being fixed at Frischermont, near the borders of the forest of
Soignies. On the French side the Elector and Villeroy,
observing the march of the allies, had made a corresponding
movement of their own for the protection of the capital. They
encamped behind the small stream of the Ische, their right and
rear being partly covered by the forest. Only the day before
they had been joined by Marsin from the Rhine, and they agreed
to give battle sooner than yield Brussels. One of their main
posts was at Waterloo. … It is probable, had a battle now
ensued, that it would have been fought on the same, or nearly
the same ground as was the memorable conflict a hundred and
ten years afterwards. … But the expected battle did not take
place." Once more the Dutch deputies and General Slangenberg
interfered, refusing to permit their troops to engage; so that
Marlborough was robbed of the opportunity for winning a
victory which he confidently declared would have been greater
than Blenheim. This practically ended the campaign of the
year, which had been ruined and wasted throughout by the
stupidity, the cowardice and the jealousies of the Dutch
deputies and the general who counselled them.
Earl Stanhope,
History of England: Reign of Queen Anne,
chapter 6.
In Spain, a campaign of more brilliancy was carried on by
Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough, in Catalonia.
See SPAIN: A. D. 1705.
{2293}
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1706-1707.
The War of the Spanish Succession:
The Battle of Ramillies and its results.
"The campaign of 1706 was begun unusually late by Marlborough,
his long stay on the Continent in the winter and his English
political business detaining him in London till the end of
April, and when he finally landed at the Hague his plans were
still coloured by the remembrance of the gratuitous and
intolerable hindrances which he had met with from his allies.
… He had made up his mind to operate with Eugene in Italy,
which, if he had done, there would probably have been seen
what has not been seen for nearly two thousand years—a
successful invasion of France from the southeast. But the
kings of Prussia and Denmark, and others of the allies whom
Marlborough thought he had propitiated, were as recalcitrant
as the Dutch, and the vigorous action of Villars against the
Margrave of Baden made the States-General more than ever
reluctant to lose their sword and shield. So Marlborough was
condemned to action on his old line of the Dyle, and this time
fortune was less unkind to him. Secret overtures were made
which induced him to threaten Namur, and as Namur was of all
posts in the Low Countries that to which the French attached
most importance, both on sentimental and strategical grounds,
Villeroy was ordered to abandon the defensive policy which he
had for nearly two years been forced to maintain, and to fight
at all hazards. Accordingly the tedious operations which had
for so long been pursued in this quarter were exchanged at
once for a vigorous offensive and defensive, and the two
generals, Villeroy with rather more than 60,000 men,
Marlborough with that number or a little less, came to blows
at Ramillies (a few miles only from the spot where the lines
had been forced the year before) on May 23, 1706, or scarcely
more than a week after the campaign had begun. Here, as
before, the result is assigned by the French to the fault of
the general. … The battle itself was one completely of
generalship, and of generalship as simple as it was masterly.
It was in defending his position, not in taking it up, that
Villeroy lost the battle. … Thirteen thousand of the French
and Bavarians were killed, wounded, and taken, and the loss of
the allies, who had been throughout the attacking party, was
not less than 4,000 men. … The Dutch, who bore the burden of
the attack on Ramillies, had the credit of the day's fighting
on the allied side, as the Bavarian horse had on that of the
French. In hardly any of Marlborough's operations had he his
hands so free as at Ramillies, and in none did he carry off a
completer victory. … The strong places of Flanders fell
before the allied army like ripe fruit. Brussels surrendered
and was occupied on the fourth day after the battle, May 28.
Louvain and Malines had fallen already. The French garrison
precipitately left Ghent, and the Duke entered it on June 2.
Oudenarde came in next day; Antwerp was summoned, expelled the
French part of its garrison, and capitulated on September 7.
And a vigorous siege in less than a month reduced Ostend,
reputed one of the strongest places in Europe. In six weeks
from the battle of Ramillies not a French soldier remained in
a district which the day before that battle had been occupied
by a network of the strongest fortresses and a field army of
80,000 men. The strong places on the Lys and the Dender,
tributaries of the Scheldt, gave more trouble, and Menin, a
small but very important position, cost nearly half the loss
of Ramillies before it could be taken. But it fell, as well as
Dendermonde and Ath, and nothing but the recrudescence of
Dutch obstruction prevented Marlborough from finishing the
campaign with the taking of Mons, almost the last place of any
importance held by the French north of their own frontier, as
that frontier is now understood. But the difficulties of all
generals are said to begin on the morrow of victory, and
certainly the saying was true in Marlborough's case. … The
Dutch were, before all things, set on a strong barrier or zone
of territory, studded with fortresses in their own keeping,
between themselves and France: the Emperor naturally objected
to the alienation of the Spanish-Austrian Netherlands. The
barrier disputes were for years the greatest difficulty which
Marlborough had to contend with abroad, and the main theme of
the objections to the war made by the adverse party at home.
… It was in the main due, no doubt, to these jealousies and
hesitations, strengthened by the alarm caused by the loss of
the battle of Almanza in Spain, and by the threatened invasion
of Germany under Villars, that made the campaign of 1707 an
almost wholly inactive one. … The campaign of this year is
almost wholly barren of any military operations interesting to
anyone but the mere annalist of tactics."
G. Saintsbury,
Marlborough,
chapter 6.
In Spain, several sharp changes of fortune during two years
terminated in a disastrous defeat of the allies at Almanza in
April, 1707, by the Duke of Berwick.
See SPAIN: A. D. 1706 and 1707;
see, also, GERMANY: A. D. 1706-1711.
Earl Stanhope,
History of England: Reign of Queen Anne,
chapter 7 and 9.
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1708-1709.
The War of the Spanish Succession: Oudenarde and Malplaquet.
To the great satisfaction of Marlborough, Prince Eugene of
Savoy was sent by the Emperor to co-operate with him, in the
spring of 1708. The two generals met in April to discuss
plans; after which Eugene returned into Germany to gather up
the various contingents that would compose his army. He
encountered many difficulties and delays, and was unable to
bring his forces to the field until July. Marlborough,
meantime, had been placed in a critical situation. "For whilst
the English commander and Eugene had formed the plan to unite
and overwhelm Vendome, the Court of Versailles had, on its
side, contemplated the despatch of a portion of the Army of
the Rhine, commanded by the Elector of Bavaria and the Duke of
Berwick, so to reinforce Vendome that he might overwhelm
Marlborough, and Berwick was actually on his march to carry
out his portion of the plan." Prince Eugene crossed the
Moselle on the 28th June, "reached Düren the 3rd July, and
learning there that affairs were critical, hastened with an
escort of Hussars, in advance of his army, to Brussels. On his
arrival there, the 6th, he learned that the French had
attacked and occupied the city of Ghent, and were then
besieging the castle."
{2294}
The two commanders having met at Assche, to concert their
movements, made haste to throw: "a reinforcement into the
fortress of Oudenarde, then besieged by the French; and,
convinced now that the conquest of that fortress by Vendome
would give him an unassailable position, they pushed forward
their troops with all diligence to save it. The two armies
united on the 8th. On the 9th they set out for Oudenarde, and
crossed the Dender on the 10th. Before daybreak of the 11th
Marlborough despatched General Cadogan with a strong corps to
the Scheldt, to throw bridges over that river near Oudenarde
and to reconnoitre the enemy. The main army followed at 7
o'clock." In the battle which ensued, Vendome was hampered by
the equal authority of the Duke of Burgundy—the king's
grandson—who would not concur with his plans. "One after
another the positions occupied by the French soldiers were
carried. Then these took advantage of the falling night to
make a retreat as hurried and disorderly as their defence had
been wanting in tenacity. In no pitched battle, indeed, have
the French soldiers less distinguished themselves than at
Oudenarde. Fighting under a divided leadership, they were
fighting virtually without leadership, and they knew it. The
Duke of Burgundy contributed as much as either Marlborough or
Eugene to gain the battle of Oudenarde for the Allies." The
French army, losing heavily in the retreat, was rallied
finally at Ghent. "The Allies, meanwhile, prepared to take
advantage of their victory. They were within a circle
commanded by three hostile fortresses, Ypres, Lille, and
Tournay. After some consideration it was resolved, on the
proposition of Eugene, that Lille should be besieged." The
siege of Lille, the capital of French Flanders, fortified by
the utmost skill and science of Vauban, and held by a garrison
of 10,000 men under Marshal Boufflers, was a formidable
undertaking. The city was invested on the 13th of August, and
defended heroically by the garrison: but Vendome, who would
have attacked the besiegers, was paralyzed by the royal youth
who shared his command. Lille, the town, was surrendered on
the 22d of October and its citadel on the 9th of December. The
siege of Ghent followed, and the capitulation of that city, on
the 2d of January, 1709, closed the campaign. "The winter of
1709 was spent mainly in negotiations. Louis XIV. was
humiliated, and he offered peace on terms which the Allies
would have done well to accept." Their demands, however, rose
too high, and the war went on. "It had been decided that the
campaign in the Netherlands should be continued under the same
skilful generals who had brought that of 1708 to so successful
an issue. … On the 23rd of [June] … the allied army,
consisting of 110,000 men, was assembled between Courtray and
Menin. Marlborough commanded the left wing, about 70,000
strong; Eugene the right, about 40,000. Louis, on his side,
had made extraordinary efforts. But even with these he had
been able to put in the field an army only 80,000 strong
[under Marshal Villars]. … Villars had occupied a position
between Douai and the Lys, and had there thrown up lines, in
the strengthening of which he found daily employment for his
troops." Not venturing to attack the French army in its strong
position, Marlborough and Eugene began operations by laying
siege to Tournay. The town was yielded to them on the 30th of
July and the citadel on the 3d of September. They next turned
their attention to Mons, which the French thought it necessary
to save at any cost. The attempt which the latter made to
drive the allied army from the position it had gained between
themselves and Mons had its outcome in the terribly bloody
battle of Malplaquet—"the bloodiest known till then in modern
history. The loss of the victors was greater than that of the
vanquished. That of the former amounted to from 18,000 to
20,000 men: the French admitted a loss of 7,000, but German
writers raise it to 15,000. Probably it did not exceed 11,000.
… The results … were in no way proportionate to its cost.
The French army retreated in good order, taking with it all
its impedimenta, to a new position as strong as the former.
There, under Berwick, who was sent to replace Villars, it
watched the movements of the Allies. These resumed, indeed,
the siege of Mons [which surrendered on the 20th of October].
… But this was the solitary result of the victory."
Colonel G. B. Malleson,
Prince Eugene of Savoy,
chapters 10-11.
ALSO IN:
W. Coxe,
Memoirs of Marlborough,
chapters 66-83 (volumes 4-5).
H. Martin,
History of France: Age of Louis XIV.
(translated by M. L. Booth),
volume 2, chapters 5-6.
J. W. Gerard,
Peace of Utrecht,
chapters 17-19.
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D, 1709.
The Barrier Treaty with England.
See ENGLAND: A. D. 1709.
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1710-1712.
The War of the Spanish Succession:
The last campaigns of Marlborough.
"As soon as it became clear that the negotiations [at
Gertruydenberg] would lead to nothing, Eugene and Marlborough
at once began the active business of the campaign. …
Marlborough began … with the siege of Douai, the possession
of which would be of the greatest importance to him. … In
spite of Villars' boasts the French were unable to prevent the
capture of Douai. … The campaign of 1710 was full of
disappointment to Marlborough. He had hoped to carry the war
into the heart of France. But after Douai fell, Villars so
placed his army that [Marlborough] … was obliged to content
himself with the capture of Bethune, St. Venant, and Aire.
Heavy rains and a great deal of illness among his troops
prevented further operations. Besides this, his energy was
somewhat paralysed by the changes which had taken place in
England," where the Duchess of Marlborough and the Whig party
had lost the favor of the Queen, and the Tory opponents of
Marlborough and the war had come into power.
L. Creighton,
Life of Marlborough,
chapters 15-16.
"In 1711, in a complicated series of operations round Arras,
Marlborough, who was now alone, Eugene having been recalled to
Vienna, completely outgeneraled Villars and broke through his
lines. But he did not fight, and the sole result of the
campaign was the capture of Bouchain at the cost of some
16,000 men, while no serious impression was made on the French
system of defence. … Lille had cost 14,000; Tournay a number
not exactly mentioned, but very large; the petty place of Aire
7,000. How many, malcontent Englishmen might well ask
themselves, would it cost before Arras, Cambrai, Hesdin,
Calais, Namur, and all the rest of the fortresses that studded
the country, could be expected to fall? … Marlborough had
himself, so to speak, spoilt his audience.
{2295}
He had given them four great victories in a little more than
five years; it was perhaps unreasonable, but certainly not
unnatural, that they should grow fretful when he gave them
none during nearly half the same time. … The expense of the
war was frightening men of all classes in England, and,
independently of the more strictly political considerations,
… it will be seen that there was some reason for wishing
Marlborough anywhere but on or near the field of battle. He
was got rid of none too honourably; restrictions were put upon
his successor Ormond which were none too honourable either;
and when Villars, freed from his invincible antagonist, had
inflicted a sharp defeat upon Eugene at Denain, the military
situation was changed from one very much in favour of the
allies to one slightly against them, and so contributed beyond
all doubt to bring about the Peace of Utrecht."
G. Saintsbury,
Marlborough,
chapter 7.
ALSO IN:
G. B. Malleson,
Prince Eugene of Savoy,
chapter 12.
C. M. Davies,
History of Holland,
part 3, chapter 11 (volume 3).
See, also,
ENGLAND: A. D. 1710-1712.
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1713-1714.
The Treaties of Utrecht.
Cession of the Spanish Provinces to the House of Austria.
Barrier towns secured.
See UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1713-1715.
Second Barrier Treaty with England.
Barrier arrangements with France and the Emperor.
Connected with the other arrangements concluded in the
treaties negotiated at Utrecht, the States, in 1713, signed a
new Barrier Treaty with England, "annulling that of 1709, and
providing that the Emperor Charles should be sovereign of the
Netherlands [heretofore the 'Spanish Provinces,' but now
become the 'Austrian Provinces'], which, neither in the whole
nor in the part, should ever be possessed by France. The
States, on their side, were bound to support, if required, the
succession of the Electress of Hanover to the throne of
England. … By the treaty concluded between France and the
States, it was agreed that … the towns of Menin, Tournay,
Namur, Ypres, with Warneton, Poperingen, Comines and Werwyk,
Fumes, Dixmuyde, and the fort of Knokke, were to be ceded to
the States, as a barrier, to be held in such a manner as they
should afterwards agree upon with the Emperor." In the
subsequent arrangement, concluded with the Emperor in 1715,
"he permitted the boundary on the side of Flanders to be fixed
in a manner highly satisfactory to the States, who sought
security rather than extent of dominion. By the possession of
Namur they commanded the passage of the Sambre and Meuse;
Tournay ensured the navigation of the Scheldt; Menin and
Warneton protected the Leye; while Ypres and the fort of
Knokke kept open the communication with Fumes, Nieuport and
Dunkirk. … Events proved the barrier, so earnestly insisted
upon, to have been wholly insufficient as a means of defence
to the United Provinces, and scarcely worth the labour and
cost of its maintenance."
C. M. Davies,
History of Holland,
chapter 11 (volume 3).
(NETHERLANDS: Holland): A. D. 1713-1725.
Continued Austro-Spanish troubles.
The Triple Alliance.
The Quadruple Alliance.
The Alliance of Hanover.
See SPAIN: A. D. 1713-1725;
also, ITALY: A. D. 1715-1735.
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1729-1731.
The Treaty of Seville.
The second Treaty of Vienna.
The Ostend Company abolished.
See SPAIN: A. D. 1726-1731.
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1731-1740.
The question of the Austrian Succession.
Guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction.
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1718-1738; and 1740.
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1740-1741.
Beginning of the War of the Austrian Succession.
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1740-1741.
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1743.
The War of the Austrian Succession: Dutch Subsidies and Troops.
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1743; and 1743-1744.
NETHERLANDS: (Austrian Provinces): A. D. 1744.
Invasion by the French.
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1743-1744.
NETHERLANDS: (The Austrian Provinces): A. D. 1745.
The War of the Austrian Succession: Battle of Fontenoy.
French conquests.
In the spring of 1745, while events in the second Silesian War
were still threatening to Frederick the Great (see AUSTRIA: A.
D. 1744-1745), his allies, the French, though indifferent to
his troubles, were doing better for themselves in the
Netherlands. They had given to Marshal de Saxe, who commanded
there, an army of 76,000 excellent troops. "As to the Allies,
England had furnished her full contingent of 28,000 men, but
Holland less than half of the 50,000 she had stipulated; there
were but eight Austrian squadrons, and the whole body scarcely
exceeded 50,000 fighting men. The nominal leader was the young
Duke of Cumberland, but subject in a great measure to the
control of an Austrian veteran, Marshal Konigsegg, and obliged
to consult the Dutch commander, Prince de Waldeck. Against
these inferior numbers and divided councils the French
advanced in full confidence of victory, and, after various
movements to distract the attention of the Allies, suddenly,
on the 1st of May, invested Tournay. … To relieve this
important city, immediately became the principal object with
the Allies; and the States, usually so cautious, nay, timorous
in their suggestions, were now as eager in demanding battle.
… On the other hand, the Mareschal de Saxe made most skilful
dispositions to receive them. Leaving 15,000 infantry to cover
the blockade of Tournay, he drew up the rest of his army, a
few miles further, in an excellent position, which he
strengthened with numerous works; and his soldiers were
inspirited by the arrival of the King and Dauphin, who had
hastened from Paris to join in the expected action. The three
allied generals, on advancing against the French, found them
encamped on some gentle heights, with the village of Antoin
and the river Scheldt on their right, Fontenoy and a narrow
valley in their front, and a small wood named Barre on their
left. The passage of the Scheldt, and, if needful, a retreat,
were secured by the bridge of Calonne in the rear, by a tête
de pont, and by a reserve of the Household Troops. Abbatis
were constructed in the wood of Barre; redoubts between Antoin
and Fontenoy; and the villages themselves had been carefully
fortified and, garrisoned. The narrow space between Fontenoy
and Barre seemed sufficiently defended by cross fires, and by
the natural ruggedness of the ground: in short, as the French
officers thought, the strength of the position might bid
defiance to the boldest assailant.
{2296}
Nevertheless, the Allied chiefs, who had already resolved on a
general engagement, drove in the French piquets and outposts
on the 10th of May, New Style, and issued orders for their
intended attack at daybreak. … At six o'clock on the morning
of the 11th, the cannonade began. The Prince of Waldeck, and
his Dutch, undertook to carry Antoin and Fontenoy by assault,
while the Duke of Cumberland, at the head of the British and
Hanoverians, was to advance against the enemy's left. His
Royal Highness, at the same time with his own attack, sent
General Ingoldsby, with a division, to pierce through the wood
of Barre, and storm the redoubt beyond it." Ingoldsby's
division and the Dutch troops were both repulsed, and the
latter made no further effort. But the British and
Hanoverians, leaving their cavalry behind and dragging with
them a few field pieces, "plunged down the ravine between
Fontenoy and Barre, and marched on against a position which
the best Marshals of France had deemed impregnable, and which
the best troops of that nation defended. … Whole ranks of
the British were swept away, at once, by the murderous fire of
the batteries on their left and right. Still did their column,
diminishing in numbers not in spirit, steadily press forward,
repulse several desperate attacks of the French infantry, and
gain ground on its position. … The battle appeared to be
decided: already did Marshal Konigsegg offer his
congratulations to the Duke of Cumberland; already had
Mareschal de Saxe prepared for retreat, and, in repeated
messages, urged the King to consult his safety and withdraw,
while it was yet time, beyond the Scheldt." The continued
inactivity of the Dutch, however, enabled the French commander
to gather his last reserves at the one point of danger, while
he brought another battery to bear on the head of the
advancing British column. "The British, exhausted by their own
exertions, mowed down by the artillery in front, and assailed
by the fresh troops in flank, were overpowered. Their column
wavered—broke—fell back. … In this battle of Fontenoy (for
such is the name it has borne), the British left behind a few
pieces of artillery, but no standards, and scarce any
prisoners but the wounded. The loss in these, and in killed,
was given out as 4,041 British, 1,762 Hanoverians, and only
1,544 Dutch; while on their part the French likewise
acknowledged above 7,000." As the consequence of the battle of
Fontenoy, not only Tournay, but Ghent, likewise, was speedily
surrendered to the French. "Equal success crowned similar
attempts on Bruges, on Oudenarde, and on Dendermonde, while
the allies could only act on the defensive and cover Brussels
and Antwerp. The French next directed their arms against
Ostend, … which … yielded in fourteen days. … Meanwhile
the events in Scotland [the Jacobite rebellion—see SCOTLAND:
A. D. 1745-1746] were compelling the British government to
withdraw the greater part of their force; and it was only the
approach of winter, and the retreat of both armies into
quarters, that obtained a brief respite for the remaining
fortresses of Flanders."
Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope),
History of England, 1713-1783,
chapter 26 (volume 3).
ALSO IN:
F. P. Guizot,
Popular History of France,
chapter 52 (volume 6).
J. G. Wilson,
Sketches of Illustrious Soldiers: Saxe.
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1746-1747.
The War of the Austrian Succession:
French conquest of the Austrian provinces.
Humiliation of Holland.
The Stadtholdership restored.
"In the campaign in Flanders in 1746, the French followed up
the successes which they had achieved in the previous year.
Brussels, Antwerp, Mons, Charleroi, Namur, and other places
successively surrendered to Marshal Saxe and the Prince of
Conti. After the capture of Namur in September, Marshal Saxe,
reuniting all the French forces, attacked Prince Charles of
Lorraine at Raucoux [or Roucoux], between Liege and Viset, and
completely defeated him, October 11; after which both sides
went into winter quarters. All the country between the Meuse
and the sea was now in the power of France, Austria retaining
only Luxemburg and Limburg. … Ever since the year 1745 some
negociations had been going on between France and the Dutch
for the reestablishment of peace. The States-General had
proposed the assembling of a Congress to the Cabinet of
Vienna, which, however, had been rejected. In September 1746,
conferences had been opened at Breda, between France, Great
Britain, and the States-General; but as Great Britain had
gained some advantages at sea, the negociations were
protracted, and the Cabinets of London and Vienna had
endeavoured to induce the Dutch to take a more direct and
active part in the war. In this state of things the Court of
Versailles took a sudden resolution to coerce the
States-General. A manifest was published by Louis XV. April
17th 1747, filled with those pretexts which it is easy to find
on such occasions: not, indeed, exactly declaring war against
the Dutch Republic, but that he should enter her territories
'without breaking with her'; that he should hold in deposit
the places he might conquer, and restore them as soon as the
States ceased to succour his enemies. At the same time Count
Löwendahl entered Dutch Flanders by Bruges, and seized in less
than a month Sluys, Ysendick, Sas de Gand, Hulst, Axel, and
other places. Holland had now very much declined from the
position she had held a century before. There were indeed many
large capitalists in the United Provinces, whose wealth had
been amassed during the period of the Republic's commercial
prosperity, but the State as a whole was impoverished and
steeped in debt. … In … becoming the capitalists and
money-lenders of Europe, they [the Dutch] had ceased to be her
brokers and carriers. … Holland was no longer the entrepôt
of nations. The English, the Swedes, the Danes, and the
Hamburghers had appropriated the greater part of her trade.
Such was the result of the long wars in which she had been
engaged. … Her political consideration had dwindled equally
with her commerce. Instead of pretending as formerly to be the
arbiter of nations, she had become little more than the
satellite of Great Britain; a position forced upon her by fear
of France, and her anxiety to maintain her barriers against
that encroaching Power. Since the death of William III., the
republican or aristocratic party had again seized the
ascendency. William III.'s collateral heir, John William
Friso, had not been recognised as Stadtholder, and the
Republic was again governed, as in the time of De Witt, by a
Grand Pensionary and greffier. The dominant party had,
however, become highly unpopular.
{2297}
It had sacrificed the army to maintain the fleet, and the
Republic seemed to lie at the mercy of France. At the approach
of the French, consternation reigned in the provinces. The
Orange party raised its head and demanded the re-establishment
of the Stadtholdership. The town of Veere in Zealand gave the
example of insurrection, and William IV. of Nassau-Dietz, who
was already Stadtholder of Friesland, Groningen and
Gelderland, was ultimately proclaimed hereditary Stadtholder,
Captain-General and Admiral of the United Provinces. William
IV. was the son of John William Friso, and son-in-law of
George II., whose daughter, Anne, he had married. The French
threatening to attack Maestricht, the allies under the Duke of
Cumberland marched to Lawfeld in order to protect it. Here
they were attacked by Marshal Saxe, July 2nd 1747, and after a
bloody battle compelled to recross the Meuse. The Duke of
Cumberland, however, took up a position which prevented the
French from investing Maestricht. On the other hand, Löwendahl
[a Swedish general in the French service] carried
Bergen-op-Zoom by assault., July 16th." The following spring
(1748), the French succeeded in laying siege to Maestricht,
notwithstanding the presence of the allies, and it was
surrendered to them on the 7th of May. "Negociations had been
going on throughout the winter, and a Congress had been
appointed to meet at Aix-la-Chapelle, whose first conference
took place April 24th 1748." The taking of Maestricht was
intended to stimulate these negotiations for peace, and it
undoubtedly had that effect. The treaties which concluded the
war were signed the following October.
T. H. Dyer,
History of Modern Europe,
book 6, chapter 4 (volume 3).
ALSO IN:
C. M. Davies,
History of Holland,
part 3, chapter 12,
part 4, chapter 1.
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1746-1787.
The restored Stadtholdership.
Forty years of peace.
War with England and trouble with Austria.
The razing of the Barriers.
Premature revolutions.
In their extremity, when the provinces of the Dutch Republic
were threatened with invasion by the French, a cry for the
House of Orange was raised once more. "The jealousies of
Provincial magistratures were overborne, and in obedience to
the voice of the people a Stadholder again arose. William of
Nassau Dietz, the heir to William III., and the successor to a
line of Stadholders who had ruled continuously in Friesland
since the days of Philip II., was summoned to power. …
William IV. had married, as William II. and William III. had
done, the daughter of a King of England. As the husband of
Anne, the child of George II., he had added to the
consideration of his House; and he was now able to secure for
his descendants the dignities to which he had himself been
elected. The States General in 1747 declared that both male
and female heirs should succeed to his honours. The
constitution was thus in a measure changed, and the
appointment of a hereditary chief magistrate appeared to many
… to be a departure from the pure ideal of a Republic. The
election of the new Stadholder brought less advantage to his
people than to his family. He could not recall the glorious
days of the great ancestors who had preceded him. Without
abilities for war himself, and jealous of those with whom he
was brought in contact, he caused disunion to arise among the
forces of the allies. … When the terms at Aix La Chapelle
restored their losses to the Dutch and confirmed the
stipulations of previous treaties in their favour, it was felt
that the Republic was indebted to the exertions of its allies,
and not to any strength or successes of its own. It was well
for the Republic that she could rest. The days of her
greatness had gone by, and the recent struggle had manifested
her decline to Europe. … The next forty years were years of
peace, … When war again arrived it was again external
circumstances [connected with the war between England and her
revolted colonies in America] that compelled the Republic to
take up arms. … She … contemplated, as it was discovered,
an alliance with the American insurgents. The exposure of her
designs drew on her a declaration of war from England, which
was followed by the temporary loss of many of her colonies
both in the East and West Indies. But in Europe the struggle
was more equally sustained. The hostile fleets engaged in 1781
off the Dogger Bank; and the Dutch sailors fought with a
success that made them claim a victory, and that at least
secured them from the consequences of a defeat. The war indeed
caused far less injury to the Republic than might have been
supposed. … When she concluded peace in 1783, the whole of
her lost colonies, with the one exception of Negapatam, were
restored to her. But the occasion of the war had been made use
of by Austria, and a blow had been meanwhile inflicted upon
the United Provinces the fatal effect of which was soon to be
apparent. The Emperor Joseph II. had long protested against
the existence of the Barrier: and he had seized upon the
opportunity to undo by an arbitrary act all that the blood and
treasure of Europe had been lavished to secure. 'The Emperor
will hear no more of Barriers,' wrote his minister; 'our
connection with France has made them needless': and the
fortresses for which William III. had schemed and Marlborough
had fought, were razed to the ground [1782]. Holland, unable
at the moment to resist, withdrew her garrisons in silence;
and Joseph, emboldened by his success, proceeded to ask for
more [1784]. The rectification of the Dutch frontiers, the
opening of the Scheldt, and the release for his subjects from
the long-enforced restrictions upon their trade did not appear
too much to him. But the spirit of the Dutch had not yet left
them. They fired at the vessels which dared to attempt to
navigate the Scheldt, and war again appeared imminent. The
support of France, however, upon which the Emperor had relied,
was now given to the Republic, and Joseph recognized that he
had gone too far. The Barrier, once destroyed, was not to be
restored; but the claims which had been put forward were
abandoned upon the payment of money compensation by the
States. The feverous age of revolution was now at hand, and
party spirit, which had ever divided the United Provinces, and
had been quickened by the intercourse and alliance with
America during the war, broke out in an insurrection against
the Stadholder [William V.], which drove him from his country,
and compelled him to appeal to Prussian troops for his
restoration. Almost at the same time, in the Austrian
provinces, a Belgic Republic was proclaimed [1787], the result
in a great degree of imprudent changes which Joseph II. had
enforced. The Dutch returned to their obedience under
Prussian threats [and invasion of Holland by an army of 30,000
men—September, 1787], and Belgium under the concessions of
Leopold III. But these were the clouds foreshadowing the
coming storm, beneath whose fury all Europe was to tremble."
C. F. Johnstone,
Historical Abstracts,
chapter 2.
ALSO IN:
T. H. Dyer,
History of Modern Europe,
book 6, chapter 8 (volume 3).
F. C. Schlosser,
History of the 18th Century, period 4,
chapter 1, section 2,
and chapter 2, section 2 (volume 5).
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NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1748.
Termination and results of the War of the Austrian Succession.
French conquests restored to Austria and to Holland.
See AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, THE CONGRESS.
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1782.
Recognition of the United States of America.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (APRIL).
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1792-1793.
The Austrian provinces occupied
by the French revolutionary army.
Determination to annex them to the French Republic.
Preparations to attack Holland.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1702 (SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER);
and 1702-1703 (DECEMBER-FEBRUARY).
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1793 (February-April).
French invasion of Holland.
Defeat at Neerwinden and retreat.
Recovery of Belgian provinces by the Austrians.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1793 (FEBRUARY-APRIL).
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1793 (March-September).
The Coalition against Revolutionary France.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1793 (MARCH-SEPTEMBER).
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1794.
French conquest of the Austrian Provinces.
Holland open to invasion.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1794 (MARCH-JULY).
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1794-1795.
Subjugation and occupation by the French.
Overthrow of the Stadtholdership.
Establishment of the Batavian Republic, in alliance with France.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1794-1795 (OCTOBER-MAY).
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1797.
Naval defeat by the English in the Battle of Camperdown.
See ENGLAND: A. D. 1797.
NETHERLANDS: (Austrian Provinces): A. D. 1797.
Ceded to France.
See FRANCE: A. D. 17\!7 (MAY-OCTOBER).
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1799.
English and Russian invasion.
Capture of the Dutch fleet.
Ignominious ending of the expedition.
Capitulation of the Duke of York.
Dissolution of the Dutch East India Company.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1790 (APRIL-SEPTEMBER),
and (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER).
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1801.
Revolution instigated and enforced by Bonaparte.
A new Constitution.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1801-1803.
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1802.
The Peace of Amiens.
Recovery of the Cape of Good Hope and Dutch Guiana.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1801-1802.
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1806.
Final seizure of Cape Colony by the English.
See SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1486-1806.
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1806-1810.
Commercial blockade by the English Orders in Council and
Napoleon's Decrees.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1806-1810.
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1806-1810.
The Batavian Republic transformed into the Kingdom of Holland.
Louis Bonaparte made King.
His fidelity to the country offensive to Napoleon.
His abdication.
Annexation of Holland to the French empire.
"While Bonaparte was the chief of the French republic, he had
no objection to the existence of a Batavian republic in the
north of France, and he equally tolerated the Cisalpine
republic in the south. But after the coronation all the
republics, which were grouped like satellites round the grand
republic, were converted into kingdoms, subject to the empire,
if not avowedly, at least in fact. In this respect there was
no difference between the Batavian and Cisalpine republic. The
latter having been metamorphosed into the kingdom of Italy, it
was necessary to find some pretext for transforming the former
into the kingdom of Holland. … The Emperor kept up such an
extensive agency in Holland that he easily got up a
deputation, soliciting him to choose a king for the Batavian
republic. This submissive deputation came to Paris in 1806, to
solicit the Emperor, as a favour, to place Prince Louis
[Napoleon's brother] on the throne of Holland. … Louis
became King of Holland much against his inclination, for he
opposed the proposition as much as he dared, alleging as an
objection the state of his health, to which certainly the
climate of Holland was not favourable; but Bonaparte sternly
replied to his remonstrance—'It is better to die a king than
live a prince.' He was then obliged to accept the crown. He
went to Holland accompanied by Hortense, who, however, did not
stay long there. The new king wanted to make himself beloved
by his subjects, and as they were an entirely commercial
people, the best way to win their affections was … not to
adopt Napoleon's rigid laws against commercial intercourse
with England. Hence the first coolness between the two
brothers, which ended in the abdication of Louis. I know not
whether Napoleon recollected the motive assigned by Louis for
at first refusing the crown of Holland, namely, the climate of
the country, or whether he calculated upon greater submission
in another of his brothers; but this is certain, that Joseph
was not called from the throne of Naples to the throne of
Spain, until after the refusal of Louis. … Before finally
seizing Holland, Napoleon formed the project of separating
from it Brabant and Zealand, in exchange for other provinces,
the possession of which was doubtful: but Louis successfully
resisted this first act of usurpation. Bonaparte was too
intent on the great business in Spain, to risk any commotion
in the north, where the declaration of Russia against Sweden
already sufficiently occupied him. He therefore did not insist
upon, and even affected indifference to the proposed
augmentation of the territory of the empire. … But when he
got his brother Joseph recognized, and when he had himself
struck an important blow in the Peninsula, he began to change
his tone to Louis. On the 20th of December [1808] he wrote to
him a very remarkable letter, which exhibits the unreserved
expression of that tyranny which he wished to exercise over
all his family in order to make them the instruments of his
despotism. He reproached Louis for not following his system of
policy, telling him that he had forgotten he was a Frenchman,
and that he wished to become a Dutchman. Among other things he
said: … 'I have been obliged a second time to prohibit trade
with Holland. In this state of things we may consider
ourselves really at war. In my speech to the legislative body
I manifested my displeasure; for I will not conceal from you,
that my intention is to unite Holland with France.
{2299}
This will be the most severe blow I can aim against England,
and will deliver me from the perpetual insults which the
plotters of your cabinet are constantly directing against me.
The mouths of the Rhine, and of the Meuse, ought, indeed, to
belong to me. … The following are my conditions:—First, the
interdiction of all trade and communication with England.
Second. The supply of a fleet of fourteen sail of the line,
seven frigates and seven brigs or corvettes, armed and manned.
Third, an army of 25,000 men. Fourth. The suppression of the
rank of Marshals. Fifth. The abolition of all the privileges
of nobility, which is contrary to the constitution. Your
Majesty may negotiate on these bases with the Duke de Cadore,
through the medium of your minister; but be assured, that on
the entrance of the first packet-boat into Holland, I will
restore my prohibitions, and that the first Dutch officer who
may presume to insult my flag, shall be seized and hanged at
the main-yard. Your Majesty will find in me a brother if you
prove yourself a Frenchman; but if you forget the sentiments
which attach you to our common country, you cannot think it
extraordinary that I should lose sight of those which nature
has raised between us. In short, the union of Holland and
France will be, of all things, most useful to France, Holland
and the Continent, because it will be most injurious to
England. This union must be effected willingly, or by force.'
… Here the correspondence between the two brothers was
suspended for a time; but Louis still continued exposed to new
vexations on the part of Napoleon. About the end of 1809, the
Emperor summoned to Paris the sovereigns who might be called
his vassals. Among the number was Louis, who, however, did not
shew himself very willing to quit his states. He called a
council of his ministers, who were of opinion that for the
interest of Holland he ought to make this new sacrifice. He
did so with resignation. Indeed, every day passed on the
throne was a sacrifice to Louis. … Amidst the general
silence of the servants of the empire, and even of the kings
and princes assembled in the capital, he ventured to say:—'I
have been deceived by promises which were never intended to be
kept. Holland is tired of being the sport of France.' The
Emperor, who was unused to such language as this, was highly
incensed at it. Louis had now no alternative, but to yield to
the incessant exactions of Napoleon, or to see Holland united
to France. He chose the latter, though not before he had
exerted all his feeble power in behalf of the subjects whom
Napoleon had consigned to him; but he would not be the
accomplice of him who had resolved to make those subjects the
victims of his hatred against England. … Louis was, however,
permitted to return to his states, to contemplate the
stagnating effect of the continental blockade on every branch
of trade and industry, formerly so active in Holland.
Distressed at witnessing evils to which he could apply no
remedy, he endeavoured by some prudent remonstrances to avert
the utter ruin with which Holland was threatened. On the 23rd
of March, 1810, he wrote … [a] letter to Napoleon. …
Written remonstrances were not more to Napoleon's taste than
verbal ones at a time when, as I was informed by my friends,
whom fortune chained to his destiny, no one presumed to
address a word to him, except to answer his questions. … His
brother's letter highly roused his displeasure. Two months
after he received it, being on a journey in the north, he
addressed to Louis from Ostend a letter," followed in a few
days by another in which latter he said: "'I want no more
phrases and protestations. It is time I should know whether
you intend, by your follies, to ruin Holland. I do not choose
that you should again send a Minister to Austria, or that you
should dismiss the French who are in your service. I have
recalled my Ambassador, as I intend only to have a
Chargé-d'affaires in Holland. The Sieur Serrurier, who remains
there in that capacity, will communicate to you my intentions.
My Ambassador shall no longer be exposed to your insults.
Write to me no more those set phrases which you have been
repeating for the last three years, and the falsehood of which
is proved every day. This is the last letter I will ever write
to you as long as I live.' … Thus reduced to the cruel
alternative of crushing Holland with his own hands, or leaving
that task to the Emperor, Louis did not hesitate to lay down
his sceptre. Having formed this resolution, he addressed a
message to the legislative body of the kingdom of Holland,
explaining the motives of his abdication. … The French
troops entered Holland under the command of the Duke de
Reggio; and that Marshal, who was more King than the King
himself, threatened to occupy Amsterdam. Louis then descended
from his throne [July 1, 1810]. … Louis bade farewell to the
people of Holland in a proclamation, after the publication of
which he repaired to the waters of Toeplitz. There he was
living in tranquil retirement, when he learnt that his brother
had united Holland to the Empire [December 10, 1810]. He then
published a protest. … Thus there seemed to be an end of all
intercourse between these two brothers, who were so opposite
in character and disposition. But Napoleon, who was enraged
that Louis should have presumed to protest, and that in
energetic terms, against the union of his kingdom with the
empire, ordered him to return to France, whither he was
summoned in his character of Constable and French Prince.
Louis, however, did not think proper to obey this summons, and
Napoleon, faithful to his promise of never writing to him
again, ordered … [a] letter to be addressed to him by M.
Otto, … Ambassador from France to Vienna," saying: "'The
Emperor requires that Prince Louis shall return, at the
latest, by the 1st of December next, under pain of being
considered as disobeying the constitution of the empire and
the head of his family, and being treated accordingly.'"
M. de Bourrienne,
Private Memoirs of Napoleon,
volume 4, chapter 2.
ALSO IN:
D. A. Bingham,
Marriages of the Bonapartes,
chapter 11 (volume 2).
T. C. Grattan,
History of the Netherlands,
chapter 22.
See, also,
FRANCE: A. D. 1806 (JANUARY-OCTOBER).
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1809.
The English Walcheren expedition against Antwerp.
See ENGLAND: A. D. 1809 (JULY-DECEMBER).
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1811.
Java taken by the English.
See INDIA: A. D. 1805-1816.
{2300}
NETHERLANDS: (Holland): A. D. 1813.
Expulsion of the French.
Independence regained.
Restoration of the Prince of Orange.
"The universal fermentation produced in Europe by the
deliverance of Germany was not long of spreading to the Dutch
Provinces.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1812-1813, to 1813 (OCTOBER-DECEMBER).
The yoke of Napoleon, universally grievous from the enormous
pecuniary exactions with which it was attended, and the
wasting military conscriptions to which it immediately led,
had been in a peculiar manner felt as oppressive in Holland,
from the maritime and commercial habits of the people, and the
total stoppage of all their sources of industry, which the
naval war and long-continued blockade of their coasts had
occasioned. They had tasted for nearly twenty years of the
last drop of humiliation in the cup of the vanquished—that of
being compelled themselves to aid in upholding the system
which was exterminating their resources, and to purchase with
the blood of their children the ruin of their country. These
feelings, which had for years existed in such intensity, as to
have rendered revolt inevitable but for the evident
hopelessness at all former times of the attempt, could no
longer be restrained after the battle of Leipsic had thrown
down the colossus of French external power, and the approach
of the Allied standards to their frontiers had opened to the
people the means of salvation.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (OCTOBER) and (OCTOBER-DECEMBER).
From the Hansa Towns the flame of independence spread to the
nearest cities of the old United Provinces; and the small
number of French troops in the country at once encouraged
revolt and paved the way for external aid. At this period, the
whole troops which Napoleon had in Holland did not exceed
6,000 French, and two regiments of Germans, upon whose
fidelity to their colours little reliance could be placed.
Upon the approach of the Allied troops under Bulow, who
advanced by the road of Munster, and Winzingerode, who soon
followed from the same quarter, the douaniers all withdrew
from the coast, the garrison of Amsterdam retired, and the
whole disposable force of the country was concentrated at
Utrecht, to form a corps of observation, and act according to
circumstances. This was the signal for a general revolt. At
Amsterdam [November 15], the troops were no sooner gone than
the inhabitants rose in insurrection, deposed the Imperial
authorities, hoisted the orange flag, and established a
provisional government with a view to the restoration of the
ancient order of things; yet not violently or with cruelty,
but with the calmness and composure which attest the exercise
of social rights by a people long habituated to their
enjoyment. The same change took place, at the same time and in
the same orderly manner, at Rotterdam, Dordrecht, Delft,
Leyden, Haarlem, and the other chief towns; the people,
everywhere, amidst cries of 'Orange Boven' and universal
rapture, mounted the orange cockade, and reinstated the
ancient authorities. … Military and political consequences
of the highest importance immediately followed this
uncontrollable outbreak of public enthusiasm. A deputation
from Holland waited on the Prince Regent of England and the
Prince of Orange, in London: the latter shortly after embarked
on board an English line-of-battle ship, the Warrior, and on
the 27th landed at Scheveling, from whence he proceeded to the
Hague. Meantime the French troops and coast-guards, who had
concentrated at Utrecht, seeing that the general effervescence
was not as yet supported by any solid military force, and that
the people, though they had all hoisted the orange flag, were
not aided by any corps of the Allies, recovered from their
consternation, and made it general forward movement against
Amsterdam. Before they got there, however, a body of 300
Cossacks had reached that capital, where they were received
with enthusiastic joy: and this advanced guard was soon after
followed by General Benkendorf's brigade, which, after
travelling by post from Zwoll to Harderwyk, embarked at the
latter plage, and, by the aid of a favourable wind, reached
Amsterdam on the 1st December. The Russian general immediately
advanced against the forts of Mayder and Halfweg, of which he
made himself master, taking twenty pieces of cannon and 600
prisoners; while on the eastern frontier, General Oppen, with
Bulow's advanced guards, carried Dornbourg by assault on the
23d, and, advancing against Arnheim, threw the garrison, 3,000
strong, which strove to prevent the place being invested, with
great loss back into the town. Next day, Bulow himself came up
with the main strength of his corps, and, as the ditches were
still dry, hazarded an escalade, which proved entirely
successful; the greater part of the garrison retiring to