fleet, borne down by sheer force of numbers, was put to
flight, and probably saved from utter ruin only by the open
interference of the Athenians, who now dashed into the fight
without scruple, and came into direct conflict with the
Corinthians. The latter were now resolved to press their
advantage to the utmost. Sailing through the enemy's ships,
they applied themselves to the task not of taking prizes, but
of indiscriminate slaughter, to which not a few of their own
people fell victims. After this work of destruction, they
conveyed their disabled ships with their dead to Sybota, and,
still unwearied, advanced again to the attack, although it was
now late in the day. Their Paian, or battle cry, had already
rung through the air, when they suddenly backed water. Twenty
Athenian ships had come into sight, and the Corinthians,
supposing them to be only the vanguard of a larger force,
hastily retreated. The Korkyraians, ignorant of the cause of
this movement, marvelled at their departure: but the darkness
was now closing in, and they also withdrew to their own
ground. So ended the greatest sea-fight in which Hellenes had
thus far contended not with barbarians but with their own
kinsfolk. On the following day the Korkyraians sailed to
Sybota with such of their ships as were still fit for service,
supported by the thirty Athenian ships. But the Corinthians,
far from wishing to come to blows with the newcomers, were
anxious rather for their own safety. Concluding that the
Athenians now regarded the Thirty Years' Truce as broken, they
were afraid of being forcibly hindered by them in their
homeward voyage. It became necessary therefore to learn what
they meant to do. The answer of the Athenians was plain and
decisive. They did not mean to break the truce, and the
Corinthians might go where they pleased, so long as they did
not go to Korkyra or to any city or settlement belonging to
her. … Upwards of a thousand prisoners had fallen into the
hands of the Corinthians. Of these 250 were conveyed to
Corinth, and treated with the greatest kindness and care. Like
the Athenians, the Corinthians were acting only from a regard
to their own interests. Their object was to send these
prisoners back to Korkyra, nominally under pledge to pay a
heavy ransom for their freedom, but having really covenanted
to put down the Demos, and thus to insure the hearty alliance
of Korkyra with Corinth. These men returned home to stir up
the most savage seditions that ever disgraced an Hellenic
city.
G. W. Cox,
General History of Greece,
book 3, chapter 1.
"The evils of this imprudent interference of the Athenians
began now to be seen. In consequence of the Corcyrian
alliance, the Athenians issued an order to Potidæa, a
Macedonian town acknowledging their supremacy, to demolish its
walls; to send back certain officers whom they had received
from Corinth, and to give hostages for their good conduct.
Potidæa, although an ally of Athens, had originally been a
colony of Corinth, and thus arose the jealousy which
occasioned these harsh and peremptory orders. Symptoms of
universal hostility to Athens now appeared in the states
around. The Corinthians and their allies were much irritated;
the oppressed Potidæans were strongly instigated to revolt;
and Perdiccas, king of Macedon, who had some time since been
at open war with the Athenians, now gladly seized the
opportunity to distress them, by exciting and assisting the
malcontents. The Potidæans, however, deputed ambassadors to
Athens to deprecate the harsh orders which had been sent them;
but in the mean time to prepare for the worst, they also sent
messengers to Sparta entreating support, where they met
deputies from Corinth and Megara. By these loud and general
complaints Sparta was at length roused to head the conspiracy
against Athens, and the universal flames of war shortly
afterwards broke forth throughout Greece." The revolt of
Potidæa followed immediately; the Corinthians placed a strong
force in the town, under Aristeus, and the Athenians sent an
army under Phormion to lay siege to it.
Early History of Greece
(Enc. Metropolitana),
page 283.
GREECE: B. C. 432-431.
Charges brought by Corinth against Athens.
The hearing and the Congress at Sparta.
Decision for war.
Theban attack on Platæa.
The Peloponnesian War begun.
The Corinthians "invited deputies from the other states of the
confederacy to meet them at Sparta, and there charged the
Athenians with having broken the treaty, and trampled on the
rights of the Peloponnesians. The Spartans held an assembly to
receive the complaints of their allies, and to discuss the
question of peace or war. Here the Corinthians were seconded
by several other members of the confederacy, who had also
wrongs to complain of against Athens, and urged the Spartans
for redress. … It happened that at this time Athenian
envoys, who had been sent on other business, were still in
Sparta.
{1581}
They desired permission to attend and address the assembly.
… When the strangers had all been heard, they were desired
to withdraw, that the assembly might deliberate. The feeling
against the Athenians was universal; most voices were for
instant war. … The deputies of the allies were then informed
of the resolution which the assembly had adopted, and that a
general congress of the confederacy would shortly be summoned
to deliberate on the same question, in order that war, if
decided on, might be decreed by common consent. … The
congress decided on the war; but the confederacy was totally
unprepared for commencing hostilities, and though the
necessary preparations were immediately begun and vigorously
prosecuted, nearly a year elapsed before it was ready to bring
an army into the field. In the meantime embassies were sent to
Athens with various remonstrances and demands, for the double
purpose of amusing the Athenians with the prospect of peace,
and of multiplying pretexts for war. An attempt was made, not,
perhaps, so foolish as it was insolent, to revive the popular
dread of the curse which had been supposed to hang over the
Alcmæonids. The Athenians were called upon, in the name of the
gods, to banish all who remained among them of that
blood-stained race. If they had complied with this demand,
they must have parted with Pericles, who, by the mother's
side, was connected with the Alcmæonids. This, indeed, was not
expected; but it was hoped that the refusal might afford a
pretext to his enemies at Athens for treating him as the
author of the war. The Athenians retorted by requiring the
Spartans to expiate the pollution with which they had profaned
the sanctuary of Tænarus, by dragging from it some Helots who
had taken refuge there, and that of Athene, by the death of
Pausanias. … Still, war had been only threatened, not
declared; and peaceful intercourse, though not wholly free
from distrust, was still kept up between the subjects of the
two confederacies. But early in the following spring, B. C.
431, in the fifteenth year of the Thirty Years' Truce, an
event took place which closed all prospects of peace,
precipitated the commencement of war, imbittered the animosity
of the contending parties, and prepared some of the most
tragical scenes of the ensuing history. In the dead of night
the city of Platæa was surprised by a body of 300 Thebans,
commanded by two of the great officers called Bœotarchs. They
had been invited by a Platæan named Nauclides, and others of
the same party, who hoped, with the aid of the Thebans, to rid
themselves of their political opponents, and to break off the
relation in which their city was standing to Athens, and
transfer its alliance to Thebes. The Thebans, foreseeing that
a general war was fast approaching, felt the less scruple in
strengthening themselves by this acquisition, while it might
be made with little cost and risk. The gates were unguarded,
as in time of peace, and one of them was secretly opened to
the invaders, who advanced without interruption into the
marketplace. … The Platæans, who were not in the plot,
imagined the force by which their city had been surprised to
be much stronger than it really was, and, as no hostile
treatment was offered to them, remained quiet, and entered
into a parley with the Thebans. In the course of these
conferences they gradually discovered that the number of the
enemy was small, and might be easily overpowered. … Having
barricaded the streets with wagons, and made such other
preparations as they thought necessary, a little before
daybreak they suddenly fell upon the Thebans. The little band
made a vigorous defence, and twice or thrice repulsed the
assailants; but as these still returned to the charge, and
were assisted by the women and slaves, who showered stones and
tiles from the houses on the enemy, all, at the same time,
raising a tumultuous clamour, and a heavy rain increased the
confusion caused by the darkness, they at length lost their
presence of mind, and took to flight. But most were unable to
find their way in the dark through a strange town, and several
were slain as they wandered to and fro in search of an outlet.
… The main body, which had kept together, entered a large
building adjoining the walls, having mistaken its gates, which
they found open, for those of the town, and were shut in. The
Platæans at first thought of setting fire to the building; but
at length the men within, as well as the rest of the Thebans,
who were still wandering up and down the streets, surrendered
at discretion. Before their departure from Thebes it had been
concerted that as large a force as could be raised should
march the same night to support them. The distance between the
two places was not quite nine miles, and these troops were
expected to reach the gates of Platæa before the morning; but
the Asopus, which crossed their road, had been swollen by the
rain, and the state of the ground and the weather otherwise
retarded them, so that they were still on their way when they
heard of the failure of the enterprise. Though they did not
know the fate of their countrymen, as it was possible that
some might have been taken prisoners, they were at first
inclined to seize as many of the Platæans as they could find
without the walls, and to keep them as hostages. … The
Thebans afterward alleged that they had received a promise,
confirmed by an oath, that, on condition of their retiring
from the Platæan territory, the prisoners should be released;
and Thucydides seems disposed to believe this statement. The
Platæans denied that they had pledged themselves to spare the
lives of the prisoners, unless they should come to terms on
the whole matter with the Thebans; but it does not seem likely
that, after ascertaining the state of the case, the Thebans
would have been satisfied with so slight a security. It is
certain, however, that they retired, and that the Platæans, as
soon as they had transported their movable property out of the
country into the town, put to death all the prisoners—
amounting to 180, and including Eurymachus, the principal
author of the enterprise, and the man who possessed the
greatest influence in Thebes. On the first entrance of the
Thebans into Platæa, a messenger had been despatched to Athens
with the intelligence, and the Athenians had immediately laid
all the Bœotians in Attica under arrest; and when another
messenger brought the news of the victory gained by the
Platæans, they sent a herald to request that they would
reserve the prisoners for the disposal of the Athenians. The
herald came too late to prevent the execution; and the
Athenians, foreseeing that Platæa would stand in great need of
defence, sent a body of troops to garrison it, supplied it
with provisions, and removed the women and children and all
persons unfit for service in a siege.
{1582}
After this event it was apparent that the quarrel could only
be decided by arms. Platæa was so intimately united with
Athens, that the Athenians felt the attack which had been made
on it as an outrage offered to themselves, and prepared for
immediate hostilities. Sparta, too, instantly sent notice to
all her allies to get their contingents ready by an appointed
day for the invasion of Attica."
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 19 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
Thucydides,
History,
books 1-2.
GREECE: B. C. 431-429.
The Peloponnesian War: How Hellas was divided.
The opposing camps.
Peloponnesian invasions of Attica.
The Plague at Athens.
Death of Pericles.
Surrender of Potidæa to the Athenians.
"All Hellas was excited by the coming conflict between her two
chief cities. … The feeling of mankind was strongly on the
side of the Lacedaemonians; for they professed to be the
liberators of Hellas. … The general indignation against the
Athenians was intense; some were longing to be delivered from
them, others fearful of falling under their sway. … The
Lacedaemonian confederacy included all the Peloponnesians with
the exception of the Argives and the Achaeans—they were both
neutral; only the Achaeans of Pellene took part with the
Lacedaemonians at first; afterwards all the Achaeans joined
them. Beyond the borders of the Peloponnese, the Megarians,
Phocians, Locrians, Boeotians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and
Anactorians were their allies. Of these the Corinthians,
Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and
Leucadians provided a navy, the Boeotians, Phocians, and
Locrians furnished cavalry, the other states only infantry.
The allies of the Athenians were Chios, Lesbos, Plataea, the
Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part of Acarnania,
Corcyra, Zacynthus, and cities in many other countries which
were their tributaries. There was the maritime region of
Caria, the adjacent Dorian peoples, Ionia, the Hellespont, the
Thracian coast, the islands that lie to the east within the
line of Peloponnesus and Crete, including all the Cyclades
with the exception of Melos and Thera. Chios, Lesbos and
Corcyra furnished a navy; the rest, land forces and money.
Thus much concerning the two confederacies, and the character
of their respective forces. Immediately after the affair at
Plataea the Lacedaemonians determined to invade Attica, and
sent round word to their Peloponnesian and other allies,
bidding them equip troops and provide all things necessary for
a foreign expedition. The various states made their
preparations as fast as they could, and at the appointed time,
with contingents numbering two-thirds of the forces of each,
met at the Isthmus." Then followed the invasion of Attica, the
siege of Athens, the plague in the city, the death of
Pericles, and the success won by the indomitable Athenians, at
Potidaea, in the midst of their sore distress.
Thucydides,
History
(translated by Jowett),
book 2, sections 8-70 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
E. Abbott,
Pericles,
chapters 13-15.
See ATHENS: 431 B. C. 431 and 430-429.
GREECE: B. C. 429-427.
The Peloponnesian War:
Siege, capture and destruction of Platæa.
"In the third spring of the war, the Peloponnesians changed
their plan of offence. By the invasion and ravage of Attica
for two following summers, tho much injury had been done to
the Athenians, little advantage had accrued to themselves: the
booty was far from paying the expense of the expedition; the
enemy, it was found, could not be provoked to risk a battle,
and the great purpose of the war was little forwarded. The
Peloponnesians were yet very unequal to attempt naval
operations of any consequence. Of the continental dependencies
of Athens none was so open to their attacks, none so
completely excluded from naval protection, none so likely by
its danger to superinduce that war of the field which they
wished, as Platæa. Against that town therefore it was
determined to direct the principal effort. … Under the
command still of Archidamus, the confederate army accordingly
entered the Platæid, and ravage was immediately begun. … The
town was small, as may be judged from the very small force
which sufficed for an effectual garrison; only 400 Platæans,
with 80 Athenians. There were besides in the place 110 women
to prepare provisions, and no other person free or slave. The
besieging army, composed of the flower of the Peloponnesian
youth, was numerous. The first operation was to surround the
town with a palisade, which might prevent any ready egress;
the neighboring forest of Cithæron supplying materials. Then,
in a chosen spot, ground was broken, according to the modern
phrase, for making approaches. The business was to fill the
town-ditch, and against the wall to form a mound, on which a
force sufficient for assault might ascend. … Such was at
that time the inartificial process of a siege. Thucydides
appears to have been well aware that it did no credit to the
science of his age. … To oppose this mode of attack, the
first measure of the besieged was to raise, on that part of
their wall against which the mound was forming, a strong
wooden frame, covered in front with leather and hides; and,
within this, to build a rampart with bricks from the
neighboring houses. The wooden frame bound the whole, and kept
it firm to a considerable height: the covering of hides
protected both work and workmen against weapons discharged
against them, especially fiery arrows. But the mound still
rising as the superstructure on the wall rose, and this
superstructure becoming unavoidably weaker with increasing
height, while the mound was liable to no counterbalancing
defect, it was necessary for the besieged to devise other
opposition. Accordingly they broke through the bottom of
their wall, where the mound bore against it, and brought in
the earth. The Peloponnesians, soon aware of this, instead of
loose earth, repaired their mound with clay or mud inclosed in
baskets. This requiring more labor to remove, the besieged
undermined the mound; and thus, for a long time unperceived,
prevented it from gaining height. Still, however, fearing that
the efforts of their scanty numbers would be overborne by the
multitude of hands which the besiegers could employ, they had
recourse to another device. Within their town-wall they built,
in a semilunar form, a second wall, connected with the first
at the extremities. These extended, on either side, beyond the
mound; so that should the enemy possess themselves of the
outer wall, their work would be to be renewed in a far less
favorable situation. … A ram, advanced upon the
Peloponnesian mound, battered the superstructure on the
Platæan rampart, and shook it violently; to the great alarm of
the garrison, but with little farther effect.
{1583}
Other machines of the same kind were employed against
different parts of the wall itself, but to yet less purpose.
… No means however were neglected by the besiegers that
either approved practice suggested, or their ingenuity could
devise, to promote their purpose; yet, after much of the
summer consumed, they found every effort of their numerous
forces so completely baffled by the vigilance, activity, and
resolution of the little garrison, that they began to despair
of succeeding by assault. Before however they would recur to
the tedious method of blockade, they determined to try one
more experiment, for which their numbers, and the neighboring
woods of Cithæron, gave them more than ordinary facility.
Preparing a very great quantity of faggots, they filled with
them the town-ditch in the parts adjoining to their mound, and
disposed piles in other parts around the place, wherever
ground or any other circumstance gave most advantage. On the
faggots they put sulphur and pitch, and then set all on fire.
The conflagration was such as was never before known, says
Thucydides, to have been prepared and made by the hands or
men. … But fortunately for the garrison, a heavy rain,
brought on by a thunderstorm without wind, extinguished the
fire, and relieved them from an attack far more formidable
than any they had before experienced. This attempt failing,
the Peloponnesians determined immediately to reduce the siege
to a blockade. … To the palisade, which already surrounded
the town, a contravallation was added; with a double ditch,
one without, and one within. A sufficient body of troops being
then appointed to the guard of these works, the Bœotians
undertaking one half, the other was allotted to detachments
drafted from the troops of every state of the confederacy,
and, a little after the middle of September, the rest of the
army was dismissed for the winter."
W. Mitford,
History of Greece,
chapter 15, section 1 (volume 2).
When the blockade had endured for more than a year, and food
in the city grew scarce, about half of the defending force
made a bold dash for liberty, one stormy night, scaled the
walls of circumvallation, and escaped. The remainder held out
until some time in the next year, when they surrendered and
were all put to death, the city being destroyed. The families
of the Platæans had been sheltered at Athens before the siege
began.
Thucydides,
History,
books 2-3.
GREECE: B. C. 429-427.
The Peloponnesian War:
Phormio's sea-fights.
Revolt of Lesbos.
Siege and capture of Mitylene.
The ferocious decree of Cleon reversed.
"At the same time that Archidamus laid siege to Plataea, a
small Peloponnesian expedition, under a Spartan officer named
Cnemus, had crossed the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth, and
joined the land forces of the Leucadians and Ambraciots. They
were bent on conquering the Acarnanians and the Messenians of
Naupactus, the only continental allies whom Athens possessed
in Western Greece. … When Cnemus had been joined by the
troops of Leucas and the other Corinthian towns, and had
further strengthened himself by summoning to his standard a
number of the predatory barbarian tribes of Epirus, he
advanced on Stratus, the chief city of Acarnania. At the same
time a squadron of Peloponnesian ships collected at Corinth,
and set sail down the gulf towards Naupactus. The only
Athenian force in these waters consisted of twenty galleys
under an able officer named Phormio, who was cruising off the
straits of Rhium, to protect Naupactus and blockade the
Corinthian Gulf. Both by land and by sea the operations of the
Peloponnesians miscarried miserably. Cnemus collected a very
considerable army, but as he sent his men forward to attack
Stratus by three separate roads, he exposed them to defeat in
detail. … By sea the defeat of the Peloponnesians was even
more disgraceful; the Corinthian admirals Machaon and
Isocrates were so scared, when they came across the squadron
of Phormio at the mouth of the gulf, that, although they
mustered 47 ships to his 20, they took up the defensive.
Huddling together in a circle, they shrank from his attack,
and allowed themselves to be hustled and worried into the
Achaian harbour of Patrae, losing several ships in their
flight. Presently reinforcements arrived; the Peloponnesian
fleet was raised to no less than 77 vessels, and three Spartan
officers were sent on board, to compel the Corinthian
admirals, who had behaved so badly, to do their best in
future. The whole squadron then set out to hunt down Phormio.
They found him with his 20 ships coasting along the Aetolian
shore towards Naupactus, and at once set out in pursuit. The
long chase separated the larger fleet into scattered knots,
and gave the fighting a disconnected and irregular character.
While the rear ships of Phormio's squadron were compelled to
run on shore a few miles outside Naupactus, the 11 leading
vessels reached the harbour in safety. Finding that he was now
only pursued by about a score of the enemy—the rest having
stayed behind to take possession of the stranded Athenian
vessels—Phormio came boldly out of port again. His 11
vessels took 6, and sunk one of their pursuers; and then,
pushing on westward, actually succeeded in recapturing most of
the 9 ships which had been lost in the morning. This
engagement, though it had no great results, was considered the
most daring feat performed by the Athenian navy during the
whole war. … The winter passed uneventfully, and the war
seemed as far as ever from showing any signs of producing a
definite result. But although the Spartan invasion of 428 B.
C. had no more effect than those of the preceding years, yet
in the late summer there occurred an event so fraught with
evil omens for Athens, as to threaten the whole fabric of her
empire. For the first time since the commencement of
hostilities, an important subject state made an endeavour to
free itself by the aid of the Spartan fleet. Lesbos was one of
the two Aegean islands which still remained free from tribute,
and possessed a considerable war-navy. Among its five towns
Mitylene was the chief, and far exceeded the others in wealth
and resources. It was governed by an oligarchy, who had long
been yearning to revolt, and had made careful preparation by
accumulating war-like stores and enlisting foreign
mercenaries. … The whole island except Methymna, where a
democracy ruled, rose in arms, and determined to send for aid
to Sparta. The Athenians at once despatched against Mitylene a
squadron of 40 ships under Cleïppides, which had just been
equipped for a cruise in Peloponnesian waters. This force had
an engagement with the Lesbian fleet, and drove it back into
the harbour of Mitylene.
{1584}
To gain time for assistance from across the Aegean to arrive,
the Lesbians now pretended to be anxious to surrender, and
engaged Cleïppides in a long and fruitless negotiation, while
they were repeating their demands at Sparta. But at last the
Athenian grew suspicious, established a close blockade of
Mitylene by sea, and landed a small force of hoplites to hold
a fortified camp on shore. … Believing the revolt of the
Lesbians to be the earnest of a general rising of all the
vassals of Athens, the Peloponnesians determined to make a
vigorous effort in their favour. The land contingents of the
various states were summoned to the Isthmus—though the
harvest was now ripe, and the allies were loath to leave their
reaping—while it was also determined to haul over the
Corinthian Isthmus the fleet which had fought against Phormio,
and then to despatch it to relieve Mitylene. … The Athenians
were furious at the idea that their vassals were now about to
be stirred up to revolt, and strained every nerve to defend
themselves. While the blockade of Mitylene was kept up, and
100 galleys cruised in the Aegean to intercept any succours
sent to Lesbos, another squadron of 100 ships sailed round
Peloponnesus and harried the coastland with a systematic
ferocity that surpassed any of their previous doings. To
complete the crews of the 250 ships now afloat and in active
service proved so great a drain on the military force of
Athens, that not only the Thetes but citizens of the higher
classes were drafted on shipboard. Nevertheless the effect
which they designed by this display of power was fully
produced. To defend their own harvests the confederates who
had met at the Isthmus went homewards, while the dismay at the
strength of the Athenian fleet was so great that the plan of
sending naval aid to Lesbos was put off for the present. …
All through the winter of 428-7 B. C. the blockade of Mitylene
was kept up, though its maintenance proved a great drain on
the resources of Athens. On the land side a considerable force
of hoplites under Paches strengthened the troops already on
the spot, and made it possible to wall the city in with lines
of circumvallation. … When the spring of 427 B. C. arrived,
the Spartans determined to make a serious attempt to send aid
to Lesbos; but the fear of imperiling all their naval
resources in a single expedition kept them from despatching a
fleet of sufficient size. Only 42 galleys, under an admiral
named Alcidas, were sent forth from Corinth. This squadron
managed to cross the Aegean without meeting the Athenians, by
steering a cautious and circuitous course among the islands.
But so much time was lost on the way, that on arriving off
Embatum in Ionia, Ælia found that Mitylene had surrendered
just seven days before. … Learning the fall of Mitylene, he
made off southward, and, after intercepting many merchant
vessels off the Ionian coast and brutally slaying their crews,
returned to Corinth without having struck a single blow for
the cause of Sparta. Paches soon reduced Antissa, Eresus, and
Pyrrha, the three Lesbian towns which had joined in the revolt
of Mitylene, and was then able to sail home, taking with him
the Laconian general Salaethus, who had been caught in hiding
at Mitylene, together with the other leaders of the revolt.
When the prisoners arrived at Athens Salaethus was at once put
to death without a trial. But the fate of the Lesbians was the
subject of an important and characteristic debate in the
Ecclesia. Led by the demagogue Cleon, the Athenians at first
passed the monstrous resolution that the whole of the
Mitylenaeans, not merely the prisoners at Athens, but every
adult male in the city, should be put to death, and their
wives and families sold as slaves. It is some explanation but
no excuse for this horrible decree that Lesbos had been an
especially favoured ally, and that its revolt had for a moment
put Athens in deadly fear of a general rising of Ionia and
Aeolis. Cleon the leather-seller, the author of this infamous
decree, was one of the statesmen of a coarse and inferior
stamp, whose rise had been rendered possible by the democratic
changes which Pericles had introduced into the state. … On
the eve of the first day of debate the motion of Cleon had
been passed, and a galley sent off to Paches at Mitylene,
bidding him slay all the Lesbians; but on the next morning …
the decree of Cleon was rescinded by a small majority, and a
second galley sent off to stay Paches from the massacre. …
By extraordinary exertions the bearers of the reprieve
contrived to reach Lesbos only a few hours after Paches had
received the first despatch, and before he had time to put it
into execution. Thus the majority of the Mitylenaeans were
saved; but all their leaders and prominent men, not less than
1,000 in number, were put to death. … The land of the
Lesbians was divided into 3,000 lots, of which a tenth was
consecrated to the gods, while the rest were granted out to
Athenian cleruchs, who became the landlords of the old
owners."
C. W. C. Oman,
History of Greece,
chapter 28.
ALSO IN:
Thucydides,
History,
book 2, sections 80-92,
and book 3, sections 1-50.
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 4, chapter 2 (volume 3).
GREECE: B. C. 425.
The Peloponnesian War:
Spartan catastrophe at Sphacteria.
Peace pleaded for and refused by Athens.
In the seventh year of the Peloponnesian War (B. C. 425), the
enterprising Athenian general, Demosthenes, obtained
permission to seize and fortify a harbor on the west coast of
Messenia, with a view to harassing the adjacent Spartan
territory and stirring up revolt among the subjugated
Messenians. The position he secured was the promontory of
Pylus, overlooking the basin now called the Bay of Navarino,
which latter was protected from the sea by the small island of
Sphacteria, stretching across its front. The seizure of Pylus
created alarm in Sparta at once, and vigorous measures were
taken to expel the intruders. The small force of Demosthenes
was assailed, front and rear, by a strong land army and a
powerful Peloponnesian fleet; but he had fortified himself
with skill and stoutly held his ground, waiting for help from
Athens. Meantime his assailants had landed 420 men on the
island of Sphacteria, and these were mostly hoplites, or
heavy-armed soldiers, from the best citizenship of Sparta. In
this situation an Athenian fleet made its sudden and
unexpected appearance, defeated the Peloponnesian fleet
completely, took possession of the harbor and surrounded the
Spartans on Sphacteria with a ring from which there was no
escape. To obtain the release of these citizens the Spartans
were reduced to plead for peace on almost any terms, and
Athens had her opportunity to end the war at that moment with
great advantage to herself. But Cleon, the demagogue,
persuaded the people to refuse peace. The beleaguered hoplites
on Sphacteria were made prisoners by force, and little came of
it in the end.
{1585}
Thucydides,
History,
book 4, sections 2-38.
Pylus remained in the possession of the Athenians until
B. C. 408, when it was retaken by the Spartans.
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 52.
ALSO IN:
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 4, chapter 2 (volume 3).
GREECE: B. C. 424-421.
The Peloponnesian War:
Brasidas in Chalcidice.
Athenian defeat at Delium.
A year's Truce.
Renewed hostilities.
Death of Brasidas and Cleon at Amphipolis.
The Peace of Nikias (Nicias).
"About the beginning of 424 B. C. Brasidas did for Sparta what
Demosthenes had done for the Athenians. Just as Demosthenes
had understood that the severest blow which he could inflict
on Sparta was to occupy the coasts of Laconia, so Brasidas
understood that the most effective method of assailing the
Athenians was to arouse the allies to revolution, and by all
means to aid the uprising. But since, from lack of a
sufficient naval force, he could not work on the islands, he
resolved to carry the war to the allied cities of the
Athenians situated on the coast of Macedonia; especially since
Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, the inhabitants of Chalkidike,
and some other districts subject to the Athenians, had sought
the assistance of Sparta, and had asked Brasidas to lead the
undertaking. Sparta permitted his departure, but so little did
she appear disposed to assist him, that she granted him only
700 Helots. In addition to these, however, he succeeded,
through the money sent from Chalkidike, in enrolling about
1,000 men from the Peloponnesus. With this small force of
1,700 hoplites, Brasidas resolved to undertake this
adventurous and important expedition. He started in the spring
of 424, and reached Macedonia through eastern Hellas and
Thessaly. He effected the march with great daring and wisdom,
and on his way he also saved Megara, which was in extreme
danger from the Athenians. Reaching Macedonia and uniting
forces with Perdikkas, Brasidas detached from the Athenians
many cities, promising them liberty from the tyranny they
suffered, and their association in the Peloponnesian alliance
on equal terms. He made good these promises by great military
experience and perfectly honest dealings. In December he
became master of Amphipolis, perhaps the most important of all
the foreign possessions of Athens. The historian Thucydides,
to whom was intrusted the defense of that important town, was
at Thasos when Brasidas surprised it. He hastened to the
assistance of the threatened city, but did not arrive in time
to prevent its capture. Dr. Thirlwall says it does not appear
that human prudence and activity could have accomplished
anything more under the same circumstances; yet his
unavoidable failure proved the occasion of a sentence under
which he spent twenty years of his life in exile, where he
composed his history. … The revolution of the allied cities
in Macedonia astonished the Athenians, who almost at the same
time sustained other misfortunes. Following the advice of
Kleon, instead of directing their main efforts to the
endangered Chalkidike, they decided, about the middle of 424,
to recover Bœotia itself, in conjunction as usual with some
malcontents in the Bœotian towns, who desired to break down
and democratize the oligarchical governments. The undertaking,
however, was not merely unsuccessful, but attended with a
ruinous defeat. A force of 7,000 hoplites [among them,
Socrates, the philosopher—see DELIUM], several hundred
horsemen, and 25,000 light-armed under command of Hippokrates,
took possession of Delium, a spot strongly situated,
overhanging the sea, about five miles from Tanagra, and very
near the Attic confines. But while the Athenians were still
occupied in raising their fortifications, they were suddenly
startled by the sound of the Bœotian pæan, and found
themselves attacked by an army of 7,000 hoplites, 1,000 horse,
and 500 peltasts. The Athenians suffered a complete defeat,
and were driven away with great loss. Such was the change of
affairs which took place in 424 B. C. During the preceding
year they could have ended the war in a manner most
advantageous to them. They did not choose to do so, and were
now constantly defeated. Worse still, the seeds of revolt
spread among the allied cities. The best citizens, among whom
Nikias was a leader, finally persuaded the people that it was
necessary to come to terms of peace, while affairs were yet
undecided. For, although the Athenians had suffered the
terrific defeat near Delium, and had lost Amphipolis and other
cities of Macedonia, they were still masters of Pylos, of
Kythera, of Methone, of Nisæa, and of the Spartans captured in
Sphakteria; so that there was now an equality of advantages
and of losses. Besides, the Lacedæmonians were ever ready to
lay aside the sword in order to regain their men. Again, the
oligarchy in Sparta envied Brasidas, and did not look with
pleasure on his splendid achievements. Lately they had refused
to send him any assistance whatever: The opportunity,
therefore, was advantageous for the conclusion of peace, …
Such were the arguments by which Nikias and his party finally
gained the ascendency over Kleon, and in the beginning of 423
B. C. persuaded the Athenians to enter into an armistice of
one year, within which they hoped to be able to put an end to
the destructive war by a lasting peace. Unfortunately, the
armistice could not be carried out in Chalkidike. The cities
there continued in their rebellion against the Athenians.
Brasidas could not be prevailed upon to leave them unprotected
in the struggle which they had undertaken, relying on his
promises of assistance. The war-like party at Athens, taking
advantage of this, succeeded in frustrating any definite
conditions of peace. On the other hand, the Lacedæmonians,
seeing that the war was continued, sent an ample force to
Brasidas. This army did not succeed in reaching him, because
the king of Macedonia, Perdikkas, had in the meantime become
angered with Brasidas, and persuaded the Thessalians to oppose
the Lacedæmonians in their passage. The year of the armistice
passed, and Kleon renewed his expostulations against the
incompetency of the generals who had the control of affairs in
Chalkidike. … The Athenians decided to forward a new force,
and intrusted its command to Kleon. He therefore, in August,
422 B. C., started from the Peiræus, with 1,200 hoplites, 300
horsemen, a considerable number of allies, and thirty
triremes. Reaching Chalkidike, he engaged in battle against
Brasidas in Amphipolis, suffered a disgraceful defeat, and was
killed while fleeing. Brasidas also ended his short but
glorious career in this battle, dying the death of a hero. The
way in which his memory was honored was the best evidence of
the deep impression that he had made on the Hellenic world.
{1586}
All the allies attended his funeral in arms, and interred him
at the public expense, in front of the market-place of
Amphipolis. … Thus disappeared the two foremost champions of
the war—its good spirit, Brasidas, and its evil, Kleon. The
party of Nikias finally prevailed at Athens, and that general
soon after arranged a conference with King Pleistoanax of
Sparta, who was also anxious for peace. Discussions continued
during the whole autumn and winter after the battle of
Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities on either side.
Finally, at the beginning of the spring of 421 B. C., a peace
of fifty years was agreed upon. The principal conditions of
this peace, known in history as the 'peace of Nikias,' were as
follows:
1. The Lacedæmonians and their allies were to restore
Amphipolis and all the prisoners to the Athenians. They were
further to relinquish to the Athenians Argilus, Stageirus,
Acanthus, Skolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. But, with the
exception of Amphipolis, these cities were to remain
independent, paying to the Athenians only the usual tribute of
the time of Aristeides.
2. The Athenians should restore to the Lacedæmonians
Koryphasium, Kythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalante, with all
the captives in their hands from Sparta or her allies.
3. Respecting Skione, Torone, Sermylus, or any other town in
the possession of Athens, the Athenians should have the right
to adopt such measures as they pleased.
4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies should restore Panaktum
to the Athenians.
When these terms were submitted at Sparta to the consideration
of the allied cities, the majority accepted them. The
Bœotians, Megarians, and Corinthians, however, summarily
refused their consent. The Peloponnesian war was now
considered to be at an end, precisely ten years from its
beginning; Both the combatants came out from it terribly
maimed. Sparta not only did not attain her object—the
emancipation of the Hellenic cities from the tyranny of the
Athenians—but even officially recognized this tyranny, by
consenting that the Athenians should adopt such measures as
they choose toward the allied cities. Besides, Sparta obtained
an ill repute throughout Hellas, because she had abandoned the
Greeks in Chalkidike, who had at her instigation revolted, and
because she had also sacrificed the interests of her principal
allies. … Athens, on the other hand, preserved intact her
supremacy, for which she undertook the struggle. This,
however, was gained at the cost of Attica ravaged, a multitude
of citizens slain, the exhaustion of the treasury, and the
increase of the common hatred."
T. T. Timayenis,
History of Greece,
part 5, chapter 4 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 23 (volume 3).
GREECE: B. C. 421-418.
The Peloponnesian War:
New combinations.
The Argive League against Sparta.
Conflicting alliances of Athens with both.
Rising influence of Alcibiades.
War in Argos.
Spartan victory at Mantinea.
Revolution in Argos.
"All the Spartan allies in Peloponnesus and the Boeotians
refused to join in this treaty [of Nicias]. The latter
concluded with the Athenians only a truce of ten days … ,
probably on condition, that, if no notice was given to the
contrary, it was to be constantly renewed after the lapse of
ten days. With Corinth there existed no truce at all. Some of
the terms of the peace were not complied with, though this was
the case much less on the part of Athens than on that of
Sparta. … The Spartans, from the first, were guilty of
infamous deception, and this immediately gave rise to bitter
feelings. But before matters had come to this, and when the
Athenians were still in the full belief that the Spartans were
honest, all Greece was startled by a treaty of alliance
between Athens and Sparta against their common enemies. This
treaty was concluded very soon after the peace. … The
consequence was, that Sparta suddenly found herself deserted
by all her allies; the Corinthians and Boeotians renounced
her, because they found themselves given over to the
Athenians, and the Boeotians perhaps thought that the
Spartans, if they could but reduce the Eleans to the condition
of Helots, would readily allow Boeotia to be subdued by the
Athenians. Thus Argos found the means of again following a
policy which ever since the time of Cleomenes it had not
ventured to think of, and … became the centre of an alliance
with Mantinea, 'which had always been opposed to the
Lacedaemonians,' and some other Arcadian towns, Achaia, Elis,
and some places of the Acte. The Arcadians had dissolved their
union, the three people of the country had separated
themselves, though sometimes they united again; and thus it
happened that only some of their towns were allied with Argos.
Corinth at first would listen to neither party, and chose to
remain neutral; 'for although for the moment it was highly
exasperated against Sparta, yet it had at all times
entertained a mortal hatred of Argos, and its own interests
drew it towards Sparta.' But when, owing to Sparta's
dishonesty, the affairs on the coasts of Thrace became more
and more complicated, when the towns refused to submit to
Athens, and when it became evident that this was the
consequence of the instigations of Sparta, then the relation
subsisting between the two states became worse also in Greece,
and various negotiations and cavillings ensued. … After much
delay, the Athenians and Spartans were already on the point of
taking up arms against each other; but then they came to the
singular agreement (Olympiad 89, 4), that the Athenians should
retain possession of Pylos, but keep in it only Athenian
troops, and not allow the Helots and Messenians to remain
there. After this the loosened bonds between the Spartans,
Corinthians, and Boeotians, were drawn more closely. The
Boeotians were at length prevailed upon to surrender Panacton
to the Spartans, who now restored it to the Athenians. This
was in accordance with the undoubted meaning of the peace; but
the Boeotians had first destroyed the place, and the Spartans
delivered it to the Athenians only a heap of ruins. The
Athenians justly complained, that this was not an honest
restoration, and that the place ought to have been given back
to them with its fortifications uninjured. The Spartans do not
appear to have had honest intentions in any way. … While
thus the alliance between Athens and Sparta, in the eyes of
the world, still existed, it had in reality ceased and become
an impossibility. Another alliance, however, was formed
between Athens and Argos (Olympiad 89, 4) through the
influence of Alcibiades, who stood in the relation of an
hereditary proxenus to Argos.
{1587}
A more natural alliance than this could not be conceived, and
by it the Athenians gained the Mantineans, Eleans, and other
Peloponnesians over to their side. Alcibiades now exercised a
decisive influence upon the fate of his country. … We
generally conceive Alcibiades as a man whose beauty was his
ornament, and to whom the follies of life were the main thing,
and we forget that part of his character which history reveals
to us. … Thucydides, who cannot be suspected of having been
particularly partial to Alcibiades, most expressly recognises
the fact, that the fate of Athens depended upon him, and that,
if he had not separated his own fate from that of his native
city, at first from necessity, but afterwards of his own
accord, the course of the Peloponnesian war, through his
personal influence alone, would have taken quite a different
direction, and that he alone would have decided it in favour
of Athens. This is, in fact, the general opinion of all
antiquity, and there is no ancient writer of importance who
does not view and estimate him in this light. It is only the
moderns that entertain a derogatory opinion of him, and speak
of him as an eccentric fool, who ought not to be named among
the great statesmen of antiquity. … Alcibiades is quite a
peculiar character; and I know no one in the whole range of
ancient history who might be compared with him, though I have
sometimes thought of Caesar. … Alcibiades was opposed to the
peace of Nicias from entirely personal, perhaps even mean,
motives. … It was on his advice that Athens concluded the
alliance with Argos and Elis. Athens now had two alliances
which were equally binding, and yet altogether opposed to each
other: the one with Sparta, and an equally stringent one with
Argos, the enemy of Sparta. This treaty with Argos, the
Peloponnesians, etc., was extremely formidable to the
Spartans; and they accordingly, for once, determined to act
quickly, before it should be too late. The alliance with
Argos, however, did not confer much real strength upon Athens,
for the Argives were lazy, and Elis did not respect them,
whence the Spartans had time again to unite themselves more
closely with Corinth, Boeotia, and Megara. When, therefore,
the war between the Spartans and Argives broke out, and the
former resolutely took the field, Alcibiades persuaded the
Athenians to send succour to the Argives, and thus the peace
with Sparta was violated in an unprincipled manner. But still
no blow was struck between Argos and Sparta. … King Agis had
set out with a Spartan army, but concluded a truce with the
Argives (Olympiad 90, 2); this, however, was taken very ill at
Sparta, and the Argive commanders who had concluded it were
censured by the people and magistrates of Argos. Soon
afterwards the war broke out again, and, when the Athenian
auxiliaries appeared, decided acts of hostility commenced. The
occasion was an attempt of the Mantineans to subdue Tegea: the
sad condition of Greece became more particularly manifest in
Arcadia, by the divisions which tore one and the same nation
to pieces. The country was distracted by several parties; had
Arcadia been united, it would have been invulnerable. A battle
was fought (Olympiad 90, 3) in the neighbourhood of Mantinea,
between the Argives, their Athenian allies, the Mantineans,
and part of the Arcadians ('the Eleans, annoyed at the conduct
of the Argives, had abandoned their cause'), on the one hand,
and the Spartans and a few allies on the other. The Spartans
gained a most decisive victory; and, although they did not
follow it up, yet the consequence was, that Argos concluded
peace, the Argive alliance broke up, and at Argos a revolution
took place, in which an oligarchical government was
instituted, and by which Argos was drawn into the interest of
Sparta (Olympiad 90, 4). This constitution, however, did not
last, and very soon gave way to a democratic form of
government. Argos, even at this time, and still more at a
later period, is a sad example of the most degenerate and
deplorable democracy, or, more properly speaking, anarchy."
B. G. Niebuhr,
Lectures on Ancient History,
lecture 49 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
Plutarch,
Alcibiades.
W. Mitford,
History of Greece,
chapter 17 (volume 3).
GREECE: B. C. 416.
Siege and conquest of Melos by the Athenians.
Massacre of the inhabitants.
"It was in the beginning of summer 416 B. C. that the
Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian
island of Mêlos, one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except
Thêra, which was not already included in their empire. Mêlos
and Thêra were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom
they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined
the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with
Athens; but, at the same time, neither had they ever taken
part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground
of complaint, until she landed and attacked them in the sixth
year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending
against the island a considerable force under Kleomêdês and
Tisias."
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 56.
"They desired immediate submission on the part of Melos, any
attempt at resistance being regarded as an inroad upon the
omnipotence of Athens by sea. For this reason they were wroth
at the obstinate courage of the islanders, who broke off all
further negotiations, and thus made it necessary for the
Athenians to commence a costly circumvallation of the city.
The Melians even succeeded on two successive occasions in
breaking through part of the wall built round them by the
enemy, and obtaining fresh supplies; but no relief arrived;
and they had to undergo sufferings which made the 'Melian
famine' a proverbial phrase to express the height of misery;
and before the winter ended the island was forced to surrender
unconditionally. … There was no question of quarter. All the
islanders capable of bearing arms who had fallen into the
hands of the Athenians were sentenced to death, and all the
women and children to slavery."
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 4, chapter 4 (volume 3).
ALSO IN:
Thucydides,
History,
book 5, sections 84-116.
GREECE: B. C. 415.
The mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens.
See ATHENS: B. C. 415.
GREECE: B. C. 415-413.
The Peloponnesian War:
Disastrous Athenian expedition against Syracuse.
Alcibiades a fugitive in Sparta.
His enmity to Athens.
See SYRACUSE: B. C. 415-413.
{1588}
GREECE: B. C. 413.
The Peloponnesian War:
Effects and consequences of the Sicilian expedition.
Prostration of Athens.
Strengthening of Sparta.
Negotiations with the Persians against Athens.
Peloponnesian invasion of Attica.
The Decelian War.
"The Sicilian expedition ended in a series of events which, to
this day, it is impossible to recall without a feeling of
horror. … Since the Persian wars it had never come to pass,
that on the one side all had been so completely lost, while on
the other all was won. … When the Athenians recovered from
the first stupefaction of grief, they called to mind the
causes of the whole calamity, and hereupon in passionate fury
turned round upon all who had advised the expedition, or who
had encouraged vain hopes of victory, as orators, prophets, or
soothsayers. Finally, the general excitement passed into the
phase of despair and terror, conjuring up dangers even greater
and more imminent than existed in reality. The citizens every
day expected to see the Sicilian fleet with the Peloponnesians
appear off the harbor, to take possession of the defenceless
city; and they believed that the last days of Athens had
arrived. … Athens had risked all her military and naval
resources for the purpose of overcoming Syracuse. More than
200 ships of state, with their entire equipment, had been
lost; and if we reckon up the numbers despatched on successive
occasions to Sicily, the sum total, inclusive of the auxiliary
troops, may be calculated at about 60,000 men. A squadron
still lay in the waters of Naupactus; but even this was in
danger and exposed to attack from the Corinthians, who had