JODL: Such a directive was necessary in order that careless statements on the part of German officers should not be used by officers of the Japanese Army and Navy for their own political purposes. For this reason the Foreign Office also received a copy, as is shown in the distribution list on the bottom of Page 96. This would never have happened in the case of an operational order. Also that is why the Führer did not sign it.

DR. EXNER: The objectives of the German Navy are also stated on the top of Page 96. They read as follows:

And so we again find the endeavor to prevent the entry of the United States into the war and to attack them only if nothing else should prove possible.

JODL: I should like to add that the purpose of this document was not to exert influence on Japan, as that would have been a political action; it was merely a directive for all officers telling them what to say in such a case.

DR. EXNER: Grossadmiral Raeder has already told us by what naval orders he had endeavored to keep the United States out of the war. Have you anything to add to that?

JODL: Only one point, which the Grossadmiral did not mention. It comes from Document C-119 and Exhibit Jodl-37. It can be read on Page 98 of Document Book Number 1.

DR. EXNER: Page 98 of Volume I, Exhibit Jodl-37, which we submit. There we find: “Special regulations on deportment during the occupation of Denmark and Norway.” And then...

JODL: Only the last sentence need be read.

DR. EXNER: Please read it.

DR. EXNER: And that is the last sentence at the bottom of Page 98. The paragraph speaks of prohibiting warships, merchant vessels, aircraft, et cetera, from leaving port, with the exception of the Americans.

JODL: And so, in all the war measures of the Naval Operations Staff, America was granted an exceptional position for a long time.

DR. EXNER: Before Japan’s attack on America, did you have any official dealings with Japanese officers?

JODL: No, not before.

DR. EXNER: None at all?

JODL: No.

DR. EXNER: Did you expect the attack on Pearl Harbor?

JODL: The attack came as a complete surprise. It was a complete surprise to me, and I had the feeling it was also a surprise for the Führer; for he came, in the middle of the night, to my map room in order to give the news to Field Marshal Keitel and myself. He was completely surprised.

DR. EXNER: Now, I should like you to clear up an erroneous interpretation of this letter of Falkenstein’s. It is Page 81, Volume I, of our document book. A letter, Document 376-PS, Exhibit USA-161, can be found there. There is a letter from Falkenstein to yourself, I believe?

JODL: No, no.

DR. EXNER: No?

JODL: No, to General Von Waldau, of the Air Force Operations Staff.

DR. EXNER: It states:

That can be interpreted to mean that he intended to attack America: “With a view to a future war against America, the Führer is considering...” What is meant by that, and how did you interpret it?

JODL: That is perfectly obvious. At that time consideration was actually being given to the occupation of the Atlantic islands, a thing the Führer had always wanted to do.

DR. EXNER: For what purpose?

JODL: As a certain security base, thus an outpost in case of American intervention; and so we had to take this idea into consideration. Although the Navy as well as the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces definitely rejected it, we had to consider these matters in theory at least; and this is what he tells General Von Waldau in this letter.

Furthermore, the same thing was then written in a document, later in an order, Document 444-PS, exactly as written here.

DR. EXNER: Did we have any interest at all in extending the war?

JODL: I, personally, none. I can only say that the expanse from the North Cape to Tobruk, and from Brest to Rostov-on-the-Don was too great for my liking.

DR. EXNER: And were we interested in having Japan at war with America?

JODL: No, we would have much preferred a new and powerful ally without a new and powerful enemy.

DR. EXNER: Did we drag Italy into the war?

JODL: I do not know what was done politically; but after the collapse of France, when Italy also wished to take an active part in the war, we tried to prevent this, we soldiers in the OKW. But we only succeeded in delaying her intervention by 4 to 6 days; the Führer could not refuse altogether. But during the whole of the war Italy was of no help to us, rather only a burden; and this will be confirmed by subsequent histories of the war.

DR. EXNER: As to all the accusations concerning Crimes Against Peace, I should like to refer to the relevant documents which have been submitted by Göring, Ribbentrop, Raeder, and Dönitz. I do not know whether such a reference is at all necessary according to the rules of procedure.

Now one final question. The Prosecution has represented this whole series of campaigns as a long premeditated and concerted plan of conquest which you, as a conspirator, both instigated and carried out. What have you to say to this?

JODL: I believe I have already corrected this completely distorted picture by my testimony. The war against Poland broke out without my having taken any part in its preparation. It developed into a World War contrary to the hopes of all soldiers. Everything had to be improvised for this war. There was nothing ready except the plan of attack against Poland. There were neither enough bombs nor enough ammunition. At that time not a single soldier thought about Norway, Belgium, Holland, Yugoslavia, Greece, or even Russia. No military agreements had been reached with Italy or with Japan.

I acknowledge the statement of the American Chief of General Staff, General Marshall, to be absolutely correct in almost every point.

DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions?

DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): General, as Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, you were for many years the leading General Staff officer of the German Armed Forces?

JODL: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: In the course of your military activity you were also for a fairly long time a teacher at the War Academy?

JODL: Not exactly at the War Academy but at the General Staff courses which preceded the War Academy and which at that time were held at the individual district headquarters.

DR. LATERNSER: As all our higher military leaders came from the professional class of General Staff officers, I ask you to tell us briefly how these officers were trained at the War Academy. Please confine yourself exclusively to the following points:

How was, or rather how much time was allotted to instruction on attack; then for propaganda for wars of aggression; and the attitude toward international law and politics?

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think this question is completely irrelevant.

DR. LATERNSER: If the Court considers these questions to be irrelevant, I will dispense with the answers to these questions.

Generaloberst, you know the standpoint of the Prosecution, that the military leaders are supposed to have formed a group with the aim of unleashing wars of aggression and, in the course of these wars, committing crimes against military law and the laws of humanity. Please explain to the Tribunal your attitude toward this point, particularly as to whether the higher military leaders ever actually formed such a group.

JODL: I never understood the idea of such a group, and I never shall understand it. It is just as if the passengers of a passenger ship were to meet on an ocean liner and there form a unit—or be obliged to form a unit—under the authority of the captain. This so-called group of high-ranking officers might possibly have existed in imperial times as an absolute entity, but not entirely even then. But here, after the National Socialist revolution, these groups broke up completely in all spheres of life, politically, philosophically, and ideologically. The goal that united them was the military profession and the necessary obedience.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn at this time.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, before the occupation of Czechoslovakia there was a meeting on 10 August 1938 at the Berghof between Hitler and the military leaders, at which you were also present. Up to now that conference has not yet been discussed here, and I want to ask you what was the subject of that conference.

JODL: During that conference, the Führer spoke to General Staff officers only, and gave them a talk that lasted for about two and a half hours on the whole military and political situation. In particular, he dealt with the Sudeten-German problem, and said that it would have to be solved no matter what happened. He described the various possibilities and, in particular, made it clear that he intended to solve the question without interference from France and England and was confident he would succeed.

DR. LATERNSER: That was the subject of that conference?

JODL: Yes, that in the main was the subject.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know for what reason the Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces and their chiefs were not there?

JODL: I know the reason because the Chief Adjutant, Major Schmundt, informed me of it before the conference. He told me that it was the Führer’s intention to speak directly to the senior General Staff officers at a time when they would not be under the influence of their too-critical Commanders-in-Chief and thus not inclined to balk or criticize.

DR. LATERNSER: But then, during that conference there was, nevertheless, considerable criticism on the part of those officers, was there not?

JODL: I could not say that there was criticism; but one of the generals believed that he could or should draw the Führer’s attention to the possibility that France and England might interfere after all, if he did something against Czechoslovakia. That was General Von Wietersheim.

DR. LATERNSER: Did Hitler later on again follow the principle of excluding the highest military leaders from such conferences?

JODL: The Führer did that quite often. I would say that he did it on principle. For instance, after our unsuccessful attack on the bridgehead at Nettuno, southwest of Rome, he ordered the junior officers, who were taking part in these battles, from the regimental commanders down to the company commanders, to come to the Führer’s headquarters. For days he personally interrogated each one of them alone without their superiors being present. He did the same thing very, very often with Air Force officers, whom he interrogated without the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force present.

DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, you were present during most of the Hitler conferences on the situation. Could the commanding generals present at the Führer’s headquarters at the time take part in such conferences without difficulties?

JODL: As long as during these orientation conferences on the situation only things which had already happened were discussed, the Führer was very generous about who took part in them; but as soon as something was discussed which dealt with future operations—for instance, the attack on Russia in 1942—commanding generals of an army group from the Western Front could not take part; nor was it possible the other way round, so that so far as his intentions were concerned, he would only initiate such officers as had to be informed for official reasons.

DR. LATERNSER: In such cases then, the so-called “smallest circle” was summoned to a situation conference?

JODL: That is right. And so it was that the chief adjutant would announce, on behalf of the Führer, that a discussion among the smallest circle would now take place in which only such and such officers could take part.

DR. LATERNSER: During such situation discussions, did you often hear energetic remonstrances on the part of the commanding generals of an army group? Who made these remonstrances, and on what occasion? Please limit yourself to the most important instances.

JODL: I can only give you a very short answer to that question; otherwise, I would have to speak about it for an hour. I can say that not a single conference took place without the old traditional conceptions, if I may call them so, regarding operations coming into conflict with the revolutionary conceptions of the Führer. Therefore, apart perhaps from single operations during the first part of the war, I can state that whenever such a report was made by a commanding general of an army group, there was a clash of opinions. I could mention the names of all the commanding generals of army groups who ever held a post. I know of none to whom this would not apply.

DR. LATERNSER: Of course, you knew all the commanding generals of army groups, did you not?

JODL: During the first half of the war I knew all the commanding generals down to, and including, commanding generals of army groups. During the second half of the war, there were commanding generals of army groups in the East whom I did not know. For the most part they did not come from the General Staff, but were line officers, so that I did not know some of them.

DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, could, for instance, a commanding general of an army group report for a discussion with Hitler without difficulties?

JODL: The commanding general of an army group could not do that. The commanding general of an army group would, first of all, have to ask the Commander-in-Chief of the Army as long as there was one. When the Commander-in-Chief of the Army no longer existed, the commanding generals of army groups then applied to the military adjutant’s office, or they applied to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army for permission to make a report, which the commanding generals could not do themselves.

DR. LATERNSER: So that, if a commanding general of an army group intended to protest against some measure which he did not consider right, then he had to go to the commander-in-chief of his army group, who in turn would have to go to the commander-in-chief of the particular branch of the Armed Forces; so that this was practically the only channel through which objections could be made to Hitler in the normal official way?

JODL: That is perfectly correct. All military departments did that, and it had been done for a number of years.

DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about Himmler’s attempt to set Hitler against the generals? When I say “generals” I mean the ones who are of the “group.”

JODL: I have perhaps already answered that in part when I complained that we were not in a position to prevent military reports and news of irresponsible sources from reaching the Führer. It was a standing rule that police circles particularly continually used the opportunity through Himmler to criticize the traditional, or—as they called it—the reactionary, humanitarian, chivalrous attitude of the higher military leaders, so that the severe orders of the Führer for brutal action—as he called it—might be stayed. This was a constant state of affairs. All of them were by no means involved and it was not directed against all the commanding generals, but it was against quite a few.

DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, you still have not quite answered my question. I asked you whether you knew anything about Himmler’s attempt to make Hitler hostile, for reasons which I hope you will tell me.

JODL: Well, the outcome of what I have just described was that Himmler went to the Führer and reported to him, privately of course. He complained about certain commanding generals, all of them of the Army; and we knew about it, because the following day the Führer suddenly began to raise some objections to some commanding general without our knowing why, and would cause bad feeling.

DR. LATERNSER: How were the relations between the OKW and the OKH?

JODL: Before the war and during the first part of the war the relationship between the High Command of the Armed Forces and the High Command of the Army was made difficult by considerable tension. The reason, however, was exclusively an internal military one. Because in the creation of the High Command of the Armed Forces a general staff group had come into being which was outside the jurisdiction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and which was, I should say, even above the General Staff of the Army and gave orders to them. This constellation was, of course, regarded with a great deal of distrust by the General Staff of the Army. I might add, however, that Field Marshal Keitel and I, and many reasonable officers, succeeded in completely overcoming this tension as the war went on.

DR. LATERNSER: I think, Generaloberst, that that is enough on that point.

The military leaders are accused of having delayed the end of a hopeless war unnecessarily. What do you know about the efforts of Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and Rommel after the invasion had succeeded?

JODL: I remember a conference with these two commanding generals when the Führer and I flew to the headquarters which had been prepared north of Reims. That was about July 1944. During that conference, both Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and particularly Rommel described in an unmistakable manner the seriousness of the entire situation in France, characterized by the tremendous superiority of the Anglo-Saxon Air Force, against which ground operations were powerless. I remember quite clearly that Field Marshal Rommel asked the Führer at the end, “My Führer, what do you really think about the further development of the war?” The Führer was rather angry at this remark, and he answered curtly, “That is a question which is no part of your duty. You will have to leave that to me.”

DR. LATERNSER: Did you read the letter which Field Marshal Von Kluge wrote to Hitler shortly before he died?

JODL: I stood next to the Führer when he received this letter. He opened the envelope, read the letter, and then gave it to me to read. It said exactly the opposite of what I had expected. Field Marshal Von Kluge began his letter with fulsome praise for the Führer’s personality and steadfastness in the conduct of the war. He said that he was much more in sympathy with his ideals than the Führer assumed. He had begun his task in the West full of confidence. But as the promised support of our own Air Force had not been given he was now convinced that the situation was hopeless, and his dying counsel was to make peace now. That briefly, was what the letter contained.

DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, can you give further examples regarding the efforts of the commanding generals to end the hopeless war?

JODL: No commanding general could touch upon the political question, because the ending of a war is not a military but a political decision. But indirectly I must say that there was not one officer in a responsible position who did not tell the Führer soberly, honestly, and openly what the military situation was and describe it as hopeless—as indeed it turned out to be at the end. I, myself, too, expressed this view in writing in a memorandum to the Führer.

DR. LATERNSER: I have a few questions regarding the various campaigns.

What was the attitude of the High Command of the Army, particularly Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, regarding the Austrian campaign?

JODL: The evening before the march into Austria, at about 2 o’clock in the morning, I was with Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. I found him in a dejected mood. I saw no reason for it; but apparently he was convinced that this march into Austria might possibly lead to a military conflict either with Italy or with Czechoslovakia. Or perhaps from a political point of view he was not quite pleased about this impending increase of the south German element in the Reich. I do not know. But at any rate he was most dejected.

DR. LATERNSER: What were the reasons for the tension which existed between Hitler on the one hand and the military leaders on the other after the Polish campaign?

JODL: The conflict was particularly serious at that time because the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and many of the higher generals held the view I described this morning—namely, that we should remain quiet in the West to end the war. As this again was a political argument, which they could not use, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army presented a military argument to the Führer at that time. This argument was that considering the conditions in which our Army was at the time, it would not be in a position to defeat the French Army, strengthened by the British Army, in an offensive. That made the Führer extremely bitter, and this bitterness expressed itself repeatedly in every speech to the commanding generals. The entire speech of 23 November, the entire memorandum which he wrote on 10 October can only be explained in the light of that conflict.

DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution, as a basis for the Indictment of the group, have presented a number of affidavits. I should like to ask you to state your views in connection with Affidavit Number 12, Document 3710-PS, Exhibit USA-557, which was made by Walter Schellenberg. There on Page 1 Schellenberg testifies that in the front zone the SD special task groups were entirely under the command of the armies—that is to say, tactically, technically, and from the point of view of troop service, as he says in his affidavit. Is that true, Generaloberst?

JODL: It is only true to a very limited extent. I must start my answer by saying I was not familiar with the idea of the Einsatzgruppe and Einsatzkommando until I came here to Nuremberg. I must say that quite openly, even at the risk of being called a “Parsifal,” but it is a fact. I only knew about the Police. The operational territory of the Army was divided into three sectors. The front line was called the fighting zone, and that went back approximately as far as the enemy artillery could fire. In that sector everything, that was anything at all, was in all respects subordinate to the Army. But in that sector there was no Police—except the Secret Field Police, who were in any case completely under the jurisdiction of the Army.

DR. LATERNSER: The Secret Field Police were actually a part of the division, were they not?

JODL: Yes, they were divisional troops which carried out police work among the troops. Then came the rear area of the armies which was under the commanding generals of the armies, and behind that were the lines of communication of the Army which comprised all the supply units and services of the Quartermaster General of the Army. In this main sector—which was by far the largest sector as it comprised 97 percent of the entire operational area—the entire Police and everything which did not belong to the Army organically was not under the command of the Army, as far as tasks were concerned, but under the Police, under the Reichsführer SS Himmler. Only from the standpoint of servicing the troops—that is, with regard to their supplies or movements during advance or retreat—did the Army, of course, have the right to give orders to the troops regarding their movements and their accommodation.

DR. LATERNSER: Schellenberg states that in the rear operational areas and in the rear areas of the Army these special task groups came under the Army only as far as supplies were concerned; and as far as orders and tasks were concerned, under the Reich Security Main Office. Is that correct?

JODL: That is correct. The entire Police received orders about what they were to do from Himmler only.

DR. LATERNSER: Schellenberg also states further in his Affidavit Number 12, Document 3710-PS, Exhibit USA-557, that this subordination as regards troop servicing also included the question of discipline. Is that true?

JODL: That is wrong. An officer of the Army could never punish a member of the Police or the SS.

DR. LATERNSER: As has been established, the chief task of these special task groups was to carry out mass extermination of Jews and Communists. Schellenberg states in his Affidavit Number 12 that he was convinced that the commanding generals of the army groups and armies had been clearly informed of these tasks through official channels. Since Schellenberg has stated his conviction in this affidavit I ask you to give us yours, because I think I am right in assuming that you were with the best informed officers of the Armed Forces.

JODL: I cannot, of course, judge exactly what the commanding generals actually experienced while they were together at the front; but I can say with absolute certainty that I have never seen an order which revealed that these police units had been sent into the operational zone for any other purpose than that of maintaining quiet and order, from the police point of view, and uncovering revolts and partisan activities. I have never seen a report or an order which contained anything other than that.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you believe, Generaloberst, that the commanding generals of the armies or army groups would have tolerated those conditions without protest?

JODL: I consider that out of the question, because even in the case of much smaller incidents they raised the most violent protests. Hundreds of documents which have been offered by the Prosecution here show how the troops at the front had objected to measures which they considered inadmissible from a humane point of view or dangerous to peace and order in the occupied territories. I have only to remind you of Blaskowitz’ memorandum, which was one of the first.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you read that memorandum?

JODL: No, I did not read it. I only heard about it.

DR. LATERNSER: Furthermore, the Prosecution have submitted Affidavit Number 13 from Rittmeister Wilhelm Scheidt. It is Document 3711-PS, Exhibit USA-558. Scheidt says in this affidavit, and I quote from Page 2: “It was a generally known fact that the partisan fights were conducted with cruelty on both sides.”

I skip a sentence. He goes on to say:

Is Rittmeister Scheidt’s statement correct, namely, that the leading officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the General Staff of the Army knew of the cruelty employed by both sides in the partisan fighting?

JODL: What we knew about the conduct of partisan warfare has already been submitted to this Tribunal. I refer to the instructions which I signed regarding the combating of partisans in Document F-665, Exhibit RF-411. It begins with a lengthy discourse on how the partisans conducted this war. Of course, we did not invent this. This was extracted from hundreds of reports. That troops in such a fight, seeing the methods employed by the enemy, would on their part not be exactly mild can readily be imagined. In spite of that the directives which we issued never contained a word to the effect that no prisoners were to be taken in these partisan fights. On the contrary, all reports showed that the number taken prisoner was larger by far than the number killed. That it was the Führer’s view that in their fight against the partisans the troops should in no way be restricted is authentically proved by the many arguments which I, as well as the General Staff of the Army, had with the Führer on this subject.

DR. LATERNSER: What if the commanding generals received reports about cruelties committed by their own soldiers?

JODL: Then they would be court-martialed. That again is established in the documents. I remind you of an order, issued by the Führer, which begins with the sentence, “It has been reported to me that individual soldiers of the Armed Forces have been dealt with by court martial because of their behavior when fighting partisans.”

DR. LATERNSER: And that was the only thing the commanding general could do in a case like that?

JODL: There was no other way open. And even on these orders, he always acted in accordance with his own legal judgment. Who could stop him from doing that?

DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution have also submitted Affidavit Number 15, by General Röttiger, Document 5713-PS which is numbered Exhibit USA-559. In this affidavit General Röttiger states, in the middle of Page 1:

Did the military leadership at the highest level hold any such point of view, and was that their final aim?

JODL: No. Of course, one is wise after the event. I too have learned many things today which I did not know before. However, this knowledge does not apply at all here, because there were next to no Jews among the partisans. In the main, these partisans were fanatical Russian fighters—mostly White Russians—and were as hard as steel. And, to a question put by my counsel, even the witness Bach-Zelewski had to admit that there were just about no Jews among these partisans.

As regards the extermination of Slavs, I can only say that the Slavs who were killed in the partisan fighting amounted to no more than one-twentieth or one-thirtieth of the numbers which in the normal, large-scale battles with the Soviet Russian armies the Russians lost in dead or wounded. As far as figures are concerned, that carries no weight at all. Therefore that is a completely erroneous view.

DR. LATERNSER: A further Affidavit, Number 16, by the same General Röttiger, was submitted by the Prosecution under Document 5714-PS, Exhibit Number USA-560. In the last sentence General Röttiger states the following, and I quote:

In other words, General Röttiger, in his affidavit, maintains that the special tasks of the SD units were apparently carried out with the knowledge of the highest military leaders. If that is correct, then, you, Generaloberst, must have known about the tasks and these questions you have already...

JODL: Yes, I have already answered. I have never spoken to a single officer who had knowledge of these matters and told me about them.

DR. LATERNSER: Also, in the case against the General Staff and the OKW, the Prosecution have submitted Affidavit 17, Document 3715-PS, Exhibit Number USA-562. This affidavit comes from SS Leader Rode. Rode states, at the top of Page 2:

Generaloberst, was there such an order that in guerrilla fighting no prisoners were to be taken?

JODL: Such an order never existed. I have never seen such an order. It was not contained in the instructions regarding guerrilla fighting. Apart from that, practically every word in that statement is untrue. There never was an order from the OKW-OKH—that is, an order which came from both departments. Jews among the guerrillas. I have already dealt with that. Agents among the guerrillas. Agents—that is a chapter by itself. Political commissars. That is quite another point. They were never handed over to the SD for special treatment—if they were handed over at all—because the task of the SD was an entirely different one. They may have been handed over to the Security Police. In other words, every word is untrue.

DR. LATERNSER: There is an Affidavit Number IS, by the same SS Leader Rode, which the Prosecution have submitted under Document 3716-PS, Exhibit Number USA-563. Rode states as follows in this affidavit:

Do you know SS Leader Rode?

JODL: No, I do not know him. I do not think it is necessary to say much about this, because the General of the Police Schellenberg, who led such a special task group himself, and who really must know, has stated quite clearly on this witness stand what jurisdiction he was under and from whom he received his orders.

DR. LATERNSER: That was not the witness Schellenberg; that was Ohlendorf.

JODL: Ohlendorf? Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have a few questions about the Commissar Order. Were you present at the conference when Hitler gave the Commissar Order orally to the commanding generals?

JODL: As far as I remember, right at the beginning he spoke only to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, or the Chief of the General Staff and a few officers of the OKW, about this Commissar Order. As far as I recollect he referred to that order of his at a later date when addressing the commanding generals. I believe that it was during that second conference that he used the words, “I cannot expect that my generals understand my orders, but I must demand that they obey them.”

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know any commanding generals who resisted that order?

JODL: Later on someone told me—I do not know whether it is true—that Field Marshal Rommel had burned this order. But...

DR. LATERNSER: Does not that recollection of yours refer to the Commando Order? General Field Marshal Rommel was...

JODL: Oh, yes, that was the Commando Order. You are talking about the Commissar Order, are you not?

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that is right.

JODL: I remember that there were constant objections from the High Command of the Army which, unfortunately, had to carry out this order, and these went on for a long time. Officers of the General Staff told me confidentially that for the most part it was not being carried out. I know of one official application made to the Führer to have this order officially withdrawn. That was done, although I cannot remember when.

DR. LATERNSER: Who made that application?

JODL: The High Command of the Army. Whether it was the Chief of the General Staff or the Commander-in-Chief, I cannot say.

DR. LATERNSER: When was this application made?

JODL: I believe it was in the spring of 1942.

DR. LATERNSER: The spring of 1942? And to that application...

JODL: I know for certain, the order was withdrawn.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you talk to any commanding general who approved of that order?

JODL: No. All the officers to whom I spoke considered, first, that the order should be turned down from the humane point of view and, secondly, that it was wrong from the practical point of view.

DR. LATERNSER: When Hitler gave his reasons for this order orally—and you have already told us some of them—he is supposed to have mentioned additional reasons for making it. I should like you to tell us what they were so that we may get this matter quite clear.

JODL: He gave a lengthy explanation—as he always did when he felt it necessary to convince somebody.

DR. LATERNSER: Did he state...

THE PRESIDENT: Have not these reasons already been given?

DR. LATERNSER: As far as I am informed, Mr. President, they have not yet all been given.

[Turning to the defendant.] During that conference did Hitler state...

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Haven’t you already given the reasons which, you say, Hitler gave for this order?

JODL: I have not given some very important reasons, which the Führer also pointed out. They were...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.

Dr. Laternser, I have already had to ask you to be more brief on many occasions in which you have examined witnesses, and really you have spent over an hour already on this High Command Staff. Every witness who comes to the box you take a very long time over, and the Tribunal think that a great deal of their time has been wasted by you. Now, this witness can give any further reasons, but I do not want any argument about it. He can give his explanation now.

JODL: I have only to add that the Führer said on that occasion: “If you do not believe what I am telling you, then read the reports from Counterintelligence which we have received regarding the behavior of the Russian commissars in the occupied Baltic states. Then you will get a picture of what can be expected from these commissars.”

He also stated that.

DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put a question to you about the report in Document 884-PS, submitted under Exhibit USSR-351.

THE PRESIDENT: Repeat the number please.

DR. LATERNSER: Number 884-PS, it is a document submitted by the Russian Prosecution on 13 February, and it is on Page 151 of the second document book for General Jodl. Under Number II of this report, Page 153, there is the following statement. I quote, “To this, Reichsleiter Rosenberg in Memorandum 3 suggests...” I do not want to read further. The next is a suggestion.

I would like to ask you for what reason this Number II was brought out in this report.

JODL: I can only guess because I did not write it. But I have no doubt...

THE PRESIDENT: We do not want his guesses, you know. If he can only guess, then he had better not guess. We want evidence, not guesses.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I will dispense with this question. I assumed that the witness would have personal knowledge about that.

Witness, you said yesterday that the Commando Order of 18 October 1942 had been changed—that is, partially revoked by application of the Commander, West. Who was that Commander, West who had applied for that change?

JODL: General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, and he applied to have the entire order withdrawn.

DR. LATERNSER: You know the order by General Von Reichenau which the Russian Prosecution submitted on 13 February as Document USSR-12? It is dated 10 October 1941. Do you know the reasons this order was issued?

JODL: Yes. Reichenau, at that time, was commanding general of the 6th Army, and in his army sector was the town of Kiev. This morning I already started to describe events that took place in Kiev at the end of September, and that was the reason for this order.

DR. LATERNSER: How did the commanding generals exercise their jurisdiction—strictly, or not so strictly?

JODL: I know this because Dr. Lehmann...

THE PRESIDENT: That has nothing to do with the charge against the High Command. There is no charge against the High Command for having arranged courts martial or administering their courts martial improperly.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I believe I am of a different opinion on this point. If the commanding generals heard of any breaches of discipline or atrocities...

THE PRESIDENT: Do you know of anything in the Indictment, or anything in the evidence, which charges the High Command, or any member of the High Command, with improper behavior at a court martial, or in connection with a court martial?

DR. LATERNSER: No. I merely want to discover the typical attitude of the High Command.

[Turning to the defendant.] What do you know about the reasons for the mass deaths which occurred among Russian prisoners of war during the winter of 1941?

JODL: I am informed on this subject because several adjutants of the Führer were sent there personally, and they reported to the Führer in my presence. We were mostly concerned with the mass deaths after the last great battle for the Vyazma pocket. The reason for the mass deaths was described by the Führer’s adjutants as follows: The half-famished encircled Russian armies had put up fanatical resistance during the last 8 or 10 days. They literally lived on the bark of trees and roots because they had retreated to impenetrable wooded country, and when they fell into our hands they were in such a condition that they could hardly move. It was impossible to transport them. The situation as regards supplies was critical, because the railway system had been destroyed, so that it was impossible to take them all away. There were no accommodations nearby. Only immediate careful hospital treatment could have saved the majority of them. Soon afterwards the rain started, and then the cold set in, and that is the reason why such a large number of those prisoners—particularly these prisoners of Vyazma—died.

That is the report of the Führer’s adjutants who had been sent there to investigate. Similar reports came from the Quartermaster General of the Army.

DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the shelling of Leningrad by German artillery? You remember that a witness has been examined here on that point?

JODL: I was present during two conferences which the Führer himself had with the German artillery commander who was in charge of the artillery before Leningrad. He brought along the exact target chart, and it showed a very carefully worked-out system, according to which only key plants in Leningrad were marked as necessary targets, so as to cripple the power of resistance of the fortress. They were mostly factories which were still producing munitions. The ammunition for this heavy artillery, only a small portion of which could reach the center of Leningrad, was so scarce that one had to be extremely economical in its use. They were mostly captured guns from France, and we only had as much ammunition as we had captured.

DR. LATERNSER: You know that the witness has asserted that in his opinion the artillery deliberately destroyed the castles in Leningrad. You have seen the target chart for this artillery?

JODL: Yes; I myself had the artillery target chart in my brief case for many weeks. Only the armament industry was marked on it. It would have been insane to shoot at anything else. Of course, every artilleryman knows that through dispersion the shots can fall elsewhere.

DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the order from Hitler and the OKH to destroy dwellings and fireplaces during the retreat in the winter of 1941? What was the reason for that order?

JODL: The reasons are that...

DR. LATERNSER: I refer to the Order USSR-130. Unfortunately, I have not been able to ascertain on what day the Prosecution presented this order. I shall ascertain it later and have the Tribunal informed.

JODL: During that frightful winter battle, with a temperature of 48 degrees of frost, the commanders at the front reported to the Führer in his headquarters that this battle was exclusively a battle for warm shelter. Those who did not have some sort of heating arrangement—that is to say, a village with serviceable stoves—could not hold out and would not be able to fight the following day. One could say it was really a fight for stoves. And when, because of this, we were forced to retreat, the Führer then ordered that those fireplaces must be destroyed—not only the houses but also the fireplaces were to be blown up—because in such a critical situation that alone would prevent the Russians from pursuing. Since, in accordance with the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare, every type of destruction is permissible which is absolutely necessary from the military point of view, I believe that for this type of winter warfare—and it happened only during the winter—that order can be justified.

DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the case of Katyn?

JODL: Regarding the finding of these mass graves, I received the first report through my propaganda department, which was informed through its propaganda company attached to the army group. I heard that the Reich Police Criminal Department had been given the task of investigating the whole affair, and I then sent an officer from my propaganda department to the exhumation to check the findings of the foreign experts. I received a report which, in general, tallies with the report which is contained in the White Book issued, I think, by the Foreign Office. I have never heard anyone raise any doubts as to the facts as they were presented.

DR. LATERNSER: You have also seen the film which the Russian Prosecution have shown in this courtroom, and which showed atrocities committed in the Yugoslav theater of war. Can you explain any of the pictures which you perhaps still recollect?

JODL: I believe that every picture shown in this courtroom is, and was, perfectly truthful as a picture. These were captured photographs. But it has never been said what the photographs represented. It was not clear from the film whether the dog that was mauling a human being was not photographed in an army dog training center.

THE PRESIDENT: That is mere argument.

DR. LATERNSER: I was about to stop him.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: I was thinking of certain photographs which you might be able to clarify with a statement as: “I remember one photograph of a police dog jumping at a human being or a dummy.” Can you say...

THE PRESIDENT: You asked him about these photographs, and he says that they were all true—in his opinion—true pictures; and he didn’t take them. He doesn’t know anything about them, and anything that he can say upon them appears to us to be argument.

DR. LATERNSER: I will withdraw that question.

Generaloberst, was Louvain captured in the manner as testified by the witness Van der Essen? The witness Van der Essen said that Louvain was taken without fighting.

JODL: I have ascertained that the Armed Forces communiqué of, I think, 18 May contains the sentence, “Louvain taken after heavy fighting.” But I do not believe...

THE PRESIDENT: What was the place that you are asking about?

DR. LATERNSER: I asked the witness in what way Louvain was captured: whether it was only evacuated by the enemy, and then occupied, or whether the town had to be fought for. The witness has stated that there was no fighting for Louvain, and that therefore it was a particularly despicable act.

THE PRESIDENT: How did it affect the General Staff?

DR. LATERNSER: Well, in that case, Mr. President, I do not know who should be blamed for this event. I cannot see any connection with any one of the defendants; and if nobody can be blamed for it, we must strike out the whole event.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it one of the events which is charged in the Indictment?

DR. LATERNSER: No, the Indictment does not refer to it.

THE PRESIDENT: And the evidence, did the evidence deal with it?

DR. LATERNSER: There is no reference to it in the Indictment; but in the evidence, a witness was produced who stated that the University of Louvain was willfully destroyed by the German artillery although there was no reason to fire on the town.

THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t catch the place—but go on.

JODL: I know that the Armed Forces communiqué of 18 May 1940 contained the sentence, “Louvain captured after heavy fighting.” Even though the German Armed Forces communiqué was silent on some things, it certainly never stated deliberate untruths. I can say that because I edited it.

DR. LATERNSER: You already spoke yesterday about the case of Oradour. I merely wanted to ask you what Field Marshal Von Rundstedt did about this event when it was reported to him.

JODL: Many weeks afterwards I learned that an investigation had been started by Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, and that there was correspondence about the case of Oradour between Field Marshal Keitel, the Armistice Commission, and Field Marshal Von Rundstedt.

DR. LATERNSER: Did the Commander, West begin court-martial proceedings?

JODL: He must have done so, because I read a statement of an SS court in connection with this event.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the outcome of those proceedings?

JODL: I cannot say.

DR. LATERNSER: Then I come to the last points. How many conferences were there before the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944?

JODL: There were four conferences about the Ardennes Offensive.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you attend all of them?

JODL: I took part in all of them.

DR. LATERNSER: Was there ever any request for an order, or was an order ever issued at one of these conferences to shoot prisoners during this offensive?

JODL: No. And I can also add that not once during any one of those conferences was a single word mentioned which did not deal with purely operational considerations. There was no talk at all about the conduct of the troops.

DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, would you have known if such an order had been issued by—let us assume—Field Marshal Von Rundstedt?

JODL: There can be no question of such an order. It never could have been issued through the military channels. It could have been issued only through the Police—that is to say, Himmler or the SS.

PR. LATERNSER: But then it would not have been binding on the units of the Armed Forces—that is, of the Army?

JODL: It is quite out of the question that any commanding general of the Army would even have accepted such an order; and I know of no order of the Führer which was directed against ordinary prisoners in this way.

DR. LATERNSER: I merely put that question because the witness Van der Essen also stated in this courtroom that, judging by the way the prisoners were treated, he had to draw the conclusion that it was the result of an order from a higher level. That is why I asked that question.

Do you know the case—the Commando case?

THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had put your last question. You said that was your last question.

DR. LATERNSER: The last questions. Mr. President, I shall be through in about 5 minutes. I ask you to take into consideration the fact that Generaloberst Jodl is a member of the indicted group, and that he is the officer who is best informed, and that an hour and a half for such an examination is not an excessive amount of time.

[Turning to the defendant.] Do you know the Commando case in which the son of the British Field Marshal Alexander was a participant?

JODL: Yes, I know the case.

DR. LATERNSER: Please tell us about it.

JODL: I heard about this affair through a report—I cannot quite remember whom it came from. I discussed it with Field Marshal Keitel, and I expressed the view that it was not necessary to take court proceedings against a lieutenant just because he was wearing a German cap during an action of this kind. Court proceedings were in progress against him, and Field Marshal Keitel gave the order that these proceedings be discontinued.

DR. LATERNSER: And the proceedings were discontinued?

JODL: Yes, they were.

DR. LATERNSER: Well now, regarding the extent of the group, two more questions: What was the jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff?

JODL: The Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff—I would say—directed, in practice, the general staff work of my entire staff, from which, of course, I was separated to a certain extent because I was in the so-called Security Circle Number 1, and my staff was in Security Circle Number 2—that is to say, outside; and the whole of this general staff work within the inner staff was directed by him, and if necessary, he acted, of course, as my deputy.

DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution have stated that the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff was responsible for strategic planning. Is that correct?

JODL: No. I was primarily responsible.

DR. LATERNSER: Is the significance of the position of this Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff equal to the significance of the other positions which are comprised in the indicted group?

JODL: No, it is far below that. He did not have the position of a commanding general of an army, nor the position of a General Staff chief.

DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much; I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to ask any questions.

DR. STAHMER: Were you present, Generaloberst, when toward the end of March 1944 Himmler reported to Hitler, during the situation conference, that about 80 Royal Air Force officers had escaped from the camp, Stalag III, at Sagan?

JODL: At the moment when Himmler reported this fact, I was not in the big hall of the Berghof. I was in the next room telephoning. Hearing a very loud discussion, I went over to the curtain to hear what was going on. I heard that they were talking about the escape of the English airmen from the Sagan Camp.

DR. STAHMER: Was Reich Marshal Göring present at this situation conference?

JODL: The Reich Marshal was not present at this situation conference. I am absolutely certain about that.

DR. STAHMER: In later talks with the Reich Marshal, did you find out what he thought of the shooting of some of the escaped officers?

JODL: From talks with the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, I learned that the Reich Marshal was indignant at this shooting, and I knew that particularly in situations such as these the former officer in him who did not approve of such incredible acts came to the surface. One must give him his due. There were repeated arguments over this between him and the Führer, which I witnessed personally.

DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions.

HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): With the permission of the Court, I will ask the witness a few questions.

Witness, you were Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and the units at your disposal were known to you. The Prosecution assert that you expected to find in the SA a fighting unit in the first days of aggressive war on the basis of the so-called Commando unit (Kommandotruppe). Now I should like to ask you if the term Commando unit is known to you in connection with the use of the SA by the Wehrmacht.

JODL: No, that is not known to me. I heard the word Commando unit for the first time in connection with the undertakings of the English Ranger battalions. We never used this term.

HERR BÖHM: There can be no question then that the SA was used as a Commando unit behind the regular troops in the entry into Austria or in the occupation of the Sudetenland?

JODL: I know of no case where formations of the SA co-operated in the occupation of another country—with the exception of the Henlein Free Corps; but that, however, consisted primarily of Sudeten-German refugees. In the Henlein Free Corps there were, I believe, a few SA leaders who had formerly been officers.

HERR BÖHM: Was the Feldherrnhalle Regiment used as an SA unit or as a Wehrmacht regiment in the war?

JODL: The Feldherrnhalle Regiment was definitely a Wehrmacht regiment. I should like to say that it embodied the traditions of the SA, and it was recruited primarily from the SA, but it had nothing whatever to do with the Supreme SA Command. It was a Wehrmacht regiment in every sense of the word.

HERR BÖHM: Do you know anything about the fact that in 25 group schools, and in 3 Reich leader schools of the SA, 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders were trained annually for the front, and that these 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders were used as such in the Wehrmacht?

JODL: I know nothing about this, and I consider it impossible that the Wehrmacht had its leaders and assistant leaders trained by anyone else than by its own personnel.

HERR BÖHM: Would not the position be that all the SA members were drafted into the Wehrmacht as ordinary soldiers, and had to rise from the ranks in the same way as any Wehrmacht soldier?

JODL: The SA were drafted into the Wehrmacht the same as any other German. I know of many cases where high SA leaders started their service in the Wehrmacht in the very lowest positions as soldiers or as noncommissioned officers.

HERR BÖHM: Then, the Prosecution also assert that after 1934 the SA trained not only 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders, but that 25,000 officers, commissioned and noncommissioned, were trained by the SA for the Wehrmacht. Do you know anything about this?

JODL: What I said before about assistant leaders is true to an even much greater extent among the officers. The officers were trained only in the military schools of the Army and nowhere else.

HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution assert further—and I ask whether you know anything about this—that in the course of extending the war effort, 86 percent of the professional leadership corps were made available.

JODL: I cannot give a binding answer to that. I do not know about that.

HERR BÖHM: And the Prosecution assert further that the SA sent 70 percent of its millions of members straight to the Wehrmacht. It may be that 70 percent of the SA members did their military service. I want to ask you whether these 70 percent were taken straight from the SA or whether they were called up in the ordinary groups which applied to the able-bodied male population?

JODL: No importance whatsoever was attached to the SA when men were drafted into the Army. The SA man was drafted like any other German who was called up for military service. Whether or not a man had been in the SA previously, did not matter in the slightest.

HERR BÖHM: Did the Wehrmacht ever take SA signal units (Stürme), engineer units, or cavalry units, or medical units, and use them in action inside or outside a division of the Wehrmacht?

JODL: I personally knew of no case where any SA unit appeared in action outside Germany during the war.

HERR BÖHM: Did the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff have a liaison man with the SA?

JODL: No. From time to time an officer came to me from the Supreme SA Command, and he generally inquired as to the fate and well-being of the Feldherrnhalle Regiment, which had come primarily from the SA, or was composed mainly of members of the SA, and later, about a Panzer formation which also continued the tradition of the Feldherrnhalle of the SA.

HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution have submitted a newspaper which shows that on the occasion of the mustering of SA members, Field Marshal Brauchitsch was present. They want to show from this the close connection between the training of the SA and the Wehrmacht. Can you explain this photograph?

JODL: I believe it can be explained by the fact that Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch accompanied the Chief of Staff Lutze once when the latter inspected an ordinary SA unit, and he was accompanied by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch because, as I have already said, after the Röhm Putsch we no longer had any cause for conflict with the SA. At the outbreak of war the SA placed all their equipment, including all tent squares, at the disposal of the Wehrmacht. I remember very clearly.

HERR BÖHM: Could this visit of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, when he inspected the SA members, be part of the official activity of the Field Marshal?

JODL: No, in my opinion that was an act of courtesy.

HERR BÖHM: From the point of view of conspiracy with which the SA is charged here, do you know that it was said to have always been the task of the SA, especially in the years 1933 to 1939, to prepare Germany, and especially the youth, for a difficult war of conquest by instilling, increasing, and maintaining a warlike spirit in Germany, especially among the youth? Do you know anything in this connection from personal observations?

JODL: I do not know anything about that. That the SA, as a branch of the Party, also endeavored to foster the patriotic spirit within its ranks, to carry on physical training, is a matter of course. As to preparing for wars of aggression, no one ever did that.

HERR BÖHM: But that was asserted here in regard to the SA. You are of the opinion that it is not true?

JODL: I have no reason to think that it is true.

HERR BÖHM: I have no more questions.

DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Generaloberst, the 26th of August 1939 was fixed as X-Day for the attack on Poland. Is it true that on 25 August the order to attack was withdrawn upon the urgent request of Ribbentrop because, according to the communication which reached the Foreign Office, Great Britain had ratified the Treaty of Alliance concluded with Poland on 6 April 1939, and Ribbentrop told the Führer that the advance of German troops would therefore mean war with Great Britain?

JODL: I cannot answer the whole of your question, but I do know something about it. When, on the 25th, to our great surprise we received the order, “The attack fixed for the 26th will not take place,” I telephoned to the then Major Schmundt—Field Marshal Keitel was not there—and asked him what was the matter. He told me that shortly before the Reich Foreign Minister had reported to the Führer that Britain had concluded a pact—a mutual assistance pact—with Poland, and for that reason he could expect British intervention in the war with Poland. For this reason the Führer had withdrawn the order for attack. That is what I learned at that time.

DR. HORN: In the spring of 1941, after the Simovic Putsch, the Führer held a conference with the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht and the Defendant Von Ribbentrop was called in to this conference later. Is it true that at this conference Von Ribbentrop represented the point of view that before military action was taken, an attempt should be made to settle the differences with Yugoslavia by diplomatic means? How did Hitler react to this suggestion?