SECTION 1.
Letter from lieut.-general Graham to the right honourable Henry Wellesley, Isla de Leon, 24th March, 1811.
SIR,
You will do justice to my reluctance to enter into any controversy for the purpose of counteracting the effects of that obloquy which you yourself and many others assured me my conduct was exposed to by the reports circulated, at Cadiz, relative to the issue of the late expedition.
But a copy of a printed statement of general La Peña having been shewn to me, which, by implication at least, leaves the blame of the failure of the most brilliant prospects on me, it becomes indispensably necessary that I should take up my pen in self-defence.
Having already sent you a copy of my despatch to the earl of Liverpool, with a report of the action, I will not trouble you with a detail of the first movements of the army, nor with any other observation relative to them, than that the troops suffered much unnecessary fatigue by marching in the night, and without good guides.
Considering the nature of the service we were engaged in, I was most anxious that the army should not come into contest with the enemy in an exhausted state, nor be exposed to the attack of the enemy but when it was well collected; and, in consequence of representations to this effect, I understood that the march of the afternoon of the 4th was to be a short one, to take up for the night a position near Conil; to prepare which, staff-officers, of both nations, were sent forward with a proper escort.
The march was, nevertheless, continued through the night, with those frequent and harassing halts which the necessity of groping for the way occasioned.
When the British division began its march from the position of Barrosa to that of Bermeja, I left the general on the Barrosa height, nor did I know of his intentions of quitting it; and, when I ordered the division to countermarch in the wood, I did so to support the troops left for its defence, and believing the general to be there in person. In this belief I sent no report of the attack, which was made so near the spot where the general was supposed to be, and, though confident in the bravery of the British troops, I was not less so in the support I should receive from the Spanish army. The distance, however, to Bermeja is trifling, and no orders were given from head-quarters for the movement of any corps of the Spanish army to support the British division, to prevent its defeat in this unequal contest, or to profit of the success earned at so heavy expense. The voluntary zeal of the two small battalions, (Walloon guards and Ciudad Real,) which had been detached from my division, brought them alone back from the wood; but, notwithstanding their utmost efforts, they could only come at the close of the action.
Had the whole body of the Spanish cavalry, with the horse-artillery, been rapidly sent by the sea-beach to form in the plain, and to envelop the enemy’s left; had the greatest part of the infantry been marched through the pine-wood, in our rear, to turn his right, what success might have been expected from such decisive movements? The enemy must either have retired instantly, and without occasioning any serious loss to the British division, or he would have exposed himself to absolute destruction, his cavalry greatly outnumbered, his artillery lost, his columns mixed and in confusion; a general dispersion would have been the inevitable consequence of a close pursuit; our wearied men would have found spirits to go on and would have done so trusting to finding refreshments and repose at Chiclana. This moment was lost. Within a quarter of an hour’s ride of the scene of action, the general remained ignorant of what was passing, and nothing was done! Let not, then, this action of Barrosa form any part of the general result of the transactions of the day; it was an accidental feature; it was the result of no combination, it was equally unseen and unheeded by the Spanish staff; the British division, left alone, suffered the loss of more than one-fourth of its number, and became unfit for future exertion. Need I say more to justify my determination of declining any further co-operation in the field towards the prosecution of the object of the expedition? I am, however, free to confess that, having thus placed myself and the British division under the direction of the Spanish commander-in-chief in the field, (contrary to my instructions,) I should not have thought myself justified to my king and country to risk the absolute destruction of this division in a second trial. But I have right to claim credit for what would have been my conduct from what it was; and I will ask if it can be doubted, after my zealous co-operation throughout, and the ready assistance afforded to the troops left on Barrosa height, that the same anxiety for the success of the cause would not have secured to the Spanish army the utmost efforts of the British division during the whole of the enterprise, had we been supported as we had a right to expect?
There is not a man in the division who would not gladly have relinquished his claim to glory, acquired by the action of Barrosa, to have shared, with the Spaniards, the ultimate success that was within our grasp as it were.
The people of Spain, the brave and persevering people, are universally esteemed, respected, and admired by all who value liberty and independence; the hearts and hands of British soldiers will ever be with them; the cause of Spain is felt by all to be a common one.
I conclude with mentioning that the only request expressed to me, at head-quarters, on the morning of the 6th, on knowing of my intention to send the British troops across the river St. Petri, was that the opportunity of withdrawing the Spanish troops, during the night, was lost; and on my observing that, after such a defeat, there was no risk of attack from an enemy, a very contrary opinion was maintained.
In point of fact, no enemy ever appeared during several days employed in bringing off the wounded and burying the dead. It may be proper to remark on the report published relative to the enemy’s number at St. Petri, (4500 men of Villat’s division,) that, by the concurrent testimony of all the French officers here, general Villat’s division had charge of the whole line,—what, then, must be the strength of that division to have afforded 4500 men to St. Petri alone? In order to establish, by authentic documents, facts which may have been disputed, and to elucidate others, I enclose, by way of appendix, the reports of various officers of this division.
I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.
(Signed) Thos. Graham,
Lt.-General.
P.S. I must add this postscript distinctly to deny my having spoken, at head-quarters, in the evening of the 5th, of sending for more troops, or for provisions from the Isla. My visit was a very short one, of mere ceremony. I may have asked if the Spanish troops expected were arrived. This error must have arisen from the difficulty of conversing in a foreign language.
With this I send you a sketch of the ground, &c. of the action of Barrosa; by which it will be seen how impossible, according to my judgement, it would be for an enemy to expose his left flank, by making a direct attack through the wood on the Barmeja position, while that of Barrosa was occupied in force by the allied army.
SECTION 2.
Adjutant-general’s state of the troops assembled at Tarifa, under the command of the lieut.-general Graham, 25th Feb. 1810.
| Designations. | Number of bayonets. |
Commanders. | |
| Two squadrons of 2d German Hussars. | ” | Major Busche. | |
| Detachment of artillery. | Major Duncan. 10 guns | ||
| Detachment of engineers | 47 | Captain Birch. | |
| Brigade of guards, reinforced by a detachment of the 2d battalion 95th rifles | } | 1221 | Brigadier-gen. Dilke. |
| 1st battalion 28th foot; 2d battalion 67th; 2d battalion 87th; reinforced with 2 companies of the 20th Portuguese | } | 1764 | Colonel Wheatley. |
| Flank battalion composed of detachments of the 3d battalion 95th rifles and two companies of the 47th foot | } | 594 | Lt.-col. A. Barnard, 95th regt. |
| Two companies of 2d battalion 9th regt.; two companies of 1st battalion 28th regt.; two companies of 2d battalion 82 regt. | } | 475 | Lt.-col. Brown, 28th regt. |
| One Company of the royal staff corps | 33 | Lieutenant Reid. | |
| —— | |||
| Total number of bayonets | 4114 | ||
| The hussars were about | 180 | ||
| —— | |||
| Total of sabres and bayonets | 4294, | with 10 guns. | |
| —— | |||
SECTION 3.
Extract from a letter of general Frederick Ponsonby.
“I proceeded rapidly towards the entrance of the wood, found the Germans, and conducted them along the right flank of our little army. We came in contact with the French dragoons, whom we found nearly abreast of our front line and about three hundred yards apart from it on our right flank, our line had just halted and the firing was gradually decreasing at the time we charged. I do not imagine the French dragoons much exceeded us in number, they behaved well, but if we had had half a dozen stout squadrons the mass of beaten infantry would not have returned to their camp.”
SECTION 4.—STATE OF THE FIRST CORPS.
[A] Genereaux de Brigade.
[B] Colonels.
[C] Chefs de Bt. ou Escadron.
[D] Capitaines.
[E] Lieutenants.
[F] Sous Lieutenants.
[G] Sous Officiers et Soldats.
[H] Total.
(Part 1 of 3)
| Tués. | ||||||||||
| [A] | [B] | [C] | [D] | [E] | [F] | [G] | [H] | |||
| St. Petri, | 4 | { 95 de Ligne | 3 | 3 | ||||||
| { Etat Major | ||||||||||
| { | { Etat Major | 1 | 1 | 2 | ||||||
| { | { 9 Infr. Ligne | 1 | 14 | 15 | ||||||
| { 1 | { 24 Ligne | 1 | 1 | 33 | 35 | |||||
| { | { 96 Ligne | 1 | 1 | 39 | 41 | |||||
| { | {1 Br. Elite | 1 | 1 | 2 | ||||||
| { | { Etat Major | |||||||||
| { 2 | { 45 Ligne | 1 | 7 | 8 | ||||||
| 5 Mars | { | { 8 Ligne | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 63 | 74 | |
| { | { 54 Ligne | 1 | 2 | 26 | 29 | |||||
| { | { Etat Major | |||||||||
| { 3 | { 27 Infr. Ligne | 1 | 20 | 21 | ||||||
| { | { 94 Ligne | 1 | 9 | 10 | ||||||
| { | { 95 Ligne | 1 | 1 | |||||||
| { | { 1 Regt. | 2 | 2 | |||||||
| { Dragoons | { 2 Regt. | 3 | 3 | |||||||
| { | { Artillerie | 16 | 16 | |||||||
| Puerta | St. Maria | { 45 Ligne | 10 | 10 | ||||||
| { Artillerie | 1 | 1 | ||||||||
| Medina, | 9 Mars, | { 94 | 4 | 4 | ||||||
| 8 Dr. | { 95 | 4 | 4 | |||||||
| 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 6 | 3 | 255 | 281 | |||
(Part 2 of 3)
| Blessés. | ||||||||||
| [A] | [B] | [C] | [D] | [E] | [F] | [G] | [H] | |||
| St. Petri, | 4 | { 95 de Ligne | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 32 | 37 | ||
| { Etat Major | 2 | 1 | 3 | |||||||
| { | { Etat Major | |||||||||
| { | { 9 Infr. Ligne | 1 | 1 | 2 | 70 | 74 | ||||
| { 1 | { 24 Ligne | 1 | 4 | 2 | 214 | 221 | ||||
| { | { 96 Ligne | 1 | 3 | 2 | 109 | 205 | ||||
| { | {1 Br. Elite | 2 | 3 | 136 | 141 | |||||
| { | { Etat Major | 1 | 1 | 2 | ||||||
| { 2 | { 45 Ligne | 44 | 44 | |||||||
| 5 Mars | { | { 8 Ligne | 2 | 6 | 3 | 622 | 633 | |||
| { | { 54 Ligne | 4 | 5 | 1 | 284 | 294 | ||||
| { | { Etat Major | 1 | 1 | |||||||
| { 3 | { 27 Infr. Ligne | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 150 | 157 | |||
| { | { 94 Ligne | 1 | 1 | 1 | 49 | 52 | ||||
| { | { 95 Ligne | 32 | 32 | |||||||
| { | { 1 Regt. | 3 | 1 | 2 | 30 | 36 | ||||
| { Dragoons | { 2 Regt. | 12 | 12 | |||||||
| { | { Artillerie | 3 | 31 | 34 | ||||||
| Puerta | St. Maria | { 45 Ligne | 43 | 43 | ||||||
| { Artillerie | 2 | 2 | ||||||||
| Medina, | 9 Mars, | { 94 | 29 | 29 | ||||||
| 8 Dr. | { 95 | 1 | 18 | 19 | ||||||
| 1 | 3 | 5 | 23 | 27 | 12 | 1997 | 2068 | |||
(Part 3 of 3)
| Restes sus les Champ grièvement Blessés |
|||||||||
| [A] | [B] | [D] | [F] | [G] | [H] | Total general. |
|||
| St. Petri, | 4 | { 95 de Ligne | 5 | 5 | 42 | ||||
| { Etat Major | 3 | ||||||||
| { | { Etat Major | 1 | 1 | 3 | |||||
| { | { 9 Infr. Ligne | 1 | 18 | 19 | 108 | ||||
| { 1 | { 24 Ligne | 2 | 1 | 21 | 24 | 280 | |||
| { | { 96 Ligne | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 249 | |||
| { | {1 Br. Elite | 1 | 59 | 60 | 203 | ||||
| { | { Etat Major | 2 | |||||||
| { 2 | { 45 Ligne | 3 | 3 | 55 | |||||
| 5 Mars | { | { 8 Ligne | 19 | 19 | 726 | ||||
| { | { 54 Ligne | 323 | |||||||
| { | { Etat Major | 1 | |||||||
| { 3 | { 27 Infr. Ligne | 2 | 21 | 23 | 201 | ||||
| { | { 94 Ligne | 62 | |||||||
| { | { 95 Ligne | 1 | 1 | 34 | |||||
| { | { 1 Regt. | 1 | 3 | 4 | 42 | ||||
| { Dragoons | { 2 Regt. | 4 | 4 | 19 | |||||
| { | { Artillerie | 1 | 1 | 51 | |||||
| Puerta | St. Maria | { 45 Ligne | 1 | 27 | 28 | 81 | |||
| { Artillerie | 6 | 6 | 9 | ||||||
| Medina, | 9 Mars, | { 94 | 33 | ||||||
| 8 Dr. | { 95 | 1 | 1 | 24 | |||||
| 1 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 180 | 202 | 2551 | |||
Certified copy by Count Gazan.
| Total | 2551 | ||||
| Note by the Editor.— | Deduct affair | of the 4th about Santa Petri | 45 | ||
| ” ” | at Puerta Santa Maria. | 81 | |||
| ” ” | at Medina | 64 | |||
| —– | 190 | ||||
| —— | |||||
| Remains loss at Barrosa | 2361 |