At Poperinghe the Battalion was housed in the Rest Camp by the Railway Station, but most of the officers slept in the Convent not far away. No training was attempted. The men were given as much rest as possible. Time was spent in reorganisation, of which every company stood much in need. A draft, about two hundred strong, joined the Battalion; but this was not sufficient to bring it to full strength, for over four hundred casualties had been suffered during the past fortnight. Here the 147th Infantry Brigade came again under the 49th Division, as did also the 148th Infantry Brigade.

The days were fairly peaceful, but the nights were rather disturbed by high velocity guns, which fired into the town. During the last night, several bombing planes visited Poperinghe and caused great excitement. Some bombs were dropped very near the camp, one in particular narrowly missing the Battalion Transport and stampeding some of the animals.

It was fully realised that the period of rest would almost certainly be short. The Germans had already captured the low range of hills about Neuve Eglise, and it was certain they would make a bid for the chain, of which Mont Kemmel is the highest point. Hence, there was little surprise when, early in the morning of April 25th, the Battalion was put on half-an-hour’s notice to move.

(f) Kemmel.[18]

About 8-45 a.m. on April 25th, the order to move arrived. The Brigade was proceeding at once to Ouderdom in support of the 9th Division. The Battalion was to move by march route as it was to remain in Brigade Reserve, but motor buses were provided for all the rest of the Brigade. However, so quickly did the Battalion fall in and move off that it arrived at Ouderdom long before the buses appeared.

The situation was very obscure. A great battle was in progress to the south and it was believed that the enemy had captured Mont Kemmel; but nothing was definitely known. The 6th and 7th Battalions were moved forward to form a defensive flank from Beaver Corner to Millekruisse, as the Cheapside Line was thought still to be in British hands; but touch had been completely lost with the troops on the right. All that day the Battalion remained inactive in the fields near Ouderdom. They were little troubled, except by an occasional aeroplane. One of these dropped a bomb which caused one or two casualties, but otherwise the Battalion escaped unscathed.

In the evening the Battalion moved up to positions in some old trenches a little to the north of Millekruisse, and here it settled down for the night. But it was not to rest for long. About 2-30 a.m., Major A. L. Mowat arrived from 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q. with orders for an immediate attack. The situation and details were as follows:—

From the Battalion point of view, this operation was extremely difficult. No one had any knowledge of the ground, and the assembly was to take place and the attack to open before dawn. As the companies were much below full strength, the Commanding Officer decided to attack on a three-company frontage—B Company was to attack on the right, D Company in the centre, and A Company on the left. C Company was in support, and was to advance about two hundred yards in rear of the assaulting troops.

At once the Battalion fell in and marched off. Owing to the darkness of the night and the fact that everyone was completely ignorant of the ground, companies did not quite reach their assembly positions by zero hour, but were drawn up about the line of the Kemmelbeke. At 4-25 a.m. the barrage—a very thin one—opened, and the Battalion advanced. It passed through a deserted camp and came to a road, along the line of which were some old trenches. These had been occupied by the enemy, but he retired when the British advanced. The trenches were occupied and a halt was made there. This was due to the failure of the next battalion to advance.

The 74th Infantry Brigade of the 25th Division was attacking on the Battalion’s right. One of its battalions did extremely well, forcing its way right into Kemmel village, and taking about 150 prisoners there. But the battalion on the immediate right of B Company failed to get forward. The 4th Battalion had met with very little resistance up to that time. Enemy machine gun fire was extremely heavy, but, as the morning was misty, very few casualties were caused by it at first. There is no doubt that the Battalion could have advanced further without much difficulty, but its orders were to conform to the 25th Division, and, as the men on its right were not advancing, it halted. For several hours it was believed that the line of Sackville Street had been reached, and this was the situation reported by the Commanding Officer to Brigade H.Q. at 5.5 a.m. Later it was found that the men had only got as far as Cheapside.

For about an hour things were comparatively quiet, except for enemy machine gun fire. Soon after 6-0 a.m. the battalion on the right began to withdraw, and before long the situation was becoming serious on that flank. The mist had cleared considerably, and the enemy was making better use of his machine guns. Taking advantage of the weakness of the troops there, he began to work round the Battalion’s right flank, by Beaver Corner and R.E. Farm. To cope with this menace, first half, and later the whole, of C Company had to be sent over to the right to form a defensive flank, facing south-west. On the rest of the Battalion front there was little anxiety. All three companies were well in touch, and A Company was connected up with the 9th Battalion King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (21st Division) on its left. Enemy machine gun fire was heavy, but the troops had good cover.

As time went on, the situation on the right became more and more serious. Here enemy machine gun fire was particularly heavy, and his sniping very accurate. He was making determined attempts to advance to the west of the Milky Way, and there was great danger that he might get across the Battalion’s line of retreat. The whole of C Company had been committed to the defence of this flank, and later, two guns of the Machine Gun Company and a detachment of the 147th Light Trench Mortar Battery had also been sent up. Thus, the whole available battalion reserve, except a few H.Q. details, was engaged. C Company had done some very useful work. They had driven the enemy from R.E. Farm, though they were unable to occupy it themselves; but they were suffering heavily from the enemy’s very accurate sniping. At 9-25 a.m. a message was sent to the 6th Battalion asking it to send up a company to reinforce the right.

By about 11-0 a.m. the strength of C Company had been very much reduced. Man after man had been shot in the head by enemy snipers, among the casualties being Pte. A. Poulter, the stretcher-bearer who had so greatly distinguished himself two weeks before at Erquinghem. Lieut. W. G. Mackie, who was commanding C Company, was also wounded, and Sec.-Lieut. T. T. Gilroy assumed command. Soon after noon, two platoons of the 6th Battalion arrived and were sent up to strengthen C Company. This helped to restore the situation on the right flank, and, for a time, things were much quieter, though the enemy sniping and machine gun fire continued.

It was hoped that the 25th Division would take action to restore the situation on its left, and about 1-30 p.m. a message was received that a battalion of the South Lancashire Regt. was coming up to get in touch there. Meanwhile, there was great difficulty in supplying the forward troops with ammunition, owing to the heavy fire kept up by the enemy. Everything had to be carried across the open, and there was very little cover. In this connection, splendid work was done by some of the H.Q. batmen, who crawled up to the line with bandoliers slung over their backs.

During the afternoon the enemy made a further attempt to work round the right flank. Considerable numbers of them were seen moving along the side of a hedge, but the situation was satisfactorily dealt with by C Company. Sec.-Lieut. T. T. Gilroy had seen them himself. He quickly got two Vickers guns into position, and, when the enemy appeared at a gap in the hedge, so heavy a fire was opened at close range that the party was almost wiped out. This was the last attempt to advance that the enemy made that day.

By this time the discovery had been made that the Battalion was not in Sackville Street at all, but in Cheapside. This was at once reported to 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q., as it altered the situation considerably. The battalion of South Lancashires had come up, but was halted by the Milky Way and did not go into action. It was now night. Arrangements were made for wiring and other work to be done on the front; but this was not to be. The higher authorities had realised that the counter-attack had failed, and had decided to withdraw the troops, who had carried it out, from their advanced positions. About 11-0 p.m., the order for the withdrawal was received, and the operation began at 12-30 a.m. All went smoothly. The night was dark and the enemy remained inactive. A Company withdrew first, and was followed by the others in order from left to right, C Company moving last and bringing out with them the few men who were left of the next battalion. All the ammunition, which had been sent up during the day, was got away. The Battalion moved back along the Milky Way, through the line held by the 6th Battalion, and reoccupied the same positions near Millekruisse which it had left in the early morning of April 26th.

For the next two days the enemy made no further infantry attack, but his artillery was often active, particularly round Millekruisse cross roads. Not far from this spot Sec.-Lieut J. C. Whitaker, of A Company, was killed by a shell on April 28th. There can be no doubt that, between April 25th and 29th, the Germans were replenishing their ammunition dumps, and making preparations for their next big attack. During this time the Battalion was in Brigade Reserve. Much work was done on a new line a little to the south of Millekruisse, and A Company moved up to garrison it. Otherwise, there was no change in dispositions.

On April 28th the enemy put down a heavy barrage on the British front, from 7-30 p.m. to 9-0 p.m., and desultory shelling continued through the night. About 3-0 a.m. on the morning of April 29th this suddenly changed to a barrage, the intensity and depth of which can seldom have been equalled. From Mont Vidaigne on the right to Zillebeke Lake on the left, the whole front was ablaze. On the sector held by the 147th Infantry Brigade the whole country, from the front line to beyond Ouderdom, was deluged with shells. High explosive and gas literally rained down everywhere. Practically the first shell of the bombardment burst in the roof of the farm house, which was occupied by Battalion H.Q., and mortally wounded both the orderly room clerks; the R.S.M., who was in the same room, had a wonderful escape, and fragments actually penetrated the roof of the cellar, in which the Commanding Officer was sleeping at the time. By a great stroke of luck the barrage almost entirely missed the front line, so that its garrison, though extremely uncomfortable, was practically unharmed. No one doubted that this was the prelude to another mighty attack.

After about two hours of this bombardment, the German infantry advanced in great numbers to the attack. They gained nothing. Caught by the British barrage, mown down by Lewis gun and rifle fire, they suffered enormous casualties. It is said that, on one part of the front, they were so demoralised that they put out a white flag and tried to come in, but could not pass through the barrage. On the whole front attacked they only gained a footing in the allied line in two places, and from both of these they were ejected almost immediately by counter-attacks. All this time the barrage continued.

Meanwhile, the Battalion was in Brigade Reserve, anxiously awaiting information which could be acted upon. The Millekruisse Line had been strengthened by the addition of D Company, but B and C Companies were both available for any action. All telephone lines had been broken within a few minutes of the opening of the bombardment, and it was extremely difficult to obtain any news. Lieut. J. C. Walton, the Battalion Intelligence Officer, was sent up to get in touch with the H.Q. of the 7th Battalion, which was in the line; but he was blown to pieces by a shell before he had gone more than two hundred yards. About 7-0 a.m. it was learned from wounded men who had come down, that the 7th Battalion had been heavily attacked, but that they had held their ground and still had a company in reserve. On receipt of this news, the Commanding Officer immediately communicated with Brigade H.Q., asking whether he should send a company to assist them. About 9-0 a.m. a wounded N.C.O. of the 7th Battalion reported a fresh massing of the enemy for the attack. Lieut.-Col. Sugden waited no longer, but at once ordered up B Company to reinforce. Though the barrage was almost as thick as ever, the company succeeded in finding a route by which it reached its objective with very few casualties. It arrived just in time to stop an urgent message which was being sent, asking for the assistance of a company. But the reinforcements were never required. The worst of the battle was over. After two violent attacks all along the front, the enemy made only local and spasmodic efforts for the rest of the day. His force was broken; he had been beaten to a standstill; and he had gained—nothing. As the Divisional Commander wrote shortly after—“It was a great day for British Arms.”

The battle of April 29th was far more than an ordinary defeat for the enemy. It was the final collapse of his offensive. During the next three months he was to launch other great attacks against the French, further to the south. But never again was he to try conclusions with the British in a great battle, until they took the initiative into their own hands, and, after driving him headlong from position after position, forced him to sue for an armistice from the men he had professed to despise. For the second time in less than three weeks the 147th Infantry Brigade had assisted in bringing the German attack to a standstill, and had consolidated and held a line which was to remain unbroken until all lines were left behind in the victorious advance of the autumn.

The following days were uneventful. Work continued on the Millekruisse Line, in which two companies were now permanently stationed. B Company remained under the orders of the 7th Battalion. Enemy artillery was active, but was as nothing compared with the barrage of April 29th. The 147th Infantry Brigade was strengthened by the temporary addition of a composite battalion, made up of the remnants of the 146th Infantry Brigade and the 19th Lancashire Fusiliers, each battalion furnishing one company. Among the many congratulatory messages, which poured in after the victory of April 29th, not the least appreciated was one from the G.O.C., IX. Corps, who had not forgotten the work of the 147th Infantry Brigade while serving under his command so recently.

On the night of May 1/2nd the Battalion relieved the 7th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. on the left of the Brigade Sector. The front held was a peculiar one, and lay almost at right angles to the general line. Its left rested almost on Cheapside, where A Company had been on April 26th. From that point it ran nearly due north to and across the Kemmelbeke, and then turned at right angles across the Milky Way. Three companies held this line, the men occupying small slits in the ground; the fourth and a company of the 6th Battalion, which had been relieved by the 146th Composite Battalion, were in support. There was still plenty of hostile shelling but it was very scattered, and the little slits in the ground were difficult targets to hit.

The labours and troubles of the Battalion were now nearly over for the time being. A French Army had come up and was gradually taking over the front, along the chain of hills. On the night of May 3/4th the Battalion was relieved by the 3rd Battalion, 80th Infantry Regt., of the 32nd French Division. This Battalion, which was very strong, took over the whole front of the 147th Infantry Brigade. They were a magnificent body of men, and the British were much struck with their fine appearance. While the relief was in progress some anxiety was caused by a heavy enemy bombardment, but, apart from this, everything went smoothly. Capt. Fenton, with a few N.C.O’s, was left in the line for twenty-four hours to assist the French; and the Battalion started on its march through the night to a well-earned rest.

It was daylight before the first halting-place was reached. This was a camp which, it was rumoured, had recently been occupied by a Chinese Labour Company. This fact did not altogether commend itself to the Battalion, but all men were so weary that it scarcely disturbed their sleep. In the afternoon a short march brought the Battalion to a hutment camp at St. Jans ter Biezen, where the rest period was to be spent.

The part taken by the Battalion, in what is generally known as the Battle of the Lys, is the most glorious chapter in its history. Never before nor since did the men fight so long continuously, nor against such overwhelming odds. They faced the enemy in the full flush of his successes on the Somme, when his morale was at its highest. They fought him again and again, and never yielded an inch of ground in battle. They taught him that he was no match for a British soldier, either in attack or in defence. They helped to pave the way for his crushing defeat a few months later.

And the men learned many things too. They learned that the German will never push home an assault in the face of a really determined resistance; that infantry fire alone is sufficient to stop his most violent attacks. In the many engagements that they fought during April, 1918, no man of them ever used a bayonet, for never did the enemy reach their lines. They learned too—those of them who did not know it well before—that the spade, almost as much as the rifle, is the infantry man’s weapon. And, perhaps most valuable lesson of all, they learned that what appear to be the blackest and most hopeless situations can be restored by men, if only they possess the necessary determination.

Throughout the most trying and uncomfortable conditions all ranks continued cheerful, and morale never declined. In spite of appalling casualties, the Battalion never became in the least disorganised. Camaraderie and good-fellowship were never more conspicuous. Though the Battalion was only about three hundred strong, a draft of two hundred was incorporated so thoroughly that the men of it fought, only two or three days later, as if they had never served with any other unit.

The Transport and Stores too did magnificent work. Frequently shelled, and on one occasion at least under machine gun fire, constantly on the move and often surrounded by disorder, they carried on their work in a way which earned the admiration of everyone. At a time when one was continually hearing of battalions who had had no rations for days, the 4th Battalion had never lived in such plenty. There is no doubt that this happy state of affairs increased the fighting efficiency of everyone enormously.

The work of the 49th Division, in which the Battalion had played no inconsiderable a part, was recognised on all sides. On the night of April 29th, the Commander-in-Chief expressed himself in the following terms:—

Among the many other messages, too numerous for reproduction, which were received, the following, expressed in the inimitable manner of the French, deserves special notice:—

It was a matter of the deepest regret to all that the 49th Division could not work as a whole during a great part of the operations; and none felt it more than General Cameron. In the confidential summary of operations, which he circulated a few days after the Division was withdrawn from the battle, one can clearly see his disappointment that this should have been so. One can also distinguish clearly his pride in the record of his men on so many different fronts. The concluding paragraph of that summary, as looking to the future, may fittingly end this chapter:—