(a) Erquinghem and Le Veau.

On April 9th the enemy launched his great offensive between the La Bassée Canal and Armentiéres. Preceded by an intense artillery bombardment, the German infantry broke right through the centre of the line which was held by the Portuguese; and all was confusion there. It was the sound of this battle that the Battalion had heard as it marched along the road towards Reninghelst.

At the moment the 49th Division was too scattered for immediate combined action. Divisional H.Q. was still at Chateau Ségard, and in the same area the 148th Infantry Brigade was concentrated. The 147th Infantry Brigade had all arrived in the neighbourhood of Reninghelst by the evening of April 9th. But the 146th Infantry Brigade was still holding the line astride the Menin Road. It was due to this that, during the first fortnight of the operations which followed, the Division was not able to act as a unit.

When the Battalion arrived in camp, on the evening of April 9th, everyone expected to remain there for two or three days. It was the general idea that the Division would concentrate in that area, and then move down to the Somme battlefield. Hence, preparations were made for spending the night. The Commanding Officer was dining with Lieut.-General A. J. Godley, at Corps H.Q., and was not expected back until late. The Battalion was turning in for the night when he suddenly returned, bringing early information of an immediate move. He had heard of the disaster on the Portuguese front, and brought the news that the 147th Infantry Brigade was to be pushed into the battle at once. Immediately, all was bustle and excitement in the camp, and never had the men been in better spirits than when they heard that the Battalion was for battle at last. Little time was needed for preparation. Soon after midnight all were in motor buses hurrying south. At Neuve Eglise, through which the buses passed, the gravity of the situation was apparent. Transport vehicles and guns were being hurried back, while already enemy shells were dropping in the village. At La Crèche, which was reached at 3-15 a.m., the Battalion debussed, and marched through the darkness to Le Veau, arriving at 4-30 a.m. Here some empty huts and stables were found, and into these the men were put to get what rest they could. Picquets were posted, for the situation was so obscure that no one knew how soon the enemy might be upon him. And the Battalion waited for orders.

About 6-30 a.m. orders were received from 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q., to move up to a position of readiness near the cross-roads at L’Epinette. Packs were dumped in a hut at Le Veau, a hurried selection was made of the personnel of B Echelon who were not to go into battle, and about 7-0 a.m. the Battalion[15] moved off. All along the road was witnessed one of the most pitiful sights of warfare, common enough in the early days of 1914, but never before seen by the Battalion. Everywhere civilians were leaving their homes and flocking to the rear; old people, women, and young children, some driving an odd cow or two, others pushing a few of their most valued household goods in barrows, plodded wearily along. Fortunately the enemy was not shelling the road, so the troops were able to advance without hindrance, except from one low-flying aeroplane. L’Epinette was reached before 8-30 a.m. and the men began to dig in. Little was known of the situation, but from observation it appeared that the British were withdrawing to the north bank of the River Lys, particularly about the loop to the west of Erquinghem.

The Battalion had been placed at the disposal of the 101st Infantry Brigade (34th Division), and about 9-30 a.m. the G.O.C., Brig.-General B. C. Gore, came up, explained the situation, and issued his orders as follows:—

Company commanders were immediately summoned and the situation was explained to them. C Company, with D Company in support, was ordered to move up by the Rue Delpierre and close the gap. B Company, with A Company in support, was to assemble near the Rue du Moulin and advance to the assistance of the Royal Scots.

About 10-0 a.m. all companies moved off and Battalion H.Q. went forward to Wigan Post, some 500 yards north of the river. Enemy shells were already bursting around, and several direct hits were made on the road. The numbers of wounded who were streaming back showed only too clearly how severe the fighting was. Yet, quietly and in perfect order, the companies marched down to the River Lys by platoons. The main bridge was destroyed, but B Company, which was leading, succeeded in crossing by a wooden bridge near by, though this was also badly broken and only possible for men in single file. All the other companies crossed by a wooden bridge near the church. From this time, except A and B Companies which were in close touch throughout the day, companies were separated and their doings must be told individually.

On arriving in Erquinghem, B Company marched along the main street of the village, and took cover at the west end, while Capt. N. T. Farrar and Sergt. R. G. Brunt went forward to reconnoitre. They soon found that the situation was very different from what had been reported. Not only was the enemy to the north of the railway, near the Rue du Moulin, but he also appeared to be occupying the whole of the ground in the loop which the river makes to the west of Erquinghem. His outposts were in farms, only about 200 yards west of the village, and there was no sign of any formed body of Royal Scots. In these circumstances any attempt to advance south would almost certainly have led to disaster, so Capt. Farrar decided to take up a position covering the west end of the village. Between the river and the Rue du Moulin was an R.E. yard, with piles of trench grids and other stores; this B Company garrisoned with three platoons, pushing out its fourth platoon about a hundred yards in front. Its left was covered by a Lewis gun section which could fire, either along the road to the west, or down the Rue du Moulin; to protect its right and cover a bridge over the Lys, which was its main line of retreat, A Company sent up a platoon and a half, under Sec.-Lieut. E. Clarke, between the R.E. yard and the river. These dispositions opposed an enemy advance either from the west or up the Rue du Moulin, and remained unchanged for five hours—until the order to withdraw was received. During that time, two separate attacks were made by the enemy on the village; but so heavy was the fire kept up by A and B Companies that these had no success. Parts of Erquinghem were heavily shelled, and many buildings were set on fire; but the R.E. yard escaped the attentions of the hostile artillery. The men were much harassed by machine gun and rifle fire. In particular, A Company’s platoon was heavily fired on from a farm house, only about a hundred yards away. Careful observation of this place through glasses revealed the fact that a large store of Mills bombs and Stokes shells was in an outhouse against the wall of the farm. Lewis guns were trained on this dump and fired for some minutes without success; but, suddenly, the whole dump blew up, completely destroying the farmhouse. As the place was packed with Germans, there is no doubt that they suffered very heavily. The British had excellent cover behind the piles of R.E. material, and, as a result, comparatively few casualties were suffered; but heavy losses were certainly inflicted on the enemy.

Late in the morning, an officer of the 11th Battalion Suffolk Regt. asked for reinforcements to close a gap in the line near the Rue du Moulin. In response, A Company sent up a platoon, which Sec.-Lieut. B. H. Huggard saw into position. This platoon was never seen again, and its fate was a mystery until after the armistice. Then, returned prisoners told how it had been surrounded by the enemy, and, after suffering heavily, the few survivors had been captured.

Meanwhile, what was happening to C and D Companies? After crossing the Lys, C Company assembled near the top of the Rue Delpierre, while Capt. A. M. Luty, with Sec.-Lieut. T. T. Gilroy, C.S.M. N. Hobson and two N.C.O’s, went forward to reconnoitre. The ground was swept by machine gun fire, and it was only by crawling that the party was able to reach the point where the road crosses the railway. Capt. Luty at once realised that it was impossible for him to get to his objective, and decided to hold the line of the railway. He returned to his company which, by this time, had suffered several casualties from enemy artillery fire. The company moved down the road by platoons and took up a position along the railway line, with its right turned back to face south-west. The position was a bad one as the straight line of the railway was heavily enfiladed by machine guns near the Rue du Moulin. Losses were heavy from the very first. Sec.-Lieut. M. C. O’Dowd and several men had been hit coming down the road. C.S.M. N. Hobson was wounded soon after the line of the railway had been taken up. After a short time, one platoon was sent across the railway to take up a more advanced position. Here, except for sniping, this platoon was not much worried for some time, but the rest of the company was suffering appalling casualties. The numbers of wounded were soon far greater than the company stretcher-bearers could deal with. It was then that Pte. A. Poulter earned the highest decoration that a soldier can win—the Victoria Cross. Hour after hour he toiled, in the greatest danger, tending the wounded and carrying them into safety.[16]

About 1-0 p.m. the situation became even worse. The enemy brought up a field gun which enfiladed C Company’s position at a range of only a few hundred yards. Within half-an-hour scarcely twenty men were left unwounded. The position on the railway was clearly untenable, and soon it was decided that a move was necessary, if any were to escape unhurt. The few survivors crossed the railway and took up a position a little to the south of it. Here they suffered much less. About the middle of the afternoon the men of the 11th Battalion Suffolk Regt., who had been on the left of C Company all day, withdrew, having written orders to do so. As he had received no orders, Capt. Luty remained. It should be mentioned that orders to withdraw had been sent to him from Battalion H.Q. some time before, but the runners had become casualties and the orders never arrived. But before long the enemy was seen to be advancing rapidly, both from the south and west, and the position became hopeless. A withdrawal was ordered. Sec.-Lieut. F. D. Chippindale went forward to warn No. 9 Platoon, which was lying out in front; a hail of machine gun bullets was sweeping the ground, and he had barely given the order when he was struck down. The few survivors of this platoon were surrounded and captured. The rest of C Company made a dash for the railway, but only about twelve ever reached it. One by one they rushed across, suffering two more casualties before all were over, and then made for Erquinghem. Many wounded were collected on the way, practically every man of the party assisting one along. They found the bridge near the church destroyed, and, before another crossing could be found, enemy skirmishers were already in the village. At last another bridge was discovered, about half a mile towards Armentiéres, and over this the miserable remnants of the company crossed, remaining on the northern bank until the bridge had been demolished. Of the Company, 5 officers and 139 other ranks strong, which had crossed the Lys about six hours before, little more than the strength of a section remained.

D Company had crossed the Lys in rear of C Company in the morning, and had taken up a position in support, south of Erquinghem and astride the Rue Delpierre. Here they had come under heavy artillery and machine gun fire, and had suffered considerably. About 1-30 p.m. they received orders to support the 11th Battalion Suffolk Regt., and moved up to a position in rear of La Rolanderie Farm, where the H.Q. of that battalion was situated. They had not been there long when they received their orders to withdraw, and so returned to the north of the river.

Throughout the day Battalion H.Q. was at Wigan. It had originally been intended to move across the river, but, owing to the uncertainty of the situation, this was never done. The position had not been occupied long before it was realised that the enemy had crossed the Lys, away to the right. Indeed, it is very possible that German troops were actually across, a little to the west of Erquinghem, before any of the Battalion entered the village. By the middle of the morning the situation on that flank was rapidly becoming serious, and the Commanding Officer recommended that troops should be sent up to the neighbourhood of the line Lancashire—Jesus Farm. By 12-20 p.m. A Company’s signallers had established communication by means of a visual station in one of the houses, and throughout the day they and B Company remained in touch with Battalion H.Q. But no reports were received from C and D Companies until the afternoon. About mid-day the neighbourhood of Wigan began to receive attention from the enemy artillery, and, though few casualties were suffered, great inconvenience was caused by the destruction of the officers’ rations. At 12-40 p.m. orders were sent to D Company to move up in support of the 11th Suffolks, these orders anticipating a very urgent appeal from the Commanding Officer of that unit which arrived a little later. The first report from C Company, timed 1-7 p.m., arrived about 2-0 p.m., but gave no idea of Capt. Luty’s desperate situation. However, it was rapidly becoming clear that Erquinghem was untenable, though the real gravity of the situation was not known at the time. As a matter of fact, while the Battalion was still fighting in and to the south of Erquinghem, the enemy was right in its rear at Le Veau, looting the packs which had been dumped there in the morning, and fighting with the men of B Echelon who had been left behind. Early in the afternoon, machine gun bullets from the west began to fall about Wigan. But, by this time, the order to withdraw to Nieppe had been received, and had been passed on to companies. B Company and part of A Company withdrew by the bridge which they had been covering all day; the others crossed by bridges further to the east. Battalion H.Q. remained at Wigan until the early evening. Many buildings in Erquinghem were burning furiously, and numbers of the enemy could be seen moving about in the village.

All the companies had passed long before Battalion H.Q. moved. About 6-0 p.m. the line at Wigan was left in the hands of a very mixed garrison of Royal Scots, Suffolks, Australian tunnellers and others, and the Commanding Officer started for Nieppe. It was only then that the full gravity of the situation was realised. Enemy machine gun bullets were whistling across the road as the party moved along, and, when the level crossing by Nieppe Station was reached, it was found that an enemy machine gun was on the railway line to the north-west, shooting straight down the line. One or two casualties were suffered by H.Q. details in crossing the line. Near the entrance to Nieppe, the whole of D Company was met marching out towards the Station, and Lieut. B. M. Machin stated that he had received orders from the G.O.C. himself to seize and hold that point. Away to the north troops could be seen in extended order attacking towards Le Veau. These troops were A and B Companies, though this was not known at the time. From what he knew of the enemy’s position on the railway, near the station, it was obvious to the Commanding Officer that the left flank of this attack was in danger. To cope with the difficulty H.Q. details, organised in two platoons under Sec.-Lieut. H. A. Loudoun, and one platoon of D Company, were sent down the road to the Station. Two platoons of D Company were directed to prolong the left flank of the attack on Le Veau, and the other platoon was kept in reserve.

It is now necessary to return to A and B Companies. On reporting at 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q. in Nieppe they had been told to occupy some old trenches at Les Trois Arbres. They had not been there long before they were ordered to fall in and move along the Nieppe-Bailleul Road towards Pont d’Achelles. Here they were drawn up by Maj. A. L. Mowat[17] and directed to attack and expel the enemy, who was established in the farmhouses and enclosures at Le Veau. A Company was on the extreme left with B Company on its right; beyond B Company were some Royal Engineers and other troops, mainly Northumberland Fusiliers. Neither side had any artillery to support it.

The advance started and at first progress was easy; but, when the attacking force was about six hundred yards from the enemy, very heavy machine gun and rifle fire opened on it. Progress could now only be made by section rushes with covering fire, and even this became impossible when the line had got to about three hundred yards from the enemy. It was at this point that the arrival of the two platoons of D Company on the left restored the situation. These did not meet with strong opposition, and were able to push forward and gain a footing on the railway. Taken now in flank the Germans began to withdraw, and this enabled A Company to continue its advance and reach the railway on its whole front. Meanwhile B Company had met with strong resistance from the farms and enclosures of Le Veau. A sniper, firing from an attic window, had been particularly obnoxious. For a short time they too had been held up, but Sec.-Lieut. F. Akroyd, supported by heavy covering fire from the rest of the company, managed to push forward on the right and establish a footing, with his platoon, in the enclosures. The enemy then withdrew on this front too, and B Company advanced to the railway. As the H.Q. details had established themselves firmly in the neighbourhood of the Station, the Battalion now held the whole of the railway line from that point nearly up to the Steenwerck Road. The men dug in a few yards in front of the railway line and there settled down for the night, after a most strenuous and exciting day. During this attack A Company had suffered heavy casualties, but both B and D Companies had come through comparatively lightly. In all, the Battalion had lost nearly two hundred men since it had left Le Veau early that morning.

(b) Nieppe.

During the night of April 10/11th Battalion H.Q. was established in the Hospice at the south-west end of Nieppe, and here it remained until the following evening. With the exception of the pitiful remnants of C Company, and one platoon of D Company, the whole Battalion was manning the line which had been established in front of the railway, between Nieppe Station and the Steenwerck Road. In spite of the uncertainty of the situation, everyone whose duties would allow of it slept soundly, tired out with the activities of the previous day and night. The night passed quietly, the enemy, after his set-back at Le Veau, making no further attack.

Early the next morning, the Commanding Officer made a personal reconnaissance towards L’Epinette, and nearly reached the village before he saw anything of the enemy. He was then heavily fired on by a party of Germans and forced to withdraw. Other patrols were pushed out well to the west of the railway without encountering the enemy. From French civilians, who had remained in their homes all through the fighting, they learned that large numbers of Germans had been there, but had withdrawn towards the south-west after the successful attack of the Battalion at Le Veau. The only actual encounter that took place near the railway was with a German artillery officer, who rode nearly up to the line with a mounted orderly about 8-30 a.m. He was shot and fell from his horse dead, but his companion escaped. The numbers of German dead littering the ground in front of the railway showed that, in spite of its own heavy losses, the Battalion had made the enemy pay even more heavily. About 9-0 a.m., units of the 101st Infantry Brigade relieved the Battalion, and the men were concentrated in houses near the Hospice.

The Battalion was now in Brigade Reserve, the other battalions of the Brigade manning the Nieppe System to the east of the town. The day was a very confused one. Continually the situation was being reported obscure at some part of the front, and frequently a company, or two platoons, or some other force, had to be sent off to clear it up. The only part of the front where the situation was never reported obscure was that held by the 147th Infantry Brigade. Such duties proved very tiring, though for some time no serious fighting resulted. By now the enemy was everywhere well across the Lys, the entrenched line of which Wigan formed a part had been entirely given up, and the railway and the Nieppe System were the outpost lines of the British. Incidentally, it should be mentioned here that the 1/5th Battalion York and Lancaster Regt. did the 147th Infantry Brigade a very good turn that day. By a highly successful counter-attack in the neighbourhood of Steenwerck, they held up the enemy’s advance, and barred his approach to the main line of retreat from Nieppe—the road to Bailleul.

Nothing serious, so far as the Battalion was concerned, happened until after mid-day. But about 12-30 p.m., a message arrived from Brigade H.Q. stating that the situation was very obscure on the left of the 6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., near Bruna Gaye; the remnants of C Company were already on their way there; and an additional company was to be despatched at once. A Company was detailed for this duty, and the Commanding Officer himself accompanied it, leaving Capt. Fenton in charge at Battalion H.Q. Lieut.-Col. Sugden found matters in a very critical state; artillery and machine gun fire were very heavy, and a strong German attack was being directed against a battalion of the Cheshires. The arrival of the 4th Battalion detachment restored the situation, but hard fighting continued there until the evening. One Lewis gun of A Company did great execution; it was concealed in the upper storey of a house, found excellent targets among the masses of the enemy, and was apparently never discovered by them. The Commanding Officer remained at Bruna Gaye to direct operations.

Late in the afternoon there was again trouble on the right, and two platoons of B Company were sent to the neighbourhood of Nieppe Station. Here they had hard fighting for two hours, but held their ground successfully.

About 7-0 p.m. the Commanding Officer returned from Bruna Gaye. He had called at Brigade H.Q. on his way back, and had received orders for a further withdrawal, which was to be made that night. This withdrawal was rendered necessary by a fresh attack which the enemy had launched at Wytschaete that day, for there was now great danger that, unless all the troops in and around Nieppe withdrew at once, they would be surrounded. The withdrawal was to start at 7-30 p.m. and the difficulty was to get orders through to A and C Companies. Runners managed to reach them just in time, when they were in imminent danger of being cut off.

At 7-30 p.m. B and D Companies, followed by Battalion H.Q., left the Hospice and started towards Bailleul. Enemy machine gun bullets were sweeping the ground, and, before he had gone more than a hundred yards, R.S.M. F. P. Stirzaker, M.C., was hit in the throat, and died within five minutes. His death was a great blow to the Battalion which he had fought with continuously for three years; he was a most hardworking, conscientious and gallant man, whose place could never be filled. It was impossible to remove the body, and he would have been the last to wish any risks to be run by others on his account. So he was left like a soldier on the spot where he had died, and the remainder of the party continued sorrowfully on its way.

The sight on the Nieppe-Bailleul Road that night was such as none of the Battalion had seen before, nor any wished to see again. Of vehicles there were practically none, but the whole road was crowded with men hastening to the rear. It was an army in retreat. But the crowd of men was not disorderly; there was no panic. As each one reached his allotted station he quietly fell in, ready to hold a fresh line. Mercifully the enemy, for some unknown reason, scarcely attempted to shell the road. Had he done so the casualties must have been awful, for no shell dropped among those masses of men could have failed to hit many. One gruesome spot, where a 15 cm. shell had burst among a number of Royal Engineers, gave the passer-by an idea of what might have been. All along the left of the road the enemy flares, approaching nearer and nearer, showed how near the British troops were to utter disaster. But they escaped. And never again had the enemy such an opportunity. By about 11-0 p.m. the Battalion was again concentrated in a position near Bailleul.

(c) Bailleul.

About a mile from Bailleul the road to Armentiéres almost touches the railway. It was at this point that 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q. was established, the battalions occupying positions in the fields just to the south of the railway. The position was not really intended to be a defensive one, for other troops were well out in front of the Brigade. Nevertheless, the men dug in, and patrols were pushed out down the roads. The rest of the night passed quietly.

On April 12th, though there were some mild alarms during the morning, nothing special happened until after mid-day. Occasional shells burst near the Battalion’s positions, one of which wounded Sec.-Lieut. F. Akroyd. But about 1-0 p.m. a heavy bombardment opened, and quickly drove Battalion H.Q. from its cottage to seek a hole in the ground, among the slits which had been dug the previous night. Intermittent shelling went on for the whole afternoon and caused several casualties, among them being Lieut. B. M. Machin and Sergt. F. Firth, the pioneer sergeant.

About 4-0 p.m. the Commanding Officer, who had been to Brigade H.Q., returned with the alarming news that the enemy had entered Bailleul from the west. The Battalion was ordered to move at once and expel him. Company commanders were summoned, and columns were detailed to enter the town by different roads. The operation was carried out with unexpected ease. The report was found to be incorrect. Nothing of the enemy could be seen in Bailleul; in fact, the town was deserted, except for an Australian corporal who had just set fire to the Australian Comforts Store, much to the disgust of the Battalion which could have done with many of the articles thus destroyed. The companies moved through the deserted town and established a picquet line in the fields to the west of it, roughly along the line of the Becque de la Flanche, and covering all the roads in that direction.

Up to this time there had been little activity in the area occupied by battalions of the 147th Infantry Brigade. But early in the evening the advanced troops began rapidly to retire through them. Numbers of stragglers of different units entered Bailleul from the south, and the situation began to look serious. It was restored by Capt. Fenton, who took charge of a number of stragglers and posted them with D Company, in and around Bailleul Station. About this time the enemy began to shell the town, possibly attracted by the fire at the Australian Comforts Store, which was now burning furiously. One shell burst near a group of H.Q. details, as they were marching up the Station Road, killing one and wounding about fifteen of them.

When darkness fell the dispositions of the Battalion were as follows:—

Reconnaissance soon showed that a composite force, which had been organised at the 22nd Corps Reinforcement Camp and went by the name of the 22nd Corps Reinforcement Battalion, was holding a line of posts from Steam Mill towards Meteren. Beyond these troops was the 19th Infantry Brigade (33rd Division) covering Meteren itself. Thus, only A Company was actually in the front line.

The night passed quietly. A patrol of A Company, from Steam Mill along the Oultersteene Road, did not gain touch with the enemy until more than a mile down the road. During the night A Company was relieved by the 9th Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, so that, by dawn, both A and C Companies were in Battalion Reserve in the town.

The morning of the 13th was also uneventful. A well-stocked Y.M.C.A. canteen was found in Bailleul, and a guard was placed over it to stop looting; the supplies there were taken charge of, and many were issued to the troops to supplement rations. Early in the afternoon the enemy began to shell the town heavily, and continued to do so for about two hours. Buildings proved a very bad protection against high explosive. The house occupied by Battalion H.Q. did not receive a direct hit, but windows were smashed and considerable damage caused by shells bursting just outside. Here Sec.-Lieut. H. A. Loudoun, the Signalling Officer, was wounded in the arm; and Cpl. A. R. Mitchell, the stout and popular N.C.O. in charge of the Battalion runners, was so badly hit in the body that he died shortly afterwards in hospital. It was deemed advisable to move Battalion H.Q. to a neighbouring house which had a small but substantial cellar.

Meanwhile, the other units of the Brigade were having serious fighting to the south of Bailleul. About dusk, the Battalion received orders to send up two companies to hold the line of the railway on either side of the Station, as it was feared the enemy might break through. A and C Companies were sent up, under the command of Capt. Fenton. These occupied a line to the south of the railway, covering the Station, on a frontage of about half a mile. During the night another withdrawal took place, contracting the defences to the south and south-east of the town. The 6th Battalion took over the defence of the railway line and Bailleul Station, while the 7th Battalion was brought back into the town in Brigade Reserve. D Company relieved the 9th Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers between the railway and Steam Mill. Its left should have been in touch with the right of the 6th Battalion, but there was found to be a considerable gap which it could not fill without dangerously weakening its front. A Company was moved up to close this gap. The withdrawal had, of course, automatically brought about the relief of the two companies south of the railway. At dawn the Battalion was disposed as follows:—

Two days had now passed without the Battalion being drawn into any really serious fighting. There had been plenty of anxiety and much changing of dispositions, but, compared with the activities of April 10th and 11th, it had been a rest period. The attacks which the enemy had made to the south of Bailleul on April 13th had not been very successful for him, and he now determined to try his luck to the west of the town. Already, on the night of the 13th, his troops had been seen dribbling up towards Steam Mill.

The night of April 13/14th passed quietly, as did also the following morning. But early in the afternoon a bombardment, far heavier than on the previous day, opened on the town and on the positions along the Becque de la Flanche. B and D Companies were both shelled out of their H.Q. and forced to take to the fields; in this shelling Sec.-Lieut. W. Oldfield, M.M., of D Company, was severely wounded, and had the grave misfortune to lose the sight of both eyes. Meanwhile, observers reported that large numbers of the enemy were dribbling forward and massing about three hundred yards from the Battalion’s outpost line. It was obvious that a heavy attack was impending. Fire was opened upon all movement, but did not appear to interfere much with the assembly. Little could be done but wait. As a precautionary measure, all available reserves of A Company were placed at the disposal of D Company.

Bailleul was still being heavily bombarded, and about six big fires were raging in the Station Road alone, without anyone to check them, when, about 4-0 p.m., the attack came. Masses of the enemy advanced against the fronts held by D Company and the 22nd Corps Reinforcement Battalion. The latter gave way without much resistance, and the enemy was able to occupy Steam Mill. This seriously threatened the right flank of D Company, along the whole of whose front heavy fighting was going on. For a time its centre was pressed back, but the men soon regained the ground without assistance. Unfortunately, in this fighting, Sec.-Lieut. J. H. Kitson was killed.

The whole situation was extremely critical. The 22nd Corps Reinforcement Battalion had ceased to exist as a fighting unit though, luckily, B Company was in its rear, and held up the further advance of the enemy on that front. The loss of Steam Mill seriously threatened the right flank of D Company, who had only just been able to beat off the attack on its immediate front. The only battalion reserves available were the few survivors of C Company and the Battalion H.Q. details. Fortunately, something of the state of affairs was quickly known at 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q., and the G.O.C. promptly placed two companies of the 7th Battalion at the disposal of the Commanding Officer of the 4th Battalion. Battalion H.Q. details were assembled ready for any eventuality near the huts of the Officers’ Rest Camp, while C Company and the companies of the 7th Battalion were warned to be prepared to counter-attack.

About 5-30 p.m. a heavy counter-attack was launched from the north-east towards Steam Mill, by Capt. Fenton with one and a half companies of the 7th Battalion, and Capt. Luty with C Company. The attack met with almost complete success. With the single exception of Steam Mill, the whole of the ground which had been lost by the 22nd Corps Reinforcement Battalion was regained. But Steam Mill itself was firmly held by the enemy, and could not be retaken. Everywhere else the enemy withdrew in confusion. During this fighting Capt. A. M. Luty was twice wounded, once while leading his men near Steam Mill, and a second time while he was being carried away on a stretcher. About 7-30 p.m., the Commanding Officer was able to report to Brigade H.Q. that the situation was again quiet.

Had the enemy been able to make a second attack, the situation would have been serious indeed. Save for the H.Q. details, the Battalion now had absolutely no reserves, while the companies of the 7th Battalion which had counter-attacked had to be used to man the line formerly held by the 22nd Corps Reinforcement Battalion. But, after the failure of their attack, the Germans attempted nothing further that day. In all, on April 14th, the Battalion lost one officer and 14 other ranks killed, two officers and 51 other ranks wounded, and two other ranks missing.

The occasional crashes of burning buildings were almost the only sounds which disturbed the night. It was not free from alarms, but nothing came of any of them. Towards midnight, the joyful news arrived that the Battalion was to be relieved by troops of the 59th Division, who were already on their way. The whole of both the 4th and 6th Battalions were to be relieved by the 5th Battalion North Staffordshire Regt., but as this Battalion was about 900 fighting strength, and the total effective strength of the battalions to be relieved was only about 600, no great difficulty was anticipated by 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q. There was, however, considerable difficulty in handing over the line, owing to the great extension of front which the dispersal of the 22nd Corps Reinforcement Battalion had rendered necessary. As a result, relief was not complete until some time after daybreak. Then the Battalion, delighted at the prospect of a rest, moved back to a position about half a mile south of St. Jans Cappel, where the site of a new line had been taped out the previous day.

(d) St. Jans Cappel.

On being relieved in Bailleul, the 147th Infantry Brigade passed into IX. Corps Reserve, but was to be prepared to move at half-an-hour’s notice. The 7th Battalion was in reserve in or near St. Jans Cappel; the 4th and 6th Battalions bivouaced in the open about a thousand yards south of the village, where the new line had been taped. Everyone was tired out with the exertions of the past week, and the opportunity for a sound and unbroken sleep was welcomed. No one guessed how short the period of rest would be.

A few alarming rumours came through during the day, but little was thought of them at first. Then, about 4-30 p.m., came the order from Brigade which disillusioned all—the Battalion was to stand to at once, and work on the taped-out line was to be pressed on with as hard as possible. It was hinted that this line would probably be the front line before morning. Everyone responded with the greatest readiness and cheerfulness. Few shovels were available, but farm implements were seized and many of the men set to work with the long-handled spades of the district. The Battalion was responsible for a line, about half a mile in length, on the western side of the Bailleul—St. Jans Cappel Road. The 6th Battalion held a similar front on the opposite side of the road, but, apart from some Lewis guns manned by a battalion of the Tank Corps, there appeared to be no one for several hundred yards on the right. “When positions are taken up all ranks must definitely understand that no withdrawal is to take place excepting under written orders” was the Commanding Officer’s message to companies. The strength of the Battalion was very low—only 19 officers and 307 other ranks all told—little enough to hold half a mile of front. It was then that the Commanding Officer, thinking the extreme urgency of the situation warranted the step, ordered up practically the whole of B Echelon.

The night which followed was one of the most depressing in the whole history of the Battalion. About 8-30 p.m. a message had arrived from Brigade H.Q. to warn everyone that the 59th Division would probably withdraw through the new line. But the message was unnecessary. The men of the 176th Infantry Brigade were already coming along the road, and it was clear that Bailleul, the town which the Battalion had helped to defend for three days in spite of heavy losses, had fallen. Many of the men of the 5th Battalion North Staffordshire Regt. stopped to assist in the defence of the new line; but most of their Brigade passed through to Locre to reorganise. The Battalion was again holding the front line. Picquets were pushed out well in front, a wiring party under the 57th Field Company, Royal Engineers, did valuable work, while through the night the men dug hard, and by dawn there was quite a good line.

The chief anxiety was the gap in the line, on the Battalion’s right. This was eventually filled by the 5th Battalion North Staffordshire Regt. About 350 men of this battalion had remained in the line when the rest of their Brigade passed through, and these were now transferred to the right, where they took over the front under their own Commanding Officer. But, in accordance with the instructions of the G.O.C., 147th Infantry Brigade, Lieut.-Col. R. E. Sugden, D.S.O., retained supreme command of that part of the front, as well as of his own battalion.

The night passed without any enemy action. At dawn the next day, patrols pushed out well in front of the line, and located the enemy on the Becque de la Flanche. It was certain that he would soon make an attempt to continue his advance, but the Battalion now felt ready for him. Quite a respectable line had been dug during the night. This was held by B Company on the right and C Company on the left; D and A Companies were in support on the right and left respectively; B Echelon, which had arrived during the night, was kept at Battalion H.Q. in reserve. As time went on movement among the enemy became more and more pronounced, and early in the afternoon it was obvious that an attack was imminent. Large numbers of Germans were seen dribbling down the hedge-rows, from the direction of Bailleul, and massing about 500 or 600 yards from the Battalion front. Two companies of the 7th Battalion had been placed at the disposal of the Commanding Officer, to strengthen his right flank, and all ranks quietly awaited the enemy’s move.

About 4-0 p.m. the storm burst. The desultory shelling of the earlier part of the afternoon changed to a barrage, and large numbers of the enemy advanced to the attack. The Battalion settled down to fight. On the right such a hail of bullets was poured into the advancing masses by B Company that the attack scarcely succeeded in debouching from the hedge, behind which the assembly had been carried out. On the left C Company, whose line was packed with Lewis guns, brought the advance to a complete standstill 300 yards from the line. A detachment of the 176th Light Trench Mortar Battery, which was covering the road to Bailleul, was able to burst shell after shell in the midst of the enemy. The attack had hardly opened before it had failed. Nowhere did a German get within 300 yards of the British line. To the east of the road it was much the same tale; there the 6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. first held up the attack by Lewis gun and rifle fire, and then, issuing from its trenches, collected a number of prisoners. Within half-an-hour, of the whole German regiment which had made the attack, nothing was to be seen but the little group of prisoners moving to the rear, and the scores of dead who littered the battlefield. “Well done all ranks” was the message received from the Brigadier; and “Well done old 147 Brigade” was the affectionate greeting of Major-General N. J. G. Cameron when he received the news.

Though the men of the Battalion knew it not, this was the last attack they were to sustain on that front. After eight days of almost continuous fighting, they had at length succeeded in bringing the enemy’s advance to a full stop. The line which they had started to dig late in the afternoon of April 15th, and which they had defended so successfully the following day, was to remain the front line until the beginning of the victorious British advance in the late summer. Through it the enemy was never to penetrate; and while the Battalion was in the neighbourhood he never again tried. For the time being the Germans had had enough of the 147th Infantry Brigade. But, at the time, the Battalion knew nothing of all this.

The days that followed were very anxious ones. So weak was the Battalion that it could not be expected to withstand many more attacks. Time after time reports came in that reinforcements were coming up, that French troops would soon be there. But as the days went by, and the Battalion still remained in that all-important part of the line, some began to doubt whether relief ever would come. At length one day a French cavalry officer arrived at Battalion H.Q., and informed the Commanding Officer that he had come for liaison purposes. His regiment was the advanced guard of considerable numbers of French troops, and was already bivouacing in the neighbourhood. He was authorised by his Commanding Officer to say that, although the regiment was not intended to take part in any fighting without orders from higher authority, if help were needed the Battalion need only let him know and the regiment would come.

Meanwhile the Battalion was hard at work improving the line. Patrols were active on the front, and were seldom interfered with. Two days after his unsuccessful attempt towards St. Jans Cappel, the enemy launched an attack further to the west, on the front which had been occupied by the men of the 5th Battalion North Staffordshire Regt. As luck would have it, these had been relieved the previous night by the 2nd Battalion Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders, who gave the enemy so warm a reception that afterwards he left that front severely alone. During these days the Battalion was not much troubled, except by intermittent artillery fire.

On the night of April 18/19th the Battalion was relieved by the 7th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., and went into Brigade Reserve. Battalion H.Q. was situated in the Convent at St. Jans Cappel which had large, though not very strongly built cellars. The Aid Post was in a brewery on the opposite side of the road, where considerable stocks of beer, rather better in quality than the normal French variety, were much appreciated. Most of the men held a new switch line, which had been dug to the south-west of the village.

Only twenty-four hours were spent in the new location, for the next night the whole Brigade was withdrawn into Divisional Reserve. The Battalion was relieved by the 1st Queens and withdrew to Mont Noir; here the only billets available, with the exception of one estaminet occupied by Battalion H.Q., were slits in the ground.

By this time the French were coming up in force and were taking over the whole sector. Long before dawn on the morning of April 21st, the Battalion marched out and proceeded in the darkness, through batteries of French 75’s which were already in action, to a hutment camp on the top of Mont des Cats. Here the men slept until the middle of the afternoon. It was the first real piece of comfort they had had since they were hurried into battle nearly two weeks before.

(e) Poperinghe.

The Battalion only stopped on Mont des Cats for a few hours and then it moved off to Poperinghe. On the way, it passed the G.O.C., IX. Corps, who had come to take a last look at the men who had served him so well. Though a sorry remnant of the Battalion, which had embussed so cheerfully at Reninghelst only twelve days before, they were well worth a second glance. Ragged, unshaven and unkempt, with nothing clean about them but their rifles, bayonets and ammunition, they were yet a body of veterans whom anyone would have been proud to command. Thrown into the battle when the enemy was flushed with success, they had fought and beaten him time after time. It was the proud boast of the Battalion that it had never withdrawn without definite orders to do so, and that the enemy had never won from it an inch of ground.

Messages of thanks and congratulations had poured in to the Brigade from all quarters—from the Commander-in-Chief, from General Plumer, and from the IX. Corps. The G.O.C., 34th Division, on parting with the 147th Infantry Brigade, wrote to the G.O.C., 49th Division, in the following terms:—