INDEX

449. Brook v. Wife, Cro. El. 878; Davis v. Taylor, Cro. El. 648; Garford v. Clerk, Cro. El. 857; Miller’s Case, Cro. Jac. 430; Crittal v. Horner, Hob. 219 b; Elyott v. Blague, Sty. 283; Marshall v. Chickall, 1 Sid. 50; Comming’s Case, 2 Sid. 5; Lymbe v. Hockly, 1 Lev. 205; Grimes v. Lovel, 12 Mod. 242; Clifton v. Wells, 12 Mod. 634; Whitfield v. Powel, 12 Mod. 248; Bloodworth v. Gray, 7 M. & G. 334; Watson v. McCarthy, 2 Ga. 57; Nichols v. Guy, 2 Ind. 82; McDonald v. Nugent, 122 Ia. 651; Meteye v. Times Co., 47 La. Ann. 824; Golderman v. Stearns, 7 Gray, 181; Williams v. Holdredge, 22 Barb. 396; Hewitt v. Mason, 24 How. Pr. 366; Upton v. Upton, 51 Hun, 184; Simpson v. Press Co., 33 Misc. 228; Kaucher v. Blinn, 29 Ohio St. 62; Irons v. Field, 9 R. I. 216 Accord.

Bury v. Chappel, Golds. 135; James v. Rutlech, 4 Rep. 17 a; Hunt v. Jones, Cro. Jac. 499; Califord v. Knight, Cro. Jac. 514 Contra.

In Taylor v. Hall, 2 Strange, 1189, it was held not actionable to say that plaintiff had had the pox. Smith’s Case, Noy, 151; Dutton v. Eaton, Al. 30; Carslake v. Mapledoram, 2 T. R. 473; Nichols v. Guy, 2 Ind. 82; Pike v. Van Wormer, 5 How. Pr. 171; Irons v. Field, 9 R. I. 216 Accord. Austin v. White, Cro. El. 214; Anon. Ow. 34; Hobson v. Hudson, Sty. 199, 219 Contra.

450. Only the opinion of the court is given.

451. But see Fitzgerald v. Young, 89 Neb. 693 (imputation of insanity to a teacher).

452. Only the opinion of the court upon this point is given.

453. Lucas v. Cotton, Moore, 79; Underwood v. Parks, 2 Stra. 1200; Ellis v. Buzzell, 60 Me. 209; Baum v. Clause, 5 Hill, 196 Accord.

The rule is the same as to actions for a libel. Leyman v. Latimer, 3 Ex. D. 15, 352; Grand Union Tea Co. v. Lorch, (C. C. A.) 231 Fed. 390; Schuler v. Fischer, 167 Ala. 184; Children v. Shinn, 168 Ia. 531; Castle v. Hunston, 19 Kan. 417; Hanson v. Bristow, 87 Kan. 72; Herald Pub. Co. v. Feltner, 158 Ky. 35; Cook v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 241 Mo. 326; Merrey v. Guardian Pub. Co., 79 N. J. Law, 177; Willetts v. Scudder, 72 Or. 535. Unless modified by statute, as in Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, Rhode Island and West Virginia. Delaware Co. v. Croasdale, 6 Houst. 181; Jones v. Townsend, 21 Fla. 431; Palmer v. Adams, 137 Ind. 72; Perry v. Porter, 124 Mass. 338; Fordyce v. Richmond, 78 Neb. 752; McClaugherty v. Cooper, 39 W. Va. 313. In New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, however, the mere truth of the libel is not always a defence, although there is no such statute. Hutchins v. Page, 75 N. H. 215; Burkhart v. N. Am. Co., 214 Pa. St. 39.

454. The statement of the pleadings is abridged; the arguments of counsel and the concurring opinions of Martin, Channell, and Bramwell, BB., are omitted.

455. Rex v. Skinner, Lofft, 55; Thomas v. Churton, 2 B. & S. 475; Dawkins v. Paulet, L. R. 5 Q. B. 94; Dawkins v. Prince Edward, 1 Q. B. D. 499; Law v. Llewellyn, [1906] 1 K. B. 487 (judge of inferior court—Scotch case Allardice v. Robertson, 1 Dow & Cl. 495 not followed); Bottomley v. Brougham, [1908] 1 K. B. 584 (official receiver); Miller v. Hope, 2 Shaw, App. Cas. 125; Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 9 Johns. 395 (but see Aylesworth v. St. John, 25 Hun, 156); Allen v. Earnest, (Tex. Civ. App.) 145 S. W. 1101 Accord.

Kendillon v. Maltby, Car. & M. 402, 2 M. & Rob. 438, S. C., lays down too restricted a rule.

“The publication of defamatory words may be under an absolute or under a qualified or conditional privilege. Under the former there is no liability, although the defamatory words are falsely and maliciously published. The class of absolutely privileged communications is narrow and practically limited to legislative and judicial proceedings and acts of state.” Hall, C. J., in Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 35.

See Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578; Peterson v. Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87.

456. Only the opinion of Brett, M. R., is given.

457. Pedley v. Morris, 61 L. J. Q. B. 21 Accord.

See Buckley v. Wood, 4 Rep. 14 b; Hodgson v. Scarlett, 1 B. & Ald. 232; Mackay v. Ford, 5 H. & N. 792; Smallwood v. York, 163 Ky. 139; Rudin v. Fauver, 33 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 315; Kruegel v. Cockrell (Tex. Ci v. App.) 151 S. W. 352.

“We cannot accept the absolute and unqualified privilege laid down in Munster v. Lamb.... We cannot agree with Brett, M. R., that in a suit against counsel for slander the only inquiry is whether the words were spoken in a judicial proceeding, and if so, the case must be stopped. We quite agree however, with Bramwell, J. A., in Seaman v. Netherclift, that ‘relevant’ and ‘pertinent’ are not the best words that could be used. These words have in a measure a technical meaning, and we all know the difficulty in determining in some cases what is relevant or pertinent. With Lord Chancellor Cairns we prefer the words ‘having reference’ or ‘made with reference,’ or in the language of Shaw, C. J., ‘having relation to the cause or subject-matter.’ And if counsel in the trial of a cause maliciously slanders a party, or witness or any other person in regard to a matter that has no reference or relation to, or connection with, the case before the Court, he is and ought to be answerable in an action by the party injured. This qualification of his privilege in no manner impairs the freedom of discussion so necessary to the proper administration of the law, nor does it subject counsel to actions for slander except in cases in which upon reason and sound public policy he ought to be held answerable. We cannot agree that for the abuse of his privilege he is amenable only to the authority of the Court. Mere punishment by the Court is no recompense to one who has thus been maliciously and wantonly slandered.” Robinson, J., in Maulsby v. Reifsnider, 69 Md. 143, 162. La Porta v. Leonard, 88 N. J. Law, 663; Andrews v. Gardiner, 165 App. Div. 595 Accord.

Defamatory statements in brief of counsel. Brooks v. Bank of Acadia, 138 La. 657.

Pleadings. Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U. S. 165; Carpenter v. Grimes Min. Co., 19 Idaho, 384; Hess v. McKee, 150 Ia. 409; Lebovitch v. Levy, 128 La. 518; Flynn v. Boglarsky, 164 Mich. 513; Rosenberg v. Dworetsky, 139 App. Div. 517; Harris v. Santa Fé Townsite Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 125 S. W. 77.

In England, statements in a pleading are absolutely privileged, though not relevant. Hodson v. Pare, [1899] 1 Q. B. 455.

In the United States, statements in a pleading not pertinent to the action are not privileged. Union Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 83 Fed. 803; King v. McKissick, 126 Fed. 215; Potter v. Troy, 175 Fed. 128; Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197; Gaines v. Aetna Ins. Co., 104 Ky. 695; Jones v. Brownlee, 161 Mo. 258; Gilbert v. People, 1 Denio, 41; Kemper v. Fort, 219 Pa. St. 85; Crockett v. McLanahan, 109 Tenn. 517; Miller v. Gust, 71 Wash. 139.

Charges in disbarment proceedings, see Preusser v. Faulhaber, 33 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 312.

Statements in a petition for pardon. Connollee v. Blanton, (Tex. Ci v. App.) 163 S. W. 404 (held absolutely privileged).

Statement by defendant on trial for crime. Nelson v. Davis, 9 Ga. App. 131.

In Louisiana the statements of parties in judicial proceedings are not absolutely privileged. Lescale v. Joseph Schwartz Co., 116 La. 293, 118 La. 718; Dunn v. Southern Co., 116 La. 431.

458. The arguments and the opinion of Amphlett, J. A., are omitted.

459. Revis v. Smith, 18 C. B. 126; Henderson v. Broomhead, 4 H. & N. 569; Dawkins v. Rokeby, L. R. 7 H. L. 744, L. R. 8 Q. B. 255 (military court of inquiry); Goffin v. Donnelly, 6 Q. B. D. 307 (select committee of House of Commons); Gompas v. White, 6 T. L. R. 20; Watson v. Jones, [1905] A. C. 480 (privilege extends to statement to client and solicitor in preparation of case for trial); Terry v. Fellows, 21 La. Ann. 375; Hunckle v. Voneiff, 69 Md. 173; Dodge v. Gilman, 122 Minn. 177; Runge v. Franklin, 72 Tex. 585; Kennedy v. Hilliard, 10 Ir. C. L. R. 195 Accord. But the English courts do not extend the doctrine to hearings before an administrative board. Atwood v. Chapman, 111 L. T. 726.

See also Hutchinson v. Lewis, 75 Ind. 55; Liles v. Gaster, 42 Ohio St. 631.

In Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, supra, Lord Penzance said: “It is said that a statement of fact of a libellous nature which is palpably untrue—known to be untrue by him who made it, and dictated by malice—ought to be the subject of a civil remedy, though made in the course of a purely military inquiry. This mode of stating the question assumes the untruth and assumes the malice. If by any process of demonstration, free from the defects of human judgment, the untruth and malice could be set above and beyond all question or doubt, there might be ground for contending that the law of the land should give damages to the injured man.

“But this is not the state of things under which this question of law has to be determined. Whether the statements were, in fact, untrue, and whether they were dictated by malice, are, and always will be, open questions, upon which opinions may differ, and which can only be resolved by the exercise of human judgment. And the real question is, whether it is proper on grounds of public policy to remit such questions to the judgment of a jury. The reasons against doing so are simple and obvious. A witness may be utterly free from malice, and may yet in the eyes of a jury be open to that imputation; or, again, the witness may be cleared by the jury of the imputation, and may yet have to encounter the expenses and distress of a harassing litigation. With such possibilities hanging over his head, a witness cannot be expected to speak with that free and open mind which the administration of justice demands.

“These considerations have long since led to the legal doctrine that a witness in the courts of law is free from any action; and I fail to perceive any reason why the same considerations should not be applied to an inquiry such as the present, and with the same result.”

460. The statement, arguments of counsel and parts of the opinion are omitted.

461. “White v. Carroll, rightly understood, is in harmony with the other cases. The case shows that the court held that the answer given to the question put to the defendant as a witness before the surrogate was not material and pertinent to the inquiry; and further held it was privileged if the defendant, when he gave it, in good faith believed that it was; and whether he so believed, was a question of fact to be determined by the jury. Had the evidence proved that the answer was material and pertinent, the court must have held it privileged, irrespective of the defendant’s belief upon the subject.” Grover, J., in Marsh v. Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. 309, 313.

“It seems to be settled by the English authorities that judges, counsel, parties, and witnesses are absolutely exempted from liability to an action for defamatory words published in the course of judicial proceedings; and that the same doctrine is generally held in the American courts, with the qualification, as to parties, counsel, and witnesses, that their statements made in the course of an action must be pertinent and material to the case.” Lord, J., in McLaughlin v. Cowley, 127 Mass. 316, 319.

“The examination of witnesses is regulated by the tribunal before which they testify, and if witnesses answer pertinently questions asked them by counsel which are not excluded by the tribunal, or answer pertinently questions asked them by the tribunal, they ought to be absolutely protected. It is not the duty of a witness to decide for himself whether the questions asked him under the direction of the tribunal are relevant. As the witness is sworn to tell the whole truth relating to the matter concerning which his testimony is taken, he ought also to be absolutely protected in testifying to any matter which is relevant to the inquiry, or which he reasonably believes to be relevant to it. But a witness ought not to be permitted with impunity to volunteer defamatory statements which are irrelevant to the matter of inquiry, and which he does not believe to be relevant. This statement of the law we think, is supported by the decisions in this Commonwealth. The English decisions, perhaps, go somewhat further than this in favor of a witness; certainly they apply the rule liberally for his protection.” Field, J., in Wright v. Lothrop, 149 Mass. 385, 389.

The principal case and the preceding extracts in this note represent the views of the American courts in general.

King v. McKissick, 126 Fed. 215; Lawson v. Hicks, 38 Ala. 279; Wyatt v. Buell, 47 Cal. 624; Hollis v. Meux, 69 Cal. 625; People v. Green, 9 Col. 506; Lester v. Thurmond, 51 Ga. 118; Buschbaum v. Heriot, 5 Ga. App. 521; Spaids v. Barrett, 57 Ill. 289; Fagan v. Fries, 30 Ill. App. 236; Smith v. Howard, 28 Ia. 51; Hawk v. Evans, 76 Ia. 593; Forbes v. Johnson, 11 B. Mon. 48; Morgan v. Booth, 13 Bush, 480; Stewart v. Hall, 83 Ky. 375; Sebree v. Thompson, 126 Ky. 223; Kelly v. Lafitte, 28 La. Ann. 435; Gardemal v. McWilliams, 43 La. Ann. 454; Barnes v. McCrate, 32 Me. 442; Hoar v. Wood, 3 Met. 193; Kidder v. Parkhurst, 3 All. 393; McLaughlin v. Cowley, 127 Mass. 316; Wright v. Lothrop, 149 Mass. 385; Wheaton v. Beecher, 49 Mich. 348; Acre v. Starkweather, 118 Mich. 214; Hastings v. Lusk, 22 Wend. 410; Ring v. Wheeler, 7 Cow. 725; Garr v. Selden, 4 N. Y. 91; Marsh v. Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. 309; Moore v. Manufacturers’ Bank, 123 N. Y. 420, 136 N. Y. 666; Newfield v. Copperman, 15 Abb. Pr. N. S. 360; Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461; Dada v. Piper, 41 Hun, 254; McLaughlin v. Charles, 60 Hun, 239; Beggs v. McCrea, 62 App. Div. 39 (semble); Suydam v. Moffat, 1 Sandf. 459; Perzel v. Tousey, 52 N. Y. Super. Ct. 79; Cooper v. Phipps, 24 Or. 357; Shadden v. McElwee, 86 Tenn. 146; Mower v. Watson, 11 Vt. 536; Dunham v. Powers, 42 Vt. 1; Johnson v. Brown, 13 W. Va. 71; Jennings v. Paine, 4 Wis. 358; Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193; Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 82.

Statements volunteered by witness. Viss v. Calligan, 91 Wash. 673.

Statements in affidavit. Perry v. Perry, 153 N. C. 266; Baggett v. Grady, 154 N. C. 342; Keeley v. Great Northern R. Co., 156 Wis. 181. But see Ritschy v. Garrels, 195 Mo. App. 670.

Affidavit in legislative investigation. Tuohy v. Hassell, 35 Okl. 61.

Defamatory statements at creditors’ meeting. Smith v. Agee, 178 Ala. 627.

Statements in notice of foreclosure sale. Tierney v. Ruppert, 150 App. Div. 863.

Report of grand jury without indictment. Rich v. Eason, (Tex. Civ. App.) 180 S. W. 303.

Statement of guardian as to person making claim against ward’s estate. Marney v. Joseph, 94 Kan. 18.

Letter from one attorney to another, not confined to the matters in litigation. Savage v. Stover, 86 N. J. Law, 478.

Message of a mayor. A communication from the mayor of a city to the common council is absolutely privileged. Trebilcock v. Anderson, 117 Mich. 39.

Official statements of officers of state are absolutely privileged. Chatterton v. Secretary of State, [1895] 2 Q. B. 189; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483.

Statements of administrative officers. Farr v. Valentine, 38 App. D. C. 413; Haskell v. Perkins, 165 Ill. App. 144; Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578; Peterson v. Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87; Johnson v. Marsh, 82 N. J. Law, 4 (notice not to sell liquor to alleged drunkard); Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N. Y. 27.

462. It is well settled that no action is allowed against a witness for damage caused by his perjury. Damport v. Sympson, Cro. El. 520, Ow. 158, 2 And. 47, s. c.; Eyres v. Sedgewicke, Cro. Jac. 601; Yelv. 142, 2 Roll. R. 197, S. C.; Wimberly v. Thompson, Noy, 6; Harding v. Bodman, Hutt. 11; Coxe v. Smithe, 1 Lev. 119; Taylor v. Bidwell, 65 Cal. 489; Bostwick v. Lewis, 2 Day, 447; Grove v. Brandenburg, 7 Blackf. 239; Dunlap v. Glidden, 31 Me. 435; Severance v. Judkins, 73 Me. 376, 379; Garing v. Fraser, 76 Me. 37; Phelps v. Stearns, 4 Gray, 105; Curtis v. Fairbanks, 16 N. H. 542; Smith v. Lewis, 3 Johns. 157; Cunningham v. Brown, 18 Vt. 123.

See Bell v. Senneff, 83 Ill. 122. Compare Schaub v. O’Ferrell, 116 Md. 131.

463. See also Taylor v. Bidwell, 65 Cal. 489; Curtis v. Fairbanks, 16 N. H. 542; Stevens v. Rowe, 59 N. H. 578.

464. A part of the opinion relating to points of pleading is omitted.

465. The arguments and the concurring opinions of Martin and Channell, BB., are omitted.

466. Risk Allah Bey v. Whitehurst, 18 L. T. Rep. 615; Hope v. Leng, 23 T. L. R. 243; Furniss v. Cambridge News, 23 T. L. R. 705; Todd v. Every Evening Co., (Del.) 62 Atl. 1089 (semble); Blodgett v. Des Moines Co., (Ia.) 113 N. W. 821; Billet v. Publishing Co., 107 La. 751 (semble); McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403; Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392; Conner v. Standard Co., 183 Mass. 474; Nixon v. Dispatch Co., 101 Minn. 309; Hawkins v. Globe Co., 10 Mo. App. 174; Boogher v. Knapp, 97 Mo. 122; Brown v. Knapp, 213 Mo. 655 (semble); Brown v. Globe Co., 213 Mo. 611; Thompson v. Powning, 15 Nev. 195; Edsall v. Brooks, 17 Abb. Pr. 221; N. Y. Code Civ. Proc., § 1907; Ackerman v. Jones, 37 N. Y. Super. Ct. 42; Salisbury v. Union Co., 45 Hun, 120; Hart v. Sun Co., 79 Hun, 358; Cincinnati Co. v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio St. 548; Metcalf v. Times Co., 20 R. I. 674; Saunders v. Baxter, 6 Heisk. 369; American Co. v. Gamble, 115 Tenn. 663; People v. Glassman, 12 Utah, 238 Accord.

So publication of copies from the register of judgments is privileged. Searles v. Scarlett, [1892] 2 Q. B. 56.

Publication of papers filed in the clerk’s office, but not produced in open court, is not privileged. Meeker v. Post Pub. Co., 45 Col. 355; Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392; Lundin v. Post Pub. Co., 217 Mass. 213; Park v. Detroit Co., 72 Mich. 560; Barber v. St. Louis Co., 3 Mo. App. 377; Stuart v. Press Co., 83 App. Div. 467; Byers v. Meridian Printing Co., 84 Ohio St. 408; American Co. v. Gamble, 115 Tenn. 663; Houston Pub. Co. v. McDavid, (Tex. Civ. App.) 173 S. W. 467; Ilsley v. Sentinel Co., 133 Wis. 20.

Report of criminal proceeding before magistrate with no jurisdiction. Lee v. Brooklyn Pub. Co., 209 N. Y. 245.

Report of investigation before grand jury. Poston v. Washington R. Co., 36 App. D. C. 359; Sweet v. Post Publishing Co., 215 Mass. 450.

Report in advance of judicial proceeding as to evidence to be adduced. Houston Pub. Co. v. Tiernan, (Tex. Civ. App.) 171 S. W. 542. See Kelly v. Independent Pub. Co., 45 Mont. 127.

Humorous report. Bresslin v. Star Co., 85 Misc. 609.

Matter added to the report. Smith v. New Yorker Staats Zeitung, 154 App. Div. 458.

467. Only the opinion of Lord Coleridge, and that, too, slightly abridged, is given. Lopes, J., concurred.

468. Curry v. Walter, 1 Esp. 456, 1 B. & P. 525; Lewis v. Levy, E. B. & E. 537; Kimber v. Press Association, [1893] 1 Q. B. 65; McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403; Salisbury v. Union Co., 45 Hun, 120 (semble); Metcalf v. Times Co., 20 R. I. 674 (semble); Brown v. Providence Co., 25 R. I. 117 (semble) Accord.

See Duncan v. Thwaites, 3 B. & C. 556; Parsons v. Age Herald Pub. Co., 181 Ala. 439; Todd v. Every Evening Co., (Del.) 62 Atl. 1089; Flues v. New Nonpareil Co., 155 Ia. 290; Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392; Jones v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 240 Mo. 200; Stanley v. Webb, 4 Sandf. 21; Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 256; Cincinnati Co. v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio St. 548; Mengel v. Reading Eagle Co., 241 Pa. St. 367.

The report of ex parte proceedings may be published before their termination, if of such a character that there will be a final decision. Kimber v. Press Association, [1893] 1 Q. B. 65.

469. Only the opinion of the court is given.

470. In 1843, see Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. lxx. pp. 1254–8; and in 1858, see vol. cxlix. pp. 947–82.—Reporter’s Note.

471. See Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. lxx. p. 1254; and vol. cxlix. p. 947.—Reporter’s Note.

472. Garby v. Bennett, 57 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 853; Buckstaff v. Hicks, 94 Wis. 34 (semble—report of proceedings of common council of a city not privileged); Dillon v. Balfour, L. R. 20 Ir. 600 Accord.

The publication must purport to be a report. Lewis v. Hayes, 165 Cal. 527.

473. The concurring opinions of Cockburn, C. J., and Baggallay and Bramwell, JJ. A., and the arguments of counsel are omitted.

474. See Charlton v. Watton, 6 Car. & P. 385; Davison v. Duncan, 7. E. & B. 229, 233; Popham v. Pickburn, 7 H. & N. 891; Davis v. Duncan, L. R. 9 C. P. 396; Allbutt v. General Council, 23 Q. B. D. 400, 411.

By St. 51 & 52 Vict. c. 64, §§ 3 and 4, “§ 3. A fair and accurate report in any newspaper of proceedings publicly heard before any court exercising judicial authority shall, if published contemporaneously with such proceedings, be privileged: Provided that nothing in this section shall authorize the publication of any blasphemous or indecent matter.

“§ 4. A fair and accurate report published in any newspaper of the proceedings of a public meeting, or (except where neither the public nor any newspaper reporter is admitted) of any meeting of a vestry, town council, school board, board of guardians, board or local authority formed or constituted under the provisions of any Act of Parliament, or of any committee appointed by any of the above-mentioned bodies, or of any meeting of any commissioners authorized to act by letters patent, Act of Parliament, warrant under the Royal Sign Manual, or other lawful warrant or authority, select committees of either House of Parliament, justices of the peace in quarter sessions assembled for administrative or deliberative purposes, and the publication at the request of any Government office or department, officer of state, commissioner of police, or chief constable of any notice or report issued by them for the information of the public, shall be privileged, unless it shall be proved that such report or publication was published or made maliciously: Provided that nothing in this section shall authorize the publication of any blasphemous or indecent matter: Provided also, that the protection intended to be afforded by this section shall not be available as a defence in any proceedings if it shall be proved that the defendant has been requested to insert in the newspaper in which the report or other publication complained of appeared a reasonable letter or statement by way of contradiction or explanation of such report or other publication, and has refused or neglected to insert the same: Provided further, that nothing in this section contained shall be deemed or construed to limit or abridge any privilege now by law existing, or to protect the publication of any matter not of public concern and the publication of which is not for the public benefit.

“For the purposes of this section ‘public meeting’ shall mean any meeting bona fide and lawfully held for a lawful purpose, and for the furtherance or discussion of any matter of public concern, whether the admission thereto be general or restricted.” Kelly v. O’Malley, 6 T. L. R. 62, was decided under this statute.

Newspaper publication of reports of administrative officers. Tilles v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 241 Mo. 609; Schwarz v. Evening News Co., 84 N. J. Law 486; Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N. Y. 27. Contra, Madill v. Currie, 168 Mich. 546. See Morasca v. Item Co., 126 La. 426.

Report of investigation by administrative officers. Williams v. Black, 24 S. D. 501.

475. The case has been much abridged.

476. Allbutt v. General Council, 23 Q. B. D. 400 Accord. But see Kimball v. Post Pub. Co., 199 Mass. 248; Peoples Bank v. Goodwin, 148 Mo. App. 364.

Report of proceedings of a church commission. Bass v. Mathews, 69 Wash. 214.

477. Only the opinion of Mellish, L. J., is given.

478. Macdougall v. Knight, 14 App. Cas. 194 (explaining S. C. 17 Q. B. Div. 636); Salisbury v. Union Co., 45 Hun, 120 Accord.

See Annaly v. Trade Co., L. R. 26 Ir. 394.

479. Parsons v. Age Herald Pub. Co., 181 Ala. 439; Washington Herald Co. v. Berry, 41 App. D. C. 322; Lundin v. Post Pub. Co., 217 Mass. 213; Schwarz v. Evening News Co., 84 N. J. Law, 486; Williams v. Black, 24 S. D. 501; Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders, 113 Va. 156 Accord.

But see U. S. v. Journal Co., 197 Fed. 415; Tilles v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 241 Mo. 609.

“Their Lordships regret to find that there appeared on the one side of this case the time-worn fallacy that some kind of privilege attaches to the profession of the Press as distinguished from the members of the public. The freedom of the journalist is an ordinary part of the freedom of the subject, and to whatever lengths the subject in general may go so also may the journalist, but, apart from statute law, his privilege is no other and no higher. The responsibilities which attach to his power in the dissemination of printed matter may, and in the case of a conscientious journalist do, make him more careful; but the range of his assertions, his criticisms, or his comments is as wide as, and no wider than, that of any other subject. No privilege attaches to his position.” Lord Shaw in Arnold v. King-Emperor, 111 L. T. 324, 325.

480. The statement has been condensed, the facts sufficiently appearing in the opinion of Mellor, J. The arguments of counsel and the concurring opinion of Hannen, J., are omitted.

481. Barbaud v. Hookham, 5 Esp. 109; McDougall v. Claridge, 1 Camp. 267; Dunman v. Bigg, 1 Camp, 269 n.; Todd v. Hawkins, 2 M. & R. 20, 8 Car. & P. 88; Shipley v. Todhunter, 7 Car. & P. 680; Harris v. Thompson, 13 C. B. 333; Maitland v. Bramwell, 2 F. & F. 623; Scarll v. Dixon, 4 F. & F. 250; Cooke v. Wildes, 5 E. & B. 328; Croft v. Stevens, 7 H. & N. 570; Whiteley v. Adams, 15 C. B. N. S. 392; Spill v. Maule, L. R. 4 Ex. 232; Laughton v. Bishop, L. R. 4 P. C. 495; Davies v. Snead, L. R. 5 Q. B. 608; Waller v. Loch, 7 Q. B. D. 619; Cowles v. Potts, 34 L. J. Q. B. 247; Quartz Co. v. Beall, 20 Ch. Div. 501; Royal Aquarium v. Parkinson, [1892] 1 Q. B. 431; Pittard v. Oliver, [1891] 1 Q. B. 474; Phila. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202; Broughton v. McGrew, 39 Fed. 672; Haight v. Cornell, 15 Conn. 74; Etchison v. Pergerson, 88 Ga. 620; Wharton v. Wright, 30 Ill. App. 343; Coombs v. Rose, 8 Blackf. 155; Kirkpatrick v. Eagle Lodge, 26 Kan. 384; Lynch v. Febiger, 39 La. Ann. 336; Remington v. Congdon, 2 Pick. 310; Bradley v. Heath, 12 Pick. 163; Farnsworth v. Storrs, 5 Cush. 412; York v. Pease, 2 Gray, 282; Gassett v. Gilbert, 6 Gray, 94; Shurtleff v. Parker, 130 Mass. 293 (semble); Howland v. Flood, 160 Mass. 509; Landis v. Campbell, 79 Mo. 433; Rothholz v. Dunkle, 53 N. J. Law, 438; Jarvis v. Hatheway, 3 Johns, 180; O’Donaghue v. McGovern, 23 Wend. 26; Streety v. Wood, 15 Barb. 105; Fowles v. Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20; Kilinck v. Colby, 46 N. Y. 427; McKnight v. Hasbrouck, 17 R. I. 70; Tillinghast v. McLeod, 17 R. I. 208; Holt v. Parsons, 23 Tex. 9; Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51 Vt. 501 (semble) Accord.

See also Dickeson v. Hilliard, L. R. 9 Ex. 79; Lyman v. Gowing, L. R. 6 Ir. 259 (where the communication was made to unsuitable persons); Phillips v. Bradshaw, 181 Ala. 541; Bohlinger v. Germania Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477.

Communication by promoter of an enterprise to one whose assistance is sought. Cook v. Gust, 155 Wis. 594.

Communication from superintendent of railroad to express company as to employee who serves both. International R. Co. v. Edmundson, (Tex. Civ. App.) 185 S. W. 402.

Communication by insurance adjuster to insurers. Richardson v. Cooke, 129 La. 365.

Indorsement of officer on recommendation for promotion. Gray v. Mossman, 88 Conn. 247.

Communication between stockholders as to manager of a corporation. Ashcroft v. Hammond, 197 N. Y. 488.

Communication by person immediately interested made honestly to protect his own interest. Delany v. Jones, 4 Esp. 190 (but see Lay v. Lawson, 4 A. & E. 798); Fairman v. Ives, 5 B. & A. 642; Coward v. Wellington, 7 Car. & P. 531; Tuson v. Evans, 12 A. & E. 733 (semble); Blackham v. Pugh, 2 C. B. 611; Wenman v. Ash, 13 C. B. 836 (semble, communication to unsuitable person); Manby v. Witt, 18 C. B. 544; Taylor v. Hawkins, 16 Q. B. 308; Amann v. Damm, 8 C. B. N. S. 597; Force v. Warren, 15 C. B. N. S. 806; Oddy v. Paulet, 4 F. & F. 1009 (semble); Cooke v. Wildes, 5 E. & B. 328; Regina v. Perry, 15 Cox C. C. 169; Bank v. Strong, 1 App. Cas. 307; Hunt v. Great Northern Co., [1891] 2 Q. B. 189; Baker v. Carrick, [1894] 1 Q. B. 838; Hobbs v. Bryers, L. R. 2 Ir. 496; Lang v. Gilbert, 4 All. (N. B.) 445; Gasley v. Moss, 9 Ala. 266; Butterworth v. Conrow, 1 Marv. 361; Henry v. Moberly, 23 Ind. App. 305; Nichols v. Eaton, 110 Ia. 509; Caldwell v. Story, 107 Ky. 10; Baysett v. Hire, 49 La. Ann. 904; Dickinson v. Hathaway, 122 La. Ann. 644; Beeler v. Jackson, 64 Md. 589; Brow v. Hathaway, 13 All. 239; Bacon v. Mich. Co., 66 Mich. 166; Howard v. Dickie, 120 Mich. 238; Alabama Co. v. Brooks, 69 Miss. 168; Lovell Co. v. Houghton, 116 N. Y. 520; Lent v. Underhill, 54 App. Div. 609; Reynolds v. Plumbers’ Ass’n, 30 Misc. 709; Behee v. Missouri R. Co., 71 Tex. 424; Missouri R. Co. v. Richmond, 73 Tex. 568; Missouri Co. v. Behee, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 107; Miller v. Armstrong, 24 N. Zeal. 968.

482. The arguments of counsel are omitted.

483. Johnson v. Evans, 3 Esp. 32; Fowler v. Homer, 3 Camp. 294; Jones v. Thomas, 34 W. R. 104; Lightbody v. Gordon, 9 Scotch Sess. Cas. (4th series) 934; Dale v. Harris, 109 Mass. 193 Accord.

See to the same effect Flanagan v. McLane, 87 Conn. 220; Wall v. Seaboard Ry., 18 Ga. App. 457; Cristman v. Cristman, 36 Ill. App. 567; Harper v. Harper, 10 Bush, 447; Hyatt v. Lindner, 133 La. 614; Bavington v. Robinson, 127 Md. 46, 124 Md. 85; Eames v. Whittaker, 123 Mass. 342; Wells v. Toogood, 165 Mich. 677; Lally v. Emery, 59 Hun, 237; Hayden v. Hasbrouck, 34 R. I. 556; Viss v. Calligan, 91 Wash. 673. Compare Hansen v. Hansen, 126 Minn. 426; Hooper v. Truscott, 2 B. N. C. 457; Harrison v. Fraser, 29 W. R. 652.

But see Peak v. Taubman, 251 Mo. 390; Vanloon v. Vanloon, 159 Mo. App. 255; Hagener v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 172 Mo. App. 436.

Relevant statement in course of dispute as to property. Alderson v. Kahle, 73 W. Va. 690.

484. The argument for the plaintiff and the opinions of Lord Tenterden, C. J., Bayley, and Littledale, JJ., are omitted.

485. Servant cases. Edmondson v. Stevenson, Bull. N. P. 8; Weatherston v. Hawkins, 1 T. R. 110; Rogers v. Clifton, 3 B. & P. 587; Pattison v. Jones, 8 B. & C. 578; Gardner v. Slade, 13 Q. B. 796; Murdoch v. Funduklian, 2 T. L. R. 614 (reversing S. C. 2 T. L. R. 215); Doane v. Grew, 220 Mass. 171; Carroll v. Owen, 178 Mich. 551 Accord.

Commercial agency cases. Lemay v. Chamberlain, 10 Ont. 638; Todd v. Dun, 12 Ont. 791; Erber v. Dun, 12 Fed. 526; Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172; Pollasky v. Minchener, 81 Mich. 280; Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226; King v. Patterson, 49 N. J. Law, 417; Taylor v. Church, 8 N. Y. 452; Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188; Bradstreet Co. v. Gill, 72 Texas, 115 Accord.

Macintosh v. Dun, [1908] A. C. 390 Contra. Aliter in case of credit association not for profit. London Ass’n for Protection of Trade v. Greenlands, [1916] 2 A. C. 15.

But information given to persons having no interest in the mercantile standing of the plaintiff—for example, reports sent by a commercial agency to its subscribers generally—is not privileged. Erber v. Dun, 12 Fed. 526; Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 Fed. 214 (criticising Beardsley v. Tappan, 5 Blatchford, 497); Locke v. Bradstreet Co., 22 Fed. 771; Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet, 25 Idaho, 696; Pollasky v. Minchener, 81 Mich. 280; Ormsby v. Douglass, 37 N. Y. 477; State v. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348.

For other cases of communications privileged because made in answer to proper inquiries, see Cockayne v. Hodgkisson, 5 Car. & P. 543; Storey v. Challands, 8 Car. & P. 234; Kline v. Sewell, 3 M. & W. 297; Hopwood v. Thorn, 8 C. B. 293; Robshaw v. Smith, 38 L. T. Rep. 423; Weldon v. Winslow, Odgers, Lib. & Sl. (5th ed.) 255; Melcher v. Beeler, 48 Col. 233; Zuckerman v. Sonnenschein, 62 Ill. 115; Richardson v. Gunby, 88 Kan. 47; Atwill v. Mackintosh, 120 Mass. 177; Howland v. Blake Co., 156 Mass. 543; Froslee v. Lund’s State Bank, 131 Minn. 435; Fahr v. Hayes, 50 N. J. Law, 275; Posnett v. Marble, 62 Vt. 481; Rude v. Nass, 79 Wis. 321.

Advice by attorney to client as to person with whom client has business. Kruse v. Rabe, 80 N. J. Law, 378.

Fiduciary relations. Communications made in the line of a business duty, for example, by an agent or employee to his principal or employer are privileged. Wright v. Woodgate, 2 C. M. & R. 573; Scarll v. Dixon, 4 F. & F. 250; Stace v. Griffith, L. R. 2 P. C. 420; Hume v. Marshall, 42 J. P. 136; Washburn v. Cooke, 3 Den. 110; Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369.

Family relations. A bona fide communication by a brother to his sister reflecting on the character of her suitor is privileged. Anon., 2 Smith, 4, cited; Adams v. Coleridge, 1 T. L. R. 4. So is a similar communication by a son-in-law to his mother-in-law. Todd v. Hawkins, 2 M. & Rob. 20, 8 C. & P. 88.

Inquiry as to character of candidate for admission to a society. Cadle v. McIntosh, 51 Ind. App. 365.