Incoming 1st Marines platoons and companies from the 2d and 3d (Lieutenant Colonel Roy D. Miller) Battalions augmented the forces at the two critical Hill 119 and 111 locations. As it turned out, 1st Marines personnel returning to the front from division reserve were to see the last of the war’s heavy fighting in the course of their relief of the 7th Marines. Ultimately, the regimental forward defense, instead of being divided into two battalion sectors as before, now consisted of three—a left, center, and right sector. By 23 July the depth reorganization had been completed and these sectors were manned by 1/7, 2/1, and 3/7. (See Map 32.)

Renewal of Heavy Fighting, 24–26 July517

Sightings of enemy troops for the next few days were light. A large scale attack expected on the 21st by the 5th Marines at Hedy and Dagmar failed to materialize. Instead, a token force of a dozen Chinese dressed in burlap bags made a limited appearance at Hedy before departing, minus three of its party, due to Marine sharp-shooting skills. In the skies, MAG-33 fliers from VMF-115 and -311 had been transferred by Fifth Air Force from exclusive missions for the central and eastern UNC front (the IX, ROK II, and X Corps sectors) to join VMA-121 in MPQ flights supporting the 1st Marine Division. During the 21–23 July period, despite layers of thick stratus clouds and rain that turned off and on periodically like a water spigot, more than 15 radar missions were executed by the three squadrons.518 They unleashed a gross 33-ton bomb load on CCF mortar and 76mm gun positions, supply areas, CPs, bunkers, and trenches.

The lull in ground fighting lasted until late on the 24th. Then, at 1930, a heavy preparation of 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars combined with 76mm and 122mm artillery shells began to rain down on Boulder City. Men of G/3/1, under command of First Lieutenant Oral R. Swigart, Jr., were deployed at that time in a perimeter defense of the position having that morning completed the relief of G/3/7.

Enemy troops were reported massing for an assault. One regiment located by forward observers behind Hill 139, some 700 yards northwest of Berlin, was taken under fire at 1940 by artillery and rocket ripple. At 2030, following their usual pattern of laying down a heavy mortar and artillery barrage, the CCF began to probe the MLR at Hills 119 and 111 in the Marine right battalion sector. They hit first at Hill 111, the far right anchor of the division line, currently held by 7th Marines personnel. Then the CCF moved westward to Hill 119. Their choice of time for the attack once again coincided with the relief of 7th Marines units by the 1st Marines.519 When the assault began, H/3/1 was moving up to relieve H/3/7 at the easternmost point of the line in the Hill 111 vicinity, and Company I was preparing to relieve I/3/7, to its left.

The Communist troops temporarily penetrated Hill 111 positions. At Boulder City, where the main force of the CCF two-battalion unit had struck, they occupied a portion of the trenchline. Attempting to exploit this gain, the Chinese repeatedly assaulted the Berlin Gate, on the left flank of Company G’s position and the East Berlin Gate, to its right. Marine units of the two regiments posted at the two citadel hills were heavily supported by MLR mortar, artillery, and tank fires. No artillery spotter or CAS flights were flown through the night, once again due to weather conditions.

By 2120, the bulk of Chinese soldiers had begun to withdraw from Hill 111, this attack apparently being a diversionary effort. But the enemy’s main thrust continued against the central Hill 119 position. Here the close, heavy fighting raged on through the morning hours, with enemy troops steadily reinforcing from the Jersey Ridge and East Berlin, by way of the Berlin Gate, the best avenue of approach to forward positions of Hill 119. At approximately 2100, the Chinese hurled a second attack against Hill 119 in the strength of two companies, supported by intense mortar and artillery fire. An hour later hand-to-hand combat had developed all along the 700 yards of the forward trenches. Company G men of the 1st Marines were down to half their original number, ammunition was running low, and evacuation of casualties was slowed by the fact that two of the eight corpsmen had been killed and most of the rest were themselves casualties.

By midnight, the front, left, and right flanks of the perimeter had been pushed back to the reverse slope of the hill and a 1st Marines participant commented “... only a never-say-die resistance was keeping the enemy from seizing the remainder of the position.”520 At 0015, the thinning ranks of G/3/1 Marines (now down to 25 percent effectives) were cheered by the news that Company I men were about to reinforce their position. This latter unit itself suffered 35 casualties while moving into the rear area, when the Chinese intercepted a coded message and shifted a substantial amount of their mortar and artillery fires to the rear approaches of Hill 119.

In response to the enemy bombardment, Marine artillery fires crashed against the Chinese continuously from 2100 to midnight. Four ripples were launched in support of the Hill 119 defenders. In one of the regiment’s most intense counterbattery shoots on record, the 11th Marines in three hours had fired 157 missions. By 2400, an estimated 6,000 to 8,000 hostile rounds had fallen in the division sector.

Meanwhile, the Chinese were also attempting to punch holes in the 5th regimental sector. In a second-step operation, rather than striking simultaneously as was customary, the enemy at 2115 had jabbed at outposts Esther and Dagmar in the right battalion of the 5th Marines. The reinforced Chinese company from the 408th Regiment quickly began to concentrate its attention on Esther, outposted by Company H Marines. During the heavy fighting both Marines and Chinese reinforced. By early morning, the enemy had seized part of the front trenchline, but the Marines controlled the rear trenches and reorganized the defense under rifle platoon commander, Second Lieutenant William H. Bates. The Chinese unsuccessfully attempted to isolate the position by heavy shelling and patrolled vigorously between Esther and the MLR.

Marines replied with flamethrowers and heavy supporting fires from the MLR, including machine guns, 81mm and 4.2-inch mortar boxes. Three tanks—a section from the regimental antitank platoon and one from Company A—neutralized enemy targets with 153 rounds to assist the 3d and 2d Battalions. The 3/11 gunners supporting the 5th Marines also hurled 3,886 rounds against the Chinese in breaking up the attack. After several hours of strong resistance, the Chinese loosened their grip, and at 0640 on the 25th, Esther was reported secured.

By this time an enemy battalion had been committed piecemeal at the position. The action had developed into the heaviest encounter of the month in the 5th Marines sector. During that night of 24–25 July, more than 4,000 artillery and mortar rounds fell in the outpost vicinity; total incoming for the regimental sector throughout July was recorded at 8,413 rounds. Twelve Marines lost their lives in the battle, with 35 wounded and evacuated, and 63 suffering minor injuries. A total of 85 CCF were counted dead, 110 more estimated killed, and an estimated 250 wounded.

Back at the Berlin Complex area of the 7th Marines where the major action centered, intense shelling, fire fights, and close hand-to-hand combat continued through the early morning of the 25th. Chinese infiltrators had broken through a substantial part of the trenchwork on the forward slope of Boulder City. For a while they temporarily occupied the rocky, shrub-grown hill crest as well.

A swift-moving counterattack launched at 0130 by 1st Marines from Companies G and I, led by Captain Louis J. Sartor, of I/3/1, began to restore the proper balance to the situation. At 0330 the MLR had been reestablished and the Marines had the controlling hand. By 0530 the Hill 119 area was secured, with four new platoons from Companies E of the 7th and 1st Marines aiding the defense. Scattered groups of Chinese still clung to the forward slopes, and others vainly tried to reinforce by the Berlin-to-Hill 119 left flank trenchline.

Direct fire from the four M-46s on position at Boulder City521 had helped disperse hostile troop concentrations. The tanks had also played a major communication role. Although surrounded by enemy forces during the peak of the fighting, two of the armored vehicles were still able to radio timely tactical information to higher echelons. This Company C quartet, plus another vehicle from the 7th Marines antitank unit, between the time of the enemy assault to 0600 when it stabilized, had pumped 109 HE, 8 marking shells, and 20,750 .30 caliber machine gun bullets into opposition forces.522 Five tanks from the 1st Marines AT company located to the west of the Berlin site meted out further punishment to enemy soldiers, gun pits, and trenches.

Sporadic fighting and heavy incoming (at the rate of 60–70 rounds per minute for 10 minutes duration) also rained down on eastern Hill 111 in the early hours of the 25th. Assault teams with flamethrowers and 3.5-inch rocket launchers completed the job of clearing the enemy out of Marine bunkers.

Altogether the Communists had committed 3,000 troops across the Marine division front during the night of 24–25 July. Between 2200 and 0400, a total of 23,725 rounds had been fired by the 11th Marines and 10 battalions under its operational control in the division sector. This included batteries from the 25th Division Artillery, I Corps Artillery, and 1st Commonwealth Division Artillery.523 The artillery outgoing represented 7,057 rounds to assist the 5th Marines at outpost Esther and 16,668 in defense of Boulder City.

On the morning of 25 July, the Chinese at 0820 again assaulted Hill 119 in company strength. Marine mortar and artillery fire repulsed the attack, with heavy enemy losses. See-saw action continued for most of the rest of the day on the position. No major infantry attempt was made at Hill 111. Intense hostile shelling was reported here at 1100, however, when the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, still in operational control of the area, began receiving 125 to 150 rounds per minute. The last of the Chinese marauders were forced off the forward slope at Boulder City at 1335. For some welcomed hours both Marine positions remained quiet. A conservative estimate by 3/7 of the toll for the enemy’s efforts were 75 CCF killed and 425 wounded.

Air support that morning was provided by 32 of the sleek, hard-hitting F9Fs from VMF-115 and -311. Working in tandem over Chinese terrain directly north of the right regimental sector, the two squadrons, between 0616 and 1036, flew nine MPQ missions. In the aerial assault, they bombarded the enemy with more than 32 tons of explosives.

Twelve Marine tanks had a workout, expending 480 HE and 33 WP shells and 21,300 rounds of machine gun ammunition in direct fire missions. The traditional inequity of battlefront luck was plainly demonstrated between a section (two) of armored vehicles near the Hill 111 company CP and a trio located at Boulder City. It was practically a standoff for the former. Together they were able to fire only 71 high explosive shells, drawing a return of 1,000 rounds of CCF 60mm mortar and 122mm cannon shells. Blazing guns of the three tanks in the Hill 119 area, meanwhile, during the 24-hour firing period had sent 158 HE, 10 WP, and 17,295 bullets to destroy hostile weapons and installations and received but 120 mortar and another 120 rounds of artillery fire.

The 11th Marines were also busy as heavy firing continued on Chinese policing parties and those enemy batteries actively shelling MLR positions. By late afternoon, 13,500 rounds of Chinese mortar and artillery had crashed against the 7th Marines right sector—the highest rate of incoming for any 24-hour period during the entire Berlin action. For its part, the regiment and its medium and heavy support units completed 216 counterbattery missions and sent 36,794 rounds of outgoing into Chinese defenses between 2200 on 24 July and 1600 on the 25th.

Meanwhile, during 25 July, Colonel Nelson’s men continued with their relief of the 7th Marines. At 1100 Major Robert D. Thurston, S-3 of 3/1, assumed command of Hill 119 and reorganized the embattled Company G and Company I personnel, 1st Marines. That night, at 1940, E/2/1 and F/2/7 effected the relief of the composite George-Item men. At the eastern Hill 111 Company H, 1st Marines had assisted Company H, 7th Marines during the day in clearing the trenchworks of the enemy; then at 1815, the 1st Marines unit completed its relief of H/3/7 and took over responsibility for the MLR right company sector. Not long after, beginning at 2130, 1st and 7th Marines at the critical Hill 119 complex were attacked by two enemy companies. MLR fire support plus artillery and tank guns lashed at the enemy and he withdrew. Between 0130 and 0300 the Chinese again probed Hills 111 and 119, gaining small parts of the trenchline before being driven out by superior Marine firepower. Marine casualties were 19 killed and 125 wounded. The CCF had suffered 30 known dead, an estimated 84 killed, and 310 estimated wounded.

With dawn on the 26th came the first real quiet the battlefield had known for two days. Small enemy groups tried to reinforce by way of the Berlin trenchline, only to be stopped by Marine riflemen and machine gunners. Hostile incoming continued spasmodically. At 1330 the 1st Marines assumed operational control of the right regimental sector, as scheduled, and of the remaining 7th Marines units still in the area.524 By this time Marine casualties since 24 July numbered 43 killed and 316 wounded.

That night the Communists, knowing the armistice was near and that time was running out for seizing the Boulder City objective, made their final attempts at the strongpoint. Again they attacked at 2130. Defending 1st Marines were now under Captain Esmond E. Harper, CO of E/2/1, who had assumed command when Major Thurston was seriously wounded and evacuated. They fought off the Chinese platoon-size drive when the enemy advanced from Berlin to the wire at Hill 119. Shortly after midnight another Chinese platoon returned to Hill 119 in the last skirmish for the territory, but Marine small arms and artillery handily sent it home. At 0045, a CCF platoon nosed about the Hill 111 area for an hour and twenty minutes. Again the Marines discouraged these last faltering enemy efforts. Action at both hills ceased and what was to become the concluding ground action for the 1st Marine Division in Korea had ended.

Despite impressive tenacity and determination, the Chinese Communist attacks throughout most of July on the two Berlin outposts and Hills 119 and 111 achieved no real gain. Their repetitive assaults on strongly-defended Boulder City up until the last day of the war was an attempt to place the Marines (and the United Nations Command) in as unfavorable a position as possible when the armistice agreement was signed. While talking at Panmunjom, the Communists pressed hungrily on the battlefront for as much critical terrain as they could get under their control before the final ceasefire line was established.

Had the enemy succeeded in his assaults on the two hill defenses after his earlier seizure of the Berlins, under terms of the agreement UNC forces would have been forced to withdraw southward to a point where they no longer had free access to all of the Imjin River. If the Chinese had taken Boulder City this would have also provided the CCF a major high ground position (Hill 126) with direct observation into Marine rear areas and important supply routes.

From the standpoint of casualties, the last month of the Korean War was a costly one, with 181 infantry Marines killed in action and total losses of 1,611 men.525 This was the highest rate for any month during 1953. It was second only to the October 1952 outpost battles526 for any month during the year the 1st Marine Division defended the line in West Korea. The closing days of the war produced the last action for which Marines were awarded the Navy Cross. These Marines were Second Lieutenant Bates, H/3/5; First Lieutenant Swigart, G/3/1; Second Lieutenant Theodore J. Lutz, Jr., H/3/1; and Sergeant Robert J. Raymond, F/2/7, who was mortally wounded.

The 7th and 1st Marines, as the two regiments involved during July in the Berlin sector defense, sustained high monthly losses: 804 and 594, respectively. Forty-eight men from the 7th Marines and 70 from the 1st Marines were killed in action. In contrast, the 5th Marines which witnessed little frontline action during the month (except for a sharp one-night clash at Outpost Esther), suffered total monthly casualties of 150 men, of whom 26 lost their lives. Chinese losses were also high: 405 counted killed, 761 estimated killed, 1,988 estimated wounded, 1 prisoner, or 3,155 for the month of July.

In their unsuccessful attempts to dislodge the Marines from their MLR positions the Chinese had pounded the right regimental flank with approximately 22,200 artillery and mortar shells during the last 24–27 July battle. In reply, 11th Marines gunners and supporting units had expended a total of 64,187 rounds against CCF strongpoints. The enemy’s increased counterbattery capabilities in July, noted by division intelligence, also received particular attention from the artillerymen. A record number of 345 counterbattery missions were conducted during the period by Marine and Army cannoneers.

More than 46,000 rounds of outgoing had been fired by the Chinese in their repeated attempts of 7–9, 19–20, and 24–27 July to seize the Berlin posts and key MLR terrain. Operations during this final month, as the 2/11 commander was to point out later, on numerous occasions had verified the wisdom of leaving “direct support artillery battalions in place during frequent changes of frontline infantry units.”527

Armored support throughout the 24–27 July period consisted of more than 30 tanks (Company C, AT Company elements of the 1st and 7th Marines, a section of flames, and Company D platoon) on line or in reserve. Marine tankers used a record 1,287 shells and 54,845 bullets against the CCF, while drawing 4,845 rounds of enemy mixed mortar and artillery.

The enemy’s attack on Marine MLR positions, beginning 24 July, constituted the major action in the I Corps sector the final 10 days of the war. During this period the Chinese probed I Corps positions 25 times (8 in the Marine, 5 in the 1st Commonwealth, 6 in the 1st ROK, and 6 in the 7th Infantry Division sectors).

In other parts of the Eighth Army line, the last large-scale action had broken out east of the Marine sector beginning 13 July when major elements of six Chinese Communist divisions penetrated a ROK unit to the right of the IX Corps. As the division’s right and center fell back, units withdrew into the zones of the IX and ROK II Corps on the east. General Taylor directed that a new MLR be established south of the Kumsong River, and a counterattack 17–20 July by three II Corps divisions attained this objective.

Since the armistice agreement was imminent, no attempt was made to restore the original line. The Chinese had achieved temporary success528 but at heavy cost. Eighth Army officials estimated that CCF casualties in July reached 72,000 men, with more than 25,000 of these dead. The enemy had lost the equivalent of seven divisions of the five Chinese armies committed in attacks upon the II and IX Corps sectors.

The Last Day of the War529

Representatives of the Communist Forces and the United Nations Command signed the armistice agreement that marked the end of the Korean War in Panmunjom at 1000 on Monday, 27 July 1953. The cease-fire, ending two years of often fruitless and hostile truce negotiations, became effective at 2200 that night. After three years, one month, and two days the so-called police action in Korea had come to a halt.

Actually, final agreement on the armistice had been expected since late June. By mid-July it was considered imminent, even though the CCF during these waning days of the war had launched several major counteroffensives against ROK troops defending the central part of the Eighth Army line as well as the Marines in the western I Corps sector.

With the final resolution of hostilities at 1000, a flash message went out immediately to the 26,000 Marines of General Pate’s division directing that there be “no celebration firing related in any way to the advent of the armistice.”530 Fraternization or communication with the enemy was expressly forbidden. Personnel were reminded that firing of all weapons was to be “restricted to the minimum justified by the tactical situation.”531 No defensive firing was to take place after 2145 unless the Marines were actually attacked by enemy infantry. Each frontline company was authorized to fire one white star cluster at 2200, signalling the cease fire.

The signing of the armistice agreement on 27 July thus ended 36 months of war for the Marines in Korea. On that date, the 1st Marine Division initiated plans for its withdrawal to defensive positions south of the Imjin River. One regiment, the 5th Marines, was left north of the river to man the general outpost line across the entire division front. A transition was made at this time from the customary wide-front linear defense to a defense in depth, similar to that employed in the July Boulder City battle.