A

DETAILED ACCOUNT

OF THE

BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ

BY THE

AUSTRIAN MAJOR-GENERAL,

STUTTERHEIM.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

BY

MAJOR PINE COFFIN,

ASSISTANT QUARTER-MASTER-GENERAL TO THE BRITISH ARMY,

Tout cela, prouve, qu'il y a beaucoup d'hommes, capables de faire manœuvrer, quinze a vingt mille hommes, et qu'il en est peu, qui puissent tirer tout le parti possible, d'une armée de quatre-vingt mille hommes.

Note par un officier François.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR T. GODDARD, MILITARY BOOKSELLER,
NO. 1, PALL-MALL, CORNER OF THE HAYMARKET.

1807.

W. Marchant, Printer, 3, Greville-street, Holborn.

TO THE PUBLIC.

The fatal consequences that resulted from the battle of Austerlitz, to the cause of Europe, and of humanity, render it an object of too deep an interest with the statesman and the soldier to make an apology requisite for introducing to the public, what may be considered as the Austrian official account of that action. It is hardly probable, that, under a government so constituted as that of Austria, a general officer would have ventured to publish the particulars of an action, in which he himself bore a conspicuous part, (at least with his name attached to it,) unless he felt himself sanctioned by the highest authority in so doing.

However that may be, the work bears evident internal marks of authenticity, while the events daily passing under our eyes, with such dazzling, and unprecedented rapidity, give an additional interest to the cause which has been productive of such direful effects.

Scarcely have twelve months elapsed since this disastrous battle was fought, and already have we seen new dynasties created, and the proudest empires levelled in the dust.

We have seen one of the most powerful monarchies of Europe, whether it be considered as to its military resources, or its well replenished treasury; as to its well disciplined army, or the glorious recollection of its past achievements: we have seen the armies of Prussia, which were wont to be considered as the patterns of military excellence, dissipated and annihilated, like chaff before the wind, by the well-trained legions of the modern Alexander.

The present state of Europe affords ample scope to the reflections of the statesman. For, though the soldier may account for the loss of a battle, by reasoning on what was done, and what was left undone, the subjugation of states is to be looked for in causes far remote from the scene of action. These are times which not only require superiority of intellect in those who govern, but the conviction on the part of the governed, that they are not mere spectators of the fray; that it is not a mere squabble for power; but that the happiness of each individual, that the preservation of all he holds most dear, in short, that the liberties of his country are at stake, and depend upon the issue of the contest.

Has this been, or could it be, the feeling of those nations of the Continent we have seen overrun?

In the answer to this simple question, we may perhaps find the real cause of all the disasters of the coalition, and subject of much contemplation for ourselves. The cloud which has been long gathering over Europe has begun to burst; we have seen the storm fall where least expected, and bury whole empires, and their people, in one common ruin. When the demon of destruction is abroad, let us not be unmindful of ourselves. Are we better prepared than our neighbours? Have we more skilful generals, or less intriguing politicians? I fear not. It is then only to the people we can look in the day of trial; and I trust there is yet enough left of the genuine spirit of the constitution, and of the native valour of Britons, to make every man feel his country is worth contending for. The moment that ceases to be the case, our independence as a nation is virtually gone; and, though our empire may drag on a precarious existence for a few years, it will fall, inevitably fall, at no distant period.

I have been inadvertently led into a train of reflection, which some persons may think not quite compatible with the character of a soldier. Against this opinion, I beg leave to enter my protest. I have always considered the superiority of the French troops over those of the continent, as the result of their individual intelligence; arising in a great degree from the habit of every Frenchman, to discuss whatever topic comes under his notice; and it is quite unnecessary for me to remark, that the powers of the mind only develope themselves in proportion as they are called into action. Let us hear no more then of soldiers being mere machines. The absurdity of the doctrine is too palpable to need refutation.

I ought perhaps to assign some reason for having undertaken a labour, to which I may appear so very unequal. It was to relieve my mind from constantly dwelling on a subject of disappointment, which still weighs but too heavily on my spirits; and which I hoped to alleviate, though it cannot be removed by occupation. Personal vanity had no share whatever in it, and if I have not concealed my name, it has been because I hoped to disarm the severity of criticism by avowing it. Much will not be expected from one, who embraced the profession of arms at a very early period, and whose ambition, from a child, has been military and not literary reputation. All that I can flatter myself with having succeeded in, is, the rendering the sense of the author, in terms plain and intelligible. For elegance of style, and flowing periods, the public may look to a Hutchinson, but not to soldiers in general.

JOHN PINE COFFIN.

P.S. It was my original intention to have annexed a good map to this work, on which the reader might be enabled satisfactorily to follow the operations with his eye;—but having in vain ransacked the shops of London, without being able to procure a map of Moravia on a scale sufficiently large to make it of any use; and, in fact, without finding any that was better than Chauchards, which is woefully deficient, both in the names of villages, and in geographical accuracy; I have been induced to publish the Battle of Austerlitz without this advantage. My principal motive for so doing has been the persuasion, that a bad map could be of very little use; and that it would enhance the expense to such a degree, as to place the work beyond the reach of many military men; while others may be already in possession of as good, or better information than I could furnish them with. To those, however, who do not already possess a map of Moravia, I would recommend that published by Covens and Mortier, at Amsterdam; not as the best possible map, but as the least defective I have seen. But, I have great doubts whether this is to be procured in England.

TO THE

AUSTRIAN ARMY.

This account of what passed under my own observation at the Battle of Austerlitz, and of the result of my researches on that memorable event, I here dedicate to my brethren in arms. The desire of being read by all the military men in Europe has induced me to write in a language more generally known than that of Germany, and which there are few among you who do not understand. Those who, like myself, have borne a part in this disastrous day of the 2d December, will be enabled to bear testimony to the truth of this narration. I have prided myself on using the greatest impartiality; on having stifled all prepossession, all passion, and every feeling, that could tend to lead my judgment astray. It is to your approbation, my brother soldiers, that I look forward, as the most delightful recompense of all my labours.

INTRODUCTION.

The imperfect accounts which have reached the public, as to the details of the Battle of Austerlitz, are so contradictory to each other, and so little satisfactory to military men, that it has been thought proper to lay the following relation before them, in order to fix their ideas as to this memorable epoch.

In all ages, as in all countries, nations and armies have been the slaves of opinion. Hence it has ever been the policy of governments to heighten, by those means best calculated to excite national enthusiasm, the splendour of even the greatest victories; as well as to give a specious colouring to those reverses of fortune, which are too public to be passed over in silence.

The soldier, who here gives the relation of what he himself saw, neither wishes to flatter a government, nor to gain the good opinion of an army. His object will be, to detail, with truth, what he has either seen or been able to discover from others; and, forgetting the part he himself acted, he will speak with candour and impartiality of the events that passed under his own observation, without the slightest tincture of prejudice, or passion. Of these events, posterity must be the judge.

Nothing will be found here, but the simple recital, without commentary, naked, and devoid of art, of one of the most famous epochs of history. To attempt to reason on the operations of wars that have passed in our times would be giving too much scope to self-love, which always adopts or rejects, as suits our own opinions.

It is not the strength of the respective armies opposed to each other at the battle of Austerlitz, or the losses they sustained, which particularly distinguishes it, from many of those which took place in the first campaigns of the French Revolution, and the seven years war.

We have heretofore often seen 150,000 men in the field, and 30,000 slain. But it is the consequences of the action of the 2d of December, 1805; it is the epoch when it decided the fate of war; it is the moment in which it was fought, which makes it worthy of attention, and which will assign it a marked place in history.

It was the wish to gain personal information that induced the author to collect materials, which may become useful to a better pen: and he avails himself of a leisure moment to offer them to such as have the talent to make use of them.

In order that the past may serve to elucidate the future, it becomes requisite to recur to the circumstances that led to this decisive day; which proved how scrupulously accurate it is necessary to be, in making the calculations and combinations, to which the existing circumstances and the knowledge of human nature give rise.

The battles of Crems, and of Hollabrunn, are already well known. This is not intended as a history of the late campaign, but merely of a part of it, into which the account of those two affairs does not enter. It was after they had taken place, that M. de Koutousoff directed his retreat upon Brunn, and effected it from that moment, without much annoyance from the enemy. This first Russian army had orders carefully to avoid a serious engagement, and to hasten its retreat, for the purpose of forming a junction with that under M. de Buxhoevden, who was advancing rapidly to its support. M. de Koutousoff executed a difficult retreat from the river Inn, upon Moravia, which commenced on the 14th October, and lasted till the 18th November; and, although very inferior to the enemy in point of numbers, this Russian army effected its junction without much loss. The farther the grand French army advanced, the more its combinations became multiplied, and the more it was obliged to detach its force. The Russian general had the advantage of being enabled to concentrate during his retreat, which he also effected in good order: for this he was principally indebted to Prince Bagration, who conducted the rear-guard with much courage. The two Russian armies formed their junction at Wischau, on the 18th of November; from which time they became one, under the command of the General in Chief, Koutousoff. Its strength consisted of 104 Battalions, 20 of which were Austrians; and 159 squadrons, 54 of which were Austrians, and 40 Cosacks. The Austrian corps was commanded by Lieutenant General Prince John de Liechtenstein: his infantry was composed of the 6th Battalion, recruited, armed, and organized about a month before; M. de Kienmayer, with the remains of his corps, (very much weakened by the movement of M. de Merveldt on Styria,) formed a part of the corps under Prince John de Liechtenstein. The Archduke Ferdinand, with the wreck of the army from Ulm, and some Battalions, also newly raised, was in Bohemia, and thereby covered the right of the combined army; which might at this time be computed at about 72,000 men. The corps under the Archduke Ferdinand was composed of from 18 to 20,000 men.

The grand French army, after passing the Danube, had advanced into Moravia, being composed of the corps under Prince Murat, Marshals Soult, Lannes, and Bernadotte. The last of these was then opposed to the Archduke Ferdinand, and was advancing upon Iglau. Marshal Davoust, after having followed M. de Merveldt into Styria, moved from Vienna upon Presbourgh. The corps of Marmont marched upon Carinthia, and then upon Styria; in the first instance, to open the communication between the grand army and that of Italy; and afterwards, to oppose the junction of the Archduke Charles with the army under M. de Koutousoff; but the movements of this prince were so well calculated, and his force so well concentrated, that he did not allow time for the French to establish themselves at Gratz. Marshal Ney, after the passage of the Inn, took his direction on the Tyrol, by Scharnitz.

At the time of the junction of the two Russian armies near Wischau, they had only opposed to them, the corps of Prince Murat, part of which formed the advanced guard, those of Marshals Soult and Lannes, the imperial guards, under Marshal Bessiéres, and a corps of grenadiers, drawn from these different troops, forming a reserve of 15,000 men, under General Duroc. This army, when near Brunn, was composed of eight divisions, each of which was about 7000 strong. The Russian army was so much fatigued with the continual marches it had been making, whether to fall back on the support, or the support to get forward in time, that it was decided at Wischau to take up the position of Olmutz, to give some days rest to the troops.

Opinions were at that time much divided. The Russian advanced posts had no sort of information as to the position and force of the enemy; at one time, even Prince Bagration was ignorant of the situation occupied by the French advanced guard. The Austrians also, notwithstanding the facility they ought to have possessed of procuring intelligence in the country, had only very vague data to act upon.

By this information, however, it appeared, that the French forces were collected only in small numbers near Brunn; and some generals of the combined army gave their opinion at Wischau, for immediately resuming the offensive. It is possible, this moment might have been more fortunate than that which was afterwards chosen. The strength of the coalesced army was, from the 19th of November, superior to that of the enemy, who was yet uninformed that the junction of the two Russian armies was effected, and therefore could not expect an offensive movement,[1] such as a manœuvre on either of his flanks would have been. The army was then too near him to admit of his receiving reinforcements near Brunn. But this very diversity of opinion, perhaps rendered the movement on Olmutz necessary, because those in command did not possess that decision, which can only be the result of a military eye.

The Austrian general Weyrother, had been sent into Galicia, for the purpose of conducting the army of Buxhoevden through the hereditary states. He was an officer of reputation, who did not want for talent, and who had inspired the Russians with confidence. As soon as the two armies became united, he filled the situation of Quarter-master general. The court of Vienna had previously selected General Schmidt for this important trust; but that officer, a man of superior merit, and who, with a talent for the profoundest calculation, possessed that tranquil wisdom, which gives reason and deliberation in counsel; after having shewn himself, at Crems, to be worthy of the confidence that was placed in him, lost his life there, and was thus snatched from the hopes of his sovereign, and of his brother soldiers. His loss was the more sensibly felt, and the more regretted, because his successor, neither possessed his calmness, his prudence, or his firmness. The army marched, the 21st of November, from Wischau, and arrived the next day but one, in the position in front of Olmutz, whither we will follow it, for the purpose of detailing the operations.

March of the Combined Army into the Position of Olmutz.

It was on the 23d of November, the army arrived in this position, and was posted in rear of the village of Ollschan. Its left rested on the river March; its right extended to the heights in rear of Tobolau. In this manner it lay upon its arms, in three lines; while the Austrian corps, under Prince John de Liechtenstein, formed the reserve of the army, on the heights in rear of Schnabelin, and was principally intended to secure, in case of a check, the passage across the March. With this view, several bridges were constructed across that river, between Nimlau and Olmutz, to facilitate the operation. The ground occupied by the army in this position, offered great advantages. It was so commanding, throughout its whole extent, from the heights near Nimlau, to the right of the position, as to discover nearly a league in its front, all the enemy's movements in case of attack; while the slope of the hills in its immediate front was so gentle, as to resemble a glacis. In its rear, spacious ravines, only of sufficient depth to conceal large columns of troops from the enemy, which might unexpectedly be brought into action, facilitated the means, in this defensive position, of manœuvring offensively, under cover of the heights. Along their summit, there were commanding points, which mutually defended each other; and on which, the numerous artillery, with which this army was provided, might be employed with great success. A morass covered the right, and a part of the centre; the Blata ran at the foot of these heights, on which heavy batteries might have been constructed: this little stream, although insignificant in itself, became an additional obstacle, under the fire of grape. To sum up all, the ground offered the means of delaying the enemy, in his attempt to overcome these obstacles, and to open out. The General Bagration, with his advanced guard, was at Prosnitz. General Kienmayer, with his, upon the left, at Kralitz, pushed on detachments upon Klenowitz. The out-posts were at Predlitz. An Austrian partisan was sent along the March, on Tobitschau, Kogetein, and Kremsir, to observe that country. The French army had also sent a partisan, from Goeding on Hradisch, and Kremsir; but the latter was repulsed, and the Austrian detachments remained masters of the March. It will not escape the observation of intelligent military men, that this was an advantage which gave the allies the means of manœuvring by their left, while their right (which would then have rested on the March) was secured; and would have masked this movement, so as to give them, at least two days march in advance. The good understanding, at that time subsisting with Prussia, appears to have been such, as to have made it expedient for the allied army, to think of establishing a communication with the Archduke Charles. But, in determining on offensive movements, nothing appears to have been thought of, but going straight forward.

M. de Koutousoff had also sent some Austrian partisans, on his right flank, who marched upon Tribau and Zwittau, whither the Archduke Ferdinand, who was at Czaslau, had sent some parties of light troops, to keep up the chain of communication.

Prince Murat arrived, on the 18th of November, at Brunn. His advanced guard, under general Sebastiani, pushed forward in the first instance, to Rausnitz, and afterwards entered Wischau, after Prince Bagration had evacuated it. The Emperor Napoleon, established himself, on the 20th November, at Brunn, and placed his army in concentrated cantonments, in the following manner:

The corps of guards, the grenadiers of the reserve, and the troops under Marshal Lannes, in Brunn and its vicinity. The cavalry under Prince Murat, on the right and left of the great road, between Brunn and Posorsitz. Marshal Soult, at Austerlitz; and the three divisions, of which his army was composed, were divided, between that place, Butschowitz, Neuwieslitz, Stanitz, and the road to Hungary. At Gaja, was a strong detachment, which kept open the communication with that which observed the river March, in order to secure the right of the army.[2]

The 25th November, the Grand Duke Constantine arrived at Olmutz, with the corps of guards, of which he had the command. After a long and forced march from St. Petersburgh, this fine body of men was in the best order.

This corps was composed of ten battalions, and eighteen squadrons, the whole amounting to 10,000 men; of whom, however, there were only 8,500 under arms. At this moment, the army, under M. de Koutousoff may be computed to have amounted, in all, to above 80,000 men, as will be seen hereafter, in detail.

A reinforcement of 10,000 men was still expected, under General Essen; which, accordingly, arrived near Olmutz, at the moment when the allied army commenced its offensive operations. The corps of Essen was at Kremsir, the day of the battle of Austerlitz, and was of no kind of use. The army under M. de Koutousoff, was certainly stronger than the one opposed to it; but while the latter was concentrated towards a single point, and formed into masses, the former diffused its force as it advanced. It is not in numbers that the only, and, indeed, the principal strength of an army consists; but there are emergencies, and occasions, in which it is absolutely necessary to profit by that advantage; and the present was an instance of the kind. The allied army was under the necessity of advancing, for the reasons hereafter to be detailed. Had it commenced its movement from the day when the Grand Duke Constantine arrived with his reinforcement, forming the reserve of the centre. If, at this epoch, it had manœuvred with rapidity, and calculation; if the reserve, under the Grand Duke, had been augmented by the corps under General Essen; if less importance had been attached to the resting an army, which, after some days inactivity, could no longer be fatigued; there might, perhaps, have been found means, without risking a battle, to oblige the French to abandon their position, by turning one of its flanks; which, by giving this army some uneasiness, as to its communications, would have induced it to move upon Vienna, or Bohemia. The former step would have been attended with danger. The corps of Bernadotte, which came from Iglau to reinforce the army in front of Brunn, the evening before the battle of Austerlitz, would not then have had time to make this movement, which was followed by such fatal consequences to the allies.[3] It was only by means such as these, had the allies acted with prudence and vigour, that they could have hoped to make the French fall into their combinations: combinations which should have been calmly conceived, and vigorously executed. But the Quarter-master general, it has before been mentioned, though an officer of great personal courage, had not that confidence in himself which could enable him to give advice at the head-quarters, where the greatest degree of wisdom was requisite. Without regarding the difficulties thrown in his way, this officer, too easily, abandoned his own opinions, to adopt those of other people.

The astonishing rapidity with which the unfortunate events, of this disastrous war, succeeded each other; the excessive folly of Mack, which was only to be surpassed by his disgrace; and in which originated that succession of guilty errors, which astonished Europe, and calumniated a brave army; that folly of never anticipating a check, and of not establishing magazines in the rear, as a consequence of that presumption. To these circumstances it was owing, that the army, while in the position of Olmutz, was almost destitute of provisions. It had only been there one day, before it was obliged to have recourse to forced requisitions; a violent expedient, which, by the disorderly manner in which it was executed, had much influence on the discipline of the army, into which a spirit of licentiousness began to insinuate itself from that day forwards. In the then state of politics, the gaining time was, at that moment, nearly of equal importance with the gaining a battle: and, the instant it was decided, not to manœuvre, it became of the highest importance to be enabled to subsist in the position of Olmutz, for the purpose of maintaining it. There still remained countries, from whence it would have been possible to draw provisions; but they were at a distance, and the convoys were obliged to make a long circuit. To this it was necessary to apply a speedy remedy. The officers of the commissariat received orders, incessantly repeated, but never sufficiently urgent, to establish convoys of provisions, with all possible dispatch, upon the different roads; but some of this department wanted both activity and inclination; their systematic conception of things not allowing them to feel the extent of the emergency; while others experienced great embarrassment, from the detention, by the Russians, of a great part of the horses belonging to the country, which were employed in the transport of provisions, and were, in consequence, at a loss for the means of conveyance. The bread was plundered on the road, both by the detachments appointed for its escort, and by a number of marauders who followed the army. The strict discipline, that ought to have existed, was not vigourously maintained, under the pretext, that the army was starving. Relaxation of discipline is always succeeded by excesses; and the licentiousness, attendant upon it, gives full latitude to the disaffected, and to all those who have not courage to support the numerous privations attendant upon modern warfare. It was thought impossible to subsist the army in the position in front of Olmutz, and it was resolved to abandon it, for the purpose of attacking the enemy.

Offensive Movements of the Allied Army.

We have already seen the uncertainty in which M. de Koutousoff found himself, as to the movements and force of the enemy, at the moment when it was decided to resume the offensive. The accounts derived from the people of the country were contradictory; and the out-posts gave no information whatever. The first disposition made for the advance, was not then founded upon an exact knowledge both of the position of the enemy and the numbers to be contended with, but was solely adapted to the nature of the ground, between Olmutz and Wischau. This disposition was given to the generals, the 24th November. The 25th was the day on which it was fixed to march; but it was necessary to take two days provisions; and these provisions could not arrive till the day after. When that day came, some of the generals had not sufficiently studied their dispositions; and thus, another day was lost. The enemy profited by this time. The evening before the battle, as has been already mentioned, Marshal Bernadotte, as well as part of the corps of Marshal Davoust, reinforced the Emperor Napoleon. It was necessary to recall the attention to these facts, on which we shall yet have occasion still further to remark.

The 27th November, at eight o'clock in the morning, the army was put in motion, in five columns, to approach nearer the advanced guard, under Prince Bagration, who, on that day, made no movement whatever, in order that the manœuvre might be concealed from the enemy. This was done with a view to concentrating the troops, which, however, in the end, were diffused afresh. The five roads, by which the army advanced, were parallel to each other. The two right columns marched along the foot of the mountains, to the right of the causeway, and were composed of infantry only. That of the centre was on the great road to Prosnitz; the fourth to the left of this, and very little distant from it; the fifth, composed entirely of cavalry, was in sight of the fourth. In front of this last, the country was entirely open.

Here follows the detail of the march.

RIGHT WING.

The General of Infantry, Buxhoevden.

FIRST COLUMN.

Lieutenant General Wimpfen.
Major Generals Muller, Sclichow, and Strick.
18 battalions of Russians. 1 company of pioneers.
2½ squadrons of Cosacks.
8,320 men. 250 horses.

SECOND COLUMN.

Lieutenant General Langeron.
Major Generals Kaminsky, Alsufieu.
18 battalions of Russians. 1 company of pioneers.
2½ squadrons of Cosacks.
11,420 men. 250 horses.

CENTRE.

The General in Chief, Koutousoff.

THIRD COLUMN.

Lieutenant General Przybyszewsky.
Major Generals Orosow, Lieders, Lewis.
24 battalions of Russians.
2 companies of reserve artillery.
13,800 men.

LEFT WING.

The Austrian Lieutenant General Prince John de Liechtenstein.

FOURTH COLUMN.

The Austrian Lieutenant General Kollowrath.
The Russian Lieutenant Generals Essen and Miloradowich.
The Russian Major Generals Szepelow and Repninsky.
The Austrian Major Generals Carneville, Rottermund, and Jurezeck.
32 battalions, of which 20 were Austrians.
1 company of reserve artillery.
5 companies of pioneers.
30 squadrons of Russians, of which 8 were Cosacks.
22,400 men. 3000 horses.

FIFTH COLUMN.

The Austrian Lieutenant General Prince Hohenlohe.
The Russian Lieutenant General Ouwarow.
The Austrian Major Generals Stutterheim, Weber, and Caramelli.
The Russian Major General Piritzky.
70 squadrons, of which 40 were Austrian, but very weak.
2 companies of light artillery.
4600 horses.

THE RESERVE.

The Grand Duke Constantine.
Lieutenant Generals Kollagriwoff and Malutin.
Major Generals Jankewitz and Depleradowich.
10 battalions of guards, 4 companies.
18 squadrons.
8,500 men.

RECAPITULATION.

The first column assembled at Nebotin, and marched upon Trzebschein, Blumenau, and Kobelnizeck, where it formed in two lines.

The second column assembled at Ollschan, and marched upon Studnitz, Czechowitz, and Ottaslowitz, where it formed, with its right supported by the left of the first column.

The third column assembled on the high road to Prosnitz, on which it marched, and formed in line with the two right columns.

The fourth column[6] assembled at Nedwriss, and marched upon Wrahowitz, and Dobrochow, where it formed, and established its communication with the centre column.

The fifth column assembled at Schabelin, and marched upon Kralitz, and Brzesowitz, where it formed in two lines.

This last column, not being covered by the out-posts on the left, had an advanced guard of its own, commanded by General Stutterheim, which communicated with the detachments observing the river March.

The army advanced with much precaution, because it was ignorant of the enemy's movements. It had orders to refuse the left, and to allow the right, which moved along the mountains, to gain ground, in order to turn the enemy's left, in case of meeting with it. The corps under the Grand Duke marched upon Prosnitz, (where the two emperors and the head-quarters were established) and formed the reserve. After four hours march, the army arrived on its different points of formation without any obstacle.

Information was received that the enemy had made no movement whatever, and that his advanced guard at Wischau had neither been reinforced or diminished. Preparations were in consequence made for its attack the next morning, and Prince Bagration received orders to put it in execution. The army was to follow, in the same order as before, the route that should be opened for it by this general. On the 28th, at day-break, Prince Bagration put his corps in motion, in three columns; that of the centre remained on the causeway; the two others, on the right and left, turned the town of Wischau; in which the enemy had a regiment of hussars, and one of chasseurs. Two other regiments of cavalry were posted in reserve, in rear of the town; while General Sebastiani was at Huluboschan with a regiment of dragoons. As soon as the Russians, with the cavalry under General Kienmayer (composed of the hussars of Szechler and Hesse Hombourg) on their left, appeared before Wischau, and on the heights of Brindlitz, the French cavalry, with the exception of about 100 men, precipitately abandoned the town.

The Adjutant General Dolgorucky, took possession of the town with two Battalions of Infantry, and made four officers and 100 men prisoners. The Enemy's Cavalry received considerable reinforcements in retiring upon Rausnitz, where was a strong Reserve. In the first instance, they were pursued by four squadrons of Russian Hussars, and two of Cosacks; but afterwards all the cavalry under Prince Bagration, reinforced by that of the fourth column, under the command of Lieutenant General Essen, (under whose orders were placed ten squadrons of Hulans, five of Cuirassiers, five of Dragoons, and eight of Cosacks) passed through Wischau, to support the attack of the advanced guard. To cover his right during this movement, Prince Bagration had received orders to send a regiment of chasseurs, and one of cavalry, to the right of Drissitz by Bustomirz and Dietitz, upon Habrowan. This general prosecuted his march as far as the heights of Rausnitz, where he took up his position. The enemy was still master of this little town, and began to cannonade; but the Russian artillery, which was more numerous, soon silenced the fire. In the evening, two Russian Battalions took possession of Rausnitz, in front of which were placed the out-posts.

M. de Kienmayer, who, with his cavalry, had supported the Russian advanced guard on the left, took his direction upon Drasowitz, and there established his communication with Prince Bagration.

The army, on the 28th, moved, as before, in five columns, and followed up the movement of the advanced guard, in the following manner:

The first column, from Kobelnizeck, by Ratzlawitz, upon Lutsch, where it took up its position, posting six Battalions of Infantry and Chasseurs, in the wood between Nemajam and Pistomirtz.

The second column, from Ottaslowitz, by Dietitz, upon Nosalowitz, where it formed in second line.

The third column, marched as before, along the causeway, to beyond Noska: one brigade was posted in the first, and the two others in second line.

The fourth column, from Dobrochow, by Krzizanowitz, and Brindlitz, upon the heights of Noska, where two regiments[7] formed in first line; and the two others in second line. The Austrian infantry attached to this column was formed in two lines, on the left of the Russians.

The fifth column, from Brzesowitz, by Ewanowitz, upon Topolan: its advanced guard marched upon Kutscherau, and communicated with that at Drasowitz.

Upon these movements of the allies, the French quitted their cantonments. By a signal made from Austerlitz, Marshal Soult collected his corps there, which evacuated the villages it had before occupied.

The allies flattered themselves that the enemy would not risk the fate of a battle in front of Brunn. After the 28th, this hope became the prevailing opinion at head-quarters. Then, instead of hastening their movements, they wished to manœuvre, at a period, when too much had been risked, to enable them to avoid a decisive action; if, contrary to the opinion of those who thought the French would not fight, they still persisted in not retiring.

We have, hitherto, seen M. de Koutousoff advancing his right, and refusing his left, with the view of turning the enemy's flank by the mountains; for which purpose he had disposed the greater part of his infantry on the right wing. At Wischau this disposition was changed. He wished to manœuvre on the right of the enemy. A march to the left was undertaken, which both lost time, and the ground that might have been gained to the front. The 29th November, the combined army moved from Lultsch, and the heights of Noska, upon those of Huluboschan and Kutscherau. It was not till the 1st December that Marshals Bernadotte and Davoust joined the Emperor Napoleon; and, on the 29th, M. de Koutousoff might have been at Austerlitz. After having passed Wischau, the allied army could no longer manœuvre with impunity. The time it then lost, in making movements, which did not lead it directly towards the enemy, while it discovered its intentions to the French army, gave it also the means of receiving such reinforcements as were within reach. A short flank movement could not answer the end proposed; while one that was longer, would have afforded the enemy an opportunity of attacking on the march.

While the army was moving on the heights of Kutscherau, Prince Bagration pushed on his advanced posts towards Posorsitz: General Kienmayer marched upon Austerlitz, which the enemy had evacuated at ten o'clock,[8] on the morning of the 29th; and General Stutterheim arrived at Butschowitz, from whence he kept up the communication by Stanitz, with a detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Scheither, who had driven the enemy's detachments from Gaja. The French army concentrated its forces, the same day, between Turas and Brunn: it occupied the villages of Menitz, Tellnitz, Sokolnitz, Kobelnitz, and Schlapanitz, which covered its front, and placed its out-posts at Aujest, on the heights of Girshikowitz, and near Krug. The 30th November, the combined army, in consequence of its new plan, again marched to its left, in the following manner:

The first column, from Kutscherau, by Lettonitz, upon Niemschan, which was the appuy for the right; its left was at Hodiegitz, and it was disposed in two lines.

The second column, by Lettonitz, to Hodiegitz, where it formed on the left of the first column.

The third column, upon Malkowitz, by Butschowitz, and Krzizanowitz, where it was posted in reserve, in rear of the first column.

The fourth column, by Schardiska, Tschertschein, Krzizanowitz, upon Herspitz, where it formed in reserve to the second column.

The fifth column, by Neuwieslitz, followed the march of the third, and was posted in the valley, in front of Marhoefen.

The Reserve, under the Archduke Constantine, marched to Butschowitz; the advanced corps, under Prince Bagration, to Posorsitz; and pushed on its out-posts upon the causeway, and upon Krug. M. de Kienmayer remained at Austerlitz, and was reinforced by the brigade under General Stutterheim. A little affair of out-posts took place that day; the enemy was employed in reconnoitring, and a few cannon shots were ineffectually exchanged. The head-quarters of M. de Koutousoff were at Hodiegitz; those of the two Emperors at Krzizanowitz, near Austerlitz.

It is here necessary to remark, that during these offensive movements the Archduke Ferdinand had received orders to advance also, to make a diversion and occupy the enemy; and that this prince, quitting Czaslau, after having driven the Bavarians, first from Steinsdorff and afterwards from Deutschbrod, was advancing upon Iglau, where the Bavarian general, De Wrede, had the command.

On the 1st December, there was a good deal of firing, the whole of the morning, along the entire chain of out-posts. The enemy, from day-break in the morning, was continually reconnoitring along the heights in front of Pratzen and Krug. He also, for the like purpose, pushed parties from his left to beyond the high road. M. de Kienmayer's out-posts, on the left, were at Satchan: and he had a post near Menitz, a village which the French abandoned. Five Battalions of frontier troops, under Major-general Carneville, being a part of the Austrian infantry, arrived in the evening to reinforce M. de Kienmayer.

The combined army, the left of which was commanded by General Buxhoevden, and the centre by the general-in-chief, after having dined, moved forwards, in five columns, in the following manner:

The first column, under Lieutenant-General Dochtorow, composed of twenty-four Battalions of Russians, marched by its left on Herspitz, Wachan, Klein-Hostieradeck, and took up a position in two lines, on the heights where this village is situated. A regiment of Chasseurs was posted at Aujest, a village between the foot of the mountain and the lakes of Menitz.

The second column, commanded by Lieutenant-general Langeron, composed of eighteen Battalions of Russians, marched by Austerlitz, Krzenowitz, and took up a position on the heights of Pratzen; also in two lines on the right of the first column.

The third column, commanded by Lieutenant-General Przybyszewsky, composed of eighteen Battalions of Russians, marched on the right of Austerlitz, took its direction upon Pratzen, and its position on the heights, to the right of this village.

The fourth column, commanded by the Austrian Lieutenant-general Kollowrath, was composed of twelve Battalions of Russians, under Lieutenant-general Miloradowitsch, and of fifteen of Austrians, who were in the rear of this column. This latter marched by its right, near Niemschan, intersected the high road from Austerlitz to Brunn, and took post in two lines, in rear of the third column.

The fifth column, composed of cavalry, under the orders of Lieutenant-general Prince John, of Liechtenstein, was composed of eighty-two squadrons, marched by its left, and followed the direction of the third column, behind which it took post under the heights.

The corps of reserve, under the Grand Duke Constantine, composed of ten Battalions, and eighteen squadrons of guards, passed by Austerlitz, and posted itself on the heights in front, with its left towards Krzenowitz, and its right towards the high road from Austerlitz to Brunn.

The advanced corps, under Prince Bagration, extended by its left beyond Holubitz and Blasowitz, in order to facilitate the march of the third and fourth columns upon their points of formation.

Lieutenant-general Kienmayer, as soon as the columns arrived on the heights, in front of Austerlitz and Krzenowitz, where his troops were posted, marched by Pratzen, in front of Aujest, where he arrived at nine o'clock at night: his corps was then composed of twenty-two squadrons of Austrians, ten of Cosacks, and five Battalions of Croats.

The head-quarters were at Krzenowitz. The enemy did not interrupt this movement, and even withdrew his out-posts as far as Tellnitz, Sokolnitz and Schlapanitz. The second column having arrived late on its point of formation, had no out-posts in its front. During the whole night there was no chain of out-posts established in front of the position occupied by the combined army.

At one moment during the night, the enemy evacuated the village of Tellnitz, in which out-posts were placed by a half squadron of Austrian light cavalry of the regiment of O'Reilly: but two hours after, the French returned in force, and posted a regiment of infantry in this village, from the division of Legrand, forming a part of the right of Marshal Soult. The out-posts on the left of the allies sent, continually, patroles during the night, to their right, in order to establish a communication with the Russian advanced posts, but could never fall in with them.

This offensive movement had been made by the army in open day, and in sight of the enemy, who, from the heights of Schlapanitz, and in front of Kobelnitz, had been able to remark it at his ease. The position occupied by the allies, at the moment when they crowned the heights between Aujest, Pratzen, and Holubitz, was a strong one. The enemy, had he been well observed, would have found it difficult to advance for the purpose of attacking these heights;[9] The defiles of Tellnitz, Sokolnitz, and Schlapanitz, which separated the two armies, offered the means of delay; and the very elevated points of these heights afforded strong means of defence. Here, as in the position, in front of Olmutz, the army was posted on a curtain, behind which massive columns might be posted, ready to act offensively. Its left was secured by the lakes of Menitz and Aujest, while the right was refused. But the taking advantage of this position was never thought of, any more than the possibility of being attacked on these heights, or of finding the enemy on this side the defile. The French emperor took advantage, in a masterly manner, of the faults that were committed. He kept his troops concentrated in massive columns, ready to act according to circumstances. Marshal Bernadotte (who had joined the Emperor Napoleon the day on which the allies shewed themselves on the heights of Pratzen), had been posted in the first instance to the left of the high road. In the night the Emperor caused his corps to pass this road, and posted it in rear of the village of Girschikowitz, which was occupied in force. This corps, composed of the divisions of Rivaux and Drouet, formed the centre of the French army. Prince Murat's cavalry was in rear of Marshal Bernadotte, and on his left. Marshal Lannes formed the left wing with the divisions of Suchet and Caffarelli; this last was connected with the left of Prince Murat. The right of the army, commanded by Marshal Soult, was placed between Kobelnitz and Sokolnitz; the division of Legrand forming the extreme right, was posted between Sokolnitz and Tellnitz, and occupied these villages with strong detachments of Infantry. The division of Vandamme was on the left, and the division of St. Hilaire in the centre of Marshal Soult's corps.

The reserve of the army, composed of ten Battalions of the imperial guard, and of ten Battalions of General Oudinot's corps, the whole commanded by General Duroc, was near Turas. The division of Friant, belonging to the corps under Marshal Davoust, which had just arrived from Presburg, was sent to the convent of Reygern, on the Schwartza, to observe and keep the enemy in check, should he approach by the route of Auspitz. The division of General Gudin (also arrived from Presburg), with some dragoons belonging to Marshal Davoust's corps, advanced from Nickolsbourg, on the right of the French army, to keep in check the corps of M. de Merveldt, who had penetrated through Hungary to Lundenbourg. This general had with him his own regiment of Hulans, and the Emperor's hussars, much weakened by the losses they had sustained during a difficult retreat; and six Battalions of infantry, also very weak; the whole amounting to little more than 4,000 men. A detachment of O'Reilly's light cavalry, and some Cossacks, were sent to Gros-Niemschitz to observe that point.

We have now given the position of both armies, during the night between the 1st and 2nd December, which immediately preceded this ever-memorable day.