and copper, some ginseng root, and marine products such as agar-agar. The most optimistic estimate is $10 million worth of exports by 1950. Much more than $10 million earned by Korean exports will be needed to finance essential raw material imports, and there is no prospect of any capital development out of current production.

Inflation

The Korean inflation is not as serious as the Chinese inflation in rate of price increase, but its causes are less susceptible to control by measures taken within Korea. Price increases have been due to physical inability to produce goods, and not to unrestrained issuance of paper currency. Prices of consumers’ goods in various categories have risen 200 to 700 times over the 1937 level. The official rise price, however, has risen only 70 times, and about 80 per cent of the calorie requirement for the urban population is available at the official price. A runaway inflation has not yet occurred in South Korea, because (a) the Military Government has restrained the issuance of currency by keeping governmental expenditures and local occupation costs at reasonable levels, and (b) because cannibalization and the use of Japanese stocks have kept some industry going, and (c) the forcible collection of rice at harvest time has brought in sufficient food to maintain, with “disease an unrest” imports, an adequate official ration in the cities without the use of large inflationary payments to the farmers. Highly inflationary factors such as the exhaustion of raw material stocks, cumulative breakdowns in public services and transportation, and the cutting of power supply from the North, might occur simultaneously. The Korean economic outlook is, therefore, more grave than in China or Japan, where governmental fiscal policies as well as low production, are the main causes of inflation. Korea, lacking raw materials and skilled labor, is not in a position to be saved from a disastrous and chaotic hyper-inflation by the efforts of its own people combined with correct policy decisions. A breakdown could be forestalled only by external provision of large amounts of consumers’ goods and transportation equipment.

Agriculture and Fisheries

Agriculture—Over three-quarters of the total population of South Korea are farmers. The total area of land under cultivation in 1946 was 6,033,000 acres, or about 2½ acres per farm household. Approximately 15 per cent of agricultural land was formerly owned by Japanese, but title thereto remains with the Military Government and will eventually pass to Koreans. In the projected land reforms an additional 60 per cent of land, which is tenant-operated, would be involved. The Military Government has not proceeded with land reform even with regard to Japanese-held land, in the view that such reform should not precede establishment of an interim Korean Government.

After VJ-Day the influx of over two and a half million Koreans from Japan, China, and North Korea into South Korea, coupled with almost complete lack of commercial fertilizers as well as severe floods, resulted in a severe food shortage. Farmers have been reluctant to double-crop soils already depleted because of a lack of fertilizer, and have preferred to conserve land for rice, the best money crop. In 1946 the average planted acreage was only 79 per cent of the 1935-39 average, and production of grains and pulses was only 71 per cent.

In the past, about 36 per cent of the population and 36 per cent of the food production of Korea were located north of the 38° North parallel. However, postwar population movements, plus the availability of more commercial fertilizers in North Korea (where almost all of Korea’s large chemical plants are located), has changed this situation. Only about 30 per cent of Korea’s population is now north of the 38° North parallel, but that area accounts for around 38 per cent of food production.

Rice is the principal Korean crop, and it has consistently represented more than half the total value of agricultural production. During the 1930’s the rice crop averaged about 100,000,000 bushels annually. Forty per cent or more was exported each year to Japan accounting generally for about one-third of the total gross value of exports. This was by no means voluntary on the part of the Korean people. In line with Japanese policy, farm tenancy increased from less than 40 per cent in 1910 to more than 75 per cent in 1945. This facilitated grain collections, for landlords usually received their rentals in rice, and these averaged about 60 per cent of the crop. Consequently, although Koreans preferred rice to other grains, their per capita consumption was forced down from 3.62 bushels in 1915-19 to 2.0 bushels in 1939-45, a decline of 44 per cent. This deficiency was partly made up by imports of Manchurian millet and soya beans, but underconsumption was nevertheless chronic.

To meet the food crisis in South Korea and to rehabilitate agriculture the Military Government developed program to import foodstuffs to prevent starvation and to assure Korean urban residents at least a subsistence diet until indigenous production could be increased to meet minimum food needs; and a fertilizer import program designed to restore depleted soils and increase agricultural production to levels at least as high as had been reached in the past.

In 1945 the Military Government’s attempt to institute a compulsory system of rice collection for rationing to non-self-suppliers was largely unsuccessful. In 1946, a poor crop year due to floods, the Military Government collected 87,428 tons of rice, or about one-sixth of the total production. In order to supplement indigenous production to meet the minimum needs of non-self-suppliers in South Korea, 180,848 metric tons of wheat, corn, and flour were imported into South Korea by the Military Government from May through December, 1946.

A program for the collection of the rice in 1946 was given highest priority by the Military Government, as one of the most important ways to ease the food situation, stabilize the economy, and check the inflationary spiral. This program was fully supported by all agencies, and it succeeded in collecting a total of 548,000 metric tons of polished rice, or its equivalent, about 30 per cent of the total 1946 production.

This successful collection program, coupled with the importation of 275,962 metric tons of cereals purchased with U. S. funds during the first seven months of 1947, has enabled the Military Government to stabilize the food situation in South Korea through the issuance to non-self-suppliers of minimum staple rations averaging slightly over 300 grams (1,050 calories) per person per day.

Fisheries—Fishing was one of the important prewar Korean industries, ranking sixth in the world. It is second in importance, only to agriculture in the economic structure of the country. The industry was, however, largely dependent upon Japan for imports of fisheries supplies and, has deteriorated seriously since this source has been cut off. Consumption of fish products has decreased from a prewar average of 47 pounds per capita per year to 32 pounds. Korea needs additional fisheries supplies, boats, manila line, nets, trawls, ammonia for refrigeration, tin plate for canning, salt and sugar for canning. Fears are expressed that if such supplies are not forthcoming and fishing operations considerably expanded, the Japanese will enter claims for fishing grounds now reserved for the Koreans.

Foreign Trade

The total volume of Korea’s external trade grew from 660,000,000 yen in 1910 to more than 2,400,000,000 yen in 1939. With respect to the principal categories of its trade, i. e., foodstuffs, textiles and fibres, minerals, manufactures, and miscellaneous items. Korea was consistently a net importer; of all, except for foodstuffs. Food exports however, were seldom so large that they did more than offset imports of textiles and fibers.

From 1910 to 1945, Korea’s external trade was almost wholly absorbed by the Japanese Empire and the prime factor during the entire period was the export of rice to Japan. In 1936, of the value of 41 Korean products showing a net export balance, rice accounted for approximately 64 per cent. Although by 1939 the relative importance of rice exports had declined in favor of minerals and manufactures, of the 55 net export products in that year, rice still made up one-third of the total money value. Until the years immediately preceding the war, fish and marine products ranked second to rice, averaging from 7.5 per cent to 9 per cent of all net export commodities. Other exports individually were of minor significance. Korea’s principal imports historically have reflected its dependence on the outside world for fuels, heavy manufacturers, machinery, automotive equipment, textiles, and fibers, and specialized products.

Under current conditions, foreign trade in the ordinary sense of the term is small in amount. During the period August 15, 1945, through June 30, 1947, the value of goods entering or leaving the area was approximately $168,000,000. Of this sum, however, only about $25,000,000 represents the value of goods exchanged between Korea and the mainland of Asia as a result of the operations of private traders. The remaining $143,000,000 represents mainly commodities imported by agencies of the United State Government as a part of the Civilian Supply Program and financed with appropriated funds of the War Department, or as shipments made under the $25,000,000 UNRRA supplies. Exports which enter into this figure are surplus Foreign Liquidation Commission credit, plus small amounts of government-owned minerals and marine products, to the value of some $5,000,000.

The Military Government is endeavoring to encourage such trade as will reduce the area’s dependence upon American funds. Credits realized from South Korea exports, unless balanced in kind by imports approved as essential, are to be used to purchase commodities similar to those making up the Civilian Supply list and certified for import by the Military Government. On July 15, 1947, Korea was declared open to small numbers of foreign businessmen, who might desire to develop trade possibilities within the framework established by the military authorities. Meanwhile, trade has been undertaken with Hong Kong and Macao, and some critically needed materials have been obtained by barter in exchange for Korean surpluses. Recent negotiations with the Egyptian government have led to an agreement to exchange 730 tons of tungsten concentrates for 3,000 bales of long-staple Egyptian cotton.

All dealings with Japan are restricted to a governmental level, and China has imposed conditions which make legitimate trade virtually out of the question. Actually, a growing smuggling trade is going on both with Japan and China, and via Hong Kong and Macao. An essential step for promoting Korea’s trade on a sound basis would be development of an efficient customs service.

United States Investment in Rehabilitation

There is one basic policy question which overhangs all financial and economic programs for Korea: How long will the occupation of South Korea continue on a unilateral basis? Until this question is answered in terms of months or years, no satisfactory decision can be made on United States financial or developmental programs for the area. The characteristics of the South Korean economy are such that there is no compromise which provides effective utilization of dollars, and at the same time leaves open the decision concerning the duration of the occupation. If a serious decline in the living standard, and possibly economic disintegration are to be avoided, South Korea must have (a) unification with North Korea, or (b) substantial relief supplies, or (c) relief and rehabilitation supplies of $200 to $300 million a year for several years. The third alternative would provide a possible basis for an indefinite continuance of occupation. The capital investment in a permanently separate South Korea would be wasteful, and the likelihood of a stable economy resulting therefrom would be in doubt for some years. South Korea is a depleted and eroded country with no minerals worth mentioning; an agriculture dependent on nitrate input, and a backward people. In terms of the needs of the East Asia area, an investment in rehabilitation and industrialization, which would permit South Korea to subsist on its own industrial output at its standards of the past 10 years with a minimum of relief, could be justified only by political and strategic consideration of the highest order.

A consideration affecting the duration of the occupation of Korea, and hence the type of economic program, is the estimated length of the occupation in Japan. General MacArthur has indicated his desire for a United Nations, or other international administration to take responsibility in Japan soon after the peace treaty is signed. There would be obvious difficulties in any long-term occupation and rehabilitation program for South Korea, initiated at a time when the occupation of Japan was about to be relinquished by the United States. Apart from the problem of tactical forces in Japan to back up the Korean occupation, there would be communication and supply problems. There might he political objection to the occupation of liberated Korea after the termination of occupation in defeated Japan.

The United States Military Government in Korea has recommended a five-year rehabilitation program starting in July, 1948, and requiring U. S. financing for a deficit of $647 million. The estimates indicate that the proposed rehabilitation of the Korean economy would cost more per year for the first three years, than the relief program of $137 million which was tentatively approved for fiscal 1948, but reduced in July, 1947, to $92.7 million.

A feature of the proposed rehabilitation program is an expenditure of $35 million to provide a chemical fertilizer industry and the supporting power installations, roughly duplicating the installations in North Korea which formerly supplied the fertilizer needs of South Korea. An additional amount of approximately $85 million is included in the five-year rehabilitation program to cover the cost of fertilizer imports, pending the completion of the plants. Other items in the program are investment in coal mining to provide low-grade anthracite for briquetting, and to provide for the development and reconstruction of the transportation, textile and fisheries industries. There is no assurance, however, that (a) $35 million fertilizer industry would meet the estimated requirements, or reach capacity production in the time allotted. The suitability of low-grade anthracite dust as the basic energy source for a considerable industrial establishment in South Korea has not been tested, and (b) there are no reliable estimates of the reserves of this fuel, and no evidence of this fuel, and no evidence that the mines and railroads could be developed to fit the prescribed time schedule.

In the event that it is decided to continue a one-nation occupation of South Korea for some years, the least costly program would be one designed to provide, not capital goods, but raw materials and fertilizer in sufficient quantity to stabilize the economy at a satisfactory standard of living as measured by a prewar Japanese and potential North Korean living standards. In this way, the risk of an experiment in industrialization without resources would be avoided.

A relief program of the type envisaged might cost the United States about $150 million a year, in addition to the present military occupation costs which are in the neighborhood of $200 million a year. It would be necessary frankly to recognize this as a relief program which held no prospect of financial return, and no prospect of making South Korea a self sufficient economy.

Industrial Survey

A comprehensive industrial survey of South Korea would not be warranted. The industrial elements and capabilities as well as weaknesses of that area are all too evident. Should Korea be reunited, and the United States bear a responsibility in the economic rehabilitation of the country, an industrial survey wholly or in part by qualified United States Government personnel is indicated. If, however, it be made by private consultants, they should clearly understand that the survey must be realistic and reflect the economic needs and capabilities of the country. Foreign consultants and construction firms do themselves and their own country as well as the country concerned, a disservice in recommending projects for which there is not complete economic justification.

Appendix G to Part III—Korea

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL

Because Japan had administered and developed Korea uniformly for Japanese and not Korean purposes, and in particular had persistently suppressed the people’s historic culture, once the region was freed of the Japanese, its people undertook a re-Koreanization program with feverish activity. Since VJ-Day, their own labors in behalf of education, for example, apart from the contributions of American authorities have been determined and surprisingly effective. In that short time it is estimated that total illiteracy has been cut from 75 to 44 per cent (to 25 per cent in a most favored area), a commendable record even when one notes warningly that the degree of literacy thus attained is necessarily a modest one permitting little more in some cases than ability to read a ballot. Although there are today more children in school in South Korea than were in school in all Korea during the Japanese rule, popular education is but begun, whether one considers primary or secondary schooling. Its advancement calls for buildings, texts and other equipment, teachers and advisors, and these requirements call for money.

The program of the educational group in our own Military Government is well designed but promoted within tight financial limits The same can be said for adult educational work of the United States Office of Civil Information. It operates through local libraries whose pictures, posters, periodicals, and other exhibits reach a great many urban visitors, and through a special train which moves periodically among the villages, presenting well-attended educational picture shows and distributing eagerly read farm weeklies and newspapers. Of many lacks the worst is of picture films.

Korean newspapers are numerous but for the most part are primarily political organs. Only by hastening education in the Korean language, long suppressed by Japan, can there be prompt development of adult education; there is present need for increased educational and cultural activities to occupy the attention of young people who presently have insufficient employment.

American health advisers report good progress in prevention of such serious diseases as smallpox and typhus, scant progress in the fight on chronic maladies. Institutional welfare work is insufficient but no more so than under Japan.

In general, one notes abundant energy among Korean leaders and a great desire for mass improvement socially and culturally as well as in other fields; it merits greater financial encouragement than thus far has been available.

Appendix H to Part III—Korea

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN KOREA AND PROPOSED MILITARY AID

Military Situation

In September, 1945, United States Army Forces, pursuant to instructions contained in General Order Number 1 of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, occupied Korea south of the 38° North parallel and accepted the surrender of Japanese troops south of that line. This arbitrary line of demarcation between the United States and Soviet Union occupation areas rapidly became a complete barrier to free movement between agricultural South Korea and the more industrialized North Korea. Numerous disputes and incidents, mostly political or economic, continue to take place even after two years of occupation.

The Commander in Chief, Far East, has delegated military responsibility and authority for occupation of South Korea to Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General of the XXIV Corps. This Corps of two divisions totals 41,000 United States troops and constitutes the American Occupational Force in Korea.

There are no South Korean Armed Forces to augment these American occupational troops. There are, however, three authorized Korean uniformed elements or quasi-military forces: the National Police with a strength of 28,000, the Constabulary with 16,000, and the Korean Coast Guard with 3,000. These forces may be expected to remain loyal to the United States Military Government in the event of emergency. The National Police Force is the agency for enforcing law and order in Korea and is organized into district and subdistrict headquarters with police stations in principal towns and villages.

The Constabulary is similar in purpose to the National Guard of the United States in that it is used to back up the police in event of major disorders. At present, the Constabulary is also being utilized to augment American guards on United States Army installations. It is armed with captured Japanese rifles and small arms, and its efficiency is low by American standards.

North of the 38° North parallel, the estimated Soviet troop strength in Korea is approximately 45,000. These forces are organized into two major units, the 40th Rifle Division and the 19th Mechanized Division, plus complementary air, naval, and service support. There is evidence of further Soviet withdrawal now underway. An accurate figure denoting the Soviet-trained and equipped North Korean People’s (Communist) Army in its overall structure has not yet been obtained but the figure of 125,000 troops has been generally accepted. These forces assist Soviets in control of the border, maintain liaison with Chinese Communists in Manchuria, and constitute a potential military threat to South Korea.

Current political and economic unrest in Southern Korea is aggravated by Communistic terrorism, and by Communist-inspired riots and revolutionary activities in the occupied area. Such disorders impose additional military burdens on the police, the constabulary, and the American Occupation Forces. In addition, there is a possibility, however remote, of a Soviet-inspired invasion of South Korea by troops of the North Korean People’s (Communist) Army. Recent reports from Manchuria indicate that sizable elements of Korean troops are operating with Chinese Communists, possibly to acquire battle conditioning. Furthermore there is evidence that Soviet officers and equipment are being used to groom the Korean Army.

Although it is extremely doubtful that the Soviets or their North Korean satellites would invade South Korea in the near future, infiltration of Communists and of large numbers of the North Korean Army, in connection with large-scale Communist-inspired or abetted riots or revolts in the South, is always a dangerous threat. Should this occur, the forces available should be adequate for maintaining order under any circumstances except for an outright Soviet directed or controlled invasion.

Strategic Importance

The political, social, economic, and military situations in South Korea are inextricably mingled. A Soviet-dominated Korea would constitute a serious political and psychological threat to Manchuria, North China, the Ryukyus, and Japan, and hence to United States strategic interests in the Far East. It is therefore in the best interest of the United States to ensure the permanent military neutralization of Korea. Neutralization can only be assured by its occupation until its future independence as a buffer state is assured.

So long as Soviet troops remain in occupation of North Korea, the United States must maintain troops in South Korea or admit before the world an “ideological retreat.” The military standing of the United States would decline accordingly; not only throughout the Far East, but throughout the world. Withdrawal of United States Occupation Forces from Korea would result in a growing unrest among the Japanese people because of their uncertainty regarding future United States policy in the Far East, and their consequent fears of expanding Soviet influence. This might well increase occupational requirements for Japan.

Except as indicated above, and the fact that its occupation denies a potential enemy the use of warm-water ports and the opportunity to establish strong air and naval bases in the peninsula, the United States has little military interest in maintaining troops or bases in Korea. In the event of major hostilities in the Far East, present forces in Korea would most likely be a military liability as they could not be maintained there within our present military capabilities.

There are three possible courses of action with reference to United States Occupation Forces in Korea:

They may be withdrawn immediately, which would abandon South Korea to the Soviet Union through pressures which could be exerted by the North Korea People’s (Communist) Army and is therefore an unacceptable course from the strategic viewpoint.

They may remain in occupation indefinitely, which course would be unacceptable to the American public after Soviet withdrawal, and would subject United States to international censure.

They may be withdrawn concurrently with Soviet occupation forces.

Soviet forces in Northern Korea will not be withdrawn until the North Korean puppet government and armed forces which they have created are strong enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops. One of these Soviet objectives will undoubtedly be to obtain control of South Korea by utilization of Communist Korean armed forces as a means of pressure after withdrawal of United States forces, as was done in the cases of Poland, Outer Mongolia, Yugoslavia, and Albania.

There appears to be a strong possibility that Soviet Russia will withdraw its occupational forces when such conditions are favorable and thus induce our own withdrawal.

Military Aid to Korea

The Military Government in Korea, which is currently being turned over to American and Korean civilians, is the only government in South Korea. The immediate and primary objectives of the American Military Commander in Korea are to maintain law and order in the face of subversive uprisings in the American zone, to care for and safeguard American noncombatants and property, and to operate a military government which looks toward the future political independence of Korea together with its economic and social rehabilitation. In view of these objectives, the immediate purpose of any American military aid to Korea should be to facilitate their realization.

The long-term purpose of military aid to Korea should be to enable South Korea, and later all Korea, to engage in a holding operation against the progressive expansion of militaristic Communism. Minimum military aid to Southern Korea therefore should envisage the support of the uniformed elements of Korean military and quasi-military forces through the furnishing of United States equipment including carbines and some light machine guns as well as furnishing vehicles, telephone and radio communications, etc., and training advice.

Consideration was given by the Mission to the organization, training, and equipping of a strong Korean military force along the lines of the former Philippine Scouts. This force should be under the control of the United States Military Commander, initially should be officered throughout by Americans, but with a program for replacement and understudy by Korean officers, and should be of sufficient strength to cope with the threat from the north. Such a force will become truly effective only if the United States Commander in Korea is given clear-cut authority to establish and control it.

Because of its occupation by two nations of radically differing ideologies and policies, and the corresponding separation into two parts economically, there is little that Korea, even as a liberated nation, can do to improve its situation. South Korea lacks the experience and industrial potential to create or support its own armed forces.

An American organized and equipped Korean military force would serve to counteract in large measure the North Korean People’s (Communist) Army when the American and the Soviet forces are withdrawn from Korea. It might possibly preclude the forceful establishment of a Communist Government, and thus contribute to a situation favorable for the establishment of a free and independent Korea.

Conclusions

United States-Soviet Union troop strengths in South and North Korea are approximately equal but the Soviets, assisted by a Soviet-controlled, equipped, and trained North Korean People’s (Communist) Army of 125,000 men, and geographically supported by a contiguous Soviet Siberia, are in an infinitely stronger military position.

There is considerable unrest in South Korea but forces available to General Hodge are adequate to cope with it and to maintain order, though completely inadequate, even with maximum assistance from General MacArthur, to meet Soviet-controlled invasion of North Korean forces.

A United States withdrawal which permitted the Soviet Union to dominate Korea would result in a serious political and psychological threat to China, including Manchuria, and Japan.

The United States has a strong strategic interest in insuring permanent military neutralization of Korea and its denial as a base to the Soviet Union.

The Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces just as soon as they can be sure that the North Korean puppet government and armed forces which they have created will be strong enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

United States withdrawal from Korea be based upon agreements with the Soviet Union to effect proportional withdrawals, with as many guarantees as possible to safeguard Korean freedom and independence.

Military aid be furnished to South Korea which would support the achievement of such adequate safeguards and which would envisage:

Continuing to furnish arms and equipment to Korean National

Police and Korean Coast Guard.

The creation of an American-officered Korean Scout Force to replace the present Constabulary of sufficient strength to cope with the threat from the North.

Continued interim occupation by United States Army forces in Korea.

Advice in training of technical specialists and tactical units.

Bibliography

A

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American Mercury Magazine, March, 1951.

Asia at the Crossroads, by E. Alexander Powell, Century Co., N. Y., 1922.

C

Caesar and Christ, by Will Durant, Simon & Schuster, N. Y., 1944.

Challenge of the East, The, by George E. Eddy, Farrar, N. Y., 1931.

China of Chiang Kai-shek, a political study, by Paul M. A. Linebarger, World Peace Foundation, Boston, Mass., 1941.

China Shall Rise Again, by Mei-ling Soong Chiang, Harper and Bros., N. Y., and London, 1940.

China in the Sun, by Randall Gould, Doubleday and Co., Inc., N. Y., 1946.

Chinese Civilization, by Marcel Granet, Alfred Knopf, N. Y., 1930.

Chinese, Their History and Culture, The, by Kenneth Scott Latourette, The MacMillan Co., N. Y., 1934.

City of the Czars, The, by Harold Lamb, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, N. Y., 1948.

Civilization on Trial, Essays, by Arnold J. Toynbee, N. Y., Oxford University Press, 1948.

Conquest of Civilization, The, by James H. Breasted, Harper Bros., N. Y., 1938.

Current Magazines and Newspapers.

D

Discovery of Freedom, The, by Rose Wilder Lane, The John Day Co., N. Y., 1943.

Dawn of Conscience, The, by James Henry Breasted, N. Y., London, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1933.

E

Early Empires of Central Asia, The, by William Montgomery McGovern, Chapel Hill, 1939.

Economics and the Public Welfare, by Benjamin McAlister Anderson, Literary Guild of America, N. Y., 1938.

Economics in One Easy Lesson, by Henry Hazlitt, Harper and Bros., N. Y. and London, 1946.

Empire of the Tsars and the Russians, The, by Anatole Leroy Beaulieu, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, N. Y., 1893.

F

Fight for the Republic of China, The, by B. L. Putnam Weale, Dodd, Mead and Co., N. Y., 1917.

G

Genghis Khan, by Harold Lamb, Robert M. McBride and Co., N. Y., 1927.

Great Globe Itself, The, by William C. Bullitt, Charles Scribner’s Sons, N. Y., 1946.

H

History of Civilization, by James Henry Breasted, Ginn & Co., N. Y. and Boston, 1937.

History of Russia, A, by Bernard Pares, Alfred A. Knopf, N. Y., 1926.

History of the Russian Empire Under Peter the Great, by Voltaire, Vol. XVIII, St. Hubert Guild, N. Y., 1901.

History of the Russian Revolution, by Leon Trotsky, Vols. I, II, III, Simon and Schuster, N. Y., 1932.

I

Inside Asia, by John Gunther, Harper and Bros., N. Y. and London, 1942.

Intelligence Digest—A Review of World Affairs.

International Relations of the Chinese Empire, The, by Hosea Ballou Morse, Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., Vols. I, II, III, 1918.

I Speak for the Chinese, by Carl Crow, Harper and Bros., N. Y. and London, 1937.

Ivan the Terrible, Czar of Russia, by George Backer, Random House, N. Y., 1950.

J

Journey to China, A, by Arnold J. Toynbee, London, Constable and Co., Ltd., 1931.

L

Life Magazine, The June 14, issue.

Lost Peace in China, by George Moorad, E. P. Dutton, N. Y., 1949.

M

Man of Independence, The, by Jonathan Daniels, Lippincott & Co., N. Y., 1940.

March of the Barbarians, by Harold Lamb, Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., N. Y., 1940.

March of Muscovy, The, by Harold Lamb, Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden City, N. Y., 1948.

Marco Polo, the Venetian, Everyman’s Library, Edited by Ernest Rhys, 1907.

O

Old Civilizations of the New World, by Hyatt Verrill, Bobbs-Merrill Co., N. Y., 1929.

P

Pageant of Chinese History, The, by Elizabeth Seeger, Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., 1934.

Pamphlets, Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, N. Y.

Practical Program for America, A, Edited by Henry Hazlett, Harcourt Brace and Co., N. Y., 1932.

R

Resistance and Reconstruction, by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Harper and Bros., N. Y. and London, 1943.

Riding the Tiger, by Harry Carr, Houghton Mifflin Co., N. Y., and Boston, 1934.

Russia and the Peace, by Bernard Pares, The MacMillan Co., N. Y., 1944.

Russian Enigma, The, by William Henry Chamberlin, Charles Scribner’s Sons, N. Y., 1943.

Russia and the Russians, by Edward Crankshaw, Viking Press, N. Y., 1948.

S

Siberia, by Emil Lengyel, Random House, N. Y., 1942.

Soong Sisters, The, by Emily Hahn, Doubleday, Doran and Co., Garden City, N. Y., 1942.

Speaking Frankly, by James F. Byrnes, Harper Bros., N. Y., 1947.

Stalin, A Critical Survey of Bolshevism, by Boris Souvarine, Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., 1939.

Stalin’s Russia and the Crisis in Socialism, by Max Eastman, W. W. Norton and Co., N. Y., 1940.

Study in History, A, by Arnold J. Toynbee, Abridgement of Vols. I-VI, by D. C. Somervell, N. Y., G. Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1946.

T

Tamerlane, the Earth Shaker, by Harold Lamb, Robert M. McBride and Co., N. Y., 1928.

Tinder Box of Asia, The, by George E. Sokolsky, Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., N. Y., 1932.

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W

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Index

A

Acheson, 19, 26, 118.

American Mercury, 23.

Atwood, Harry E., 134.

Anti-Imperialist League, 67

Aristotle, 144.

Attila, the Hun, 73, 74.

Attlee, Prime Minister, 146.

B

“Ballentine Beer Patches,” 16.

“Big Noses,” 117.

Bleucher, General, 59.

Borodin, Michael, 59.

Bourtai, 76.

(See also Genghis Khan, favorite wife of)

Browder, Earl, 50, 53, 59, 60.

Byrnes, Secretary of State, 19, 24.

C

Cairo Conference, 108.

Canton, Russians in, 113, 120, 121.

Chang Kuo Sin, 117, 119.

Checfoo, 9.

Cheng Tien-shi, Dr., 129, 130.

Chennault, Claire L., 119.

Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 64, 104, 106;

building of model village by, 106, (See also Soong, Sisters).

Chiang Kai-shek, 7, 8, 27, 59, 62, 67, 85, 92, 93, 103-116,

contributions of, to the U. S., 103;

“Golden Decade” of, 104;

mistakes of, 10;

tragedy of, 103-116.

Chinese Communist Party, 45;

Central Committee of, 32;

Central People’s Government, 45;

Personalities, 45-68;

young intelligentsia of, 57.

Chinese New Year, 87.

Chingwangtao, 7.

Chou En-lai, 8, 13, 28, 42, 56-61, 125;

family of, 59;

wife of, 60, 126;

“Executioner,” 59.

Chungking, 45, 105, 106;

destruction of, by Japanese, 106;

model village in, 106.

Churchill, 26, 33, 108.

Chu Teh, 13, 38, 40, 50-56;

as a movie “fan,” 40;

family of, 51;

hunting prowess of, 40;

wives of, 51, 54.

Comintern, 49.

Communism, the “lure” of, 1;

forebears of, 70-81.

Communist, flag; propaganda, 82-93;

(See also Propaganda, Communist)

Confucius, 50, 115.

Courcy, Kenneth de, 145.

“Cumshaw,” 36.

D

Dairen, 9.

Daniels, Jonathan, 25.

Drugs, “actedon,” 90;

“mescaline,” 90;

use of, 90, 91;

on Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, 91;

(See also Hypnotism, use of)

on Michael Shipkov, 91;

on Robert A. Vogeler, 91, 92;

(See also Hypnotism, use of).

Democracy, as a principle, 133.

E

England, 139.

Estabrooks, Dr. G. H., 91;

(See also Hypnotism, use of).

Eurasia, 7.

F

Fifth Column, conception of, 72.

Finland, 132.

Foundation for Economic Education, 136.

Formosa, 112, 115, 118;

invasion of, 118-120.

France, 132.

Free love, 125.

G

Gallen, 59.

Genghis Khan, 17, 22, 53, 68, 70, 74-78, 79, 81, 96, 99, 100, 105, 106, 108, 109;

favorite wife of, 76;

“Scourge of God,” 74;

superstitions of, 77;

Yassa of, 1, 78.

Generalissimo, 7, 10, 17, 28, 33, 45.

H

Hankow, 115.

Hatem, Dr., 63, 64;

family of, 63, 64. (See also Ma Hia-teh).

Hiss, 26.

Hirohito, 131.

Hitler, 46, 131, 136.

Hong Kong, 108, 124, 128, 129;

treatment of British in, 129.

Hoover administration, 135, 136.

Hoover, J. Edgar, 137.

Huns, 70, 73.

Hutton, Betty, 40.

Hurley, Ambassador, 10, 41, 45, 109.

Hypnotism, use of, 91, 92;

(See also Estabrooks, Dr. G. H.);

on Cardinal Mindszenty, 91, 92;

on Robert Vogeler, 91, 92;

(See also Drugs, use of);

on Van der Lubbe, 92;

(See also Drugs, use of).

I

International News Service, 18.

International Hospital, 30, 37.

(See also Yenan).

J

Japanese, peace terms offered, 108, 115.

Jefferson, Thomas, 142.

Jenner, William E., 20, 22.

Jessup, 26.

Joffe, Adolph, 104.

Judd, Walter H., 17.

K

Kalgan Pass, 9.

Kung, H. H., Madame, 64.

(See also Soong, Sisters).

Kung, H. H., Dr., 104.

Kwangsi Province, 113.

L

Lamb, Harold, 22.

Lattimore, 26.

Lehey, William D., 25.

Lesser concessions, theory of, 135.

Li Li San, 61, 96;

wife of, 61.

Life Magazine, 115.

Lin Piao, 62.

Li Tsun-jen, General, 113.

“Long March,” the, 47, 48, 54, 121.

Lu Hsun Art Academy, 34, 64.

M

MacArthur, General Douglas, 22, 23, 25, 107.

Madison, James, 134.

Ma Hai-teh, 63, 64.

(See also Hatem, Dr.).

Malinovsky, Marshall, 61.

Mao Tse-tung, 13, 14, 15, 29, 33, 45-50, 54, 57, 61, 62, 63, 68, 76, 92, 102, 121, 125;

daughter of, 30;

son of, 46;

wives of, 48;

heroine of “Long March,” 48, 49;

Lang Ping, 48, 49;

Myth, 49;

propaganda speech by, 92, 93.

Manchuria, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 61, 94-102;

as granary of Asia, 94;

occupation of, by Japanese, 94;

stripping of, by Communists, 96.

Manchus, 94, 104.

Marriage, New Democracy, 125-126.

Marshall, General George C., 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 24, 28, 56;

at a Chinese opera, 14;

at a Communist banquet, 14;

in conference with Mao, 15;

preference for Mao, 16;

visit of, to Yenan, 12, 14, 15.

McNeil, Hector, 130.

Michener, James, 115.

Mindszenty, Joseph Cardinal, 91;

(See also Drugs, use; Hypnotism, use of).

Ming Bing, 13.

Min Yuan Park, 87.

Missionaries, Catholic, 34;

Protestants, 35.

Mongol, 38, 70, 72, 73, 74, 81, 100, 101.

Mongolia, 9.

Mossadegh, Mohammed, 146.

Moses, 70, 133.

Mud caves, of Yenan, 29, 44.

Mukden, 95, 99.

N

Nanking, 16, 56, 58.

Nan Yuan, 8.

Nationalist, 9, 11;

(See also Chiang Kai-shek, tragedy of).

“New Democracy,” 82;

marriage under the, 125-126.

New Life Movement, 61, 106.

Nimitz, Admiral Chester, 107.

O

Open Door Policy, 9.

Opera, Chinese, 14;

Shanghai, 68.

P

Peace terms, Japanese, 108.

Pei Yuan, 8.

Peking, 7, 8, 57, 87, 122;

capture of, 87, 122;

famine in, 122.

Personalities, Communist, 45-69.

Plato, 50

Politburo, 15.

Port Arthur, 9.

“Prisoners of War School,” 32;

(See also Yenan).

Propaganda, Communist, 82-93;

against Americans, 85;

basic purpose of, 82;

distortion of terms in, 82, 83;

Democracy, 82;

Freedom, 82, 83;

Security, 83;

Truth, 83;

for children, 84, 85;

newspapers as, 86;

opera as, 89;

posters as, 84;

slogans as, 84;

speeches as, 86;

by Mao Tse-tung, 12, 93;

titles as reward, 87;

types of, two, 83.

Q

Quislings, 100.

Quo Vadis, 131-148.

R

Red Curtain, Behind the, 117-130.

Republic, discussion of, 133, 134.

Rosenberg, Anna, 27.

Roosevelt, 21, 26, 33, 108, 135.

“Rosamond,” 65.

Russell, Dean, 143.

Russia, war potential, 138, 139.

Russian advisors, 117.

S

Samarkand, Battle of, 100.

Sanzo Nosako, 33.

Shanghai, fall of, 119, 120, 124;

Mayor of, 119;

Russians in, 120;

treatment of Americans in, 127.

Shensi Province, 29.

Shipkov, Michael, 91;

(See also Drugs, use of).

Soong, Charlie, 65;

family, 65, 104;

Sisters, 64, 104.

“Stakhanovitism,” 80.

Stalin, 3, 28, 49, 50, 131.

State Department, 7, 9, 27, 42.

Stuart, J. Leighton, Ambassador, 24, 56.

Sun Fo, 66.

Sun Yat-sen, Madame, 31, 45, 64-69;

(See also Soong, Sisters).

Sun Yat-sen, 47, 103;

revolution of, 51.

T

Tamerlane, 53, 78.

Tang Shan, 8.

Tartars, 63, 70, 78.

Tientsin, 7, 87, 88.

Tipping, prohibition against, 36;

“cumshaw,” 36.

Trans-Siberian Railway, 97.

Trohan, Walter, 23, 25.

Trotsky, 2.

Truce teams, 16.

Truman, President, 7, 10, 15, 19, 22, 108, 111.

U

United States, 7, 8, 16, 117.

Urals, 96, 97.

V

Vogeler, Robert A., 91;

(See also Drugs, use of; Hypnotism, use of).

V-J Day, 95, 97.

Voice of America, 118.

W

Wallace, Henry, 131.

Wedemeyer, Lieutenant General Albert C., 9, 24, 111, 114, 118, 142.

Wei Tao-ming, Madame, 68, 69.

Wesleyan College, 65.

Wife swapping, 125.

Worton, Major General William Arthur, 7, 8.

Y

Yalta, 10, 12, 13, 22.

Yangtse River, 60, 105.

“Yassa,” 1, 78.

Yeaton, Colonel Ivan D., 31.

Yenan, 12, 15, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 48, 57, 64;

International Hospital in, 30;

Market place in, 35;

“Prisoner of War School,” 32.

Yenching University, 24, 56, 57.

Z

Zukov, 62.

About the Author...

MARY LAMAR KNIGHT, famed foreign correspondent and lecturer, graduated into the ranks of foreign correspondents while she was on a two-month “tour” of Europe in 1930. The tour lasted for five full years with only brief vacations and assignments at home. At that time Miss Knight was the only woman employed on a full-time basis in the Paris Bureau of the United Press Associations. In this capacity she covered the European continent as a feature writer in the varied fields of women’s fashions, crime and politics.

She reported on the outstanding fashions of the Parisian designers as they paraded their creations into pages of history; she was the first woman since the days of the French Revolution to witness the guillotining of a famous convict in Paris; she interviewed royalty of many nationalities; and, most important of all, she saw and studied the beginnings of World War II: the propaganda build-up, the international deceit and intrigue, the in-human characters of the men who promoted the war and prepared the nations of Europe for their own destruction.

During her varied career, Miss Knight, who is the daughter of the late Dr. Lucian Lamar and Edith Nelson Knight, of Atlanta, Georgia, has worked as a nurse at Bellevue Hospital, New York, to report on a bitter campaign to regulate working conditions for doctors and nurses; she was assigned to the New York Women’s House of Detention to pose as a prostitute, going to jail with Lucky Luciano’s “girls” and latter covered his vice trial in the courtroom; at one time she was assigned the role of a taxi-dance girl, and at another time to join the chorus line of the world-famous “Rockettes” at the lavish Music Hall theater; she was the first woman reporter allowed to invade the training camps of Joe Louis and Max Schmeling prior to their title fight which she covered at ringside. In 1935, the author embarked for China on a Norwegian freighter.

Remaining in China for two years she travelled to most of the principal cities in China, Korea and Manchuria. At the borders of Mongolia she witnessed the beginnings of her RED BLIGHT of today. The Communists were then in the process of developing the tactics, the brutality, the deceit and the methods which they have so far so successfully employed against their homeland and the neighboring countries of Tibet and Korea. In China, 1935-36, Mary Lamar Knight had a 15-year advance in preview of the tragic days that are now immediately ahead for all civilized nations. She returned to China again in 1946, independently covering the Pauley and the Marshall Missions. She met and became personally acquainted with most of the men who dominate today’s great human conflict—Marshall, Wedemeyer, Ambassador Hurley, Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang, Chou En-lai and many others. Herein she was able to objectively view the entire American-Chinese crisis, make a personal analysis of the appalling international situation and draw the conclusions which she presents in RED BLIGHT.

In recent months Miss Knight has spent her time in bringing this vitally enlightening book up-to-the-minute and appearing before many outstanding political, civic and patriotic clubs and organizations as a featured speaker on Communism and its avowed principles of ruling or ruining the earth.

Among Miss Knight’s published works are: On My Own, an autobiography, (MacMillan, 1938); Spies versus Censors (Reader’s Digest, May, 1946) and Red Realm in China (Reader’s Digest, February, 1947). The author was the only woman contributor to We Cover the World, the first symposium of foreign correspondents (Prentice-Hall).

The author is available for personal appearances and speaking engagements. (Fees are variable.)

A Note on KOREA ...

By Mary Lamar Knight

Books already have been written about the Korean situation. Although it is one spoke in the great Asiatic wheel, Korea is very important, but China still remains in the hub of the wheel. One of the greatest tragedies of this whole chain of events is that General Douglas MacArthur had the difficult—the impossible—task of trying to rescue the Korean chestnut from the fire—a fire which might not have ignited had his counsel and advice, along with that of Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer and others, been heeded in the first place.

The Communist-inspired invasion of South Korea by the North Korean Communists was a trial balloon let loose by the Soviet and Chinese Communists to determine how far the United States and the United Nations would go before buying an all-out Asiatic war. It was a trick from the start, to draw U. S. and UN forces foremost into the area from which the U. S. had withdrawn in 1949. Once committed, and once having dispatched American—and a trickle of UN soldiers into South Korea, the chances were that they could be kept there indefinitely. We were permitted, early in the conflict, to cross the arbitrary 38th parallel, and to proceed at great difficulty and even greater loss of life, to the borders of Manchuria. Then, in typical Communist fashion, they struck back in the evening, almost, of our declaration of all but total victory. One need only to glance at a map of Korea to realize that the Communists, Soviet and Chinese, are in a position to pour millions of men into North Korea, dressed as Koreans or otherwise, at their will. How could we hope to do anything of a permanent nature in unifying Korea against the Communists? The Korean patriot Kim Koo, shortly before his assassination and replying to a question put to him by Representative Walter Judd said: “It doesn’t make any difference what you (the U. S.) do now. There just isn’t any way to get Korea so that she can be independent and secure and self-sustaining, until you solve the Communist problem across the border in Manchuria.” We solved that problem by giving that prize to the Soviets. It was Russia’s price for entering the war, the last six days of it, as an ally, even though it was rather generally known that Japan was ready to surrender.

For every life that may have been spared by the signing of the questionable Yalta agreement, thousands of American and Korean GI’s, and Korean civilians are now dead, dying and maimed. This little Florida-shaped country of Korea, cut up by outsiders, is a tragic example of failure to think beyond military objectives. We cannot defend Korea from Russian attack without an all-out war. We can only prolong the agony. If it was right for us to leave Korea in 1949, can we, honestly, justify our re-entry there in 1950—at the price we have paid?

There yet remain other fates to be decided—Formosa, the Philippines and numerous islands of the Pacific, whether we occupy them or not. Have we not already proven that, “It is fantastic to imagine that we can convert our enemies into our friends by treating our friends as if they were our enemies”?

But to understand the overall picture, one must begin with a knowledge of the background that has made China and the United States the estranged bed-fellow nations which they have become. The historic removal of Douglas MacArthur from all of his commands in the Far East, by President Truman at 1 a. m. on April 11, 1951, will have far-reaching effects. Due to this move, disaster looms before us larger than ever, especially for the United States and Great Britain. Nearly a month before the news of the impending MacArthur dismissal by the President “leaked” to the American press, headlines had appeared in Danish newspapers saying: “British Say ‘MacArthur Must go’.”

The average reader, in all probability, sees only a difference of opinion in the policies of the political and military leadership on the conduct of World War III, but the facts go deeper than this. There appears to be a determination on the part of those who are playing international politics, to obtain and control world power. MacArthur, definitely, was the greatest single stumbling block in their path. To be in a position, militarily, to bomb enemy supply sources, and yet forbidden, by political directives from Washington, to do this, put greater handicaps on MacArthur than he was willing to take. With the MacArthur removal, Truman will bend every effort toward silencing all who remain opposed to his Acheson-approved manifesto.

On April 1, 1951, correspondent Kenneth de Courcy (Intelligence Digest—A Review of World Affairs) cabled from London:

“There is no longer even a definite objective in the Korean war. Each nation or organization concerned in it seems to have a different objective; while each high commander seems to have a private idea of what would represent success or victory. If the powers that be cannot agree even in Korea, it is hardly surprising that they cannot devise an agreed strategy for the entire world. Mr. Truman, who is becoming very tired, seems determined to await decisive trends of public opinion. His private views and conclusions are not likely to be pressed unless he is convinced that public opinion is more than ready for them. In fact, American public opinion is far ahead of its leadership. Mr. Truman however, has not yet been convinced of this....

“The Kremlin reckons on a steadily progressive weakening of the Atlantic group of powers. Meanwhile, it is intended to increase the flow of warlike supplies and indirect help to Asiatic Communist forces, rather than to the European satellites. Major developments are timed to take place in Asia before the end of this year, which by the middle of 1952, will give the USSR access to certain valuable and essential raw materials which now have to be purchased from outside the Soviet system.... The Kremlin thinks war with the West will become inevitable ... but hopes to be able to postpone this war until Burma and India have been brought within the Soviet sphere of influence.”

To follow the MacArthur program has been called a “colossal gamble,” but what greater gamble can there be than sitting back and waiting for the enemy to come and destroy us? Was England able to stop Hitler by appeasement? Nor will the present British Labor Government be able to silence the Chinese Communists by promising them Formosa and a hand in the Japanese peace treaty if, indeed, the Japanese accept such a treaty.

Those who still believe that a “deal” can be made with Stalin or Communists anywhere, just do not know the history of Communism or of Communism’s forbears. MacArthur’s removal from the scene at this time is cause for jubilation among the radically inclined the world over, for this particular American hero was Stalin’s Enemy Number One.

Another great boon to the Chinese and Korean Reds is that Truman has virtually promised them that their Manchurian bases will not be bombed by us, unless of course, they step out of line and bomb us first. Thus, they can continue to kill and maim our boys without fear of too much retaliation on our part. We won two great victories on the battlefields of World Wars I and II, but we lost them both at conference tables. Political double-talk always gives the enemy a far greater victory than could be won on the battlefield.

The political moves made by the powers that be in Washington serve only to cancel out our military victories. On November 16, 1950, when Russia vetoed the Security Council’s resolution demanding that China clear out of Korea, she put the blame for the Korean war squarely in her own lap. But as long as Stalin and the Kremlin remain within the United Nations, this international body politic will remain hamstrung, for it will be used as an instrument to give aid and comfort to Communists everywhere in achieving military aggression against the Western Hemisphere. For Russia, as a member of the United Nations, with veto power, has sent no troops to Korea to fight the aggression. But why should she be exempt when others are not? A United Nations operating in opposite directions cannot be very united. With one side of the UN fighting aggression and another faction pushing it, defeat can be the only outcome. When the Korean war first burst into actual flame, and we discovered that Russia was openly, as well as secretly, supporting the North Koreans, why did we not then expel her from the UN and declare her an enemy of the peace? Had we had the courage to do so, the story would be different today. Now, with our hands tied behind our backs, we wait for the enemy to make the next move in the most tragic game of chess ever played with flesh and blood pawns.

It is difficult to understand why General MacArthur was prevented from arming some 400,000 unarmed South Koreans. On April 6, 1951, he stated that political decisions beyond his authority prevented him from doing this, but why were they deprived of fighting for their own land? And why were American fathers and sons to be butchered in battle to free those who would gladly fight for themselves, but for political interference? No short term good ever derived from a long term evil, nor can any amount of political expediency replace military emergency.

Terrible sabotage in this country is not unlikely. On April 7, 1951, J. Edgar Hoover stood before the Senate Committee and said: “A hard core of Communists trained in sabotage is ready to strike at vital industries ...” and he added that this would be one of the most effective weapons that Stalin could use against the United States.

Despite denials from the White House and State Department, we know that Russia has a solid network of spies and undercover agents operating in every department of our national life, operating to destroy us from within, circumventing the need for any long-range attack.

To those who stubbornly maintain that the blood of more than sixty thousand American boys killed or wounded in Korea, in addition to an almost equal number of what are called non-battle casualties, still constitutes merely a “police action,” I say in all reverence, may God forgive you. We are at war now. No amount of waiting or appeasement will put off World War III. We are in it up to our necks.

Your First Step....

“The journey of a thousand miles begins with just one step ...” says a Chinese proverb.

Millions of Americans today know that we have to take that “one step” individually, if order is to be restored to the national house in which we live.

You have read in this volume of the many wrong steps in the wrong direction that have been taken by our national planners. These have resulted in the human turmoil, the domestic unrest, and in undeclared war against Communism. Our battlefield casualties have already passed the seventy thousand mark.

Every American must act NOW to preserve our Constitutional Way of Life. But before concerted political action can be taken the facts must be known. RED BLIGHT tells these facts!

Now you can take your first step in the right direction by helping to disseminate the truth about the RED BLIGHT that is engulfing the earth. You can do this by placing RED BLIGHT into the hands of as many people as possible.

RED BLIGHT is bound in two editions: Paper bound, $1.50 per copy; Cloth Bound, $2.50 per copy. Please use the coupon below for placing your order.

Lorrin L. Morrison, Publisher,
1915 South Western Avenue,
Los Angeles 18, California.

Enclosed please find remittance in the amount of $.......... for which please send .... copy/ies of the .......... Bound Edition of RED BLIGHT, by Mary Lamar Knight, as indicated in Remittance Advice column below.

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Transcriber’s Notes

pg 10 Changed at no time had be to: he

pg 13 Changed spelling of Moa Tse-tung to: Mao

pg 15 Changed swayed to its ryhthmic to: rhythmic

pg 22 Changed methods of Genghis Kahn to: Khan

pg 23 Changed that these are dissillusioning to: disillusioning

pg 25 Changed Eighth Regiment at Fort Screvan to: Screven

pg 26 Added quote after: finest regiments in the Army.

pg 27 Changed May God forebid to: forbid

pg 31 Changed this last shipemnt to: shipment

pg 32 Changed proved to be a diobolical to: diabolical

pg 46 Changed Moa’s childhood was to: Mao’s

pg 50 Changed devotion to Confuscius to: Confucius

pg 52 Changed fire of vitrolic to: vitriolic

pg 56 Replaced comma with period at: foreign dignitaries with ease

pg 56 Changed did such a consumate to: consummate

pg 58 Changed more violent and vitrolic to: vitriolic

pg 58 Added double quote to end of sentence: return to China from Europe?

pg 66 Changed publicity she so abhored to: abhorred

pg 67 Changed capitalization of world Anti-Imperialist to: World

pg 67 Changed capitalization of a cable to the anti-Imperialist to: Anti

pg 67 Changed mind and persuasive personalitly to: personality

pg 72 Changed horsemen in the earily to: early

pg 73 Changed dirty and disheaveled to: disheveled

pg 86 Changed effort is wasted on superflous to: superfluous

pg 91 Changed warrant a demontration to: demonstration

pg 105 Changed capitalization of it had become obvious to: It

pg 135 Changed established in this county to: country

pg 138 Changed humiliation and degredation to: degradation

pg 141 Changed economically and phychologically to: psychologically

pg 142 Changed use our almost unprecendented to: unprecedented

pg 146 Changed dispatch datelined Teheran to: Tehran

pg 152 Changed Russian reentry to: re-entry

pg 153 Changed facilitate China’s post-war to: postwar

pg 154 Added comma after: Korea, the political

pg 155 Changed bound ideolologically to: ideologically

pg 163 Changed developments as portentious to: portentous

pg 164 Changed program of assistant to: assistance

pg 164 Changed eight years of war. to: war,

pg 166 Changed to preserve Korea to: Korea’s

pg 167 Removed comma from: first meeting March 8, 1946

pg 169 Changed continue as long is to: as

pg 169 Changed In the over-all administration to: overall

pg 174 Added space between words eastern and half

pg 177 Changed land for rise to: rice

pg 177 Changed chaotic hyperinflation to: hyper-inflation

pg 178 Removed period after: 1915-19 to 2.0

pg 178 Changed diet until indigeous to: indigenous

pg 179 Changed over 300 gram to: grams

pg 179 Changed salt an sugar to: and

pg 180 Changed long-staple Egyption to: Egyptian

pg 181 Changed in the time alloted to: allotted

pg 182 Removed duplicate word and their own own country

pg 184 Changed Army in its over-all to: overall

pg 186 Changed expansion of miltaristic to: militaristic

pg 189 Changed Charles Schribner’s to: Scribner’s

pg 191 Changed Education, Irrington-on Hudson to: Irvington

pg 193 Changed spelling of Aristole to Aristotle and changed page number from 143 to 144

pg 193 Changed spelling of Centrol People’s Government to: Central

pg 193 Changed spelling of Crinese New Year to: Chinese

pg 193 Changed period to semicolon after: Drugs, use of, 90, 91

pg 193 Changed period to semicolon after: Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 64, 104, 106

pg 194 Fixed page references under Hypnotism

pg 194 Replaced semi-colon with period after: International News Service

pg 195 Changed spelling under Mindszenty of Hynotism to: Hypnotism

pg 196 Changed Sun Yet-sen to: Yat-sen

pg 196 Changed spelling of: Hynotism under Vogeler to: Hypnotism