sovereign; and more and more completely Austrian interests and
   Austrian policy became removed and estranged from the interests
   of the Germanic people. The ambitions and the cares of the
   House of Hapsburg were increasingly in directions most
   opposite to the German side of its relations, tending towards
   Italy and the southeast; while, at the same time, the narrow
   church influence which depressed the Austrian states widened a
   hopeless intellectual difference between them and the northern
   German people.

Brandenburg.--Prussia.

   The most notable movements in dull German affairs after the
   Peace of Westphalia were those which connected themselves with
   the settling and centering in Brandenburg of a nucleus of
   growing power, around which the nationalizing of Germany has
   been a crystalizing process ever since. The Mark of
   Brandenburg was one of the earliest conquests (tenth century)
   of the Germans from the Wends. Prussia, afterwards united with
   Brandenburg, was a later conquest (thirteenth century) from
   Wendish or Slavonic and other pagan inhabitants, and its
   subjugation was a missionary enterprise, accomplished by the
   crusading Order of Teutonic Knights, under the authority and
   direction of the Pope. The Order, which held the country for
   more than two centuries, and ruled it badly, became
   degenerate, and about the middle of the fifteenth century it
   was overcome in war by Casimir IV. of Poland, who took away
   from it the western part of its territory, and forced it to do
   homage to him for the eastern part, as a fief of the Polish
   crown. Sixty years later, the Reformation movement in Germany
   brought about the extinguishment of the Teutonic Order as a
   political power. The Grand Master of the Order at that time
   was Albert, a Hohenzollern prince, belonging to a younger
   branch of the Brandenburg family. He became a Lutheran, and
   succeeded in persuading the Polish king, Sigismund I., to
   transfer the sovereignty of the East Prussian fief to him
   personally, as a duchy. He transmitted it to his descendants,
   who held it for a few generations; but the line became extinct
   in 1618, and the Duchy of Prussia then passed to the elder
   branch of the family and was united with Brandenburg. The Mark
   of Brandenburg had been raised to the rank of an Electorate in
   1356 and had been acquired by the Hohenzollern family in 1417.
   The superior weight of the Brandenburg electors in northern
   Germany may be dated from their acquisition of the important
   Duchy of Prussia; but they made no mark on affairs until the
   time of Frederick William I., called the Great Elector, who
   succeeded to the Electorate in 1640, near the close of the
   Thirty Years War. In the arrangements of the Peace of
   Westphalia he secured East Pomerania and other considerable
   additions of territory. In 1657 he made his Duchy of Prussia
   independent of Poland, by treaty with the Polish king. In 1672
   and 1674 he had the courage and the independence to join the
   allies against Louis XIV., and when the Swedes, in alliance
   with Louis, invaded his dominions, he defeated and humbled
   them at Fehrbellen, and took from them the greater part of
   their Pomeranian territory. When the Great Elector died, in
   1688, Brandenburg was the commanding North-German power, and
   the Hohenzollern family had fully entered on the great career
   it has since pursued.

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   Frederick William's son Frederick, with none of his father's
   talent, had a pushing but shallow ambition. He aspired to be a
   king, and circumstances made his friendship so important to
   the Emperor Leopold I. that the latter, exercising the
   theoretical super-sovereignty of the Cæsars, endowed him with
   the regal title. He was made King of Prussia, not of
   Brandenburg, because Brandenburg stood in vassalage to the
   Empire, while Prussia was an independent state.

Poland and Russia.

   When Brandenburg and Prussia united began to rise to
   importance, the neighboring kingdom of Poland had already
   passed the climax of its career. Under the Jagellon dynasty,
   sprung from the Duke Jagellon of Lithuania, who married
   Hedwig, Queen of Poland, in 1386, and united the two states,
   Poland was a great power for two centuries, and seemed more
   likely than Russia to dominate the Slavonic peoples of Europe.
   The Russians at that time were under the feet of the Mongols
   or Tartars, whose terrific sweep westwards, from the steppes
   of Asia, had overwhelmed them completely and seemed to bring
   their independent history to an end. Slowly a Russian duchy
   had emerged, having its seat of doubtful sovereignty at
   Moscow, and being subject quite humbly to the Mongol Khan.
   About 1477 the Muscovite duke of that time, Ivan Vasilovitch,
   broke the Tartar yoke and acquired independence. But his
   dominion was limited. The Poles and Lithuanians, now united,
   had taken possession of large and important territories
   formerly Russian, and the Muscovite state was entirely cut off
   from the Baltic. It began, however, in the next century, under
   Ivan the Terrible, first of the Czars, to make conquests
   southward and south-eastward, from the Tartars, until it had
   reached the Caspian Sea. The dominion of the Czar stretched
   northward, at the same time, to the White Sea, at the single
   port of which trade was opened with the Russian country by
   English merchant adventurers in the reign of Elizabeth. Late
   in the sixteenth century the old line of rulers, descended
   from the Scandinavian Ruric, came to an end, and after a few
   years Michael Romanoff established the dynasty which has
   reigned since his time.

   As between the two principal Slavonic nations, Russia was now
   gaining stability and weight, while Poland had begun to lose
   both. It was a fatal day for the Poles when, in 1573, on the
   death of the last of the Jagellons, they made their monarchy
   purely elective, abolishing the restriction to one family
   which had previously prevailed. The election was by the
   suffrage of the nobles, not the people at large (who were
   generally serfs), and the government became an oligarchy of
   the most unregulated kind known in history. The crown was
   stripped of power, and the unwillingness of the nobility to
   submit to any national authority, even that of its own
   assembly, reached a point, about the middle of the seventeenth
   century, at which anarchy was virtually agreed upon as the
   desirable political state. The extraordinary "liberum veto,"
   then made part of the Polish constitution, gave to each single
   member of the assemblies of the nobles, or of the deputies
   representing them, a right to forbid any enactment, or to
   arrest the whole proceedings of the body, by his unsupported
   negative. This amazing prerogative appears to have been
   exercised very rarely in its fullness; but its theoretical
   existence effectually extinguished public spirit and paralyzed
   all rational legislation. Linked with the singular feebleness
   of the monarchy, it leaves small room for surprise at the
   ultimate shipwreck of the Polish state.

   The royal elections at Warsaw came to be prize contests at
   which all Europe assisted. Every Court set up its candidate
   for the paltry titular place; every candidate emptied his
   purse into the Polish capital, and bribed, intrigued,
   corrupted, to the best of his ability. Once, at least (1674),
   when the game was on, a sudden breeze of patriotic feeling
   swept the traffickers out of the diet, and inspired the
   election of a national hero, John Sobieski, to whom Europe
   owes much; for it was he who drove back the Turks, in 1683,
   when their last bold push into central Europe was made, and
   when they were storming at the gates of Vienna. But when
   Sobieski died, in 1696, the old scandalous vendue of a crown
   was re-opened, and the Elector of Saxony was the buyer. During
   most of the last two centuries of its history, Poland sold its
   throne to one alien after another, and allowed foreign states
   to mix and meddle with its affairs. Of real nationality there
   was not much left to extinguish when the time of extinction
   came. There were patriots, and very noble patriots, among the
   Poles, at all periods of their history; but it seems to have
   been the very hopelessness of the state into which their
   country had drifted which intensified their patriotic feeling.

   Russia had acquired magnitude and strength as a barbaric
   power, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; but it was
   not until the reign of Peter the Great, which opened in 1682,
   that the great Slavonic empire began to take on a European
   character, with European interests and influences, and to
   assimilate the civilization of the West. Peter may be said to
   have knotted Russia to Europe at both extremities, by pushing
   his dominions to the Baltic on the north and to the Black Sea
   on the south, and by putting his own ships afloat in both.
   From his day, Russia has been steadily gathering weight in
   each of the two continents over which her vast bulk of empire
   is stretched, and moving to a mysterious great destiny in time
   to come.

The Turks.

   The Turks, natural enemies of all the Christian races of
   eastern and southeastern Europe, came practically to the end
   of their threatening career of conquest about the middle of
   the sixteenth century, when Suleiman the Magnificent died
   (1566). He had occupied a great part of Hungary; seated a
   pasha in Buda; laid siege to Vienna; taken Rhodes from the
   Knights of St. John; attacked them in Malta; made an alliance
   with the King of France; brought a Turkish fleet into the
   western Mediterranean, and held Europe in positive terror of
   an Ottoman domination for half a century. His son Selim added
   Cyprus to the Turkish conquests; but was humbled in the
   Mediterranean by the great Christian victory of Lepanto, won
   by the combined fleets of Spain, Venice and the Pope, under
   Don John of Austria. After that time Europe had no great fear
   of the Turk; though he still fought hard with the Venetians,
   the Poles, the Russians, the Hungarians, and, once more,
   carried his arms even to Vienna. But, on the whole, it was a
   losing fight; the crescent was on the wane.

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Last glories of Venice.

   In the whole struggle with the Ottomans, through the
   fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, the republic
   of Venice bore a noble part. She contested with them foot by
   foot the Greek islands, Peloponnesus, and the eastern shores
   of the Adriatic. Even after her commerce began to slip from
   her control, and the strength which came from it sank rapidly,
   she gave up her eastern possessions but slowly, one by one,
   and after stout resistance. Crete cost the Turks a war of
   twenty-four years (1645-1669). Fifteen years afterwards the
   Venetians gathered their energies afresh, assumed the
   aggressive, and conquered the whole Peloponnesus, which they
   held for a quarter of a century. Then it was lost again, and
   the Ionian Islands alone remained Venetian territory in the
   East.

Rise of the House of Savoy.

   Of Italy at large, in the seventeenth century, lying prostrate
   under the heavy hand of Spain, there is no history to claim
   attention in so brief a sketch as this. One sovereign family
   in the northwest, long balanced on the Alps, in uncertainty
   between a cis-Alpine and a trans-Alpine destiny, but now
   clearly committed to Italian fortunes, had begun to win its
   footing among the noticeable smaller powers of the day by
   sheer dexterity of trimming and shifting sides in the
   conflicts of the time. This was the House of Savoy, whose
   first possessions were gathered in the crumbling of the old
   kingdom of Burgundy, and lay on both slopes of the Alps,
   commanding several important passes. On the western and
   northern side, the counts, afterwards dukes, of Savoy had to
   contend, as time went on, with the expanding kingdom of France
   and with the stout-hearted communities which ultimately formed
   the Swiss Confederacy. They fell back before both. At one
   period, in the fifteenth century, their dominion had stretched
   to the Saone, and to the lake of Neufchatel, on both sides of
   it, surrounding the free city of Geneva, which they were never
   able to overcome, and the lake of Geneva entire. After that
   time, the Savoyards gradually lost territory on the Gallic
   side and won compensations on the Italian side, in Piedmont,
   and at the expense of Genoa and the duchy of Milan. The Duke
   Victor Amadeus II. was the most successful winner for his
   house, and he made his gains by remarkable manœuvering on both
   sides of the wars of Louis XIV. One of his acquisitions (1713)
   was the island kingdom of Sicily, which gave him a royal title. A
   few years later he exchanged it with Austria for the island
   kingdom of Sardinia--a realm more desirable to him for
   geographical reasons only. The dukes of Savoy and princes of
   Piedmont thus became kings of Sardinia, and the name of the
   kingdom was often applied to their whole dominion, down to the
   recent time when the House of Savoy attained the grander
   kingship of united Italy.

First wars of Louis XIV.

   The wars of Louis XIV. gave little opportunity for western and
   central Europe to make any other history than that of struggle
   and battle, invasion and devastation, intrigue and faithless
   diplomacy, shifting of political landmarks and traffic in
   border populations, as though they were pastured cattle, for
   fifty years, in the last part of the seventeenth century and
   the first part of the eighteenth (1665-1715). It will be
   remembered that when this King of France married the Infanta
   of Spain, he joined in a solemn renunciation of all rights on
   her part and on that of her children to such dominions as she
   might otherwise inherit. But such a renunciation, with no
   sentiment of honor behind it, was worthless, of course, and
   Louis XIV., in his own esteem, stood on a height quite above
   the moral considerations that have force with common men. When
   Philip IV. of Spain died, in 1665, Louis promptly began to put
   forward the claims which he had pledged himself not to make.
   He demanded part of the Netherlands, and Franche Comté--the
   old county (not the duchy) of Burgundy--as belonging to his
   queen. It was his good fortune to be served by some of the
   greatest generals, military engineers and administrators of
   the day--by Turenne, Condé, Vauban, Louvois, and others--and
   when he sent his armies of invasion into Flanders and Franche
   Comté they carried all before them. Holland took alarm at
   these aggressions which came so near to her, and formed an
   alliance with England and Sweden to assist Spain. But the
   unprincipled English king, Charles II., was easily bribed to
   betray his ally; Sweden was bought over; Spain submitted to a
   treaty which gave the Burgundian county back to her, and
   surrendered an important part of the Spanish Netherlands to
   France. Louis' first exploit of national brigandage had thus
   been a glorious success, as glory is defined in the vocabulary
   of sovereigns of his class. He had stolen several valuable
   towns, killed some thousands of people, carried misery into
   the lives of some thousands more, and provoked the Dutch to a
   challenge of war that seemed promising of more glory of like
   kind.

   In 1672 he prepared himself to chastise the Dutch, and his
   English pensioner, Charles II., with several German princes,
   joined him in the war. It was this war, as related already,
   which brought about the fall and the death of John de Witt,
   Grand Pensionary of Holland; which raised William of Orange to
   the restored stadtholdership, and which gave him a certain
   leadership of influence in Europe, as against the French king.
   It was this war, likewise, which gave the Hohenzollerns their
   first great battle-triumph, in the defeat of the Swedes,
   allies of the French, at Fehrbellin. For Frederick William,
   the Great Elector, had joined the Emperor Leopold and the King
   of Spain in another league with Holland to resist the
   aggressions of France; while Sweden now took sides with Louis.
   England was soon withdrawn from the contest, by the determined
   action of Parliament, which forced its king to make peace.
   Otherwise the war became general in western Europe and was
   frightful in the death and misery it cost. Generally the
   French had the most success. Turenne was killed in 1675 and
   Condé retired the same year; but able commanders were found in
   Luxemburg and Crequi to succeed them. In opposition to William
   of Orange, the Dutch made peace at Nimegueu, in 1678, and
   Spain was forced to give up Franche Comté, with another
   fraction of her Netherland territories; but Holland lost
   nothing. Again Louis XIV. had beaten and robbed his neighbors
   with success, and was at the pinnacle of his glory. France, it
   is true, was oppressed and exhausted, but her king was a
   "grand monarch," and she must needs be content.

{1082}

   For a few years the grand monarch contented himself with small
   filchings of territory, which kept his conscience supple and
   gave practice to his sleight-of-hand. On one pretext and
   another he seized town after town in Alsace, and, at last,
   1681, surprised and captured the imperial free city of
   Strasburg, in a time of entire peace. He bombarded Genoa, took
   Avignon from the Pope, bullied and abused feeble Spain, made
   large claims on the Palatinate in the name of his
   sister-in-law, but against her will, and did nearly what he
   was pleased to do, without any effective resistance, until
   after William of Orange had been called to the English throne.
   That completed a great change in the European situation.

Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.

   The change had already been more than half brought about by a
   foul and foolish measure which Louis had adopted in his
   domestic administration. Cursed by a tyrant's impatience at
   the idea of free thought and free opinion among his subjects,
   he had been persuaded by Catholic zealots near his person to
   revoke the Edict of Nantes and revive persecution of the
   Huguenots. This was done in 1685. The fatal effects within
   France resembled those which followed the persecution of the
   Moriscoes of Spain. The Huguenots formed a large proportion of
   the best middle class of the kingdom,--its manufacturers, its
   merchants, its skilled and thrifty artisans. Infamous efforts
   were made to detain them in the country and there force them
   to apostacy or hold them under punishment if they withstood.
   But there was not power enough in the monarchy, with all its
   absolutism, to enclose France in such a wall. Vast numbers
   escaped--half a million it is thought--carrying their skill,
   their knowledge, their industry and their energy into Holland,
   England, Switzerland, all parts of Protestant Germany, and
   across the ocean to America. France was half ruined by the
   loss.

The League of Augsburg.

   At the same time, the Protestant allies in Germany and the
   North, whom Louis had held in subserviency to himself so long,
   were angered and alarmed by his act. They joined a new
   defensive league against him, formed at Augsburg, in 1686,
   which embraced the Emperor, Spain, Holland, and Sweden, at
   first, and afterwards took in Savoy and other Italian states,
   along with Germany almost entire. But the League was miserably
   unprepared for war, and hardly hindered the march of Louis'
   armies when he suddenly moved them into the Rhenish
   electorates in 1688. For the second time in his reign, and
   under his orders, the Palatinate was fearfully devastated with
   fire and sword. But this attack on Germany, occupying the arms
   of France, gave William of Orange his opportunity to enter
   England unopposed and take the English crown. That
   accomplished, he speedily brought England into the League,
   enlarging it to a "grand alliance" of all western Europe
   against the dangerous monarch of France, and inspiring it with
   some measure of his own energy and courage. France had now to
   deal with enemies on every side. They swarmed on all her
   frontiers, and the strength and valor with which she met them
   were amazing. For three years the French more than held their
   own, not only in land-fighting, but on the sea, where they
   seemed likely, for a time, to dispute the supremacy of the
   English and the Dutch with success. But the frightful draft
   made on the resources of the nation, and the strain on its
   spirit, were more than could be kept up. The obstinacy of the
   king, and his indifference to the sufferings of his people,
   prolonged the war until 1697, but with steady loss to the
   French of the advantages with which they began. Two years
   before the end, Louis had bought over the Duke of Savoy, by
   giving back to him all that France had taken from his Italian
   territories since Richelieu's time. When the final peace was
   settled, at Ryswick, like surrenders had to be made in the
   Netherlands, Lorraine, and beyond the Rhine; but Alsace, with
   Strasburg, was kept, to be a German graft on France, until the
   sharp Prussian pruning knife, in our own time, cut it away.

War of the Spanish Succession.

   There were three years of peace after the treaty of Ryswick,
   an then a new war--longer, more bitter, and more destructive
   than those before it--arose out of questions connected with
   the succession to the crown of Spain. Charles II., last of the
   Austro-Spanish or Spanish-Hapsburg kings, died in 1700,
   leaving no heir. The nearest of his relatives to the throne
   were the descendants of his two sisters, one of whom had
   married Louis XIV. and the other the Emperor Leopold, of the
   Austrian House. Louis XIV., as we know, had renounced all the
   Spanish rights of his queen and her issue; but that
   renunciation had been shown already to be wasted paper.
   Leopold had renounced nothing; but he had required a
   renunciation of her Spanish claims from the one daughter,
   Maria, of his Spanish wife, and he put forward claims to the
   Spanish succession, on his own behalf, because his mother had
   been a princess of that nation, as well as his wife. He was
   willing, however, to transfer his own rights to a younger son,
   fruit of a second marriage, the Archduke Charles.

   The question of the Spanish succession was one of European
   interest and importance, and attempts had been made to settle
   it two years before the death of the Spanish king, in 1698, by
   a treaty, or agreement, between France, England, and Holland.
   By that treaty these outside powers (consulting Spain not at
   all) undertook a partition of the Spanish monarchy, in what
   they assumed to be the interest of the European balance of
   power. They awarded Naples, Sicily, and some lesser Italian
   possessions to a grandson of Louis XIV., the Milanese
   territory to the Archduke Charles, and the rest of the Spanish
   dominions to an infant son of Maria, the Emperor's daughter,
   who was married to the elector of Bavaria. But the infant so
   selected to wear the crown of Spain died soon afterwards, and
   a second treaty of partition was framed. This gave the
   Milanese to the Duke of Lorraine, in exchange for his own
   duchy, which he promised to cede to France, and the whole
   remainder of the Spanish inheritance was conceded to the
   Austrian archduke, Charles. In Spain, these arrangements were
   naturally resented, by both people and king, and the latter
   was persuaded to set against them a will, bequeathing all that
   he ruled to the younger grandson of Louis XIV., Philip of
   Anjou, on condition that the latter renounce for himself and
   for his heirs all claims to the crown of France. The
   inducement to this bequest was the power which the King of
   France possessed to enforce it, and so to preserve the unity
   of the Spanish realm. That the argument and the persuasion
   came from Louis' own agents, while other agents amused
   England, Holland and Austria with treaties of partition, is
   tolerably clear.

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   Near the end of the year 1700, the King of Spain died; his
   will was disclosed; the treaties were as coolly ignored as the
   prior renunciation had been, and the young French prince was
   sent pompously into Spain to accept the proffered crown. For a
   time, there was indignation in Europe, but no more. William of
   Orange could persuade neither England nor Holland to war, and
   Austria could not venture hostilities without their help. But
   that submissiveness only drew from the grand monarch fresh
   displays of his dishonesty and his insolence. Philip of
   Anjou's renunciation of a possible succession to the French
   throne, while occupying that of Spain, was practically
   annulled: The government of Spain was guided from Paris like
   that of a dependency of France. Dutch and English commerce was
   injured by hostile measures. Movements alarming to Holland
   were made on the frontiers of the Spanish Netherlands.
   Finally, when the fugitive ex-king of England, James II., died
   at St. Germains, in September, 1701, Louis acknowledged James'
   son, the Pretender, as King of England. This insult roused the
   war spirit in England which King William had striven so hard
   to evoke. He had already arranged the terms of a new defensive
   Grand Alliance with Holland, Austria, and most of the German
   states. There was no difficulty now in making it an offensive
   combination.

   But William, always weak in health, and worn by many cares and
   harassing troubles, died in March, 1702, before the war which
   he desired broke out. His death made no pause in the movement
   of events. Able statesmen, under Queen Anne, his successor,
   carried forward his policy and a great soldier was found, in
   the person of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, to command
   the armies of England and the Dutch. Another commander, of
   remarkable genius, Prince Eugene of Savoy, took service with
   the Emperor, and these two, acting cordially together, humbled
   the overweening pride of Louis XIV. in the later years of his
   reign. He had worn out France by his long exactions. His
   strong ministers, Colbert, Louvois and others, were dead, and
   he did not find successors for them. He had able generals, but
   none equal to Turenne, Condé or Luxemburg,--none to cope with
   Marlborough and Prince Eugene. The war was widespread, on a
   stupendous scale, and it lasted for twelve years. Its
   campaigns were fought in the Low Countries, in Germany, in
   Italy and in Spain. It glorified the reign of Anne, in English
   history, by the shining victories of Blenheim, Ramilies,
   Oudenarde and Malplaquet, and by the capture of Gibraltar, the
   padlock of the Mediterranean. The misery to which France was
   reduced in the later years of the war was probably the
   greatest that the much suffering nation ever knew.

The Peace of Utrecht.

   Louis sought peace, and was willing to go far in surrenders to
   obtain it. But the allies pressed him too hard in their
   demands. They would have him not only abandon the Bourbon
   dynasty that he had set up in Spain, but join them in
   overthrowing it. He refused to negotiate on such terms, and
   Fortune approved his resolution, by giving decisive victories
   to his arms in Spain, while dealing, out disaster and defeat
   in every other field. England grew weary of the war when it
   came to appear endless, and Marlborough and the Whigs, who had
   carried it on, were ousted from power. The Tories, under
   Harley and Bolingbroke, came into office and negotiated the
   famous Peace of Utrecht (1713), to which all the belligerents
   in the war, save the Emperor, consented. The Emperor yielded
   to a supplementary treaty, signed at Rastadt the next year.
   These treaties left the Bourbon King of Spain, Philip V., on
   his throne, but bound him, by fresh renunciations, not to be
   likewise King of France. They gave to England Gibraltar and
   Minorca, at the expense of Spain, and Nova Scotia,
   Newfoundland and Hudson's Bay at the expense of France. They
   took much more from Spain. They took Sicily, which they gave
   to the Duke of Savoy, with the title of King; they took
   Naples, Milan, Mantua and Sardinia, which they gave to
   Austria, or, more strictly speaking, to the Emperor; and they
   took the Spanish Netherlands, which they gave to Austria in
   the main, with some barrier towns to the Dutch. They took from
   France her conquests on the right bank of the Rhine; but they
   left her in possession of Alsace, with Strasburg and Landau.
   The great victim of the war was Spain.

France at the death of Louis XIV.

   Louis XIV. was near the end of his reign when this last of the
   fearful wars which he caused was brought to a close. He died
   in September, 1715, leaving a kingdom which had reasons to
   curse his memory in every particular of its state. He had
   foiled the exertions of as wise a minister, Jean Colbert, as
   ever strove to do good to France. He had dried the sources of
   national life as with a searching and monstrous sponge. He had
   repressed everything which he could not absorb in his
   flaunting court, in his destroying armies, and in himself. He
   had dealt with France as with a dumb beast that had been given
   him to bestride; to display himself upon, before the gaze of an
   envious world; to be bridled, and spurred at his pleasure, and
   whipped; to toil for him and bear burdens as he willed; to
   tread upon his enemies and trample his neighbors' fields. It
   was he, more than all others before or after, who made France
   that dumb creature which suffered and was still for a little
   longer time, and then began thinking and went mad.

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Charles XII. of Sweden.

   While the Powers of western Europe were wrestling in the great
   war of the Spanish Succession, the nations of the North and
   East were tearing each other, at the same time, with equal
   stubbornness and ferocity. The beginning of their conflict was
   a wanton attack from Russia, Poland and Denmark, on the
   possessions of Sweden. Sweden, in the past century, had made
   extensive, conquests, and her territories, outside of the
   Scandinavian peninsula, were thrust provokingly into the sides
   of all these three neighbors. There had been three Charleses
   on the Swedish throne in succession, following Christina, the
   daughter of Gustavus Adolphus. Queen Christina, an eccentric
   character, had abdicated in 1654, in order to join the
   Catholic Church, and had been succeeded by her cousin, Charles
   X. The six years reign of this Charles was one of constant war
   with the Danes and the Poles, and almost uniformly he was the
   aggressor. His son and successor, Charles XI., suffered the
   great defeat at Fehrbellin which gave prestige to Brandenburg;
   but he was shielded by the puissant arm of Louis XIV., his
   ally, and lost no territory. More successful in his domestic
   policy than in his wars, he, both practically and formally,
   established absolutism in the monarchy. Inheriting from his
   father that absolute power, while inheriting at the same time
   the ruthless ambition of his grandfather, Charles XII. came to
   the throne in 1697.

   In the first two years of his reign, this extraordinary young
   autocrat showed so little of his character that his royal
   neighbors thought him a weakling, and Peter the Great, of
   Russia, conspired with Augustus of Poland and Frederick IV. of
   Denmark to strip him of those parts of his dominion which they
   severally coveted. The result was like the rousing of a lion
   by hunters who went forth to pursue a hare. The young Swede,
   dropping, instantly and forever, all frivolities, sprang at
   his assailants before they dreamed of finding him awake, and
   the game was suddenly reversed. The hunters became the hunted,
   and they had no rest for nine years from the implacable
   pursuit of them which Charles kept up. He defeated the Danes
   and the Russians in the first year of the war (1700). In 1702
   he invaded Poland and occupied Warsaw; in 1704 he forced the
   deposition of the Saxon King of Poland, Augustus, and the
   election of Stanislaus Leczinski. Not yet satisfied, he
   followed Augustus into his electorate of Saxony, and compelled
   him there to renounce the Polish crown and the Russian
   alliance. In 1708 he invaded Russia, marching on Moscow, but
   turning aside to meet an expected ally, Mazeppa the Cossack.
   It was the mistake which Napoleon repeated a century later.
   The Swedes exhausted themselves in the march, and the Russians
   bided their time. Peter the Czar had devoted eight years,
   since Charles defeated him at Narva, to making soldiers,
   well-trained, out of the mob which that fight scattered. When
   Charles had worn his army down to a slender and disheartened
   force, Peter struck and destroyed it at Pultowa. Charles
   escaped from the wreck and took refuge, with a few hundreds of
   is guards, in the Turkish province of Bessarabia, at Bender. In
   that shelter, which the Ottomans hospitably accorded to him,
   he remained for five years, intriguing to bring the Porte into
   war with his Muscovite enemy, while all the fruits of his nine
   years of conquest in the North were stripped from him by the
   old league revived. Augustus returned to Poland and recovered
   his crown. Peter took possession of Livonia, Ingria, and a
   great part of Finland. Frederick IV., of Denmark, attacked
   Sweden itself. The kingless kingdom made a valiant defense
   against the crowd of eager enemies; but Charles had used the
   best of its energies and its resources, and it was not strong.

   Near the end of 1710, Charles succeeded in pushing the Sultan
   into war with the Czar, and the latter, advancing into
   Moldavia, rashly placed himself in a position of great peril,
   where the Turks had him really at their mercy. But Catherine,
   the Czarina, who was present, found means to bribe the Turkish
   vizier in command, and Peter escaped with no loss more serious
   than the surrender of Azov. That ended the war, and the hopes
   of the Swedish king. But still the stubborn Charles wearied
   the Porte with his importunities, until he was commanded to
   quit the country. Even then he refused to depart,--resisted
   when force was used to expel him, and did not take his leave
   until late in November, 1714, when he received intelligence
   that his subjects were preparing to appoint his sister regent
   of the kingdom and to make peace with the Czar. That news
   hurried him homeward; but only for continued war. He was about
   to make terms with Russia, and to secure her alliance against
   Denmark, Poland and Hanover, when he was killed during an
   invasion of Norway, in the siege of Friedrickshall (December,
   1718). The crown of Sweden was then conferred upon his sister,
   but shorn of absolute powers, and practically dependent upon
   the nobles. All the wars in which Charles XII. had involved
   his kingdom were brought to an end by great sacrifices, and
   Russia rose to the place of Sweden as the chief power in the
   North. The Swedes paid heavily for the career of their
   "Northern Alexander."

Alliance against Spain.

   Before the belligerents in the North had quieted themselves,
   those of the West were again in arms. Spain had fallen under
   the influence of two eager and restless ambitions, that of the
   queen, Elizabeth of Parma, and an Italian minister, Cardinal
   Alberoni; and the schemes into which these two drew the
   Bourbon king, Philip V., soon ruptured the close relations
   with France which Louis XIV. had ruined his kingdom to bring
   about. To check them, a triple alliance was formed (1717)
   between France, England and Holland,--enlarged the next year
   to a quadruple alliance by the adhesion of Austria. At the
   outset of the war, Spain made a conquest of Sardinia, and
   almost accomplished the same in Sicily; but the English
   crushed her navy and her rising commerce, while the French
   crossed the Pyrenees with an army which the Spaniards could
   not resist. A vast combination which Alberoni was weaving, and
   which took in Charles XII., Peter the Great, the Stuart
   pretender, the English Jacobites, and the opponents of the
   regency in France, fell to pieces when the Swedish king fell.
   Alberoni was driven from Spain and all his plans were given
   up. The Spanish king withdrew from Sicily and surrendered
   Sardinia. The Emperor and the Duke of Savoy exchanged islands,
   as stated before, and the former (holding Naples already)
   revived the old Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, while the latter
   became King of Sardinia.

{1085}

War of the Polish Succession.

   These disturbances ended, there were a few years of rest in
   Europe, and then another war, of the character peculiar to the
   eighteenth century, broke out. It had its cause in the Polish
   election of a king to succeed Augustus II. As usual, the
   neighboring nations formed a betting ring of onlookers, so to
   speak, and "backed" their several candidates heavily. The
   deposed and exiled king, Stanislaus Leczinski, who received
   his crown from Charles XII. and lost it after Pultowa, was the
   French candidate; for he had married his daughter to Louis XV.
   Frederick Augustus of Saxony, son of the late King Augustus,
   was the Russian and Austrian candidate. The contest resulted
   in a double election (1733), and out of that came war. Spain
   and Sardinia joined France, and the Emperor had no allies.
   Hence the House of Austria suffered greatly in the war, losing
   the Two Sicilies, which went to Spain, and were conferred on a
   younger son of the king, creating a third Bourbon monarchy.
   Part of the duchy of Milan was also yielded by Austria to the
   King of Sardinia; and the Duke of Lorraine, husband of the
   Emperor's daughter, Maria Theresa, gave up his duchy to
   Stanislaus, who renounced therefor his claim on the crown of
   Poland. The Duke of Lorraine received as compensation a right
   of succession to the grand duchy of Tuscany, where the
   Medicean House was about to expire. These were the principal
   consequences, humiliating to Austria, of what is known as the
   First Family Compact of the French and Spanish Bourbons.

War of Jenkins' Ear.

   This alliance between the two courts gave encouragement to
   hostile demonstrations in the Spanish colonies against English
   traders, who were accused of extensive smuggling, and the
   outcome was a petty war (1739), called "the War of Jenkins'
   Ear."

War of the Austrian Succession.

   Before these hostilities were ended, another "war of
   succession," more serious than any before it, was wickedly
   brought upon Europe. The Emperor, Charles VI., died in 1740,
   leaving no son, but transmitting his hereditary dominions to
   his eldest daughter, the celebrated Maria Theresa, married to
   the ex-Duke of Lorraine. Years before his death he had sought
   to provide against any possible disputing of the succession,
   by an instrument known as the Pragmatic Sanction, to which he
   obtained, first, the assent of the estates of all the
   provinces and kingdoms of the Austrian realm, and, secondly,
   the guaranty by solemn treaty of almost every European Power.
   He died in the belief that he had established his daughter
   securely, and left her to the enjoyment of a peaceful reign.
   It was a pitiful illusion. He was scarcely in his grave before
   half the guarantors of the Pragmatic Sanction were putting
   forward claims to this part and that part of the Austrian
   territories. The Elector of Bavaria, the Elector of Saxony (in
   his wife's name) and the King of Spain, claimed the whole
   succession; the two first mentioned on grounds of collateral
   lineage, the latter (a Bourbon cuckoo in the Spanish-Hapsburg
   nest) as being the heir of the Hapsburgs of Spain.

   While these larger pretensions were still jostling each other
   in the diplomatic stage, a minor claimant, who said little but
   acted powerfully, sent his demands to the Court of Vienna with
   an army following close at their heels. This was Frederick II.
   of Prussia, presently known as Frederick the Great, who
   resuscitated an obsolete claim on Silesia and took possession
   of the province (1740-41) without waiting for debate. If,
   anywhere, there had been virtuous hesitations before, his bold
   stroke ended them. France could not see her old Austrian rival
   dismembered without hastening to grasp a share. She contracted
   with the Spanish king and the Elector of Bavaria to enforce
   the latter's claims, and to take the Austrian Netherlands in
   prospect for compensation, while Spain should find indemnity
   in the Austro-Italian states. Frederick of Prussia, having
   Silesia in hand, offered to join Maria Theresa in the defense
   of her remaining dominions; but his proposals were refused,
   and he entered the league against her. Saxony did the same.
   England and Sardinia were alone in befriending Austria, and
   England was only strong at sea. Maria Theresa found her
   heartiest support in Hungary, where she made a personal appeal
   to her subjects, and enlarged their constitutional privileges.
   In 1742 the Elector of Bavaria was elected Emperor, as Charles
   VII. In the same year, Maria Theresa, acting under pressure
   from England, gave up the greater part of Silesia to
   Frederick, by treaty, as a price paid, not for the help he had
   offered at first, but barely for his neutrality. He abandoned
   his allies and withdrew from the war. His retirement produced
   an immense difference in the conditions of the contest. Saxony
   made peace at the same time, and became an active ally on the
   Austrian side. So rapidly did the latter then recover their
   ground and the French slip back that Frederick, after two
   years of neutrality, became alarmed, and found a pretext to
   take up arms again. The scale was now tipped to the side on
   which he threw himself, but not immediately; and when, in
   1745, the Emperor, Charles VII., died suddenly, Maria Theresa
   was able to secure the election of her husband, Francis of
   Lorraine (or Tuscany), which founded the Hapsburg-Lorraine
   dynasty on the imperial throne. This was in September. In the
   following December Frederick was in Dresden, and Saxony--the
   one effective ally left to the Austrians, since England had
   withdrawn from the war in the previous August--was at his
   feet. Maria Theresa, having the Spaniards and the French still
   to fight in Italy and the Netherlands, could do nothing but make
   terms with the terrible Prussian king. The treaty, signed at
   Dresden on Christmas Day, 1745, repeated the cession of
   Silesia to Frederick, with Glatz, and restored Saxony to the
   humbled Elector.

Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

   France and Spain, deserted the second time by their faithless
   Prussian ally, continued the war until 1748, when the
   influence of England and Holland brought about a treaty of
   peace signed at Aix-la-Chapelle. France gained nothing from
   the war, but had suffered a loss of prestige, distinctly.
   Austria, besides giving up Silesia to Frederick of Prussia,
   was required to surrender a bit of Lombardy to the King of
   Sardinia, and to make over Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla to
   Don Philip of Spain, for a hereditary principality. Under the
   circumstances, the result to Maria Theresa was a notable
   triumph, and she shared with her enemy, Frederick, the
   fruitage of fame harvested in the war. But antagonism between
   these two, and between the interests and ambitions which they
   respectively represented--dynastic on one side and national
   on the other--was henceforth settled and irreconcilable, and
   could leave in Germany no durable peace.

{1086}

Colonial conflicts of France and England.

   The peace was broken, not for Germany alone, but for Europe
   and for almost the world at large, in six years after the
   signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. The rupture occurred
   first very far from Europe--on the other sides of the globe,
   in America and Hindostan, where England and France were eager
   rivals in colonial conquest. In America, they had quarreled
   since the Treaty of Utrecht over the boundaries of Acadia, or
   Nova Scotia, which that treaty transferred to England.
   Latterly, they had come to a more serious collision in the
   interior of the continent. The English, rooting their
   possession of the Atlantic seaboard by strong and stable
   settlements, had been tardy explorers and slow in passing the
   Alleganies to the region inland. On the other hand, the
   French, nimble and enterprising in exploration, and in
   military occupation, but superficial and artificial in
   colonizing, had pushed their way by a long circuit from
   Canada, through the great lakes to the head waters of the
   Ohio, and were fortifying a line in the rear of the British
   colonies, from the valley of the St. Lawrence to the valley of
   the Mississippi, before the English were well aware of their
   intent. Then the colonists, Virginians and Pennsylvanians,
   took arms, and the career of George Washington was begun as
   leader of an expedition in 1754 to drive the French from the
   Ohio. It was not successful, and a strong force of regular
   troops was sent over next year by the British government,
   under Braddock, to repeat the attempt. A frightful
   catastrophe, worse than failure, came of this second
   undertaking, and open war between France and England, which
   had not yet been declared, followed soon. This colonial
   conflict of England and France fired the train, so to speak,
   which caused a great explosion of suppressed hostilities in
   Europe.

The House of Hanover in England.

   If the English crown had not been worn by a German king,
   having a German principality to defend, the French and English
   might have fought out their quarrel on the ocean, and in the
   wilderness of America, or on the plains of the Carnatic,
   without disturbing their continental neighbors. But England
   was now under a new, foreign-bred line of sovereigns,
   descended from that daughter of James I., the princess
   Elizabeth, who married the unfortunate Elector Palatine and
   was queen of Bohemia for a brief winter term. After William of
   Orange died, his wife, Queen Mary, having preceded him to the
   grave, and no children having been born to them, Anne, the
   sister of Mary, had been called to the throne. It was in her
   reign that the brilliant victories of Marlborough were won,
   and in her reign that the Union of Scotland with England,
   under one parliament as well as one sovereign, was brought
   about. On Anne's death (1714), her brother, the son of James
   II., called "the Pretender," was still excluded from the
   throne, because of his religion, and the next heir was sought
   and summoned, in the person of the Elector George, of Hanover,
   whose remote ancestress was Elizabeth Stuart. George I. had
   reigned thirteen years, and his son, George II., had been
   twenty-seven years on the throne, when these quarrels with
   France arose. Throughout the two reigns, until 1742, the
   English nation had been kept mostly at peace, by the potent
   influence of a great minister, Sir Robert Walpole, and had
   made a splendid advance in material prosperity and strength;
   while the system of ministerial government, responsible to
   Parliament and independent of the Crown, which has been in
   later times the peculiar feature of the British constitution,
   was taking shape. In 1742, Walpole fell from power, and the
   era of peace for England was ended. But her new dynasty had
   been firmly settled, and politically, industrially, and
   commercially, the nation was so sound in its condition as to
   be well prepared for the series of wars into which it plunged.
   In the War of the Austrian Succession England had taken a limited
   part, and with small results to herself. She was now about to
   enter, under the lead of the high spirited and ambitious Pitt,
   afterwards Earl of Chatham, the greatest career of conquest in
   her history.