ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH DAY Saturday, 8 June 1946

I want to ask you now, can you explain how General Heusinger could have arrived at that view?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I worked closely with General Heusinger and very often I talked to him about questions concerning anti-guerrilla warfare.

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: He never said anything to me which might express this view and I cannot explain this statement of his, because it is entirely contrary to the basic views of the military leaders in regard to the conduct of anti-guerrilla warfare.

DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. Why was the general command over anti-guerrilla fighting in the East in 1943, as well as in Italy at the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, transferred to Himmler by the Führer’s order?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The Führer always held the view that anti-guerrilla warfare was predominantly a task for the Police and that police forces were more suited to carrying it out than the partly over-aged security forces of the Army which we could detail for these tasks. Just how far Himmler wanted to obtain a new increase of power in this connection I do not know, nor how far he might have suggested it to the Führer.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the OKW and especially of the Armed Forces Operations Staff to this decree of Hitler’s?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must be emphasized first of all in this connection that, so far as operational areas were concerned, there was no change. The operational area remained until the end, in the case of guerrilla warfare too, under the orders of the commanding generals. In the remaining areas the Armed Forces Operations Staff did not altogether disagree with this arrangement, because we hoped that in these zones the Reichsführer SS would be in a position to use some of his reserves, which were, mostly unknown to us; and we should then have some forces released for the front.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you remember, Witness, that the Commander, Southwest made an urgent request to be excepted from this measure, that is, from transferring his authority in anti-guerrilla warfare to Himmler?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These cases were discussed with General Westphal several times over the telephone, and I consider it possible that he might have made such a suggestion at that time.

DR. LATERNSER: With the chief, yes. As you have just said, before the war you were in the Central Department of the General Staff of the Army; and, as I know, the filling of the higher command positions was handled there, too. Now I want to ask you on what principles they based their selection of commanding generals of army groups and armies?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These appointments were made according to ability and length of service, and the peacetime appointments formed the framework for filling positions at the time of mobilization.

DR. LATERNSER: Were these appointments of the higher commanders carried out strictly from a military standpoint?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These nominations took place entirely on the strength of military considerations; and retired officers, some of whom I am convinced left because of political pressure, were again placed in responsible positions in the event of mobilization. I should like to cite as examples General Von Leeb, General Von Kressenstein, General Von Kleist, Generaloberst Von Hammerstein.

DR. LATERNSER: And these officers you have just mentioned had already retired before the outbreak of the war but were meant to take over higher positions of command in the event of a mobilization?

DR. LATERNSER: Did the Central Department, which had to fill these positions, ever learn that the military leaders had formed a group with the aim of carrying out aggressive wars and of disregarding international law in these wars of aggression?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In the Central Department we knew nothing of the formation of such a group. Perhaps I may state in this connection that during the years 1937 to 1939 quite a number of General Staff officers came to see Lieutenant Colonel Von Zielberg and me, as personnel administrators of the General Staff officers, and talked to us. The majority of these officers were chiefs of army corps, army, and army group general staffs; and they were, therefore, the confidential and responsible advisers of the commanding generals and commanders. These officers, just like their commanding generals, had fought in the first World War; and the opinion they always expressed to us was only that the German nation should be spared a second war. In spite of every positive attitude to the Führer’s successes, there was a certain anxiety about his policy and particularly about the rapid rearmament of the forces, which made careful work difficult.

After the Munich negotiations confidence increased a great deal and it was the general opinion of the officers that the Führer would continue to be successful in maintaining peace.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the higher commanders towards Hitler after the Munich Agreement?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: After the Munich Agreement I concluded from my talks with General Staff officers that there was a general conviction among them that, thanks to his policy, the Führer would continue to preserve peace. I remember that as late as 25 or 26 August I saw the Führer, at headquarters in Zossen, having a conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Von Zielberg and several other officers. At that time these officers were still of the opinion that a war would not occur and that to render the Führer’s political aims feasible it was only necessary to keep the troops firmly under control so that no political catastrophe should be produced by the laying down of arms.

DR. LATERNSER: I think that is enough as far as this question is concerned. Now, regarding the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944, at what time were the preparations for that offensive begun?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, for my next question I should like to ask the witness who of the commanding generals were informed of this offensive and when. It is important to ascertain what co-operation there was among the group. I beg you to allow me to put this question. It is the last but one. The one I just mentioned is the last.

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: As far as I can remember, the first preparations were begun in about September 1944.

DR. LATERNSER: When were the commanding generals informed of these intentions and were commanding generals who did not take part in the offensive informed before it began?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: To the last question I can answer, “no.” The first question I cannot answer as far as the date is concerned: but I do know that in the zone which was proposed for the offensive there had already been troop movements ordered by the supreme command before the Commander, West, who was responsible, was informed and that he therefore made frequent inquiries of us asking for an explanation of these movements.

DR. LATERNSER: The Commander, West, who later on had to direct the offensive, was not previously informed about the movements and transfer of divisions for the offensive, all of which took place in his very territory?

[The Tribunal adjourned until 8 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]

Morning Session

MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the Defendants Hess and Raeder are absent.

THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the applications for witnesses and documents that were made the other day in Court, I will take them in the order in which they were dealt with in Court.

The first application is the application of Kaltenbrunner, and the three witnesses which he asks for are allowed: Tiefenbacher, Kandruth, and Strupp.

The applications of the Defendants Hess and Frank for General Donovan are rejected.

The applications of the Defendants Speer and Keitel are granted, and the application of the Defendant Jodl for an affidavit I think was granted yesterday.

The application for the Defendant Göring for two witnesses, Stuckart and Burmath is granted, but on the condition that three witnesses only may be called upon the subject concerned.

With reference to the application of the Defendant Hess, the Tribunal order as follows:

The affidavit of the former Ambassador Gaus of the 17th of May 1946 is rejected on the ground that it is not in accordance with the permission given on May 14, 1946, but purports to incorporate not merely the substance but also the form of the secret treaties, and the form embraced in the affidavit is not identified as being correct either by a person who made the copies or by one who compared them with the originals. Such copies cannot be received in evidence, and the Tribunal have twice ruled to this effect. The matter of importance to the issues before the Tribunal is not the form of the treaties, but their contents, and evidence of their contents is already before the Tribunal by the testimony of three witnesses. The admission of this affidavit would add nothing to the proof before the Tribunal. The same is true of the proposal to call Gaus as a witness, who would only support evidence as to the contents of the treaties which has not been contradicted. The motion of the 23d of May 1946 to reconsider the Tribunal’s former decision and the motion of the 24th of May 1946 to call Gaus as a witness are accordingly denied.

There is one other matter with which the Tribunal propose to deal, and it is this: In the future, counsel for the organizations which the Prosecution have asked the Tribunal to declare to be criminal will not be permitted to examine or to cross-examine any witnesses other than the defendants in this Court. If they wish to examine or to cross-examine those witnesses, they must call them before the commissions which are now sitting for the taking of evidence oh the questions with which the organizations are concerned.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to voice a further request for the case of Von Papen. I already submitted a written request on 6 June. This was discussed with the Prosecution, and the General Secretary has instructed me to bring this matter to the attention of the Court.

Prince Erbach-Schönberg has filled out an interrogatory. His answers, however, are partially incomplete and sometimes misleading, and it is therefore necessary to supplement them. I suggest that Prince Erbach, who is in Gmunden in the American-occupied zone of Austria, be brought here and interrogated—outside of this Court but in the presence of the Prosecution—to supplement this interrogatory.

My associate received a letter some days ago from Count Pfeil, who is living in Bad Ischl, which is also in the American-occupied zone of Austria, not far from Gmunden, the residence of Prince Erbach. In this letter he has made detailed statements about the contacts which the Defendant Von Papen had with the circle of conspirators involved in the attempted assassination of 20 July. Since this question was raised by the witness Gisevius, the Defense feel themselves bound to discuss it in the presentation of evidence, although they attach no great importance to it. This evidence can probably be produced by means of an affidavit.

I ask that Count Pfeil be brought here with Prince Erbach at the same time so that he can depose an affidavit in the presence of the Prosecution. It is absolutely essential to bring both of these witnesses here, because the case of Von Papen is imminent, and we could not take care of these matters by correspondence.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, will you draw our attention to the particular points in which you say that the interrogatory of Prince Erbach-Schönberg is incomplete or misleading?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with one of the preceding questions of this interrogatory, Prince Erbach answered that the Defendant Von Papen had desired to achieve his assignment by peaceful means rather than by the use of force. The witness answered a later question as to whether the Defendant Von Papen acted in accordance with these political principles as follows:

“As long as I was there I had the impression that the Defendant Von Papen acted in accordance with these principles—that is, the establishment of relations by peaceful means rather than by the use of force.”

This last statement contradicts the first half of the answer. Moreover, this latter phrasing scarcely corresponds to the facts.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: There is a contradiction. “Rather than by force” contradicts the first half of his reply, that he acted according to these principles. These questions...

“As long as I was there I had the impression that the Defendant Von Papen acted according to this policy of establishing relations through peaceful means rather than force.”

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German text it says, “rather than with force.” The word “rather” disturbs me, and is a contradiction. It does not mean the same thing—namely, that he wanted to bring about connections in a peaceful manner only and not by force.

THE PRESIDENT: It means the same thing. It means that he wanted to establish the relations by peaceful means rather than with forceful means. “Not by force” he means.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: This version might lead to the assumption that the Defendant Von Papen may even have considered non-peaceful means. We want to prove, in accordance with the foregoing answer, that he rejected all means other than peaceful means from the beginning, and never introduced them into his discussions. However, if the High Tribunal interpret the interrogatory in the manner which has just been stated, then I have no further reason to supplement it.

THE PRESIDENT: It couldn’t mean anything else in English. I don’t know what it could mean in German.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German version it is translated, “I would prefer peaceful means to force; as a last resort, other than peaceful means might have to be considered.” That would be the interpretation placed on the German translation.

We want to establish clearly the fact that none other than peaceful methods were ever considered.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To save any trouble, I should like to assure the Tribunal that the Prosecution accepted the answer in the sense which Your Lordship has just put. We shouldn’t suggest for a moment that Prince Erbach would make any other answer than in the sense the Tribunal have accepted it.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps a way of meeting the difficulty would be if you would agree to read the words in the sense “and not by force.”

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then, of course, I quite agree. And I should like to have the Tribunal’s decision as to whether Count Pfeil is to be brought here to depose an affidavit.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The second witness, Count Pfeil, who wrote the letter which we wish to submit to the High Tribunal in the form of an affidavit.

Are there any other inconsistencies or contradictions which you wish to draw our attention to in the Prince’s interrogatory?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, it has not as yet been translated. But it is simply a letter, the identity of which we cannot prove, and that is why we wanted the affidavit in the proper form.

THE PRESIDENT: Would the letter itself be sufficient if the Prosecution were prepared to admit the letter?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, it would suffice, for we could certainly prove nothing more with the affidavit than what is contained in the letter.

Then the interrogatories of Prince Erbach-Schönberg will be amended in the way that we have indicated, and the letter of Count Friedrich Karl von Pfeil will be admitted.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wonder if Your Lordship will allow me to mention one point that arose on Tuesday.

Your Lordship may remember that the Defendant Jodl said that he had not been permitted by the Prosecution to mention a document. My Lord, a misunderstanding arose in this way. Your Lordship may remember that at an early stage in dealing with witnesses and applications, I objected to general evidence of shackling because I said that the Prosecution had not made the evidence as to shackling by the Germans a part of their case, and therefore it did not seem to me an issue that need be pursued. I put that forward, and Mr. Roberts, who was dealing with the later stages, adopted the same line.

Apparently that was understood as including an objection to the Wehrmacht order which the Defendant Jodl mentioned, and which he wanted to use as an answer to a broadcast of the British War Office. This, I think, is a further remark which could be made. I certainly didn’t wish to object to the Defendant Jodl clarifying a Wehrmacht order that was part of the preparations for the Commando Order, and I said so at the time.

I should not like the Tribunal to think that I was making any reflection on the learned professors who are conducting the Defendant Jodl’s case, or putting forward that they had made a basic accusation against me. I thought, therefore, the Tribunal would allow me just a moment to explain that it was a misunderstanding, and that neither of us feels that we have been injured in any way by the other by what has been said.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything further that needs to be done with reference to the admission or introduction of this?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not at all, because I waived any objection to it, and the Defendant Jodl was permitted, in giving his evidence, to make a full explanation concerning it. I only wanted it understood how the misunderstanding had arisen, and that I did not feel that Professor Exner or Professor Jahrreiss had made any baseless charges against me in so doing.

Witness, the charge has been made against the Defendant Field Marshal Keitel that—and I quote—“rather than back up his subordinate officers and protect them, he threatened them; yes, he threatened to turn them over to the Gestapo.”

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I can testify that Field Marshal Keitel, as superior, was always very well-disposed toward the officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. For instance, the relations between himself and Colonel Moench, who was closely connected with him in his military capacity of Chief of the Organization Division, were almost that of father and son; and he deeply lamented his death in action on the Eastern Front.

I can also say that I myself, along with Lieutenant Colonel Ziehrvogel, the A-1 man on my staff, on the basis of factual disagreement with the staff of the Reichsführer SS, was in 1944 accused in a letter to Field Marshal Keitel of sabotaging the co-operation between OKW and Reichsführer SS and the conduct of the war. In his reply, which I saw myself, Field Marshal Keitel defended us in every way, and said that he would take entire responsibility for everything done by his subordinate officers.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not propose to cross-examine. That, of course, will not be taken that the Prosecution is accepting the truth of this evidence at all. But the whole question of atrocities in the East has been so thoroughly covered by evidence and by document, My Lord, I think it would be wrong and repetitious if I cross-examined.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, there was one other point. Dr. Laternser, in the interests of saving time, produced an affidavit of this witness dated the 20th of May 1946.

My Lord, of course, we are most anxious to assist Dr. Laternser in any effort on his part to save time, and we do not put any objection to this affidavit. But I am not quite certain as to what the affidavit is, and as to whether it has been put in as an exhibit—in which case it should be given a number—or whether it should go to the commission.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think it necessary for it to be given an exhibit number. It was put to the witness, and he says the evidence was correct. That enables Dr. Laternser to refer to it hereafter.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. Then I propose the Prosecution should get copies. Could that be conveniently arranged?

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, Mr. Dodd is pointing out that we have not seen this affidavit; we do not know what it contains. But we will get a copy, and if we have any further application to make, we can make it.

THE PRESIDENT: When an affidavit is used in this way and put to a witness who is in the witness box, of course the affidavit ought to be supplied to the Prosecution in order that they may see what is in it, and so be able to cross-examine if they wish to do so.

THE PRESIDENT: That has not been done in this case. The best course would be for the affidavit to be supplied to the Prosecution, and they may, if they wish, apply to examine on it before the commission.

Do you think it is necessary? Perhaps you could see the affidavit soon and decide whether it is necessary to keep the witness here.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, we accept the invitation to examine the affidavit over the week end, and then, if necessary, we could make an application on Monday.

DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, if it is the Tribunal’s wish. With the permission of the Tribunal, I wish to call Major Büchs as my next witness. Major Büchs.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold nothing and add nothing.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, what position did you have in the last years of the war?

BÜCHS: From November 1943 I was a General Staff officer of the Air Force serving with the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff; and in that capacity I was second adjutant to General Jodl.

BÜCHS: I remained in this position until the end, until our arrest on 23 May 1945.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, during this time in which you were in the Führer’s headquarters, were you in the various compounds of these headquarters?

BÜCHS: Yes. I was in the headquarters in East Prussia, and in addition to that I was in the headquarters in Berlin, and in 1944 also in Berchtesgaden.

DR. JAHRREISS: It has been said that there was a Party clique at the Führer’s headquarters. Do you know anything about that?

BÜCHS: If I am to understand by that a circle of people, I would name Fegelein, Bormann, and Burgdorf.

BÜCHS: These were three gentlemen who were in very close personal and official contact, and who made that impression on outsiders.

DR. JAHRREISS: Was this very close official and personal relationship between themselves or with others?

BÜCHS: They not only had very close relations among themselves, but I also observed that these three gentlemen had very strong influence on Adolf Hitler himself.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, would you ascertain the names of the three again? They did not come to us quite clearly.

[Turning to the witness.] Major, will you please pronounce slowly the names of these three gentlemen you just mentioned?

BÜCHS: There is Fegelein, Himmler’s liaison officer to Adolf Hitler; then Bormann, the head of the Party Chancellery and the representative of the Party; and General Burgdorf, who had a dual position as Chief of the Army Personnel Office and at the same time Chief Adjutant of the Armed Forces with the Führer.

DR. JAHRREISS: Did General Jodl have official relations with each of these three gentlemen?

BÜCHS: If I may start with Fegelein: Fegelein as liaison officer to Himmler was, as far as the Führer was concerned, the man to whom he turned in all questions of material and personal equipment of the Waffen-SS divisions whenever these questions arose during the situation discussions in connection with putting these divisions into operation. In this connection, points which fell within Fegelein’s sphere were frequently raised during situation reports. But the official connection between Jodl and Fegelein was otherwise very distant.

BÜCHS: In dealing with Bormann as Deputy of the Party, General Jodl always strictly defined his own sphere of military tasks. He always rejected complaints or unjustifiable accusations or possible attacks against the Armed Forces. I witnessed this especially while the war was fought on German soil and there was often friction with the Gauleiter who had been appointed Reich Defense Commissars. For instance, I saw that General Jodl on receiving complaints or letters from Bormann simply returned the originals with rather abrupt marginal notes of his views. If that had no effect, he did not hesitate to express his views to the Führer in every possible way in order to obtain his decision as to the dispute in question.

BÜCHS: To my recollection Generaloberst Jodl had very little official contact with General Burgdorf, although it was Burgdorf who discussed the important questions of the appointment of the commanders and higher officers with the Führer. It was in just such a case that I saw General Burgdorf first of all discuss these matters with the Führer alone, so that General Jodl had comparatively little influence in that direction.

DR. JAHRREISS: Now I should like to hear from you, Witness, what personal relations existed between Generaloberst Jodl and each of these three gentlemen.

BÜCHS: Jodl disliked Fegelein, because—I believe—he discerned the defects of his character at a very early stage. I have known him on several occasions to call Fegelein to account and reprimand him.

As for Bormann, I should say General Jodl had no connection with him at all. I also have never noticed any personal or informal relations between them. What I have said about Fegelein also applies to his relations with General Burgdorf, whom General Jodl probably also disliked personally.

DR. JAHRREISS: Now I turn to a different point. Witness, do you know anything about the fact that in the last phase of the war the possibility of exposing a certain category of captured enemy airmen to the popular rage was under consideration? Did you hear about that?

BÜCHS: Yes. I recall that in the spring of 1944, at Berchtesgaden, the Führer vehemently demanded that Allied fliers who made emergency landings in Germany no longer be protected by the Armed Forces against the enraged populace. This demand was based on reports alleging that a Kreisleiter of the Party and an officer of the Air Force had protected an Allied airman. At that time the Führer made this demand in a very sharp and pointed manner. He demanded that the Armed Forces issue the appropriate orders to put a stop to this once and for all.

BÜCHS: This demand was made at a situation conference attended by these gentlemen and Jodl himself; but I do not think that General Jodl had any direct connection with the handling of the whole question, as it was not directly connected with military matters.

BÜCHS: General Jodl, like all the other gentlemen, rejected this demand and, on his part, did everything he could to try to dissuade the Führer from this demand. He began immediately by adopting a critical attitude, which expressed itself later in details he gave of four cases of violation of international law on the part of Allied airmen.

DR. JAHRREISS: I really do not need to ask you about this, for we have documentary proof of it. If Hitler was so enraged and demanded a decree with the urgency you have described, was it possible to pursue a delaying action?

BÜCHS: In a case of this kind, in which the Führer in the heat of his rage made such demands, it was impossible for the gentlemen to whom the demand was put to oppose him at the moment, let alone flatly refuse to carry out the order. There was nothing else for them to do—General Jodl used these tactics frequently—but to try by obtaining data, arguments pro and con, and asking for comments and opinions from all the offices concerned—to collect the material and at a quiet opportune moment approach the Führer on the matter again and try to dissuade him from his extravagant demand. Outwardly, this resulted in a lengthy correspondence, in which the files of the various departments involved were sent back and forth, all with the intent of delaying the matter to the utmost and, if possible, shelving it completely. My impression, as far as the treatment of the terror-fliers was concerned, was that in this case we really succeeded even though the Führer’s attention was repeatedly called to this question through new reports and statements and he demanded that a decree be put into execution.

DR. JAHRREISS: Can you cite an incident which shows clearly that no such decree was issued?

BÜCHS: On one occasion in August 1944 I personally was called to account by the Führer rather sharply. After an air raid on Munich, Fegelein had described low-level attacks to Hitler rather crudely and reported the incident where a plane was shot down by antiaircraft artillery, and two Allied airmen had made an emergency parachute landing. When they were captured and brought off by a Wachtmeister of the antiaircraft artillery, he himself said that he had called this man to account, and had asked him why he had not shot the two fliers. The man replied, “because I had no orders to do so.” At that moment I interpolated on my own account that no such order existed. And then the Führer reproached me in the most violent manner because the leading men of the Armed Forces had not issued a decree like that. Then, of course, he again demanded that the order be carried out.

BÜCHS: No, for that was the period after 20 July, and the time of the campaign in the West when there were more urgent questions in the foreground. And because of all of these questions that of the treatment of terror-fliers was again put aside.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know about an incident in Berlin—I believe in March 1945—which is supposed to have taken place in the Reich Chancellery, where the Führer again complained that in spite of his demand this decree had not been issued?

BÜCHS: I recall that in March 1945 the Führer again expressed himself very heatedly on this problem to General Koller, who was then Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force. I myself was not present at the beginning of this conversation. I was called in, however, and heard the Führer say something to the effect that on the basis of the attitude taken by the Armed Forces, and especially by the Air Force, it had been impossible for him to counteract the terror of the Allied fliers over Germany by means of a corresponding counterterror...

DR. JAHRREISS: Just a moment, Witness. You said that you had not been present at the entire discussion.

Mr. President, we have an interrogatory which we want to submit to the Tribunal. It is in our document book, Volume II, Page 178, and is the testimony of General of the Air Force, Koller. This testimony under Number 5, which is on Page 180 of the document book, contains all the details worth preserving of this extremely important conference in Berlin. Only part of this conversation took place in the Führer’s room. Another part took place in the anterooms—as, for instance, that with Kaltenbrunner—while the conversation with Göring was carried on by telephone. In order to save time and to avoid splitting up the matter, I should like to have the Tribunal’s permission to present it as a whole, even though the witness heard only a part.

With regard to Jodl, the last sentence says, as a whole—I believe, Mr. President, we can save time if I may present it now.

First of all, I must read the first question put to General Koller, which is to be found on Page 179. Here the witness was asked:

“How long have you been Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force?” The answer is on the next page and is:

“From 1 September 1943 to 3 September 1944 I was Chief of the Air Force Operations Staff; from 23 November 1944, Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.”

“Do you recall that about March 1945, in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery, the Führer censured you and the Air Force because such an order was not given?”

“Yes, I remember exactly. A notice taken from the Allied press reporter survey between the beginning and the middle of March 1945 was laid before the Führer by Bormann during the situation discussion. In brief it read somewhat to this effect:

“ ‘An American combat air crew, shot down over Germany a short time previously, was overtaken by advancing American troops. They had declared that they were ill-treated by enraged members of the population, threatened with death, and probably would have been killed if German soldiers had not released them and taken them under their protection.’

“Bormann further pointed out to the Führer in a few words that this confirmed that soldiers in such cases intervene against the population.

“b) Hitler turned angrily to me and said excitedly:

“ ‘I have already issued one order that bomber crews which bail out are not to be protected against the population. These people only murder German women and children. It is unheard of that German soldiers should take measures to protect them against our own population, which is acting on motives of justifiable hate. Why are my orders not carried out?’

“Surprised by this attack I replied something like this:

“ ‘I know nothing about any such order; and it would in any case be a practical impossibility.’

“Hitler turned to me and said very loudly and sharply:

“ ‘The reason why my orders are not carried out is only the cowardice of the Air Force, because the gentlemen of the Air Force are cowards, and are afraid that something might happen to them too. The whole thing is nothing more than a cowardly pact between the Air Force and the British and American airmen.’

“Hitler then turned also to Kaltenbrunner, who happened to be present in the background, and went on, addressing him but sometimes not looking at him:

“ ‘I hereby order that all bomber crews who bailed out in the last few months, as well as all bomber crews bailing out in future, are to be turned over immediately by the Air Force to the SD, and are to be liquidated by the SD. Anyone failing to carry out my orders, or taking action against the population, is liable to the death penalty and is to be shot.’

“Hitler then further expressed in general terms his indignation and his views on the matter. The assembled officers gave the impression of general surprise and disapproval.

“c) After the situation discussion with the Führer I requested an interview with Kaltenbrunner in the side passageway. Essential points:

“Koller: ‘It is impossible to carry out those orders. The Air Force will have nothing more to do with them, nor I myself in any way whatsoever—and I can say as much for the Reich Marshal. It is entirely out of the question that the Air Force will agree to this in any way, shape, or form.’

“Kaltenbrunner: ‘The Führer has completely mistaken ideas. The duties of the SD are also constantly misunderstood. Those things are no concern of the SD. Moreover, no German soldier does what the Führer demands. That is not in the German soldier’s line. He does not kill prisoners. If individual fanatical Party followers of Herr Bormann try to do so, the German soldier intervenes. The Führer has a completely false idea of the views held by our soldiers. Moreover, I myself will do nothing in the matter either. I have no intention of doing anything. We must just take care that we get out of it again, otherwise we will be the first to get shot. We must gain time. I am again leaving Berlin at once for a fairly long time anyway.’

“Koller: ‘Then we are agreed on the main point. Your leaving Berlin is favorable. But we must have another way out as far as the Führer is concerned, for it is possible that he may again refer to his order tomorrow. Later on if it becomes extreme, we will have to see how we can put a stop to the business, or what is going to happen to us?’

“The following was decided at my suggestion:

“No order along the lines decreed by the Führer will be issued by the Air Force or the SD.

“Surrenders to the SD—none.

“In case the Führer should refer to his order again, then, first of all, prevent further action through explanations of the following kind: All members of air crews previously captured, not in the hands of the Air Force but dispersed under the control of the Replacement Army Commander (BdE). Time of capture not known to a central office. Therefore a lengthy and difficult process to determine the number of air personnel captured during the last few months.

“Also, preparations must be made in detail for getting them out without attracting attention. The newly captured crews go automatically to interrogation centers. These are in process of transfer owing to operations. Communications are bad.

“Detailed discussions and agreements with the SD necessary. In order to preserve the appearance of discussion, the I-c officer of the High Command of the Air Force (I-c of OKL) should go to a delegate of Kaltenbrunner who, however, would first have to be appointed.

“d) After the situation discussion with the Führer, I spoke to Field Marshal Keitel at the entrance of the air-raid shelter, and said:

“ ‘The Führer’s order is insane.’—Keitel affirmed, ‘It certainly is’—‘The Air Force must keep its escutcheon clean. The order cannot be carried out. I am convinced that the Reich Marshal is entirely of my opinion. To issue such an order—and verbally—and moreover with such threats of punishment. He must sign an order of this kind with his own name. It may or may not be carried out—but not by the Air Force. Nor by the SD, either; I have spoken to Kaltenbrunner.’

“Field Marshal Keitel: ‘He will not sign such orders then, and everything is always placed on the shoulders of the OKW. But I’ll be damned if I issue such an order.’

“Koller: ‘The Air Force cannot join in this in any circumstances. We will not assume such a responsibility.’

“Field Marshal Keitel: ‘You are right; neither can I. I must think over what I can do about it, and how I can do it.’

“The conversation was interrupted because Keitel was called to the telephone. Keitel was very indignant and annoyed about the Führer’s order.

“e) After refreshments in a side room of the air-raid shelter, I had to cross the antechamber of the conference room again to reach the cloakroom and exit. Hitler happened to come out of the room to give an order to an orderly, and he called me as I was passing. The door leading to the conference room was open, and Ley was sitting at the table. Hitler said to me:

“ ‘I must come back to my order once more. You must all help me, for matters cannot go on like this any longer. The Air Force—or at least defense of the Reich—has failed. What am I to do against the frightful bombing terror which is murdering German women and children?’

“Koller: ‘The Air Defense and our crews do what they can and what is humanly possible. Our neglect of air armament and the enemy’s present technical and numerical superiority cannot be eliminated or remedied overnight. When the searchlight units get stronger, the air situation over Germany will be more in our favor.’

“Hitler: ‘I cannot wait for that. I can no longer be responsible to the German people for the continuation of this situation in the air. If those fliers realize that they will be liquidated as terrorists, they will think twice about flying here.’

“Koller: ‘That will certainly not improve the situation in the air. On the contrary, it will make it worse.’

“Hitler: ‘No; the Japanese method is the best.’

“Hitler’s manner was now calm again, in comparison with what it had been at the situation discussion. He appeared more approachable. Experience had shown that it was better to talk to him alone than in the presence of others. I thought it was a good opportunity to attack the whole problem and stated:

“ ‘If I may state my point of view, I think that this will not do. Measures of this kind are in such crass opposition to the education, feelings, and way of thinking of all soldiers, that they cannot be carried out. One cannot train soldiers on the regulations governing warfare and decent conduct, and then order actions which are repulsive to everyone. You must not forget, my Führer, that enemy airmen also carry out orders, and do their duty just as ours do. If they are shot down or make forced landings, they are defenseless and unarmed prisoners. What would the world think of us? And the first thing the enemy would do would be to treat our air crews in the same way. That is something for which we cannot answer to our men and their relatives. All their willingness to serve and their discipline would collapse at one blow.’

“Up to that point the Führer had not interrupted me. After his first glance at me he looked away again and seemed to be lost in thought. He had been listening, however, and at that point he interrupted me and said quietly and earnestly:

“ ‘So the Air Force is afraid after all. That is all very well. But I am responsible for the protection of the German people and have no other means except this.’

“Hitler turned away, and went back into the conference room.

“f) After my arrival at the Air Force headquarters (Kurfürst) I told Colonel Von Brauchitsch what had happened, and ordered him to report it to the Reich Marshal as soon as possible. I myself could not contact the Reich Marshal at the moment. During our conversation Brauchitsch also expressed disapproval of the Führer’s order.

“g) An hour or two later the Reich Marshal called me, and began with the following words, ‘Tell me, has he gone quite mad now?’

“It was quite clear who was meant. I myself reported the principal happenings and the conversation with Kaltenbrunner to the Reich Marshal again, and added:

“ ‘I will not carry out this order or anything connected with it. I will endeavor to handle the situation so as to gain time now, in any case, and will do everything in my power to protect any of us from disastrous consequences. Perhaps after the last conference the Führer will not refer to his order again. If he does, however, a very difficult situation will arise, and you will have to go to the Führer yourself. What the Führer has ordered must in no case be allowed to happen.’

“The Reich Marshal expressed strong disapproval of Hitler’s attitude and agreed with me in every point. He ordered me to act as I had suggested, to inform him immediately when necessary, and ended the interview with these words, ‘This is all insane and cannot be done.’

“h) Measures against Allied airmen on the basis of the above-mentioned Führer’s order were taken neither by the Air Force nor by the SD. This order did not become known, in my opinion, to the Replacement Army Command (BdE), or its offices, as the Replacement Army Command was not present at the Führer’s meeting, and the order was not transmitted by the Armed Forces High Command (OKW).

“Hitler made no further reference to his order, either to the Reich Marshal or to myself or my representative or, I think, to Kaltenbrunner. To be sure, I never spoke to the latter again about this matter.

“I cannot judge whether Hitler deliberately let the matter drop or whether he forgot about it under the pressure of events.

“i) I know that about two or three weeks later an OKW directive was issued—I think a teletype—in which, as I recall, mention was made of the correspondent’s report that occasioned it. It disclosed the fact that the Führer had expressed his displeasure that German soldiers had taken action against their own people.

“No mention was made of the main point of Hitler’s order. If I remember correctly, the directive was signed by Keitel, and must be regarded as an attempt to cover himself as far as the Führer was concerned.

“In my opinion, General Jodl had nothing to do with the affair at all.”

Witness, as far as you were present at this meeting, is the picture presented by General Koller correct?

BÜCHS: I remember personally something like the following formulation by the Führer, “This results from the fact that in the Air Force war is based on a mutual life insurance policy of, ‘Don’t hurt me; I won’t hurt you.’ ” That was the sentence which impressed me most strongly, which emphasizes what was said...

DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Then I need not ask you any further questions on this point.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, I assume that you can still recollect how the offices of the Führer’s headquarters were furnished.

DR. JAHRREISS: In the offices occupied by the Führer, the Field Marshal, the General, and yourself, were there maps on the wall?

BÜCHS: Yes, and also in East Prussia—particularly the headquarters—the Führer had a topographic map of Germany, as well as a political map of Europe, and there were similar maps in the various other rooms.

DR. JAHRREISS: And the neighboring territories on which concentration camps and penal institutions were indicated with a red or blue ring?

BÜCHS: No. Neither in the headquarters in East Prussia nor in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, nor at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden, have I ever seen such a map.

DR. JAHRREISS: At 1230 hours on 11 May 1946, the Munich radio station broadcast a letter from a painter asserting that he had seen maps in the Führer’s headquarters which could only be intended to show the location of concentration camps. Is that possible?

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need go into the broadcast from Munich. We have no evidence of a broadcast from Munich.

DR. JAHRREISS: I am afraid I was misunderstood. I did not ask him whether he heard it, but I wanted to illustrate how the public had come to believe that there were such maps. Thank you, I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: What I was pointing out was that it ought not be referred to, as it is not in evidence. The fact which you alleged, that there was a broadcast, ought not to be referred to.

DR. STAHMER: Major Büchs, during the time you spent as commanding officer attached to Führer headquarters, were you regularly present at the daily discussions of the situation?

DR. STAHMER: Do you still remember whether you attended the situation discussion of 27 January 1945, at which the fate of the 10,000 air force officers imprisoned in the Sagan Camp was discussed?

BÜCHS: I can remember something like this: Fegelein must have raised the question of evacuating that camp on the approach of the Russian troops. These captured officers were asked whether they wished to remain in the camp and be handed over to the Russian Army, or whether they wanted to be taken away in the course of the evacuation of Silesia. As far as I remember, they definitely decided on the latter alternative—that is to say, to be taken away; and I believe that the only question still to be decided was how their transport was to be arranged.

DR. STAHMER: Can you still remember the suggestions that were made regarding that transport, and who made them?

BÜCHS: No. I believe, at that time, the Führer only said in general terms that these imprisoned officers could not receive better treatment than our own people. It was just at the time of the evacuation of Silesia, and our traffic situation did not permit the transport of even our own people by means of railway trains or in large columns, and the population had to tramp along the roads even in winter. And I think I remember that, at the time, the Führer said, “If these officers wish to be taken along on a transport, they will have to march just like the German civilian population.”

DR. STAHMER: May I, Mr. President, in connection with this statement, refer to an error, in the record. During the cross-examination of the Defendant Göring on 20 March 1946, Document 3786-PS, Exhibit USA-787 was presented. In the German record, Page 6249, after a discussion of how they should be transported, there is a statement that the Führer said, “They will have to go even if they march in ‘Dreck’ (mud).” The actual text is, “They will have to go even if they trek (Treck) on foot.” That is quite a different thing. I do not know how the word is translated in the English text; but that, of course, would give it a very different and entirely wrong meaning. As the witness has just said, the Führer said, “They have got to go even if they have to trek”—that is to march in a column, on foot.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Now, the Tribunal think that the best way to deal with these questions of translation is to take it up with the General Secretary, and get it submitted to the Translation Division.

[Turning to the witness.] A remark is supposed to have been made in the course of that conference, during the discussion on transport, “Take off their boots and trousers so that they cannot walk in the snow.” Do you remember who made that remark?

BÜCHS: It is perfectly possible that Fegelein made such a suggestion in some connection or other; I do not know.

DR. STAHMER: According to the record, Reich Marshal Göring is supposed to have made such a remark.

In this connection may I just mention that it was extremely difficult to take notes of the proceedings. Four to six people frequently spoke at once during these conferences—and much more rapidly than usual. The stenographers could only take down what they heard. They could neither look up nor make certain who actually made such and such a remark at such and such a moment. There was a table around which there were often some 30 people standing; and that interfered with the work of the stenographers.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, at this point of the Trial I feel obliged to make a statement. I wanted to ask this witness some important questions, but I am not in a position to do so because of the decision announced by the Tribunal today. I state that through that decision I...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you will have full opportunity to put the questions to the witness before the Commission.

I have explained that as a result of the decision announced today, I am not in a position to put my questions, and that I must submit to that decision. I wish to state, however, that I consider this decision...

THE PRESIDENT: But it is inaccurate to say you are not in a position to put your questions. You are not able to put your questions now to the witness, but it is not true to say that you are not in a position to put your questions without further qualification. You are in a position to put your questions to the witness before the Commission.

DR. LATERNSER: Nevertheless, Mr. President, I feel there is an impediment for the defense, constituted by the fact that the defense of the organizations is thus not in a position to present its evidence directly.

DR. LATERNSER: I only regret, Mr. President, that that decision was announced without the Defense having first been notified.

DR. MARTIN LÖFFLER (Counsel for the SA): I should like to add in connection with the statements of my colleague Laternser that I must emphasize them because...

DR. LÖFFLER: On the point that the witnesses called today cannot be questioned by defense counsel for the organizations, as has been the custom until now, and that is, therefore, a disadvantage to the defense because for all practical purposes we lose these witnesses altogether.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Löffler, you and Dr. Laternser seem not to have read Article 9 of the Charter, which provides that the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard. That is with reference to the organizations. The Tribunal, after very great trouble, have brought to Nuremberg a very large number of witnesses and have set up commissions for the purpose of examining those witnesses, and they are going to hear some witnesses from among those witnesses at a future date in this Court.

The Tribunal have given the matter full consideration, and it doesn’t desire to hear any further arguments from you or from any other of the counsel for the organizations.

DR. LÖFFLER: Mr. President, we appreciate the Tribunal’s grounds, but we feel obliged to point out from the point of view of the defense that these reasons are justified in theory, but entail in practice the loss of that witness.

I ask permission, therefore, to give you a very brief explanation so that the Tribunal will understand why we lose those witnesses. You, Mr. President, have said that the witnesses can be heard before this Commission. These witnesses cannot be heard before the Commission because the number...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Löffler, the Tribunal, as I have told you, have already considered this matter, and it may be that they will consider it further, but they don’t desire to hear any further argument about it. It is a matter entirely within their discretion, and they have been at very great pains to provide that the applicants who wish to be heard in respect to these organizations shall be fully and thoroughly heard.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear what I said? I said the Tribunal will not hear you further at this stage.

[Turning to the witness.] Your memory of that conference doesn’t seem to be entirely clear.

MR. ROBERTS: The conference that you last mentioned, with regard to the evacuation of the prisoners of Sagan.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, but you say that you don’t remember any mention being made of the prisoners having to walk through the snow without their boots on.

MR. ROBERTS: And you know that it is—I can’t find the actual place; I had no idea this exhibit was going to be referred to—but you know that that is in the actual stenographer’s notes, do you not?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes. And you would agree with me that the stenographer could hardly put that remark down unless it was said?

MR. ROBERTS: But you didn’t hear the remark; therefore, you don’t know who said it?

I just ask on one other matter: In April of 1945 did Fegelein attain the status of Hitler’s brother-in-law, when Hitler got married?

MR. ROBERTS: And two days afterwards, was Fegelein shot on the orders of his new-found brother-in-law?

DR. JAHRREISS: With the permission of the Tribunal, I now call the witness Professor Dr. Schramm.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, were you working in the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the war?

SCHRAMM: Yes. From March 1943 onwards, I was working in the Armed Forces Operations Staff.

DR. JAHRREISS: What functions did you have in the Armed Forces Operations Staff?

SCHRAMM: During my entire time in the Armed Forces Operations Staff I kept the War Diary of that staff.

SCHRAMM: My appointment to the Armed Forces Operations Staff was due to the fact that my civilian profession is professor of history at the University of Göttingen. At that time an expert was sought whose name would constitute a guarantee for expert work. General Jodl appointed me to the position at the suggestion of the deputy chief.

DR. JAHRREISS: If you were to write a war diary in the way a historian would wish to do, you would require an insight into all the events connected with that staff, would you not?

SCHRAMM: Yes. I did not attend the Führer’s situation discussions or the internal conferences; but I did participate every day in the situation discussions of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and every important document passed through my office during those two years.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, considering that you had perhaps more insight into the activities of the Armed Forces Operations Staff than anyone else, I should like you to tell us here what you know of the range of General Jodl’s activities.

SCHRAMM: It is impossible to overestimate the range of the General’s activities. As proof of this, I may say that in 1944 alone, according to information which I received from a competent officer, 60,000 teleprint messages went through the teleprint department of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. There was also a large courier correspondence which, of course, was even larger. Then there was internal correspondence between individual departments. The bulk of that correspondence appeared on the General’s desk at some time or other. To look at it from another angle, the General was responsible for four theaters of war: North Finland and Norway; West Holland, Belgium, France; then the Southwest, in the first place Africa and Italy; and then the Southeast.

SCHRAMM: It was the General’s task not only to have up-to-date information based on incoming reports, but also to act as operational adviser to the Führer.

DR. JAHRREISS: Did I understand you correctly as saying that the four theaters you have just mentioned were the so-called OKW main theaters of war?

SCHRAMM: Precisely. The East was under the General Staff of the Army, and the General was concerned only insofar as the main difficulty always lay in co-ordinating the interests of the other theaters of war with those of the Eastern Front.

DR. JAHRREISS: Did I understand you correctly as mentioning 60,000 teleprint messages in a year?

SCHRAMM: Yes, 60,000. I remember the exact figure. And I remember it exactly, because my clerk calculated that 120 volumes of files passed through the War Diary office, and that they were so [demonstrating] thick. Therefore, about 12 yards of material passed constantly through my office. That represents 10,000 sheets of paper, if not 100,000.