1. Smith v. Newsam, 1 Vent. 256; Tombs v. Painter, 13 East, 1; Lewis v. Hoover, 3 Blackf. 407; Handy v. Johnson, 5 Md. 450; People v. Carlson, 160 Mich. 426; Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N. C. 463; Leach v. Leach, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 699 Accord.

2. The report of the same case in 2 Keble, 545, adds: “The defendant pleaded the plaintiff began first, and the stroke he received, whereby he lost his eye, was on his own assault, and in defense of the defendant.”

3. Blake v. Barnard, 9 Car. & P. 626; State v. Crow, 1 Ired. 375; Commonwealth v. Eyre, 1 S. & R. 347; Biggins v. Gulf R. Co., 102 Tex. 417 Accord. Compare Handy v. Johnson, 5 Md. 450.

Similarly, a mere preparation for a possible assault, but without any act indicating a present intention to do personal violence to another, is not an assault. Lawson v. State, 30 Ala. 14; Godwin v. Collins, 67 Fla. 197; Penny v. State, 114 Ga. 77; Gober v. State, 7 Ga. App. 206; Haupt v. Swenson, 125 Ia. 694; State v. Painter, 67 Mo. 84; State v. Milsaps, 82 N. C. 549. But compare State v. Hampton, 63 N. C. 13.

4. Townsdin v. Nutt, 19 Kan. 282; Handy v. Johnson, 5 Md. 450; Fairme’s Case, 5 City Hall Rec. 95; Brister v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. 505; Western T. Co. v. Bowdoin, (Tex. Civ. App.) 168 S. W. 1 Accord. Jones v. State, 89 Ark. 213 (semble) Contra.

Compare Cobbett v. Grey, 4 Ex. 744, per Pollock, C. B.; Burton v. State, 8 Ala. App. 295; Wells v. State, 108 Ark. 312; People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521; Grimes v. State, 99 Miss. 232; Commonwealth v. Roman, 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 64; Trimble v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. 439.

In Mortin v. Shoppee, 3 Car. & P. 373, defendant rode up to plaintiff’s gate, plaintiff being in his garden about three yards off, and, shaking his whip, said, “Come out, and I will lick you before your own servants.” Compare People v. Yslas, 27 Cal. 630; State v. Shipman, 81 N. C. 513.

5. Only so much of the case is given as relates to the question of assault.

6. United States v. Kiernan, 3 Cranch, C. C. 435; Plonty v. Murphy, 82 Minn. 268; People v. Lee, 1 Wheeler, Crim. Cas. 364; State v. Davis, 1 Ired. 125; Alexander v. Blodgett, 44 Vt. 476; Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589; Bishop v. Ranney, 59 Vt. 316; Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wis. 240; Keep v. Quallman, 68 Wis. 451 Accord.

7. United States v. Myers, 1 Cranch, C. C. 310; Keefe v. State, 19 Ark. 190; Hixson v. Slocum, 156 Ky. 487; State v. Dooley, 121 Mo. 591; State v. Herron, 12 Mont. 230; State v. Morgan, 3 Ired. 186; State v. Cherry, 11 Ired. 475; State v. Church, 63 N. C. 15; Bishop v. Ranney, 59 Vt. 316; French v. Ware, 65 Vt. 338 Accord.

8. State v. Church, 63 N. C. 15 Accord.

Firing a revolver in plaintiff’s presence but not at him, intending to frighten him but not to do him any bodily harm, was held not to be an assault. Degenhardt v. Heller, 93 Wis. 662. Compare Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466.

9. The argument for the plaintiff is omitted.

10. In Chapman v. State, 78 Ala. 463; State v. Yturaspe, 22 Idaho, 360; State v. Sears, 86 Mo. 169; State v. Godfrey, 17 Or. 300; McKay v. State, 44 Tex. 43, it was decided that a defendant who aimed an unloaded pistol at another, although perhaps liable for a civil assault, was not guilty of a criminal assault. See also 2 Green, Cr. Cas. 271 n.; Territory v. Gomez, 14 Ariz. 139; People v. Sylva, 143 Cal. 62. Such conduct was held to be a criminal assault in State v. Shepard, 10 Ia. 126; Commonwealth v. White, 110 Mass. 407; State v. Barry, 45 Mont. 598; Clark v. State, (Okl. Cr.) 106 Pac. 803; State v. Smith, 2 Humph. 457; Richels v. State, 1 Sneed, 606 (semble); Morison’s Case, 1 Brown, Just. R. (Scotch) 394. In Commonwealth v. White, supra, Wells, J., said: “It is not the secret intent of the assaulting party, nor the undisclosed fact of his ability or inability to commit a battery, that is material, but what his conduct and the attending circumstances denote at the time to the party assaulted.” Cf. Howell v. Winters, 58 Wash. 436.

11. Only so much of the case is printed as relates to this count.

12. State v. Daniel, 136 N. C. 571; Degenhardt v. Heller, 93 Wis. 662 Accord. Wood v. Young, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1931 Contra. It is not an assault to make the kissing sign to another. Fuller v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. 463.

Mere words, looks, or gestures, however violent or insulting, do not amount to an assault. State v. Borrelli, 24 Del. 349; Reimenschneider v. Neusis, 175 Ill. App. 172; Harvey v. Harvey, 124 La. 595; Bouillon v. La Clede Gas Light Co., 148 Mo. App. 462; State v. Daniel, 136 N. C. 571; Lewis v. Fountain, 168 N. C. 277. A fortiori violent language over the telephone is no assault. Kramer v. Ricksmeier, 159 Ia. 48.

No action lies for the shame and insult to a woman from inviting her to illicit intercourse. Davis v. Richardson, 76 Ark. 348; Reed v. Maley, 115 Ky. 816; State v. White, 52 Mo. App. 285. Aliter where accompanied by acts that put her in fear. Johnson v. Hohn, 168 Ia. 147; Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah, 536; Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589. And a common carrier is liable, as a public service company, for insults to a passenger by its employees. Knoxville Co. v. Lane, 103 Tenn. 376.

“Injury is committed not only when a man is struck with the fist or beaten with a stick or lashed, but also when abusive language is publicly addressed to any one, or when ... some one ... has followed about a married woman or a young boy or girl, or when some person’s modesty may be said to have been assailed.” Institutes of Justinian, iv, 4, 1.

“Likewise it is an injury of this kind when one person, without actually striking another, keeps raising his hand menacingly and creates in the other the fear that he will be struck.... Likewise if he mocks another with indecent or indecorous gestures; or if by means of gesticulations he indicates things of such a kind that if they were expressed in spoken words or in writing they would convey an injury.” Voet, Commentary on the Pandects, xlvii, 10, § 7.

“Ignominious treatment is an injury only when it is an infringement of one of the absolute rights of personality: a right that is recognized by the law of the State as included amongst the natural rights of every freeman. Such an infringement of another’s right may be regarded as offensive to good morals (contra bonos mores); hence the definition of injuria as ‘an insult offered to any person against good morals’ (contumelia contra bonos mores alicui illata).” De Villiers, Roman and Roman-Dutch Law of Injuries, 22.

13. Meader v. Stone, 7 Met. (Mass.) 147 Accord.

See Rex v. Smith, 2 Car. & P. 449; Preiser v. Wielandt, 48 App. Div. 569.

14. Hostile touching or in anger. Singer Co. v. Methvin, 184 Ala. 554; McGlone v. Hanger, 56 Ind. App. 243; Booher v. Trainer, 172 Mo. App. 376; Hough v. Iderhoff, 69 Or. 568; Raefeldt v. Koenig, 152 Wis. 459 Accord.

Touching contra bonos mores but with no hostile intent. Richmond v. Fisk, 160 Mass. 34. Taking liberties with a woman. Hatchett v. Blacketer, 162 Ky. 266; Timmons v. Kenrick, 53 Ind. App. 490. Unauthorized surgical operation. Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300; Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261; Schloendorff v. Society, 211 N. Y. 125; Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okl. 572. But see Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 N. J. Law, 20. Aliter where authorized by a minor. Bakker v. Welsh, 144 Mich. 632.

15. Kerifford’s Case, Clayt. 22 pl. 38 Accord. See, also, Steinman v. Baltimore Laundry Co., 109 Md. 62; Courtney v. Kneib, 131 Mo. App. 204.

16. The statement of the case has been abridged.

17. Courtney v. Kneib, 131 Mo. App. 204 Accord. Compare Reynolds v. Pierson, 29 Ind. App. 273.

18. A part of the case, relating to a point of practice, is omitted.

19. Dodwell v. Burford, 1 Mod. 24; Hopper v. Reeve, 7 Taunt. 698; Spear v. Chapman, 8 Ir. L. R. 461; Reynolds v. Pierson, 29 Ind. App. 273; Burdick v. Worrall, 4 Barb. 596 (semble); Bull v. Colton, 22 Barb. 94; Clark v. Downing, 55 Vt. 259 Accord. But see Kirland v. State, 43 Ind. 146.

An injury to the clothes on one’s back is a trespass on the person, Regina v. Day, 1 Cox, C. C. 207. So is the removal of an ulster from the plaintiff, Geraty v. Stern, 30 Hun, 426; or seizing anything in the plaintiff’s hand, Scott v. State, 118 Ala. 115; Dyk v. De Young, 35 Ill. App. 138; Steinman v. Baltimore Laundry Co., 109 Md. 62 (semble); Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 Dall. 111; or cutting a rope connecting the plaintiff with his slave, State v. Davis, 1 Hill (S. C.) 46.

20. The statement of the pleadings and the arguments of counsel are omitted.

21. Berry v. Da Costa, L. R. 1 C. P. 331; Collins v. Mack, 31 Ark. 684; Hattin v. Chapman, 46 Conn. 607; Graves v. Rivers, 123 Ga. 224; Tubbs v. Van Kleek, 12 Ill. 446; Tyler v. Salley, 82 Me. 128; Sauer v. Schulenberg, 33 Md. 288; Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395; Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339; Bennett v. Beam, 42 Mich. 346; Schmidt v. Durnham, 46 Minn. 227; Green v. Spencer, 3 Mo. 318; Musselman v. Barker, 26 Neb. 737; Coil v. Wallace, 24 N. J. Law, 291; Kniffen v. McConnell, 30 N. Y. 285; Spellings v. Parks, 104 Tenn. 351; Daggett v. Wallace, 75 Tex. 352; Giese v. Schultz, 69 Wis. 521 Accord.

Weaver v. Bachert, 2 Pa. St. 80; Wrynn v. Downey, 27 R. I. 454 Contra.

22. But see 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, 65; 1 Bishop, New Criminal Law, § 38.

23. Beseler v. Stephani, 71 Ill. 400; Woodward v. Anderson, 9 Bush, 624; Paul v. Frazier, 3 Mass. 71; Welsund v. Schueller, 98 Minn. 475; Robinson v. Musser, 78 Mo. 153; Hamilton v. Lomax, 26 Barb. 615; Weaver v. Bachert, 2 Pa. St. 80; Conn v. Wilson, 2 Overt. 233 Accord. See Desborough v. Homes, 1 F. & F. 6.

An action is allowed by statute in some jurisdictions. Marshall v. Taylor, 98 Cal. 55; Swett v. Gray, 141 Cal. 83; McIlvain v. Emery, 88 Ind. 298; Verwers v. Carpenter, 166 Ia. 273; Watson v. Watson, 49 Mich. 540; Hood v. Sudderth, 111 N. C. 215; Breon v. Henkle, 14 Or. 494. The Scotch law is to the same effect. Smith, Law of Damages in Scotland, 128. Under these statutes it has been held that there must be a real seduction: “Consent must be procured by some trick or artifice other than mere solicitation.” Brown v. Kingsley, 38 Ia. 220. Compare Breon v. Henkle, 14 Or. 494.

Even without a statute a guardian is liable in damages for the seduction of his ward. Graham v. Wallace, 50 App. Div. 101. See also Smith v. Richards, 29 Conn. 232.

24. Boulter v. Clarke, Bull. N. P. 16; Reg. v. Coney, 8 Q. B. D. 534, 538, 546, 549, 567; Logan v. Austin, 1 Stewart (Ala.) 476; Cadwell v. Farrell, 28 Ill. 438; Adams v. Waggoner, 33 Ind. 531; Lund v. Tyler, 115 Ia. 236; McNeil v. Mullin, 70 Kan. 634; Galbraith v. Fleming, 60 Mich. 403; Grotton v. Glidden, 84 Me. 589; Commonwealth v. Colburg, 119 Mass. 350 (semble); Lizana v. Lang. 90 Miss. 469; Jones v. Gale, 22 Mo. App. 637; Morris v. Miller, 83 Neb. 218; Stout v. Wren, 1 Hawks (N. C.), 420; Barholt v. Wright, 45 Ohio St. 177 (explaining Champer v. State, 14 Ohio St. 437); McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168 (semble); Willey v. Carpenter, 64 Vt. 212; Shay v. Thompson, 59 Wis. 540; Miller v. Bayer, 94 Wis. 124 (procuring an abortion with plaintiff’s consent) Accord.

Reg. v. Coney, 15 Cox, C. C. 46 (semble), per Hawkins J.; Hegarty v. Shine, L. R. 4 Ir. 288, 294 (semble); Goldnamer v. O’Brien, 98 Ky. 569 (procuring an abortion with plaintiff’s consent); Lykins v. Hamrick, 144 Ky. 80, Contra. If the plaintiff is injured by the defendant, both being engaged in an illegal charivari party, he cannot recover damages from the defendant. Gilmore v. Fuller, 198 Ill. 130.

As to injury in the course of a “friendly scuffle,” see Gibeline v. Smith, 106 Mo. App. 545.

25. McNay v. Stratton, 9 Ill. App. 215; Price v. Bailey, 66 Ill. 48; Hildebrand v. McCrum, 101 Ind. 61; Smith v. State, 7 Humph. 43; Sorenson v. Dundas, 50 Wis. 335 Accord.

Compare Marshall v. Heller, 55 Wis. 392. For recent definitions see Westberry v. Clanton, 136 Ga. 795; Coolahan v. Marshall Field & Co., 159 Ill. App. 466; Efroymson v. Smith, 29 Ind. App. 451; Comer v. Knowles, 17 Kan. 436; New York R. Co. v. Waldron, 116 Md. 441; Smith v. Clark, 37 Utah, 116, 126.

26. Anon. 1 Vent. 306; Anon. 7 Mod. 8; Whithead v. Keyes, 3 All. 495 Accord.

27. If the bailiff, who has a process against one, says to him when he is on horseback or in a coach, “You are my prisoner; I have a writ against you,” upon which he submits, turns back, or goes with him, though the bailiff never touched him, yet it is an arrest, because he submitted to the process; but if, instead of going with the bailiff, he had gone or fled from him, it could be no arrest, unless the bailiff laid hold of him. Horner v. Battyn, Bull. N. P. 62.

28. Chinn v. Morris, 2 Car. & P. 361; Pocock v. Moore, Ry. & M. 321; Peters v. Stanway, 6 Car. & P. 737; Granger v. Hill, 4 Bing. N.C. 212; Warner v. Riddiford, 4 C. B. N. S. 180 (criticizing Arrowsmith v. Le Mesurier, 2 B. & P. N. R. 211); Singleton v. Kansas City Base Ball Co., 172 Mo. App. 299 Accord.

To hold a man by the sleeve without professing to arrest him or leading him to believe he is not free to get away is not an imprisonment. Macintosh v. Cohen, 24 N. Zeal. L. R. 625.

29. Part of the case, not relating to imprisonment, has been omitted.

30. Johnson v. Tompkins, Baldw. C. C. 571, 601; Collins v. Fowler, 10 Ala. 858; Courtoy v. Dozier, 20 Ga. 369; Hawk v. Ridgway, 33 Ill. 473; Brushaber v. Stegemann, 22 Mich. 266; Josselyn v. McAllister, 25 Mich. 45; Moore v. Thompson, 92 Mich. 498; Ahern v. Collins, 39 Mo. 145; Strout v. Gooch, 8 Greenl. 126; Mowry v. Chase, 100 Mass. 79; Emery v. Chesley, 18 N. H. 198; Browning v. Rittenhouse, 40 N. J. Law, 230; Hebrew v. Pulis, 73 N. J. Law, 621; Gold v. Bissell, 1 Wend. 210; Van Voorhees v. Leonard, 1 Thomp. & C. 148; Searls v. Viets, 2 Thomp. & C. 224; Limbeck v. Gerry, 15 Misc. 663; Martin v. Houck, 141 N. C. 317; Huntington v. Shultz, Harp. 452; Mead v. Young, 2 Dev. & Batt. 521; Haskins v. Young, 2 Dev. & Batt. 527; Jones v. Jones, 13 Ired. 448; McCracken v. Ansley, 4 Strob. 1; Gunderson v. Struebing, 125 Wis. 173 Accord.

Submission to wrongful detention by conductor of a train in consequence of his representation of authority to detain plaintiff was held an imprisonment in Whitman v. Atchison R. Co., 85 Kan. 150.

There must be reasonable ground for fear that defendant will use force. Powell v. Champion Fibre Co., 150 N. C. 12.

But compare Cottam v. Oregon City, 98 Fed. 570, deciding that a submission to arrest rather than pay an illegal license fee is not an imprisonment.

31. A portion of the case, relating to damages, is omitted.

32. As to “shadowing” by detectives, see Chappell v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323; People v. Weiler, 179 N. Y. 46; Schultz v. Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537.

33. Stat. 13 Ed. I. c. 48.

34. The concurring opinions of Williams and Patteson, JJ., are omitted.

35. Wright v. Wilson, 1 Ld. Raym. 739; Crossett v. Campbell, 122 La. 659; Balmain Ferry Co. v. Robertson, 4 C. L. R. (Australia) 379, aff’d [1910] A. C. 295; Queen v. Macquarie, 13 N. S. W. Sup. Ct. R. (Law) 264 (semble) Accord.

See Hawk v. Ridgway, 33 Ill. 473; Cullen v. Dickenson, 33 S. D. 27.

To order one to leave a boat which was moored to a wharf and, upon his refusal, to set the boat adrift is an imprisonment. Queen v. Macquarie, 13 N. S. W. Sup. Ct. R. (Law) 264.

Compare Herd v. Weardale Steel Co. [1913] 3 K. B. 771; Robinson v. Ferry Co. [1910] A. C. 295; Whittaker v. Sanford, 110 Me. 77; Talcott v. National Exhibition Co., 144 App. Div. 337.

36. Gates v. Miles, 3 Conn. 64, 70; McIntyre v. Sholty, 121 Ill. 660; Amick v. O’Hara, 6 Blackf. 258, 259; Cross v. Kent, 32 Md. 581; Feld v. Borodófski, 87 Miss. 727; Bullock v. Babcock, 3 Wend. 391; Krom v. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. 647. (imprisonment); Ward v. Conatser, 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 64; Brennan v. Donaghey, 19 N. Zeal. Gaz. L. R. 289, affirming s. c. 2 New Zeal. Gaz. L. R. 410 Accord.

The rule is the same as to torts in general. Behrens v. McKenzie, 23 Ia. 333, 343; Chesapeake R. Co. v. Francisco, 149 Ky. 307; Morain v. Devlin, 132 Mass. 87 (nuisance); Gibson v. Pollock, 179 Mo. App. 188; Jewell v. Colby, 66 N. H. 399; Re Heller, 3 Paige, 199; Williams v. Hays, 143 N. Y. 442 (compare Williams v. Hays, 157 N. Y. 541); Williams v. Cameron, 26 Barb. 172; Lancaster Bank v. Moore, 78 Pa. St. 407, 412; Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499 (conversion).

A lunatic has been held liable under a statute giving an action to the widow and children of one killed by the “careless, wanton, or malicious” use of firearms. Young v. Young, 141 Ky. 76.

In McIntyre v. Sholty, supra, Magruder, J., said, p. 664: “It is well settled that, though a lunatic is not punishable criminally, he is liable in a civil action for any tort he may commit. However justly this doctrine may have been originally subject to criticism on the grounds of reason and principle, it is now too firmly supported by the weight of authority to be disturbed. It is the outcome of the principle, that, in trespass, the intent is not conclusive. Mr. Sedgwick, in his work on Damages (margin, p. 456), says that, on principle, a lunatic should not be held liable for his tortious acts. Opposed to this view, however, is a majority of the decisions and text writers.”

“So long as the primitive notion prevailed that the doer of harm was absolutely responsible therefor, the insanity of the doer could afford no defence, either to a criminal prosecution or a civil action. 7 Harv. L. Rev. 446. When this notion was so far modified that misadventure or accident on the part of the doer became a defence, it would have been entirely logical for the courts to treat the acts or the omissions of lunatics as involuntary, and consequently not tortious but accidental.” Burdick, Torts (2d ed.), 60. See also Ames, Law and Morals, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 97, 99–100; Hornblower, Insanity and the Law of Negligence, 5 Col. L. Rev. 278.

“827. A person who causes damage to another while in a condition of unconsciousness or in a condition of morbid disturbance of mental activity incompatible with the free determination of the will is not responsible for the damage....”

“829. A person who ... is by virtue of 827 ... not responsible for any damage caused by him shall nevertheless where compensation cannot be obtained from a third party charged with the duty of supervision make compensation for damage in so far as according to the circumstances (e. g. according to the relative positions of the parties) equity requires compensation and he is not deprived of the means which he needs for his own maintenance suitable to his station in life and for the fulfilment of his statutory duties to furnish maintenance to others.”—German Civil Code, §§ 827, 829.

37. Underwood v. Hewson, 1 Stra. 596; Welch v. Durand, 36 Conn. 182; Atchison v. Dullam, 16 Ill. App. 42; Hodges v. Weltberger, 6 Monr. (Ky.) 337; Louisville R. Co. v. Sweeney, 157 Ky. 620; Chataigne v. Bergeron, 10 La. An. 699; Sullivan v. Murphy, 2 Miles (Pa.) 298; Castle v. Duryee, 2 Keyes, 169; Taylor v. Rainbow, 2 Hen. & Mun. 423 Accord.

See to the same effect Morgan v. Cox, 22 Mo. 373; Dygert v. Bradley, 8 Wend. 469; Jennings v. Fundeburg, 4 McC. 161; Tally v. Ayres, 3 Sneed, 677 (the injury to chattels); Wetzel v. Satterwhite, (Tex. Civ. App.) 125 S. W. 93 (injury to property); Wright v. Clark, 50 Vt. 130. Compare Osborne v. Van Dyke, 113 Ia. 557.

38. Nitro-Glycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524, 538 (semble); Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75, 84–90 (defendant in defending himself lawfully against A. fired a pistol at A., but accidentally hit the plaintiff); Paxton v. Boyer, 67 Ill. 132 (facts similar to those in Morris v. Platt, supra); Crabtree v. Dawson, 119 Ky. 148 Accord.

39. Only the opinion of the court is given.

40. Alderson v. Waistell, 1 Car. & K. 358; The Virgo, 25 W. R. 397; Nitro-Glycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524 (semble); Strouse v. Whittlesey, 41 Conn. 559; Sutton v. Bonnett, 114 Ind. 243; Holland v. Bartch, 120 Ind. 46 (see also Bennett v. Ford, 47 Ind. 264); Harvey v. Dunlop, Hill & D. 193; Center v. Finney, 17 Barb. 94, Seld. Notes, 80 Accord.

But one who by blasting throws rocks upon the plaintiff’s land is liable in trespass quare clausum fregit, irrespective of negligence. Central Co. v. Vandenheuk, 147 Ala. 546; Bessemer Co. v. Doak, 152 Ala. 166; Sloss Co. v. Salser, 158 Ala. 511; Birmingham Co. v. Grover, 159 Ala. 276; Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159; Tremain v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 163; St. Peter v. Denison, 58 N. Y. 416; Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N. Y. 290; Holland House v. Baird, 169 N. Y. 136, 140. And the same rule has been applied to trespass to the person by blasting. Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N. Y. 290; Turner v. Degnon Co., 99 App. Div. 135.

41. Only so much of the report is given as relates to the first count.

42. See The Mediana, [1900] A. C. 113, 116–118; Columbus Co. v. Clowes, [1903] 1 K. B. 244.

43. Brunsden v. Humphrey, 14 Q. B. D. 141, 150 (semble); Vogrin v. American Steel Co., 179 Ill. App. 245; Muncie Pulp Co. v. Davis, 162 Ind. 558; Foster v. County, 63 Kan. 43; Stepp v. Chicago R. Co., 85 Mo. 229; Commercial Bank v. Ten Eyck, 48 N. Y. 305; McCaffrey v. Twenty-Third St. R. Co., 47 Hun, 404; Washington v. Baltimore R. Co., 17 W. Va. 190 Accord.

Compare Clifton v. Hooper, 6 Q. B. 468.

44. Statement condensed. Only part of opinion is given.

45. Carlisle Banking Co. v. Bragg, [1911] 1 K. B. 489; Jackson v. Metropolitan R. Co., 2 C. P. D. 125; Steel Car Co. v. Chec, 184 Fed. 868; Louisville R. Co. v. Pearce, 142 Ala. 680; Florida R. Co. v. Williams, 37 Fla. 406; Perry v. Central R., 66 Ga. 746; Cleveland R. Co. v. Lindsay, 109 Ill. App. 533; City v. Martin, 74 Ind. 449; Hart v. Brick Co., 154 Ia. 741; Goins v. North Coal Co., 140 Ky. 323; County v. Collison, 122 Md. 91; Tutein v. Hurley, 98 Mass. 211; McNally v. Colwell, 91 Mich. 527; Harlan v. St. Louis R. Co., 65 Mo. 22; Wallace v. Chicago R. Co., 48 Mont. 427; Brotherton v. Manhattan Beach Co., 48 Neb. 563; Koch v. Fox, 71 App. Div. 288; Alexander v. City, 165 N. C. 527; St. Louis R. Co. v. Hess, 34 Okl. 615; Thubron v. Dravo Co., 238 Pa. St. 443; Anderson v. Southern R. Co., 70 S. C. 490; Newton v. Oregon R. Co., 43 Utah, 219; Sowles v. Moore, 65 Vt. 322; Schwartz v. Shull, 45 W. Va. 405; Klatt v. Foster, 92 Wis. 622 Accord.

46. Only so much of the case as relates to this count is given. The arguments are omitted. The statement was compiled, by Professor Jeremiah Smith, from the bill of exceptions filed in the Social Law Library of Boston.

47. Western Co. v. Wood, 57 Fed. 471; Kyle v. Chicago R. Co., 182 Fed. 613; McCray v. Sharpe, 188 Ala. 375; Bachelder v. Morgan, 179 Ala. 339; St. Louis Co. v. Taylor, 84 Ark. 42; Chicago Co. v. Moss, 89 Ark. 187; Green v. Southern R. Co., 9 Ga. App. 751; Haas v. Metz, 78 Ill. App. 46; Kalen v. Terre Haute Co., 18 Ind. App. 202; Zabron v. Cunard Co., 151 Ia. 345; Kentucky Traction Co. v. Bain, 161 Ky. 44; Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227; Wilson v. St. Louis R. Co., 160 Mo. App. 649; Arthur v. Henry, 157 N. C. 438; Samarra v. Allegheny Co., 238 Pa. St. 469; Folk v. Seaboard Co., 99 S. C. 284; Chesapeake R. Co. v. Tinsley, 116 Va. 600; Gulf Co. v. Trott, 86 Tex. 412 Accord.

48. “Ordinary street cars must be run with reference to ordinary susceptibilities, and the liability of their proprietors cannot be increased simply by a passenger’s notifying the conductor that he has unstable nerves.” Holmes J., in Spade v. Lynn R. Co., 172 Mass. 488, 491. But compare Webber v. Old Colony R. Co., 210 Mass. 432.

49. Victorian Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222; Haile v. Tex. Co., 60 Fed. 557; St. Louis Co. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402; Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401 (semble); Kansas Co. v. Dalton, 65 Kan. 661; Morse v. Chesapeake Co., 117 Ky. 11; Reed v. Ford, 129 Ky. 471; White v. Sander, 168 Mass. 296; Smith v. Postal Co., 174 Mass. 576; Homans v. Boston Co., 180 Mass. 456 (semble); Cameron v. N. E. Co., 182 Mass. 310 (semble); Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466; Crutcher v. Cleveland Co., 132 Mo. App. 311; Deming v. Chicago Co., 80 Mo. App. 152; Rawlings v. Wabash Co., 97 Mo. App. 515; Ward v. West Co., 65 N. J. Law, 383; Porter v. Del. Co., 73 N. J. Law, 405 (semble); Mitchell v. Rochester Co., 151 N. Y. 107; Newton v. N. Y. Co., 106 App. Div. 415 (semble); Prince v. Ridge, 32 Misc. 666, 667 (semble); Hutchinson v. Stern, 115 App. Div. 791; Miller v. Belt Co., 78 Ohio St. 309; Ewing v. Pittsburgh Co., 147 Pa. St. 40; Linn v. Duquesne Co., 204 Pa. St. 551; Huston v. Freemansburg, 212 Pa. St. 548; Hess v. American Pipe Co., 221 Pa. St. 67; Morris v. Lackawana R. Co., 228 Pa. St. 198; Taylor v. Atlantic Co., 78 S. C. 552; Ford v. Schliessman, 107 Wis. 479, 483 (semble) Accord.

The damages for an admitted tort to the person may be enhanced by proof of nervous shock caused by fright induced by the defendant’s misconduct. Eagan v. Middlesex R. Co., 212 Fed. 562, 214 Fed. 747; Birmingham Co. v. Martini, 2 Ala. App. 653; Melone v. Sierra Co., 151 Cal. 113; Seger v. Barkhamsted, 22 Conn. 290; Masters v. Warren, 27 Conn. 293; Garvey v. Metropolitan R. Co., 155 Ill. App. 601; Pittsburgh Co. v. Sponier, 85 Ind. 165; McClintic v. Eckman, 153 Ky. 704; Newport Co. v. Gholson, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 938; City Co. v. Robinson, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 555; Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69; Warren v. Boston Co., 163 Mass. 484; Homans v. Boston Co., 180 Mass. 456; Cameron v. N. E. Co., 182 Mass. 310; Driscoll v. Gaffey, 207 Mass. 102; Conley v. United Drug Co., 218 Mass. 238; Smith v. St. Paul Co., 30 Minn. 169; Hollingshed v. Yazoo R. Co., 99 Miss. 464; Butts v. Nat. Bank, 99 Mo. App. 168; Breen v. St. Louis Co., 102 Mo. App. 479; Heiberger v. Missouri Tel. Co., 133 Mo. App. 452; Lowe v. Metropolitan R. Co., 145 Mo. App. 248; Buchanan v. West Co., 52 N. J. Law, 265; Consol. Co. v. Lambertson, 59 N. J. Law, 297; Stokes v. Schlacter, 66 N. J. Law, 334; Porter v. Del. Co., 73 N. J. Law, 405; Kennell v. Gershonovitz, 84 N. J. Law, 577; O’Flaherty v. Nassau Co., 34 App. Div. 74 (affirmed 165 N. Y. 624); Cohn v. Ansonia Co., 162 App. Div. 791; Pa. Co. v. Graham, 63 Pa. St. 290; Scott v. Montgomery, 95 Pa. St. 444; Ewing v. Pittsburgh Co., 147 Pa. St. 40 (semble); Linn v. Duquesne Co., 204 Pa. St. 551 (semble); Samarra v. Allegheny R. Co., 238 Pa. St. 469; Folk v. Seaboard Co., 99 S. C. 284; Godeau v. Blood, 52 Vt. 251; Nordgren v. Lawrence, 74 Wash. 305; Shutz v. Chicago Co., 73 Wis. 147; and even though the admitted tort is only an assault as distinguished from a battery. Kline v. Kline, 158 Ind. 602; Williams v. Underhill, 63 App. Div. 223; Leach v. Leach, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 699. It must be shown that there was causal connection between the fright and the shock. Hack v. Dady, 142 App. Div. 510.

In Homans v. Boston Co., supra, the court said, through Holmes, C. J.: “As has been explained repeatedly, it is an arbitrary exception, based upon a notion of what is practicable, that prevents a recovery for visible illness resulting from nervous shock alone. Spade v. Lynn Co.; Smith v. Postal Co., 174 Mass. 576. But when there has been a battery and the nervous shock results from the same wrongful management as the battery, it is at least equally impracticable to go further and to inquire whether the shock comes through the battery or along with it. Even were it otherwise, recognizing as we must the logic in favor of the plaintiff when a remedy is denied because the only immediate wrong was a shock to the nerves, we think that when the reality of the cause is guaranteed by proof of a substantial battery of the person there is no occasion to press further the exception to general rules.” See also Spade v. Lynn Co., 172 Mass. 690, per Holmes, C. J.

Liability for frightening an Animal to Death. The doctrine of the principal case was carried so far in Lee v. Burlington, 113 Ia., 356, that no recovery was allowed for the death of a horse from fright caused by the careless conduct of the defendant. But the opposite view prevailed in Louisville R. Co. v. Melton, 158 Ala. 509, and Conklin v. Thompson, 29 Barb. 218.

50. Portions of the statement of facts have been omitted.

51. See to the same effect Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 Ill. 11; Cleveland Co. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374; Gaskins v. Runkle, 25 Ind. App. 584; Mahoney v. Dankwart, 108 Ia. 321; McGee v. Vanover, 148 Ky. 737; Chesapeake R. Co. v. Robinett, 151 Ky. 778; Sperier v. Ott, 116 La. 1087; Renner v. Canfield, 36 Minn. 90; Bucknam v. Great Northern R. Co., 76 Minn. 373; Sanderson v. Great Northern R. Co., 88 Minn. 162; Hutchinson v. Stern, 115 App. Div. 791; Gosa v. Southern Ry., 67 S. C. 347; Gulf R. Co. v. Overton, 101 Tex. 583 (but compare Gulf R. Co. v. Coopwood, 16 Tex. Ct. Rep. 354); Taylor v. Spokane R. Co., 72 Wash. 378, rev’g 67 Wash. 96.

52. Pullman Co. v. Lutz, 154 Ala. 517; Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473; Sloane v. So. Co., 111 Cal. 668; Watson v. Dilts, 116 Ia. 249; Cowan v. Tel. Co., 122 Ia. 379, 382 (semble); Purcell v. St. Paul Co., 48 Minn. 134, 138; Lesch v. Great Northern R. Co., 97 Minn. 503; Watkins v. Kaolin Co., 131 N. C. 536; Taber v. Seaboard Co., 81 S. C. 317; Simone v. R. I. Co., 28 R. I. 186; Mack v. South Co., 52 S. C. 323; Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210; Gulf Co. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239; Yoakum v. Kroeger, (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 953; St. Louis Co. v. Murdock, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 249; Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146; Fitzpatrick v. Gr. W. Co., 12 Up. Can. Q. B. 645; Bell v. Great Northern R. Co., 26 L. R. Ir. 428; Cooper v. Caledonia Co. (Court of Sess., June 14, 1902), 4. F. 880 Accord.

See Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence without Impact, 41 Am. L. Reg. & Rev. 141.

Mental Anguish caused by Negligence in Transmission of Telegrams. In a few states the addressee is allowed to recover damages for mental anguish resulting from the negligent failure of a telegraph company to make seasonable delivery of a message. Mentzer v. Western Co., 93 Ia. 752; Cowan v. Western Co., 122 Ia. 379; Hurlburt v. Western Co., 123 Ia. 295; Chapman v. Western Co., 90 Ky. 265; Western Co. v. Van Cleave, 107 Ky. 464; Western Co. v. Fisher, 107 Ky. 513; Graham v. Western Co., 109 La. 1069; Barnes v. Western Co., 27 Nev. 438 (semble); Thompson v. Western Co., 106 N. C. 549; Young v. Western Co., 107 N. C. 370; Bryan v. Western Co., 133 N. C. 603; Woods v. Western Co., 148 N. C. 1; Hellams v. Western Co., 70 S. C. 83 (statutory); Capers v. Western Co., 71 S. C. 29; Wadsworth v. Western Co., 86 Tenn. 695; Railroad v. Griffin, 92 Tenn. 694; So Relle v. Western Co., 55 Tex. 308; Stuart v. Western Co., 66 Tex. 580; Western Co. v. Beringer, 84 Tex. 38.

But the weight of authority is against such recovery. Chase v. Western Co., 44 Fed. 554; Crawson v. Western Co., 47 Fed. 544; Tyler v. Western Co., 54 Fed. 634; Western Co. v. Wood, 57 Fed. 471; Gahan v. Western Co., 59 Fed. 433; Stansell v. Western Co., 107 Fed. 668; Western Co. v. Sklar, 126 Fed. 295; Rowan v. Western Co., 149 Fed. 550; Blount v. Western Co., 126 Ala. 105; Western Co. v. Krichbaum, 132 Ala. 535; Western Co. v. Blocker, 138 Ala. 484; Western Co. v. Waters, 139 Ala. 652; Peay v. Western Co., 64 Ark. 538 (but changed by statute, Western Co. v. McMullin, 98 Ark. 346); Russell v. Western Co., 3 Dak. 315; Internat. Co. v. Saunders, 32 Fla. 434; Chapman v. Western Co., 88 Ga. 763; Giddens v. Western Co., 111 Ga. 824; Western Co. v. Haltom, 71 Ill. App. 63; Western Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64 (overruling Reese v. Western Co., 123 Ind. 294); West v. Western Co., 39 Kan. 93 (semble); Cole v. Gray, 70 Kan. 705; Francis v. Western Co., 58 Minn. 252; Western Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748; Duncan v. Western Co., 93 Miss. 500; Connell v. Western Co., 116 Mo. 34; Newman v. Western Co., 54 Mo. App. 434; Curtin v. Western Co., 13 App. Div. 253; Morton v. Western Co., 53 Ohio St. 431; Butner v. Western Co., 2 Okl. 234; Western Co. v. Chouteau, 28 Okl. 664; Lewis v. Western Co., 57 S. C. 325 (law changed by statute in 1900, Capers v. Western Co., 71 S. C. 29); Connelly v. Western Co., 100 Va. 51; Corcoran v. Postal Co., 80 Wash. 570; Davis v. Western Co., 46 W. Va. 48; Summerfield v. Western Co., 87 Wis. 1; Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 464 (semble).

53. Only the judgment of the court is printed.

54. Hall v. Jackson, 24 Col. App. 225; Dunn v. Western Co., 2 Ga. App. 845; Goddard v. Watters, 14 Ga. App. 722 (semble); Watson v. Dilts, 116 Ia. 249, 124 Ia. 249; Lonergan v. Small, 81 Kan. 48; Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466 (semble); Preiser v. Wielandt, 48 App. Div. 569; Buchanan v. Stout, 123 App. Div. 648 (semble); Miller v. R. R. Co., 78 Ohio St. 309, 324 (semble); Butler v. Western Co., 62 S. C. 222 (semble); Western Co. v. Watson, 82 Miss. 101 (semble); Shellabarger v. Morris, 115 Mo. App. 566; Wilson v. St. Louis R. Co., 160 Mo. App. 649; Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210; Davidson v. Lee, (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S. W. 904; Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536 Accord.

Threats not amounting to an Assault. Threats of bodily harm sent by letter and causing illness by reason of apprehension of bodily harm are grounds for an action. Houston v. Woolley, 37 Mo. App. 15; Grimes v. Gates, 47 Vt. 594. Compare Stevens v. Steadman, 140 Ga. 680; Degenhardt v. Heller, 93 Wis. 662.