them unserviceable.' So crippled was their colonial trade
that, even for their own use, the Spaniards were obliged to
buy nutmegs, cloves, and mace, from their hated rivals."
W. T. McCullagh,
Industrial History of Free Nations,
chapter 13 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
D. McPherson,
Annals of Commerce,
volume 2, pages 206-296.
J. Yeats,
Growth and Vicissitudes of Commerce,
part 3, chapters 3-4.
{2277}
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1603-1619.
Calvinistic persecution of Arminianism.
The hunting down of John of Barneveldt by Prince Maurice.
Synod of Dort.
Calvin's doctrine of predestination was strongly expressed in
what was called the Heidelberg Catechism. "A synod of the
pastors of Holland had decreed that this must be signed by all
their preachers, and be to them what the Thirty-nine Articles
are to the English Church and the Confession of Augsburg to
the Lutherans. Many preachers hesitated to pledge themselves
to doctrines that they did not think Scriptural nor according
to primitive faith, and still more, not accordant with the
eternal mercy of God. Of these Jacob Hermann, a minister of
Amsterdam, or as he Latinised his name, Arminius, was the
foremost, and under his influence a number of clergy refused
their signature. The University of Leyden in 1603 chose
Arminius as their Professor of Theology. The opposite party,
in great wrath, insisted on holding a synod, and the
States-General gave permission, but at first only on condition
that there should be a revision of the confession of faith and
catechism. The ministers refused, but the States-General
insisted, led by John Barneveldt, then Advocate and Keeper of
the Seals, who declared in their name that as 'foster fathers
and protectors of the churches to them every right belonged.'
It was an Erastian sentiment, but this opinion was held by all
reformed governments, including the English, and Barneveldt
spoke in the hope of mitigating Calvinistic violence. The
Advocate of the States-General was in fact their mouthpiece.
They might vote, but no one expressed their decisions at home
or abroad save the Advocate; and Barneveldt, both from
position and character, was thus the chief manager of civil
affairs, and an equal if not a superior power to Maurice of
Nassau, the Stadtholder and commander-in-chief, and recently,
by the death of his elder brother, Prince of Orange. The
question had even been mooted of giving him the sovereignty,
but to this Barneveldt was strongly averse. Maurice knew very
little about the argument, and his real feelings were
Arminian, though jealousy of Barneveldt made him favour the
opposite party, whose chief champion was Jacob Gomer, or
Gomerus as he called himself. King James, though really
holding with the Arminians, disliked Barneveldt, and therefore
threw all the weight of England into the scale against them.
Arguments were held before Maurice and before the university,
in which three champions on the one side were pitted against
three on the other, but nothing came of them but a good deal
of audacious profanity, till Arminius, in ministering to the
sick during a visitation of the plague at Amsterdam, caught
the disease and died. He was so much respected that the
University of Leyden pensioned his widow. They chose a young
Genevese, named Conrad Voorst or Vorstius, as his successor.
Voorst had written two books, one on the nature of God,
Tractatus Theologicus de Deo, and the other, Exegesis
Apologetica, in which (by Fuller's account) there was a
considerable amount of materialism, and likewise what amounted
to a denial of the Divine Omniscience, being no doubt a
reaction from extreme Calvinism. King James met with the book,
and was horrified at its statements. He conceived himself
bound to interfere both as protector to the States—which he
said had been cemented with English blood—and because the
University of Leyden was much frequented by the youth of
England and Scotland, who often completed their legal studies
there. He ordered Sir Ralf Winwood, his ambassador at the
Hague, to deliver a sharp remonstrance to the States, and to
read them a catalogue of the dangerous and blasphemous errors
that he had detected, recommending the States to protest
against the appointment, and burn the books. Barneveldt was
much distressed, and uncertain whether James really was
speaking out of zeal for orthodoxy, or to have an excuse for a
quarrel. Letters and arguments passed without number. …
Leyden supported the professor it had invited, and, together
with Barneveldt, felt that to expel a man whom they had
chosen, at the bidding of a foreign sovereign, was almost
accepting a yoke like that of the Inquisition. … Maurice, on
the other hand, was glad to set the English King against
Barneveldt, and to represent that support of the foes of
strict Calvinism meant treachery to the Republic and a
betrayal to Spain. Winwood, on the King's part, insisted on
Vorstius's dismissal and banishment. … Maurice's own
preacher, Uytenbogen, wrote a remonstrance on behalf of the
Arminians, who were therefore sometimes termed Remonstrants,
while the Gomerists, from their answer, were called
Counter-Remonstrants. Unfortunately, political jealousy of
Barneveldt on the part of Maurice caused the influence of
Uytenbogen to decline. Most of the preachers and of the
populace held to the Counter-Remonstrants and their
old-fashioned Calvinism, most of the nobles and magistrates
were Remonstrants. The question began to branch into a second,
namely, whether the state had power to control the faith of
all its subjects, and whether when it convoked a synod it
could control its decisions, or was bound to enforce them
absolutely and without question. … Whichever party was
predominant in a place turned the other out of church. Appeals
were made to the Stadtholder, and he became angry. The
States-General at large, with Barneveldt to speak for them,
were Remonstrant; the states of Holland were
Counter-Remonstrant; and one of the questions thus at issue
was how far the power of the general government outweighed
that of a particular state. … By steps here impossible to
follow, Maurice destroyed the ascendency of Barneveldt, and
the reports that the old statesman was playing into the hands
of Spain grew more and more current. The magistrates of the
Arminian persuasion found themselves depending for protection
on the Waartgelders, a sort of burgher militia, who
endeavoured to keep the peace between the furious mobs who
struggled on either side. Accusations flew about freely that
now Maurice, now Barneveldt wanted the sovereignty. England
favoured the former; and after Henri IV. was dead, French
support little availed the latter, but rather did him harm.
Maurice did not scruple to raise the popular cry that there
were two factions in Holland, for Orange or for Spain, though
he must have known that there never had been a more steady foe
of Spain than the old statesman. The public, however,
preferred the general to the statesman, and bit by bit Maurice
succeeded in exchanging Remonstrant magistrates for
Counter-Remonstrant, or, as Barneveldt explained the matter to
Sir Dudley Carleton, who had become ambassador from England,
Puritan for double Puritan. … Sunday, the 17th of July,
1617, Uytenbogen preached against the assembly of a national
synod, knowing well that it would only confirm and narrow the
cruel doctrine. Maurice, who was bent on the synod came out in
a rage. …
{2278}
Barneveldt on this moved the States-General to refuse their
consent to the synod as inconsistent with their laws. This was
carried by a majority, and was called the Sharp Resolve. …
The High Council by a majority of one set aside the Sharp
Resolve, and decided for the synod. Barneveldt had a severe
illness, during which Maurice's influence made progress,
assisted by detestable accusations that the Advocate was in
league with the Spaniards. At last Maurice mastered Utrecht,
hitherto the chief hold of Arminianism. He disbanded the
Waartgelders, and when the States-General came together in the
summer of 1618, he had all prepared for sweeping his
adversaries from his path. On the 29th of August, as
Barneveldt was going to take his place at the States-General,
he was told by a chamberlain that the Prince wished to speak
with him, and in Maurice's ante-room was arrested by a
lieutenant of the guard and locked up. In exactly the same
manner was arrested his friend and supporter Pensionary
Rambolt Hoogenboets, who had protested against the decree by
which the High Council reversed that of the States-General,
and Hugo Van Groot, or, as he called himself, Hugo Grotius,
one of the greatest scholars who ever lived, especially in
jurisprudence, and a strong adherent of the Advocate. … The
synod met at Dordrecht [or Dort] in January, 1619, and lasted
till April. The Calvinists carried the day completely, and
Arminians were declared heretics, schismatics, incapable of
preaching, or of acting as professors or schoolmasters, unless
they signed the Heidelberg Catechism and Netherland
Confession, which laid down the hard-and-fast doctrine that
predestination excluded all free will on man's part, but
divided the human race into vessels of wrath and vessels of
mercy, without power on their own part to reverse the doom.
… The trial of Barneveldt was going on at the same time with
the Synod of Dordrecht after he had been many months in
prison. Twenty-four commissioners were appointed, twelve from
Holland, and two from each of the other states, and most of
them were personal enemies of the prisoner. Before them he was
examined day by day for three months, without any indictment;
no witnesses, no counsel on either side; nor was he permitted
pen and ink to prepare his defence, nor the use of his books
and papers." Barneveldt and his family protested against the
flagrant injustice and illegality of the so-called trial, but
refused to sue for pardon, which Maurice was determined they
should do. "It was submission that he wanted, not life"; but
as the submission was not yielded he coldly exacted the life.
Barneveldt was condemned and sentenced to be beheaded by the
sword. The sentence was executed on the same day it was
pronounced, May 12, 1619. Grotius was condemned to perpetual
imprisonment, but made his escape, by the contrivance of his
wife, in 1621.
C. M. Yonge,
Cameos from English History,
series 6, chapter 9.
ALSO IN:
J. L. Motley,
Life and Death of John of Barneveld,
chapters 14-22 (volume 2).
J. Arminius,
Works, etc.; edited by Nichols,
volume 1.
NETHERLANDS: (United Provinces): A. D.1608-1620.
Residence of the exiled Independents who afterwards founded
Plymouth Colony in New England.
See INDEPENDENTS: A. D. 1604-1617.
NETHERLANDS: (United Provinces): A. D. 1609.
The founding of the Bank of Amsterdam.
See MONEY AND BANKING: 17TH CENTURY.
NETHERLANDS: (United Provinces): A. D. 1609.
Henry Hudson's voyage of exploration.
See AMERICA: A. D. 1609.
NETHERLANDS: (United Provinces): A. D. 1610-1614.
Possession taken of New Netherland (New York).
See NEW YORK: A. D. 1610-1614.
NETHERLANDS: (United Provinces): A. D. 1621.
Incorporation of the Dutch West India Company.
See NEW YORK: A. D. 1621-1646.
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1621-1633.
End of the Twelve Years Truce.
Renewal of war.
Death of Prince Maurice.
Reversion of the sovereignty of the Spanish Provinces to
the king of Spain.
"In 1621, the twelve years' truce being expired, the King of
Spain and the Archdukes offered to renew it, on the condition
that the States would acknowledge their ancient sovereigns,
one of whom, the Archduke Albert, died this year. Even if the
States had been inclined to negotiate, the will of Maurice was
in the ascendant, and the war was renewed. The Dutch, it is
true, were now entirely insulated. James of England was making
overtures to Spain and being cajoled. France, who had wished
to save Barneveldt, was unfriendly in consequence of the
manner in which her intercession had been treated. The Dutch
party which was opposed to Maurice was exasperated, and the
great counsellor was no more there to advise his country in
its emergencies. The safety of Holland lay in the fact that
the wars of religion were being waged on a wider and more
distant field, for a larger stake, and with larger armies. Not
content with murdering Barneveldt, Maurice took care to ruin
his family. But at last, and just before his death in 1625,
Maurice, in the bitterness of disappointment, said, 'As long
as the old rascal was alive, we had counsels and money; now we
can find neither one nor the other.' … The memory of
Barneveldt was avenged, even though his reputation has not
been rehabilitated. Frederic Henry, half-brother of Maurice,
was at once made Captain and Admiral-General of the States,
and soon after Stadtholder. … Very speedily the controversy
which had threatened to tear Holland asunder was silenced by
mutual consent, except in synods and presbyteries. In a few
years, Holland became, as far as the government was concerned,
the most tolerant country in the world, the asylum of those
whom bigotry hunted from their native land. Hence it became
the favourite abode of those wealthy and enterprising Jews,
who greatly increased its wealth by aiding its external and
internal commerce."
J. E. T. Rogers,
Story of Holland,
chapter 26.
"Marquis Spinola commenced the campaign by the siege of.
Bergen-op-Zoom, with a considerable Spanish army, in 1622, but
Maurice was enabled to meet him with the united forces of
Mansfeld, Brunswick [see GERMANY: A. D. 1621-1623], and his
own, and obliged the Marquis to raise the siege. He afterwards
encountered Don Gonsalvo de Cordova, who endeavoured to stay
their passage into Germany with a Spanish force near Fleurus;
but he also was defeated. After this, however, Prince Maurice
could effect nothing considerable, but maintained his ground
solely by acting on the defensive during the entire year 1623.
… He could not prevent the capture [by Spinola] of Breda,
one of the strongest fortifications of the Low Countries. …
The mortification at being unable to relieve this place during
a long blockade of six months preyed upon the mind of Prince
Maurice, whose health had already begun to give way. … An
access of fever obliged him to quit the field and withdraw to
the Hague, where he died in 1625, at the age of 58 years."
Sir E. Cust,
Lives of the Warriors of the Thirty Years' War:
Maurice of Orange-Nassau,
page 47.
{2279}
The new Stadtholder, Prince Frederic Henry, made every effort
to raise the siege of Breda, but without success, and the
place was surrendered (June 2, 1625) to the Spaniards. In the
next year little was accomplished on either side; but in 1627
the Prince took Grol, after a siege of less than one month. In
1628 the Dutch Admiral Piet Heyn captured one of the Spanish
silver-fleets, with a cargo, largely pure silver, valued at
12,000,000 florins. In 1629 the king of Spain and the
Archduchess made overtures of peace, with offers of a renewed
truce for 24 years. "But no sooner did the negotiations become
public than they encountered general and violent opposition,"
especially from the West India Company, which found the war
profitable, and from the ministers of the church. At the same
time the operations of the war assumed more activity. The
Prince laid siege to Bois-le-Duc, a Brabant town deemed
impregnable, and the Spaniards, to draw him away, invaded
Guelderland, and captured Amersfoort, near Utrecht. They laid
waste the country, and were compelled to retire, without
interrupting the siege of Bois-le-Duc, which presently was
surrendered. In 1631 the Prince undertook the siege of
Dunkirk, which had long been a rendezvous of pirates,
troublesome to the commerce of all the surrounding nations;
but on the approach of a Spanish relieving force, the deputies
of the States, who had authority over the commander, required
him to relinquish the undertaking. In 1632, the Prince
achieved a great success, in the siege and reduction of
Maestricht, which he accomplished, notwithstanding his lines
were attacked by a Spanish army of 24,000 men, and by an army
from Germany, under the Imperial general Pappenheim, who
brought 16,000 men to assist in raising the siege. In the face
of these two armies, Maestricht was forced to capitulate, and
the fall of Limburg followed. Peace negotiations were reopened
the same year, but came to nothing, and they were followed
shortly by the death of the Archduchess Isabella. "At her
death, the Netherlands, in pursuance of the terms of the
surrender made by Philip II., reverted to the King of Spain,
who placed the government, after it had been administered a
short time by a commission, in the hands of the Marquis of
Aitona, commander-in-chief of the army, until the arrival of
his brother Ferdinand, cardinal and archbishop of Toledo
[known as 'the Cardinal Infant'], whom he had, during the
lifetime of the Archduchess, appointed her successor."
C. M. Davies,
History of Holland,
part 3, chapter 6 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
C. R. Markham,
The Fighting Veres,
part 2, chapter 4.
NETHERLANDS: (United Provinces): A. D. 1623.
The massacre of Amboyna.
See INDIA: A. D. 1600-1702.
NETHERLANDS: (United Provinces): A. D. 1624-1661.
Conquests in Brazil and their loss.
See BRAZIL: A. D. 1510-1661.
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1625.
The Protestant alliance in the Thirty Years War.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1624-1626.
NETHERLANDS: (United Provinces): A. D. 1635.
Alliance with France against Spain and Austria.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1634-1639.
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1635-1638.
The Cardinal Infant in the government
of the Spanish Provinces.
His campaigns against the Dutch and French.
Invasion of France.
Dutch capture of Breda.
In 1635, the Archduchess Isabella having recently died, it was
thought expedient in Spain "that a member of the royal family
should be intrusted with the administration of the Netherlands
[Spanish Provinces]. This appointment was accordingly
conferred on the Cardinal Infant [Ferdinand, son of Philip
III.], who was at that time in Italy, where he had collected a
considerable army. With this force, amounting to about 12,000
men, he had passed in the preceding year through Germany, on
his route to the Netherlands, and, having formed a junction
with the Imperialists, under the King of Hungary, he greatly
contributed to the victory gained over the Swedes and German
Protestants, at Nordlingen. …
See GERMANY: A. D. 1634-1639.
The Cardinal Infant entered on the civil and military
government of the Spanish Netherlands nearly at the time when
the seizure of the Elector of Treves had called forth from
France an open declaration of war. By uniting the newly raised
troops which he had brought with him from Italy to the veteran
legions of the provinces, he found himself at the head of a
considerable military force. At the same time, an army of
20,000 French was assembled under the inspection of their king
at Amiens, and was intrusted to Chatillon, and Mareschal Brezé
the brother-in-law of Richelieu. … It was intended, however,
that this army should form a junction with the Dutch at
Maestricht, after which the troops of both nations should be
placed under the orders of Frederic Henry, Prince of Orange,
who had inherited all the military talents of his ancestors.
In order to counteract this movement, the Cardinal Infant
separated his army into two divisions. One was ordered to
confront the Dutch, and the other, under Prince Thomas of
Savoy, marched to oppose the progress of the French. This
latter division of the Spaniards encountered the enemy at
Avein, in the territory of Liege; but though it had taken up a
favourable position, it was totally defeated, and forced to
retreat to Namur. The French army then continued its march
with little farther interruption, and effected its intended
union with the Dutch in the neighbourhood of Maestricht. After
this junction, the Prince of Orange assumed the command of the
allied army, which now stormed and sacked Tillemont, where
great cruelties were committed. … The union of the two
armies spread terror throughout the Spanish Netherlands, and
the outrages practised at Tillemont gave the Catholics a
horror at the French name and alliance. … The Flemings,
forgetting their late discontents with the Spanish government,
now made the utmost efforts against their invaders. … The
Spanish prince … contrived to elude a general engagement.
… His opponents … were obliged to employ their arms in
besieging towns. It was believed for some time that they
intended to invest Brussels, but the storm fell on Louvain."
The Emperor now sent from Germany a force of 18,000 men, under
Piccolomini, "to the succour of the Cardinal Infant.
{2280}
The slowness of all the operations of the Prince of Orange
afforded sufficient time for these auxiliaries to cut off the
French supplies of provisions, and advance to the relief of
Louvain. On the intelligence of their approach, the
half-famished French abandoned the siege, and, after suffering
severely in their retreat, retired to recruit at Ruremonde.
The Dutch afforded them no assistance, and showed them but
little sympathy in their disasters. Though the Dutch hated
Spain, they were jealous of France, and dreaded an increase of
its power in the Netherlands. … Mareschals Chatillon and
Brezé, who were thus in a great measure the victims of the
policy of their allies, were under the necessity of leading
back beyond the Meuse, to Nimeguen, the wretched remains of
their army, now reduced to 9,000 men. … After the departure
of the French, the exertions of the Prince of Orange were
limited, during this season, to an attempt for the recovery of
the strong fortress of Skink, which had recently been reduced
by the Spaniards. The Cardinal Infant, availing himself of the
opportunity thus presented to him, quickly regained, by aid of
the Austrian reinforcements, his superiority in the field. He
took several fortresses from the Dutch, and sent to the
frontiers of France detachments which levied contributions
over great part of Picardy and Champagne. … Encouraged by
these successes, Olivarez [the Spanish minister] redoubled his
exertions, and now boldly planned invasions of France from
three different quarters"—to enter Picardy on the north,
Burgundy on the east, and Guienne at the south. "Of all these
expeditions, the most successful, at least for a time, was the
invasion of Picardy, which, indeed, had nearly proved fatal to
the French monarchy. By orders of the Cardinal Infant, his
generals, Prince Thomas of Savoy, Piccolomini, and John de
Vert, or Wert, … began their march at the head of an army
which exceeded 30,000 men, and was particularly strong in
cavalry. … No interruption being … offered by the Dutch,
the Spanish generals entered Picardy [1636], and seized almost
without resistance on La Capelle and Catelet, which the French
ministry expected would have occupied their arms for some
months. The Count de Soissons, who was already thinking more
of his plots against Richelieu than the defence of his
country, did nothing to arrest the progress of the Spaniards,
till they arrived at the Somme," and there but little. They
forced the passage of the river with slight difficulty, and
"occupied Roye, to the south of the Somme, on the river Oise;
and having thus obtained an entrance into France, spread
themselves over the whole country lying between these rivers.
The smoke of the villages to which they set fire was seen from
the heights in the vicinity of Paris; and such in that capital
was the consternation consequent on these events that it seems
probable, had the Spanish generals marched straight on Paris,
the city would have fallen into their hands." But Prince
Thomas was not bold enough for the exploit, and prudently
"receded with his army to form the siege of Corbie. This town
presented no great resistance to his arms, but the time
occupied by its capture allowed the Parisians to recover from
their consternation, and to prepare the means of defence."
They raised an army of 60,000 men, chiefly apprentices and
artisans of the capital, before which Prince Thomas was
obliged to retreat. "The French quickly recovered all those
fortified places in Picardy which had been previously lost by
the incapacity, or, as Richelieu alleged, by the treachery of
their governors. But they could not prevent the Spaniards from
plundering and desolating the country as they retired. … The
Cardinal Infant was obliged to remain on the defensive for
some time after his retreat from Picardy to the Netherlands,
which were anew invaded by a French force, under the Cardinal
La Valette, a younger son of the Duke d'Epernon. But even
while restricting his operations to defence, the Infant could
not prevent the capture by the French of Ivry and Landreci in
Hainault. While opposing the enemy in that quarter, he
received intelligence of an unexpected attempt on Breda by the
Dutch [1637]. He immediately hastened to its relief; but the
Prince of Orange having rapidly collected 6,000 or 7,000
peasants, whom he had employed in forming intrenchments and
drawing lines of circumvallation, was so well fortified on the
arrival of the Cardinal Infant, who had crossed the Scheldt at
Antwerp, and approached with not fewer than 25,000 men, that
that Prince, in despair of forcing the enemy's camp, or in any
way succouring Breda, marched towards Guelderland. In that
province he took Venlo and Ruremonde; but Breda, as he had
anticipated, surrendered to the Dutch after a siege of nine
weeks. … Its capture greatly relieved the Dutch in Brabant,
who now, for many years, had been checked by an enemy in the
heart of their territories. … Early in the year 1638, the
Infant resumed offensive operations, and again rendered
himself formidable to his enemies. He frustrated the attempts
which the Dutch had concerted against Antwerp. … In person
he beat off the army of the Prince of Orange, who had invested
Gueldres; and, about the same time, his active generals;
Prince Thomas of Savoy and Piccolomini, compelled the French
to raise the siege of St. Omer."
J. Dunlop,
Memoirs of Spain from 1621 to 1700,
volume 1, chapter 4.
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1643.
Invasion of France by the Spaniards and their defeat at Rocroi.
Loss of Thionville and the line of the Moselle.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1642-1643; and 1643.
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1645-1646.
French campaign in Flanders, under Orleans and Enghien (Conde).
Siege and capture of Dunkirk.
"In 1645, Orleans led the [French] army into Flanders, and
began the campaign with the capture of Mardyck. A few weeks of
leisurely siege resulted in the conquest of some towns, and by
the first of September Gaston sought rest at the Court. As it
was now well towards the end of the season, the Hollanders
were at last ready to cooperate, and they joined the French
under Gassion and Rantzau. But the allied armies did little
except march and countermarch, and at the end of the year the
Spaniards surprised the French garrison at Mardyck and retook
the only place of importance they had lost. … Gaston was,
however, well content even with the moderate glory of such
warfare. In 1646 he commanded an army of 35,000 men, one
portion of which was led by Enghien himself. The Hollanders
were under arms unusually early, but they atoned for this by
accomplishing nothing. The French laid siege to Courtrai,
which in due time surrendered, and they then spent three weeks
in a vigorous siege of Mardyck.
{2281}
This place was finally captured for the second time in
fourteen months. It was now late in August, and Orleans was
ready to rest from a campaign which had lasted three months.
… By the departure of Gaston the Duke of Enghien was left
free to attempt some important movement, and his thoughts
turned upon the capture of the city of Dunkirk. Dunkirk was
situated on the shore of the North Sea, in a position that
made it alike important and formidable to commerce. … Its
harbor leading to a canal in the city where a fleet might
safely enter, and its position near the shores of France and
the British Channel, had rendered it a frequent retreat for
pirates. The cruisers that captured the ships of the merchants
of Havre and Dieppe, or made plundering expeditions along the
shores of Picardy and Normandy, found safe refuge in the
harbor of Dunkirk. Its name was odious through northern
France, alike to the shipper and the resident of the towns
along the coast. The ravages of the pirates of Dunkirk are
said to have cost France as much as a million a year. … The
position of Dunkirk was such that it seemed to defy attack,
and the strangeness and wildness of its approaches added
terror to its name. It was surrounded by vast plains of sand,
far over which often spread the waters of the North Sea, and
its name was said to signify the church of the dunes. Upon
them the fury of the storms often worked strange changes. What
had seemed solid land would be swallowed up in some tempest.
What had been part of the ocean would be left so that men and
wagons could pass over what the day before had been as
inaccessible as the Straits of Dover. An army attempting a
siege would find itself on these wild dunes far removed from
any places for supplies, and exposed to the utmost severity of
storm and weather. Tents could hardly be pitched, and the
changing sands would threaten the troops with destruction. The
city was, moreover, garrisoned by 3,000 soldiers, and by 3,000
of the citizens and 2,000 sailors. … The ardor of Enghien
was increased by these difficulties, and he believed that with
skill and vigor the perils of a siege could be overcome. This
plan met the warm approval of Mazarin. … Enghien advanced
with his army of about 15,000 men, and on the 10th of
September the siege began. It was necessary to prevent
supplies being received by sea. Tromp, excited to hearty
admiration of the genius of the young general, sailed with ten
ships into the harbor, and cut off communications. Enghien, in
the meantime, was pressing the circumvallation of the city
with the utmost vigor. … Half fed, wet, sleepless, the men
worked on, inspired by the zeal of their leader. Piccolomini
attempted to relieve the city, but he could not force
Enghien's entrenchments, except by risking a pitched battle,
and that he did not dare to venture. Mines were now carried
under the city by the besiegers, and a great explosion made a
breach in the wall. The French and Spanish met, but the smoke
and confusion were so terrible that both sides at last fell
back in disorder. The French finally discovered that the
advantage was really theirs, and held the position. Nothing
now remained but a final and bloody assault, but Leyde did not
think that honor required him to await this. He agreed that if
he did not receive succor by the 10th of October, the city
should be surrendered. Piccolomini dared not risk the last
army in Flanders in an assault on Enghien's entrenchments,
and, on October 11th, the Spanish troops evacuated the town. A
siege of three weeks had conquered obstacles of man and
nature, and destroyed the scourge of French commerce."
J. B. Perkins,
France under [Richelieu and] Mazarin,
chapter 8 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
Lord Mahon,
Life of Condé,
chapter 2.
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1646-1648.
Final Negotiation of Peace between Spain and the
United Provinces.
"The late campaign had been so unfortunate [to the Spaniards]
that they felt their only possibility of obtaining reasonable
terms, or of continuing the war with the hope of a change in
fortune, was to break the alliance between Holland and
France. A long debt of gratitude, assistance rendered in the
struggle with Spain when assistance was valuable, the treaty
of 1635 renewed in 1644, forbade Holland making a peace,
except jointly with France. On the other hand, the
States-General were weary of war, and jealous of the power and
ambition of the French. … This disposition was skilfully
fostered by the Spanish envoys. Pau and Knuyt,
plenipotentiaries from Holland to the Congress at Münster
[where, in part, the negotiations of the Peace of Westphalia
were in progress—see GERMANY: A. D. 1648], were gained to the
Spanish interest, as Mazarin claimed, by the promise to each
of 100,000 crowns. But, apart from bribes, the Spanish used
Mazarin's own plans to alarm the Hollanders. … It was
intimated to the Hollanders that France was about to make a
separate peace, that the Spanish Netherlands were to be given
her, and that perhaps with the hand of the infanta might be
transferred what claims Spain still made on the allegiance of
the United Provinces. The French protested in vain they had
never thought of making any treaty unless Holland joined, and
that the proposed marriage of Louis with the infanta had been
idle talk, suggested by the Spanish for the purpose of
alarming the States-General. The Hollanders were suspicious,
and they became still more eager for peace. … In the spring
of 1646, seventy-one proposed articles had been submitted to
the Spanish for their consideration. The French made repeated
protests against these steps, but the States-General insisted
that they were only acting with such celerity as should enable
them to have the terms of their treaty adjusted as soon as
those of the French. The successes of 1646 and the capture of
Dunkirk quickened the desires of the United Provinces for a
treaty with their ancient enemy. … In December, 1646,
articles were signed between Spain and Holland, to be inserted
in the treaty of Münster, when that should be settled upon,
though the States-General still declared that no peace should
be made unless the terms were approved by France. Active
hostilities were again commenced in 1647, but little progress
was made in Flanders during this campaign. Though the
Hollanders had not actually made peace with Spain, they gave
the French no aid. … On January 30, 1648, the treaty was at
last signed. 'One would think,' wrote Mazarin, 'that for
eighty years France had been warring with the provinces, and
Spain had been protecting them. They have stained their
reputation with a shameful blemish.'
{2282}
It was eighty years since William of Orange had issued his
proclamation inviting all the Netherlands to take up arms 'to
oppose the violent tyranny of the Spaniards.' Unlike the truce
of 1609, a formal and final peace was now made. The United
Provinces were acknowledged as free and sovereign states. At
the time of the truce the Spaniards had only treated with them
'in quality of, and as holding them for independent
provinces.' By a provision which had increased the eagerness
for peace of the burghers and merchants of the United
Provinces, it was agreed that the Escaut [Scheldt] should be
closed. The wealth and commerce of Antwerp were thus
sacrificed for the benefit of Amsterdam. The trade with the
Indies was divided between the two countries. Numerous
commercial advantages were secured and certain additional
territory was ceded to the States-General."
J. B. Perkins,
France under [Richelieu and] Mazarin,
chapter 8 (volume 1).
"It had … become a settled conviction of Holland that a
barrier of Spanish territory between the United Provinces and
France was necessary as a safeguard against the latter. But
the idea of fighting to maintain that barrier had not yet
arisen, though fighting was the outcome of the doctrine. All
that the United Provinces now did, or could do, was simply to
back out of the war with Spain, sit still, and look passively
upon the conflict between her and France for possession of the
barrier, until it should please the two belligerents to make
peace."
J. Geddes,
History of the Administration of John De Witt,
book 2, chapter 1, section 1 (volume 1).
NETHERLANDS: (Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1647-1648.
The Spanish war with France.
Siege and Battle of Lens.
"While Condé was at the head of the army of the Netherlands,
it at least suffered no disaster; but, while he was affording
the enemy a triumph in Spain [by his failure at Lerida,—the
army which he left behind him was equally unfortunate].
See SPAIN: A. D. 1644-1646.
As he had taken some regiments with him to Spain, it did not
exceed 16,000 men; and in 1647 was commanded by the two
marshals, Gassion and Rantzau," who exercised the command on
alternate days. Both were brave and skilful officers, but they
were hostile to one another, and Rantzau was, unfortunately, a
drunkard. "The Spanish army had been raised to 22,000 men, and
besides being superior in numbers to them, was now under the
command of a singularly active leader, the Archduke Leopold.
He took town after town before their face; and towards the end
of June laid siege to Landrecies. The danger of so important a
place stimulated Mazarin to send some strong battalions,
including the royal guards, to reinforce the army: and the two
marshals made skilful dispositions to surprise the Spanish
camp. By a night march of great rapidity, they reached the
neighbourhood of the enemy without their presence being
suspected; but the next morning, when the attack was to be
made, it was Rantzau's turn to command; and he was too
helplessly drunk to give the necessary orders. Before he had
recovered his consciousness daylight had revealed his danger
to the archduke, and he had taken up a position in which he
could give battle with advantage. Greatly mortified, the
French were forced to draw off, and leave Landrecies to its
fate. As some apparent set-off to their losses, they succeeded
in taking Dixmude, and one or two other unimportant towns, and
were besieging Lens, when Gassion was killed; and though, a
few days afterwards, that town was taken, its capture made but
small amends. … Though the war was almost at an end in
Germany, Turenne was still in that country; and, therefore,
the next year there was no one who could be sent to replace
Gassion but Condé and Grammont, who fortunately for the
prince, was his almost inseparable comrade and adviser. …
Though 16,000 men had been thought enough for Gassion and
Rantzau, 30,000 were now collected to enable Condé to make a
more successful campaign. The archduke had received no
reinforcements, and had now only 18,000 men to make head
against him; yet with this greatly inferior force he, for a
while, balanced Condé's successes; losing Ypres, it is true,
but taking Courtrai and Furnes, and defeating and almost
annihilating a division with which the prince had detached
Rantzau to make an attempt upon Ostend. At last, in the middle
of August, he laid siege to Lens, the capture of which had, as
we have already mentioned, been the last exploit of the French
army in the preceding campaign, and which was now retaken
without the garrison making the slightest effort at
resistance. But, just as the first intelligence of his having
sat down before it reached Condé, he was joined by the Count
d'Erlach with a reinforcement of 5,000 men from the German
army; and he resolved to march against the archduke in the
hope of saving" the place. "He arrived in sight of the town on
the 20th of August, a few hours after it had surrendered; and
he found the archduke's victorious army in a position which,
eager as he was for battle, he could not venture to attack.
For Leopold had 18,000 men under arms, and the force that
Condé had been able to bring with him did not exceed 14,000,
with 18 guns. For the first time in his life he decided on
retreating;" but early in the retreat his army was thrown into
disorder by an attack from the archduke's cavalry, commanded
by General Beck. "All was nearly lost, when Grammont turned
the fortune of the day. He was in the van, but the moment that
he learnt what was taking place behind him, he halted the
advanced guard, and leading it back towards the now triumphant
enemy, gave time for those regiments which had been driven in
to rally behind the firm line which he presented. … It soon
came to be a contest of hard fighting, unvaried by manœuvres
on either side; and in hard fighting no troops could stand
before those who might be lead by Condé. … At last victory
declared for him in every part of his line. He had sustained a
heavy loss himself, but less than that of the enemy, who left
3,000 of their number slain upon the field; while 5,000
prisoners, among whom was Beck himself, struck down by a
mortal wound, and nearly all their artillery and baggage,
attested the reality and greatness of his triumph."
C. D. Yonge,
History of France under the Bourbons,
chapter 10 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
Sir E. Cust,
Lives of the Warriors of the Civil Wars,
part 1, pages 149-152.
{2283}
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1647-1650.
Suspension of the Stadtholdership.
Supremacy of the States of Holland.
The fourth stadtholder, William II., who succeeded his father,
Frederick Henry, in 1647, "was young and enterprising, and not at
all disposed to follow the pacific example of his father. …
His attempt at a coup d'état only prepared the way for an
interregnum. … He was brother-in-law to the Elector of
Brandenburg … and son-in-law to Charles I. of England and
Henrietta Maria, the sister of Louis XIII. … The proud
descendant of the Stuarts, the Princess Mary, who had been
married to him when hardly more than a child, thought it
beneath her not to be the wife of a sovereign, and encouraged
her husband not to be satisfied to remain merely 'the official
of a republic.' Thus encouraged, the son of Frederick Henry
cherished the secret purpose of transforming the elective
stadtholdership into an hereditary monarchy. … He needed
supreme authority to enable him to render assistance to
Charles I. … Finding in the opposition of the States an
insurmountable obstacle to his wish of intervention, he sought
the support of France, … and was now ready to come to an
understanding with Mazarin to break the treaty of Munster and
wrest the Netherlands from Spain. Mazarin promised in return
to help him to assert his authority over the States. … But
if William desired war, the United Provinces, and in
particular the province of Holland, could not dispense with
peace. … The States of Holland … fixed the period for the
disbanding of the twenty-nine companies whose dismissal had
been promised to them. After twelve days of useless
deliberations they issued definite orders to that effect. The
step had been provoked, but it was precipitate and might give
rise to a legal contest as to their competency. The Prince of
Orange, therefore, eager to hasten a struggle from which he
expected an easy victory, chose to consider the resolution of
the States of Holland as a signal for the rupture of the
Union, and the very next day solemnly demanded reparation from
the States-General, who in their turn issued a counter order.
The Prince made skilful use of the rivalry of power between
the two assemblies to obtain for himself extraordinary powers
which were contrary to the laws of the Confederation. By the
terms of the resolution, which was passed by only four
provinces, of which two were represented by but one deputy
each, he was authorised to take all measures necessary for the
maintenance of order and peace, and particularly for the
preservation of the Union. 'The States-General consequently
commissioned him to visit the town councils of Holland,
accompanied by six members of the States-General and of the
Council of State, with all the pomp of a military escort,
including a large number of officers. He was charged to
address them with remonstrances and threats intended to
intimidate the provincial States.' This was the first act of
the coup d'état that he had prepared, and his mistake was
quickly shown him." The Prince gained nothing by his
visitation of the towns. At Amsterdam he was not permitted to
enter the place with his following, and he returned to the
Hague especially enraged against that bold and independent
city. He planned an expedition to take it by surprise; but the
citizens got timely warning and his scheme was baffled. He had
succeeded, however, in arresting and imprisoning six of the
most influential deputies of the Assembly of Holland, and his
attitude was formidable enough to extort some concessions from
the popular party, by way of compromise. A state of suspicious
quiet was restored for the time, which William improved by
renewing negotiations for a secret treaty with France.
"Arrogating to himself already the right to dispose as he
pleased of the republic, he signed a convention with Count
d'Estrades, whom he had summoned to the Hague. By this the
King of France and the Prince of Orange engaged themselves 'to
attack conjointly the Netherlands on May 1, 1651, with an army
of 20,000 foot and 10,000 horse, to break at the same time
with Cromwell, to re-establish Charles II. as King of England,
and to make no treaty with Spain excepting in concert with
each other.' The Prince of Orange guaranteed a fleet of 50
vessels besides the land contingent, and in return for his
co-operation was promised the absolute possession of the city
of Antwerp and the Duchy of Brabant or Marquisate of the Holy
Roman Empire. William thus interested France in the success of
his cause by making ready to resume the war with Spain, and
calculated, as he told his confidants, on profiting by her
assistance to disperse the cabal opposed to him. … The
internal pacification amounted then to no more than a truce,
when three months later the Prince of Orange, having
over-fatigued and heated himself in the chase, was seized with
small-pox, of which in a few days he died. He was thus carried
off at the age of 24, in the full force and flower of his age,
leaving only one son, born a week after his father's death.
… His attempt at a coup d'état was destined to press heavily
and long upon the fate of the posthumous son, who had to wait
22 years before succeeding to his ancestral functions. It
closed the succession to him for many years, by making the
stadtholdership a standing menace to the public freedom. …
The son of William II., an orphan before his birth, and named
William like his father, seemed destined to succeed to little
more than the paternal name. … Three days after the death of
William II., the former deputies, whom he had treated as state
prisoners and deprived of all their offices, were recalled to
take their seats in the Assembly. At the same time the
provincial Town Councils assumed the power of nominating their
own magistrates, which had almost always been left to the
pleasure of the Stadtholder, and thus obtained the full
enjoyment of municipal freedom. The States of Holland, on
their side, grasped the authority hitherto exercised in their
province by the Prince of Orange, and claimed successively all
the rights of sovereignty. The States of Zealand … exhibited
the same eagerness to free themselves from all subjection. …
Thus, before declaring the stadtholdership vacant, the office
was deprived of its prerogatives. To complete this
transformation of the government, the States of Holland took
the initiative in summoning to the Hague a great assembly of
the Confederation, which met at the beginning of the year
1651. … The congress was called upon to decide between two
forms of constitution. The question was whether the United
Provinces should be a republic governed by the States-General,
or whether the government should belong to the States of each
province, with only a reservation in favour of the obligations
imposed by the Act of Union. Was each province to be sovereign
in itself, or subject to the federal power?" The result was a
suspension and practical abolition of the stadtholdership.
"Freed from the counterbalancing power of the Stadtholder,
Holland to a great extent absorbed the federal power, and was
the gainer by all that that power lost. …
{2284}
The States of Holland, … destined henceforward to be the
principal instrument of government of the republic, was
composed partly of nobles and partly of deputies from the
towns. … The Grand Pensionary was the minister of the States
of Holland. He was appointed for five years, and represented
them in the States-General. … Called upon by the vacancy in
the stadtholdership to the government of the United Provinces,
without any legal power of enforcing obedience, Holland
required a statesman who could secure this political supremacy
and use it for her benefit. The nomination of John de Witt as
Grand Pensionary placed at her service one of the youngest
members of the assembly."
A. L. Pontalis,
John de Witt,
chapters 1-2 (volume 1).
NETHERLANDS: (Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1648.
Still held to form a part of the Empire.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1648.
NETHERLANDS: (United Provinces): A. D. 1648-1665.
Prosperity and pre-eminence of the Dutch Republic.
The causes.
"That this little patch of earth, a bog rescued from the
waters, warred on ever by man and by the elements, without
natural advantages except those of contact with the sea,
should in the middle of the seventeenth century have become
the commercial centre of Europe, is one of the phenomena of
history. But in the explanation of this phenomenon history has
one of its most instructive lessons. Philip II. said of
Holland, 'that it was the country nearest to hell.' Well might
he express such an opinion. He had buried around the walls of
its cities more than three hundred thousand Spanish soldiers,
and had spent in the attempt at its subjugation more than two
hundred million ducats. This fact alone would account for his
abhorrence, but, in addition, the republic was in its every
feature opposed to the ideal country of a bigot and a despot.
The first element which contributed to its wealth, as well as
to the vast increase of its population, was its religious
toleration. … This, of course, was as incomprehensible to a
Spanish Catholic as it was to a High-Churchman or to a
Presbyterian in England. That Lutherans, Calvinists,
Anabaptists, Jews, and Catholics should all be permitted to
live under the same government seemed to the rest of Europe
like flying in the face of Providence. Critics at this time
occasionally said that the Hollanders cared nothing for
religion; that with them theology was of less account than
commerce. To taunts like these no reply was needed by men who
could point to their record of eighty years of war. This war
had been fought for liberty of conscience, but more than all,
as the greater includes the less, for civil liberty. During
its continuance, and at every crisis, Catholics had stood side
by side with Protestants to defend their country, as they had
done in England when the Spanish Armada appeared upon her
coast. It would have been a strange reward for their fidelity
to subject them, as Elizabeth did, to a relentless
persecution, upon the pretext that they were dangerous to the
State. In addition to the toleration, there were other causes
leading to the marvellous prosperity of the republic, which
are of particular interest to Americans. In 1659, Samuel Lamb,
a prominent and far-seeing London merchant, published a
pamphlet, in the form of a letter to Cromwell, urging the
establishment of a bank in England similar to the one at
Amsterdam. In this pamphlet, which Lord Somers thought worthy
of preservation, the author gives the reasons, as they
occurred to him, which accounted for the vast superiority of
Holland over the rest of Europe as a commercial nation. … As
the foundation of a bank for England was the subject of the
letter, the author naturally lays particular stress upon that
factor, but the other causes which he enumerates as explaining
the great trade of the republic are the following: First. The
statesmen sitting at the helm in Holland are many of them
merchants, bred to trade from their youth, improved by foreign
travel, and acquainted with all the necessities of commerce.
Hence, their laws and treaties are framed with wisdom. Second.
In Holland when a merchant dies, his property is equally
divided among his children, and the business is continued and
expanded, with all its traditions and inherited experience. In
England, on the contrary, the property goes to the eldest son,
who often sets up for a country gentleman, squanders his
patrimony, and neglects the business by which his father had
become enriched. Third. The honesty of the Hollanders in their
manufacturing and commercial dealings. When goods are made up
in Holland, they sell everywhere without question, for the
purchaser knows that they are exactly as represented in
quality, weight, and measure. Not so with England's goods. Our
manufacturers are so given to fraud and adulteration as to
bring their commodities into disgrace abroad. 'And so the
Dutch have the pre-eminence in the sale of their manufactures
before us, by their true making, to their very files and
needles.' Fourth. The care and vigilance of the government in
the laying of impositions so as to encourage their own
manufactures; the skill and rapidity with which they are
changed to meet the shifting wants of trade; the encouragement
given by ample rewards from the public treasury for useful
inventions and improvements; and the promotion of men to
office for services and not for favor or sinister ends. Such
were the causes of the commercial supremacy of the Dutch as
they appeared to an English merchant of the time, and all
modern investigations support his view. … Sir Joshua
[Josiah] Child, writing a few years later ['A New Discourse of
Trade, page 2, and after—1665], gives a fuller explanation of
the great prosperity of the Netherland Republic. He evidently
had Lamb's pamphlet before him, for he enumerates all the
causes set forth by his predecessor. In addition, he gives
several others, as to some of which we shall see more
hereafter. Among these are the general education of the
people, including the women, religious toleration, care of the
poor, low custom duties and high excise, registration of
titles to real estate, low interest, the laws permitting the
assignment of debts, and the judicial system under which
controversies between merchants can be decided at one fortieth
part of the expense in England. … Probably, no body of men
governing a state were ever more enlightened and better
acquainted with the necessities of legislation than were these