[A recess was taken.]

“On the night of 22 March 1944, 2 officers and 13 enlisted men of the Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the Army of the United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats and landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All 15 men were members of the United States Army and were in the military service of the United States. When they landed they were all properly dressed in the field uniform of the United States Army and they had no civilian clothes. Their mission was to demolish a railroad tunnel on the main line between La Spezia and Genoa. That rail line was being used by the German Forces to supply their fighting forces on the Cassino and Anzio Beachhead fronts.”

MR. ROBERTS: And all 15 men were shot because of the order that you circulated...

MR. ROBERTS: Which you circulated on the 19th of October. You circulated a supplementary order to the Führer Order, the last paragraph of which, I think, disgusted you. That is 503-PS.

MR. ROBERTS: I will take that question up in a moment. I do not agree. I must not argue with you, but I must put some questions.

General Dostler, who ordered the shooting of those men, he himself, you see, was also shot by sentence of this court martial.

JODL: This incident never came to my knowledge; at least, I have no recollection of it. As far as I know, it never appeared in the Armed Forces communiqué, because General Dostler did not report the incident to his commanding officer, Kesselring, who might have been able to take, and might have taken, a different course in this affair.

MR. ROBERTS: Why do you say that you had to circulate this order? No man can compel another to circulate an order for murder, unless he does it.

JODL: I have explained at length that this order could not simply be interpreted as an order to murder, but that very serious and justified doubts and considerations could arise with regard to international law and with regard to the justness of this order. In any case, you should have complete appreciation of such a delicate situation, because even now, in my position here, I cannot say or do as I like, and that exactly is what I experienced during these last 5½ years.

MR. ROBERTS: You could have refused. You could have said, and the other generals could have said, could you not: “We are all honorable soldiers. We will not publish and issue those orders”?

JODL: Certainly under other circumstances it might have been possible, first, if at the time I had not had that conflict with the Führer, and secondly, if the British Ministry of War had made my task a little easier. However, these events and the statement made by the British on the 2d of September put the Führer into a rage against which I was powerless. How much I tried to resist, for that the document itself is the best proof, because the threat of punishment and detailed justification for it were directed against me personally.

[A recess was taken.]

MR. ROBERTS: I want to ask you a few questions about the deportation of the Jews from Denmark. Will you look, please, at a new exhibit, D-547, which I offer as GB-488. Now, that is the OKW Operational Staff from the commander, Denmark, dated 20 September 1943. That is before the teletype which has been put in, 2 days before:

“The Führer has agreed in principle with Dr. Best’s telegram that the Jewish question in Denmark be solved very soon by deportation.

“Execution of this measure should take place while the state of military emergency still exists. It is not certain if sufficient police forces can be provided for the arrest of the Jews and their families, about 6,000 persons, most of whom live in Copenhagen. The Army would be heavily burdened....

“I believe that the results of the deportation will be serious....

“The armament industry deliveries will be prejudiced. Considerable disturbances will have to be reckoned with.”

“I know nothing of this. If a political measure is to be carried out by the commander of Denmark the OKW must be notified by the Foreign Office.”

JODL: Yes. I would not have recalled this document, but I certainly wrote the note. It proves that I did not remember until now that obviously this question had been discussed in Denmark some days before and that the commander in Denmark had been making objections. Consequently I wrote, I know nothing of this. This is a political measure, and if a political measure is to be carried out in Denmark, then the Foreign Office should kindly notify us.

MR. ROBERTS: I omit one or two unimportant documents. Will you go to document dated 1 October 1943—the fifth or sixth document of Your Lordship’s file, Number D-547, dated 1 October 1943. It is to the OKW from Denmark, and quotes as follows:

“The Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark has given the following report to the Minister for Foreign Affairs:

“1) The arrest of the Jews will take place on the night of 1-2 October. Transportation from Zealand will be carried out by ship....

“2) Should I receive no contrary instruction, I do not intend allowing the Jewish action to be mentioned, either on the radio or in the press”—and then

“3) ...I intend leaving the possessions of the evacuated Jews undisturbed in order that the seizure of these possessions cannot be imputed to be the reason or one of the reasons for the action.”

Then you deal with the disadvantages—the writer does—and there is a question: “Does the Reichsführer SS know?” The answer:

“The Reichsführer SS knows, is in agreement,” and then a pencil note in Jodl’s handwriting, “The Führer agrees.” Is that in your writing?

JODL: Yes, that is my handwriting, but that refers only to the announcement of the release of the interned Danish soldiers.

JODL: Then it is important to note in this document that the commander in Denmark said that he did not intend having the property of the evacuated Jews disturbed. He said:

“...I intend leaving the possessions of the evacuated Jews undisturbed....”

MR. ROBERTS: Have you got the next document in the same bundle, 2d of October 1943, to OKW Operations Staff, from Denmark? I quote:

“Jewish action carried out in the night of the 1-2 October by the German Police without incidents.”

“According to the statement of the Reich Plenipotentiary, the Reichsführer SS has ordered that the Reichsführer SS alone as the person ordering the Jewish action is to receive the exact figures on arrests.

“The Plenipotentiary has, therefore, given no figures to the commander of the German troops in Denmark. 232 Jews have been handed in by the Police via the collecting points set up by the Watch Battalion, Copenhagen.”

JODL: I cannot say that at the moment; I do not know how it was composed. It might have been a unit of the Police; it might have been part of the Army; I cannot say with certainty. At any rate it was a unit which was used only for guard duties. But it is interesting that I wrote the remark: “Is a matter of complete indifference to us,” which proves that I was not interested in the affair, and refused to have any part in it.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I wonder. First of all, you said that the Watch Battalion might have been a part of the Wehrmacht. Were you...

JODL: That is not certain. I do not wish to dispute it definitely. There were also watch battalions of the Army, but it might equally well have been a watch unit of the Police. I cannot say it with certainty, but General Von Hannecken should have information about it.

MR. ROBERTS: But were your “decent German soldiers,” whom you mentioned yesterday, were they called upon to round up Jews who managed to get through the SS net?

JODL: No, it says here, “...it was carried through by the Police,” and I do not believe that any unit of the Wehrmacht concerned itself with deportation of Jews. I do not believe it; the Wehrmacht rejected that.

MR. ROBERTS: Then your note: “...is a matter of complete indifference to us”—it was a matter of complete indifference to you how many Jews were deported, you did not care?

JODL: The note does not imply that, but it does prove that the matter was a political one, and with political matters I was not concerned. My attitude to the Jewish question has, I believe, been made clear already.

JODL: No. The French Prosecution read it here; these Jews of whom we are speaking now were taken to Theresienstadt; a few of the older people died there, but all of them were treated well, and received clothing and food. I had the same information, and this document of the Danish Government confirms it.

JODL: Yes, I believe that, because the Danish Government confirms it here; it was confirmed in this court by the Prosecution itself.

MR. ROBERTS: Now I want to deal with one other topic, the topic of forced labor. Did you say in your speech—will you look at your notes of your speech, Pages 38 and 39, and it is Page 298 of Document Book 7, the big one, the paragraph, which begins on Page 38 in the witness’ copy. It has got a frame; I think it is a piece of paper headed “38.” I wonder if you can find it for him.

“This dilemma of manpower shortage has led to the idea of making more thorough use of the manpower reserves in the territories dominated by us. Right thinking and wrong thinking are mixed up together. I believe that insofar as concerns labor, everything has been done that could be done. Where this has not yet been achieved, it appeared to be more favorable politically to refrain from measures of compulsion, and secure in turn order and economic aid. In my opinion, however, the time has now come to take steps with remorseless vigor and resolution in Denmark, Holland, France, and Belgium to compel thousands of idlers to carry out the fortification work which is more important than any other work. The necessary orders for this have already been given.” (Document Number L-172, Exhibit Number USA-34.)

MR. ROBERTS: But had the necessary orders been given for the civilians in the occupied territories to work on the German fortification?

JODL: A compulsory labor order was issued in most countries, but I—you may not know it—I state under my oath that in Denmark and Holland, and also in Belgium, local firms, which recruited their own labor under the labor order, worked on these fortifications and that the populations of these areas were particularly glad about this, because the stronger their coast was fortified, the more certain were they that the invasion would not take place in their neighborhood. And, of course, they were greatly interested in preventing an invasion, which they knew would destroy everything. Though it sounds incredible, the local inhabitants did work on these fortifications, some of them with the greatest enthusiasm. That is a fact.

MR. ROBERTS: No, I did not stop you. But had the necessary orders been given—that is in the last sentence—to compel these people who did not want to, to compel them to work on fortification? I am not talking about the people who did want it, but the people who did not.

JODL: I understand. I did not know details of the procedure, as I did not concern myself with it, but I did know that compulsory labor orders had been issued in the occupied countries.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I will leave that, if you have said all you want to say. Will you look now, please, at a new document, Number 1383-PS, which I offer as GB-489. This is a report of a discussion of the current military situation, 12 December 1942, Pages 65 and 66, Jodl speaking:

“The military commander of France reports: The number of French workers deported into the Reich since 1 June has now passed 220,000. There are in round figures 100,000 skilled laborers in Berlin.”

JODL: I cannot say that; I only quoted from a report which was appended to the situation report from France. That a large-scale exchange between prisoners of war and workers had been in progress has already been stated in detail by Sauckel.

MR. ROBERTS: I will leave that. I ask only two questions now on Sagan, Stalag Luft III.

You said yesterday that after the incident of the Sagan shooting, you thought Hitler was no longer “humane.” Did you say that?

JODL: I said yesterday, I had the impression then that he was disavowing all humane conceptions of right.

JODL: Before this time, I personally knew of no action of his which could not be justified legally, at least under international law. All his previous orders, so far as I knew, could still be justified in some way. They were reprisals. But this act was not a reprisal.

MR. ROBERTS: This was—would you agree with me—the word is not too strong—that this was sheer murder of these 50 airmen?

MR. ROBERTS: How could you honorable generals go on serving a murderer with unabated loyalty?

JODL: I did not serve with unabated loyalty after this event, but I did everything in my power to avoid further injustice.

MR. ROBERTS: Now I come to something else, the question of destruction in Norway. The document is 754-PS. It has not yet been exhibited. I offer it as GB-490. This document is signed by you, is it not?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes. Perhaps I might just read parts of it to the Tribunal. Dated 28 October 1944. It is from your staff, and the distribution is to the Army supreme command; commander-in-chief, Norway; to the Reich Commissioner, Norway; and the Navy.

“Because of the unwillingness of the northern Norwegian population to evacuate voluntarily the Führer has agreed to the proposals of the Reich Commissioner and has ordered that the entire Norwegian population east of the Fjord of Lyngen be evacuated by force in the interest of their own security, and that all homes are to be burned to the ground or destroyed.

“The commander, Northern Finland, is responsible that the Führer’s orders be carried out without consideration. Only by this method can the Russians with strong forces, aided by these homesteads and the population familiar with the terrain, be prevented from following our withdrawal operations during the winter and shortly appearing in front of our position in Lyngen. This is not the place for sympathy for the civilian population.”

JODL: No, on the northern coast, where Finland is closest to the coast of the polar region and very near Norway.

MR. ROBERTS: Now, that order was carried out, according to the Norwegian report, UK-79, which the Tribunal will find as the last document in the small book, 7A, Page 26 of the Norwegian report, at the bottom of the page, Page 26:

“As a result of the advance of the Russian troops and the retreat of the German Army in Finnmark, October-November 1944, the Germans practiced the ‘scorched earth’ policy for the first time in Norway. Orders were issued that the civilian population was to evacuate, and that all houses, transport, and stores were to be destroyed. As a result of this, about 30,000 houses were damaged apart from 12,000 items of damage to chattels amounting to 176 million kroner.”

And then, for photographs will the Tribunal turn to Pages 62 and 63; 62 is a copy of the German order, and 63 is a photograph of the ruins of a fishing village.

JODL: No, not exactly. I should like to make a few explanatory remarks about it. Typically, as I have always said, this order was urged upon the Führer by the Reich Commissioner Terboven; not by the soldiers but much against their will.

Secondly, this order was not carried out, because otherwise the cities of Kirkenes, Hammerfest, and Alta would today no longer exist. All these cities are east of the Lyngen Fjord. In practice this order was moderated by our forces in agreement with me, and in conversations I had with my brother, who was the commanding general in that region—and whom I wanted to call as a witness since I expected this document to be produced—it was moderated to such an extent that, in fact, only what was necessary from a military point of view and could be justified under Article 23 of the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare was destroyed. Otherwise no city or house would be left today in northern Norway; and if you were to travel there, you would see that these cities are still standing, not destroyed.

The Armed Forces commander in Norway strongly protested against this attitude of Terboven, and I repeated these objections to the Führer in similarly strong terms, but nevertheless he demanded that this order be issued. We who retained our humanitarian sentiments carried out the order only insofar as it was absolutely necessary for military reasons. These are the facts.

MR. ROBERTS: I think you said, when you were interrogated, that your brother complained of this order, did he not?

MR. ROBERTS: Very well. I am now going to turn to two documents with regard to the treatment of the Norwegian civilian population.

They are in your Document Book 1, Pages 99 and 100—well, it begins at Page 98. These are regulations on the conduct during the occupation of Denmark and Norway. And there are instructions to the troops to treat the inhabitants politely and well and to behave themselves with due decorum. That is right, is it not?

MR. ROBERTS: And they must be told that they are entering Norway for the protection of the country and the safety of its inhabitants. That appears on Page 99. That is rather a euphemistic description of a sudden invasion with no declaration of war, is it not?

JODL: Yes, but at first it was carried out in a fairly peaceful manner on the whole.

JODL: No, from the point of view of the Norwegians as well. The most extraordinary things...

MR. ROBERTS: Well, you know, we have seen—we can see in the Norwegian Government’s report photograph after photograph of these towns and villages bombed to ruins. Is that your idea of an orderly occupation?

JODL: What was bombed on the day of the landing is hardly worth mentioning; just a few coastal batteries and a few fortifications, but no cities. Villages were destroyed only later in the battle with the English brigade at Dombass and at Lillehammer, but nothing was destroyed when the country was first occupied. Then the Norwegians only stood at the quays, hands in their pockets, and looked on with great interest.

MR. ROBERTS: And naturally, Witness, if you could have landed without opposition and occupied the country without opposition, so much the better for you? That is obvious, is it not?

JODL: Yes, undoubtedly; that would have been even better; and the Norwegians would certainly have fared very well during the occupation if Terboven had not come.

MR. ROBERTS: Now, I want you to look at a part of that document which, quite properly, of course, was not read.

It is Appendix 5 which will be part, My Lord, I assume, of Exhibit AJ-14, the number which this document was given when it was put in in the examination-in-chief. But I am handing the Tribunal copies of Appendix 5, because it does not appear in the Jodl document book.

[Turning to the defendant.] Well, now, Appendix 5, I can describe as the sting in the tail of this document:

“Guiding Principles for the Attitude of Troops in Occupied Areas.

“Only”—I do not read the first few paragraphs—“Only in the event of the civil population’s putting up a resistance or behaving rebelliously can the following decisions be carried out:

“1) If the civilian population offers resistance or if attacks are to be feared, the arrest of hostages should, on principle, be resorted to. Hostages should only be arrested on orders of the commander of a regiment or a commander of equivalent rank.

“When accommodating and feeding hostages it should be borne in mind that they are not imprisoned because of crimes. Hostages and population are to be informed that the hostages will be shot at any sign of hostile action. Previous sanction of the shooting by the divisional commander must be obtained....”

“Armed resistance by the civilian population is to be crushed by force of arms.”

“The death penalty will be imposed for violence of any kind against the German Armed Forces. Immediate trials will be held by a field court martial. The regimental commander can appoint the summary court, composed of one captain, one sergeant, one corporal, hear witnesses, draw up the sentence in writing. The verdict will be the death penalty if guilty, otherwise acquittal. The sentence will be executed immediately after confirmation by the regimental commander.

“The following are to be considered as acts of violence: Sabotage, destruction of our lines of communications, cutting of telephone wires, demolitions, et cetera.” (Document Number Jodl-37, Exhibit Number AJ-14.)

JODL: These instructions are, word for word, in complete accord with our directives which, in times of peace, were laid down by the group of experts on international law in co-operation with the Foreign Office and with German professors of international law. It would have been well, if only these, our military precepts, our military court procedure laid down before we went to war, had been followed consistently everywhere. Our official directives laid down the question of hostages from the point of view of international law, and there is no doubt that under international law as applicable in the year 1939, the taking of hostages was admissible.

MR. ROBERTS: I suggest to you, as you raise that point, that nowhere in international law will you find the shooting of hostages legalized at all.

JODL: Then it is not with certainty prohibited anywhere in international law. I believe it is an open question. In our directives, even in the Handbook on Tactics, the concept of taking hostages had been laid down for years.

MR. ROBERTS: That may be so, and I do not want to argue with you about it. I suggest to you that the Hague Regulations protect the lives of civilians in occupied countries, unless they commit crimes, of course, and also prohibit collective punishment of the innocent.

If you do not want to say any more on that—I do not want to stop you if you do.

JODL: I can only summarize and say that every word here is in accord with the directives applicable in the German Army, and these directives were not illegal. But one would have to argue this problem with experts on international law.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, will you look at one other document dealing with Norway? It is D-582.

JODL: Yes. It originated with the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Quartermaster Section.

JODL: I cannot recall it, but there are some notes of mine on it, and so I undoubtedly saw the document.

MR. ROBERTS: Oh, I see what you mean, yes. Well, will you take first of all—I had forgotten that you were getting more than one document. Will you take first of all the document dated the 2d of February 1945? I think it is the top one.

JODL: There are no remarks of mine on that document, so I cannot say with certainty whether I have seen it.

JODL: I do not think I have seen this. I do not—I have no recollection of having ever read it.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, then, I do not think it would be right to cross-examine you on that document.

My Lord, in that case, I would ask to withdraw it, and I will not put it in as an exhibit.

[Turning to the defendant.] You see what the document says, Defendant. It is dated 2 April 1945; it deals with...

MR. ROBERTS: It is the 2d of February. It deals with Reich Commissioner Terboven’s report to the Führer. It says:

“Those responsible for attempts to murder and to carry out sabotage are the illegal elements within Norway with a bourgeois-national majority and a communist minority, as well as individual groups which came direct from England or Sweden....

“The bourgeois-national majority was opposed to the communist minority in conception of sabotage and murder, and in particular with regard to their extent and nature. This resistance has ... become progressively weaker during the course of the past year.

“Official departments of the exile government, as for instance the Crown Prince Olaf, as so-called Commander-in-Chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces, and various others, have called upon the population in speeches and orders to carry out sabotage. As a result, there is a particularly good possibility here of stamping every supporter of the exile government as an intellectual instigator or accomplice.

“The aim of the coming measures must therefore be: a) to strengthen the power and will to turn once more against sabotage by threatening the very influential class of leaders in the bourgeois camp; b) thereby to exacerbate more and more antagonism between the bourgeois and Communists....”

And then, “Suggestions.” These are suggestions from your office, apparently:

“1. Particularly influential representatives of the explicitly anti-German and anti-National Socialist class of industrialists to be shot without trial on the accusation that they are intellectual instigators or accomplices and stating that they were convicted within the framework of police investigations.

“2. Similar men from the same circle to be sent to Germany to work on fortifications.

“3. In cases where the circumstances are particularly suitable, proceedings to be taken before the SS and Police Court, with the execution of the sentence of death and suitable publicity.”

There are other suggestions which I need not read. And then the last paragraph but one:

“The Führer has agreed to these proposals only in part. Especially in connection with efforts at protection against acts of sabotage he has rejected taking hostages. He has rejected the shooting of influential Norwegian representatives without trial”—which is underlined in blue pencil.

MR. ROBERTS: You see, it is a remarkable document, Witness, because that is one instance where your department is suggesting a course of what I submit is brutal action, which for once the Führer rejects.

JODL: I believe, Mr. Roberts, you are somewhat mistaken. No proposal at all is being made here, but the Armed Forces Operations Staff is advising the military commander in Norway of what Reich Commissioner Terboven has told the Führer. He reported to the Führer first about the general situation and then be made the proposals mentioned here; and the Armed Forces Operations Staff which obviously had a representative at this meeting—I was not there—immediately advised the military commander of the handsome proposals of his friend Terboven.

That is what happened and these proposals went beyond—they were too much even for the Führer. But they were not our proposals.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good, Witness, I hear your answer, and the Court will consider it. It may be accepted. The document speaks for itself.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you read the first—the subject description “Orientation about Reich Commissioner Terboven’s Report to the Führer”?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes. That is the first—that is the subject, is it not, beginning, Witness, “Orientation about Reich Commissioner Terboven’s Report”? Whose orientation? Your department’s?

JODL: Orientation of the Mountain Army, that is, of General Böhm. General Böhm as commanding general of the Mountain Army, High Command 20, is advised of the report made to the Führer by Reich Commissioner Terboven, so that he would know what his friend Terboven was proposing. It is no more than information on what Terboven said to the Führer. I cannot tell you who was present; I was not there. The entire thing did not originate with me; I have never seen it.

MR. ROBERTS: Well now, the second document, this is from Terboven to Bormann on the 28th of October 1944. That is with regard to the evacuation east of Lyngen. I do not think I need read that. Then, the next document, maybe the second document, it is a teleprint of the 6th of April 1945, from Oberführer Fehlis, SS Oberführer to the Operations Staff, and it says:

“In accordance with the instructions of the OKW (WFSt) ... dated 29 March 1945, members of the Norwegian resistance movement who appear in organized units and who are easily recognizable as combatants by arm bands or other insignia are to be treated as prisoners of war.”

“I consider this order completely intolerable. I explained this clearly to Lieutenant Colonel Hass and Major Benze from the Armed Forces Operations Staff, who stayed here. There have been isolated appearances of uniformed groups in Norway, but there has been no fighting as yet. Inquiries were made at the defense headquarters in London as to whether armed resistance should be offered in case of German or Norwegian police action. As yet no partisan or other fighting in Norway. On one occasion, captured members of the military organization in uniform claimed the right to be treated as prisoners of war. If this demand were met at the present moment, the result would be that active fighting on the part of the military organization would be set going. Please obtain cancellation of the order of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.”

“The objection is justified. Norway has a government in its own country. Whoever fights against it in the country is a rebel. It is another question in the case of Norwegian troops who were taken to England and from there brought into the struggle under England’s order.”

MR. ROBERTS: And you stick to that, do you? I mean you—that is your opinion today?

JODL: Yes, indeed. I am of the opinion, from the point of view of international law, that members of a resistance movement against their own Norwegian government are certainly not to be considered as normal troops but as constituting an uprising, a rebellion. But if Norwegian troops come to Norway from England, then they are regular soldiers. And that, today, is still my opinion on the basis of international law.

MR. ROBERTS: What do you call their own Norwegian government, the puppet government which was set up by the Germans?

JODL: In any event, there was the government of Quisling at the time; and in any event, speaking now from the point of view of international law, we were occupying the country, and therefore, according to international law, were justified in issuing laws and enforcing them. That is accepted under international law, and resistance against it has been considered all over the world as rebellion. The same applies to us in Germany today.

MR. ROBERTS: Now, I want to deal quite shortly with three other matters, and then I have finished. I want to deal first of all with what you have said with regard to Hitler’s suggestion to revoke the Geneva Convention. You say you were instrumental in preventing him from renouncing that Convention?

MR. ROBERTS: Would you look at a document which has already been put in, C-158, which is GB-209. I think you have loose copies for it; it is not in a document book. This was put in with regard to the case against Dönitz. It is headed, “Extracts from Minutes of the Hitler Conference on the 19th of February 1945...”:

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy was present on 19 February 1945.

“The Führer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention. As not only the Russians but also the Western Powers are violating international law by their actions against the defenseless population and the residential districts, it appears expedient to adopt the same course in order to show the enemy that we are determined to fight with every means for our existence, and also to urge our people to resist to the utmost. The Führer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to consider the pros and cons and to state his own opinion.”

Then, further down, My Lord—Commander-in-Chief of the Navy on the Hitler conference of the 20th of February:

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy informed Generaloberst Jodl, Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and the representative of the Foreign Office at the Führer’s headquarters, Ambassador Hewel, of his views with regard to Germany’s possible renunciation of the Geneva Convention. From a military standpoint there are no grounds for this step as far as the conduct of the war at sea is concerned. On the contrary, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages; even from a general standpoint it appears to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that this measure would bring no advantages. It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning and at all costs to save face with the world. The Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and Ambassador Hewel are in full agreement.”

You were saying there, were you not, that you agreed with Raeder when he said, “Break the Geneva Convention, but do not tell the world that we are doing so.”

MR. ROBERTS: Dönitz, right. I beg your pardon. That is what you were saying, is it not?

JODL: No. The whole thing, as I have said, is a notice of Admiral Wagner on a conference from which one can gather only that Grossadmiral Dönitz disapproved, and that he is supposed to have made this remark at the end. I can hardly account for that remark today, because the only reason given to us by the Führer at that time was that the tremendous number of German soldiers in the West must be prevented from deserting as a consequence of enemy propaganda about good treatment. I cannot explain this remark, and in my written draft which I submitted to the Führer and which contains the attitude of the Navy that sentence was not included, but only advantages and disadvantages were compared. The disadvantages were overwhelming; the whole thing was completely impracticable and impossible, and so it was not carried out. More I cannot say. Witnesses will confirm my statement.

[Turning to the defendant.] Now that is signed by you, is it not? It deals with the subject of the breach of the Geneva Convention. If you would say first if it is signed by you? Is it signed by you? Please answer my question: Is it signed by you?

MR. ROBERTS: Well, that is where one usually finds the signature. Now, it is dated 21 February 1945, and it is written on your letterhead notepaper. And then, “Notes on report submitted to the Führer on 23 February through the Chief of the Operations Staff. The following questions were to be examined.”

My Lord, I do not propose to read it all, or anything like that. If the witness would follow me, I will read anything he wants. But it is a discussion as to the various advantages and disadvantages of repudiating the various international agreements, and I think I am not doing the witness an injustice if I say from a utilitarian rather than a moral point of view.

JODL: Yes, quite correct. For my only aim was to succeed with the Führer, and this document was worded accordingly.

My Lord, it is the last page but one of Your Lordship’s document, right at the bottom:

“C. Proposal of the OKW:

“At the present moment the disadvantages of repudiating the agreements which have been kept up to now in any case outweigh the advantages by far.

“Just as it was a mistake in 1914 that we ourselves solemnly declared war on all the states which had for a long time wanted to wage war on us, and through this took the whole guilt of the war on our shoulders before the outside world, and just as it was a mistake to admit that the necessary”—note the word “necessary”—“passage through Belgium in 1914 was our own fault, so it would be a mistake now to repudiate openly the obligations of international law which we accepted and thereby to stand again as the guilty party before the outside world.

“Adherence to the accepted obligations does not demand in any way that we should have to impose on ourselves any limitations which will interfere with the conduct of the war. For instance, if the British sink a hospital ship, this must be used for propaganda purposes, as has been done to date. That, of course, in no way prevents our sinking an English hospital ship at once as a reprisal and then expressing our regret that it was a mistake in the same manner as the British do.”

JODL: I can only say in reply that this was the sole method which achieved success with the Führer, and by its use success was, in fact, achieved. If I had come to him with moral or purely legal arguments, he would have said, “Leave me alone with this foolish talk,” and he would have proceeded with the renunciation of the Convention; but these things compelled him to reconsider the step and, in consequence, he did not carry it through.

You must after all grant me that at the end of 5½ years I knew best how to achieve good results with him and avoid bad ones. My aim was to achieve success, and I achieved it.

MR. ROBERTS: But, you see, you were deploring it there, the fact that you told the world the truth in 1914. In 1914 you said that you regarded treaties only as a scrap of paper. You are saying now, “What a pity we told the world the truth in 1914. We ought to have told them something untrue, and then we should have, possibly, had a better world reputation.”

JODL: That was an argument which the Führer used frequently. If one repeated his arguments in that form again and again he was more inclined to read and accept one’s suggestions. One had to prevent his flinging our proposals to the ground in a fit of rage and immediately decreeing renunciation. That was the approach one had to follow. If one cannot do good openly, it is better to do it in a roundabout way than not at all.

MR. ROBERTS: I am now coming to quite another point: Were you an admirer of the principles of the Nazi Party?

MR. ROBERTS: Were you of the opinion that there was a successful fusion between the Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht, which brought about the rejuvenation, the resurrection of Germany after 1933?

JODL: It would have happened, and I hoped for a long time that it would happen; indeed, on the whole the relationship improved somewhat in the course of the years and especially during the war. At first, it was poor, very poor.

MR. ROBERTS: You wrote—please, I am reading now from your speech, L-172. It is Page 290 of Document Book 7, and it is Page 6 of your lecture notes, Page 290 of Document Book 7 and 203 of the German: