bread.' ... Meanwhile the French armies, without any further
resistance, took possession of the whole country between the
Rhine and the Oder; and in the rear of the victorious bands
appeared, in severity unprecedented even in the revolutionary
armies, the dismal scourge of contributions. Resolved to
maintain the war exclusively on the provinces which were to be
its theatre, Napoleon had taken only 24,000 francs in specie
across the Rhine in the military chest of the army. It soon
appeared from whom the deficiency was to be supplied. On the
day after the battle of Jena appeared a proclamation,
directing the levy of an extraordinary war contribution of
159,000,000 francs (£6,300,000) on the countries at war with
France, of which 100,000,000 was to be borne by the Prussian
states to the west of the Vistula, 25,000,000 by the Elector
of Saxony [who had already detached himself from his alliance
with Prussia], and the remainder by the lesser states in the
Prussian confederacy. This enormous burden ... was levied with
unrelenting severity. ... Nor was this all. The whole civil
authorities who remained in the abandoned provinces were
compelled to take an oath of fidelity to the French
Emperor,--an unprecedented step, which clearly indicated the
intention of annexing the Prussian dominions to the great
nation. ... Early in November there appeared an elaborate
ordinance, which provided for the complete civil organisation
and military occupation of the whole country from the Rhine to
the Vistula. By this decree the conquered states were divided
into four departments; those of Berlin, of Magdeburg, of
Stettin, and of Custrin; the military and civil government of
the whole conquered territory was intrusted to a
governor-general at Berlin, having under him eight commanders
of provinces into which it was divided. ... The same system of
government was extended to the duchy of Brunswick, the states
of Hesse and Hanover, the duchy of Mecklenburg, and the Hanse
towns, including Hamburg, which was speedily oppressed by
grievous contributions. ... The Emperor openly announced his
determination to retain possession of all these states till
England consented to his demands on the subject of the liberty
of the seas. ... Meanwhile the negotiations for the conclusion of
a separate peace between France and Prussia were resumed. ...
The severity of the terms demanded, as well as ... express
assurances that no concessions, how great soever, could lead
to a separate accommodation, as Napoleon was resolved to
retain all his conquests until a general peace, led, as might
have been expected, to the rupture of the negotiations.
Desperate as the fortunes of Prussia were, ... the King ...
declared his resolution to stand or fall with the Emperor of
Russia [who was vigorously preparing to fulfil his promise of
help to the stricken nation]. This refusal was anticipated by
Napoleon. It reached him at Posen, whither he had advanced on
his road to the Vistula; and nothing remained but to enter
vigorously on the prosecution of the war in Poland.
{1511}
To this period of the war belongs the famous Berlin decree
[see FRANCE: A. D. 1806-1810] of the 21st November against the
commerce of Great Britain. ... Napoleon ... at Posen, in
Prussian Poland, gave audience to the deputies of that unhappy
kingdom, who came to implore his support to the remains of its
once mighty dominion. His words were calculated to excite
hopes which his subsequent conduct never realised. ... While
the main body of the French army was advancing by rapid
strides from the Oder to the Vistula, Napoleon, ever anxious
to secure his communications, and clear his rear of hostile
bodies, caused two different armies to advance to support the
flanks of the invading force. ... The whole of the north of
Germany was overrun by French troops, while 100,000 were
assembling to meet the formidable legions of Russia in the
heart of Poland. Vast as the forces of Napoleon were, such
prodigious efforts, over so great an extent of surface,
rendered fresh supplies indispensable. The senate at Paris was
ready to furnish them; and on the requisition of the Emperor
80,000 were voted from the youth who were to arrive at the
military age in 1807. ... A treaty, offensive and defensive,
between Saxony and France, was the natural result of these
successes. This convention, arranged by Talleyrand, was signed
at Posen, on the 12th December. It stipulated that the Elector
of Saxony should be elevated to the dignity of king; he was
admitted into the Confederation of the Rhine, and his
contingent fixed at 20,000 men. By a separate article, it was
provided that the passage of foreign troops across the kingdom
of Saxony should take place without the consent of the sovereign:
a provision which sufficiently pointed it out as a military
outpost of the great nation--while, by a subsidiary treaty,
signed at Posen three days afterwards, the whole minor princes
of the House of Saxony were also admitted into the
Confederacy."
Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe, 1789-1815,
chapter 43, sections 87-99 (volume 10).
ALSO IN:
P. Lanfrey,
History of Napoleon,
volume 2, chapter 16.
Mrs. S. Austin,
Germany from 1760 to 1814,
page 294, and after.
E. H. Hudson,
Life and Times of Louisa,
Queen of Prussia, volume 2, chapters 8-9.
GERMANY: A. D. 1806-1807.
Opening of Napoleon's campaign against the Russians.
The deluding of the Poles.
indecisive battle of Eylau.
The campaign against the Russians "opened early in the winter.
The 1st of November, the Russians and French marched towards
the Vistula, the former from the Memel, the latter from the
Oder. Fifty thousand Russians pressed forward under General
Benningsen; a second and equal army followed at a distance
with a reserve force. Some of the Russian forces on the
Turkish frontier were recalled, but were still remote. The
first two Russian armies, with the remaining Prussians,
numbered about 120,000. England made many promises and kept
few of them, thinking more of conquering Spanish and Dutch
colonies than of helping her allies. Her aid was limited to a
small reinforcement of the Swedes guarding Swedish Pomerania,
the only portion of Northern Germany not yet in French power.
Gustavus II., the young King of Sweden, weak and impulsive,
rushed headlong, without a motive, into the ... alliance
[against Napoleon], destined to be so fatal to Sweden. ...
Eighty thousand men under Murat crossed the Oder and entered
Prussian Poland, and an equal number stood ready to sustain
them. November 9, Davout's division entered Posen, the
principal town of the Polish provinces still preserving the
national sentiment, and whose people detested Prussian rule
and resented the treachery with which Prussia dismembered
Poland after swearing alliance with her. All along the road,
the peasants hastened to meet the French; and at Posen, Davout
was hailed with an enthusiasm which moved even him, cold and
severe as he was, and he urged Napoleon to justify the hopes
of Poland, who looked to him as her savior. The Russian
vanguard reached Warsaw before the French, but made no effort
to remain there, and recrossed the Vistula. November 28,
Davout and Murat entered the town, and public delight knew no
bounds. It would be a mere illusion to fancy that sentiments
of right and justice had any share in Napoleon's resolve, and
that he was stirred by a desire to repair great wrongs. His
only question was whether the resurrection of Poland would
increase his greatness or not; and if he told the Sultan that
he meant to restore Poland, it was because he thought Turkey
would assist him the more willingly against Russia. He also
offered part of Silesia to Austria, if she would aid him in
the restoration of Poland by the cession of her Polish
provinces; but it was not a sufficient offer, and therefore
not serious. The truth was that he wanted promises from the
Poles before he made any to them. ... Thousands of Poles
enlisted under the French flag and joined the Polish legions
left from the Italian war. Napoleon established a provisional
government of well-known Poles in Warsaw, and required nothing
but volunteers of the country. He had seized without a blow
that line of the Vistula which the Prussian king would not
barter for a truce, and might have gone into winter-quarters
there; but the Russians were close at hand on the opposite
shore, in two great divisions 100,000 strong, in a wooded and
marshy country forming a sort of triangle, whose point touches
the union of the Narew and Ukra rivers with the Vistula, a few
leagues below Warsaw. The Russians communicated with the sea
by a Prussian corps stationed between them and Dantzic.
Napoleon would not permit them to hold this post, and resolved
to strike a blow, before going into winter-quarters, which
should cut them off from the sea and drive them back towards
the Memel and Lithuania. He crossed the Vistula, December 23,
and attacked the Russians between the Narew and the Ukra. A
series of bloody battles followed [the most important being at
Pultusk and Golymin, December 26] in the dense forests and deep
bogs of the thawing land. Napoleon said that he had discovered
a fifth element in Poland,--mud. Men and horses stuck in the
swamp and the cannons could not be extricated. Luckily the
Russians were in the incompetent hands of General Kamenski,
and both parties fought in the dark, the labyrinth of swamps
and woods preventing either army from guessing the other's
movements. The Russians were finally driven, with great loss,
beyond the Narew towards the forests of Belostok, and a
Prussian corps striving to assist them was driven back to the
sea. ... The grand army did not long enjoy the rest it so much
needed; for the Russians, whose losses were more than made up
by the arrival of their reserves, suddenly resumed the
offensive.
{1512}
General Benningsen, who gave a fearful proof of his sinister
energy by the murder of Paul I., had been put in command in
Kamenski's place. Marching round the forests and traversing
the line of lakes which divide the basin of the Narew from
those watercourses flowing directly to the sea, he reached the
maritime part of old Prussia, intending to cross the Vistula
and drive the French from their position in Poland. He had
hoped to surprise the French left wing, lying between the
Passarge and Lower Vistula, but arrived too late. Ney and
Bernadotte rapidly concentrated their forces and fought with a
bravery which arrested the Russians (January 25 and 27).
Napoleon came to the rescue, and having once driven the enemy
into the woods and marshes of the interior, now strove to turn
those who meant to turn him, by an inverse action forcing them
to the sea-coast. ... Benningsen then halted beyond Eylau, and
massed his forces to receive battle next day [February 8]. He
had about 70,000 men, twice the artillery of Napoleon (400
guns against 200), and hoped to be joined betimes by a
Prussian corps. Napoleon could only dispose of 60,000 out of
his 300,000 men,--Ney being some leagues away and Bernadotte
out of reach. ... The battlefield was a fearful sight next
day. Twelve thousand Russians and 10,000 French lay dying and
dead on the vast fields of snow reddened with blood. The
Russians, besides, carried off 15,000 wounded. 'What an
ineffectual massacre" cried Ney, as he traversed the scene of
carnage. This was too true; for although Napoleon drove the
Russians to the sea, it was not in the way he desired.
Benningsen succeeded in reaching Konigsberg, where he could
rest and reinforce his army, and Napoleon was not strong
enough to drive him from this last shelter."
H. Martin,
Popular History of France from 1789,
volume 2, chapter 11.
ALSO IN:
Baron Jomini,
Life of Napoleon,
chapter 10 (volume 2).
C. Joyneville,
Life and Times of Alexander I.,
volume 1, chapter 8.
J. C. Ropes,
The First Napoleon,
lecture 3.
Baron de Marbot,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapters 29-30.
GERMANY: A. D. 1806-1810.
Commercial blockade by the English Orders in Council and
Napoleon's Decrees.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1806-1810.
GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (February-June).
Closer alliance of Prussia and Russia.
Treaty of Bartenstein.
Napoleon's victory at Friedland.
End of the campaign.
The effect produced in Europe by the doubtful battle of Eylau
"was unlucky for France; in Paris the Funds fell. Bennigsen
boldly ordered the Te Deum to be sung. In order to confirm his
victory, re-organise his army, reassure France, re-establish
the opinion of Europe, encourage the Polish insurrection, and
to curb the ill-will of Germany and Austria, Napoleon remained
a week at Eylau. He negotiated: on one side he caused
Talleyrand to write to Zastrow, the Prussian foreign minister,
to propose peace and his alliance; he sent Bertrand to Memel
to offer to re-establish the King of Prussia, on the condition
of no foreign intervention. He also tried to negotiate with
Bennigsen; to which the latter made answer, 'that his master
had charged him to fight, and not negotiate.' After some
hesitation, Prussia ended by joining her fortunes to those of
Russia. By the convention of Bartenstein (25th April, 1807)
the two sovereigns came to terms on the following points:
1. The re-establishment of Prussia within the limits of 1805.
2. The dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine.
3. The restitution to Austria of the Tyrol and Venice.
4. The accession of England to the coalition, and the
aggrandisement of Hanover.
5. The co-operation of Sweden.
6. The restoration of the house of Orange, and indemnities to
the kings of Naples and Sardinia.
This document is important; it nearly reproduces the
conditions offered to Napoleon at the Congress of Prague, in
1813. Russia and Prussia proposed then to make a more pressing
appeal to Austria, Sweden, and England; but the Emperor
Francis was naturally undecided, and the Archduke Charles,
alleging the state of the finances and the army, strongly
advised him against any new intervention. Sweden was too weak;
and notwithstanding his fury against Napoleon, Gustavus III.
had just been forced to treat with Mortier. The English
minister showed a remarkable inability to conceive the
situation; he refused to guarantee the new Russian loan of a
hundred and fifty millions, and would lend himself to no
maritime diversion. Napoleon showed the greatest diplomatic
activity. The Sultan Selim III. declared war against Russia;
General Sebastiani, the envoy at Constantinople, put the
Bosphorus in a state of defence, and repulsed the English
fleet [see TURKS: A. D. 1806-1807]; General Gardane left for
Ispahan, with a mission to cause a Persian outbreak in the
Caucasus. Dantzig had capitulated [May 24, after a long
siege], and Lefèbvre's 40,000 men were therefore ready for
service. Masséna took 36,000 of them into Italy, In the
spring, Bennigsen, who had been reinforced by 10,000 regular
troops, 6,000 Cossacks, and the Imperial Guard, being now at
the head of 100,000 men, took the offensive; Gortchakof
commanding the right and Bagration the left. He tried, as in
the preceding year, to seize Ney's division; but the latter
fought, as he retired, two bloody fights, at Gutstadt and
Ankendorff. Bennigsen, again in danger of being surrounded,
retired on Heilsberg. He defended himself bravely (June 10);
but the French, extending their line on his right, marched on
Eylau, so as to cut him off from Konigsberg. The Russian
generalissimo retreated; but being pressed, he had to draw up
at Friedland, on the Alle. The position he had taken up was
most dangerous. All his army was enclosed in an angle of the
Alle, with the steep bed of the river at their backs, which in
case of misfortune left them only one means of retreat, over
the three bridges of Friedland. ... 'Where are the Russians
concealed?' asked Napoleon when he came up. When he had noted
their situation, he exclaimed, 'It is not every day that one
surprises the enemy in such a fault.' He put Lannes and Victor
in reserve, ordered Mortier to oppose Gortchakof on the left
and to remain still, as the movement which 'would be made by
the right would pivot on the left.' As to Ney, he was to cope
on the right with Bagration, who was shut in by the angle of
the river; he was to meet them 'with his head down,' without
taking any care of his own safety. Ney led the charge with
irresistible fury; the Russians were riddled by his artillery
at 150 paces: he successively crushed the chasseurs of the
Russian Guard, the Ismaïlovski, and the Horse Guards, burnt
Friedland by shells, and cannonaded the bridges which were the
only means of retreat. ... The Russian left wing was almost
thrown into the river; Bagration, with the Semenovski and
other troops, was hardly able to cover the defeat.
{1513}
On the Russian right, Gortchakof, who had advanced to attack
the immovable Mortier, had only time to ford the Alle. Count
Lambert retired with 29 guns by the left bank; the rest fled
by the right bank, closely pursued by the cavalry. Meanwhile
Murat, Davoust, and Soult, who had taken no part in the
battle, arrived before Konigsberg. Lestocq, with 25,000 men,
tried to defend it, but on learning the disaster of Friedland
he hastily evacuated it. Only one fortress now remained to
Frederick William--the little town of Memel. The Russians had
lost at Friedland from 15,000 to 20,000 men, besides 80 guns
(June 14, 1807). ... Alexander had no longer an army. Only one
man, Barclay de Tolly, proposed to continue the war; but in
order to do this it would be necessary to re-enter Russia, to
penetrate into the very heart of the empire, to burn
everything on the way, and only present a desert to the enemy.
Alexander hoped to get off more cheaply. He wrote a severe
letter to Bennigsen, and gave him powers to treat."
A. Rambaud,
History of Russia,
volume 2, chapter 12.
ALSO IN:
Duke de Rovigo,
Memoirs,
volume 2, part 1, chapters 4-6.
GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (June-July).
The Treaty of Tilsit.
Its known and its unknown agreements.
"Alexander I. now determined to negotiate in person with the
rival emperor, and on the 25th of June the two sovereigns met
at Tilsit, on a raft which was moored in the middle of the
Niemen. The details of the conference are a secret, as
Napoleon's subsequent account of it is untrustworthy, and no
witnesses were present. All that is certain is that Alexander
I., whose character was a curious mixture of nobility and
weakness, was completely won over by his conqueror. ...
Napoleon, ... instead of attempting to impose extreme terms
upon a country which it was impossible to conquer, ... offered
to share with Russia the supremacy in Europe which had been
won by French arms. The only conditions were the abandonment
of the cause of the old monarchies, which seemed hopeless, and
an alliance with France against England. Alexander had several
grievances against the English government, especially the
lukewarm support that had been given in recent operations, and
made no objection to resume the policy of his predecessors in
this respect. Two interviews sufficed to arrange the basis of
an agreement. Both sovereigns abandoned their allies without
scruple. Alexander gave up Prussia and Sweden, while Napoleon
deserted the cause of the Poles, who had trusted to his zeal
for their independence, and of the Turks, whom his envoy had
recently induced to make war upon Russia. The Treaty of Tilsit
was speedily drawn up; on the 7th of July peace was signed
between France and Russia, on the 9th between France and
Prussia. Frederick William III. had to resign the whole of his
kingdom west of the Elbe, together with all the acquisitions
which Prussia had made in the second and third partitions of
Poland. The provinces that were left, amounting to barely half
of what he had inherited, were burthened with the payment of
an enormous sum as compensation to France. The district west
of the Elbe was united with Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick, and
ultimately with Hanover, to form the kingdom of Westphalia,
which was given to Napoleon's youngest brother, Jerome. Of
Polish Prussia, one province, Bialystock, was added to Russia,
and the rest was made into the grand duchy of Warsaw, and
transferred to Saxony. Danzig, with the surrounding territory,
was declared a free state under Prussian and Saxon protection,
but it was really subject to France, and remained a centre of
French power on the Baltic. All trade between Prussia and
England was cut off. Alexander I., on his side, recognised all
Napoleon's new creations in Europe--the Confederation of the
Rhine, the kingdoms of Italy, Naples, Holland, and Westphalia,
and undertook to mediate between France and England. But the
really important agreement between France and Russia was to be
found, not in the formal treaties, but in the secret
conventions which were arranged by the two emperors. The exact
text of these has never been made public, and it is probable
that some of the terms rested upon verbal rather than on
written understandings, but the general drift of them is
unquestionable. The bribe offered to Alexander was the
aggrandisement of Russia in the East. To make him an
accomplice in the acts of Napoleon, he was to be allowed to
annex Finland from Sweden, and Moldavia and Wallachia from
Turkey. With regard to England, Russia undertook to adopt
Napoleon's blockade-system, and to obtain the adhesion of
those states which still remained open to English
trade--Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal."
H. Lodge,
History of Modern Europe,
chapter 24, section 25.
"'I thought,' said Napoleon at St. Helena, 'it would benefit
the world to drive these brutes, the Turks, out of Europe. But
when I reflected what power it would give to Russia, from the
number of Greeks in the Turkish dominions who may be
considered Russians, I refused to consent to it, especially as
Alexander wanted Constantinople, which would have destroyed
the equilibrium of power in Europe. France would gain Egypt,
Syria, and the islands; but those were nothing to what Russia
would have obtained.' This coincides with Savary's [Duke de
Rovigo's] statement, that Alexander told him Napoleon said he
was under no engagements to the new Sultan, and that changes
in the world inevitably changed the relations of states to one
another; and again, Alexander said that, in their
conversations at Tilsit, Napoleon often told him he did not
require the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia; he would
place things in a train to dispense with it, and it was not
possible to suffer longer the presence of the Turks in Europe.
'He even left me,' said Alexander, 'to entertain the project
of driving them back into Asia. It is only since that he has
returned to the idea of leaving Constantinople to them, and
some surrounding provinces.' Due day, when Napoleon was
talking to Alexander, he asked his secretary, M. Meneval, for
the map of Turkey, opened it, then renewed the conversation;
and placing his finger on Constantinople said several times to
the secretary, though not loud enough to be heard by
Alexander, 'Constantinople, Constantinople, never. It is the
capital of the world.' ... It is very evident in their
conversations that Napoleon agreed to his [Alexander's]
possessing himself of the Turkish Empire up to the Balkan, if
not beyond; though Bignon denies that any plan for the actual
partition of Turkey was embodied in the treaty of Tilsit.
Hardenberg, not always well informed, asserts that it was.
{1514}
Savary says he could not believe that Napoleon would have
abandoned the Turks without a compensation in some other
quarter; and he felt certain Alexander had agreed in return to
Napoleon's project for the conquest of Spain, 'which the
Emperor had very much at heart'"
C. Joyneville,
Life and Times of Alexander I.,
volume 1, chapter 8.
ALSO IN:
Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe, 1789-1815,
chapter 46 (volume 10).
Count Miot de Melito,
Memoirs,
chapter 24.
P. Lanfrey,
History of Napoleon,
chapters 3-4.
Prince de Talleyrand,
Memoirs,
part 3 (volume 1).
A. Thiers,
History of the Consulate and the Empire,
book 27 (volume 2).
GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (July).
The collapse of Prussia and its Causes.
"For the five years that followed, Prussia is to be conceived,
in addition to all her other humiliations, as in the hands of
a remorseless creditor whose claims are decided by himself
without appeal, and who wants more than all he can get. She is
to be thought of as supporting for more than a year after the
conclusion of the Treaty a French army of more than 150,000
men, then as supporting a French garrison in three principal
fortresses, and finally, just before the period ends, as
having to support the huge Russian expedition in its passage
through the country. ... It was not in fact from the Treaty of
Tilsit, but from the systematic breach of it, that the
sufferings of Prussia between 1807 and 1813 arose. It is
indeed hardly too much to say that the advantage of the Treaty
was received only by France, and that the only object Napoleon
can have had in signing it was to inflict more harm on Prussia
than he could inflict by simply continuing the war. Such was
the downfall of Prussia. The tremendousness of the catastrophe
strikes us less because we know that it was soon retrieved,
and that Prussia rose again and became greater than ever. But
could this recovery be anticipated? A great nation, we say,
cannot be dissolved by a few disasters; patriotism and energy
will retrieve everything. But precisely these seemed wanting.
The State seemed to have fallen in pieces because it had no
principle of cohesion, and was only held together by an
artificial bureaucracy. It had been created by the energy of
its government and the efficiency of its soldiers, and now it
appeared to come to an end because its government had ceased
to be energetic and its soldiers to be efficient. The
catastrophe could not but seem as irremediable as it was
sudden and complete." There may be discerned "three distinct
causes for it. First, the undecided and pusillanimous policy
pursued by the Prussian government since 1803 had an evident
influence upon the result by making the great Powers,
particularly England and Austria, slow to render it
assistance, and also by making the commanders, especially
Brunswick, irresolute in action because they could not, even
at the last moment, believe the war to be serious. This
indecision we have observed to have been connected with a
mal-organisation of the Foreign Department. Secondly, the
corruption of the military system, which led to the surrender
of the fortresses. Thirdly, a misfortune for which Prussia was
not responsible, its desertion by Russia at a critical moment,
and the formation of a close alliance between Russia and
France."
J. R. Seeley,
Life and Times of Stein,
part 2, chapter 5 (volume 1).
GERMANY: A. D. 1807-1808.
The great Revolutionary Reforms of Hardenberg, Stein and
Scharnhorst.
Edict of Emancipation.
Military reorganization.
Beginning of local self-government.
Seeds of a new national life.
"The work of those who resisted Napoleon--even if no one of
them should ever be placed in the highest class of the
benefactors of mankind--has in some cases proved enduring, and
nowhere so much as in Germany. They began two great works--the
reorganisation of Prussia and the revival of the German
nationality, and time has deliberately ratified their views.
Without retrogression, without mistake, except the mistake
which in such matters is the most venial that can be
committed, that, namely, of over-caution, of excessive
hesitation, the edifice which was then founded has been raised
higher and higher till it is near completion. ... Because
Frederick-William III. remains quietly seated on the throne
through the whole period, we remain totally unaware that a
Prussian revolution took place then--a revolution so
comprehensive that the old reign and glories of Frederick may
fairly be said to belong to another world--to an 'ancien
regime' that has utterly passed away. It was a revolution
which, though it did not touch the actual framework of
government in such a way as to substitute one of Aristotle's
forms of government for another, yet went so far beyond
government, and made such a transformation both in industry
and culture, that it deserves the name of revolution far more,
for instance, than our English Revolution of the 17th century.
... In Prussia few of the most distinguished statesmen, few even
of those who took the lead in her liberation from Napoleon,
were Prussians. Blücher himself began life in the service of
Sweden, Scharnhorst was a Hanoverian, so was Hardenberg, and
Stein came from Nassau. Niebuhr was enticed to Berlin from the
Bank of Copenhagen. Hardenberg served George III. and
afterwards the Duke of Brunswick before he entered the service
of Frederick-William II.; and when Stein was dismissed by
Frederick-William III. in the midst of the war of 1806, though
he was a man of property and rank, he took measures to
ascertain whether they were in want of a Finance Minister at
St. Petersburg. ... We misapprehend the nature of what took
place when we say, as we usually do, that some important and
useful reforms were introduced by Stein, Hardenberg, and
Scharnhorst. In the first place, such a word as reform is not
properly applied to changes so vast, and in the second place.
the changes then made or at least commenced, went far beyond
legislation. We want some word stronger than reform which
shall convey that one of the greatest events of modern history
now took place in Prussia. Revolution would convey this, but
unfortunately we appropriate that word to changes in the form
of government, or even mere changes of dynasty, provided they
are violent, though such changes are commonly quite
insignificant compared to what now took place in Prussia. ...
The form of government indeed was not changed. Not merely did
the king continue to reign, but no Parliament was created even
with powers ever so restricted. Another generation had to pass
away before this innovation, which to us seems the beginning
of political life, took place. But a nation must be made
before it can be made free, and, as we have said, in Prussia
there was an administration (in great disorder) and an army,
but no nation.
{1515}
When Stein was placed at the head of affairs in the autumn of
1807, he seems, at first, hardly to have been aware that
anything was called for beyond the reform of the
administration, and the removal of some abuses in the army.
Accordingly he did reform the administration from the top to
the bottom, remodelling the whole machinery both of central
and local government which had come down from the father of
Frederick the Great. But the other work also was forced upon
him, and he began to create the nation by emancipating the
peasantry, while Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were brooding over
the ideas which, five years later, took shape in the Landwehr
of East Prussia. Besides emancipating the peasant he
emancipated industry,--everywhere abolishing that strange
caste system which divided the population rigidly into nobles,
citizens, and peasants, and even stamped every acre of land in
the country with its own unalterable rank as noble, or
citizen, or peasant land. Emancipation, so to speak, had to be
given before enfranchisement. The peasant must have something
to live for; freewill must be awakened in the citizen; and he
must be taught to fight for something before he could receive
political liberty. Of such liberty Stein only provided one
modest germ. By his Städteordnung he introduced popular
election into the towns. Thus Prussia and France set out
towards political liberty by different roads. Prussia began
modestly with local liberties, but did not for a long time
attempt a Parliament. France with her charte, and in imitation
of France many of the small German States, had grand popular
Parliaments, but no local liberties. And so for a long time
Prussia was regarded as a backward State. ... It was only by
accident that Stein stopped short at municipal liberties and
created no Parliament. He would have gone further, and in the
last years of the wartime Hardenberg did summon deliberative
assemblies, which, however, fell into disuse again after the
peace. ... In spite however of all reaction, the change
irrevocably made by the legislation of that time was similar
to that made in France by the Revolution, and caused the age
before Jena to be regarded as an 'ancien regime.' But in
addition to this, a change had been made in men's minds and
thoughts by the shocks of the time, which prepared the way for
legislative changes which have taken place since. How
unprecedented in Prussia, for instance, was the dictatorial
authority wielded by Hardenberg early in 1807, by Stein in the
latter part of that year and in 1808, and by Hardenberg again
from 1810 onwards! Before that time in the history of Prussia
we find no subject eclipsing or even approaching the King in
importance. Prussia had been made what she was almost entirely
by her electors and kings. In war and organisation alike all
had been done by the Great Elector or Frederick-William I., or
Frederick the Great. But now this is suddenly changed. Everything
now turns on the minister. Weak ministers are expelled by
pressure put upon the king, strong ones are forced upon him.
He is compelled to create a new ministerial power much greater
than that of an English Prime Minister, and more like that of
a Grand Vizier, and by these dictators the most comprehensive
innovations are made. The loyalty of the people was not
impaired by this; on the contrary, Stein and Hardenberg saved
the Monarchy; but it evidently transferred the Monarchy,
though safely, to a lower pedestal."
J. R. Seeley,
Prussian History (Macmillan's Magazine,
volume 36, pages 342-351).
ALSO IN:
J. R. Seeley,
Life and Times of Stein,
parts 3-5 (volumes 1-2).
R. B. D. Morier,
Agrarian Legislation of Prussia
(Systems of Land Tenure: Cobden Club Essays,
chapter 5).
GERMANY: A. D. 1808.
The Awakening of the national spirit.
Effects of the Spanish rising, and of Fichte's Addresses.
The beginnings of the great rising in Spain against Napoleon
(see SPAIN: A. D. 1808, and after) "were watched by Stein from
Berlin while he was engaged in negotiating with Daru; we can
imagine with what feelings! His cause had been, since his
ministry began, substantially the same as that of Spain; but
he had perhaps understood it himself but dimly, at any rate
hoped but faintly to see it prosper. But now he ripens at once
into a great nationality statesman; the reforms of Prussia
begin at once to take a more military stamp, and to point more
decisively to a great uprising of the German race against the
foreign oppressor. The change of feeling which took place in
Prussia after the beginning of the Spanish troubles is very
clearly marked in Stein's autobiography. After describing the
negotiations at Paris and Berlin, ... he begins a new
paragraph thus: 'The popular war which had broken out in Spain
and was attended with good success, had heightened the
irritation of the inhabitants of the Prussian State caused by
the humiliation they had suffered. All thirsted for revenge;
plans of insurrection, which aimed at exterminating the French
scattered about the country, were arranged; among others, one
was to be carried out at Berlin, and I had the greatest
trouble to keep the leaders, who confided their intentions to
me, from a premature outbreak. We all watched the progress of
the Spanish war and the commencement of the Austrian, for the
preparations of that Power had not remained a secret;
expectation was strained to the highest point; pains were
necessary to moderate the excited eagerness for resistance in
order to profit by it in more favourable circumstances. ...
Fichte's Addresses to the Germans, delivered during the French
occupation of Berlin and printed under the censorship of M.
Bignon, the Intendant, had a great effect upon the feelings of
the cultivated class.' ... That in the midst of such weighty
matters he should remember to mention Fichte's Addresses is a
remarkable testimony to the effect produced by them on the
public mind, and at the same time it leads us to conjecture
that they must have strongly influenced his own. They had been
delivered in the winter at Berlin and of course could not be
heard by Stein, who was then with the King, but they were not
published till April. As affecting public opinion therefore,
and also as known to Stein, the book was almost exactly of the
same date as the Spanish Rebellion, and it is not unnatural
that he should mention the two influences together. ... When
the lectures were delivered at Berlin a rising in Spain was
not dreamed of, and even when they were published it had not
taken place, nor could clearly be foreseen. And yet they teach
the same lesson. That doctrine of nationality which was taught
affirmatively by Spain had been suggested to Fichte's mind by
the reductio ad absurdum which events had given to the
negation of it in Germany.
{1516}
Nothing could be more convincing than the concurrence of the
two methods of proof at the same moment, and the prophetic
elevation of these discourses (which may have furnished a
model to Carlyle) was well fitted to drive the lesson home,
particularly to a mind like Stein's, which was quite capable
of being impressed by large principles. ... Fichte's Addresses
do not profess to have in the first instance nationality for
their subject. They profess to inquire whether there exists
any grand comprehensive remedy for the evils with which
Germany is afflicted. They find such a remedy where Turgot
long before had looked for deliverance from the selfishness to
which he traced all the abuses of the old regime, that is, in
a grand system of national education. Fichte reiterates the
favourite doctrine of modern Liberalism, that education as
hitherto conducted by the Church has aimed only at securing
for men happiness in another life, and that this is not
enough, inasmuch as they need also to be taught how to bear
themselves in the present life so as to do their duty to the
state, to others and themselves. He is as sure as Turgot that
a system of national education will work so powerfully upon
the nation that in a few years they will not be recognisable,
and he explains at great length what should be the nature of
this system, dwelling principally upon the importance of
instilling a love of duty for its own sake rather than for
reward. The method to be adopted is that of Pestalozzi. Out of
fourteen lectures the first three are entirely occupied with
this. But then the subject is changed, and we find ourselves
plunged into a long discussion of the peculiar characteristics
which distinguish Germany from other nations and particularly
other nations of German origin. At the present day this
discussion, which occupies four lectures, seems hardly
satisfactory; but it is a striking deviation from the fashion
of that age. ... But up to this point we perceive only that
the subject of German nationality occupies Fichte's mind very
much, and that there was more significance than we first
remarked in the title, Addresses to the German Nation;
otherwise we have met with nothing likely to seem of great
importance to a statesman. But the eighth Lecture propounds
the question, 'What is a Nation in the higher signification of
the word, and what is patriotism? It is here that he delivers
what might seem a commentary on the Spanish Revolution, which
had not yet taken place. ... Fichte proclaims the Nation not
only to be different from the State, but to be something far
higher and greater. ... Applied to Germany this doctrine would
lead to the practical conclusion that a united German State
ought to be set up in which the separate German States should
be absorbed. ... In the lecture before us he contents himself
with advising that patriotism as distinguished from loyalty to
the State should be carefully inculcated in the new education,
and should influence the individual German Governments. It
would not indeed have been safe for Fichte to propose a
political reform, but it rather appears that he thought it an
advantage rather than a disadvantage that the Nation and the
State should be distinct. ... I should not have lingered so
long over this book if it did not strike me as the prophetical
or canonical book which announces and explains a great
transition in Modern Europe, and the prophecies of which began
to be fulfilled immediately after its publication by the
rising in Spain. ... It is this Spanish Revolution which when
it has extended to the other countries we call the
Anti-Napoleonic Revolution of Europe. It gave Europe years of
unparalleled bloodshed, but at the same time years over which
there broods a light of poetry; for no conception can be more
profoundly poetical than that which now woke up in every part
of Europe, the conception of the Nation. Those years also led
the way to the great movements which have filled so much of
the nineteenth century, and have rearranged the whole central
part of the map of Europe on a more natural system."
J. R. Seeley,
Life and Times of Stein,
part 4, chapter 1 (volume 2).
GERMANY: A. D. 1808 (January).
Kehl, Cassel and Wesel annexed to France.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1807-1808 (NOVEMBER-FEBRUARY).
GERMANY: A. D. 1808 (April-December).
The Tugendbund, and Stein's relations to it.
"English people think of Stein almost exclusively in connexion
with land laws. But the second and more warlike period of his
Ministry has also left a faint impression in the minds of many
among us, who are in the habit of regarding him as the founder
of the Tugendbund. In August and September [1808], the very
months in which Stein was taking up his new position, this
society was attracting general attention, and accordingly this
is the place to consider Stein's relation to it. That he was
secretly animating and urging it on must have seemed at the
time more than probable, almost self-evident. It aimed at the
very objects which he had at heart, it spoke of him with warm
admiration, and in general it used language which seemed an
echo of his own. ... Whatever his connexion with the
Tugendbund may have been, it cannot have commenced till April,
1808, for it was in that month that the Tugendbund began its
existence, and therefore nothing can be more absurd than to
represent Stein as beginning to revolutionise the country with
the help of the Tugendbund, for his revolutionary edict had
been promulgated in the October before. ... In his
autobiography ... Stein [says]: 'An effect and not the cause
of this passionate national indignation at the despotism of
Napoleon was the Tugendbund, of which I was no more the
founder than I was a member, as I can assert on my honour and
as is well known to its originators. About July, 1808, there
was formed at Königsberg a society consisting of several
officers, for example, Colonel Gneisenau, Grolmann, &c., and
learned men, such as Professor Krug, in order to combat
selfishness and to rouse the nobler moral feelings; and
according to the requirements of the existing laws they
communicated their statutes and the list of their members to
the King's Majesty, who sanctioned the former without any
action on my part, it being my belief in general that there
was no need of any other institute but to put new life into
the spirit of Christian patriotism, the germ of which lay
already in the existing institutions of State and Church. The
new Society held its meetings, but of the proceedings I knew
nothing, and when later it proposed to exert an indirect
influence upon educational and military institutions I
rejected the proposal as encroaching on the department of the
civil and ecclesiastical governing bodies. As I was driven
soon afterwards out of the public service, I know nothing
of the further operations of this Society.' ...
{1517}
He certainly seems to intend his readers to understand that he
had not even any indirect or underhand connexion with it, but
from first to last stood entirely aloof, except in one case
when he interfered to restrain its action. It is even possible
that by telling us that he had nothing to do with the step
taken by the King when he sanctioned the statutes of the
society he means to hint that; had his advice been taken, the
society would not have been even allowed to exist. ... The
principal fact affirmed by Stein is indeed now beyond
controversy; Stein was certainly not either the founder or a
member of the Tugendbund. The society commonly known by that
name, which however designated itself as the Moral and
Scientific Union, was founded by a number of persons, of whom
many were Freemasons, at Konigsberg in the month of April.
Professor Krug, mentioned by Stein, was one of them; Gneisenau
and Grolmann, whom he also mentions, were not among the first
members, and Gneisenau, it seems, was never a member. The
statutes were drawn by Krug, Bardeleben and Baersch, and if
anyone person can be called the Founder of the Tugendbund, the
second of these, Bardeleben, seems best to deserve the title.
The Order of Cabinet by which the society was licensed is
dated Konigsberg, June 30th, and runs as follows: 'The revival
of morality, religion, serious taste and public spirit, is
assuredly most commendable; and, so far as the society now
being formed under the name of a Virtue Union (Tugendverein)
is occupied with this within the limits of the laws of the
country and without any interference in politics or public
administration, His Majesty the King of Prussia approves the
object and constitution of the society.' ... From Konigsberg
missionaries went forth who established branch associations,
called Chambers, in other towns, first those of the Province
of Prussia, Braunsberg, Elbing, Graudenz, Eylau, Hohenstein,
Memel, Stallupöhnen; then in August and September Bardeleben
spread the movement with great success through Silesia. The
spirit which animated the new society could not but be
approved by every patriot. They had been deeply struck with
the decay of the nation, as shown in the occurrences of the
war, and their views of the way in which it might be revived
were much the same as those of Stein and Fichte. The only
question was whether they were wise in organising a society in
order to promulgate these views, whether such a society was
likely to do much good, and also whether it might not by
possibility do much harm. Stein's view, as he has given it,
was that it was not likely to do much good, and that such an
organisation was unnecessary. ... It did not follow because he
desired Estates or Parliaments that he was prepared to
sanction a political club. ... It may well have seemed to him
that to suffer a political club to come into existence was to
allow the guidance of the Revolution which he had begun to
pass out of his hands. There appears, then, when we consider
it closely, nothing unnatural in the course which Stein
declares himself to have taken."
J. R. Seeley,
Life and Times of Stein,
part 4, chapter 3 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
T. Frost,
Secret Societies of the European Revolution,
volume 1, chapter 4.
GERMANY: A. D. 1808 (September-October).
Imperial conference and Treaty of Erfurt.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1808 (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (January-June).
Outburst of Austrian feeling against France.
Reopening of war.
Napoleon's advance to Vienna.
His defeat at Aspern and perilous situation.
Austrian reverses in Italy and Hungary.
"The one man of all the Austrians who felt the least amount of
hatred against France, was, perhaps, the Emperor. All his
family and all his people--nobles and priests, the middle
classes and the peasantry--evinced a feeling full of anger
against the nation which had upset Europe. ... By reason of
the French, the disturbers and spoilers, the enemies of the
human race, despisers of morality and religion alike, Princes
were suffering in their palaces, workmen in their shops,
business men in their offices, priests in their churches,
soldiers in their camps, peasants in their huts. The movement
of exasperation was irresistible. Everyone said that it was a
mistake to have laid down their arms; that they ought against
France to have fought on to the bitter end, and to have
sacrificed the last man and the last florin; that they had
been wrong in not having gone to the assistance of Prussia
after the Jena Campaign; and that the moment had arrived for
all the Powers to coalesce against the common enemy and crush
him. ... All Europe had arrived at a paroxysm of indignation.
What was she waiting for before rising? A signal. That signal
Austria was about to give. And this time with what chances of
success! The motto was to be 'victory or death.' But they were
sure of victory. The French army, scattered from the Oder to
the Tagus, from the mountains of Bohemia to the Sierra Morena,
would not be able to resist the onslaught of so many nations
eager to break their bonds. ... Vienna, in 1809, indulged in
the same language, and felt the same passions, that Berlin did
in 1806. ... The Landwehr, then only organized a few months,
were impatiently awaiting the hour when they should measure
themselves against the Veterans of the French army. Volunteers
flocked in crowds to the colours. Patriotic subscriptions
flowed in. ... Boys wanted to leave school to fight. All
classes of society vied with each other in zeal, courage, and
a spirit of sacrifice. When the news was made public that the
Archduke Charles had, on the 20th of February, 1809, been
appointed Generalissimo, there was an outburst of joy and
confidence from one end of the Empire to the other."
Imbert de Saint-Amand,
Memoirs of the Empress Marie Louise,
part 1, chapter 2.
"On receiving decisive intelligence of these hostile
preparations, Napoleon returned with extraordinary expedition
from Spain to Paris, in January, 1809, and gave orders to
concentrate his forces in Germany, and call out the full
contingents of the Confederation of the Rhine. Some further
time was consumed by the preparations on either side. At last,
on the 8th of April, the Austrian troops crossed the frontiers
at once on the Inn, in Bohemia, in the Tyrol and in Italy. The
whole burthen of the war rested on Austria alone, for Prussia
remained neutral, and Russia, now allied to France, was even
bound to make a show at least, though it were no more, of
hostility to Austria. On the same day on which the Austrian
forces crossed the frontiers, the Tyrol rose in insurrection
[see below: A. D. 1809-1810 (APRIL-FEBRUARY)], and was swept
clear of the enemy in four days, with the exception of a
Bavarian garrison, that still held out in Kufstein.
{1518}
The French army was at this time dispersed over a line of
forty leagues in extent, with numerous undefended apertures
between the corps; so that the fairest possible opportunity
presented itself to the Austrians for cutting to pieces the
scattered forces of the French, and marching in triumph to the
Rhine. As usual, however, the archduke's early movements were
subjected to most impolitic delays by the Aulic Council; and
time was allowed Napoleon to arrive on the theatre of war
(April 17), and repair the faults committed by his
adjutant-general, Berthier. He instantly extricated his army
from its perilous position--almost cut in two by the advance
of the Austrians--and, beginning on the 19th, he beat the
latter in five battles on five successive days, at Thaun,
Abensberg, Landshut, Eckmühl, and Ratisbon. The Archduke
Charles retired into Bohemia to collect reinforcements, but
General Hiller was, in consequence of the delay in repairing
the fortifications of Linz, unable to maintain that place, the
possession of which was important, on account of its forming a
connecting point between Bohemia and the Austrian Oberland.
Hiller, however, at least saved his honour by pushing forward
to the Traun, and in a fearfully bloody encounter at
Ebersberg, captured three French eagles, one of his colours
alone falling into the enemy's hands. He was, nevertheless,
compelled to retire before the superior forces of the French,
and crossing over at Krems to the left bank of the Danube, he
formed a junction with the Archduke Charles. The way was now
clear to Vienna, which, after a slight show of defence,
capitulated to Napoleon on the 12th of May. The Archduke
Charles had hoped to reach the capital before the French, and
to give battle to them beneath its walls; but as he had to
make a circuit whilst the French pushed forward in a direct
line, his plan was frustrated, and he arrived, when too late,
from Bohemia. Both armies, separated by the Danube, stood
opposed to one another in the vicinity of the imperial city.
Both commanders were desirous of coming to a decisive
engagement. The French had secured the island of Lobau, to
serve as a mustering place, and point of transit across the
Danube. The archduke allowed them to establish a bridge of
boats, being resolved to await them on the Marchfeld. There it
was that Rudolph of Habsburg, in the battle against Ottakar,
had laid the foundation of the greatness of the house of
Austria; and there the political existence of that house and
the fate of the monarchy were now to be decided. Having
crossed the river, Napoleon was received on the opposite bank,
near Aspern and Esslingen, by his opponent, and, after a
dreadful battle [in which Marshal Lannes was killed], that was
carried on with unwearied animosity for two days, May 21st and
22nd, 1809, he was completely beaten, and compelled to fly for
refuge to the island of Lobau. The rising stream had,
meanwhile, carried away the bridge, Napoleon's sole chance of
escape to the opposite bank. For two days he remained on the
island with his defeated troops, without provisions, and in
hourly expectation of being cut to pieces; the Austrians,
however, neglected to turn the opportunity to advantage, and
allowed the French leisure to rebuild the bridge, a work of
extreme difficulty. During six weeks afterwards, the two
armies continued to occupy their former positions under the
walls of Vienna, on the right and left banks of the Danube,
narrowly watching each other's movements, and preparing for a
final struggle. Whilst these events were in progress, the
Archduke John had successfully penetrated into Italy, where he
had totally defeated the Viceroy Eugene at Salice, on the 16th
of April. Favoured by the simultaneous revolt of the Tyrolese,
he might have obtained the most decisive results from this
victory, but the extraordinary progress of Napoleon down the
valley of the Danube rendered necessary the concentration of
the whole forces of the monarchy for the defence of the