and to admit a French garrison into Vercelli, Verrua, and even
   the citadel of Turin itself, till a general peace should be
   effected, caused the Duke to enter into treaties with Spain
   and the Emperor, June 3d and 4th; and on October 20th, he
   joined the Grand Alliance by a treaty concluded at the Hague
   with England and the States-General. This last step was taken
   by Victor Amadeus in consequence of his reverses. He had
   sustained from Catinat in the battle of Staffarda (August
   17th) a defeat which only the skill of a youthful general, his
   cousin the Prince Eugene, had saved from becoming a total
   rout. As the fruits of this victory, Catinat occupied Saluzzo,
   Susa, and all the country from the Alps to the Tanaro. During
   these operations another French division had reduced, without
   much resistance, the whole of Savoy, except the fortress of
   Montmélian. The only other event of importance during this
   campaign was the decisive victory gained by Luxembourg over
   Prince Waldeck at Fleurus, July 1st. The captured standards,
   more than a hundred in number, which Luxembourg sent to Paris
   on this occasion, obtained for him the name of the 'Tapassier
   de Notre Dame.' Luxembourg was, however, prevented from
   following up his victory by the orders of Louvois, who forbade
   him to lay siege to Namur or Charleroi. Thus, in this
   campaign, France maintained her preponderance on land as well
   as at sea by the victory off Beachy Head. ...

      See ENGLAND: A. D. 1690.

   The Imperialists had this year lost one of their best leaders
   by the death of the Duke of Lorraine (April). He was succeeded
   as commander-in-chief by Maximilian Emanuel, Elector of
   Bavaria; but nothing of importance took place upon the Rhine.

   1691: The campaign of this year was singularly barren of
   events, though both the French and English kings took a
   personal part in it. In March, Louis and Luxembourg, laid
   siege to Mons, the capital of Hainault, which surrendered in
   less than three weeks. King William, who was in the
   neighbourhood, could not muster sufficient troops to venture
   on its relief. Nothing further of importance was done in this
   quarter, and the campaign in Germany was equally a blank. On
   the side of Piedmont, Catinat took Nice, but, being confronted
   by superior numbers, was forced to evacuate Piedmont; though,
   by way of compensation, he completed the conquest of Savoy by
   the capture of Montmélian. Noailles gained some trifling
   successes in Spain; and the celebrated French corsair, Jean
   Bart, distinguished himself by his enterprises at sea. One of
   the most remarkable events of the year was a domestic
   occurrence, the death of Louvois."

      T. H. Dyer,
      History of Modern Europe,
      book 5, chapter 5 (volume 3).

      ALSO IN:
      F. P. Guizot,
      Popular History of France,
      chapter 44 (volume 5).

FRANCE: A. D. 1692.
   The taking of Namur and the victory of Steinkirk, or
   Steenkerke.

   Never perhaps in the whole course of his unresting life were
   the energies of William [of Orange] more severely taxed, and
   never did his great moral and intellectual qualities shine
   forth with a brighter lustre, than in the years 1692-93.

      See ENGLAND: A. D. 1692.

   The great victory of La Hogue and the destruction of the
   flower of the French fleet did, it is true, relieve England of
   any immediate dread either of insurrection or invasion, and so
   far the prospect before him acquired a slight improvement
   towards the summer of 1692. But this was the only gleam of
   light in the horizon. ... The great coalition of Powers which
   he had succeeded in forming to resist the ambition of Louis
   was never nearer dissolution than in the spring of 1692. The
   Scandinavian states, who had held aloof from it from the
   first, were now rapidly changing the benevolence of their
   neutrality into something not easily distinguishable from its
   reverse. The new Pope Innocent XII. showed himself far less
   amicably disposed towards William than his two predecessors.
   The decrepitude of Spain and the arrogant self-will of Austria
   were displaying themselves more conspicuously than ever. Savoy
   was ruled by a duke who was more than half suspected of being
   a traitor. ... William did succeed in saving the league from
   dissolution, and in getting their armies once more into the
   field. But not, unfortunately, to any purpose. The campaign of
   the present year was destined to repeat the errors of the
   last, and these errors were to be paid for at a heavier cost.
   ... The French king was bent upon the capture of the great
   stronghold of Namur, and the enemy, as in the case of Mons,
   were too slow in their movements and too ineffective in their
   dispositions to prevent it. Marching to the assault of the
   doomed city, with a magnificence of courtly pageantry which
   had never before been witnessed in warfare, Louis sat down
   before Namur, and in eight days its faint-hearted governor,
   the nominee of the Spanish viceroy of the Netherlands,
   surrendered at discretion. Having accomplished, or rather
   having graciously condescended to witness the accomplishment
   of this feat of arms, Louis returned to Versailles, leaving
   his army under the command of Luxembourg. The fall of Namur
   was a severe blow to the hopes of William, but yet worse
   disasters were in store for him. He was now pitted against one
   who enjoyed the reputation of the greatest general of the age,
   and William, a fair but by no means brilliant strategist, was
   unequal to the contest with his accomplished adversary.
{1241}
   Luxembourg lay at Steinkirk, and William approaching him from
   a place named Lambeque, opened his attack upon him by a
   well-conceived surprise which promised at first to throw the
   French army into complete disorder. Luxembourg's resource and
   energy, however, were equal to the emergency. He rallied and
   steadied his troops with astonishing speed, and the nature of
   the ground preventing the allies from advancing as rapidly as
   they had expected, they found the enemy in a posture to
   receive them. The British forces were in the front, commanded
   by Count Solmes, the division of Mackay, a name now honourable
   for many generations in the annals of continental, no less
   than of Scottish, warfare, leading the way. These heroes, for
   so, though as yet untried soldiers, they approved themselves,
   were to have been supported by Count Solmes with a strong body
   of cavalry and infantry, but at the critical moment he failed
   them miserably, and his failure decided the fortunes of the
   day. ... The division was practically annihilated. Its five
   regiments, 'Cutt's, Mackay's, Angus's, Graham's, and Leven's,
   all,' as Corporal Trim relates pathetically, cut to pieces,
   and so had the English Life-guards been too, had it not been
   for some regiments on the right, who marched up boldly to
   their relief, and, received the enemy's fire in their faces,
   before anyone of their own platoons discharged a musket.'
   Bitter was the resentment in the English army at the desertion
   of these gallant troops by Count de Solmes, and William gave
   vent to one of his rare outbursts of anger at the sight. We
   have it indeed on the authority above quoted--unimpeachable as
   first-hand tradition, for Sterne had heard the story of these
   wars at the knees of an eye-witness of and actor in them--that
   the King 'would not suffer the Count to come into his presence
   for many months after.' The destruction of Mackay's division
   had indeed decided the issue of the struggle. Luxembourg's
   army was being rapidly strengthened by reinforcements from
   that of Boufflers, and there was nothing for it but retreat.
   The loss on both sides had been great, but the moral effect of
   the victory was still greater. William's reputation for
   generalship, perhaps unduly raised by his recent exploits in
   Ireland, underwent a serious decline."

      H. D. Traill,
      William the Third,
      chapter 10.

   On the Rhine and on the Spanish frontier nothing of importance
   occurred during 1692. The Duke of Savoy gained some advantages
   on his side and invaded Dauphiny, without any material result.
   The invasion called into action a young heroine, Mademoiselle
   de La Tour-du-Pin, whose portrait has a place at Saint-Denis
   by the side of that of Jeanne D'Arc.

      H. Martin,
      History of France: Age of Louis XIV.,
      volume 2, chapter 2.

      ALSO IN:
      W. H. Torriano,
      William the Third,
      chapter 20.

FRANCE: A. D. 1693 (July).
   The Battle of Neerwinden, or Landen.

   "Lewis had determined not to make any advance towards a
   reconciliation with the new government of England till the
   whole strength of his realm had been put forth in one more
   effort. A mighty effort in truth it was, but too exhausting to
   be repeated. He made an immense display of force at once on
   the Pyrenees and on the Alps, on the Rhine and on the Meuse,
   in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. That nothing might
   be wanting which could excite the martial ardour of a nation
   eminently high-spirited, he instituted, a few days before he
   left his palace for the camp, a new military order of
   knighthood, and placed it under the protection of his own
   sainted ancestor and patron. The cross of Saint Lewis shone on
   the breasts of the gentlemen who had been conspicuous in the
   trenches before Mons and Namur, and on the fields of Fleurus
   and Steinkirk. ... On the 18th of May Lewis left Versailles.
   Early in June he was under the walls of Namur. The Princesses,
   who had accompanied him, held their court within the fortress. He
   took under his immediate command the army of Boufflers, which
   was encamped at Gembloux. Little more than a mile off lay the
   army of Luxemburg. The force collected in that neighbourhood
   under the French lilies did not amount to less than 120,000
   men. Lewis had flattered himself that he should be able to
   repeat in 1693 the stratagem by which Mons had been taken in
   1691 and Namur in 1692; and he had determined that either
   Liege or Brussels should be his prey. But William had this
   year been able to assemble in good time a force, inferior
   indeed to that which was opposed to him, but still formidable.
   With this force he took his post near Louvain, on the road
   between the two threatened cities, and watched every movement
   of the enemy. ... Just at this conjuncture Lewis announced his
   intention to return instantly to Versailles, and to send the
   Dauphin and Boufflers, with part of the army which was
   assembled near Namur, to join Marshal Lorges who commanded in
   the Palatinate. Luxemburg was thunderstruck. He expostulated
   boldly and earnestly. Never, he said, was such an opportunity
   thrown away. ... The Marshal reasoned: he implored: he went on
   his knees: but all was vain; and he quitted the royal presence
   in the deepest dejection. Lewis left the camp a week after he
   had joined it, and never afterwards made war in person. ...
   Though the French army in the Netherlands had been weakened by
   the departure of the forces commanded by the Dauphin and
   Boufflers, and though the allied army was daily strengthened
   by the arrival of fresh troops, Luxemburg still had a
   superiority of force; and that superiority he increased by an
   adroit stratagem." He succeeded by a feint in inducing William
   to detach 20,000 men from his army and to send them to Liege.
   He then moved suddenly upon the camp of the allies, with
   80,000 men, and found but 50,000 to oppose him. "It was still
   in the [English] King's power, by a hasty retreat, to put
   between his army and the enemy the narrow, but deep, waters of
   the Gette, which had lately been swollen by rains. But the
   site which he occupied was strong; and it could easily be made
   still stronger. He set all his troops to work. Ditches were
   dug, mounds thrown up, palisades fixed in the earth. In a few
   hours the ground wore a new aspect; and the King trusted that
   he should be able to repel the attack even of a force greatly
   outnumbering his own. ... On the left flank, the village of
   Romsdorff rose close to the little stream of Landen, from
   which the English have named the disastrous day. On the right
   was the village of Neerwinden. Both villages were, after the
   fashion of the Low Countries, surrounded by moats and fences.
   "Notwithstanding the strength of the position held by the
   allies, and the valor with which they defended it, they were
   driven out of Neerwinden [July 29]--but only after the
   shattered village had been five times taken and retaken--and
   across the Gette, in confusion and with heavy loss.
{1242}
   "The French were victorious: but they had bought their victory
   dear. More then 10,000 of the best troops of Lewis had fallen.
   Neerwinden was a spectacle at which the oldest soldiers stood
   aghast. The streets were piled breast high with corpses. Among
   the slain were some great lords and some renowned warriors.
   ... The region, renowned as the battle field, through many
   ages, of the greatest powers of Europe, has seen only two more
   terrible days, the day of Malplaquet and the day of Waterloo.
   ... There was no pursuit, though the sun was still high in the
   heaven when William crossed the Gette. The conquerors were so
   much exhausted by marching and fighting that they could
   scarcely move. ... A very short delay was enough for William.
   ... Three weeks after his defeat he held a review a few miles
   from Brussels. The number of men under arms was greater than
   on the morning of the bloody day of Landen: their appearance
   was soldierlike; and their spirit seemed unbroken. William now
   wrote to Heinsius that the worst was over. 'The crisis,' he
   said, 'has been a terrible one. Thank God that it has ended
   thus.' He did not, however, think it prudent to try at that
   time the event of another pitched field. He therefore suffered
   the French to besiege and take Charleroi; and this was the
   only advantage which they derived from the most sanguinary
   battle fought in Europe during the seventeenth century."

      Lord Macaulay,
      History of England,
      chapter 20 (volume 4).

      ALSO IN:
      G. Burnet,
      History of My Own Time,
      book 5 (1693), volume 4.

      Duc de Saint-Simon,
      Memoirs (translated by St. John),
      volume 1, chapter 4.

FRANCE: A. D. 1693 (October).
   Defeat of the Duke of Savoy at Marsaglia.

   "The great efforts made by Louis in the north prevented him
   from strengthening the army of Catinat sufficiently to act
   with energy against the Savoyard prince, and it was determined
   to restrict the campaign of 1693 to the defensive on the part
   of France. The forces of the duke had in the meantime been
   reinforced from Germany, and he opened the campaign with a
   brilliant and successful movement against Pignerol. ... He is
   said to have entertained hopes of carrying the war in that one
   campaign to the very gates of Lyons; but the successes which
   inspired him with such expectations alarmed the court of
   France, and Louis detached in haste a large body of cavalry to
   reinforce Catinat. That general marched at once to fight the Duke
   of Savoy, who, presuming on his strength, suffered the French
   to pour out from the valley of Suza into the plain of
   Piedmont, abandoned the heights, and was consequently defeated
   at Marsaglia on the 4th of October. Catinat, however, could not
   profit by his victory; he was too ill supplied in every
   respect to undertake the siege of Coni, and the state of the
   French armies at this time marks as plainly that Louvois was
   dead, as the state of the finances speaks the loss of
   Colbert."

      G. P. R. James,
      Life and Times of Louis XIV.,
      volume 2, chapter 11.

FRANCE: A. D. 1694.
   Campaigns without battles.
   Operations at sea.

   In 1694, King William was "in a position to keep an army afoot
   in the Netherlands stronger than any had hitherto been. It was
   reckoned at 31,800 horse, including a corps of dragoons, and
   58,000 foot; so great a force had never been seen within the
   memory of man. All the best-known generals, who had hitherto
   taken part in the wars of western Europe, were gathered round
   him with their troops. The French army, with which the
   Dauphin, but not the King, was present, was not much smaller;
   it was once more led by Marshal Luxembourg. These two hosts
   lay over against one another in their camps for a couple of
   months; neither offered battle to the other. ... This campaign
   is notable in the annals of the art of war for the skill with
   which each force pursued or evaded the other; but the results
   were limited to the recovery by the allies of that unimportant
   place, Huy. William had thought himself fortunate in having
   come out of the previous campaign without disaster: in this
   campaign the French were proud to have held their lines in
   presence of a superior force. On the coast also the French
   were successful in repelling a most vehement and perilous
   attack. They had been warned that the English were going to
   fall on Brest, and Vauban was sent down there in haste to
   organise the defence; and in this he was thoroughly
   successful. When the English landed on the coast in Camaret
   Bay (for the fort of that name had first to be taken) they
   were saluted by two batteries, which they had never detected,
   and which were so well placed that every shot told, and the
   grape-shot wounded almost every man who had ventured ashore.
   The gallant General, Talmash, was also hit, and ere long died
   of his wounds. The English fleet, which had come to bombard
   Brest, was itself bombarded from the walls. But though this
   great effort failed, the English fleet still held the mastery
   of the Channel: it also blockaded the northern coast of
   France. After Brest it attacked Dieppe, laying it almost
   entirely in ashes; thence it sailed to Havre, and St. Malo, to
   Calais, and Dunkirk. This was of great use in the conduct of
   the war. King William observes that had not the coasts been
   kept in a state of alarm, all the forces detained there for
   defensive purposes would have been thrown on the Netherlands.
   ... But the most important result of the maritime war lay on
   another side. In May, 1694, Noailles pushed into Catalonia,
   supported by Tourville, who lay at anchor with the fleet in
   the Bay of Rosas. ... It was of incalculable importance to
   Spain to be in alliance with the maritime powers. Strengthened
   by a Dutch fleet and some Spanish ships, Admiral Russell now
   appeared in the Mediterranean. He secured Barcelona from the
   French, who would never have been kept out of the city by the
   Spaniards alone. The approach of the English fleet had at this
   time the greatest influence in keeping the Duke of Savoy
   staunch to the confederation. In Germany the rise of the house
   of Hanover to the Electoral dignity had now caused most
   unpleasant complications. A shoal of German princes, headed by
   the King of Denmark, as a Prince of the Empire, and offended
   by the preference shown to Hanover, inclined, if not to
   alliance with France, at least to neutrality. ... We can have
   no conception, and in this place we cannot possibly
   investigate, with what unbroken watchfulness King William,
   supported by Heinsius, looked after the German and the
   Northern courts, so as to keep their irritation from reacting
   on the course of the great war. ... When the French, in June,
   1694, crossed the Rhine, meaning, as they boasted with true
   Gallic arrogance, soon to dip their swords in the Danube, they
   found the Prince of Baden so well prepared, and posted so
   strongly near Wisloch, that they did not venture to attack
   him. ... The general result is this: neither side was as yet
   really superior to the other: but the French power was
   everywhere checked and held within bounds by the arms and
   influence of William III."

      L. von Ranke,
      History of England, 17th Century,
      book 20, chapter 6 (volume 5).

{1243}

FRANCE: A. D. 1695-1696.
   The end of the War of the League of Augsburg.
   Loss of Namur.
   Terms with Savoy.
   The Peace of Ryswick.

   "Military and naval efforts were relaxed on all sides: on the
   Rhine the Prince of Baden and the Marechal de Lorges, both ill
   in health, did little but observe each other; and though the
   Duke of Savoy made himself master of Casal on the 11th July,
   1695, no other military event of any consequence took place on
   the side of Italy, where Louis entered into negotiations with
   the duke, and succeeded, in the following year, in detaching
   him from the league of Augsburg. As the price of his defection
   the whole of his territories were to be restored to him, with
   the exception of Suza, Nice, and Montmeillan, which were
   promised to be delivered also on the signature of a general
   peace. Money was added to render the consent of a needy prince
   more ready. ... The duke promised to obtain from the emperor a
   pledge that Italy should be considered as neutral ground, and
   if the allies refused such a pledge, then to join the forces
   of Savoy to those of France, and give a free passage to the
   French through his dominions. In consequence of this treaty
   ... he applied to the emperor for a recognition of the
   neutrality of Italy, and was refused. He then hastened, with a
   facility which distinguished him through life, to abandon his
   friends and join his enemies, and within one month was
   generalissimo for the emperor in Italy fighting against
   France, and generalissimo for the King of France in Italy
   fighting against the emperor. Previous to this change,
   however, the King of England opened the campaign of 1695 in
   the Netherlands by the siege of Namur. The death of Luxemburg
   had placed the French army of Flanders under the command of
   the incapable Marshal Villeroi: and William, feeling that his
   enemy was no longer to be much respected, assumed at once the
   offensive. He concealed his design upon Namur under a variety
   of manœuvres which kept the French generals in suspense; and,
   then leaving the Prince of Vaudemont to protect the principal
   Spanish towns in Flanders, he collected his troops suddenly;
   and while the Duke of Bavaria invested Namur, he covered the
   operations of the siege with a considerable force. Villeroi
   now determined to attack the Prince of Vaudemont, but twice
   suffered him to escape: and then, after having apparently
   hesitated for some time how to drive or draw the King of
   England from the attack upon Namur, he resolved to bombard the
   city of Brussels, never pretending to besiege it, but alleging
   as his motive for a proceeding which was merely destructive,
   the bombardment of the maritime towns of France by the
   English. During three days he continued to fire upon the city,
   ruining a great part thereof, and then withdrew to witness the
   surrender of the citadel of Namur on the 2nd September, the
   town itself having capitulated on the 4th of the preceding
   month. As some compensation, though but a poor one, for the
   loss of Namur, and the disgrace of the French arms in
   suffering such a city to be captured in the presence of 80,000
   men, Montal took Dixmude and Deynse in the course of June. ...
   The only after-event of any importance which occurred in
   Flanders during this war, was the capture of Ath by the
   French, in the year 1697, while negotiations for peace were
   going on with activity at Ryswick. ... Regular communications
   regarding peace having been once established, Ryswick, near
   the Hague, was appointed for the meeting of plenipotentiaries;
   and Harlay, Torci, and Callières appeared at that place as
   representatives of Louis. The articles which had been formerly
   sketched out at Utrecht formed the base of the treaties now
   agreed upon; and Louis yielded far more than could have been
   expected from one so proud and so successful."

      G. P. R. James,
      Life and Times of Louis XIV.,
      volume 2, chapter 11.

      ALSO IN:
      T. H. Dyer,
      History of Modern Europe,
      volume 3, chapter 5.

      Sir J. Dalrymple,
      Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland,
      part 3, book 4 (volume 3).

FRANCE: A. D. 1697 (April).
   The sacking of Carthagena.

      See CARTHAGENA: A. D. 1697.

FRANCE: A. D. 1697.
   The Peace of Ryswick.

   "The Congress for the treaty or series of treaties that was to
   terminate the great European war, which had now lasted for
   upwards of nine years, was held at Ryswick, a château near the
   Hague. The conferences were opened in May, 1697. Among the
   countries represented were Sweden, Austria, France, Spain,
   England, Holland, Denmark and the various States of the German
   Empire. The treaties were signed, in severalty, between the
   different States, except Austria, in September and October,
   1697, and with the Emperor, in November. The principal
   features of the treaty were, as between France and Spain,
   that, the former country was to deliver to Spain Barcelona,
   and other places in Catalonia; also various places which
   France had taken in the Spanish Netherlands, during the war,
   including Luxembourg and its Duchy, Charleroi, Mons and
   Courtrai. Various others were excepted, to be retained by
   France, as dependencies of French possessions. The principal
   stipulations of the treaty, as between France and Great
   Britain, were that France formally recognized William III. as
   lawful king of Great Britain, and agreed not to trouble him in
   the possession of his dominions, and not to assist his
   enemies, directly or indirectly. This article had particular
   relation to the partisans of the exiled Stuart king, then
   living in France. By another article, all places taken by
   either country in America, during the war, were to be
   relinquished, and the Principality of Orange and its estates
   situated in the south of France were to be restored to
   William. In the treaty with Holland, certain possessions in
   the East Indies were to be restored to the Dutch East India
   Company: and important articles of commerce were appended,
   among which the principle was laid down that free ships should
   make free goods, not contraband of war. By the treaty with the
   Emperor and the German States, the Treaties of Westphalia and
   Nymeguen were recognized as the basis of the Treaty of
   Ryswick, with such exceptions only as were to be provided in
   the latter treaty. France also was to give up all territory
   she had occupied or controlled before or during the war under
   the name of 'reunions,' outside of Alsace, but the Roman
   Catholic religion was to be preserved in Alsace as it then
   existed.
{1244}
   This concession by France included among other places
   Freiburg, Brisach, and Treves; and certain restitutions were
   to be made by France, in favor of Spire, the Electors of
   Treves, and Brandenburg and the Palatinate; also, others in
   favor of certain of the smaller German Princes. The city of
   Strasburg, in return, was formally ceded to France, ... and
   the important fort of Kehl was yielded to the Empire. The
   navigation of the Rhine was to be free to all persons. The
   Duke of Lorraine was to be restored to his possessions with
   such exceptions as were provided in the treaty. By the terms
   of this treaty, a more advantageous peace was given to Spain
   than she had any expectation of. ... Not only were the places
   taken in Spain, including the numerous fortified places in
   Catalonia, yielded up, but also, with some exceptions, those
   in the Spanish Netherlands, and also the important territory
   of Luxembourg; some places were even yielded to Spain that
   France had gained under former treaties."

      J. W. Gerard,
      The Peace of Utrecht,
      chapter 4.

   "The restitutions and cessions [from France to Germany]
   comprised Treves, Germersheim, Deux-Ponts, Veldentz,
   Montbéliard, Kehl, Freiburg, Breisach, Philippsburg, the
   Emperor and the Empire ceding in exchange Strasbourg to the
   King of France in complete sovereignty. ... Louis XIV. had
   consented somewhat to relax the rigor of the treaty of
   Nimeguen towards the heir of the Duchy of Lorraine, nephew of
   the Emperor by his mother; he restored to the young Duke
   Leopold his inheritance in the condition in which Charles IV.
   had possessed it before the French conquest of 1670; that is
   to say, he restored Nancy, allowing only the ramparts of the
   Old Town to remain, and razing all the rest of the
   fortifications without the power of restoring them; he kept
   Marsal, an interior place calculated to hold Lorraine in
   check, and also Sarre-Louis, a frontier-place which separated
   Lorraine from the Germanic provinces; he restored Bitche and
   Homburg dismantled, without power to reestablish them, and
   kept Longwy in exchange for a domain of similar value in one
   of the Trois-Evêchés; finally, he no longer demanded, as at
   Nimeguen, four great strategic routes through Lorraine, and
   consented that the passage should always be open to his
   troops. The House of Lorraine was thus reestablished in its
   estates after twenty-seven years of exile."

      H. Martin,
      History of France: Age of Louis XIV.,
      volume 2, chapter 2.

      ALSO IN:
      L. von Ranke,
      History of England, 17th Century,
      book 20, chapter 11 (volume 5).

      See, also, CANADA: A. D. 1692-1697;
      and NEWFOUNDLAND: A. D. 1694-1697.

FRANCE: A. D. 1698-1712.
   The colonization of Louisiana.
   Broad claims to the whole valley of the Mississippi.

      See LOUISIANA: A. D. 1698-1712.

FRANCE: A. D. 1700.
   Bequest of the Spanish crown to a French royal prince.

      See SPAIN: A. D. 1698-1700.

FRANCE: A. D. 1701-1702.
   Provocation of the Second Grand Alliance
   and War of the Spanish Succession.

      See SPAIN: A. D. 1701-1702,
      and ENGLAND: A. D. 1701-1702.

FRANCE: A. D. 1702-1710.
   The Camisard rising of the French Protestant's in the
   Cévennes.

   "The movement known as the War of the Camisards is an episode
   of the history of Protestantism in France which, though rarely
   studied in detail and perhaps but partially understood, was
   not devoid of significance. When it occurred, in the summer of
   1702, a period of little less than 17 years had elapsed since
   Louis XIV., by his edict of Fontainebleau, October, 1685,
   solemnly revoked the great and fundamental law enacted by his
   grandfather, Henry IV., for the protection of the adherents of
   the Reformed faith, known in history as the Edict of Nantes.
   During the whole of that period the Protestants had submitted,
   with scarcely an attempt at armed resistance, to the
   proscription of their tenets: ... The majority, unable to
   escape from the land of oppression, remained at home ...
   nearly all of them cherishing the confident hope that the
   king's delusion would be short-lived, and that the edict under
   which they and their ancestors had lived for three generations
   would, before long, be restored to them with the greater part,
   if not the whole, of its beneficent provisions. Meanwhile, all
   the Protestant ministers having been expelled from France by
   the same law that prohibited the expatriation of any of the
   laity, the people of the Reformed faith found themselves
   destitute of the spiritual food they craved. True, the new
   legislation affected to regard that faith as dead, and
   designated all the former adherents of Protestantism, without
   distinction, as the 'New Converts,' 'Nouveaux Convertis.' And,
   in point of fact, the great majority had so far yielded to the
   terrible pressure of the violent measures brought to bear upon
   them ... that they had consented to sign a promise to be
   're-united' to the Roman Catholic Church, or had gone at least
   once to mass. But they were still Protestants at heart. ...
   Under these circumstances, feeling more than ever the need of
   religious comfort, now that remorse arose for a weak betrayal
   of conscientious conviction, the proscribed Protestants,
   especially in the south of France, began to meet clandestinely
   for divine worship in such retired places as seemed most
   likely to escape the notice of their vigilant enemies. ... It
   was not strange that in so exceptional a situation, a phase of
   religious life and feeling equally exceptional should manifest
   itself. I refer to that appearance of prophetic inspiration
   which attracted to the province of Vivarais and to the
   Cévennes Mountains the attention of all Europe. ...
   Historically ... the influence of the prophets of the Cévennes
   was an important factor in the Protestant problem of the end
   of the 17th and the commencement of the 18th centuries. ...
   Various methods were adopted to put an end to the prophets
   with their prophecies, which were for the most part
   denunciatory of Rome as Antichrist and foreshadowed the
   approaching fall of the papacy. But this form of enthusiasm
   had struck a deep root and it was hard to eradicate it.
   Imprisonment, in convent or jail, was the most common
   punishment, especially in the case of women. Not infrequently
   to imprisonment was, added corporal chastisement, and the
   prophets, male and female, were flogged until they might be
   regarded as fully cured of their delusion. ... But no
   utterances of prophets, however fervid and impassioned, would
   have sufficed to occasion an uprising of the inhabitants of
   the Cévennes Mountains, had it not been for the virulent
   persecution to which the latter found themselves exposed at
   the hands of the provincial authorities directly instigated
   thereto by the clergy of the established church.
{1245}
   For it must be noticed that a large part of the population of
   the Cévennes was still Protestant, and made no concealment of
   the fact, even though the king's ministers affected to call
   them 'New Catholics,' or 'New Converts.' The region over which
   the Camisard war extended with more or less violence comprised
   six episcopal dioceses, which, in 1698, had an aggregate
   population of about two-thirds of a million of souls. Of these
   souls, though Protestantism had been dead in the eye of the
   law for 13 years, fully one-fourth were still Protestant. ...
   The war may be said to have begun on the 24th of July, 1702,
   when the Abbé du Chayla, a noted persecutor, was killed in his
   house, at Pont de Montvert, by a band of 40 or 50 of the
   'Nouveaux Convertis,' whom he had driven to desperation by his
   cruelty to their fellow believers. If we regard its
   termination to be the submission of Jean Cavalier, the most
   picturesque, in the month of May, 1704, the war lasted a
   little less than two years. But, although the French
   government had succeeded, rather by craft than by force, in
   getting rid of the most formidable of its opponents ... it was
   not until five or six years later--that is, until 1709 or
   1710--that ... comparative peace was finally restored. ...
   During the first months of the insurrection the exploits of
   the malcontents were confined to deeds of destruction
   accomplished by companies of venturesome men, who almost
   everywhere eluded the pursuit of the enemy by their superior
   knowledge of the intricacies of the mountain woods and paths.
   The track of these companies could easily be made out; for it
   was marked by the destruction of vicarages and rectories, by
   the smoke of burned churches, too often by the corpses of
   slain priests. The perpetrators of these acts of violence soon
   won for themselves some special designations, to distinguish
   them from the more passive Protestants who remained in their
   homes, taking no open part in the struggle. ... About the
   close of 1702, however, or the first months of 1703, a new
   word was coined for the fresh emergency, and the armed
   Protestants received the appellation under which they have
   passed into history--the Camisards. Passing by all the strange
   and fanciful derivations of the word which seem to have no
   claim upon our notice, unless it be their evident absurdity,
   we have no difficulty in connecting it with those nocturnal
   expeditions which were styled 'Camisades'; because the
   warriors who took advantage of the darkness of the night to
   ride out and explore or force the enemy's entrenchments,
   sometimes threw over their armor a shirt that might enable
   them to recognize each other. Others will have it that, though
   the name was derived from the same article of apparel--the
   'camisa' or shirt--it was applied to the Cévenol bands for
   another reason, namely," that when they found opportunities,
   they carried off clean linen from the villages and left their
   soiled garments in exchange. The final overthrow of the
   Camisards "was not accomplished without the employment of
   100,000 troops, certainly far more than ten times the total
   number ever brought into the field by the Camisards. ... Not
   less than three officers of the highest grade in the service,
   marshals of France, were successively appointed to put down a
   revolt which it might have been expected a simple colonel
   could suffice to quell--M. de Broglie being succeeded by the
   Marshal de Montrevel, the Marshal de Montrevel by the Marshal
   de Villars, and the Marshal de Villars by the Marshal de
   Berwick."

      H. M. Baird,
      The Camisard Uprising
      (Papers of the American Society of Church History,
      volume 2, pages 13-34).

      ALSO IN:
      Mrs. Bray,
      The Revolt of the Protestants of the Cevennes.

      N. Peyrat,
      The Pastors in the Wilderness.

      S. Smiles,
      The Huguenots in France after the Revocation of the Edict
      of Nantes, chapters 5-8.

FRANCE: A. D. 1702-1711.
   The War of the Spanish Succession in America
   (called Queen Anne's War).

      See NEW ENGLAND: A. D. 1702-1710;
      and CANADA: A. D. 1711-1713.

FRANCE: A. D. 1702-1713.
   The War of the Spanish Succession in Europe.

      See
      ITALY: A. D. 1701-1713;
      SPAIN: A.D. 1702, to 1707-1710;
      GERMANY: A. D. 1702, to 1706-1711;
      NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1702-1704, to 1710-1712.

FRANCE: A. D. 1702-1715.
   Renewed Jesuitical persecution of the Jansenists.
   The odious Bull Unigenitus and its tyrannical enforcement.

      See PORT ROYAL AND THE JANSENISTS: A. D. 1702-1715.

A. D. 1710.
   The War of the Spanish Succession: Misery of the nation.
   Overtures for Peace.
   Conferences at Gertruydenberg.

   "France was still reduced to extreme and abject wretchedness.
   Her finances were ruined. Her people were half starving.
   Marlborough declared that in the villages through which he
   passed in the summer of 1710, at least half the inhabitants
   had perished since the beginning of the preceding winter, and
   the rest looked as if they had come out of their graves. All
   the old dreams of French conquests in the Spanish Netherlands,
   in Italy, and in Germany were dispelled, and the French
   generals were now struggling desperately and skilfully to
   defend their own frontier. ... In 1710, while the Whig
   ministry [in England] was still in power, but at a time when
   it was manifestly tottering to its fall, Lewis had made one
   more attempt to obtain peace by the most ample concessions.
   The conferences were held at the Dutch fortress of
   Gertruydenberg. Lewis declared himself ready to accept the
   conditions exacted as preliminaries of peace in the preceding
   year, with the exception of the article compelling Philip
   within two months to cede the Spanish throne. He consented, in
   the course of the negotiations, to grant to the Dutch nearly
   all the fortresses of the French and Spanish Netherlands,
   including among others Ypres, Tournay, Lille, Furnes, and even
   Valenciennes, to cede Alsace to the Duke of Lorraine, to destroy
   the fortifications of Dunkirk, and those on the Rhine from
   Bale to Philipsburg. The main difficulty was on the question
   of the Spanish succession. ... The French troops had already
   been recalled from Spain, and Lewis consented to recognise the
   Archduke as the sovereign, to engage to give no more
   assistance to his grandchild, to place four cautionary towns
   in the hands of the Dutch as a pledge for the fulfilment of
   the treaty, and even to pay a subsidy to the allies for the
   continuance of the war against Philip. The allies, however,
   insisted that he should join with them in driving his grandson
   by force of arms from Spain, and on this article the
   negotiations were broken off."

      W. E. H. Lecky,
      History of England in the 18th Century,
      chapter 1.

      See ENGLAND: A. D. 1710-1712.

{1246}

FRANCE: A. D. 1713-1714.
   Ending of the War of the Spanish Succession.
   The Peace of Utrecht and the Treaty of Rastadt.

      See UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.

FRANCE: A. D. 1714.
   The desertion of the Catalans.

      See SPAIN: A. D. 1713-1714.

FRANCE: A. D. 1715.
   Death of Louis XIV.
   The character of his reign.

   Louis XIV. died September 1, 1715, at the age of 77 years,
   having reigned 72 years. "Richelieu, and after him Mazarin,
   governing as if they had been dictators of a republic, had
   extinguished, if I may use the expression, their personality
   in the idea and service of the state. Possessing only the
   exercise of authority, they both conducted themselves as
   responsible agents towards the sovereign and before the
   judgment of the country; while Louis XIV., combining the
   exercise with the right, considered himself exempted from all
   rule but that of his own will, and acknowledged no
   responsibility for his actions except to his own conscience.
   It was this conviction of his universal power, a conviction
   genuine and sincere, excluding both scruples and remorse,
   which made him upset one after the other the twofold system
   founded by Henry IV., of religious liberty at home, and abroad
   of a national preponderance resting upon a generous protection
   of the independence of states and European civilisation. At
   the personal accession of Louis XIV., more than fifty years
   had passed since France had pursued the work of her policy in
   Europe, impartial towards the various communions of
   Christians, the different forms of governments, and the
   internal revolutions of the states. Although France was
   catholic and monarchical, her alliances were, in the first
   place, with the Protestant states of Germany and with
   republican Holland; she had even made friendly terms with
   regicide England. No other interest but that of the
   well-understood development of the national resources had
   weight in her councils, and directed the internal action of
   her government. But all was changed by Louis XIV., and special
   interests, the spawn of royal personality, of the principle of
   the hereditary monarchy, or that of the state religion, were
   admitted, soon to fly upward in the scale. Thence resulted the
   overthrow of the system of the balance of power in Europe,
   which might be justly called the French system, and the
   abandonment of it for dreams of an universal monarchy, revived
   after the example of Charles V. and Philip II. Thence a
   succession of enterprises, formed in opposition to the policy
   of the country, such as the war with Holland, the factions
   made with a view to the Imperial crown, the support given to
   James II. and the counter-revolution in England, the
   acceptance of the throne of Spain for a son of France,
   preserving his rights to the Crown. These causes of
   misfortune, under which the kingdom was obliged to succumb,
   all issued from the circumstance applauded by the nation and
   conformable to the spirit of its tendencies, which, after
   royalty had attained its highest degree of power under two
   ministers, delivered it unlimited into the hands of a prince
   endowed with qualities at once brilliant and solid, an object
   of enthusiastic affection and legitimate admiration. When the
   reign, which was to crown under such auspices the ascendant
   march of the French monarchy, had falsified the unbounded
   hopes which its commencement had excited; when in the midst of
   fruitless victories and continually increasing reverses, the
   people beheld progress in all the branches of public economy
   changed into distress,--the ruin of the finances, industry,
   and agriculture--the exhaustion of all the resources of the
   country,--the impoverishment of all classes of the nation, the
   dreadful misery of the population, they were seized with a
   bitter disappointment of spirit, which took the place of the
   enthusiasm of their confidence and love."

      A. Thierry,
      Formation and Progress of the Tiers
      État or Third Estate in France,
      chapter 9.

FRANCE: A. D. 1715.
   Accession of King Louis XV.

FRANCE: A. D. 1715-1723.
   State of the kingdom at the death of Louis XIV.
   The minority of Louis XV. and Regency of the Duke of Orleans.

   "Louis XIV. ... left France excessively exhausted. The State
   was ruined, and seemed to have no resource but bankruptcy.
   This trouble seemed especially imminent in 1715, after the
   war, during which the government had been obliged to borrow at
   400 per cent., to create new taxes, to spend in advance the
   revenue of two years, and to increase the public debt to 2,400
   millions. The acquisition of two provinces (Flanders,
   Franche-Comté) and a few cities (Strassburg, Landau, and
   Dunkirk) was no compensation for such terrible poverty.
   Succeeding generations have remembered only the numerous
   victories, Europe defied, France for twenty years
   preponderant, and the incomparable splendor of the court of
   Versailles, with its marvels of letters and arts, which have
   given to the 17th century the name of the age of Louis XIV. It
   is for history to show the price which France has paid for her
   king's vain attempts abroad to rule over Europe, and at home
   to enslave the wills and consciences of men. ... The weight of
   the authority of Louis XIV. had been crushing during his last
   years. When the nation felt it lifted, it breathed more
   freely; the court and the city burst into disrespectful
   demonstrations of joy; the very coffin of the great king was
   insulted. The new king [Louis XV., great-grandson of Louis
   XIV.] was five years old. Who was to govern? Louis XIV. had
   indeed left a will, but he had not deceived himself with
   regard to the value of it. 'As soon as I am dead, it will be
   disregarded; I know too well what became of the will of the
   king, my father!' As after the death of Henry IV. and Louis
   XIII. there was a moment of feudal reaction; but the decline
   of the nobility may be measured by the successive weakening of
   its efforts in each case. Under Mary de'Medici it was still able
   to make a civil war; under Anne of Austria it produced the
   Fronde; after Louis XIV. it only produced memorials. The Duke
   of Saint-Simon desired that the first prince of the blood,
   Philip of Orleans, to whom the will left only a shadow of
   power, should demand the regency from the dukes and peers, as
   heirs and representatives of the ancient grand vassals. But
   the Duke of Orleans convoked Parliament in order to break down
   the posthumous despotism of the old king, feigning that the
   king had committed the government to his hands. The regency,
   with the right to appoint the council of regency as he would,
   was conferred upon him, and the command of the royal household
   was taken from the Duke of Maine [one of the bastard sons of
   Louis XIV.], who yielded this important prerogative only after
   a violent altercation.
{1247}
   As a reward for the services of his two allies, the Duke of
   Orleans called the high nobility into affairs, by substituting
   for the ministries six councils; in which they occupied almost
   all the places, and accorded to Parliament the right of
   remonstrance. But two years had hardly passed when the
   ministries were re-established, and the Parliament again
   condemned to silence. It was plain that neither nobility nor
   Parliament were to be the heirs of the absolute monarchy. ...
   Debauchery had, until then, kept within certain limits;
   cynicism of manners as well as of thought was now adopted
   openly. The regent set the example. There had never been seen
   such frivolity of conduct nor such licentious wit as that
   exhibited in the wild meetings of the roués of the Duke of
   Orleans. There had been formerly but one salon in France, that
   of the king; a thousand were now open to a society which, no
   longer occupied with religious questions, or with war, or the
   grave futilities of etiquette, felt that pleasure and change
   were necessities. ... Louis XV. attained his majority February
   13, 1723, being then 13 years old. This terminated the regency
   of the Duke of Orleans. But the king was still to remain a
   long time under tutelage; the duke, in order to retain the
   power after resigning the regency, had in advance given
   [Cardinal] Dubois the title of prime minister. At the death of
   the wretched Dubois he took the office himself, but held it
   only four months, dying of apoplexy in December, 1723."

      V. Duruy,
      History of France,
      chapters 52 and 55.

      ALSO IN:
      W. C. Taylor,
      Memoirs of the House of Orleans,
      volume 1, chapters 11-17,
      and volume 2, chapters 1-3.

      F. Rocquain,
      The Revolutionary Spirit preceding the French Revolution,
      chapter 1.

      J. B. Perkins,
      France under the Regency.

FRANCE: A. D. 1717-1719.
   The Triple Alliance.
   The Quadruple Alliance.
   War with Spain.

      See SPAIN: A. D. 1713-1725;
      also, ITALY: A. D. 1715-1735.

FRANCE: A. D. 1717-1720.
   John Law and his Mississippi Scheme.

   "When the Regent Orleans assumed the government of France, he
   found its affairs in frightful confusion. The public debt was
   three hundred millions; putting the debt on one side, the
   expenditure was only just covered by the revenue. St. Simon
   advised him to declare a national bankruptcy. De Noailles,
   less scrupulous, proposed to debase the coinage. ... In such
   desperate circumstances, it was no wonder that the regent was
   ready to catch eagerly at any prospect of success. A remedy
   was proposed to him by the famous John Law of Lauriston. This
   new light of finance had gambled in, and been banished from,
   half the courts of Europe; he had figured in the English 'Hue
   and Cry,' as 'a very tall, black, lean man, well-shaped, above
   six feet high, large pock-holes in his face, big-nosed, speaks
   broad and loud.' He was a big, masterful, bullying man, one of
   keen intellect as well; the hero of a hundred romantic
   stories. ... He studied finance at Amsterdam, then the great
   school of commerce, and offered his services and the 'system'
   which he had invented, first to Godolphin, when that nobleman
   was at the head of affairs in England, then to Victor Amadeus,
   duke of Savoy, then to Louis XIV., who, as the story goes,
   refused any credit to a heretic. He invented a new combination
   at cards, which became the despair of all the croupiers in
   Europe; so successful was this last invention, that he arrived
   for the second time at Versailles, in the early days of the
   regency, with upwards of £120,000 at his disposal, and a copy
   of his 'system' in his pocket. ... There was a dash of daring
   in the scheme which suited well with the regent's peculiar
   turn of mind; it was gambling on a gigantic scale. ...
   Besides, the scheme was plausible and to a certain point
   correct. The regent, with all his faults, was too clever a man
   not to recognize the genius which gleamed in Law's dark eyes.
   Law showed that the trade and commerce of every country was
   crippled by the want of a circulating medium; specie was not
   to be had in sufficient quantities; paper, backed by the
   credit of the state, was the grand secret. He adduced the
   examples of Great Britain, of Genoa, and of Amsterdam to prove
   the advantage of a paper currency; he proposed to institute a
   bank, to be called the 'Bank of France,' and to issue notes
   guaranteed by the government and secured on the crown lands,
   exchangeable at sight for specie, and receivable in payment of
   taxes; the bank was to be conducted in the king's name, and to
   be managed by commissioners appointed by the States-General.
   The scheme of Law was based on principles which are now
   admitted as economical axioms; the danger lay in the enormous
   extent to which it was intended to push the scheme. ... While
   the bank was in the hands of Law himself, it appears to have
   been managed with consummate skill; the notes bore some
   proportion to the amount of available specie; they contained a
   promise to pay in silver of the same standard and weight as
   that which existed at the time. A large dividend was declared;
   then the regent stepped in. The name of the bank was changed
   to that of the Royal Bank of France, the promise to pay in
   silver of a certain weight and standard was dropped, and a
   promise substituted to pay 'in silver coin.' This omission, on
   the part of a prince who had already resorted to the expedient
   of debasing the currency, was ominous, and did much to shake
   public confidence; the intelligence that in the first year of
   the new bank 1,000,000,000 of livres were fabricated, was not
   calculated to restore it. But these trifles were forgotten in
   the mad excitement which followed. Law had long been
   elaborating a scheme which is for ever associated with his
   name, and beside which the Bank of France sank into
   insignificance. In 1717, the year before the bank had been
   adopted by the regent, the billets d'état of 500 livres each
   were worth about 160 livres in the market. Law, with the
   assent of the regent, proposed to establish a company which
   should engross all the trade of the kingdom, and all the
   revenues of the crown, should carry on the business of
   merchants in every part of the world, and monopolize the
   farming of the taxes and the coining of money; the stock was
   to be divided into 200,000 shares of 500 livres each. The
   regent nearly marred the scheme at starting by inserting a
   proviso that the depreciated billets d'état were to be
   received at par in payment for the new stock, on which four
   per cent. was guaranteed by the State." Law's company was
   formed, under the name of the Company of the West, and
   obtained for the basis of its operations a monopoly of the
   trade of that vast territory of France in the valley of the
   Mississippi which bore the name of Louisiana. The same
   monopoly had been held for five years by one Crozat, who now
   resigned it because he found it unprofitable; but the fact
   received little attention.

      See LOUISIANA: A. D. 1717-1718.

{1248}

   "Louisiana was described as a paradise. ... Shareholders in
   the company were told that they would enjoy the monopoly of
   trade throughout French North America, and the produce of a
   country rich in every kind of mineral wealth. Billets d'état
   were restored to their nominal value; stock in the Mississippi
   scheme was sold at fabulous prices; ingots of gold, which were
   declared to have come from the mines of St. Barbe, were taken
   with great pomp to the mint; 6,000 of the poor of Paris were
   sent out as miners, and provided with tools to work in the new